Studying the brain means representing our perceptions of the brain and their interpretation in our consciousness. Knowing what it's like to see blue is a different phenomenon. It's the direct perception of blue (rather than perception of the brain). Brain and blue are different things. That's why it's not the same.
So is the argument; Consciously experiencing the color blue imparts different knowledge than learning declarative facts about the color blue. Therefore consciousness is immaterial? I don't understand why it's implicitly assumed that in a materialistic world learning declarative facts about something would be identical to experience of directly perceiving that thing. If I'm misunderstanding I would appreciate clarification.
You have it right. There may be experiential knowledge that its impossible for Mary (the color scientist) to learn without having those experiences, its just that that perceptual knowledge may be physical as well
@Jon I am asking why you think that should be assumption. Because I haven't heard a reason. And I don't know any materialists that make the assumption that experiencing and leading declarative facts should be identical. It just seems to be an assertion made without argument by people who believe in something that they can't support with affirmative arguments or evidence. So it's like a double fallacy. Because you don't have an arugula against materialism and an argument against materialism can't be a reason to believe an alternative that doesn't stand on its own.
@Jon As a materialist, I see Mary reacting to very different material stimuli when she experiences blue vs when she learns declarative facts about blue. So I expect she would experience the different material stimuli differently and not experience the different stimuli identically... And I could walk you through a detailed explanation of why. But the materialist critic of materialism without explanation (you) just days I should expect the opposite with explanation. So... You know.
@Jon Again you haven't given any justification for why I should expect that knowing all the declarative facts about an the color blue is identical to experiencing blue in materialism. Maybe if you give me your account of the difference that would help I did give my account. Learning declarative facts about blue save seeing blue and different physical stimuli. They cause different brain states in Mary's physical brain as expected. By causing different predictable and well understood processes in the brain. I'm not trying to be dismissive but this seems super obviously what would be expected and I feel like there is some weird assumption the critic of materialism doesn't realize they are making with zero justification or even examination. I might take a look at what Oppy's response is but frankly I don't think Mary's room needs a response. Not because it's impossible or incoherent. But because I the critic can't justify that the result should be no new information on materialism. I am a materialist I don't expect that result. And I don't know of any materialists that does. It's only the critics of materialism that expect no new information... So... Why do you think that ?
@Jon Well that's at least an answer. I think your intuition is wrong. It's just an intuition that otherwise it's unjustified and which I don't share. Does this seem like a strong foundation for an argument to you? Intuition?
I'm pretty sure everything Huemer said here is compatible with materialism. What he said was that phenomenal consciousness, by definition, implies having experiences. Many philosophers believe that even though phenomenal consciousness exists, it's only a product of the brain.
It's a really bad argument. "I presuppose a non-material property of minds, qualia, and thereby prove minds are non-material." He doesn't mention that qualia has multiple definitions, including materialist ones. Also, how do we know there is nothing it's like to be a table? Since "whatitslike-ness" has no logical connection to brains on what basis can we say there is nothing it is like to be a table?
Our cognitive constructions would seem to be necessarily unique such that we never get to know what it is like to be anything other than ourselves. The stimuli that we receive is necessarily a unique experience due to the variation of experience and genetics. Assuming we get to the point wherein our AI systems can report the equivalent of an experience, would you declare that such must be immaterial even as we can account for every aspect of the operational details of the system?
Talk of "what it's like" to have an experience isn't even meaningful. Philosophy is in such a poor state that many of its adherents aren't even wrong, but are instead disputing pseudconcepts that have no content and don't mean anything. Jackson's thought experiment is worse than useless and doesn't show that someone who leaves the room learns anything new when she sees red, especially not in a way that somehow entails there's some special immaterial mental stuff.
Studying the brain means representing our perceptions of the brain and their interpretation in our consciousness.
Knowing what it's like to see blue is a different phenomenon. It's the direct perception of blue (rather than perception of the brain). Brain and blue are different things. That's why it's not the same.
So is the argument;
Consciously experiencing the color blue imparts different knowledge than learning declarative facts about the color blue.
Therefore consciousness is immaterial?
I don't understand why it's implicitly assumed that in a materialistic world learning declarative facts about something would be identical to experience of directly perceiving that thing.
If I'm misunderstanding I would appreciate clarification.
You have it right. There may be experiential knowledge that its impossible for Mary (the color scientist) to learn without having those experiences, its just that that perceptual knowledge may be physical as well
@Jon I am asking why you think that should be assumption. Because I haven't heard a reason. And I don't know any materialists that make the assumption that experiencing and leading declarative facts should be identical. It just seems to be an assertion made without argument by people who believe in something that they can't support with affirmative arguments or evidence. So it's like a double fallacy. Because you don't have an arugula against materialism and an argument against materialism can't be a reason to believe an alternative that doesn't stand on its own.
@Jon As a materialist, I see Mary reacting to very different material stimuli when she experiences blue vs when she learns declarative facts about blue. So I expect she would experience the different material stimuli differently and not experience the different stimuli identically... And I could walk you through a detailed explanation of why. But the materialist critic of materialism without explanation (you) just days I should expect the opposite with explanation. So... You know.
@Jon Again you haven't given any justification for why I should expect that knowing all the declarative facts about an the color blue is identical to experiencing blue in materialism. Maybe if you give me your account of the difference that would help
I did give my account. Learning declarative facts about blue save seeing blue and different physical stimuli. They cause different brain states in Mary's physical brain as expected. By causing different predictable and well understood processes in the brain. I'm not trying to be dismissive but this seems super obviously what would be expected and I feel like there is some weird assumption the critic of materialism doesn't realize they are making with zero justification or even examination.
I might take a look at what Oppy's response is but frankly I don't think Mary's room needs a response. Not because it's impossible or incoherent. But because I the critic can't justify that the result should be no new information on materialism. I am a materialist I don't expect that result. And I don't know of any materialists that does. It's only the critics of materialism that expect no new information... So... Why do you think that ?
@Jon Well that's at least an answer. I think your intuition is wrong. It's just an intuition that otherwise it's unjustified and which I don't share. Does this seem like a strong foundation for an argument to you? Intuition?
I'm pretty sure everything Huemer said here is compatible with materialism.
What he said was that phenomenal consciousness, by definition, implies having experiences.
Many philosophers believe that even though phenomenal consciousness exists, it's only a product of the brain.
That is the qualia as experience definition but there are others. Some idealists deny that qualia are strictly experiences.
It's a really bad argument. "I presuppose a non-material property of minds, qualia, and thereby prove minds are non-material." He doesn't mention that qualia has multiple definitions, including materialist ones.
Also, how do we know there is nothing it's like to be a table? Since "whatitslike-ness" has no logical connection to brains on what basis can we say there is nothing it is like to be a table?
Our cognitive constructions would seem to be necessarily unique such that we never get to know what it is like to be anything other than ourselves. The stimuli that we receive is necessarily a unique experience due to the variation of experience and genetics.
Assuming we get to the point wherein our AI systems can report the equivalent of an experience, would you declare that such must be immaterial even as we can account for every aspect of the operational details of the system?
Frank Jackson is a big time materialist again though
Doesn't mean he's successfully refuted his great arg doe
experiencing blue is no new knowledge. its just a new experience.
Talk of "what it's like" to have an experience isn't even meaningful. Philosophy is in such a poor state that many of its adherents aren't even wrong, but are instead disputing pseudconcepts that have no content and don't mean anything. Jackson's thought experiment is worse than useless and doesn't show that someone who leaves the room learns anything new when she sees red, especially not in a way that somehow entails there's some special immaterial mental stuff.