Eisenhower’s Broad Front vs Monty’s Narrow Front in 1944
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- Опубліковано 2 жов 2024
- Which was better? Eisenhower's Broad Front strategy? Or Montgomery's Narrow Front strategy? Could the Narrow Front idea have worked? And why did the Broad Front strategy go wrong? This source-backed video covers the period from August to December 1944 on the Western Front using detailed maps and animations in order to uncover the truth of the matter.
This video is discussing events or concepts that are academic, educational and historical in nature. This video is for informational purposes and was created so we may better understand the past and learn from the mistakes others have made.
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📚 BIBLIOGRAPHY / SOURCES 📚
Colley, "The Folly of Generals: How Eisenhower's Broad Front Strategy Lengthened World War II." Kindle 2021. ISBN: 978-1-61200-975-9
Creveld, M. "Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton." Cambridge University Press, Second Edition 2004.
Denny, N. "Seduction in Combat: Losing Sight of Logistics after D-Day." University of Tennessee, PDF 2003.
Eisenhower, D. "Crusade in Europe." Doubleday, Kindle 1948.
Gelb, N. "Ike and Monty: Generals at War (The Face of Battle Book 4)." Sharpe Books, Kindle 2018. (Original 1994)
Hart, L. “A History of the Second World War.” Kindle version 2015. (First Published 1970.)
Montgomery, B. "The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery." Pan & Sword Military, 2014.
Overy, R. “Why the Allies Won.” Penguin Random House, 2006.
Wikipedia, "Clearing the Channel Coast," accessed 19/01/2023 en.wikipedia.o...
Wikipedia “Ferdinand Heim,” accessed 19/01/2023 en.wikipedia.o...
Full list of all my sources docs.google.co...
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ABOUT TIK 📝
History isn’t as boring as some people think, and my goal is to get people talking about it. I also want to dispel the myths and distortions that ruin our perception of the past by asking a simple question - “But is this really the case?”. I have a 2:1 Degree in History and a passion for early 20th Century conflicts (mainly WW2). I’m therefore approaching this like I would an academic essay. Lots of sources, quotes, references and so on. Only the truth will do.
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At the end of the day, this was yet another example about how logistics and resource constraints were far more important than a lot of people like to think.
One, single thrust by an allied army would have meant that the bulk of available german forces would have opposed it. The offensive would have sucked all fuel and resources from other Allied armies, resulting in those Armies being unable to defend the flanks of a single thrust. This is where a single thrust becomes vulnerable to counterattack, as seen many times on the Eastern front. Eisenhower's strategy was the correct one, he took into account how overstretched the supply lines would become trying to support a deep penetration into the enemy's lines.
@@gawdsuniverse3282 Counter-factuals can be tricky - we will never know for sure what would have happened had they gone ahead with Monty's plan. To some extent, as TIK points out, Market Garden was more an attempt to secure Antwerp, which had it succeeded, would have alleviated many of the logistics problems. But beyond that, it is hard to say - what would the Germans have done differently, for example? We will never know.
@@JackRussell021, I completely agree with you, Eric. Every argument has a counter-argument, and debating what-ifs just comes down to people's opinions that can't be proved right or wrong.
@@gawdsuniverse3282
The available German forces in September/October 1944 would have been powerless to oppose a concentrated 4 army 40 division immovable allied force. Listen to Gunther Blumentritt:
""The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. By turning the forces from the Aachen area sharply northward, the German 15th and 1st Parachute Armies could have been pinned against the estuaries of the Mass and the Rhine. They could not have escaped eastwards into Germany. A direct attack on Metz was unnecessary. The Metz fortress area could have been masked. In contrast, a swerve northward in the direction of Luxembourg and Bitburg would have met with great success and caused the collapse of the right flank of our 7th Army. By such a flank move to the north the entire 7th Army could have been cut off before it could retreat behind the Rhine. Thus the bulk of the defeated German Army would have been wiped out west of the Rhine. ""
Gunther Blumentritt in, The Other Side Of The Hill by Liddell Hart.
@@lyndoncmp5751 his account is inaccurate, the estimated strengths of what Germany could muster in defense of the homeland are grossly underestimated. The breakthrough he preaches would have to overcome some of the most challenging natural obstacles with an overstretched, underperforming supply line, then saying the Ruhr could be taken in a rapid conquest is farcical. Gunther Blumentritt's hindsight is self-serving, and not to be trusted, as Tik often illustrates with evidence about other German General's accounts of the war.
Great video. The logistical situation always appeared to be glossed over in some ways. Your assessment points to this in a way to explain the events of the time.
The logistical situation was worsened by the dispersed broad front. It is actually closer from Le Havre to the Ruhr than it is to the Alsace. A larger concentrated effort in early autumn 1944 on the Ruhr should have been made instead of sending forces into the Lorraine and later the Alsace.
I'm wondering about an issue so often overlooked even up to current times.
These liberated areas were not unpopulated. Lots of people who probably did all they could to survive German occupation also needed to eat and such things cannot be completely ignored. Granted that oversimplification is unavoidable here, but the general point has to have been another factor with possibly more than minor significance.
It's looked over because logistics is boring to most people. Battles and tanks now that's exciting. No need to know if the soldiers have enough fuel or ammo. Lol
it never cease to amaze me, how often supposedly rational operations end up in primadonna telenovala dramas and if it doesn't happen at the moment, you can be 100% sure, that someone later will explain every fault of said operation by the bad character of one or more of its participants.
Fascinating details. The Canadian Army entered Europe carrying its reputation as an elite assault force gained in WW1 (Lloyd George's Fire Brigade) but the leadership quality in WW2 wasn't as good. The WW1 Cdn Corps of 4 Divs (from a national pop of only 8 mil) was led by a real estate broker with financial problems, Arthur Currie, who was probably the best Allied general on the Western Front, and was reportedly in consideration to made Supreme Commander had the war continued into 1919. Crerar and Simmonds were not the same level.
Currie was a fantastic general but by 1918 Haig had got the British and commonwealth armies into the most effective fighting force in the world and the 100 day offensive where Haig basically let each army commander do what they deemed necessary with a little tinkering was because they were all in his own image and had no dissenting voices . Haig had already won his trial of strength with Lloyd George and was safer than ever . The fighting troops of Canada were as elite in the second war as in the first and while Currie was exceptional he always was allowed extra time to train by Haig and never had the reduction in manpower that all other armies had when they switched to fewer divisions so could sustain casualties and training time more. I also think the generalship of the Canadians was not any worse than it’s counterparts but I do believe their missions were perhaps the hardest in the war with no way to flank and always attacking heavily defended areas with motivated troops . Like all allied troops though much of our equipment was not quite good enough in comparison to the germans although we did have far more of it and of course controlled the skies but I think the Canadian soldier of WW2 vintage could rightly hold their heads up as other did in the past and I’m English.
John English has pointed out that most of the 'Canadian' troops who fought in WWI were actually British born and raised, and implies that this was why the Canadian units in the First World War performed better than those in WWII, when the great majority of troops were Canadian born.
Certainly some were, but the Cdn Corps in WW1 were largely farm boys from rural Canada and were several inches taller than the typical Tommy, so that's nonsense. The prob in WW2 was less skilled leadership, not the soldiers themselves.@@dupplinmuir113
65% of Canadian troops at Vimy were British born.@@JK-rv9tp
At best British born were less than half in the end. With many being children when they came to Canada. By the end of the war it was more and more Cdn. born and almost all Cdn. led.
A very interesting and insightful look into just how much logistics, politics and personalities can really help pull together or toss wrenches into any plan.
An absolutely wonderful presentation. This, combined with your recent Market Garden and 'Bulge' episodes has given me my first really concise understanding of the dynamics at play post D day. Thank you.
Genau!
Great stuff as always, i've really come to grips with the concept of logistics 'leading" strategy and tactics from watching your videos over the years. It's definitely not just about the tanks 🙂
A solid like was secured at the Second Coming of the Holy Manstein. Got to appreciate the humour on top of history. :) Also, I think it was a really good idea to take a break from Stalingrad, those Western Front videos are a nice breath of fresh air.
Thank you for this awesome work and analyses.
Perfect scenario for a boardgame. Everything is there : rivalry, dilemmas, supply, ports situation, enemy strengthing up ... Gotta work on it.
I really love these in depth analysis of certain important decisions. It has helped me understand why people do the things they do.
And yes, the execution of the strategy was the main problem, not the strategy itself
I know right! I always overlooked Allied supplies and figured that it operated pretty smoothly 😮
My husband said Monty couldn't fight his way out of a paper bag Patton could do more in his sleep than Monty did awake
@@dallasmars2 Ya know they say the opposite on this board knowing history can't possibly save their hero so they try revision
@@dallasmars2 Well he didn't do a bad job at El Alamein (before the U.S.entered the War.)
. Where did Patton do these great things ??
The importance of Market Garden to overall future strategic operations begs the question of why planning and communications were so poor. Why was Gavin not CLEARLY ordered to take the Nijmegen bridge FIRST? Browning was on the scene from the beginning. Why did he NOT demand Gavin complete that mission IMMEDIATELY? Why were the radio communications problems of British 1st Air Division not anticipated and sorted out BEFORE deploying? Were all commanders advised of the true goal (go north to cut off the Scheldt defenders) of Market Garden? My study of MG since watching your Battle Storm series on it has revealed many such questions. The ultimate critical nature of everything involved with Market Garden makes it unbelievable to me that so many DETAILS were apparently left out.
Its so great that you are covering more diverse periods.. no offense but i started to get a bit fatigued with Stalingrad and North Africa, as much as i love those theatres.
I do want to continue with North Africa because I want to cover El Alamein, then Torch, Tunisia, Sicily, Italy, then Normandy, and see all the relationships between the generals from the beginning, but yes I understand why people are getting fatigued.
@@TheImperatorKnight Well i'll watch regardless.. i have to say you caught me off guard at 39:30.. after 40 minutes of build up where i'm like "yep i 100% agree a narrow front was obviously the right approach, only a moron would think otherwise, i'm 100% convinced" you bamboozle me.
Wonderful presentation! Monty is one of the most difficult characters of WW2 to keep in perspective, but I think you have provided a very even handed analysis of him. I am curious about if or how Operation Dragoon, the invasion of southern France plays into this analysis, as while I understand you are concentrating on narrow vs broad front after the breakout, surely one of the considerations has to be that there is another US Army Group that will link up from the south....
"Monty" just didn't matter....that's the perspective. Narrow front? The idea is to drive into the other guys country and pick a fight with him....then kill him. Meanwhile you break all his stuff.
You see the narrow front in reverse where the Germans marshalled everything they had and attacked at bastogne....then we killed them. Basically destroying the entire German army in Western Europe single handedly. Why waste time with their opinions on everything?
@@dhardy6654 I agree that "Monty" shouldn't have mattered. Sadly, I think he (or at least his abrasive personality) very much did matter, and while I think TIK does a great job of showing that he was much more aggressive than is usually allowed, he was a lousy politician, and in alliance warfare, this matters.
If I understand TIK correctly, he is saying that in his opinion, the single thrust would have worked at the time the German armies collapsed after Normandy, but that allied command didn't really appreciate how bad their collapse was at the time, and therefore were unable to adjust their thinking in time.
I was simply wondering if Operation Dragoon, which happened pretty much at the same time as the break out from Normandy occurred played into Eisenhowers thinking and preference for a broad front, as there was another US Army Group coming up from the south.
As you note, the Ardennes was essentially a single thrust that didn't work. But I think you have to consider all the moving parts on the board if you are going to understand why history happened as it did...
@@colinplatt1963
I think you're right about Dragoon.
The operation didn't make sense except as part of a "broad front" strategy.
Though I suppose it could have been used to liberate Northern Italy if that had been thought desirable.
Thanks, that's a much better explanation of the reality of what happened than I've heard before and it all made good sense.
So cool to be getting vids about the Western Front from ya, TiK.
It's definitely a nice change of pace
Yea, got tired of hearing about Russian orcs
Battlestorm Bulge should be good
@@crocrox2273As opposed to what ?…Einsatzgruppen or OUM elves ?
@@albertarthurparsnips5141 There are people walking around thinking real life is a fantasy MMO. I think hitler also thought that the jewish were a suboptimal player race that couldn't create faction bases and that his aryan races had better stats and could clear dungeons better.
Great analysis of Monty and Eisenhower TIK. Your videos are truly worth watching IMMEDIATELY on Monday mornings. Keep up the great work!!!
TIK, I was wondering where I could find the 'key' which defines the task group rectangles and the symbols on them? Any links to that would be greatly appreciated!
Hey TIK! May I just comment that since you have put your Stalingrad series on hiatus, you visibly seem to be much happier doing these videos. You also appear to have more enthusiasm (not that you didn't have any to begin with) and appear passionate about the topics you are discussing.
A very good video!
It's funny, but German Generals felt the same way about being transferred to the West!
Never has any other channel made me think more critically and provide me with new info about ww2 than TIK. Honestly thank you for your work, really has helped to give me fresh perspectives towards this period in time.
It's been said that WWII was mainly a war of mass production (and supply) -- won by replacing planes, tanks, etc., faster than the enemy. This site does a fine job cutting through the often-biased accounts of historians and getting to the truth.
If Monty had better presentation skills and Patton not such a glory hunter, together they probably could have sold the narrow front plan to Eisenhower and have a pincer attack into Germany with the British & Canadians in the North & Patton in the south. Both Generals would have wanted to reach Berlin first of course. Certainly if the Canadians had have sorted Antwerp quicker then the supply from there to the British would have been quicker and Pattons 3rd Army getting priority over the other US Armies it may have shortened the war and changed history.
A reasonable comment.
TIK is the history channel I click immediately, it's up there with King's and generals, Mark Felton and Epic History.
Great list. I'd add Drachinifel, Yarnhub and The Armchair Historian.
Mark Felton??? Really? He is a silly propagandist. He makes politiced episodes aimed at brainwashing his viewers into the narrative of UK warmongering foreign policy. I don't respect that dude at all.
For navy history, add Drachinifel!
montemayor
@@Fjodor.Tabularasa You'll delete your message after people disagreeing with you. Mark Felton is a brilliant channel and it's definitely not full of propaganda lol
"in other words, don't stick to tanks!" I couldn't have said it better. I really enjoy all your videos and while I understand the personal toll you pay for producing them I am always grateful for your content. I do wonder if you have thought about branching into other areas of history (other than WW2) I know this increases the burden of understanding but I also know that people that are interested in history seldom stick to a single topic, do you have any other historical periods you are interested in?
I do have other areas - I mean, I've done videos on the inter-war period already. However I'm open to suggestions. What periods of history interest you the most?
@@TheImperatorKnight Well that's quite the opened ended question, as a child I enjoyed the ancient Roman/Greek/Egyptian periods. For my A levels I studied UK politics specifically the formation of universal suffrage, from a few having the vote, right through to WW1, which at the time wasn't that interesting, although it did give me a reason to watch black adder the third 🤣 but given the current political climate it has been very good at giving context to the world and has helped me to understand and question some of the narratives being pushed these days. I'm a strong believer in the understanding past event so that we don't repeat them and given what's happening right now in the world have you thought about going into the cold war, to give perspective on current events?
@@TheImperatorKnight I know it would be a big jump but have you ever thought about doing some work on the late Roman republic era? Caesar in Gaul, first expeditions into Britain, Pompeian civil war, fall of republic and start of the Empire, all of this incredible history is jammed into a few decades. I know it’s been covered a lot but I think it would bring some new viewers and could be a nice change of pace for you to help with the burnout. Don’t get me wrong I love your WWII work, it’s just a suggestion since I’m currently reading the Landmark Caesar work right now and it’s just fantastic 😅
@@Dan-by1jd lmao why are you being so vague about "universal suffrage" and "narratives these days"
@@TheImperatorKnightHow about the role that logistics played during the American Civil War?
Amazing video I always love when you do videos more focused on logistics it's a subject that really fascinates me
I am a American and a History buff , and I have to say I think Monty's plan was a good plan ,if for no other reason then a logistical advantage
How wide was the front for Barbarossa ?
@@nickdanger3802 Did the Germans invade France on a broad front? No, they concentrated their forces in the Ardennes.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- If you are talking about the 1940 German Attack, while the main thrust was by Army A in the Ardennes, Army Group B attack through the Low Countries drawing the BEF and France forces into Belgium. Also, Army Group C facing the Maginot Line, with the role of stopping France moving force north to the Somme. Clearly it was a broad front approach with the concentration in the center.
Remember that the British launch a counterattack at Arras that threaten to cutoff the head of the German advance.
@@johnlucas8479 German tactics in general were focused on concentration of force ( Schwerpunkt) The German’s attacked on a narrow front using overwhelming numbers against the defenders at that point, with the French being unable to react quickly enough to reduce the odds.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Poland 1939 Germany Plan
Main Army South attacking from Germany Silesia and Moravian and Slovak Border 8th Army driving easy towards Lodz, 14th Army towards Krakow 10th Army (with Armour) driving with a northeastward thrust into heart of Poland.
Second route Army Group B from Northern Prussia included 3rd Army from Eastern Prussia.
Barbarossa: 3 Army Group North toward Leningrad, Centre Moscow and South toward Ukraine.
Norway Targets on day 1 Narvik, Bergen, Olso, Trondheim, Kristiansand, and Arendal.
Clearly German tactics did not focus on a concentration of force.
France Army Group B attacking in the lowland, while Army Group A attack through the Ardennes. Clearly not a narrow Front.
One concern I have with the narrow front strategy is it assumes the Germans could not scrape a decent force together to slam into the flank. Also, Monty's insistence he command the thrust was politically suicidal, Ike knew it. If SHAEF ran it, the politics would be better and more palatable to the US and others than if Monty ran it.
Monty reminds of MacArthur; a semi-competent commander who believed his own hyped and thus angered many around him. Unlike MacArthur, Monty did not manage to irritate someone who was willing to can him outright for being the insubordinate jackass he was.
MacArthur didn't manage it during WWII, either, and I'm not aware of Monty getting the chance afterwards.
@@boobah5643 Thats the rub, MacArthur got his second chance to fuck around, so someone decided he should find out.
@@boobah5643 well, he DID get command of both 1st US Army and 9th US Army during the Battle of the Bulge and post-war, he was appointed to be deputy of NATO, so clearly he did get the chance, but with the US being the big fish in the ETO, and Montgomery being personally on the nose with a few select (but pivotal) US commanders, he was severely curtailed thereafter!
Monty originally wanted 20 divisions to attack with another 20 protecting the flank.
Calling him semi-competent shows you’re clueless.
Monty was easily the most successful Western Allied ground commander of WW2 by some way. He took more ground through more countries while facing more quality German opposition than any other Western Allied ground commander. This is not opinion. This is historical fact. Montgomery was the most decisive ground commander the Western Allies had in WW2.
Could you even list Monty’s victories in WW2?
Montgomery was the most competent and most savvy Western Allied ground commander of WW2. Nobody did as much to win the ground war in the west than Bernard Montgomery. Nobody.
With the supply problems in mind.
The Western Allies attack across Europe always reminded me of driving in heavy rush hour traffic.
The front jumps forward makes headway before coming to a crushing stop, meanwhile just as the front is stopping the rear areas(supplies) are snapping forward to catch up only to come to a stop at the back of the front....who is now just getting going again...
But without enough gas.
Caught up to your videos TIK. Well done, I like your analysis of Monty's role during the Battle of the Bulge.
Oh wow! I know you've been saying you wanted to catch up for a while, so it's great to see you do it! I'm interested to hear what you think of this video, because it's like the Battle of the Bulge video and shares some points with it
@@TheImperatorKnight I will take a look today and make a comment later. Your Stalingrad series is great. I know you burnt out on it, but feel proud at what you accomplished. I am a Patron of you for your hard work. :)
@@vassilizaitzev1 Too bad that the Stalingrad Battle Storm series cost TIK so dearly , because I love it. However, all understanding for this and I like to tune in on TIK's channel at 6 am every Monday.
@@TheImperatorKnight I suspect you are probably already planning enough things to keep you busy until 2080 or something, but I would love to see you do an episode or several on the head honchos of the Allies and the clichés that do the rounds about them. As you allude to: Monty alone would be worth an enormous amount of time. I'm sure you can put some fresh perspectives on their biographies. And hell yes, get political. For what other reason than politics are wars fought anyway?
You are not supposed to enjoy these so much!!! : )))))))
Excellent context and a great joining of dots, etc. So many thanks, stay safe, have fun and don't get caught.
Great video and thanks TIK:
IMHO - a great book to read is "The War between the Generals". It gives a great insight as to what was going on behind the front lines at SHAEF.
-One of the reasons Market-Garden was greenlit was that it used airborne divisions (who used minimal fuel and sitting in England at 100% combat readiness) and XXX Corp alone making fuel demands acceptable.
3x Corps advanced for Market-Garden. XXX Corps in the Center thrust, VIII Corps and XII Corps both advanced slightly along the flanks. Unfortunately, the combination of terrain and logistics meant that they could not advance far, and they would not secure XXX Corps' flanks, allowing the Germans to cut the corridor.
American sources almost always paint Montgomery as being way too cautious. It's cool to get another perspective.
I understand the hatred of Monty, but at the same time, I think historians let their blatant NATIONALIST views cloud their judgement. Yes, Monty's attitude sucked, and he himself was "pro-British". But it's okay to give credit to someone you dislike when they do something right. Monty did make mistakes, but he also did good things. They're throwing the baby out with the bathwater.
@@TheImperatorKnight A lot of American historians definitely have nationalist tendencies. It's the "America won WWII" thing.
@@TheImperatorKnight TIK you should do a video on the Falaise Gap controversy
Was Market Garden the brainchild of a cautious man?
@@Perkelenaattori the whole Gatwick scheme honestly is like that.
Also I fully think it was worth the punt, purely on the basis of potential rewards yielded if successful
I have always thought that Montgomery was a bold commander. You look at his repeated attempts to encircle Rommel after El Alamein, the way he "bounced" Rommel out of Tripoli, the bold moves to enter Tunisia, the partial successes/failures of Goodwood, Falaise and Market-Garden, and you can see he was a daring commander. His biggest problem was that he could come up with imaginative and bold strategies, but those under his command never quite seemed to be able to fulfill a lot of them. I am not disparaging the commanders, but rather that Monty's visions were possibly grander than what the men under his command could accomplish. I suspect if he had been a German commander he would likely have been another von Manstein or Guderian.
There was no failure by Montgomery in North Africa. No failure in Normandy either read Bradley's book
Lee's COM Z not subordinated to SHAEF. Never noticed that before. That is completely insane. Well done as always.
I can kind of understand why to an extent. The US was waging two completely separate wars on different sides of the planet, both thousands of miles away from its own shores. Logistics was paramount to the United States' overall agenda, not just in the European theater. By all means it could have been handled better, but it wasn't necessarily an insane decision.
@@stevej71393
It was insane. It made sense in Washington, but not on the battlefield.
Always looking out for Monday afternoon 18.00 CET
Videos like this make my day, keep it up old chap.
Interesting that you went with Canada's modern flag. I'm curious, why not the old one?
Probably recognition for people with limited historically knowledge, these are the type of videos to be quite approached to laymen.
Tbf they also use the modem us flag to
"You're not wrong, Monty. You're just an asshole."
- Ike "The Dude" Eisenhower
This is on record?
Ike deserved a special medal just for dealing simultaneously with Monty and Patton's egos. That was a task for a really capable commander.
And that's where he should have remained, being a desk man politician, not taking over ground strategy over the heads of experienced battlefield commanders. This insistence of Eisenhower's stalled the allied advance for six months, with even a retreat thrown in.
Eisenhower had a massive ego of his own. Don't buy into Stephen Ambrose's myths.
@@lyndoncmp5751 Yes!
@@zen4men
👍
Experienced? When the odds were even monty got his sorry little self smacked of the continent. And only won with advantages any other genral would have. Winston ran out of officers to sack and got stuck with him - which he regetted
Imo, the best type of video from TIK. Awesome!
Brilliant im going to have to go back and re-watch Market Garden now
Lovely! Always makes my Monday when TiK posts. Wonderful. Cheers
Based upon everything and looking at this from a slightly separate angle, why not apply a narrow front strategy along the coast and having that turn east and evolve into a broad front? Since we know that logistics win wars and they were hyper focused on ports, then going narrow towards Antwerp and stretching that into a broad front that moves east seems like a much better option than going narrow to go east OR a broad front to go east. I don't have any understanding, of the coastal areas or anything else. This is strictly basing the question upon what little I can derive from the map.
Although I severely dislike UA-cam's censorship, I find your solutions to them absolutely hilarious @TIKhistory.
"Madman, such an idiot" made me laugh out loud but "Naughty camps" made me laugh even harder.
One of your better productions. Your final comment says it all, don't stick to tanks. The Allies had numerous considerations, you identified many. You illustrate just how complex these decisions are, even with our benefit of hindsight. Thanks for the perspective.
Best closer you've done in a video to date. Bravo!
The rail network south of Paris had been left in usable condition to route supplies from the third mulberry harbour in the gulf of Morbihan. This harbour was never built and the Americans didn't fancy capturing Bordeaux, all of which made logistics much worse.
Cannot complain it's not a Battlestorm Stalingrad, but it's a TIK history video...great content as always 👍 👍
cant have the man burn out before we get a battlestorm: kursk
I have book that mentions a lot of interesting things about monty although it's more of autobiography which obviously means some stuff has been changed to not give himself a bad rep. But, it's nice to see what he said himself and what actually happens and it's quite refreshing tbh as it shows the same scenario over different perspectives. I mean the autobiography might not be useful for historical purposes depending on what it is but still quite interesting.
I'm told that Hamilton's 3 volume biography of Monty is terrific. As you are into biography . . ..
@@brucebartup6161 yeah thanks,I just like seeing how it autobiographies translate over to the actual events kinda like how Caesar portrays himself as someone who is never in the wrong in some of his personal notes when we know he's just tryna avoid the blame for his own blunders
Regarding the broad front versus narrow front approach, I too agree that the broad front strategy was, in the long run, the better approach. The narrow front envisioned by Montgomery would still have encountered supply problems and ground to a halt, and would have given a single location for the Germans to focus their counterattacks on. The broad front strategy, that we first used to end WW1, entailed not only stretching out the German forces, but making them guess as to where the next attack would hit (and therefore where they should place their reserves). In WW1 it worked well - I have read that about 1/3rd the German army spent 1918 running from offensive to offensive, but never having a chance to engage. I think Eisenhower was aiming for this strategy in 1944, but didn't have the logistical support to do it (not to mention Hodges getting 1st Army stuck in the Huertgen Forest for 4 months!). The strategy did finally pay off in 1945, when the Allies broke through on multiple fronts.
But the concentrated northern thrust in September would have cut off Antwerp reached the Ruhr (the German industrial heartland) sooner. Both of these would have had enormous benefit to ending the war sooner. The broad front failed to achieve these objectives quickly.
Metz was not important. The Ruhr was.
Brilliant - thank you. Too many people do not understand the evolving logistics during this period - too much ink has been spilled over Flag officer personalities.
Just brilliant ,very well researched and narrated .
This is great! As much as I love the Battlestorm series, I have to admit these other topics is in a way a breath of fresh air.
Agreed!
Hey TIK, I'm curious if you could recommend be a book about the Royal Romanian Army in WW2. A general analysis or something like that
I'll be honest there's only a handful of books in English on the Romanians, and the only one I've read is Axworthy's "Third Axis, Fourth Ally". I can definitely recommend it though as it's good.
@@TheImperatorKnight Well, I know about "Third Axis, Fourth Ally" but I didn't find it anywhere.
I think I remember Gen. Horrocks, might have been on the World at War, regretting he didn't push XXX Corps on at Antwerp. "Napoleon would have hooked left. Horrocks did not."
The narrow front strategy is essentially "cutting off the head of the snake" ie the German industrial output. Such a blow would be as crippling as taking Berlin.
The starting premise that Monty could have brought the war to an earlier conclusion is just "Madman Monty" speculation that all they had to do was kick in the door and the Germans would collapse. This is obviously untrue. They didn't collapse after Falaise and they didn't collapse during Market/Garden. Monty was doing his best to not follow the Broad Front plan by almost ignoring the ports and focusing on Eastward "map" gains. Monty's seeming successful deep penetration was just following the path of least resistance. The Germans were holing up and concentrating their defense on the ports. Logistics didn't cause Monty to bypass the vital ports and leave lesser forces to lay siege to them. The Americans similarly bypassed the Brittany ports, but those while useful, wouldn't solve the lengthy overland transport issues. Even if logistics had been shifted to Monty and he somehow made it to the Zuiderzee, it would have been tenuous at best. The 15th Army likely would have held out for months, like all the other bypassed ports.
On top of that, halting Patton would only allow the Germans to focus even more resources against Monty. They probably, depending on weather, could have succesfully done their Wacht am Rhein earlier against Monty's overextended and exposed salient.
Monty's proposal to Eisenhower to envelop the Ruhr with 40 Allied divisions instead of spreading the Allies out on a Broad front would have shortened WW2.
In an interview after the war Von Rundstedt himself stated that there was no way the Germans could have prevented such a concentrated thrust from enveloping the Ruhr in the autumn of 1944; the necessary German Forces simply did not exist.
How do you know it would have stop the war.
From what I read about Montgomery proposal which is date late August 1944 with the Allied Armies at the Seine River.
You would record that November Montgomery warned Eisenhower that the lines in the Ardennes region was thinly held and that there were no strategic reserves.
Assuming that a division can hold a defensive line of 20 klms against light opposition.
On the 23rd of August Montgomery Army Group of 40 Division start north with 1st Canadian on left, then the 2nd British, then 1st US and the 3rd US on the right.
The distance from the Seine River to Belgium Border is approximately 280 Klms. So, by the time Montgomery Army Group reach the border, the 1st Canadian Army of 6 Division would have been deployed with the task of opening up the Channel Ports. Patton's 3rd Army would be responsible for expose right flank would require 14 Division to cover the right flank.
That would leave the Montgomery with 20 Divisions. With his supply line reaching back to Cherbourg and the Normandy Beaches until the channel ports are open.
If the drive continues to Eindhoven the distance would be approximately 200 Klms. That would require an additional 10 Division to be allocated to protect the right flank.
The distance from Antwerp to Eindhoven is approximately 80 Klms so to cover the left flank will require 4 divisions.
That would leave Montgomery just 6 division plus any additional division that would have arrived in France to continue his advance to the Ruhr.
Just looking at the distances this Army Group would need to travel to reach the Ruhr, Montgomery would have run out of Divisions due to the need to protect his exposed flanks.
The 21st Army Group started north on the 23rd of August, but by the 17th of September it could only committed 6 divisions to support operation Market Garden.
@@johnlucas8479
You should look at the situation facing the allies when Montgomery tried, in vain, to get a concentration of allied resources for an advance into Germany.
@@thevillaaston7811 “You should look at the situation facing the allies when Montgomery tried, in vain, to get a concentration of allied resources for an advance into Germany.”
Base on Montgomery Memoirs on the 17th August he outline his plan of 40 division as 1 solid mass of 40 Division that would move north-eastwards.
From what I have read the allied situation is as follows:
1) The German forces in the west was in retreat
2) The only operating ports were Cherbourg and Mulberry Harbour at Arromanches.
3) Number of Division was 37 21st Army Group 16 12th Army Group 21
4) The Allied cross the Siene River around 18th to 20th August.
5) Paris Fell on the 25th.
The point I was making that even the single thrust would not have reach Germany before it would be force to stop due to supply issues.
We know historically that the Germans were able to start recovery in early September, which Montgomery acknowledge by cancelling Operation Comet and expanding it into Market Garden.
If you just look at the distances that would need to be covered to reach Germany from the Seine. Ask yourself until the Channel Ports are open both the 12th and 21st Army Group supply line will stretch all the way back to Cherbourg and Arromamches.
I give you an example, the distance from Arromanches to Rouen on the Seine River is approximately 160 klms, if we assume a 2 ½ ton truck can travel at 40 KPH, the round trip would take 8 Hours (160 x 2/40). Assuming the truck operates 24 hours per day. It would deliver 7 ½ tons per day.
The distance from Rouen to Antwerp is approximately 380 Klms. For a truck to do the round trip would require 19 hours (380 x 2 / 40), if you add on the trip Arromanches to Rouen of 8 hours. The total round trip will take 27 Hours just to deliver 2 ½ tons of supplies.
If you start at Cherbourg the distance to Paris is approximately 360 Klms which would require 18 Hours, if the advance continue to Aachen a additional distance of 420 Klms The total distance from Cherbourg of 780 Klm and the time for the round trip from Cherbourg to Aachen would be 39 Hours to deliver the 2 ½ tons of supplies.
The Channel ports:
1) Dieppe captured 2nd September by the 9th 7,000 tons were being unloaded daily.
2) Le Harve captured 12/13 th September open for traffic 9th October 3,650 tons
3) Boulogne captured 23rd September open 18th November
4) Calais captured 1st October open 20th November.
Only Dieppe would provide additional supplies during September.
According to RW Thompson (Montgomery Field Marshall the Campaign in North West Europe 1944-45) on page 120 states the following:
Montgomery conception of the ground force command was (a) To command 21st Army Group concentrating on the 2nd Army. (b) to co-ordinate the movement of the Alien (US) flanking army. (I assume the 1st US) (c) To ground the rest. (I assume the 1st Canadian and 3rd US)
On page 178 18th of September Montgomery returned to his attack of strategy of the Supreme Commander. Again, he urged Eisenhower to strip all troops except for 21st Army Group and Us 1st Army of all transports and everything else to support one single Knife-like Drive toward Berlin. (the distance from Arnhem to Berlin 600 Klms)
On the 16th of September Hitler started his planning for December Ardennes offensive.
Page 179
On the 20th of October the Combined Chief of Staff in Washington came to the conclusion that the chance of winning the war in 1944 had disappeared. Only the early capture of Antwerp and it approaches might have made such a result possible.
Supply problem facing the Allied late August early September would have stop Montgomery advance before he reaches Germany. Historically he stop 2nd Army in early September.
That my view base on distances and the time line of when ports were open.
@@johnlucas8479
Montgomery met Bradley on the 17th August, and spoke about Montgomery’s proposal that 40 allied divisions should move together towards Germany. Montgomery went away from that meeting in the belief that Bradley had agreed with that proposal.
Montgomery met Eisenhower on 23rd August and proposed that, given the allied logistic situation, half of the allied divisions in Europe could kept on the offensive, if they were priotitized over the remaining divisions, but if no such prioritisation took place, then the whole allied advance would grind to halt. Montgomery proposed that the British 2nd Army, and US 1st Army could advance in the North to the Ruhr with such priotization. Failing that, Montgomery agree to the US 1st, and US 3rd Armies advancing into Germany, South of the Ardennes. Eisenhower did neither, for political reasons, and the whole allied advance ground to a halt.
By the time that Eisenhower met Montgomery again on the 10th September, Eisenhower had taken on the role of allied land forces commander, and he again refused to concentrate allied resources into a plan that keep at least as sizeable part of allied resources on the move. He did however, agree to a limited undertaking, MARKET GARDEN, which was designed to give the allies a bridgehead over the Rhine, and to take the allies to the Ijsselmeer in the hope that such a move would degrade the German V-2 rocket campaign against Britain. The evidence is clear that it was not an attempt to reach Berlin, and that it was not expected to end the war in Europe soon…
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LIMITED 1948
P336
‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.'
His words.
Further, on the 9th September 1944, Montgomery had received this message from the VCIGS, General Nye:
'Two rockets so called V.2 landed in England yesterday. Believed to have been fired from areas near ROTTERDAM and AMSTERDAM.
Will you please report most urgently by what approximate date you consider you can rope off the Coastal area contained by ANTWERP-UTRECHT-ROTTERDAM. When this area is in our hands the threat from this weapon will probably have dis-appeared.'
There can little doubt that if Arnhem had been taken then the GARDEN forces would have struck North, to the Ijsselmeer in order to stop the flow of V2 rocket equipment and supplies into the Western provinces of the Netherlands, before ground forces were turned Eastwards towards Germany.
MONTY
The Field-Marshal
1944-1976
NIGEL HAMILTON
HAMISH HAMILTON
LONDON 1986
P49
[Montgomery, when interviewed by Chester Wilmot] ‘I knew now [the time of Eisenhower’s visit on 10 September 1944] that we could not hope to get much more than a bridgehead beyond the Rhine before Winter, and be nicely poised for breaking out in the New Year. By the time MARKET GARDEN was undertaken [The revised airdrop on Arnhem] its significance was more tactical than strategic.’
‘Monty’s statement is supported by the evidence of Tedder himself, when interviewed just after the war by the American Official Historian, Dr Pogue:
‘Monty had no idea of going to Berlin from here [Arnhem]. By this time he was ready to settle for a position across the Rhine.’
In a signal to the British Chief of Air Staff (Air-Marshall Portal) immediately after 10 September meeting, Tedder stated that ‘the advance to Berlin was not discussed as a serious issue.’
And the 21st Army Group report into MARKET GARDEN:
‘21 Army Group Operations
OPERATION “MARKET GARDEN”
17-26 Sept 1944
Page 3
SECTION 2
SUMMARY OF SECOND BRITISH ARMY PLAN, OPERATION “MARKET GARDEN”
GENERAL
2. The object of Second Army, (with airborne forces under command after landing), was to position itself astride the rivers MAAS, WAAL AND NEDE RIJN in the general area GRAVE 6253 - NIJMEGEN 7062, ARNHEM E 7575 and to dominate the country to the NORTH as far as the ZUIDER ZEE, thereby cutting off communications between GERMANY and the LOW COUNTRIES.’
Thanks go to you for drawing attention to this.
MONTGOMERY
ALAN MOOREHEAD
HAMISH HAMILTON LTD. 1946
P 214
‘Arnhem was an incident magnified far beyond its strategic importance by the peculiar and exciting circumstances and poignant tragedy of the stranded parachutists. Actually, only a handful of divisions was involved, the over-all losses were small and apart from the magnificent outburst of courage the battle had no more significance than half a dozen actions that were fought that same winter.’
79 years later, it is clear, given situation that faced the allies after Montgomery’s victory in Normandy, and with the benefit of hindsight, that Mongomery’s appreciation of the allied situation at that time, and what should be done moving forward was the correct one.
The seems to be allied understanding of the German situation from evidence from allied forces, and from intelligence sources presented a (correct) picture of German armies in the West…
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 26.08 44:
‘Two and a half months of bitter fighting, culminating for the Germans in a blood-bath big enough even for their extravagant tastes, have brought the end of the war in Europe within sight, almost within reach. The strength of the German Armies in the West has been shattered, Paris belongs to France again, and the Allied Armies are streaming towards the frontiers of the Reich’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 04.09 44:
[the German forces facing British 2nd Army] ‘are no longer a cohesive force but a number of fugitive battlegroups, disorganised and even demoralised, short of equipment and arms’
SHAEF Intelligence Summary, 16.09 44:
‘the enemy has now suffered , in the West alone, losses in men and equipment that can never be repaired in this war….No force can, then, be built up in the West sufficient for a counteroffensive or even a successful defensive.’
CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE
WM. COLLINS, SONS AND CO LTD.
1954
P523
When the British tanks drove into Amiens that morning [31.08.44] they passed within a mile of Seventh German Army H.Q,. where Dietrich was in the act of handing over command of the Somme sector to Eberbach. Dietrich managed to slip away, but before Eberbach could move his newly acquired command post it was overrun and he was taken prisoner as he tried to escape in a Volkswagen. In another car the British discovered a marked map, which revealed not only the Somme defences, but also the chaos which prevailed throughout the Wehrmacht in the West.
At that time, the Germans had fewer tanks and artillery pieces in the area North of the Ardennes than had been in Britain after Dunkirk.
The logistical situation was already easing as the allies moved into September, with the allied armies already getting 14,000 tons of supplies per day…
Dieppe was liberated on the 1st September, and was operational four days later to give the allies another 3,000 tons per day, enough for the 1st Canadian army. Ostend was operational by the 28th of that month. October saw Le Havre (exclusively for US use), operational on the 13th, and Boulogne became operational on the 22nd. Calais became operational during November.
Further, the road and rail network in the allied rear was improving by the day.
By how much the war would have been shortened, and how far the allies would have got into Germany in the late Summer, and Autumn of 1944, due to a sensible concentration of allied resources is a matter that cannot be determined. That such a concentration of resources would have been the correct decision, is be beyond dispute.
Montgomery went into Normandy with a clear plan of how the OVERLORD campaign would unfold, and gave the allies a huge victory. Only those that want split hairs can find serious falt with that plan. Eisenhower squandered the fruits of Montgomery's victory by adopting a plan that put political considerations ahead of military considerations, a plan that could have been devised by a fourteen-year-old.
Eisenhower’s ‘Broad Front ‘strategy brought the allied advance to a halt, and gave the Germany the continuing use of the Ruhr until well into 1945, and in a broader sense, gave the Germans what they most needed after their catastrophe in Normandy, time, and space to rebuild their armies in the West. A look at German production in the Ruhr after Eisenhower’s fateful decision, and the make-up of the German forces in the Ardennes attack, make this clear.
The immediate beneficiary of the ‘Broad Front’ mistake was Nazi Germany. The longer-term beneficiary was the USSR, who went into the Yalta conference knowing how much of Germany they could gobble up, and also, due to US leaders failing to recognize the importance of the Italian campaign, in a commanding position in the Balkans.
Harsh but fair.
@@thevillaaston7811 This is what Alan Brooke (Montgomery Boss) said
"Triumph in the West" Arthur Bryant page 232
"October 5th 1944
"I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault. Instead of carrying out the advance to Arnhem he ought to have made of Antwerp in the first place."
Clearly, it was recognized to late that Antwerp was the key for a successful drive into Germany, either by Montgomery single thrust or Eisenhower broad Front.
Monty wanted to glorify himself and by doing that, many soldiers lost their lives.
'Monty wanted to glorify himself'
How so?
You don't read evidently mum or d-day daddy didn't either
Nice work man, I always learn so much with your documentaries. I appreciate your efforts to provide a neutral comprehensive overview. Graphics look good.
Excellent presentation. I confess I never understood the real aim of Market Garden, although I have often wondered what one armoured division over the Rhine at the end of a tenuous supply line would have been able to achieve, if the aim was to capture the Ruhr (and then on to Berlin). Regarding the Broad Front versus Narrow Front debate, because of the politics of Coalition Warfare, the Narrow Front was never going to be an option and it would have been better to have accepted that in advance. Thanks TIK!
except you're disregarding the fact that with Market Garden, it wasn't one armoured division, it was three army corps that were making the assault. The problem was that due to the fuel shortage issues, the other two flanking corps couldn't get their start at the same time so were always too far behind. The "plan" was a good plan and even the Germans thought so - the execution was screwed over by a) Gavin not taking his primary objective, causing XXX Corps to be left on the wrong side of the Waal for too long, and b) Eisenhower not having the balls to say to Bradley, NO, you are NOT going to have the use of half of IX Troop Carrier Command from the 17th to the 20th of September, so that we can drop ALL of the airborne elements on day 1 - IX Troop Carrier Command was created to drop the airborne troops, not to act as FedEx for 12AG, but that's what they were doing!!!!
To hurry along the liberation of Antwerp to allow more supplies to be landed.
@@johneyton5452 a successful Market Garden would have rendered the need for Antwerp to be mostly superfluous, as it would have potentially opened Rotterdam, instead
Yes only a bridgehead across the Rhine was the goal (as far as a Ruhr manoeuvre is concerned). After moving north to cut off the Netherlands and open Antwerp, no move on the Ruhr could have occurred without the US 1st Army to the south moved eastwards in tandem. They needed to get beyond Aachen first, and they had a tough time with that.
Suggest we are looking at different scenarios. Agree with your points if Market Garden had been part of what might be called Monty's "Plan A"...that is a full blooded "narrow front" northern thrust. That wasn't the case and what intrigues me about TIK's presentation is the question what was the plan/objective...assuming the bridge at Arnhem had been captured and Guards Armoured had got across the NederRijn...in the actual circumstances (including the prevailing supply constraints) that Market Garden was conducted. I've never really seen this considered in any detail...I went back and quickly checked Neillands and Wilmot ("Struggle for Europe") and there's not much there about this. Horrocks' orders for XXX Corps are pretty clear though..."exploit north to the Zuider Zee".
I suspect the real answer is a bit more nuanced. Eisenhower appears to have seen the operation as a way of extending his broad front to the north. I suspect Monty hadn't given up on his "Northern Thrust" plan and if a bridgehead over the Rhine had been secured he would have been in a stronger position to argue the case for reinforcing success. Even in those circumstances, however, Eisenhower would probably still have stuck with the broad front approach, because of the broader "political" considerations.
This episode was just brilliant!
Well done, and thank you for doing this video. I think you covered all the major issues and certainly did a great job of picking up on points that a lot of (professional?) authors miss. I find the same problems of fighting the conventional narrative or orthodoxy whenever the Montgomery haters (it's almost like a religion) vent their spleen over Market Garden. (By the way, it was Lindquist. Gavin was just his boss, and was very angry when he found out his divisional plan was not followed at Nijmegen against zero opposition and knew this had probably compromised the entire operation - Ref: Phil Nordyke - Put Us Down In Hell, 2012).
A good reference on the German 15.Armee during this period is Jack Didden and Maarten Swarts' new book - The Army That Got Away - The 15.Armee in the Summer of 1944 (2022). It's effectively a prequel to their first book, Autumn Gale (Herbststurm) - Kampfgruppe Chill, schwere Heeres Panzer-Jäger-Abteilung 559 and the German recovery in the Autumn of 1944 (2013). These books are heavy, expensive, limited print runs, and based on detailed research of primary sources, aimed at people seriously interested in these topics instead of the pulp mass-market Montgomery-hating orthodoxy.
I know you say it was Lindquist, but I disagree. In the post-op interviews of both Gavin and Lindquist undertaken by Capt Westover, Lindquist denied ever getting the verbal orders to head straight for the bridge and his written orders clearly show he was to secure the heights first, which he did. Westover came to the conclusion that there was no misunderstanding and that these written orders did not take place. Look at the appendix of "Lost at Nijmegen" as the broad content of the interviews is in there, along with the operational orders for 508PIR. I think Gavin threw Lindquist under a bus, personally, and Pollussen's work backs that up
@@sean640307 - the "Field Order NO.1, 508 PIR" reproduced in the appendix of Poulussen (Lost At Nijmegen, 2011) was from "Hq 508 Prcht Inf... 13 September 1944" and signed "LINDQUIST Commanding" - these were HIS detailed orders to his Regimental units outlining the specific initial objectives for the Regiment on the Groesbeek ridge. They were not GAVIN's orders to LINDQUIST.
Section 2. a. reads -
", be prepared to seize WAAL River crossing at Nijmegen (714633) on Div order"
Section 3. x. (6) reads -
"All Bns will be prepared to attack to the N, within their sectors to seize WAAL River crossing at NIJMEGEN (714633)."
Lindquist relies on this to suggest he was not to move until given the order to do so from Division HQ. In question 2 in his interview with Westover, the Q&A were:
2. GENERAL GAVIN said that he gave you orders to move directly into NIJMEGEN?
"As soon as we got into position we were told to move into NIJMEGEN. We were not told on landing. We were actually in position when I was told to move on"
A more full account is revealed in Phil Nordyke's combat history of the 508th - Put Us Down In Hell (2012):
Chapter 9: 'Put Us Down In Hell' -
Captain Chet Graham was assigned as the regimental liaison officer with division headquarters. "I sat in on a high level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important. He was also told to stay out of the city and to avoid city streets. He told Lindquist to use the west farm area to get to the bridge as quickly as possible as the bridge was the key to the division's contribution to the success of the operation."
[Note, there's no date associated with Chet Graham's testimony, but I would surmise that Lindquist left this briefing to go and write his Field Order dated 13 September, but it is a divisional briefing days BEFORE departure for Holland]
Chapter 10: 'Use Trench Knives and Bayonets' -
Captain Ben Delamater, the battalion’s executive officer, got the command post organised. "The regimental commanding officer [Colonel Roy Lindquist], with his radio operator and two Dutch interpreters from the British army soon followed us onto our first objective. The planned defenses were being set up when several civilians wearing arm bands and carrying Underground credentials of some sort told the colonel that the Germans had deserted Nijmegen, that the town and the highway bridge were lightly held. The regimental CO had been instructed that if the initial mission were accomplished to 'go ahead and take the highway bridge if you can.' This division order was perfectly understood in relation to the primary missions and was not a weak, conditional order as might be supposed offhand.”
“The regimental and battalion COs then planned to send one platoon of C Company [led by Lieutenant Bob Weaver], plus the S-2 section, plus two light machine gun squads on a reconnaissance patrol to approach the bridge from the south."
Captain Chet Graham, the regimental liasion officer with division headquarters, decided to obtain a status of the progress toward the capture of the Nijmegen highway bridge. "I went to the 508th regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, 'As soon as the DZ is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.' So I went through Indian country to the division CP and relayed Lindquist's message to Gavin. I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his Jeep, he told me, 'come with me - let's get him moving.' On arriving at the 508th regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, 'I told you to move with speed.' "
Nordyke's chapters on Normandy, the 508th's first combat jump, are also very interesting, because there were command problems in the Regiment then. Some were sorted out by Division CO Matthew Ridgway, but in August Ridgway was promoted to CO XVIII Airborne Corps and Gavin took over. Gavin, however, failed to replace himself as Assistant Divisional Commander and he was running himself ragged doing both jobs during Market Garden, as well as carrying a painful jump injury to his spine. My impression is that these are the cumulative factors resulting in the command failure at Nijmegen.
@@sean640307 - there's also the question of what happened to Lt. Weaver's recon patrol into the city. Weaver was given an SCR-300 radio set on the Battalion net - the comms within a Company did not have the range. The patrol got split up and lost in the back streets of Nijmegen and ran into some small pockets of German rear echelon troops still in the city. Eventually they received a radio message that two Companies were being sent to the bridge (the result of Gavin finally telling Lindquist to move), so Weaver decided to withdraw.
However, there's an interesting story in Zig Borough's (vet 508th Demolition Platoon) book the 508th Connection (2013), a collection of letters and stories from 508th veterans:
Chapter 6: Holland, Operation Market Garden - Nijmegen bridge -
A battalion S-2 patrol led the way and reached the Nijmegen bridge during the daylight hours. Trooper Joe Atkins, HQ 1st, told that story: "I was called on to take the point going into Nijmegen. As we entered the city, a crowd of people gathered around us, and we had to push our way through. Three of us in the lead became separated from the other troopers behind us by the crowds of Dutch people. We three continued to make our way into the city until we came to the bridge. At the bridge, only a few German soldiers were standing around a small artillery weapon. I had a Thompson sub and a .45 pistol. The other two were armed with M1 rifles...”
“The Germans were so surprised; the six or seven defenders of the bridge gave up without resisting. We held the prisoners at the entrance to the bridge for about an hour. It began to get dark, and none of our other troopers showed up. We decided to pull back away from the bridge, knowing we could not hold off a German attack. The German prisoners asked to come with us, but we refused, having no way to guard them. As we were leaving, we could hear heavy equipment approaching the bridge."
The "heavy equipment" was undoubtedly SS-Hauptsturmführer Victor Gräbner's SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 9, which had come from Beekbergen via Arnhem bridge in the early evening of 17 September. Darkness fell at about 7:30-7:40 at that time of year, and they reached Nijmegen about the time Frost was moving into position at the north end of Arnhem bridge.
I haven't been able to positvely identify the handful of troops guarding the Nijmegen highway bridge at this time before the SS-Panzer troops started arriving. Nijmegen was host to the BdO - Befehlshaber der Ordnungspolizei - HQ for the 'Order Police' for the whole Netherlands equivalent to a division HQ under Generalmajor der Polizei Hellmuth Mascus, evacuated from Den Haag in 1943 when the Dutch coast became a potential invasion coast, and evacuated again from Nijmegen on receiving reports of the airborne landings. They left north for their training depot at Schalkhaar (near Deventer) and eventually settled in Zwolle, but I understand they left behind their Musikkorps-Zug (the divisional music band platoon), since there were no combat troops available.
I have some information that the bridges at Nijmegen and Grave were the responsibilty of a company from the Fallschirm-Panzer-Ersatz-und-Ausbildungs-Regiment 'Hermann Göring', which was the training unit for the Luftwaffe's only Panzer-Division (currently fighting in Poland) and was based in Utrecht. All three battalions of the training regiment were deployed to the front in the Belgian canal zone, but some other units were in reserve (including the tanks famously photographed by RAF Spitfire), and one of them was Kompanie 'Runge' under Hauptmann Max Runge, commander of the 21.ULK (Unter-Lehr-Kommando), which was the 21st (NCO) training company. I'm not clear on their exact dispositions at the time of the airborne landings, but some of them appeared to be forward deployed at Overasselt - the eastern end of the Maasbrug near Grave, and they evacuated as soon as they realised the paratroops were landing on both sides of the river and had them caught in a pincer. The ethnic German Dutchman tasked with detonating the bridge demolitions had failed to show up, so Kompanie Runge withdrew to the Maas-Waalkanaal bridges (road and rail) at Honinghutje, reinforcing the third rate home guard troops defending the canal bridges. When that bridge came under attack on the 18 September by the Americans, they tried to demolish the bridges - the rail bridge was destroyed but the road bridge only damaged - and withdrew into Nijmegen, where they were incorporated into the SS defences around the highway bridge and made their last stand on 20 September at the Villa Belvoir overlooking Hunner Park.
The 18 Germans the Dutch reported guarding the highway bridge on the first day could have been from either unit or another I haven't yet pinned down. I've been working on the Nijmegen story for a few years now and still putting the pieces together.
Another great episode TIK, good to have you back on the western front. Seriously I think your are really progressing the history hear especially with your maps that make it much easier even for historians to comprehend. I always wondered why the British did not have more divisions in north west Europe in WW2 compared to WW1 and now I know. Paton the second coming the equal of the “great” German generals who thought by racing off to Metz and seeing the Rhine while outrunning his logistics he would some how win the war was not dissimilar to some of the German plans in Barbarossa of Gedarian. No doubt Monty was an Arrogant ****hole however with guys like Bradly and Patton commanding along side you for 2 years it’s not hard to see why. Thank god for Eisenhower.
One of his best
Patton thought that by getting to the Westwall before it could be properly staffed, the Allies would avoid getting bogged down over the winter. He was likely correct, but we can't know for sure, as his advance was halted by the lack of supplies as you said.
I don't understand the criticism of "outrunning his logistics". The purpose of the western front was to advance into Germany as quickly as possible. Why is it Patton's fault for trying to do this, not the logistical train's fault for failing to adapt to changing realities of the war allowing for more rapid movement?
@@terpfen you say that as if the logistical train had a choice. They weren't just being lazy.
"I don't understand the criticism of "outrunning his logistics". The purpose of the western front was to advance into Germany as quickly as possible."
If you have resources for ONE breach over the Rhine, you better concentrate them and make it count. Patton's advance had more disadvantages than Monty's thrust into Belgium and Netherlands.
However, I don't understand why this is Patton's fault either: the buck stops at Eisenhower, and it is unclear that he understood the advantages of a narrow front (even back in Italy campaign).
@@terpfen
Because Patton didn’t take his objectives in Brittany.
Johnny ring the nurses station you are realizing hallucinations again. Patton could have closed the Gap in Falaise but Monty couldn't bare getting upstaged again
1. We need to take Antwerp. 2. We need to clear the Scheldt. 3. We need Market-Garden to cross the Rhine to help with 2. Look, we cleared the Scheldt. 4. Battle of the Bulge to take back Antwerp. 5. V-2 rockets rain down on Antwerp. Conclusion: Antwerp is important.
Ironic that Monty had let the Germans slip the Failaise gap through being slow. Then, when he got the resources for the Niegmegen offensive at the expense of Patton, he blew it again. When supplies ran low, Eisenhower would have been smarter to give the priority to Patton who could actually move fast.
@evinoshima9923 Is that what Hollywood told you? Monty was urging the Poles and Canadians attacking the gap to advance as quickly as possible, it was Bradley who refused to let Patton try and close the gap from the other flank.
And when exactly did Patton move fast in September 1944 when he was bogged down for 3 months at Metz? British forces advanced 350 miles in six days, it took Patton 2 weeks to advance 60 miles after Cobra.
Bradley claimed responsibility for failing to close the Falaise Gap as, he claimed, he doubted the 3rd US Army had the strength to hold the Germans back if they tried to break out, and he was afraid of potential friendly fire incidents if Patton moved into the British designated area - he did not consult Montgomery when he ordered Patton to halt at Argentan but did consult Eisenhower who supported him.
Patton's advance from Normandy came to a halt at least ten days before Market Garden was even an idea. The 3rd US Army began its campaign against Metz before Market Garden and continued during it and for months after it had ended. Patton's operations were in no way hindered by Market Garden because Eisenhower, despite officially giving 21st Army Group priority of supply during the operation, was not prepared to halt the advance of any other Allied Army to make sure it recieved it.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- "Montgomery accepted Bradley’s decision and ordered the Canadians to capture Falaise before turning east to close the gap at Trun and Chambois.
On the morning of Aug. 15, three Canadian divisions converged on Falaise, a town which the corps commander, Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, thought was the wrong objective. Simonds could not disobey orders, but he could decide to use his only reserve, the battered Polish Armoured Division, to manoeuvre around the German positions and strike south to meet the Americans at Chambois."
Legion Magazine Pocket Of Destruction: Closing The Falaise Gap
The idea that British forces were "stretched thin by the broad front advance" is non-sensical. If the Americans had been told to hold in place on the Seine while the British advanced along the north, they would have created massive salient. As forward facing British forces advanced towards Belgium and northern Germany, their southern flank would have become untenable. It would be British forces which would have had to peel away from the northeasterly advance to orient on potential threats from the east and southeast.
It is funny how British advocates talk about the "old men and boys" when it suits them, but then use Student's army to the east as rationale for why they could not muster the forces to open Antwerp. If the British had advanced to Antwerp, with the Americans holding position on the Seine, their frontal responsibilities would have doubled, if not tripled.
The broad front did not overstretch the British, it was the unexpectedly quick advances that overextended them. These are two different things. Overstretched forces have too much frontage to cover. Overextended forces have advanced beyond their supply systems ability to support them. Overextended forces culminate. Overstretched forces are outflank and destroyed. Can you say Operation Uranus? By generally advancing alongside the British, the Americans continued to provide the southeaster flank security that kept the British frontal area manageable.
Moreover, from Eisenhower's perspective, there was no assurance that the Germans were going to run all the way to Germany. The fact that everyone was surprised by the Germans failure to fight along the Seine does not mean that they would not stop to fight somewhere in France. The broad front advance culminated for lack of supplies. It happens. That does not mean that narrow front advances were the answer. Broad fronts stall. Salients are cut off and destroyed. Again, look to Stalingrad. Look to the Battle of the Bulge.
Monty's (and Patton's) desire to get all the supplies is understandable. This does not mean that either was right.
Thanks Tik. Great explanation. I'd never really given much thought to this phase of the war, because it seemed Germany was all but spent. Looks like you're enjoying the change from Stalingrad.
Loving the Western Front vids.
Never knew any of this. Much appreciated.
Hard to imagine military planners did not foresee a supply distribution problem. Capturing all the ports would not have made a huge difference unless the plan was to creep along the coast to Germany and make a right. This obviously wasn't the case since pre Normandy planning was to advance on a broad front. I'd bet faced with pressure, and need, to open a second front NOW, they went in KNOWING they would face supply distribution problems and to deal with it when it happened. Yes you can't do all the prep work you want to, sometimes you need to attack and accept problems to prevent bigger problems. Perhaps Germany stripping W. Europe of all women and children for labor camps, building defensive fortifications, stripping countries of every scrap of food, fuel, animals, who knows, wood, you can make gasoline from wood, it's like a qt per cubic yard but you can do it in a back yard with scrap equipment. If the war had gone on another year it's possible Germany's wonder weapons could have then dragged it out another year. It's possible Stalin with all of E. Europe might have gone, yeah, good enough. The broad front campaign planned before D Day I think shows the MAIN intent was to 'free France' ie, take as much land from Germans as possible as fast as possible to deprive them of resources, save civilians, and that given supply issues, would be most successful and useful option. Of course, politics means to this day this can't be mentioned as it did mean Germany would have industrial resources to fight off Russia longer, and MOST German resources went that way, it meant that those in other countries knew they were abandoned to the fate for many more months.
What I find amazing about both allies and Germany is both failed ignoring rail transport, with no alternative. Both needed to create engineering divisions, 100,000 strong, with supplies and equipment to salvage, relay (along with it's own rail etc), rail lines. Laying track is fast. Blowing and bulldozing routes are the time consuming parts. With gravel in place in 99% of the routes, and tracks in 80% of the routes, getting dual rail lines operating in 2 or 3 strategic corridors would have been easy. Rolling stock was gone as were engines, but rail maint vehicles are litterally trucks that run on two pairs of train wheels. It would have taken thousands of trucks, but in FAR better working conditions they would have lasted 10 x as long. Nor if it had been prioritized, would getting an LST with tracks laid in it beached and connected to rail lines so a locomotive on it could be moved to main lines been more than a one month issue after landing. Yes, there was a shortage of LSTs. One LST, one engine a day 30 engines in a month. Rolling stock could have been salvaged, not to same capacity but higher capacity than trucks. You need a flat bed with a train carriage at each end. Or short carriages with fixed pair of train wheels each end. A very long way of saying, what were the allies and Germany thinking. Of course the answer is, they were thinking about the last war, others guts and their glory. What did the US military turn down that was forced on them by the civilian gov't? Blacks in combat, women flying planes around instead of fighter jocks, DUCKS, Higgins boats and their grown up cousins, LSTs?, liberty ships, and jeep carriers, I bet aircraft carriers - I'm sure admirals wanted more battle ships in construction before the war than aircraft carriers, I'm sure it was the president who altered that priority so we had a dozen fleet carriers ready a year after war in Pacific began.
As to broad front, yes that was the way to go, to deprive Germany of resources, workers, spare as many civilians as possible, as much civilian property and infrastructure as possible. To spread Germans out, who were insanely good at defense, as fighting after D Day proved. As well as counter attacks as shown with Battle of the Bulge. Imagine the creeping pace advancing along the coast would have turned into if Germany could have just kept throwing whatever they could scrape together overnight into ad hoc BMGs to slow the spearhead tomorrow, then tomorrow, while bigger units were cobbled together and launched at flanks cutting through to the coast again and again. Germans didn't need a year or two to train and develop Espirit D Corps to fight effectively in units. Take any German soldiers, even young and old, leaven them with experienced troops, instantly tenacious dedicated tireless. Just look at all those port city / fortresses.
"Second coming of holy Manstein" almost made me spew my glass of wine.
Your end conclusion is correct. Monty and Patton both wanted a spearpunkt attack but fought over where it would be fought.
Schwerpunkt
Montgomery's axis of advance was more logical because the Ruhr was the German industrial heartland. Not much of note at Koblenz, Mannheim etc.
I always wondered what would have happened if they launched Dragoon before Overlord. You'd think the Germans would have sent lots of reinforcements south, only to get caught completely off guard by Overlord a few weeks later.
It probably wouldn't have easy either, but considering how bad the transport situation was for the Germans, the Allies might have had the way to Paris and the German border wide open if the best German divisions were already engaged in the South.
Does this make sense or have I been playing too much Hoi3?
@@Edax_Royeaux That's why I said Dragoon first, Overlord then when the Germans send their best divisions South.
Also, your description of Southern/rural France is a little bit harsh. I go there often, it's not that bad lol
The Germans would likely see Dragoon as the diversionary attack they were anticipating and released the divisions they held in the Pas de Calias to Normandy in a more timely fashion. Perhaps they would have retreated to some river line across France a little earlier.
I'm more of the mindset that what if the Americans had actually listened to the British and NOT done Anvil/Dragoon at all - those landing craft and units would then have been available for Overlord and the sixth beach (BAND) would have been able to be utilised.
agreed! Anvil, or Dragoon as it became known, was only ever treated as a diversionary attack. All it would have done is made the job of moving to Paris that much longer and arguably harder!
Wrong 6th Army group were in fact the 1st ones over the Sigfeid line. Churchill screamed like a cat in a fan belt when the GIs were going in with the French. It became obvious that the French and GIs could go it it alone and Winston couldn't get over that fact
"He who defends everything, defends nothing" Frederick the Great
You make a strong case, sir! Makes more sense to me than the traditional narrative we're all too familiar with. And you haven't even mentioned another HUGE logistical advantage the Allies would have had, if they'd reached the IJsselmeer, cut off the 15th Army and clear the coast. The Allies would not only have the port of Antwerp, but also potentially Rotterdam. If you say one port could have made a big difference, imagine having the two largests ports in Europe in one stones throw... Seeing it like this, it only makes sense they also wanted Rotterdam.
it would have also liberated most of the Dutch population as well.
“A British Commander with American Troops, the worst of everything…”
Rommel "I remind you, that Montgomery is a British commander. And he has driven us halfway across Africa."
I want to point out that after Zanger was outflanked by Market garden, he didn't surrender, but rather, continued to defend. Amphibious attacks on the North Sea would have been limited by the vagaries of weather, and amphibious landing craft were still in demand, not least for Anvil-Dragoon.
But he wasn’t cut off because the Allies couldn’t hang on to Arnhem.
You don't get to be a commander who's decisions, good or bad, will certainly result in 1000's of or 10,000's of deaths unless you are confident of your abilities and don't suffer self doubt. Monty was undoubtly one of the best commanders in WWII with a proven track record. This will come across as a being narcissist after the event.
When marshal Mannerheim had to eat cheap caviar, he said, "In wartime I can't complain. The main thing is that we have caviar.." This seems like narcissism. However, he offered all the conscripts a ration of booze at his own expense. If I remember correctly this happened September 18th. The Germans started to land on Suursaari which led to Finnish forces opening fire at 00:55 on 15 September 1944. Likewise, Monty wasn't particularly autocratic on a WW2 scale.
You're using the wrong flag for the Canadians. The maple leaf flag wasn't adopted until decades after WWII.
And the Americans have a 48 star flag at the time, not the 50 star one pictured in the video. You really need to have a word with your staff about historically correct flags - which is weird because they do such a stellar job of finding logos and commander portraits of even the smallest units.
Ah... which flag should I use instead?
And I'm using the wrong American flag, but in that case I kinda don't want to change it because it's a lot of work just for one star 😔
@@TheImperatorKnight The Red Ensign is commonly used to represent Canada before 1965. But it wasn't an official flag either tbf.
@@TheImperatorKnight did you even read Monty’s Memoirs? Monty says hie’s going EAST and you say otherwise. How did you reach the opposite conclusion?
I find this quite interesting because of the fact that the "festung's" on this front seem to have served their purpose. I've seen recurring opinions on them, stating that they were a waste of resources.
But it seems here that they might have hurt the logistical efficiency of the Allies to such a degree that it slowed their advance considerably and possibly forced grand battle plan choices that would have not been necessary had they not been.
Great video, TIK!
I'm currently reading Jack Didden and Maarten Swarts' new book, The Army That Got Away - The 15.Armee in the Summer of 1944 (2022). The channel port garrisons really hampered the Canadian 1st Army's ability to pursue the 15.Armee up the coast. Much of the less mobile infantry was left behind to invest the channel fortresses, while the armoured units (1st Polish Armoured and 4th Canadian Armoured Divisions) were more mobile and continued the pursuit. When the 15.Armee withdrew into the Breskens pocket west of Antwerp, the canal zone terrain really required infantry as it was not suitable for amoured operations. Considering the 15.Armee was composed exclusively of infantry units itself, with mostly horse drawn transport, they conducted a very skilled withdrawal.
"In other words, don't stick to tanks". Needed a sly little wink added there Tik LOL.
Analyses tend to focus on weapons, calibers, etc. More sophisticated analyses look at strategies, tactics, logistics, etc. A complex challenge is really training.
How do you train an Eisenhower? LTG DePuy was convinced as a WW2 commander that the Army had a poor training system. He later convinced the Army to create TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command) along with Gorman and Kanner. There were a lot of innovations...National Training Center (NTC), MILES (laser force-on-force), Performance Oriented Training, Center for Lessons Learned, etc. The big mistake was to only train individual tasks in TRADOC "schools" while units trained collective tasks. Therefore, BCT marksmanship training, for example, only trained individual shooting (whereas British BCT trains to the squad defense). This is not easy because there are a large number of MOS (jobs) with a large array of assignments. LTG Brown was an innovator in that the ENDEX for armor officer et al training was the xx days of war.
The USMC analyses concluded that Known Distance fixed target shooting experts could not hit a moving target (indeed iron sights interfered with doing that). The USMC has invested $$M in new complex moving target ranges.
The larger challenge is how do you train unit commanders? Difficult to have a Battalion, Brigade, or Division around as a training aid (aside from the amount of land, fuel, etc.). Luckily, DARPA invented SIMNET... a large multi-player simulation. Ideally, in the future, SIMNET Plus could be an operational combat tool. Managing thousands of Soldiers, weapons, logistics, etc. on a moving battlefield is very, very challenging.
I remember reading a book about Patten's 3rd Army and it was very critical of Montgomery. Honestly, in the middle of a huge campaign, personalities sometimes got in the way of good decision-making, but in retrospect the choices were not as obvious as armchair historians make them out to be. I still think Patton should have been given more support, but no knock on Monty wanting to go a different path.
So what did this book say about Patton in the Lorraine, the biggest allied failure of autumn 1944? 55,000 casualties and objective not achieved?
@@lyndoncmp5751 My recollection, though scanty, was that Lorraine was the result of Patton not getting enough fuel to continue his move across France, giving the Germans time to regroup.
@@rufusmcgee4383 correct they stopped progress everywhere to accompany the laggard. The British Press propped him up beyond his limited accomplishments & abilities later realizing it. Gave everything available and he still ran things into the sand like Caen and Falaise. IKE allowed him to tag along for political considerations. If it wasn't for a looming Russian threat IKE would have drubbed him publically
@rufusmcgee4383
That was in September. In October Patton was well supplied and by the time of his early November attempt to get to the Saar and through the Siegfried Line he enjoyed a 3:1 superiority in men and 8:1 in tanks. He had 9 well equipped and well supplied divisions. 3 were armoured divisions.
As von Mellenthin wrote in
Panzer Battles, page 317:
"" On 2 November Third Army was authorized to attack to the Saar as soon as the weather cleared.
Patton now assured Bradley that he could get to the Saar in three days and easily breach the West Wall with six infantry
and three armoured divisions, plus two groups, i.e. brigades, of
mechanized cavalry. Third Army numbered approximately a quarter of a million officers and men. Its opponents, the First German Army, had a total strength of only 86,000. Seven of the
eight enemy divisions were strung out on a front of 75 miles and the only reserve was the 11th Panzer Division with 69 tanks.
While the German formations were necessarily dispersed defensively,
Patton, with command of the air and ample mobility on the ground,
had the capacity to concentrate overwhelming force at any point he chose. Even on a basis of direct comparison he had an advantage of three to one in men, eight to one in tanks and a tremendous superiority in the artillery arm"
Patton was still failing to achieve his objective SIX WEEKS later when he was pulled out of the Lorraine.
@@lyndoncmp5751 That's a great passage, thanks. Which begs the question, "What happened?" It sounds like it should have been over pretty quickly.
The Americans complained constantly about Monty's performance in Normandy but how were they bamboozled when the Normandy campaign as a whole was achieved two weeks before his predictions? Montgomery's initial plan was Operation Comet and it was put forward because Eisenhower was dithering about what to do next, the broad front strategy pleased no one. Market Garden was not entirely Monty's plan, the airborne element was planned by US Generals Brereton of 1st Allied Airborne Army and Williams of IX Transport Command. It was the Airborne element planned by the Americans that ultimately failed.
" It was the Airborne element planned by the Americans that ultimately failed."
How long did XXX Corps take to reach Arnhem? Any plan that involves a timetable dependent upon taking multiple enemy bridges intact is a fool's errand.
@@mitchrichards1532 - XXX Corps were still on schedule when they reached Nijmegen and found that the Waal bridges were still in German hands and not the 82nd Airborne's. The 36-hour delay to force a crossing of the Waal sealed the fate of 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem, who had done their job and were expecting to be relieved.
What was foolish was entrusting an unreliable officer to taking a critical objective. Gavin's judgement to assign this mission to Colonel Lindquist's 508th PIR, he had not performed well in Normandy and Ridgway did not trust him. The airborne plan was already compromised by Brereton and Williams, but Gavin failed to provide for a replacement coup de main operation on the Nijmegen bridge after Brereton had deleted Browning's glider assault planned for Operation COMET. Instead, he instructed Lindquist to send his 1st Battalion immediately to the bridge and he failed to do so. That allowed 10.SS-Panzer-Division to reinforce the bridges and the city overnight and force a delay on XXX Corp's advance to Arnhem.
@@davemac1197 Like I said: "Any plan that involves a timetable dependent upon taking multiple enemy bridges intact is a fool's errand."
A plan that requires perfection or something close to it will inevitably fail when the enemy gets his say in the matter. Market Garden defied one of the main principles of war; simplicity which is the key reason it failed.
@@mitchrichards1532 - the plan was still working except where it wasn't even being followed at Nijmegen - that was the fatal compromise. Complex operations are broken down into simple parts and not following a simple instruction undid the plan at Nijmegen on the first afternoon. I don't see anything too complex about the 508th's mission, the commander was just not a good field commander and that had been demonstrated earlier in Normandy - most notably the attack on Hill 95 (Sainte Catherine near La Haye) on 4 July 1944, over open ground instead of a recommended covered approach, resulting in unnecessary casualties.
Source:
Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke (2012), chapters 8 - 10.
@@mitchrichards1532 On the 10th September at SHAEF Eisenhower cancelled Montys Operation Comet and substituted Market-Garden. Monty still commanded XXX Corps, but US Generals Brereton and Williams were in charge ot the Airborne drop.
The Airborne plan was a disaster waiting to happen for many reasons but Eisenhower approved it. The crucial mistake was Gavin's 82 Airborne at Nijmegen, failing to capture the bridge when it was undefended. Gavin went for secondary objectives, by the time he realized his error the bridge was heavily defended and took Gavin 4 days to capture it. XXX Corps getting to Arnhem 3 days earlier would have won the battle.
Narrow front > broad front because of the principle of concentration of force to overwhelm the enemy with local absolute superiority. broad front ONLY makes sense if you are also scouring for the german nukes which they were.
Yes, however there was hardly an enemy to overwhelm at this point. The Germans in Western Europe had about 10 weak "divisions", if you can even call them that
@@TheImperatorKnight Hence a broad front is also unnecessary. If the Germans had the offensive ability to push them off, sure take a broad front. Take as much land as required for defensive withdrawal to be viable. But when you have such advantage it's worth using it to push after objectives that can actually win the war.
As this video made very clear it was the logistics that were the important part, they had a choice of chasing the Germans tails and then puttering out due to supply issues or using the opportunity available to compound strengths and overrun the most strategic areas of the enemy, sacrificing how impressive things look on a map for putting the enemy is a very nasty situation and likely forcing them to retreat anyway, they then already would have been in Germany and German priorities would likely have been forced into attacks on prepared positions in the vain hope of regaining vital industrial areas, the supply situation would have also meant that suddenly Americans who held back would become a very dangerous proposition which they couldn't neglect, not only could the war have ended earlier and many lives been saved but the iron curtain would likely have ended up a good deal further east, if things went particularly well then several post-war crimes against humanity might not have occurred in the first place on top of all the people saved from the Germans by an earlier end to the war.
@@Edax_Royeaux *"Blumentritt disagreed with the Allies′ strategy in the west, discussing the precarious nature of the German position with its meager one armoured division against the twelve of the Allies, and he stated that had Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's Anglo-Canadian 21st Army Group been unleashed earlier for a concentrated armoured assault (as he had wished) rather than fighting on a broad front, "Such a breakthrough ... would have torn the weak German front to pieces and ended the war in the winter of 1944."*
@@vorynrosethorn903 yes, being closer to the channel ports makes the advance somewhat easier. red ball express shows that being near channel ports wasn't Necessary but was desirable.
Montgommery could be a bit of a 'know-it-all' and a bit of a prick.
There's lots of anecdotes etc about this however...
Monty had been a platoon commander (Leftenant) at the beginning of WWI.
He was a Division Commander during the Battle for France in 1940.
By 1944 he was an Army Group commander.
He had risen through the ranks from a young Lt leading 30 men in a brutal earlier war to a postwar Theater commander under NATO commanding millions.
He planned and re-planned some of the most famous and decisive operations of WWII and in military history.
By the end of WWII he was to some a legend, to some an arsehole and to many a very, very experienced commander who knew his business and had a near countless amount of operations and long list of victories to his name.
He was one of the best and probably the most experienced senior commanders the allies had during WWII.
His personal 'style' rubbed quite a few people up the wrong way but his work-rate, leadership, organizational skill, charisma and sheer will is something that all can or at least should acknowledge and respect.
Once, when asked to name three generals he admired most, Montgomery replied: ‘The other two would be Alexander the Great and Napoleon.’
Like him or loathe him though, he was instrumental to winning the war.
;-)
‘General Montgomery is a very able, dynamic type of army commander. I personally think that the only thing he needs is a strong immediate commander. He loves the limelight but in seeking it, it is possible that he does so only because of the effect upon his own soldiers, who are certainly devoted to him. I have great confidence in him as a combat commander. He is intelligent, a good talker, and has a flair for showmanship.’
- US General Dwight D Eisenhower, 1943
I'm actually quite happy you've left the Stalingrad campaign for this content TIK!
It's a fresh air, of in my opinion (after hearing/seeing this video) has been hopelessly underlighted by the lights of reason and critical thinking! It appears even more mythology is involved with these campaigns than the Stalingrad Campaign. Hope you keep this content up, thanks for the subtitles and keep up the good work!
Regards,
Thomas
PS. It's interesting also that Antwerp was targeted with more V-weapons (especially V1s) than London ever was. The "Madman" in Berlin apparently ordered this. And it had some effect, being fired at a shorter range meant harder to intercept, and above all the local population needed to be paid extra "Bibbergeld" (or Shaking Money) to work in the port, further reducing it's productivity. No idea what the total impact of this was, it might be interesting to research though? Since it is your area of expertise, maybe you could come up with a decent analysis of the total impact of German operations against the port of Antwerp. It being one of the largest ports in the world, it sure must have had some effect on Allied logistics. There's also the fact that the Kriegsmarine TRIED to send U-Boats into the Scheldt Estuary during their Inshore Campaign (using only Snorkel-equipped U-Boats and midget subs) from August-September 1944 onwards. But this apparently wasn't too big of a succes because the local waters are so murky and current heavy it wasn't a good area for U-Boat operations. Anyways that's what 2 books on this Inshore Campaign claim as far as I remember.
Is it possible that politics were at play in Gavin's 'failure' to have a go at Nijmegan bridge on day one ?
Well, he did blame it on his corps commander... the question is, which one? He technically had two corps commanders. And if it was the American one - the one who hated Monty...
Monty was definitely good, he did a lot right but that led to him having an ego Steven Segal can only dream about. I also love learning in history about how much ego's affected military strategy which is something mentioned all the time for the red army but rarely for the western allies. I think the best example of ego overtaking a sound military strategy would be when Mark Clarke decided taking Rome was more important than trapping the retreating german army in Italy ( I can't remember the names of the german units).
@Julian the German 10th army.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Thanks
In all honesty - accusing a high ranking General to have an oversized ego is like accusing a general of having joy giving commands. It's actually essential in order to do the job when you think of it.
@@JosipRadnik1 Q What did your last general die of?
Ans : DIs-obedience (pats Browning pistol affectionately)
Honestly. You can't give orders unless you can take 'em. Any b'***d Corps, Army or group Commander gives you trouble - make 'em b****y swim home. I mean what part of Supreme Allied Commander do these prima donnas not get?
And desk man Eisenhower didn't have an ego by insisting he decided the strategy of the ground battle over the heads of actual experienced battlefield generals?
Montgomery even offered to serve under Bradley if American public pressure demanded an American command all ground forces.
Eisenhower says no and wanted that command himself. The result = a six month stall with hundreds of thousands of casualties.
I realize this video focuses on Monty’s issues and his desires vs. SHAEF, and I’m probably a bit early in mentioning this in regards to the allied effort to cross the Rhine, but you said nothing about Eisenhower’s unexplainable “11th hour” shutdown of General Jacob Dever’s 6th U.S. Army Group and the reconstituted French Armys’ opportunity to breech the Rhine in November 1944 and subsequent swing north allowing 3th Army to also cross, etc. Basically why Eisenhower banged his head against the Hurtgen Forest and continue to breastfeed Bradley and Montgomery to the exclusion of alternate possibilities.
Just the point I was going to make. Additionally, Dever’s forces along with Patton’s could have been supplied from Marseilles - the largest Port in France. Much of the supplies from Marseilles went to supply the other armies and not Devers.
The Germans were expecting that a "narrow front strategy" would be implemented. They were well aware of the Allied supply issues and knew a broad front strategy would slow down the allied advance. The most logical next step was to make a thrust through the low counties.
With this in mind Hitler and his generals were already in the early stages of planning and preparing the units for "Watch on the Rhine". Panzer divisions were being pulled out of Russia, reconstituted in Germany and then moved to their assembly points. Other units were rebuilding in the Arnhem area.
If Monty's plan had been followed, the German counter attack in the Ardennes would have succeeded, because all the southern armies would have been stripped of supplies and could not have stopped the Germans short of the Muse. The Germans would have reached Antwerp and Monty's entire army would have been in a sack. In this event, the war would not have been won in the summer of 1945. With the final result being the first atomic bombs being dropped in Germany, not Japan
If Montgomery's plan had been followed, the German counter attack in the Ardennes could not have taken place.
@johntrottier1162
Monty’s concept was of a concentrated mass of Allied armour, with all available logistical support devoted to it, directed against the Ruhr, a threat which would force the remaining German armour to give battle, and then let the great Allied superiority in armour and air power destroy it.
When you have that level of superiority, what you need is a large set battle to exploit it. If this basic concept had been applied, the Germans would have been forced to come out and fight for the Ruhr, just as the Japanese were forced to come out and fight for Leyte. Once the German armour was finished off, the road to Berlin then really would lie open.
This was the Schlieffen plan in reverse: a wide flanking move to reach round and stab the enemy in his industrial heartland. The appearance of the mass of Allied armour on their west flank heading round towards the Ruhr would inevitably force the German armour to come to meet it. The Allies would then be able to fight their decisive tank and air battle, on the flat plains of North Germany.
It is worth noting that the Germans used the Schlieffen plan, or a variant of it, in each world war. Each time, their idea was an outflanking move in the west, sweeping round through the Low Countries, not a broad front advance. This shows that, in strategic terms, the German General Staff agreed with Monty or it shows that Monty took a leaf out of the Germans page.
'If Monty's plan had been followed, the German counter attack in the Ardennes would have succeeded, because all the southern armies would have been stripped of supplies and could not have stopped the Germans short of the Muse.'
But the Germans were stopped short of the Meuse was stopped by northern armies (US 1st, and 9th Armies), directed by Montgomery, with back up from British 2nd Army.
The German commanders rated the chance of a German victory in the Ardennes at about 5%.
What an interesting video!
Another disadvantage to a Narrow Front strategy, and I don't think that it was mentioned in the video, is that it would require quite a few troops to guard the flanks and more troops for that purpose the further the advance was. The flanks would always be vulnerable to counter-attacks. Also, if the Allies did use the Broad Front strategy then the Germans would be much more able to concentrate forces to defend against it.
Montgomerys concentrated northern thrust wasn't really narrow. It would have been 200km in width at least, from the coast down to the Ruhr then across northern Germany towards Berlin.
Montgomerys northern thrust would have involved 40 divisions in 4 armies. North to South :
Canadian 1st.
British 2nd.
US 1st.
US 3rd.
Montgomerys proposal was for these 4 armies to stick together as one massive force and take Northern Germany instead of wasting the time and resources in the largely irrelevant southern half of Germany.
"He who takes Northern Germany takes Germany" is what Gunther Blumentritt said. He felt Montgomerys proposal would have been the best one.
@@lyndoncmp5751 if you look at the map in his memoirs regarding his 40 Div plan, the role of the 3rd Army would be to protect is right flank, 1st Canadian with only 6 Division,the left flank and capture of the ports. So only the 2nd and 1st Armies would be his spearhead until the 1st Army would need to allocated Division to the right flank once 3rd Army front is stretched too thin.
The same with his left flank, as the Canadian Army is working towards opening up the ports 2nd Army would need to provide Divisions to cover its left flank reducing the number of Division in the spearhead.
John Lucas
And the German opposition in September/October to this powerful concentrated northern thrust would have been powerless to stop even the flank, 3rd Army.
Remember, the Germans were able to send in reinforcements from Germany to counter Market Garden because no other allied attacks towards the Rhine were being made at the same time. They could throw all their eggs into one basket. Had the American 1st Army opened up a diversionary attack towards Aachen (instead of probing into the Hurtgen Forest) at the same time the Germans would have been in a quandary, not being able to counter everywhere at one at that point in time. As an example, Sturmgeschutz Brigade 280 was entrained en route to Aachen on September 17th. It was ordered to divert towards Arnhem instead because there was no pressure against Aachen.
The fuel 'crisis' had passed by September 10th.
The Germans would not been able to stop a concentrated northern thrust in early autumn 1944.
Gunther Blumentritt :
""The best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Germany's strength is in the north. South Germany was a side issue. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open. There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. By turning the forces from the Aachen area sharply northward, the German 15th and 1st Parachute Armies could have been pinned against the estuaries of the Mass and the Rhine. They could not have escaped eastwards into Germany. A direct attack on Metz was unnecessary. The Metz fortress area could have been masked. In contrast, a swerve northward in the direction of Luxembourg and Bitburg would have met with great success and caused the collapse of the right flank of our 7th Army. By such a flank move to the north the entire 7th Army could have been cut off before it could retreat behind the Rhine. Thus the bulk of the defeated German Army would have been wiped out west of the Rhine. ""
Gunther Blumentritt in The Other Side Of The Hill by Liddell Hart.
@@lyndoncmp5751 You still need to protect your flanks, look at Market Garden the failure of XII and VIII Corp to keep pace with XXX Corp enable the Germans to cut the highway forcing XXX Corp to send troops back down the highway to reopen Club Route.
You state that the fuel problem was over by the 10th Sept, as Montgomery proposal was dated July, if all 4 armies advance on a single axis, it would have the same supplies issues that occurred historical in late August early September. The situation could have been worst. Historically the advance in August/ September was 2 axis, so the supplies would have move to the front on 2 sets of highways. With Montgomery proposal the same amount of supplies would need to be moved along a single set of highways. The only way the supply situation would have been improved if the 3rd Army advance was to stop and it went over to a static defensive position. Montgomery single thrust would then consist of only 3 Armies and around 30 division.
As the Montgomery group of armies (1st Canadian, 2nd British and 1st US) is heading north towards the Ruhr they would be supplied from Cherbourg and the Normandy beaches. So how far could they have got until they would have to stop because of supply problems. From a logistic point of view every mile the strike force advance adds 2 miles to supply route (1 mile to the front and 1 mile return journey). As the 1st Canadian was on the left it would need to focus on opening up the channel ports, further reducing the north thrust by 1 Army and 6 divisions. That would leave on the 1st British and 1st US Armies as the spearhead with 2 exposed flanks just as XXX Corp experience during Market Garden.
As to the Germans opposition, remember one of the reasons for cancelling Comet was the increase in German strength facing 2nd Army. As you mention the reinforcement from German during Market Garden. Those reinforcement would still be available for the single thrust plus the reinforcement that were sent to Lorraine to stop Patton.
If you consider how the Allies handle the German attack through the Ardennes in Dec 44. Because the rest of the front was quiet Bradley was able to move 1 Armoured Division south from 9th Army and 1 north from 3rd Army. XXX Corp was able to move south to cover the crossing of the Meuse River. The 7th US Army extended its front north which enable Patton to assemble a force to strike north. All the divisions that Montgomery control on the north side also were able to be pulled out of the line, only the 6th British Airborne,82nd and 101st were not in the line on the 16th December. Clearly the German could have done something similar if faced with a single thrust.
We would never know for certain if single thrust would have ended the war any earlier, because it all based on speculation and 20/20 hindsight. As to General Blumentritt comments, how would the allies have known that information at the time.
This is an extremely important subject. The opportunity to end the war in Europe many months earlier than what was eventually achieved was an opportunity that was thrown away by failing to implement a rapid thrust as outlined by Montgomery.
The key issue appears to be a failure to take advantage of the situation by not bringing the right resources to the battlefield. This would include both at a command level and the operational level.
Beautifully explained, once more! It's wonderful how battles and campaigns that we all know are sewed by TIK in a coherent and technically sound narrative. Thank you very much!
Three prominent German commanders all thought the same, it was the wrong strategy.
First is Field Marshall Von Runstedt
*“the best course of the Allies would have been to concentrate a really strong striking force with which to break through past Aachen to the Ruhr area. Strategically and politically, Berlin was the target. Germany’s strength is in the north. He who holds northern Germany holds Germany. Such a break-through, coupled with air domination, would have torn in pieces the weak German front and ended the war. Berlin and Prague would have been occupied ahead of the Russians. There were no German forces behind the Rhine, and at the end of August our front was wide open.There was the possibility of an operational break-through in the Aachen area, in early September. This would have facilitated a rapid conquest of the Ruhr and a quicker advance on Berlin. By turning the forces from the Aachen area sharply northward, the German 15th and 1st parachute Armies could have been pinned against the estuaries of the Maas and the Rhine. They could not have escaped eastwards into Germany.”*
Second is Hasso Von Mantueffel, commander of the 5th Panzer Army.
*“I am in full agreement with Montgomery. I believe General Eisenhower’s insistence on spreading the Allied force’s out for a broader advance was wrong.The acceptance of Montgomery’s plan would have shortened the war considerably. Above all, tens of thousands of lives- on both sides- would have been saved.”*
Lastly, Gunther Blumentritt, one of the key planners of the German invasion of Poland and France.
*"After the war, Blumentritt disagreed with the Allies' strategy in the west at this time, noting the precarious nature of the German position with only one armoured division against the twelve of the Allies. He stated that had Montgomery's Anglo-Canadian 21st Army Group been unleashed earlier for a concentrated armoured assault (as Montgomery had wished) rather than fighting on a broad front, "Such a breakthrough ... would have torn the weak German front to pieces and ended the war in the winter of 1944."*
"You have only to kick in the door," Hitler told Rundstedt, "and the whole rotten structure (USSR) will come crashing down."[41]
@@nickdanger3802
What was the point of posting that quote?
what author, book and page number??? Monty isn't studied except as a bad example and didn't cross the channel for 4 full years - only with the big boys after the dunkirking. Blumentriit didn't know the GIs were propping up the snogging wanker Bernard for political purposess. IKE should have been removed for basically desrtoying the British Army at Caen
*The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page407 Churchill had cabled Montgomery "I greatly fear the dwindling of the British Army is a factor in France as it will affect our right to express our opinion upon strategic and other matters"*
*Intelligence at the Top,by Sir Kenneth Strong Montgomery was letting Bradley's Army lead the way out of Normandy because the Americans could replace their casualties and the British could not .PM Churchill also talked to Eisenhower about the problem the British were having. Churchill called Eisenhower on the telephone and asked him ".....if it was possible Eisenhower to avoid too many British casualties"*
*Masters and Commanders by Andrew Roberts, p.137 The British desperately needed very substantial American Forces in the British Isles to protect them against a German Invasion should the Soviet Union suddenly collapse*
*With Prejudice,by Air Marshall Arthur Tedder,p.562-63 Our 3 Armored Divisions, the 11th,7th, and Guards , had been counter attacked from several directions and the advance came to a halt.On 20 July. I spoke to Portal about the Army's failure. We were in agreement regarding Montgomery as the cause*
*With Prejudice, Air Marshall Tedder,p.586* "Eisenhower's firm commitment to the Anglo-American Alliance dominated his thinking. He handled Allied disagreements in Normandy, at the Falaise Gap and for Market-Garden the same way. *Eisenhower was determined to protect the facade of Allied unity at the highest levels of the Allied command in spite of Montgomery's insubordination which was motivated by both personal and political objectives. *Eisenhower's efforts covered up Montgomery's lies in Normandy"*
Bullet-Tooth-Tony
From Para Dave (aka big woody)
'Masters and Commanders by Andrew Roberts, p.137 The British desperately needed very substantial American Forces in the British Isles to protect them against a German Invasion should the Soviet Union suddenly collapse'
There is no sense in that. Britain did not fear invasion in 1940, let alone in 1942 or whenever
Even in the unlikely event that Germany defeated Russia, how many years would it have taken for Germany to mount an invasion of Britain? It took Britain and the USA several years to build up an invasion force for OVERLORD, and this against a tiny German Navy, and an emaciated German airforce?
What sort of victory could have Germany gained against Russia? Some sort of uneasy peace with Germans having to man a front 700 miles into Russia? If Britain had gone to the Germans and said 'can we talk?' They would have bitten our hand off for a deal.
The last time that I saw Robberts on TV, he got destroyed by a couple of Indian historians about the state of India at the time of Indian independence. The bloke is a rubbish historian. I understand he goes down a storm in the USA.
@@thevillaaston7811 As an author, Roberts is well-known internationally for his 2009 non-fiction work The Storm of War, which covers socio-political factors of the Second World War such as Adolf Hitler's rise to power and the administrative organisation of Nazi Germany. The work received the British Army Military Book of the Year Award for 2010 as well.
wiki
I loved how oblivious Montgomery was to the fact the ones bankrolling the war effort at that point were the Americans (and the whole Murica attitude of "we are the best, beacon of freedom, the shinning city on the hill, etc).
There was simply no way they would allow other countries take the spotlight in any major way from that victory (but sadly enough, the broad front strategy gave the Soviets time to carve out Eastern Europe for themselves.
Another great video.
Where's stalingrad battle storm!!! Just kidding 😂
Haha all I'll say is that it was extremely good timing that I paused it when I did as life has thrown some curve balls at me recently... Nothing major, just time consuming stuff
@@TheImperatorKnight bro you do whatever you like you're a UA-cam historian God!
Like always you never fail to deliver great content TIK, keep it up mate.
Don't suppose you have any book recommendations for the SS' business empire? it's an interesting subject, but not spoken about much.
given how Monty thought of himself I would have loved to see what would have happened were Patton the head of the American forces in Europe. It'd be a clash of two egotistical giants and given how Patton wrote about Monty in his journal there may have been a fight between the two.
Patton was only a minor General who couldn't see the bigger picture, he was no 'military giant'. His fame is from Hollywood fiction rather than the battlefield fact. Montgomery was in a completely different league and in the future history will judge him far better than it does now.
Nathan K……so why wasn’t Patton appointed ? Perhaps the US soldiers who died trying to rescue Pattons son from a POW camp, would have been happier ?
@@californiadreamin8423 you mean son-in-law and that operation happened well after the subject in this Tik
@@johnbrereton5229 Oh yes one of the most politically dangerous men in America was a minor general because he was busted down over the incident of him slapping a soldier and anti-soviet views. He was likely assassinated for the same reason as well(the latter not the slapping thing)
@@larrytestmi5976 You get my point though , right !!
Pet peeve: using the maple leaf flag for Canada in WWII maps. Canada used the red ensign flag at the time, the maple leaf flag wasn't introduced until 1965 by Pierre Elliot Trudeau.
Ah, Finally we see that the objective of Market-Garden was not the Ruhr, but the Ijsselmeer
this was always known and one of the orders issued by Montgomery to Dempsey explicitly states that the aim of a successful Market Garden is to open the port of Rotterdam, which would have rendered Antwerp as being a "nice to have" asset, but not more important than that!
@@sean640307 Aye, but the generally accepted narrative about the goals of Market-Garden still remains that ridiculous Ruhr break-in. Watch any historical overview and every time the goals are said to have been opening up a drive to the East.