The script to this video is part of... - The Philosophy Vibe - "Metaethics" eBook, available on Amazon: mybook.to/philosophyvibe5 - The Philosophy Vibe Paperback Anthology Vol 3 'Ethics and Political Philosophy' available worldwide on Amazon: mybook.to/philosophyvibevol3
If it weren't for these videos my metaethics class would be going very differently. I especially appreciate the way you guys divide supporting and opposing arguments the way that you do, it makes it so much easier to understand as in class we discuss the argument and then just jump into objections as they arise. Your format makes it 10x easier to understand and im really appreciative about it
Moore's argument doesn't beg the question, at least its simplest form given on wikipedia. It's just a modus ponens. Secondly, we would expect there to be moral disagreement. The existence of a moral intuition doesn't entail that the intuition is infallible. The fact that people disagree about what conforms to an objective moral standard is evidence for moral realism, and the fact there is disagreement only shows that people have different ideas of what conforms to that standard, not that there is no standard! On the empirical point, well it's not a metaphysical claim, it's an epistemic claim, but either way, the idea that "basing objective moral truths on a metaphysical belief does not seem right" is itself weird, since one of the issues we're dealing with in metaethics is moral ontology, which is literally metaphysics.
the version on wikipedia does still beg the question because premise 2 assumes the falsity of analytical naturalism, which is precisely what Moore is trying to establish the falsity of - if in fact moral facts are reducible to natural ones then we are engaging in a form of conceptual confusion when we are asking 'is it true that X is good', but this is what premise 2 assumes is false.
@Chase Roycroft It may be impossible to convince some people of some things, but this seems true in many cases, not just ethics. i.e. it may be impossible for me to convince someone devoted to a flat Earth theory that they are mistaken. Even so, you've stipulated this person is somewhat insane, but that gives us excellent reason to think bias is affecting their intuitions. It seems obvious that we should reject the credibility of their position.
Absolutely, we will be releasing videos covering Descartes Meditations on First Philosophy as well as a specific video on Dualism. Glad these videos are helping.
Excellent video, as usual. I would really enjoy it if you two made a video discussing Universal Prescriptivism! As a moral non-cognitivist, I’d love to learn more about and it’s critiques!
Thank you very much. The next video will be on Emotivism and we will touch upon Prescriptivism. We'll look to do a video solely on Universal Presciptivism at some point. Appreciate your feedback.
I haven't watched your recent videos so they could very well be different now, but I just wanted to say I thought this was really helpful in gaining insight as I've been struggling with the concept of non-naturalism. My only tip would be that it kinda sounds like you're reading from a script, so act a bit more naturally ;)
We all see the property of goodness itself the same, it's just that we disagree about which things possess that property. Different people ascribe the properties of goodness & wrongness to different things but we all see the properties the same. For example, if someone sees on tv a suicide bomber and sees children dying, they will feel strong moral disgust, but for the suicide bomber just before detonating the bomb, he will have a strong feeling of moral rightousness, but for the man watching tv, he will feel a strong feeling of rightousness by imagining himself shooting the bomber just before he detonates the bomb. The feeling of moral disgust and moral righteousness themselves will be exactly the same in the two different people, but they will have acribed those properties to opposite things.
The problem with moral intuitionism is that if I follow my moral intuitions with complete intellectual honesty the moral view I sincerely arrive at is… wait for it…. Negative utilitarianism I am the only person I know with that notoriously pessimistic and widely rejected view, yet this honestly the conclusion I arrive at.
“To base objective moral truth on something with no empirical evidence does not SEEM right to me” Lol he used intuition to claim that using intuition is wrong
An easy way to render the is-ought problem meaningless is to acknowledge that morality, an emergent biological imperative characteristic of social beings in which the evolutionary pressures leading us to form cooperative society compel us to seek the preservation of life and freedom and happiness as well as minimize unjust suffering, is itself a natural property.
I would argue though that premise 4 is a conclusion derived from premise 3. In fact, the whole argument seems to work in the way of derivative premises from one to another. If the identification among X=N is true, then it is meaningless to ask if X=N (premise 3), and it's concluded that it must be an open question. Then, if you use (4) to derive the rest, analytical equivalence among natural properties and moral properties can not be done.
I am studying this question in my philosohpy class and this video really helped me. Question: does natural property translate to things actually existent, either substantially or accidentally? At first I thought you could anser the question by making the definition of n=the course of action which should be followed. But then how could the sun be good. What about n = that which perfects. ?
However, only consider morally, N = "the course of action which should be followed" may hold. The sun would then have to be considered good, not in a univocal sense but in an analogical sense.
Also, you said that premise four is an assumption. I don't follow. According to your video, how could "is fast food good?" not be an open question? It is not self-evident that fast food is good, therefore it is an open, meaningful question.
Hi James, the question begging criticism was to show that, whilst some natural properties are self evidently an open question (such as the fast food example), it is not the case that all natural properties are self evidently open questions. Moore assumes that any natural property would be an open question.
@@PhilosophyVibe Hold on,do we really have to consider all kinds of natural propertiits here? I think what Hume was trying to do here is to show us how pleasure and pain can't be the grounding in defining what is good and what is bad. Which I think is worked in that regard
Just a question - you say cognitivism is truth apt which I understand and that cognitivists believe morality to be objective which I also get (cognitivists are moral realists etc) but where I'm getting lost is I understand that error theorists are cognitivists as they believe that morality is truth apt but all moral claims are false, but I thought error theorists were anti realists as they believe morality to be subjective? Any clarification would be really appreciated! BTW great videos gents liked and subbed!
Read Sam Harris' ''Moral Landscape'', he's a moral realist/ethical naturalist and makes the best argument I've ever read on it. He uses the framework of [well-being] as intrinsically moral, which is a difficult concept to disagree with as not being a universal standard of morality, whereas an idea such as pleasure or happiness is a tenuous one.
Although we may have an intrinsic quality of self preservation, we cannot derive morality from this happening. We could but it would lack logic, and the backing of science.
So, now we can reframe the Premise content "Pleasure" with "Wellbeing" and I believe no one would be able to figure out any sort of wellbeing which could be considered bad. Case dismiss 👍
P3 states that if we reduce Moral property 'Good' to Natural property 'Pleasure'. Then it will be pointless to ask if Pleasure is good. But,since we know that asking if pleasure really is good is a meaningful question giving the fact that there are many pleasurable things which we certainly wouldn't consider good. Therefore,Pleasure itself can't be synonymous with good,since good can't be bad.Thus, it is an open question to ask if pleasure is good.
@@proveit4145 i've got a philosophy and ethics exam tomorrow and your mini explanation of p3-p4 and open question argument has genuinely saved me !! Thankyou!
Hahaha when one says "intuitions exist", they are not saying intuitions are some sort of weird metaphysical substance that floats in the universe, they are not making an ontological claim, they are just saying that there exist a subjective 1st person phenomenological experience that we call intuitions. It's an objective fact that phenomenological experiences that we call intuition exists. It's just like saying "thoughts exist", you're not saying balls of light/energy that float in the universe exist, you're just recognizing that it's true that there are experiences that happen in the subjectivity of people that we called "thoughts". All scientific knowledge comes to us through thoughts/consciousness/subjectivity. For a human to know a fact, that human has had to have a thought about this fact, the facts of the world are accessible to humans through the experience of thoughts, and so Moore just says that how we know if things are good or wrong is when we have an intuition that such and such is good/wrong.
If Moore made such a fundamental error of logic in his cornerstone contribution to philosophy then why is he so famous? I think Hume hit the nail on the head with his IS-OUGHT gap idea that nothing in the descriptive world (the world of ISes) can compel action in the normative/prescriptive world (the world of OUGHTs). Also I loath the notion that good, evil, yellow and pleasurable are binary concepts. It seems to me we can talk of good, evil and yellowness as concepts that are capable of existing in degree along a continuum. This is the problem with Aristotelean/syllogistic logic.
How is it question begging? Since proving it would be like proving a negative? It up to those who disagree with Moore to provide proof invalidating it.
Premise 4 is an assumption. Moore was trying to prove that moral terms cannot be reduced to natural terms as it is always an open question. However in his syllogism Moore uses his intended conclusion as a premise, within premise 4 he assumes his argument is true, which is a logical fallacy known as Begging the Question. Naturalist Moral Realism is only concluded to be false based on the premise 4 assumption.
The script to this video is part of...
- The Philosophy Vibe - "Metaethics" eBook, available on Amazon:
mybook.to/philosophyvibe5
- The Philosophy Vibe Paperback Anthology Vol 3 'Ethics and Political Philosophy' available worldwide on Amazon:
mybook.to/philosophyvibevol3
If it weren't for these videos my metaethics class would be going very differently. I especially appreciate the way you guys divide supporting and opposing arguments the way that you do, it makes it so much easier to understand as in class we discuss the argument and then just jump into objections as they arise. Your format makes it 10x easier to understand and im really appreciative about it
Lovely to read this. So happy these videos have helped you.
Took me 2 hours trying to comprehend the argument, thank you!
Pleasure, thank you for watching.
Damn John went off
Lmao
"To base objective moral truths on a metaphysical belief in an intuition does not seem right to me"
The irony of this statement lol
The visual style and thumbnail turned me off first, but the content and information provided was on point. Thank you.
Glad you liked it in the end, thank you for watching.
Moore's argument doesn't beg the question, at least its simplest form given on wikipedia. It's just a modus ponens. Secondly, we would expect there to be moral disagreement. The existence of a moral intuition doesn't entail that the intuition is infallible. The fact that people disagree about what conforms to an objective moral standard is evidence for moral realism, and the fact there is disagreement only shows that people have different ideas of what conforms to that standard, not that there is no standard! On the empirical point, well it's not a metaphysical claim, it's an epistemic claim, but either way, the idea that "basing objective moral truths on a metaphysical belief does not seem right" is itself weird, since one of the issues we're dealing with in metaethics is moral ontology, which is literally metaphysics.
Your refutation, argued concisely and with clarity, hasn't drawn any rejoinders, Bru Master. I wonder why?
the version on wikipedia does still beg the question because premise 2 assumes the falsity of analytical naturalism, which is precisely what Moore is trying to establish the falsity of - if in fact moral facts are reducible to natural ones then we are engaging in a form of conceptual confusion when we are asking 'is it true that X is good', but this is what premise 2 assumes is false.
@Chase Roycroft It may be impossible to convince some people of some things, but this seems true in many cases, not just ethics. i.e. it may be impossible for me to convince someone devoted to a flat Earth theory that they are mistaken.
Even so, you've stipulated this person is somewhat insane, but that gives us excellent reason to think bias is affecting their intuitions. It seems obvious that we should reject the credibility of their position.
Begging the question is a form of modus ponens. Just saying it's modus ponens does not make it not fallacious.
Helpful discussion. Thank you.
Pleasure, glad you liked it.
Please can you make a video on dualism including substance and property. Your videos are so good and make philosophical topics easier to understand.
Absolutely, we will be releasing videos covering Descartes Meditations on First Philosophy as well as a specific video on Dualism. Glad these videos are helping.
Writing my uni essay on moral truths and every other source except from this is destroying my brain. Thank you, you've saved my degree lmao
Pleasure, thank you for watching, and good luck in the essay.
Excellent video, as usual. I would really enjoy it if you two made a video discussing Universal Prescriptivism! As a moral non-cognitivist, I’d love to learn more about and it’s critiques!
Thank you very much. The next video will be on Emotivism and we will touch upon Prescriptivism. We'll look to do a video solely on Universal Presciptivism at some point. Appreciate your feedback.
Amazingly clear
I haven't watched your recent videos so they could very well be different now, but I just wanted to say I thought this was really helpful in gaining insight as I've been struggling with the concept of non-naturalism. My only tip would be that it kinda sounds like you're reading from a script, so act a bit more naturally ;)
Glad this video helped, and thank you for the tip :)
We all see the property of goodness itself the same, it's just that we disagree about which things possess that property. Different people ascribe the properties of goodness & wrongness to different things but we all see the properties the same. For example, if someone sees on tv a suicide bomber and sees children dying, they will feel strong moral disgust, but for the suicide bomber just before detonating the bomb, he will have a strong feeling of moral rightousness, but for the man watching tv, he will feel a strong feeling of rightousness by imagining himself shooting the bomber just before he detonates the bomb. The feeling of moral disgust and moral righteousness themselves will be exactly the same in the two different people, but they will have acribed those properties to opposite things.
The problem with moral intuitionism is that if I follow my moral intuitions with complete intellectual honesty the moral view I sincerely arrive at is… wait for it….
Negative utilitarianism
I am the only person I know with that notoriously pessimistic and widely rejected view, yet this honestly the conclusion I arrive at.
excellent video.. two thumbs up
make that 3
To the point, crisp analysis.
Thank you!
“To base objective moral truth on something with no empirical evidence does not SEEM right to me”
Lol he used intuition to claim that using intuition is wrong
Thanks mates for better explaining this interesting concept.
A pleasure, thank you for watching.
@@PhilosophyVibe Thanks mate :D
Thank you
You're welcome
An easy way to render the is-ought problem meaningless is to acknowledge that morality, an emergent biological imperative characteristic of social beings in which the evolutionary pressures leading us to form cooperative society compel us to seek the preservation of life and freedom and happiness as well as minimize unjust suffering, is itself a natural property.
Can you please explain what you mean by "ethical colorblindness"?
Amazing tube on philosophizing philosophy
keep it up.
Thank you :)
this is a really good channel!
Thank you glad you like it.
Loved it!
I would argue though that premise 4 is a conclusion derived from premise 3. In fact, the whole argument seems to work in the way of derivative premises from one to another.
If the identification among X=N is true, then it is meaningless to ask if X=N (premise 3), and it's concluded that it must be an open question.
Then, if you use (4) to derive the rest, analytical equivalence among natural properties and moral properties can not be done.
yes i agree
I like you guy's style
Thanks!
I am studying this question in my philosohpy class and this video really helped me. Question: does natural property translate to things actually existent, either substantially or accidentally? At first I thought you could anser the question by making the definition of n=the course of action which should be followed. But then how could the sun be good. What about n = that which perfects. ?
However, only consider morally, N = "the course of action which should be followed" may hold. The sun would then have to be considered good, not in a univocal sense but in an analogical sense.
the analogical similarity between a good course of action and the sun would be "that which perfects".
Also, you said that premise four is an assumption. I don't follow. According to your video, how could "is fast food good?" not be an open question? It is not self-evident that fast food is good, therefore it is an open, meaningful question.
Hi James, the question begging criticism was to show that, whilst some natural properties are self evidently an open question (such as the fast food example), it is not the case that all natural properties are self evidently open questions. Moore assumes that any natural property would be an open question.
@@PhilosophyVibe Hold on,do we really have to consider all kinds of natural propertiits here? I think what Hume was trying to do here is to show us how pleasure and pain can't be the grounding in defining what is good and what is bad. Which I think is worked in that regard
Who's disliking this, good vid :)
Thank you!
Just a question - you say cognitivism is truth apt which I understand and that cognitivists believe morality to be objective which I also get (cognitivists are moral realists etc) but where I'm getting lost is I understand that error theorists are cognitivists as they believe that morality is truth apt but all moral claims are false, but I thought error theorists were anti realists as they believe morality to be subjective? Any clarification would be really appreciated!
BTW great videos gents liked and subbed!
Read Sam Harris' ''Moral Landscape'', he's a moral realist/ethical naturalist and makes the best argument I've ever read on it. He uses the framework of [well-being] as intrinsically moral, which is a difficult concept to disagree with as not being a universal standard of morality, whereas an idea such as pleasure or happiness is a tenuous one.
Although we may have an intrinsic quality of self preservation, we cannot derive morality from this happening. We could but it would lack logic, and the backing of science.
And how does he define well-being without resorting to pleasure or happiness?
So, now we can reframe the Premise content "Pleasure" with "Wellbeing" and I believe no one would be able to figure out any sort of wellbeing which could be considered bad. Case dismiss 👍
I'm really confused with the transition from P3 to P4... what's the difference and what makes the P4 becomes open questions.
P3 states that if we reduce Moral property 'Good' to Natural property 'Pleasure'. Then it will be pointless to ask if Pleasure is good. But,since we know that asking if pleasure really is good is a meaningful question giving the fact that there are many pleasurable things which we certainly wouldn't consider good. Therefore,Pleasure itself can't be synonymous with good,since good can't be bad.Thus, it is an open question to ask if pleasure is good.
@@proveit4145 Thank you!!
@@proveit4145 i've got a philosophy and ethics exam tomorrow and your mini explanation of p3-p4 and open question argument has genuinely saved me !! Thankyou!
Also, intuition would be an epistemological claim, not a metaphysical one.
Hahaha when one says "intuitions exist", they are not saying intuitions are some sort of weird metaphysical substance that floats in the universe, they are not making an ontological claim, they are just saying that there exist a subjective 1st person phenomenological experience that we call intuitions. It's an objective fact that phenomenological experiences that we call intuition exists. It's just like saying "thoughts exist", you're not saying balls of light/energy that float in the universe exist, you're just recognizing that it's true that there are experiences that happen in the subjectivity of people that we called "thoughts". All scientific knowledge comes to us through thoughts/consciousness/subjectivity. For a human to know a fact, that human has had to have a thought about this fact, the facts of the world are accessible to humans through the experience of thoughts, and so Moore just says that how we know if things are good or wrong is when we have an intuition that such and such is good/wrong.
If Moore made such a fundamental error of logic in his cornerstone contribution to philosophy then why is he so famous? I think Hume hit the nail on the head with his IS-OUGHT gap idea that nothing in the descriptive world (the world of ISes) can compel action in the normative/prescriptive world (the world of OUGHTs). Also I loath the notion that good, evil, yellow and pleasurable are binary concepts. It seems to me we can talk of good, evil and yellowness as concepts that are capable of existing in degree along a continuum. This is the problem with Aristotelean/syllogistic logic.
How is it question begging? Since proving it would be like proving a negative? It up to those who disagree with Moore to provide proof invalidating it.
What is wrong with "proving a negative"?
ie proposition, yes or no [true / not true]
Why is premise 4 a categorical mistake?
Premise 4 is an assumption. Moore was trying to prove that moral terms cannot be reduced to natural terms as it is always an open question. However in his syllogism Moore uses his intended conclusion as a premise, within premise 4 he assumes his argument is true, which is a logical fallacy known as Begging the Question. Naturalist Moral Realism is only concluded to be false based on the premise 4 assumption.
When someone says Yellow but you see Green. Damn it all
Well... you might be interested in our video on Primary and Secondary Qualities :)
ua-cam.com/video/mLK4d6avtIM/v-deo.html
Choosing or refraining from eating fast food is NOT a moral choice. This is ridiculous.
what the sigma
Shut up.
Oh no, why the freaking murmuring voice