Michael Huemer: An Ontological Proof of Moral Realism
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- Опубліковано 24 жов 2023
- University of Colorado, Boulder professor Dr. Michael Huemer joined us to discuss an interesting argument for moral realism that he made in a paper. We also discussed ethical intuitionism along with his book "Ethical Intuitionism." It was an honor to have Dr. Huemer join us twice!
Lol the goat at the end of his presentation.
Even if it's hard to pinpoint the step of the argument I think is wrong, it seems to me one could make a counterargument that it "proves to much" by making use of a "parody" argument similar to Guanilo's island as a parody of the ontological argument for God. For example, consider the aesthetic judgment that some jokes, movies etc. seem more "corny" than others--I can't rule out the notion of some kind of "objective corniness", and if that were the case, then it could be said to give me a better reason to judge something corny when other people say it's corny. So by an analogue of Huemer's argument, does this force me to accept realism about corniness?
Of course there are aesthetic realists, but this style of argument could force me to accept realism about more nonsensical types of judgments. Suppose my friend claims to have been struck by a mystical revelation that allows him to discern that some things are more "gormy" than others, and these judgments seem so intuitively self-evident that he's convinced gormniness is an objective quality. But he can't explain how gorminess is related to any existing human concept, and when I look at the list of things he considers more "gormy" I can discern no pattern at all. Nevertheless, he seems otherwise sane, and I accept some probability of mystical revelations, so I am willing to assign some tiny but nonzero probability that he is detecting a quality that everyone else is blind to, and that is wholly objective. Does a version of this argument about the PRP then force me to accept realism about gorminess as well?
A subjectivist might not accept the premise that anyone has an [objective] reason to think torturing babies is wrong (or not wrong). Idea: instead of a first-person chance of something being true, there is simply a certain degree of *seeming to be true*, which depends on a relation to a subject and does not ground or entail having any objective reason.
big fan Josh
I wonder what you think may be best moral argument
This is essentially just Pascal's wager.
What he calls "problems" with "relativism" is just a complaint that other people can be obnoxious.
It seems to me that (P provides a moral reason to PHI) is logically equivalent to (not P provides a moral reason not to PHI). This is just a normative application of the so-called Raven Paradox, which isn't a paradox, just a truth that's hard for many people to understand. If I were to update my beliefs to accept that torturing babies wasn't objectively wrong, this would be a reason for me to torture babies -- just an extremely tiny reason, comparable to the tiny evidence a red apple provides for the proposition that all ravens are black.
This feels like an argument against using probability as argument form.
1. (Probabilistic reason principle)
2. If God objectively exists, this would be a reason to believe in God.
3. Even if God does not objectively exist, this wouldn't be a reason not to believe in God.
4. There is some reason to think that God exists.
Therefore,
C. We have a reason to believe in God.
I don't think that's right, I think the argument is about belief, and not about taking action. It's an epistemic argument.
The principal that we arrive at from his argument is that the belief in normative ethics is warranted, not that it implies an action to be taken.
Similarly, a normative belief in God, does not imply an action to become a Christian. It simply means that belief in God is warranted, and belief in a moral objectivity is warranted. I don't think your response shows the difference.
for every subjective reason you can produce to NOT do something, you can produce a subjective reason to do that exact same thing.
Yes that's correct. But this does not clash with any of the argument's premises. Can you clarify which premise it is you're objecting to?
@@superstartop6763 Given that there is no criteria being put forth by which to denote any moral claim as being objective, the evaluation is being done based on how an individual feels (subjective) and thus him referencing the issue with subjective notions is an issue for the argument being put forth.
The argument is claiming objectivity without supporting such with a criteria by which an evaluation can be performed and thus degenerates into a subjective evaluation as opposed to an objective evaluation.
@@MyContext It seems like you're not understanding Huemer's argument. No where in the argument is the premise "x is an objective moral truth", so your criticism is irrelevant.
Again, if you take issue with the argument you need to specify exactly which premise it is you're objecting to.
@@superstartop6763 I would suggest you watch the video again. He makes reference to the concept of objective morality several times and thus sustains my criticism against it. Further, the whole idea of moral realism is the idea that such is something that is observer independent (objective morality) and thus sustainable as a fact of reality. The claim is a failure given the nature of the evaluation that is actually taking place - which is an appeal to subjective feelings and intuitions as opposed to something about reality.
2:10 (Implicit reference given the claim of observer independent)
8:10 (Explicit reference given the claim of "objectively wrong")
9:10 (Implicit reference given the reference to independent of desires, interests, attitude of observers)
10:10 (Explicit reference given the claim of objective moral reason)
I give a breakdown of the issues with the argument here...
ua-cam.com/video/R1eAxnN7Kl4/v-deo.html&lc=UgyGc6d2ILGM6Uuup8h4AaABAg
Ok, but this seems to miss the point. Me claiming that "morals" are "real" doesn't help me argue with someone who wants to torture babies, so I'm not sure why I'm supposed to care whether they are or not. At the end of the day, "objectivity" is just useless to speculate on, if not outright incoherent, because even if we have it, it doesn't help us do what we are already doing, so who cares?
This argument isn't actually sensitive to the moral facts themselves, only to our intuitions about them. So, for example, if the moral facts were _exactly the opposite_ of what Huemer thinks they are, the argument would supposedly still show that we have a reason to NOT torture babies. Even though, in this inverted world, we would actually have the opposite reason.
This consideration alone shows there's something critically wrong here.
The argument isn't objective due to lacking a criteria for moral evaluations.
11:07 That reply is just begging the question / assuming the conclusion.
No it isn't. Begging the question occurs when the justification of an argument's premise(s) depend on the justification of the argument's conclusion. Huemer claims that the probability of baby torture being immoral is higher than the probability of baby torture being obligatory. Huemer is *not* claiming that baby torture is *actually* immoral; he's merely claiming that *if* moral realism is true, *then* baby torture is more likely to be immoral than obligatory. That's a claim that even anti-realists could accept. So no, it isn't question begging.
I (an anti-realist) don't accept that claim. He needs to make an argument for it, but doesn't, hence why I said he's begging the question.
Said concisely: Claiming that X is more likely to be objectively immoral than Y (i.e. moral likely to be immoral in a moral realist sense) without any;argument is just begging the question.
@@WilliamKiely Well, he does give an argument for it. So, it's false to say "he doesn't". Second, failing to provide an argument for an assertion isn't question begging; it's only question begging when you use the assertion as evidence for the assertion.
Consider two statements:
(1) If moral realism is true, then torturing babies would be immoral
(2) If moral realism is true, then torturing babies would be morally obligatory
To any rational person, it should be overwhelmingly obvious that (1) is more plausible than (2). Since you disagree, please fill out your argument argument:
P1: ???
P2: ???
Conclusion: Therefore, (1) is *not* more plausible than (2).
After you've provided your argument, we can compare whether the evidence for P1 *and* P2 conjointly is stronger than the evidence of the negation of the conclusion ("(1) *is* more plausible than (2)").
1. (The Probablistic Reasons Principle.)
2. If baby torture were objectively wrong, this would be reason not to torture babies.
Rejected. (False/Malformed) a) Claims of objectivity require a criteria for evaluation. There has been no criteria for moral evaluations provided, thus there is no moral fact in the absence of a criteria by which to identify such as such. b) Even if it were the case that there is an objective criteria as to what is or is not moral, such would only be meaningful IF one cares about compliance to such and/or the consequences to violating such. A fact of any sort is always in itself insufficient as understood via the IS/OUGHT distinction.
3 Even if baby torture weren't objectively wrong, this wouldn't be a reason to torture babies.
Accepted. Agreed.
4. There is some reason to think baby torture is objectively wrong.
Rejected. False, given the absence of a criteria by which to make such an evaluation.
5. We have a reason not to torture babies.
Rejected. Unsubstantiated (pragmatically false) as predicated on the argument presented.
Okay, I'll reply to your comment here instead.
So, you reject premise (2) ("If baby torture were objectively wrong, this would be reason not to torture babies"). And your reasoning is that:
> "a) Claims of objectivity require a criteria for evaluation"
I'm not totally clear on what you mean by this, so correct me if I'm misunderstanding you, but it seems like you're saying we need a criteria to determine whether an action is objectively wrong.
If that is indeed what you're saying, then your criticism is irrelevant. For Huemer is not claiming that torturing babies is objectively wrong. What Huemer is claiming, rather, is that **if** torturing babies is objectively wrong, *then* that would be a reason to not torture babies. (Compare: The statements (1) "If I win the lottery, I will be rich" and (2) "I will win the lottery" are not equivalent).
Next, you object to premise (4) ("There is some reason to think baby torture is wrong"). Your objection is:
> "False, given the absence of a criteria by which to make such an evaluation."
Before I respond to your objection, let me clarify what premise (4) is about. Premise (4) is *not* the claim that we have 100% certainty in thinking that torturing babies is wrong. Nor, even, is it the claim that we have *very good* reasons to think torturing babies is wrong. Nor is it the claim that we have *good* reasons to think that torturing babies is objectively wrong. Indeed, premise (4) is *merely* the claim that we have *some* reason - however weak this reason is - to believe that torturing babies is objectively wrong. Perhaps this reason isn't strong enough to justify belief in moral realism; but the point is that there is *some* non-zero probability to think that baby torture is wrong.
Thus, in order to deny premise (4), one has to argue that we have *absolutely no reason at all* to believe that torturing babies is wrong. In other words, to show the denial of premise (4), you would have to show moral realism is an *absurd* view of some sort. And that's exactly where the problem lies. Moral realism may be *controversial*, but it is not *absurd* or *contradictory*. Intelligent people throughout history have believed that moral realism is true. Surely that counts as *some* (even if weak) evidence for moral realism.
So, it's false to say "we don't have any criteria to evaluate premise (4)". We do. The criteria is whether moral realism is absurd. The answer is no, moral realism isn't absurd.
If you still insist on denying premise (4). Then fill in your argument:
(Premise 1*): ???
(Premise 2*): ???
Conclusion: Therefore, moral realism is absurd and has a *zero* probability of being true.
Then we'll compare whether the force of your argument manages to refute Huemer's premise (4).
[I'm not totally clear on what you mean by this, so correct me if I'm misunderstanding you, but it seems like you're saying we need a criteria to determine whether an action is objectively wrong.]
Correct.
[What Huemer is claiming, rather, is that *if* torturing babies is objectively wrong, then that would be a reason to not torture babies. (Compare: The statements (1) "If I win the lottery, I will be rich" and (2) "I will win the lottery" are not equivalent).]
There can be no consideration in the absence of a criteria. Thus, the IF is invalid, since the statement is on par with claiming {IF torturing babies is X, then that would be reason to not torture babies.}. There is no basis for evaluating such given that X is unknown.
Further, I pointed out that even with a criteria, the argument would not follow. The issue being that the criteria would allow an IS for consideration, but any consideration is predicated on what one cares about such that the adjudication of anything being wrong even with a criteria carries no weight IF the individual doesn't actually care about morality defined or compliance with such. This immediately demotes the idea to a subjective consideration as to whether such is a reason at all.
If this is not clear, then consider the following "IF torturing babies is objectively right, then that would be a reason to torture babies." Even if there were a criteria by which torturing babies is objectively right, the acceptance or rejection of such is still a psychological issue such that IF one feels that torturing babies is wrong, one would still not abide by the criteria being put forth. The same applies in the inverse. If one feels that torturing babies is right, one would still not abide by the criteria declaring such to be wrong UNLESS there was some other consideration that forced not torturing.
[...premise (4) is merely the claim that we have some reason - however weak this reason is - to believe that torturing babies is objectively wrong.]
We have no reason given that we have no criteria for what is "objectively wrong". However, even with a criteria, the actual consideration is subjective such that the IS being denoted only plays with the individual if the IS interlinks to some personal OUGHT. This of course makes the adjudication as to whether it is wrong or not predicated on a subjective notion and thus a dismissal of moral realism.
[In other words, to show the denial of premise (4), you would have to show moral realism is an absurd view of some sort.]
The absurdity is the absence of a something in the context of reality. Consider that the observance or act of grinding up a baby would be denoted a gruesome (and morally repugnant by most), however, such is NOT a fact about reality, but our sociological/psychological judgements which is the actual basis of the judgement. It is due to this state of affairs that I am a moral antirealist, since I can support the moral judgement even as such is NOT a fact of reality, but rather my psychological dispositions.
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Years ago I asked the question "How would one define morality to those that don't have empathy?" Why? It was clear that moral determinations are about our feelings in some sense of the word such that IF one doesn't have such feelings, one would need a different guide by which to make moral adjudications. The best that I have found is simply "the degree to which an action/consideration/outcome supports well being is the degree to which such can be considered right" with the assaults to such being considered wrong. Of course one would need to either actually care or want to comply with what is considered good and thus the criteria is simply descriptive of what denotes what is right or wrong.
The question also made clear the nature of morality such that it wasn't about reality, but our quality of life in the context of reality and thus inherently sociological/psychological in nature.
@@MyContext
Thanks for the reply. I like the idea of putting brackets instead of quotes, so I'll do just that.
[Thus, the IF is invalid, since the statement is on par with claiming {IF torturing babies is X, then that would be reason to not torture babies.}. There is no basis for evaluating such given that X is unknown.]
Okay, so it seems like you're asking for the definition of 'objectively wrong'. I can't offer you a definition. Most words in English are not definable anyway. For any definition given, one can easily come up with counter examples. If you disagree, try defining 'table'. If you think your definition is correct, then there will be no counter examples to your definition.
Most words are learned not by reading definitions. Indeed, most words are learned by observing how other people use the word.
Be that as it may, I can still give you a "loose" definition of what "objectively wrong" means. If an action is objectively wrong, then that means: (a) It's wrong whether or not individuals or societies recognize it as such, and (b) there is a reason to not perform that action. (c) it is the opposite of good. Examples of things that are *generally* wrong are: stealing, killing, lying and so on.
[Further, I pointed out that even with a criteria, the argument would not follow. The issue being that the criteria would allow an IS for consideration, but any consideration is predicated on what one cares about such that the adjudication of anything being wrong even with a criteria carries no weight]
If you think nothing at all can provide reasons for action, you end up in a self-defeating position. By your own lights, we have *no reason at all* to believe anything you've just stated. Moreover, we would have *no reason at all* to think moral realism is false. Of course, even after replying to this point, we would still have *no reason at all* to believe your reply is correct. The only way out would be to accept epistemic realism.
[Even if there were a criteria by which torturing babies is objectively right, the acceptance or rejection of such is still a psychological issue such that IF one feels that torturing babies is wrong, one would still not abide by the criteria being put forth. The same applies in the inverse]
This is not relevant to the argument. The fact some individuals may not recognize or act in accordance to the moral facts does not contradict any of the argument's premises. You may be misunderstanding the word "reason" here. When Huemer says "if baby torture is objectively wrong, that would be a reason to not torture babies", he's not referring to human psychology.
Moving on to your denial of premise 4:
[The absurdity is the absence of a something in the context of reality. Consider that the observance or act of grinding up a baby would be denoted a gruesome (and morally repugnant by most), however, such is NOT a fact about reality, but our sociological/psychological judgements which is the actual basis of the judgement. It is due to this state of affairs that I am a moral antirealist, since I can support the moral judgement even as such is NOT a fact of reality, but rather my psychological dispositions.]
In summary, your argument is:
Premise (1): We can't observe moral values
Premise (2): If we can't observe moral values, then moral realism is *absurd* (i.e., impossible, having zero probability of being true).
Conclusion: Moral realism is absurd.
You take a staunch empiricist stance. This is problematic.
First, many moral realists (including Huemer!) hold that moral values are known apriori, rather than aposteriori, so premise (2) is easily false.
Second, your argument is self-refuting. What scientific instrument did you use to determine the truth of premise (2)? Which of the five senses did you use? You cannot observe the existence of premise (2) in reality. Yet, if you claim to know premise (2) to be true, then you must know it *apriori*. And if you do know it apriori, then premise (2) is false, since clearly you *would* know that there exists truths that can be known without empirical verification.
@@superstartop6763
Your argument doesn't represent my position.
I am a moral antirealist due to finding morality to be a sociological/psychological product as opposed to being a fact of reality. So, while I will likely agree with most moral adjudications claimed by moral realists, I reject the ontological status that is being accorded to morality.
I would put forth that MOST would largely accept the following definitions for what is moral and what is not.
Moral: Actions/Considerations/Outcomes which are supportive of well being.
Immoral: Actions/Considerations/Outcomes which are an assault to well being.
I reject claims of objective morality due to the nature of morality being predicated on cognitive tapestries NOT just for the evaluation, but the criteria being employed which makes such inherently subjective. This is why I requested a criteria so as to make the idea objective (independently reviewable) even if such isn't sustained as being an aspect of reality.
The Moral Roots of Liberals and Conservatives
ua-cam.com/video/8SOQduoLgRw/v-deo.html
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You are correct that I do hold an empiricist stance with regard to claims about reality, since IF there is nothing shown in the context of reality, then there is nothing to claim in the context of reality. Thus, claiming morality to be a thing of reality when every review results in such being a sociological/psychological construct amounts to making a category error with regard to the nature of morality on my view.
@@superstartop6763
Looking at your last response and my response again, I suspect was not sufficiently clear about the core issues.
So, let's consider a question that has far less universal acceptance.
*Is abortion wrong?*
*Is abortion objectively wrong?*
Regardless of which proposition is used, the adjudication invokes an individual's personal notions on the matter and is thus inherently a subjective (predicated on opinion) appeal with regard to the evaluation as opposed to being objective (independent of anyone's opinion).
This should also make it clear that adding the term objective does nothing to change the core issue accept perhaps for those that think adding the label objective has meaning in and of itself.
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There are two common lines of evaluation.
The pro-life position will often declare that a fetus is a person and killing a person is morally wrong.
The pro-choice position generally entails at least one of the following: 1) an understanding of a continuum of developmental such that the idea of being a person is developmental and not an immediate thing, 2) the impact of a pregnancy upon a person's life (physical and mental), 3) the quality of life if brought to term. Further, each of these issues is an ongoing dynamic as time progresses.
This shows that there isn't a single criteria of evaluation, but many when it comes to an adjudication with the evaluation being predicated on the individual's mindset with regard to whatever issue as to how such is evaluated.
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The criteria that I introduced for making moral determinations is still applicable from my standpoint, since a scoring of the issue can be made with regard to all the competing issues so as to make a net determination.
Unfortunately, the application of such would need to be formalized as a process for complex moral adjudications, since, in the absence of formalization, the claim of objectivity would still be a failure for more complex adjudications such as abortion.
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The core point that I am making is that the idea of objectivity requires that the evaluation be something that can be reduced to a process separate from the opinion of an individual such that such could at least in theory be implemented in an AI system and produce consistent moral evaluations.
The act of adding the label of objectivity does nothing to sustain the idea as actually being objective.
this argument sucks
When god punished king David by causing his infant son to suffer for a week from an illness and then die, was god acting morally? If so, the torturing babies is moral in some circumstances and cannot be objectively wrong. Yes?
I could bring up when god caused other infants to suffer…to glorify himself?…but I’ll just leave it with one for now.
I don't think your reasons to avoid torturing babies is observer-independent. It depends entirely on your state of knowledge. If you could take a God's-eye view of reality, you'd know *for certain* that torturing babies is/isn't wrong and would/wouldn't have a direct reason to avoid it, no need to futz around with probabilities. You have a probabilistic reason only because you're a finite being with limited knowledge. Knowledge is a state of mind, so the reason depends on your mental state, so not a real/objective moral reason.
Thinking about it more, I'm not so sure I agree with my above comment.
But I have another (possibly better) objection. For the PRP to work, it has to instantiate a preexisting (possibly universal) reason. If I enjoy Neapolitan ice cream (and thus have a reason to eat Neapolitan ice cream), and a friend tells me that its on sale at the store this weekend, the PRP gives me a probabilistic reason to go buy some. But that's ONLY because I have a preexisting reason to go eat Neapolitan ice cream. If I didn't enjoy Neapolitan ice cream, them my friend telling me so wouldn't give me a reason to go buy some.
Likewise, if torturing babies is actually wrong, then I have a reason to not torture babies, IF I already have a reason to avoid wrong things. But it would be circular to assume that I already have a reason to not do wrong things, since that's the entire point of the argument. You can't instantiate a reason that we don't already know is there.
@@Sam-vf5uc The argument hasn't put forth a criteria by which to make moral adjudications such that it using subjective notions such as feelings and intuitions. I agree that knowledge is required by which to perform an adjudication as is the case with any adjudication.
Huemer is cringe. Moral realism is basically just magic woo woo. The people who push this gibberish should grow up.
Most PHd level philosophers are moral realists, but I guess they are all idiots compared to your genius level intellect.
@@rosesmitty1206 very smart people can still be very wrong.
@@okiedokie2234 if a whole bunch of experts in a field believe In a thing in that field I'm not gonna be dogmatic and call it "magic woo woo" because I'm not an ego maniac.
@@rosesmitty1206 In hard sciences, relying on expert consensus proves effective due to the empirical nature of the discipline, where theories are subject to rigorous testing and verification. However, in philosophy, the abstract and subjective nature of concepts often defies empirical testing, making consensus-based validation less reliable.
@@okiedokie2234 I never said it proves it true, did i? I said it would make me skeptical on my take on the issue. I wouldn't dismiss all majority of experts as stupid like the comment above is, because I'm not an ego maniac.