Why did Eisenhower stop Devers from crossing the Rhine?
Вставка
- Опубліковано 3 лип 2024
- Why did Dwight D Eisenhower stop Jacob L Devers from crossing the Rhine in 1944? Let's find out.
This video is discussing events or concepts that are academic, educational and historical in nature. This video is for informational purposes and was created so we may better understand the past and learn from the mistakes others have made.
Follow me on Instagram / tikhistory
The thumbnail for this video was created by / tessdailyttv
⏲️ Videos on Mondays at 5pm GMT (depending on season, check for British Summer Time).
- - - - -
📚 BIBLIOGRAPHY / SOURCES 📚
Full list of all my sources docs.google.com/spreadsheets/...
- - - - -
⭐ SUPPORT TIK ⭐
This video isn't sponsored. My income comes purely from my Patreons and SubscribeStars, and from UA-cam ad revenue. So, if you'd like to support this channel and make these videos possible, please consider becoming a Patreon or SubscribeStar. All supporters who pledge $1 or more will have their names listed in the videos. There are higher tiers too with additional perks, so check out the links below for more details.
/ tikhistory
www.subscribestar.com/tikhistory
Thank you to my current supporters! You're AWESOME!
- - - - -
ABOUT TIK 📝
History isn’t as boring as some people think, and my goal is to get people talking about it. I also want to dispel the myths and distortions that ruin our perception of the past by asking a simple question - “But is this really the case?”. I have a 2:1 Degree in History and a passion for early 20th Century conflicts (mainly WW2). I’m therefore approaching this like I would an academic essay. Lots of sources, quotes, references and so on. Only the truth will do.
I’ve figured it out. TIK isn’t pro German, Soviet, American or British… no TIK is truly pro Canada. Think about it when was the last time you heard TIK complaining about something the Canadians did. And it’s Definitely NOT that the Canadian troops were a small part of the overall force used mainly on the flanks… nope this is proof that TIK is overwhelmingly biased in favour of the Canadians. ;P
You would be on to something if I hadn't already openly declared that Justin Trudeau is Fidel Castro's son 😂
@@TheImperatorKnight I’m a Canadian and I agree that our PM is very likely not biologically a Trudeau… also I have doubts on which set of sex chromosomes they inherited.
Criticism of Fidel Castro’s bastard daughter is not a slight against Canada… if anything Canada should be (and in a lot of cases is) ashamed because there isn’t more…
@@TheImperatorKnight That is being against Communist bastards rather than Canucks in general though. 😁
@@TheImperatorKnight 😂😂😂😂
@@TheImperatorKnight I can't belive I am not the only person who thinks that.
I had never really even heard of Devers before. shows how much power certain men have over the narratives of history. thank you tik. I actually agree that Eisenhower 100% just favored himself and his buddy.
It's weird. There were three army group commanders (Monty, Bradley and Devers), yet people just haven't heard of Devers. He really was overshadowed by the other two.
@TheImperatorKnight yea and somehow I get the impression that had market garden actually succeeded somehow einsenhower would have taken the credit for it, and monty might have ended up more obscured historically Instead of his more "infamous" current view as the guy who lead the big failed mission. Just seeing how monty and Eisenhower didn't get along either. so instead of him distancing himself on market garden. I could see himself somehow taking credit for it, and seeing how the historical narratives are well.. actually written by the writers, and none had a bigger platform at the time than Eisenhower. that might have been the prevailing paradigm of that timeline.
@@TheImperatorKnight Don't worry about this one.
The more we find out about Eisenhower the worse he looks. No General, just a bureaucrat with stars on his shoulder. As MacArthur said; "the best scribe I ever had."
But he was not the worst US General of the war, that goes to Stillwell.
Horrible, just awful, and a terrible detriment to US relations with Asia for decades afterwards.
@@FFNOJG We who attended Columbia University sometimes joke about how big Eisenhower's platform was at the end of ww2. His brother Milton was actually qualified to be president of a university but the trustees only knew of Dwight. So when the faculty recommended Milton Eisenhower, the trustees gave the job to Dwight Eisenhower. It's kinda nuts.
Well he was smart enough to let Devers handle French. Proof he did not like Devers 🤣🤣🤣 @johnwolf2829
Amazing how seriously logistics affects military campaigns. It was short of miraculous how most supplies had to cross the Atlantic and get through makeshift or partially destroyed ports, railroads, roads, etc to the frontline armies. The supply troops/logisticians were unsung heroes.
what's that saying, "Tactics win battles. Logistics win wars."
Its just doesnt make sense to make a war movie or a war game on computer around them
Indeed. But how many people know who the Quatermaster-general of the Union Army was? Off the top of my head, I do not remember. except that Nevins gives him a lot of credit. Further Grant has served as quartermaster during the Mexican War and I cannot help bu think this helps him in his planning. Certainly when he took over at Chattanooga that he was able to whip a detailed plan for the forces at his disposal in less then an hour.
I'm a yank, and I think your analysis is spot on concerning Eisenhower . Politics is Supreme when it comes to the US military.
I'm an American, I think you are the least biased person I know. You've given good reasons for all of your criticisms of various figures of history. You were the first person I've heard criticize Rommel. Particularly his dash to the wire which abandoned his main army for days. I considered your points to be valid. So ignore those critics and keep up the great work you do. Thank you
i’ve seen plenty of criticisms of Rommel
There are people who criticise Rommel, but I think the "safe" position is to say that he's a good general. I don't play it safe.
What TIK allowed me to question these last years -- from the logistical issues, the Manstein & alike motivations in their memoires, and now a slightly better understanding about the Western Allies strategy in the West -- is such an interesting addition to the main stream narative followed by most and eg. the WW2 team! 🎩👒 off to TIK from an ex history teacher in a very minor actor in this war, France.
I don't think he is biased. I think some of the positions he takes and some of the sources he chooses to rely upon leave him open to claims of bias. Simple example. He's got a map showing where Allied forces supposedly were when Antwerp was captured. This map IMO gives an improper impression that 2nd British was spearheading the advance at that point. If you go back a couple of days the U.S. 1st was on line with the British on entering Belgium. Go forward a few days and U.S. 1st is on the German border having captured Liege, and that is before Arnhem.
in history he is unbiased but he has clearly strong and opinionated views on ideology, economics and sociology
I think it's fair to criticize Ike and Allied High Command for not really making plans for after Normandy, but I think it's mainly that no one really thought the Germans in France would collapse so quickly. Everyone must have thought that by the time they got to the Rhine, the logistics issues would have had time to be sorted out. Hindsight gives us all sorts of great ideas!
Montgomery had the plans. He laid them out. Unfortunately Eisenhower took over as C-in-C of all ground forces on September 1st and had different plans. The wrong ones.
So in other words, once the Allies kicked the door in the whole rotten edifice came crashing down? That's some irony right there.
Yeah, as "slow" as hedgerow country progress was, the breakout was underway by July: Barely a month past the landing date. While the landings did not meet the optimistic timeline set for them, the breakout started way before the 3-month expected timeline.
The irony was that the Armored units goal was to create a breakthrough, but the logistical plan assumed a long slog. This was a fundamental failure of communication.
Long slogs like the hedge row campaign use lots of ammo but little fuel. Breakouts use little ammo but lots of fuel.
Plus long slogs give time to repair rail lines, but breakouts require trucks, because rail lines cannot be repaired fast enough.
The logistics plan never had the number of heavy trucks to support a breakout despite that being the Allied plan. That was a huge flaw in assumptions and some high-level commander should have spotted it and asked for rework of the plan.
@@FromPovertyToProgressSounds possible, but there's really a lot of issues with how soon something can be changed. Realistically, you have to know that the Germans are completely breaking, sometime in early July. Why? Because the ships moving back and forth need to be prepped and packed. Plus we're looking at a Push Logistics system, with some elements of Pull Logistics put in place. Even with the massive Allied naval advantage, the amphibious logistics piece never quite got to a good level that supports breakouts TBH. Having worked some of this on the ground with a Logistics Task Force overseas, I'd argue that we still have the same problem, even with Pull Logistics, Containerized, Palletized and Computerized systems. It takes a LOT of foresight to pre-position logistics right.
Love the one off videos answering questions about lesser known events and seeing how they fit in and influence the larger narrative.
I’m American and I too agree with you Tik, we often idolize our heroes that we can’t imagine that they have bias and jealousy as part of their makeup.
As an American, the more I learn about US generals in WWII, the less impressed I am. Patton being the exception. Still not a Monty fan BTW. Ike is responsible for failure to effectively communicate, and isolating his commanders. Looks like the Germans actually did the Allies a favor by launching the Battle of the Bulge, wasting their resources and opening the door to the end, thus saving Ike, Monty, and the lot. Sure, Allied victory on the western front was only a matter of time but the performance of Allied generals leaves one wanting. Victory by overwhelming might does not equal genius. Civil War generalship was more impressive. My two cents.
Ike made mistakes just like anyone else. He was one of the first to admit that, until he became president anyway. My Grandfather served on his staff in WWII and then later in the White House, so I heard a lot about Ike growing up. Not all of it was good, but it was honest and Granddad always said Ike preferred hard truths to empty BS.
Funny, in a sad kind of way. All we have today 'is' empty BS and so many people think it is truth.
@@dwrdwlsn5 I think it’s too easy to say all government lies. I still believe that we mainly get the truth or their truthful views. Now we are constantly told not to believe the media or leaders. I think the mainstream media normally gets it right for what information they get. Now when people or certain former presidents don’t like what they hear, they tell us not to trust the media, kind of like Gobels and Ghoring did. Criminals will do all they can to find alternative truth and sheep will follow and give their democracy away.
As a Yank and a veteran of 30 years service in the Army, I can safely say; "Do not underestimate the clash of personalties at the senior field grade and general officer levels." I saw and experienced this in Iraq. But in this case, when you compare Devers resume with Eisenhower you can see how Devers is an actual hands on leader while Eisenhower is a product of the system. Devers was not afraid posed a threat to Eisenhower and apparently had Marshalls backing when it came to issues. Remember it was Roosevelt who selected Eisenhowe not Marshall.
I looked at Dever's Wiki. He was no dummy that is for sure. Ike believe was jealous and ...rightfully... saw him as a threat.
There was a lot of politics and publicity involved. Eisenhower had to contend with a coalition army and could be not seen favoring the Americans over the others. The Americans could not been seen outpacing the British and "leaving them behind". In November the British/Canadians were exhausted and blocked by the Meuse river. If the Americans would have crossed the Rhine at Karlsruhe, it would have been regarded as the Americans going solo. Somehow the British and Americans must been seen working in tandem, also to keep good post-war relations.
@@ArmiesAndBattles I don't think the Brits were ever left behind anyway, as a comparison Third army took 2 weeks to advance 60 miles while the 21st army advanced 250 miles in just 6 days.
Unopposed.Metz had to be taken and Bernard couldn't even take Monty Garden - even if he had the cajones to show up - which he didn't
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Just reading up on the drive for the Seine in August 1944. The Americans crossed the river first. This caused tensions in the Allied camp, because the British were facing much tougher resistance. The Americans offered to truck the Brits over the Seine in their sector, adding insult to injury.
Good to get a video about the rather neglected southern sector of the campaign in France.
TIK, brilliant summary of a thorny question that deserves more elaboration. Especially since Patton, Bradley & Montgomery all favored competing narrow fronts instead of Ike’s broad front strategy, it’s fair to ask if broad front prolonged the war.
Overall I would say yes, but the problem was any good plan would need to clear the channel ports and Antwerp quickly for logistical reasons and be broad enough to prevent the Germans scrapping enough force together to blunt or stop the thrust. Market-Garden may have a design failure because the thrust towards Arnhem was too narrow, what would have happened if all 3 divisions were dropped near Arnhem and a full army attacked towards them.
One thing is sure: Eisenhower managed his broad from strategy poorly.
@washingtonradio
Antwerp was only crucial for the advance across Germany, once Germany was broken into. That never happened until February 1945.
Antwerp was not crucial for the westwall battles getting INTO Germany. These campaigns were well supplied without Antwerp. Eisenhower just squandered the supplies in the Hurtgen, Lorraine, Alsace.
Antwerp was fully open by late November. Operation Queen and the Lorraine continued to fail and then the Americans were pushed back into a retreat in the Ardennes nearly a month after Antwerp was open.
It did, but Monty acknowledges that Ike carried a great weight of politics, and told Monty that he had to consider public opinion in his conduct of the offensive when Monty told him that he would support Bradley on a thrust to Berlin.
Not enough drop zone areas in the Arnhem sector.@@washingtonradio
Eisenhower had been a broad thinking staff officer for the better part of his military career with no combat experience and limited junior command time, something in the order of 6 months. It was said that their was one sure way to get sent home by Eisenhower. " Disrupt the harmony of the unified combined command alliance ." He could make miracles happen on a map in charge of multiple large elements, but there's a huge difference in a broad front strategy on a map as opposed to a broad front approach with all the problems of ground maneuvers. Each and every sub commander had, at one point or another, opportunities to cross deep into Germany and other than patton ,and I think Bradley, who took remagen but who was halted by SHAEF. Eisenhower believes in strict adherence to a master plan once it has been agreed upon. That's a great staff virtue ,but on the ground to make course corrections has to be an option, I think . Thanks ever much '
Well, war is won by unified war effort, not by flashy victories of flamboyant commanders. Overall, Eisenhower was under lot of pressure: win war quickly, but not too many casualties, balance national interests of allies, stroke the ego of vain generals and above all do not let Germans pull a fast one on you. Thus he elected safe and sound broad front strategy to grind down Germans instead of risking it all in one place.
I have read that Ike wanted a broad front because he feared what might happen if his armies did not advance in lockstep, but launched offensives that left them open to getting cut off and destroyed. The Germans had done that to several Red Army offensives, and Ike didn't want to risk having that happen to him. The problem with that in France was the Germans had broken so suddenly that a properly supported narrow front offensive could have achieved so much more than a slow steady advance into Germany. The best place for this was where Monty launched Market-Garden, but that took too long to be put into motion, and the Germans had time to recover enough to halt it and threaten to cut off XXX Corps and destroy much more than just the British 1st Airborne.
@@aleksazunjic9672 Respectfully, Eisenhower main issues all derived from his insistence on loyalty above competence. Managing the personalities of opposing viewpoints are mandatory for all people who wish to command. Sure figures like Montgomery, Patton and Devers were wildly bombastic and a handfull but in warefare they had their uses. It was his job as Supreme Allied Commander to exploit their areas of genius but instead it appears that he was more keen to keep them out of sight until needed.
To me his logistical woes stemmed from his rejection of Montgomery's plan to use a narrow front to free up the port at Antwerp but he instead relied on his broad front strategy which, in my opinion, unnecessarily prolonged the war. Playing it safe gave the Germans more opportunities than they would've had if he had committed to someone outside of his favorite generals.
Patton was a grandios figure that drew both praise and controversy. To some he was a genius to others he was a reckless general who should've been removed from command. To me he was like Ajax a cold and calculating General who knew the best way to end the war was to do it quickly as opposed to the slow and steady approach while accepting there will be casualties along the way. He was the opposite of Bradley and Eisenhower who had limited command experience prior to WWII and like Devers he was reluctently retained due to figures above Eisenhower.
My biggest gripe about Eisenhower, and Bradley to a lesser extent, is he was a staff officer using office politics to command generals who had actually on the ground command experience. Sure in the end things worked out well but the war in Europe, in my opinion, could've ended sooner had he let go of his Bradley centric campaign.
@@joeclaridy I would not call either of generals you mentioned particularly competent . Montgomery was skilled in set-piece battles where he had advantage, but not terribly effective in decisive battles (Market Garden) . Patton was good in quick advance against already weakened enemy, but terrible against prepared defenses. Devers was simply second-tier and lukewarm all of his career, promoted above his grade. Eisenhower thus had to keep them in line, and precisely use their strong points, while not letting them squander army on something they were incapable to do. Broad war strategy thus safely brought war to its logical conclusion, without risking sudden German counterattack, bad preparations and things going wrong like they did during Market Garden . Realistically, there was no chance Western allies could singlehandedly defeat Germany in late 1944, no matter what they did because Germans still had enough resources for one more final push . Only after Soviet East Prussian offensive and failure of Spring Awakening in Hungary, German reserves were depleted and they could not parry Allied moves.
Really like this video, explain the complex nature major operations, and how human relationships shape those operations. In my experience in the Army, those relationships matter, and seen how both good, normal, and even bad officers career are made or hampered just because of relationships with commanders or command cliques within the organization.
Every large corporation works the same way. Something to do with human nature I suppose.
Excellent. This is the kind of content I come to this channel for again & again.
good to hear from you , Mr TIK
You may hear from me a little more often soon as I'm in a fairly-good position with Gazala now, so I want to concentrate on publishing more regular videos in the meantime
Good man .. I canna wait !!
Eisenhower was right in not crossing the Rhine in the south, but he is 100% to blame for all the wasted planning. If your personal feelings prevent you from regularly talking to your army group commanders, you are actively creating bad situations.
Love how comprehensively these questions are answered by TIK. I knew who Devers was, but only a few tidbits of what he did and his quarrel with Ike.
I think an important factor not covered in the video is the terrain that Devers wanted to attack into. The Kaiserstuhl hills would have been a major strategic impediment, making the proposed attack and push to outflank the German 5th or 19th armies incredibly difficult. If Devers attack had gone ahead, it is very likely it would have quickly ended up in a very difficult position, trying to force a way through well defended terrain that gave the defenders a significant tactical advantage. Units would have had to have been pulled from other areas of the line to reinforce Devers. I think the German response would have been to put enough troops into the favourable terrain to stall and hold Devers advance, but no necessarily try to push the Allies back across the Rhine. Holding the large numbers of troops the Allies would need between the Kaiserstuhl hills and the Rhine would probably have been viewed as sufficient. Ultimately I think Eisenhower was right to stop Devers' attack over the Rhine, and I think he was also right that as a commander Devers had a habit of being rash, over promising and under delivering.
As for the argument that the orders weren't clear, I can see both pros and cons. That Eisenhower's weren't perfectly clear is true, they could have given more detailed instructions for Devers including the conditions under which a crossing of the Rhine should be attempted, and other stipulations. Equally, I think it is reasonable for Eisenhower to expect that a 4 star general of Devers experience to have enough strategic foresight to realise that crossing the Rhine into Baden-Wurttemberg in late 1944 was not a reasonable or practical option given the situation at the time. I think that if Eisenhower had given detailed conditions for Devers to attempt to cross the Rhine, he would have been accused of micromanaging his army group commanders, and arguably justifiably so. It is interesting that Eisenhower was not aware of Devers plans to cross the Rhine until the meeting at Devers HQ, which makes me think that members of Eisenhower's staff might have been trying to keep Devers' somewhat questionable plan from happening, or to avoid a confrontation between Devers and Eisenhower. I think overall, while both Eisenhower and Devers have made mistakes in this situation, Devers plan was deeply flawed and as a 4 star general, he should have seen those flaws and either made modifications to remove them if possible, or if not, accepted that he wouldn't be able to cross the Rhine in late 1944 as to do so would harm the overall Allied effort to defeat Germany.
Devers openly criticising Eisenhower in his HQ after being ordered not to cross the Rhine strikes me as deeply unprofessional in light of the situation. It serves no purpose other than to soothe his bruised ego, and undermines the troops confidence in the entire command structure.
Edits for grammar and clarity.
Good points and well made, sir.
That's a fair point to consider
As a German reserve officer who knows this area, Bade, very well.
A Rhine crossing in this area would have had very interesting tactical aspects. The right bank of the Rhine is only 10 kilometers wide. To the east of it are the mountains of the Black Forest, which run from north to south.
In the area of the possible bridgehead there are only four very narrow roads across the Black Forest. A possible German counterattack could only have come from the north, from the Karlsruhe area. However, the narrowness of the Rhine Valley would have favored the American defenders. Artillery support could also have come from the left bank of the Rhine.
However, this bridgehead would have had a strategic consequence:
It would have cut off the German 19th Army's main supply line, the railway line in the Rhine Valley.
Further to the south there are only a few low-capacity roads across the Black Forest, and only in the very south is there a low-capacity railway along the Swiss border.
The 19th Army might then have evacuated the Colmar bridgehead in order to defend the southern Black Forest Area.
Of course, the American pontoon bridge over the Rhine would have been the logistical bottleneck. If this problem had been solved, an attack would have been north towards Karlsruhe and then on towards Mannheim/Ludwigshafen.
Very interesting, thanks for posting.
Interesting , thanks for also posting
Americans could have defended, but there was no real opportunity to advance from such bridgehead, and especially no opportunity to "end war quickly". Thus it was strategic dead end.
Cutting off the German 19th Army would have caused the Colmar pocket to collapse. As it turned out, this pocket was a major thorn-in-the-side for the Allies. To that extent, I disagree with the video's conclusion that this would not have helped the Allied war effort.
Awesome.
As much as I loved Battlestorm: Stalingrad, it’s refreshing to see TIK back doing these random WWII situation videos.
💯 👊🏼
Super great video ! I spoke to Ike's son when I was stationed washington who drew the same conclusions as you. Devers was number one on Marshall's 4 star list promoted over Bradley and Patton . Ike had him number 27 !! Devers was always Marshall's backup plan . A very moral person Marshall I'm sure was none too pleased that Ike was banging his jeep driver!!!
Hi TIK, this Ike vs Devers was a great posting. It really goes well with the approach espoused by you in your previous video “But how do you know you’re right?”
Why? Because one of the most interesting questions is not just the dates, troop strengths and timing, etc. but rather if the attack across the Rhine in Dever’s area would 1) have been successful in Dec 1944, and 2) if it would have shortened the war in Europe (and thus saved lives, etc.)
And your answer to these two questions based on your approach to History were: 1) Maybe but with strong risks including a successful German counterattack. And 2) Almost surely not because no real strategic objective (Ruhr or Berlin) would be reached to knock Germany out of the war.
(In addition, your statement on Ike and his lack of clarity in orders was a particularly useful way to see this inter-US military discussion.)
An addition to your approach could be to compare the situation under study with other similar situations. For Devers potential attack and the German reaction, I think an example would be the Soviet first Jassy-Kishinev offensive which was counter attacked successfully by the Germans and Romanians. Four Months later the Soviets were successful with their offensive in same zone and Romania switched sides to the allies.
For the use of the broad front approach that Eisenhower generally favored ,including clearing out all German pockets west of Rhine, and building up overwhelming logistical support before proceeding, case in point the Colmar Pocket on the west of the Rhine which Devers forces had to clear. The comparable situation on the Soviet side may be the 5 months pause between Operation Bagration and the subsequent Vistula - Oder offensive. The pause allowed the Soviets to cleaning up their flanks of effective German resistance, replenish their troops, repair their armor and artillery, and get their logistical situation to peak preparedness. This again was a broad front approach to get ready to push to a strategic target, in this case Berlin. A similar pause also happened over the 6-month period in W. Europe (that Ike commanded) between about October 1944 and February 1945. So, this strategy by the Soviets was successful in Poland, and would also be successful for the massive crossing of the Rhine in March 1945.
This approach of comparison with similar other situations in WW2 is an effective way to also strengthen an argument about history such as this one you covered in your Ike vs Devers. You may consider this in future videos since you have such a broad knowledge of WW2 so you can find good parallel situations to compare and contrast.
Keep up the splendid work for us, your viewers!
It's important to remember that Ike was first and foremost a politician. He managed to go from Lieutenant-Colonel in 1939 to 5-Star General in 1944 despite never once seeing combat because he was a capable staff officer and had the political know-how and charisma to effectively manage the coalition that was the Western Allies. Ike was a manager, but even the best managers have people they just do not like for any valid reason, we've all seen it in offices and workplaces. And though Ike was certainly not without his faults it's hard to imagine someone else doing a better job as SHAEF.
One thing is sure: Nimitz was a better manager than Eisenhower.
@@johnschuh8616what is your argument for saying so?
@@macmcleod1188 Nimitzmade better choices when in actual command of forces. And of course he had a through knowledge of every officer in his command. And he was far bolder than Ike.
@@johnschuh8616 what are some of the better choices Nimitz made?
@@johnschuh8616 Admirals and Generals have different problems and skills. Both Ike and Nimitz had primadonnas they had to deal with, Patton and Halsey come to mind, both excellent local commanders, but at times overly aggressive. I'd say though that Nimitz was likely the better organizer and logistician since he had the vast distances of the Pacific and the largest Naval War ever in human history to manage, he essentially wrote the book on it as humanity had never fought a war like the Pacific War before. But Ike was still the better diplomat and manager since he had more men to deal with from more allies. Nimitz only really had to contend with the British, Australians, and Dutch who mostly acquiesced due to their fleets inability to take on the IJN alone and reliance on American resupply. While Ike had to manage the Poles, Czechs, Free French, Montgomery, the AEF, and smooth over any differences with the Soviets.
There is one important fact not mentioned by any of the historians that you have cited. The third most industrialized area in Germany after the Ruhr and Silesia was the Saarland (former Bavarian and Prussian Palatinates). The Saar Basin of the Saarland was actually handed to France for 15 years by the treaty of Versailles for the French to exploit the coal fields as part of the German reparations. The Combined Chiefs of Staff actually designated the Saarland as an important secondary objective to seize. General Patton's Third Army was ordered by General Eisenhower to march eastward during the Normandy breakout to seize the Saarland to fulfill the orders of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. General Eisenhower was absolutely correct in moving General Devers 6th Army Group northwards to seize the Saarland. Devers striking eastward across the Rhine would have resulted in General Patch's 7th Army in having to fight through the Black Forest Mountain Range to reach Stuttgart.
EXCELLENT PRESENTATION! Rule I have lived by in my adult life-Just because you can do it does not mean you should do it.
My opinion; Devers across the Rhine would lead to nowhere. Nice headline though.
Logistics...logistics...logistics....☝☝☝
Great Stuff. I now understand the issues with the Western Front. It seems apparent that there was a huge amount of effort in Overlord and getting established on the Continent. But not so much about the afterwards, which makes sense. Even the Russians spent time getting ready for their great offensives on the Eastern Front. There is only so much " bandwidth" available for planning given the massive size of the forces and the manual planning systems available. There was only paper and pencil and no computers to support the people. ( I am an accountant who remembers pre computer work)
You may wish to consult a fine piece called " the Folley of Generals " by David Colley. This is all of Eisenhowers sub combatant commanders and their objections to SHAEF's broad thrust approach after the landings. Thanks ever much
Frank-I have read the book and Mr. Colley has some good points, but with hindsight, Eisenhower should have followed his history and focused on a two front attack starting In September 1944 much like Grant who attacked Lee in Virgina and Sherman attacked in Georgia.
@johnfleet235 I think you're right. I think every commander believed themselves right, and they were,because the orders were often vague to interpret. But of course, it worked out in the end. But it does show a level of inflexibility on the part of the senior command, specifically Eisenhower. For all his virtues, he was incredibly stubborn, I think. Thanks for the reply ,I'd love your thoughts.
@@frankknudsen842 Yes you are correct that Ike was incredibly stubborn. The Allied planners and Ike did not expect German forces in France to collapse so quickly. Montgomery tried to propose the single strike with him in command of course, but I think for both political and military reasons that was not a viable option. Push at several points until the German line breaks seems the best option.
@johnfleet235
Montgomery actually proposed to Eisenhower in August that if an American must be C-in-C of all ground forces then he should give the job to Bradley and he'd gladly serve under him if it meant the concentrated north thrust be chosen.
Montgomery never argued he himself had to command it.
Eisenhower's responsibility to make orders crystal clear and also ensure they are followed or action taken to stop a repeat. As a Brit I have to say having Ike or another Yank in charge was much preferable to a Brit (not that FDR would have allowed it) with Churchill constantly playing Overlord
Good episode, TIK!👍
The last episode of One Foot in the Grave was actually heavily inspired by Eisenhowers notes about Devers 👍
These are like a breath of fresh historical air! Thanks TIK.
This channel becomes better every single week. Keep it up TIK. And keep it coming. 👍
Well, I gave my answer prior to watching the video and then it turned out that I was completely wrong. I was answering for a time later in the war. So, being a man who stands up to his mistakes as I am...I deleted my answer so no one would see me failing the test. Haha.
This is why I watch so many videos like this...to learn. This evening, I am learning something. I appreciate the work you put in here, brother.
l just critsised TIK for his take on Brigadier Pienaar during operation Crusader.
l wonder if l will have to eat my words also.😅
@@patricklorkin1557 Haha, well...I just answered before watching to see what the subject was. I do not challenge him. He would be a hard one to catch in a slip.
Good luck!
Being familiar with the geography of the southern Rhine, I think a crossing there would have been fairly pointless. Opposite the Vosges mountains on the German side are the Black Forest mountains - somewhat steeper and more formidable. The only route of advance would be north, up the Rhine Valley which is only 30 miles wide or so south of Karlsruhe - easily defended and the attackers would be vulnerable to flanking attacks and ambushes from the many side valleys.
So Eisenhower was correct - a crossing may have been possible, but then what?
Then again 'but then what' seems to have been the great unanswered of the whole western front. Land them on the beaches, meticulously planned and brilliantly executed, but then what. Who left all those bocages lying around in the way? The failure to liberate the channel ports and the Scheldt estuary was all Monty's, and who could have possibly seen the Ardennes offensive coming?After all it was only the third re-run of the Schlieffen plan...
Maybee not that familiar with the Rhine valley down there since I live further north. The narrow valley could also be an argument to cross there despite the fact that before crossing, the forces already had the important parts under some kind of fire control.
The logistics/infrastructure back then were more or less similar than today, in quality/layout, not quantity! There are a few rail lines and roads traversing the black forest. In 1944/1945, I guess the capacity was limited since the German logistics were already bad.
Just sitting on the real estate east of the Rhine and south of Karlsruhe, blocking all rail and road connections up north makes everything southward into a semi pocket. Since the logistics on the German side are already strained, local resupply is shallow. The Colmar pocket gets the worst end of this as the furthest the stuff has to reach.
At the same time, this crossing also threatens and takes out some industrial capacity since the valley itself, Karlsruhe, and Pforzheim, Heilbron are now near the frontline and are not unimportant industries there. Since the Black Forest is even steeper than the Vosges vis-a-vis, a real counterattack out of them is unlikely, and therefore, one out of three flanks is already protected.
So, in my opinion, the Germans would have stood before a dilemma after a crossing by the Americans. Dig in or move out in the south and possibly shorten the lines since supplies are strained south of the crossing. Move forces to bottle in, attack from the north, and prevent further expansion down the Rhine on the east side. All that would be missed a few weeks later in the Ardennes. Even if the bridgehead is removed finally, the infrastructure there will be blown to smithereens, and the forces southward will have to endure weeks of lower supply.
The big question would be how much transport capacity is taken out and whether it is important in concert with other parts of the front, especially the south. This only a real expert can analyze. The other would be how the Ardennes would have been if enough forces and supplies had been shifted to clear the east bank of the Rhine or at least bottle them up so that Karlsruhe was secure.
It isn't like the Germans were even back then to the most blind and deaf of allied commanders working with unlimited time. A few weeks spent shifting forces down and then up a front and repairing would've seen massive periods of just pure moments of opportunity lost. It could be a doomed American push but the effects it could've had. More so if the Germans after spending those weeks decided to try to station the Ardenne offensive army in the South and just attritioned away before the start date. A harder time to clean up sure given the troops present to deal with it but it would be a golden opportunity to have Patton with that maneuver he was readying for to strike into the Rhine while the Germans are dying of no supplies in the south, unable to come north in time and intervene. Essentially the north could have been hollow and served on a platter to the allies of a Devers push did enough damage.
"The failure to liberate the channel ports and the Scheldt estuary was all Monty's, and who could have possibly seen the Ardennes offensive coming?"
The Scheldt wasn't a failure. It suceeded quicker than the Hurtgen Forest and Lorraine campaigns did, and with far fewer casualties.
Eisenhower was both Supreme Commander AND the C-in-C of all allied ground forces from September 1st, so not prioritising clearing the Scheldt was on Eisenhower. He was the boss and the man in control of strategy.
As for the Ardennes, on November 28th Montgomery warned Eisenhower that the American line in front of the Ardennes was too weak and thinly held and should be strengthed. Eisenhower didn't.
@@lyndoncmp5751the problem with clearing the Scheldt is Monty wanted Market-Garden first. By the time he got around to making Antwerp operational, the Germans had plenty of time to prepare their defenses. Devers was criticized for being too impulsive, but I think Monty had the opposite problem. Even a plan that was considered impulsive for him required a two week pause, which gave the Germans time to sort out their front.
@@fishingthelist4017
Actually a successful Market Garden would have facilitated an easier time clearing the Scheldt, because if Arnhem was taken then the immediate next phase was to head north to the coast and cut off the western Netherlands and Belgium. This would have made opening Antwerp somewhat easier.
Antwerp would never have been quick to open. It took nearly a month just to clear the mines, and they were there already.
Even if Market Garden didn't happen and the Scheldt was cleared first, Antwerp would still not have been open much before the end of October.
The Americans would still have gone into the Hurtgen Forest and failed there and failed to get beyond Aachen.
It didn't really make much difference. Antwerp was actually open at the end of November. Nothing changed. The Americans failed in the Lorraine and Operation Queen, then got pushed back into a retreat in the Ardennes.
Finally, EISENHOWER was both C-in-C of all ground forces and Supreme Commander. Eisenhower was the big cheese and the man who decided strategy, and Eisenhower placed zero priority on Antwerp in September. Eisenhower wanted a bridgehead over the Rhine first. He thought it was a great idea at the time.
Great and informative video. Thanks TIK
I say THANK YOU TIK. Your professionalism and intellectual honesty is what the world needs in a great historian.
Great video. Good job.
A very interesting and balanced discussion. Thanks for this. Although I think Eisenhower was indispensable. He was one of the major reasons that the American that the Anglo-American Alliance worked.
good work Tik! Thanks!
When I was in my college (University of Dallas) Fencing Team two years ago, our instructor was Coach Charles Helms, an international Eppee champion who had himself been taught by Monsieur Daniel Nevot, one of the most highly decorated French Soldiers of WWII. He fought in France, Norway, Africa, then France again and taken part in the liberation of Strassburg under Leclerc. So just hearing you briefly mention Leclerc's capture of Strassburg gave me chills. I know someone who knew someone who was there. :')
Anyway, fantastic historical work as always! You really are one of the best sources available right now, and we are grateful to you
Leclerc: C'est magnifique! De Gaulle: Merde...
Very interesting topic TIK. Nice job
Glad you liked it!
Good video TIK...I think when Ike gave orders for Devers to " Cross the Rhine" I think he meant "If you see an intact bridge or can bounce a crossing then do it!"...Rather than a formalised assault. Ike could be flexible, when Remagen was taken he quite happily shifted the southern arm of his attack into Germany......If Devers had been lucky enough to capture an intact bridge and get across Ike, Patton and even Monty would have exploited this gift to the full...
Not enough US troops got over the Rhine at Remagen to make a difference.
@@johnburns4017 literally the entire southern "hook" that surrounded the 300,000 Germans in the Rhur Pocket originated from the Remagen Bridgehead!! It was a crucial victory!!
@@jamesbeeching6138
About 120,000 troops crossed the bridge for 10 days. Operation Plunder, run by Monty was 1,300,000 men. A massive difference. Also the 120,000 were now short of supplies as the bridge collapsed.
@@johnburns4017 I think you will find the Americans built a lot of pontoon bridges as they were aware the Ludendorff Bridge was damaged....As for the impact strategically try looking at a map!!!
@@jamesbeeching6138
compare 120,000 with 1,300,000
I reckon this is the best analysis I have heard. Unbiased , fair and well presented.
I love your work TIK!
Tik, I love ❤️ your platform. Thanks'
Seems that Eisenhower had the better long term plan of attacking the Ruhr rather than the useless southern Germany. But I am not even close to knowledgeable about ground campaigns.
Also seems to me that when there is a personality conflict, there are two people who can do something about it, and it's unfair to put most of the blame on Eisenhower. If nothing else, it's up to the subordinates to please their commander, not the other way round. But on the gripping hand, too much of that leads to suckups and sycophants. I guess my conclusion is that I can't conclude anything....
I agree that it is best for a subordinate to also make it clear if you are varying from the plan, even a vague one like Ikes. Devers had to know that Ike wanted him tucked up on Patton's flank. I can understand that is chafing for a general. but trying to wiggle out is not right rather than put forward a clear request and make Ike say yes or no.
Good analysis! You poke, legitimately, at long provided and accepted narratives and criticism comes when folk’s reluctance to new and valid ideas are challenged. Keep up the good work!
Fantastic explanation!
“Patton finally began receiving adequate supplies on September 4, after a week’s pause. After that date supply was not a problem. Hurtgen Forest and Operation Queen were launched as supply was good.
_"Eisenhower. He had now heard from both his Army Group commanders - or Commanders-in-Chief as they were currently called - and reached the conclusion that they were both right; that it was possible to achieve everything, even with lengthening supply lines and without Antwerp."_
- Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944
_“It was commonly believed at Third Army H.Q. that Montgomery's advance through Belgium was largely maintained by supplies diverted from Patton. (See Butcher, op. cit., p. 667.) This is not true. The amount delivered by the ' air-lift ' was sufficient to maintain only one division. No road transport was diverted to aid Montgomery until September 16th. On the other hand, three British transport companies, lent to the Americans on August 6th " for eight days," were not returned until September 4th.' “_
- CHESTER WILMOT, THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE. Page 58.
Land supplies were not taken from Patton and given to Monty. It is a complete myth to claim otherwise. Monty didn't even have a full army for his attack at Market Garden, just a Corps and supporting elements, with much flown in from England. Half of the troop transport aircraft were taken by Bradley to take parcels, otherwise far more men would have been dropped on the 1st day of Market Garden.
Market Garden was not a very large ground operation. It was limited in size. The American attack into the Hurtgen Forest started when Market Garden was going on. The US advance on the Hurtgen Forest by First US Army 9th Infantry Division began on 14th September, 3 days before Market Garden began, and was continuing to try and advance into the Hurtgen even when Market Garden began 3 days later, but it was halted by the Germans however.
This was soon followed up by a larger advance by the US First Army towards Aachen at the start of October. Market Garden didn't make a notable dent in allied supplies seeing as the US was able to put on a *larger* ground attack right afterwards. According to Bradley in his own book there was parity of supplies between the three allied armies, Second British, First and Third US by mid September 1944 and according to the official US Army History as cited in Hugh Cole's book, The Lorraine Campaign page 52. _"by 10th September the period of critical (gasoline) shortage had ended"._ This was a whole week before Market Garden took place. The gasoline drought was the end of August/beginning of September. It was over by the time of Market Garden.
John your statement "Half of the troop transport aircraft were taken by Bradley to take parcels, otherwise far more men would have been dropped on the 1st day of Market Garden. " is incorrect, all of 9th TCC was committed to Market Garden.
" Market Garden was not a very large ground operation. It was limited in size." Garden force was 3 Corp XII, VIII and XXX Corp with 6 Divisions and number of independent Armoured Brigades plus 3 Airborne Division.
Whereas the attack on Aachen was US VII Corp (3rd Arm, 1st and 9th ID) and as you noted 9th was assign the Hurtgen Forest. VII Corp start the attack on 13th September. Clearly Market Garden was larger than the initial attack on Aachen
Burns jump in the chanel and grab your loofah,bernard will be by to give The Full Monty,by your request of course. And quit scribbling your bollocks into italics and passing it off as facts.
*With Prejudice, Air Marshall Tedder,p.586* "Eisenhower's firm commitment to the Anglo-American Alliance dominated his thinking. He handled Allied disagreements in Normandy, at the Falaise Gap and for Market-Garden the same way. *Eisenhower was determined to protect the facade of Allied unity at the highest levels of the Allied command in spite of Montgomery's insubordination which was motivated by both personal and political objectives. Eisenhower's efforts to cover up Montgomery's lies in Normandy"*
if we set the log challenges aside, ANY crossing of the Rhine would have been helpful. In fact, a strong US bridgehead across the Rhine anywhere would change the operational picture entirely. One can imagine this upsetting a series of German operations including Wacht on Rhein....
It occurs to me that Patch was pushing into Germany about on the same line take by the French in 1939. Did the Germans have the forces to guard the whole Rhine.
So..soldiers don't need food, Eh ?
Interesting episode. I hope you do more like this one.
Thank you, TIKhistory.
As an American, I like to think that Churchill was half genius and the other half British.
Cheeky!
I read somewhere that Devers smiled too much^^ And that it rubbed other generals the wrong way - Silly
Jumbo Wilson and Marshall seemed to like him though, so it was only really Eisenhower and Bradley that didn't like him.
TIK you are clearly not anti-American. Gavin's failure to take the Nijmegen bridge in operation market garden was a critical error that lengthened the war. It especially hurt the families of my friends in Holland. And you have been very fair in your criticism of Eisenhower and Devers in this video. It's a wonder the Allies got as far as they did in the West
@openeroftheway8596
1st British Airborne also failed at Arnhem. Never took the bridge there or enough of Arnhem.
The failure lies at the feet of Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst.
@@lyndoncmp5751 You make a very poor case for your position so if you have written up a more thorough review of the matter or recorded video or audio about it, that would be great to see. The problems at Arnhem were impossible to solve without the bridge at Nijmegen. Gavin could have secured the bridge within hours of arrival and dug in. He was foolish.
The delays to his South were lengthy and reflect poor planning but they were overcome. Meanwhile the troops at Arnhem held much longer than could have been expected but could not be relieved due to Gavin's failure.
There is ample responsibility to share. But victory has a thousand fathers and defeat is an orphan.
@@openeroftheway8596
Dont take my word for it. A German report shortly after the battle concluded that the biggest mistake made by the allies in Market Garden were dispersed drops and over a number of days. Those decisions rest squarely with Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst. You can read the report in full in Market Garden Then And Now Volume 2 by Margry.
I'll repeat, British 1st Airborne FAILED to take the Arnhem bridge and FAILED to take much of Arnhem. The plan was to take not only the bridge but much of Arnhem as well, a circular line that went from outside Oosterbeek and then to just beyond Hoogkamp then Alteveer, Paasberg and Presikhaaf. This was needed in order for XXX Corps to cross over, fan out and consolidate a bridgehead. This was never even remotely achieved, and the Germans always controlled the bridge off ramp plus 99.9% of Arnhem.
Even had the 82nd taken the Nijmegen bridge on the first day and XXX Corps crossed over on the 19th and reached the south end of the Arnhem bridge it wouldn't have mattered. The Germans were too strong in Arnhem and 1st Airborne didnt have the bridge captured anyway. The wreckage of Grabners force was also strewn across the bridge causing a road block. XXX Corps would have merely been a huge traffic jam and sitting ducks for German fire if they even attempted to get their tanks on the bridge. Nor could artillery support have helped for fear of friendly fire on Frosts men as well as destroying the very thing they wanted, the bridge and its off ramp.
Despite bravery in holding a small portion of the bridge and some buildings at that end, British 1st Airborne simply didn't do enough. They failed as much at Arnhem as the 82nd did at Nijmegen..... and I'm British.
Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst screwed the operation. All the events that followed were due primarily to the decisions made by those three men.
Very interesting discussion. Another area of the war I have never heard. Keep this up , love the new pro-Tik format , less stress more interest. Cheers mate
Good job! (as always), I have spent some time looking at the fight in the south, but never had any real insight into the 'personal' issues that affected the course of the campaign. Thanks for the education.
Don't know why the South was ever considered as you can see from the maps at 9:06 it would just drive the Allies further and further away from their supply lines at Cherbourg, whereas the North is closer to the Channel ports and it's the shortest route to Germany and leads to the benefits of cutting off 65 percent of German war industry. The Scheldt should have been prioritised from the start over the Brittany ports and Brest. Logically it makes sense.
Anyone who reads widely on Western European military history will see that the regions of Northern/north-eastern France, the low countries, north west Germany, the Po valley and the channel ports were by far the most strategically important regions. From the medieval era but the early modern and modern era especially this has always been the case especially during times like the Spanish empire when most effort was expended in the 80 years war and intervening in the French civil war, French expansion in the second half of the 1600s such as the 9 years war and Franco-Dutch wars, land battles of the 1700s like the Spanish and Austrian wars of succession, and very starkly in WW1 where the Germans were repulsed harshly outside of Nancy despite huge momentum and the front froze south of Verdun for basically the entire war. Putting so much emphasis on attacking through places like the Hurtgen forest and the Vosges where the Germans have ideal defensive positions is just historically very odd especially when you consider how the strategic value of NE France NW Germany and Belguim only increased compared to earlier eras as industrialisation (unsurprisingly) took place disproportionately in these exact areas.
@@Swift-mr5zi Yeah in addition, the ground to the South is not exactly great for manuever warfare. It's very hilly and ideal for defence. The Ruhr on the other hand to the North lies in flat country at the edge of the North German Plain, which is ideal for an Allied mechanised advance. Lots of German armour had been destroyed during the Battle of Normandy, and given the Allies successes with armour, it seems only logical to have pressed very hard across Northern Germany where the remnants of the German army would be defeated in a mobile battle over the plains, rather than hulldown in front of the hills with artillery placed on top.
Antwerp was a lame duck being 40 miles up a mined river. Time consuming to take while chasing a German army licking its wounds was very important. Eisenhower should have listened to Monty and rammed ahead to a Dutch port on the sea 40 miles ahead while the Germans were still reeling
And the north had the benefit of going for the v-2 launch sites in the netherlands which were a big political issue for the british. south was not worth the relative effort that would be needed.
@@glorgau The V-2 rockets is another interesting point as the RAF and USAAF put a huge amount of resources into destroying the launch sites in the forgotten 'operation crossbow'
'Total tonnage of bombs dropped on and sorties flown against German long-range weapon program are difficult to obtain... It is estimated, however, that altogether 124,000 tons of bombs were directed against the V-weapons. It is more accurately estimated that of the total Allied heavy bomber effort for 1944/5 5.6 per cent of all tonnage dropped was against this program. In the month of July 1944, heavy bombers devoted 22.4 per cent of all their tonnage to these targets. Among all target systems attacked by heavy bombers, the tonnage against oil and rails only the exceeded the amount expended on long range weapons'
The political issue had material conquences and therefore should be taken into account when considering the strategy of this time period (alongside the air war in general).
I seem to recall something about the logistics planning for Overlord, where they thought it would take deep into 45 get to the German border. As another comment notes, I suspect they figured by then, they'd repaired everything in the rear. In a way, I can understand why the logistics was so messed up.
Devers gets overlooked since the entire southern France effort was overlooked - not exactly a sideshow, especially from the liberated French civilian's perspective. Certainly necessary to get the ports, as TIK notes, and to tidy up the line south of Patton to the Swiss border. But, as you note directly in the reference to the Ruhr, and implicitly, the main show was going to be in the center or north, no matter what. Destroy the Ruhr, and Germany simply couldn't have physically resisted any more. Monty's dream of a push across the north German Plain to Berlin, yeah, that could also have potentially done it. Pushing across southern Germany would have done what?
In defense of Ike, I can see the point of a broad front. There's no open flank or relatively narrow salient primed for a counterattack. As pointed out, that does result in a dilution of force. Perhaps the 100 Days strategy of the First War gets the best of both - shifting focus from one point of the front to another along the length of the front with concentrated attacks. Keeps the enemy off balance, yet also, if done right, doesn't result in any terribly open flanks or over extended salient positions.
Great vid as always TIK. Hindsight being what it is, there's plenty of criticism to go around for all of the commanders. The hard part I have to imagine, is to know if the "right" decisions could have been made when immersed in the situation at the time.
Are you saying one of the most maligned generals of the WWI, Haig, was actually competent, perish the thought lol, I've often Haig was more capable than many think but he was often saddled with political offensives or the need to keep an offensive going because the strategic situation.
Brilliant work love this history
Excellent overview. Thanks.
Ike had NO plan for what do after the break out from bocage. He gambled with Monty and Market Garden. I think Ike was paranoid that a spear head advance would result in a worse failure than Market Garden did. In 20/20 hindsight Ike was covering his future political rear area. The red ball express was stretched to breaking using broad front advance but Ike had his butt covered. The upcoming Battle of the Bulge IMHO was a DIRECT result of Ike's myopic view of broad front advance, as I think Ike thought the germans would do a broad front defence, and thus did NOT predict a counter attack. The thought at the time was the germans were beaten and the war would be over by christmas (propaganda). Without supplies they had to stop. On the eastern front Bagration had the germans in almost a free fall retreat. So rounding this up... I really think Ike pissed away the ability to do a spear head advance directly to antwerp and then onto the german frontier. IF this crushing defeat was pushed combined with crossing the rhine AND bragration defeat and timing are considered it would have left the germans with no ability to reorganize for a "battle of the bulge".
Another factor i heard about is the careful tactics of the west allies.
"Ir they used men like the soviets, they would already be at Berlin"
Market garden was ALMOST a success though. And even though it failed, Germans lost two full panzer divisions in fruitless counterattacks trying to encircle the British salient
@@tedarcher9120 At best it gained a lot of territory and saved Dutch lives but sadly didn't establish a bridge head over the Rhine. ☹
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- yes, but it was really close, Monty could not have knows there were two full panzer divisions nearby. With a little more luck it would have worked, encircling a whole army in the lowlands
Market Garden was only a limited operation. It's only objectives were a bridgehead across the Rhine and, if that was achieved, an advance north to the coast to cut off the Western Netherlands and Belgium.
The American 1st Army would then still have to get beyond Aachen to the Rhine in its own separate operation before any exploitation of (a successful) Market Garden towards the Ruhr could ever work.
Excellent narrative. Your illustration of the supply chain problems, explains the drawbacks of Eisenhower's "Broad Front" strategy in a clear and concise manner. From your presentation, it is very evident that Montgomery's idea for a narrow advance along the coast, to seize supply ports, was the more sensible in the short and long term. Perhaps Eisenhower's poor decision in this regard was influenced by the fact he had never seen action, like Montgomery or Patton had, in their own careers.
Montgomery had to get his own forces to the Dunkirk beachhead intact in 1940, so that is considerable command experience alone.
I owned a hobby shop back in the '80s and this is exactly the sort of discussion we'd have around the ash tray....(We all smoked then).....
Cheers TIK.
Great video!
Devers was a much more competent commander than Bradley, TiK - would be interested to see your opinions on Bradley and the Hurtgen meatgrinder?
It easy to look good when the other side gives up in the first few hours.
I think it is important to mention for the whole Market Garden & Scheldt Estuary situation Montgomery completely ignored taking the Scheldt when he had the oppertunity to take it on September 6th when the British 11th Armoured division reached Antwep with NO German forces in the area. This goes completely against the orders that both Eisenhowr and Betram Ramsey gave to Montgomery repeatedly before D-Day and in the weeks leading up to the fall of Antwerp. Montgomery was constantly told that his top priorty was to capture Antwerp and open the port up for Allied use. Montgomery took Antwerp but completely ignored taking the Scheldt when it was undefended.
Montgomry blames the Canadians for failing to take it before the Germans reinforced it which is just insane. Montgomery told the Canadian Army commander once to take the Scheldt when they got to Antwerp and that was before D-Day even happened. And it was the British 11th Armoured division that got to Antwerpt first anyway.
After the 11th Armoured division got to Antwerp on September 6th the 50th Infantry division got to Antwerp on September 7th (still no Germans). The 11th Armoured doesn't leave Antwerp until Setemper 10th. It is then on September 11th that the Germans finally arive to defend the Scheldt with the 346th infantry division. They then dig into the Scheldt and make it insanly hard to take resulting in the Canadians suffering their bloodest fighting of the war.
Montgomery could have had the 11th Armoured division break off a single batalion(or more if he wnated to) and gain control to the access to the Scheldt so that Germans could not defend it which would have resulted in the Allies having operational access to the port of Antwerp months faster then they did and would have never resulted in Operation Market Garden even happening.
I don't know that there were no forces. In fact forces were pulling out and hanging out near Arnhem to defeat Market Garden.
@@christophersmith8316 This was before Market Garden. That happend on September 17th. By then the Germans had 2 divisions defending Walcheren islands (part ofthe Scheldt Estuary). Anyone just has to look at the map on September 8th and 9th. There is abslutly nothing in front of the British 11th Armrued division. There are German divisions far to their west that are in the process of being surronded against the coast by the Candians and the Britsh 7th Armoured divisions. The 11th had a clean route to take the Scheldt.
I'd have to take a look at the sources, but it could be explained by the total breakdown of logistics across the entire front. After taking Antwerp, the British and Canadians did little until Market Garden launched, while Patton, Bradley and Devers were more or less sat still too. This can only be explained the failure of the logistics.
@@TheImperatorKnight The British and Candian divisions were still moving all over the place up until and through Market Garden.
The British 7th Armoured division was in Ghent pushing the German 7th infantry division north to the coast working to completely cut off the beat up 13 German divions to their West that were being hit by the Candian army and other British divisions. In the Brussels area the British had the above mentioned 7th Armoured division fighting the lone German division trying to keep an escape route open for the other Germans. The British 11th Armoured division was in Atwerp just essentially sitting there holding the city when they could have sent a fraction of their force to take Walcheren island. The BRitish Gaurds armoured division was to the west holding that flank against nothing at that point. ANd the British 50th infantry division was just north of Brussels itself on September 6th as they marched to Antwerp.
If we wait until September 7th there are now 2 British divisions in Antewrp and neither go for the undefended Walcheren island. September 8th the 11th ARmoured gets in postition like they are going to move to take Walcheren island but don't. The 50th division leaves Antwerp and goes West now to fight the already surronded German troops along the coast and the Guards Armoured division rushes out in front of everyone to the East going for no general objective at all. On the 9th the 11th is still sitting in Antwerp. The 50th division is then ordered back East again and go to back up the Gauards armoured division. On the 10th the 11th finally leave Antwerp not to take Walcheren but to go help the Gaurds and 50th division. 53rd Infantry division now hold Antwerp with the 7th Armoured a bit to their West fighting the pocket of German's held agains the coast. It is then finally on September 11th that the Germans get troops onto Walcheren island.
That is a minimum of 3 days the area was open to be taken and Monty excuse that it was the Candian's fault is rediculas ad not one Candian division even got to Antwerp yet. They are all near Bruges fighting the German pocket stuck along the coast and fighting other German holdout positions along the coast. Montgomery should have redirected the assignment to take Anwterp to the British 2nd Army, particularly the 11th division rather then letting them go off to do nothing with the Guards Armoured division. The Guards and 11th division are fighting in those same places until Market Garden starts.
Antwerp was a lame duck being 40 miles up a mined river. Time consuming to take while chasing a German army licking its wounds was paramount. Eisenhower should have listened to Monty and rammed ahead to a Dutch port on the sea 40 miles ahead while the Germans were still reeling.
Rail lines were brought back to use super quick by allied rail crews. 12,000 men brought back into use 131 miles of track in three days to get the US Third Army moving in Normandy. Read _The Liberation Line_ by Christian Wolmar. Also 2/3 to 3/4 of supplies coming into Normandy came in on the beaches by LSTs. These could easily use beaches in Northern France or Belgium with track run in and marshaling yards built in no time at all by the rail crews. They never did.
Why there was an over emphasis by Eisenhower on Antwerp, up a 40 mile long mined river which would take weeks to get operational is mystifying.
Great content, you rock.
Great video, this was fascinating. Just when I thought there was nothing new to learn.
A crossing of the Rhine by the 7th US Army would give the allies important strategic advantage in their follow-up invasion of Germany. It would be a thorn on German's flesh and would disrupt german plan to make a solid defensive line in the Rhine, let alone launch a counter-offensive in the Ardennes. In pretty much the same way Remangen bridge disrupted german defence plan in the Rhine. Remangen bridge was not in a good place either. When Bradley was told that, he replied "What the hell do you want us to do, pull back and blow it up?".
However, I get it there's a risk of these forces being thrown back to the Rhine by the german armored reserves, but this would mean there would be no Ardennes offensive and the Allies would reach the Rhine some time perhaps in January in a wide front.
The politics between Ike and Devers is interesting because I've had a long lengthy discussion between world war II buff friends of mine and one of them is a proponent that the submarine was the most important instrument in world war II. I agree he definitely has some points but I have been more and more critical of how important the Kriegs Marine was to Allied planning. Considering they sunk so much merchant shipping, why wasn't more done about it?
The reason I bring this up is that airplanes are more effective against submarines than even ships are. The breaking of the U-Boat was primarily instigated by more and more long-range plane missions to search and destroy them in the Mid-Atlantic. It is interesting to me that despite all of this that the army Air Force and the RAF in 1942 were putting more and more priority on bombing German Industry than supporting African operations or stopping the Wolfpacks.
You have missed out the most important piece of the puzzle. The enigma machine is cracked and the losses against the Wolfpacks is PREDICTABLE. It is strategically more valuable to maintain the stability in this part of the war then interrupting the enemy's routine. (They did add the 4th router)
The U-boats stopped being a real threat probaly by 1941-1942, the "Happy Years" before were just when the operational capabilities were at the peak, then Barbarossa happen and oil shortages becomed more severe, thus bringing the naval operations to a crawl and don't being able to keep up with the allies upgraded ASW tactics.
The Us pacific submarine campaing in the route beetwen southeast asia and Japan mainland were the most sucessful of the war and probaly of the history of submarines, destroyed more than 70% of the japanese shipping and transport, starved Gualdacanal japanese troops and locked the iniative to the Americans. But night actions becomed the Achilles Heel, with the japanese still being able to sustain island fortress like Iwo Jima.
Then the japanese subs.. The misguided doutrine of attacking warships instead of shipping explain it all, but they did managed some sucess at sinking carriers. If used in a normal way they could have starved the marines at Gualdacanal and maybe prolonging the south pacific war.
Soviet subs and Italian subs are outshined by the German and American subs, but a soviet sub killed the most amount of people on a single ship.
Always a good day when TiK makes a video. This spat between the two now makes me wonder what it would have been like if Devers was in Eisenhower’s position.
Putting hindsight aside, things that were certain didn't happen according to plan, and critical elements of the Overlord plan went so well it caused problems while at the same time, other vital issues utterly failed.
Ultimately, it's logistics. Especially at a strategic/theater level. Some ports that should have been captured early, actually surrendered after the official surrender of Germany. ;-)
The strategic German step back mid-France, while still resisting at a local level, totally discombobulated the Allied supply system. They rushed forward and as mentioned, basically ran out of gas.
Of course the wide front approach gets criticized, in my opinion, given what the allies knew and had experienced...it was the correct course of action.
From an academic view, if you concentrate your forces against say 1 point, the enemy will obviously defend that one point. Thermopylae is a classic example.
Having superior forces or at least superior mobility/interdiction capability, if you push forward at 4 points with medium strength, and the enemy only has strength to
oppose 2-3 points with sufficient force... at some location, you will break through.
Anyone that has studied the US Civil War knows this...as did ALL US Generals involved in WWII. I think this was the basic concept behind Eisenhower's strategy.
I have more troops and supplies, sure, Germany is a tough nut, but, if I apply enough pressure everywhere, eventually, the center (wherever) can not hold. Classic strategy.
All the best.
Cheers.
I’m American and I consider TIK unbiased and a great historian. Ike did well given the rapid pace of events, and Devers was neglected because the objective was the Ruhr and he was nowhere near it.
you either not american or unread as he is a nationilistc fanboi and this his cherring section
Fascinating analysis of a lesser-known aspect of the war. Whatever his faults, Eisenhower's experience planning Overlord gave him a unique appreciation of "the big picture" as well as balancing the egos of Churchill, De Gaulle and several prima donna generals.
My wife’s grandad was Bradley’s Dep. Chief of Staff (Gen. Henry Balding Lewis). Your analysis and overview of this topic is beyond excellent. My Dad was in Patton’s Army (707th Tank Battalion) seeing his movement on your graphics was fantastic for me. Thank you! ❤
The pettiness of these guys is staggering but unfortunately not uncommon, even in the army.
Clearly a Northern spearhead under Monty combined with a Southern spearhead under Devers was the best strategy. Bradley should have been on Monty's right flank while Patton should have been on Dever's left flank. Such an approach would have resulted in an earlier conclusion of the war in Europe.
And what exactly clear about it?
Great history lesson. Thanks.
Thank you Tik
Looking at a map, the key areas were north of Devers. If there was to a crossing it would need to be heading in northerly direction not easterly. An argument about where the crossing should occur is warranted at the time. Devers' plan was idiotic at best because make a thrust the couldn't be properly supported nor properly support any offensive by Bradley and Montgomery. Something that should be considered, was Ike's assessment of Devers fundamentally accurate which obviously would color their relationship because Ike wouldn't trust Devers' judgement.
Having a bridgehead over the natural barrier, the Rhine is a good thing to have.
@@johnburns4017 Only if you can go anywhere from there
Devers actually had a good argument to cross the Rhine. In Atkinson we learn that his troops did cross and found no Germans. Devers went up in a piper cub and found no German forces within 30 miles of the Rhine and a pretty clear path to Stugardt. Devers wanted Patton to support his flank when he crossed. This is when Eisenhower intervened. The lack of German troops should have been a tell that the Battle of the Bulge was coming. A crossing here would have forced the Germans to pull troops massing for the Ardennes back to protect their own flank, weakening this attack and strengthening the American position. The focus on the Ruhr was the industrial base not on the German Army. The most important element in the whole German industrial base was the ball plant at Schwienfurt, just outside of Frankfurt. 80 miles from Devers with no German forces in his path. Without the balls no bearings, without the bearings no tanks, no planes, no rockets. Devers had this scoped.
Most the German army in the west was around the Ruhr.
Schweinfurt is not at all "just outside Frankfurt" and the idea that an Army Commander solves this Grand Strategic problem by simply driving there is really a bit of a stretch.
Bravo. Well balanced and objective presentaion of the information.
Good presentation of your arguments, both for & against.
In astronomy, it's usually just dust that's the answer. In warfare it's usually logistics. I hear about generals and their optimistic plans. And the Germans could recover and regroup a bit? Hardly surprising since the allies could not sustain the push. I think Eisenhower could have managed Devers a bit better... but doing that would not have solved the supply issues. Were Devers to cross the river and charge further ahead, that would just repeat the whole stretching the supply lines.
Mondays made great again
Yeah, I've missed publishing every week... but with a huge Battlestorm on the go behind the scenes, and with the problem with history theory, and Christmas, it's just been difficult to get much time for these sorts of videos.
@@TheImperatorKnight Totally understand mate.
I enjoy seeing 7th Army history since it often gets ignored. My father was a captain in the 7th and had told me of this early opportunity to secure a bridgehead across the Rhine. He believed that Eisenhower's personal dislike of Devers had resulted in 7th Army often being ignored by Ike, probably including the refusal to consider this as an opportunity. But there is a good case to be made for the logistics not being suitable and there had to be a follow up plan for exploiting an early river crossing in the south.
Sorry for not responding back sooner to your excellent presentation on this question I posed to a while back on this issue. I guess it’s one of those things that historians just must be satisfied with speculating about and never really knowing if a strategic military error was committed over a personality gripe. Thanks. Gary W.
I think your assessment of Gavin in Operation Market Garden was correct and it looks like IKE didn't plan much if at all beyond the Normandy landings.
Eisenhower was the best clerk MacArthur ever had.
Yeah-just ask MacArthur. haha
Hey TIKhistory: I am trying to grasp all of this, but you do a top-flight job of covering that period!!
Great timing TIK it's been too long! Keep it up!
It has. Now Gazala is in a relatively good place, I'm going to try get some more videos out soon
@@TheImperatorKnight Is this Tik or Imperator knight? WTF?
@@TheImperatorKnight Good work!
Was there any chance of a french army group being established instead of army group 6. Since both the British and Americans had their own army group's
Good question. I doubt it though, only because I read somewhere that the Free French only had about 40,000 troops or so at any one moment in time, which is barely an army. Plus, the French were far too reliant on the Americans and British, both of whom wouldn't want to subordinate themselves to the French.
French were further south, from my understanding.
No, the French weren't getting a participation trophy.
@@chico9805 Actually, they did, they got occupation zones in Berlin and Germany and a seat at the conferences of Yalta and Potsdam. You know who didn't get a participation trophy? Canada, despite having contributed a whole army.
@@chaptermasterpedrokantor1623You can blame De Gaulle. But Canada was a dominion still so unlikely anyway.
01:24 🌐 Devers clashed with Eisenhower in 1943 over resources, setting the stage for their strained relationship.
03:44 🤝 Devers' transfer to the Mediterranean was seen by Marshall as a ploy by Eisenhower to eliminate a rival, leading to tensions.
06:33 ⚔ Operation Dragoon's success in capturing Marseilles in August 1944 became a logistical challenge for the Allies.
08:17 🚚 Eisenhower's Broad Front strategy strained Allied logistics, causing fuel shortages and logistical issues.
11:56 🛣 Eisenhower's focus on maintaining the Broad Front strategy led to logistical challenges instead of solving them.
13:17 🌊 Eisenhower ordered Devers to cross the Rhine, indicating a lack of long-term planning and favoritism against Devers.
15:58 📉 Miscalculations about Marseilles' capacity and logistical issues further complicated the Allied advance.
17:18 🤷♂ Eisenhower's communication breakdown with Devers and prioritizing Bradley over other commanders impacted the campaign.
18:42 🤔 Eisenhower's favoritism towards Bradley and lack of attention to flanks (Monty and Devers) may have contributed to strategic issues.
19:33 🗺 Eisenhower's Broad Front strategy led to stretched Allied divisions across a 500-600 mile front, hindering their ability to breach the Siegfried Line.
20:54 🤷 Eisenhower's failure to plan operations beyond Normandy and prioritize logistics led to attritional battles and inadequate supply networks during the winter of 1944-45.
23:41 🤝 Miscommunication between Eisenhower and Devers regarding the Rhine crossing led to a misunderstanding and conflicting interpretations of orders.
25:06 🛑 Eisenhower halted Devers' plan to cross the Rhine in December 1944, redirecting efforts to support Patton's forces in the north.
27:18 🤬 Dispute between Eisenhower and Devers over Rhine crossing plans led to a deteriorated relationship and public criticism from Devers.
28:44 🌐 Devers argued for crossing the Rhine, emphasizing the tactical advantages, while Eisenhower prioritized the northern front and the Ruhr.
31:38 ⚔ Crossing the Rhine in Devers' area was deemed strategically unsound due to logistical challenges, potential German counterattacks, and lack of clear objectives.
33:22 🤔 Poor relations between Eisenhower and Devers played a role in the dispute, but logistical problems and strategic impracticality were also key factors.
35:14 ❓ The implications of not allowing Devers to cross the Rhine remain uncertain, with suggestions that it may or may not have influenced the Ardennes Offensive or the Battle of the Bulge.
The only thing causing problems was British bumbling in the form of Monty.Monty garden and Caen set everything back and that propped up fraud should have been sacked. And IKE reassigned for catering to him sending him men,materiel,tanks,trucks,artillery,fuel.Should have called back either O'Connor,Auchinleck or moved Slim over
The broken old, British industries couldn't keep up leaving the USA to provide the hardware here's the real problem down below
*The Second World War by John Keegan,page 399* In 1944 the USA produced 47,000 tanks ,while Germany produced 29,600 tanks and assault guns.Britain in 1944 produced only 5000 tanks.
and of course another drag on supplies
*Wilmot's "The Struggle For Europe" and on page 524 of the Reprint Society London 1954 edition*
By the start of September all the transport reserves of 21st Army Group were on the road. Imports were cut from 16,000 tons per day to 7,000 so that transport companies could be diverted from unloading ships to forward supply. *This gain, however, was almost offset by the alarming discovery that the engines of 1,400 British-built three-tonners (and all the replacement engines for this particular model) had faulty pistons which rendered them useless.* These trucks could have delivered to the Belgian border another 800 tons a day, sufficient to maintain two divisions. By reducing the daily tonnage of First Canadian Army, by bringing in fresh transport companies from England, and by such expedients as welding strips of airfield track on the sides of tank-transporters to convert them for supply carrying, 21st Army Group was able to provide enough supplies to carry Dempsey's two forward corps into Belgium as far as Brussels and Antwerp, but with it's own resources it could go no further.
"The Administrative History of the Operations of 21 Army Group." p.47
*"Eisenhower's Lieutenants" by Russell F. Weigley, page 281*
Yet Montgomery had been unable to avoid lowering his logistical sights from arguing for a forty-division offensive to settling for an eighteen-division advance. For one thing, he had on his hands an embarrassing fiasco of British logistics which increased his dependence on American help. *Some 1,400 British three-ton lorries, plus all the replacement engines for this model, had been discovered to have faulty pistons rendering them useless. The represented the loss of 800 tons a day.*
Thank you so much for this subject. Well done! I am American. I have studied in detail the movements of the 6th Army Group for years. I am fascinated with the amount of film and photographic material that is available to study as this combined American and French force fought its way from the southern coast of France to Germany. The rapid success of reaching the Rhine by this army group is little covered by historians. I have been to Alsace-Lorraine, and visited sites I have studied from combat footage taken during the fighting there. I agree with the order to not cross the Rhine, the lands to the east of the river here are difficult and held little military value at the time. However, the moral value of taking Alsace-Lorraine away from the Germans and reaching the Rhine should have been very high for the Allies (especially the French) and devastating to the Germans. Alsace-Lorraine had been bitterly fought over by the French and Germans since the Napoleonic Wars. Taking this historically important region (in whole) would have denied to the Germans the Colmar foothold (and prevented or lessen the effects of the Germans Alsace offensive in December 1944). Eisenhower should have promoted the taking Alsace-Lorraine and the west bank of the Rhine as a priority and point achievement, and recognized the 6th Army Group for its rapid advance. What General Devers was able to achieve was a good thing.
However I do a like listening to you and enjoy your programs. And you have not developed the incredibly bad habit that most British UA-camrs have of using the word extraordinary all the time. Kudos to you. May I say you are extraordinary?
Another interesting bit of history is when the French (off their own initiative) attacked into North Italy from southern France!
Sorry Devers, the south of france and germany were just a lower priority.
My thoughts on the Broad Front strategy thinking vs the Narrow Front strategy thinking.
Ike and all the Generals were men of their time, which would have included 20+ years of War College "lessons of the Great War". The WWI Germans finally surrendered after the Allies adopted a Broad Front strategy where the Germans couldn't keep reacting and moving troops to the latest trouble spot, as there was trouble everywhere. (And Hindenburg saw Germany couldn't win the war and tried to save lives by capitulating. IMO) The NFs had resulted in battles like the Somme with little results.
Regarding pronunciation. I've always said D'-vers, which you did the last 8 minutes of so. Early you were saying D-verse'. But I'm from the just plow on through school and have always called it the Vos'-a-ges. I'm sure your version of Vosages is a lot closer to correct than mine.
Thanks for another outstanding presentation.
Honestly, the problem is Gavin. If he does his job and takes the bridge and holds (versus what he did, which is hold the landing site and then take the bridge.) Someone should have explained to him that nobody really cares that his landing site nor his troops, not really. What they cared about was the bridge. If he does his job, then the allies get Antwerp operational mid October with a bridgehead over the Rhine and the Ruhr under direct threat. Game over. How SHAEF could have known about Gavin's plans and not redirected him to take the bridge, then hold, is a mystery. It does seem that SHAEF had a problem providing clear guidance to divisional-army level commanders.
In this case, Devers should not have crossed the Rhine at this point. That he was explicitly told not to cross a day before the planned operation is the problem. That is a failure of oversight as was Gavin in Market Garden.
So honestly, really the problem is Browning. It was his job to address divisions priorities, and only thing he did was reinforce that defending landings was more important than bridge itself. Add to it he did little to nothing to address issue of landing zones being simply to far from theirs' targets, problem doubly so relevant in 82nd sector where this factor not only slowed theirs' own movement, it also gave Germans window of opportunity to move troops across Arnhem bridge before British sole unit reached it.
So indeed, planning and oversight were clear issue, with Browning in Market Garden being culprit and Ike here.
Once the allies finally did get Antwerp, they still couldn't use it, because the Germans controlled the Scheldt Esutary which leads from the North Sea to Antwerp which is about 70 miles or more. The allies didn't get control of the Scheldt Estuary, and finally get to use the port of Antwerp, for a long time.
yaaaaaaay first! where is my cookie? :)
You were fourth on my end, but have a cookie anyway