Michael Huemer explains Ethical Intuitionism

In this clip from my conversation with Dr. Michael Huemer, he briefly explains his metaethical position "Intuitionism". Huemer's moral realism is non-naturalistic, meaning he denies that moral properties can be reduced to or explained in terms of natural properties. He believes that moral facts are sui generis and irreducible to natural facts. . He argues that we have direct, non-inferential access to moral facts similar to our perceptual access to the external world. According to him, the moral properties that exist are two: "Good (or bad)" and "Right (or wrong)". Here, he differs from G.E. Moore, an earlier important intuitionist who thought there was only "Good (or bad)".

[@lanceindependent]

At 1:58, Huemer talks about moral intuitions, like that you "shouldn't cause harm to people just for the fun of it." I do hold the view that you shouldn't cause harm to people just for the fun of it. But this does not present itself to me as an "intuition" any more than my preference for some kinds of food or music are "intuitions." I simply have attitudes, preferences, judgments, and beliefs. Nothing about them seems to me to require invoking special terminology like an "intuition." I'm skeptical that the sorts of intuitions philosophers talk about are a genuine feature of human psychology. I think they may instead be a pseudopsychological state philosophers have made up.
Also, Huemer talks about that remark seeming "correct" but correct in what sense? Antirealists can think it is "correct" in ways that don't entail moral realism. For instance, I think it's obviously correct that chocolate cake is tasty, but I don't think it's obviously *objectively* tasty. Just the same for morality: I'm against hurting people just for fun, but nothing about this seems *objectively* true to me.
One issue I have with Huemer's ethical intuitonism is simply that I don't have Huemer's intuitions, and am not sure why I or anyone else who doesn't share those intuitions should be moved by Huemer's position. If I don't have realist intuitions, what then? Why should I be a realist?

[@LostAndDiscouraged]

Yes, that's an interesting concern. 'A chocolate cake looks better than a pile of dirt' - you can call this an intuition, after all it does seem immediately true upon reflection to me. But isn't this just a preference?