Excellent discussion, guys! My grandfather, Chester Franklin Sparks, was a Chief Petty Officer on the flight deck of the Lexington during this battle. Like many of the WW2 vets that survived the terrible events of this war, he very rarely talked about it. And never in detail. I lived with him, and my Nana, as a young child in the mid 1970s. And after tiring of my relentless inquiries about his participation in the war, he finally agreed to answer my questions for one hour. With the agreement that the subject would never be brought up again. In hindsight, I am glad I persisted, but also feel badly for how clearly upset he was at the end of that hour. He described the attack in detail to me. And specifically how his life was saved by a man he knew. That man happened to be running in between him, and the point where a bomb hit the flight deck, at the exact moment of impact. The man was killed instantly by the splintered shards of the wooden decking that came flying towards them. One large piece through his head. He said that had the man not been there in that moment, it would have been him laying there. He recounted going into the ocean, and treading water for almost two hours before being picked up, and taken back to Pearl Harbor. Being reassigned to the Yorktown, and then going to the Battle Of Midway. He definitely had a rough time out there, like so many others. One thing we didn't get to, was where he went after the Yorktown at Midway. Does anyone know where Yorktowns' men were reassigned to afterwards? I do know he stayed in the Navy after the war, and worked on the flight deck of the U.S.S. Philippine Sea, during Korea. He was a great man, and generous, and kind, outwardly. But was tough as nails, and didn't suffer any fools. I miss him every day. Thanks again for the outstanding video. Subbed. 👍
As I study WWII this battle is one of the most frustrating of the war. I have to remember we were new to this type of warfare. People like your Granddad were invaluable to the American fleet. the knowledge they gain early in the war is what put us over the top. Respect to him and the other crewmen.
First, total respect for your detailed research and quality presentations. Second, I was taught that the Battle for the Coral Sea was a tactical defeat but a strategic victory (sort of like the Tet Offensive in many ways). Australian headlines at the time read "CORAL SEA BATTLE MAY DECIDE THE FATE OF AUSTRALIA." This is how we viewed it, and to this day we celebrate the outcome. On the 80th anniversary of the battle, the US Secretary of State press release: "Our countries joined forces and our service members fought side-by-side for four days in what would become a turning point in the war in the Pacific. Our nations are forever grateful for the heroism demonstrated by those courageous Americans and Australians. We will always remember the sacrifice they made for the cause of freedom in the Pacific." Now it may be all a myth, and the Australian involvement significantly overstated, but when you see Japanese script (money) designed for use in Australia you realize how real the threat was. (Please allow me this very soft criticism) I love the level of detail in your presentations but sometimes I think you do not see the forest for the trees. The Battle of the Coral Sea saved my country and we will be forever grateful to the USA. That is the strategic victory. In my humble view, you mention this aspect in passing and are more focused on how many fleet carriers are going to turn up to Midway. Thank you for the time and effort that goes into these excellent presentations.
@@carterjackson8033 He did ignore the facts on the ground… that’s the problem. The Vietcong was incapable of sustaining any significant operations after Tet, but we turned that victory into defeat. This was well acknowledged by their own leaders after the war.
@@JJJRRRJJJ It was a tactical lose and probably a strategic setback for the NVA. Because they probably could have used those offensive forces in a better way, but it is generally excepted that it was a surprise to the US military. They knew something was up, but didn't expect it to be so large and aggressive. Anyway, the US government was feeding the media and the Americans a line of bull for years regarding the war and the probable outcomes, and Tet was a wakeup to reality. The NVA had more resources and determination than expected and we could see that in the news video during those fierce days of battle of Tet. Walter Cronkite was just adding commentary to what we were already thinking. If you don't agree, that is fine, but I suggest you read the Pentagon Papers, and then come back and tell me how long you think we should have stayed and fought? (You can factor out Cronkite's commentary in this scenario, and just figure he somehow was gung ho about the whole thing and we as a people were not aware of Cronkite's thinking.) Were you on the ground in Vietnam? I was not, but I watched it on a daily basis from home and was wondering if I would have to go over there and kill people when I reached the age of 18 years.
@@carterjackson8033it was a propaganda lose b/c the media made it out to be just that. All attacks were repelled, even those fought mostly by ARVN. In addition the thousands of executions of Viet citizens by the VC during TET were covered up by the media and our supposed war crimes were all we heard.
What a time we live in where I can conveniently listen to a couple of subject matter experts share their passion and knowledge. Brilliant work gentlemen, brilliant.
You have a follower here. My dad flew F6F off the Enterprise, at night he was on board when the elevator was blown off in May '45(I think). They figured the Kamikaze was attempting to fly to the bottom of the ship via the elevator shaft.
Such a pleasure watching your videos and listening to your podcasts. It’s like sitting down with knowledgeable friends over a beer. I’ve read quite a bit about many of the battles you discuss, but the level of detail and objective mess of your discussions are really icing on the cake. Keep up the good work!
I proud to say my dad was on the Lexington, he would at times talk about the battle, but you and your program have given me more insight into the battle then he could. But like it's said, hindsight is 20/20. I remember a gathering we went to in the late 60's, the book The Lexington goes down had just been finished and was given to each of the families there. I wish my pop was still around, he would have enjoyed your program, thanks for all your knowledge, great job.
Dad told me alot about Coral Sea.The time it was dusk and the Japanese tried to land on the Yorktown and the wild ride to avoid the Japanese Torpedo attacks. Post script: The second of three that tried to land on Yorktown saw his mistake and gunned his engine and thumded his nose.Going passed the superstructure he banked right and the most forward .50 on the Starboard side shot him and he went nose first into the water.Everyone cheered dad said. The third ginned his engine and kept going.
Well done...im surprised to hear the criticism of Fletcher though. I felt he was a pretty under rated admiral all things considered by wars end. Nobody is perfect every time...especially in the early rounds of a fight
Great podcasts. My father was in the Navy, Pacific but did not talk about it unless it was something funny. I've learned a lot by reading the many fine books written about the war but with your podcasts I've picked up quite a bit of the history. Thanks and keep up the great work.
Brilliant presentation. I learned to understand the complexity of the Coral Sea fight minus the fog of war confusion. Also, experiencing ice cream as a patriotic salve is much appreciated. Thanks so much.
@11:11:37 Japanese multi-carrier doctrine - excellent point! Had we figured this out, it may have prevented the Midway battle "Flight to Nowhere" from Hornet.
Love the intro! Bill it had to be a total letdown stepping off the Indianapolis into a desk job. But the family time had to be tremendous. And as you say the collaboration between you both are what drew me into the Channel. Even without graphics and photos as Ryan and Drach provide. Thanks to you both a d your guests as well.
I've heard from several sources that the SBD's had issues with their bombsights fogging up as they dove, which is why they weren't able to score more hits on Shokaku or Zuikaku.
Thanks as always, I've read & watched episodes on the coral sea battle &I agree with what you have described, plus I have enjoyed listening to you describing it.Rickm.
Thank's Guys I learnt a lot about the tactical and strategic implications of Coral Sea and it"s relationship to the New Guinea Campaign. Cheers from the land of Aus.
Thank you gentlemen. Loved it I've read many books on Guadel Cannel and the battle of Coral Sea. You coverage is outstanding...again, Thank-you for this podcast. Keep up the great work.
So much detail! Love the content. Never knew all the negative stuff about Mcarthur. I grew up thinking he was a hero of sorts and only "negative" was Korean war incursion into China. Thank you!
the battle of the coral sea saved Australia and the battle of the Bismark sea finished any threat to Australia say my dad who was in the 6th div aif who later in the war served with the Americans still have his aussie and american dog tags the aif ones are made of leather and the american ones are aluminum aluminium. cheers folks.
At some point in time I hope you two go into exactly how the repair yard at Pearl Harbor fixed so much of Yorktown's damage that she was able to return to sea, battle ready, after only 72 hours in the harbor? I have read, and cannot remember the source, that the construction plans for Yorktown were at Pearl Harbor and the repair shops started "making" the broken frames and deck parts before she actually returned from the battle of the Coral Sea, in essence creating "prefabricated" parts such as support frames for the flight deck,etc. Is there any truth to this?
The aftermath of the battle of coral sea shows another difference between American and Japanese unit doctrine, and a flaw with the Japanese: shokaku herself was out of action, but her air group was relatively intact. Zuikaku was fine, but missing a functional air group. An American admiral would simply shuttle Shokaku’s air group over to Zuikaku and present a fifth complete carrier for the battle of Midway. Japanese doctrine held the carrier and air group were to be kept together; American doctrine considered them interchangeable. Japan Having a fifth carrier at Midway wouldn’t have been as bad for us as facing six, but we were pushing the odds as it was, so I’m glad we didn’t have to find out.
Agree! No need to shuttle over Shokaku's planes, because Zuikaku recovered Shokaku's surviving strike planes as well because of the damage to the latter. Post-battle, counting repaired aircraft, Zuikaku had 24 fighters, 13 dive bombers, and 8 torpedo planes on May 9th. And would've picked up more replacements upon return to Japan. But no one felt the situation for Midway was "desperate" enough to require a 5th carrier operating without her twin, outside of doctrine, an odd mix of planes, and a composite aircrew. And that led to why the IJN failed at Midway: their admirals did not do everything they could to prepare for a hard fight.
The Wildcat was not significantly inferior to the Zero if used to exploit its strengths. The major proviso for the Wildcat's pilot was not to get into a low speed. low altitude manoeuvre dogfight with the Zero
Hello Seth, I want to thank you and Mr. Totti and the other historian who's name I can't remember at this time. I enjoy your podcasts, I have been a historian of American warfare since I was a child. One of my hobbies is world naval aviation and that was part of my life serving both in the active duty and reserve United States Navy as an aircraft mechanic. In my opinion , you three gentlemen tell it was with flair and true compassion. I just wanted to say thank you for what you do.
Great discussion. In light on the outcome of Port Morsbey and the whole Papu New Guinea campaign in tandem with the Guadalcanal campaign....this has a positive outcome for the Allies.
Re: miscounting the Neosho detachment, I can easily see how it happened, if the scouts were above broken clouds. A cloud obscures you for a few seconds and now you’re at a different angle.
Thanks for doing your videos they are great, I had a uncle the flew PBY's with the Black Cat's sad to say like a lot of vets he would not talk about the battles that he was in. He would talk about flying and the told me about how he got in to PBY's. He was in advance training an the instructor told him to go inverted and then press one of the rudder peddles. my uncle said " I can't my feet don't reach the peddles" my uncle was on the short side. not to waste the training they put him in PBY's they don't invert. Maybe you could do a video about the Black Cat's you don't hear much about them.
In a previous video, You mentioned that early in the war, 42, if I remember correctly, that the Australians converted a medium bomber to a gun platform. And that it was a very successful tactic to use it first to deal with AA on a ship, then additional aircraft follow with bombs and/or torpedoes. That seems to me like a high payoff tactic. I haven’t run across following comments about how widely that might have been used. Love your approach to your presentations. 23 year veteran, engineer by training, and occasionally got the privilege of going to the field to help sort problems that established process didn’t deal with. 90% of the job was listening. The other 10% was figuring out how to tell the story to the powers that be.
Dear sirs, you guys could use some props. Seth you would look good with Maybe a WWII Bayonet and some camo net around. Bill needs a Trident. And maybe an anchor. Think about it. I like what you guys are doing. I love the insight you have on things that went down. To me this is very exciting. Both of you have a way of explaining things that makes me feel close to the situation you are speaking of. Thank you for what you do.
I love your shows so much. I remember when I first learned how to read, my first memory was reading every WW2 book in the local library. I can’t explain why, but I couldn’t help myself. Same with your shows! Thank you so much! 1:14:14
Great aynalisis of the Coral Sea's engagements. Learning curves are factors that make or break new technology especially in the application and implementation. Old methods and procedures seem to aquire a life of their own via the bureaucracy surrounding the obsolete.
I think one of the important lessons to be learned by the US was the proper control of the CAP. I remember from another source that the CAP controllers tried to direct the CAP using bearings from the ship rather than giving the CAP a bearing to intercept the enemy. Don't know if this is true or not.
Your podcasts are amazing, travelling through the pacific war going into depth looking at individual points. I have never seen a show this focused. Keep up the great work.
And Fletcher just may have learned from his error at Coral Sea. Also Fletcher gets his aircraft to the Kido Butai at Midway with no help from Arashio. Start tossing baseballs in a glass house....
The IJN pioneered coordinated composite strikes from multiple carriers at PH. The USN and RN didn't think that way. USN carriers were still operating individually throughout 1942 (though having just one or two carriers during much of the latter half of 1942 kind of limited the ability to try coordinating multiple carriers' groups into a coordinated strike).
Fantastic episode, as they all are. You guys are doing superb work with this series. Much is made - and legitimately so, of course - of the cryptanalysts' crucial role in the days prior to Midway. One thing that has long struck me is that it was not unprecedented...something similar had already occurred here for Operation MO, as mentioned toward the beginning of this episode. My perception is that the IJN was just as surprised here at Coral Sea by the early presence of USN fleet carriers as they would later be at Midway. One could reasonably surmise that they would not have sent that invasion force through the Jomard so early, with only one CVL for air support, had they'd any inkling that US carriers might be in striking vicinity. I've always wondered if there is any primary source of the time (as opposed to later hindsight) indicating that anyone in the IJN stopped to ask "wait a minute...ok, so weve sunk these two carriers [as they thought] ... but how the heck did they know to be there in the first place?"
I have a suggestion for an episode. The evolution of air sea rescue. I understand the Tang helped develop submarine air sea rescue ops. Also the air rescue system set up in the Solomon island using coast watchers and natives.
Seth,sweed had said in an interview that these 3 zeros were making head on attacks at him.The sbd was a very tough and rugged aircraft.After shooting down 2 of the 3 zeros,the last one while making a head on attack tried to kamikaze him and he apparently hit the pilot in the head with gunfire from his 20mm cannons.The first 2 bailed out,but this pilots aircraft exploded in a ball of fire.You were spot on when you said he was a great pilot.After what he did,I think he was the best pilot in the PTOA.
An observation on terminology: if your torpedo strikes the target, it seems to me that is a "hit". What happens after that is entirely down to the Bureau of Ordinance.
Great show. At almost the last minute of the podcast, Sean said the US didn't have a coordinated carrier strike until 1944. While I agree with the thrust of the comment, the two raids on Rabul in November 1943 were well coordinated.
Between attrition in searches and pre-main-battle strikes and losses in the main battle, Sho's and Zui's air groups were depleted, crew and planes. There were enough pilots that they could have been close to a full air group, but IJN doctrine at the time was that ship and air crew were a unit. Thus combining the air groups didn't happen, and Zui was not in Kido Butai at Midway.
Where did your uncle receive his training? The Navy trained carrier pilots at the Great Lakes Naval Base north of Chicago. They used two converted side wheeler steamships as aircraft carriers for practicing take-offs and landings. Those were berthed by Navy Pier where they trained the A&P mechanics and machinists using instructors provided by Chicago's Vocational schools.
I have never looked at the timeline of the aftermath of coral sea versus the run up to midway. At what point did we realize the strategic value of the damage we caused here? Did we know midway was going to happen before or after this battle? At what point, before or after midway, did we realize we could’ve faced six carriers here rather than four?
By late May or early June Hypo informed Nimitz that Zuikaku's air wing was going to be involved elsewhere and that Zuikaku herself wasn't going to be at Midway.
I don't remember which battle it was, and it has been years since I heard the story... An American fighter pilot who was out of machine gun ammo lowered his landing gear and attacked a Japanese torpedo bomber with his wheels. He kept diving into the Japanese plane, impacting it with the landing gear until he broke the Japanese plane's back and sent it into the water in pieces.
Not all radar is created equal. Lexington's CXAM detecting the incoming raid at 60+ miles, sure. This is a manually rotated radar giving good range if trained on the target, but only an A-Scope display (oscilloscope). Poor bearing resolution and NO altitude capability. Fade patterns (the only way to tell the targets altitude with these) were just beginning to be understood. Until the arrival of SG radar PPI displays are unknown, the air search sets were refitted with rotating drives and PPIs at the same time in late 1942. There seriously was good reason USN Admirals who had never seen a PPI did not trust radar. Ching Lee on the other hand is the one who brought the new technology back with him from the British, it was his initiative that made it a game changer.
17:48 question i have about detaching Crace's cruiser force is, despite weakening his AA cover doing this, he knew the Japanese carriers were around somewhere at this time and he was going after them...but i thought he wanted to make sure the invasion fleet didn't slip by him and land on Port Moresby, while he was pre-occupied with the carriers, so that was the reason for sending Crace's group to the Jomard Pass?
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar it was a calculated risk, after all he was hunting for a carrier strike force and would need every aircraft at his disposal
The Navy learned hard lessons about how to reduce the threat of fuel fed fires aboard ship. Its interesting to note that the risks are well managed today, yet even in modern times it remains a challenge - for example the USS Forrestal and Belknap collision disaster.
I have just discovered Unauthorized History, so please forgive me for being so late with my comment. (by the way, I think you guys are doing a magnificent job.) My comment is more about the Doolittle Raid than the Coral Sea, but you gave some prominence to the effect of the former on the latter, I think it is appropriate. I can personally attest to the morale boost the raid gave to the American civilian public. My best buddy at the time was the son of an aviation torpedoman on Hornet, so as soon as she got back to Pear Harbor he got word of where the planes flew from. I confess that from that day to this I don't understand why Roosevelt tried to keep it secret from the public with all that Shangri-La stuff; the Japanese knew it was a carrier, and we knew that they knew. Put that aside. The point I want to make is that the negative effects of the raid weren't confined to the Japanese. We should consider the judgment of Admiral Richard Bates, who as head of the Naval War College deserves a very respectful hearing. Bates is emphatic in his objection to the raid (see the War College publication Battle of the Coral Sea: Tactical and Strategical Analysis}. His argument is basically what economists would refer to as opportunity costs: while Enterprise and Hornet were tied up with the Doolittle Raid, they weren't doing something else - like participating in the Battle of the Coral Sea. It doesn't take much imagination to see that if the US had has four fleet carriers instead of only two at the battle, the likelihood of a major victory would have a LOT greater. Another, unimportant, comment. I have a personal tie to Lexington. My father served on her before the war, and some of my earliest memories are of having her pointed out to me while she was moored at San Diego (or was it Long Beach? --- it was a long time ago, and I wasn't aware of such fine distinctions.)
At 26:00 you give not much more than passing notice of the plight of USS Neosho (AO-23) and USS Sims (DD-409) during the Battle of the Coral Sea. You could have done better. Those two ships bore the brunt of a full- scale IJN attack who, had they been dispatched instead to TF-17 could have sent both USS Lexington (CV-2) and USS Yorktown (CV-5) to the bottom on 7 May. As it was the Neosho was saved through the damage control heroics of CPO Oscar Verner Peterson, USN, who after the battle died of his injuries, yet was awarded the MoH for his actions. His citation reads: “For extraordinary courage and conspicuous heroism above and beyond the call of duty while in charge of a repair party during an attack on the U.S.S. Neosho by enemy Japanese aerial forces on 7 May 1942. Lacking assistance because of injuries to the other members of his repair party and severely wounded himself, Peterson, with no concern for his own life, closed the bulkhead stop valves and in so doing received additional burns which resulted in his death. His spirit of self-sacrifice and loyalty, characteristic of a fine seaman, was in keeping with the highest traditions of the U.S. Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life in the service of his country.” Through his actions his ship stayed afloat, and became the refuge for about 200 survivors of that attack. Several days after that event, about 70 sailors manned life rafts, and left the ship in hopes of reaching land. They failed, and all were lost. Fortunately 125 stayed aboard, and were eventually rescued by USS Henley (DD-391) on 11 May. CPO Peterson suffered third-degree burns over much of his body, and succumbed to his injuries 13 May 1942, and was buried at sea. Today there are thousands of Americans, descendants of those survivors, to the fourth or even fifth generation, who owe their lives to CPO Oscar Peterson. HE SHALL NOT BE FORGOTTEN.
Would have liked to cover CPO Peterson's actions. And yes, I'm sure we can do better in each of our episodes. But there is so much to cover, and a limited amount of time. We do as well as we can.
Lexington demonstrates why moving all of the aircraft on US carriers to jet fuel (which wasn't complete until the 1980s) was such a big deal. Hopefully the current transition to insensitive munitions will prove similarly impactful with respect to ordnance deflagrations. Several historians have pointed out that the Japanese could have assembled an ad-hoc or composite air group from the remnants of Shokaku's and Zuikaku's groups and thereby enabled Zuikaku to sail to Midway, but their doctrine at the time envisioned operations in two-carrier divisions.
In the video, it mentions that this was ironically a well executed anvil and hammer attack and in subsequent battles, especially Midway, it all became very messy instead of improving. I am very interested to know (especially since it was not mentioned in the video) why the torpedoes worked in this battle when they did not in all previous as well as later engagements?
That the Japanese only had 4 instead of 5 carriers at Midway was down to a quirk of doctrine. To the US Navy, squadrons were pretty freely redistributable between carriers. To take a squadron from one and move to another was purely administrative and logistical - it was normal business. But to the Japanese, the air group was part of the ship, and you would no more take a squadron from one carrier and move it to another than you would borrow a turret from one battleship to lend to another. And so both S and Z stayed away from Midway...
@48:26 "Dauntli" Shelley Berman had a joke about this. "There are many incongruities in the English language as far as plurals are concerned. For example, I believe the plural for yo-yo should be yo-yi. How about this: one sheriff, two sheriffim. One goof, a group of geefs. One Kleenex, several klenexi. Two jacki." All because the plural for stewardess should be stewardi.
I'm a bit confused by the lack of significance of the oiler's loss. After Pearl Harbor a common assessment is 'Crikey, the Pacific fleet had only two. The US really would have been in trouble if it lost one or two.' Did something change in the following six month that an oiler's loss in May '42 isn't a big deal? Were Atlantic oilers re-stationed, US launched new ones, or did it pick up some of these vessels from the British, Aussies, and/or Dutch?
The War Department probably was requisitioning newer merchant tankers to serve as fleet oilers while the shipyards produced more built to military specs.
Just discovered your channel recently, and I'm playing catch up. Great podcasts! I don't normally like unscripted "shows", but I find your discussions lively and interesting. Just one specific comment on this episode, (perhaps it might be suitable for a future Q&A podcast): It seems like Aubrey Fitch was punished for the loss of Lexington. After the battle he was given a land-based desk job and never got another carrier. Do you have any insight as to why this admiral, with more combat carrier ops than most, wasn't given another command, despite the huge number of fleet carriers added to the Pacific Fleet as the war went on? Once again, great job with this series and keep up the good work! Looking forward to seeing more from you guys!
I have always thought the Doolittle Raid was a great mistake as I believe it kept USS Hornet and or both Hornet & Enterprise from participating at Coral Sea. I know the conventional thinking is the raid was a great success as it provided a moral boost. I think it was a foolish risk of two vital U.S. Carriers. What is your opinion of this position. PS: Enjoy the series, thank you.
A major problem with scouting was not the scouts, but the transmission of the report. Errors in coding and decoding were frequent, sometimes through operator error, or even coding equipment failure, not to mention weak transmission or poor reception. That's how 2 becomes 5 and destroyers become battleships.
First, I just discovered your videos and love the level of detail, such as, detailed descriptions of actions between individual opposing pilots. As I finish each video, I can't wait until I view the next. Now my question; In the battle of the Coral Sea, in the action you describe by Swede, who was flying an SBD, in shooting down three Japanese aircraft, do you know the relative roles the forward guns vs. the rear tail guns played in shooting down those planes?
Swde's rear seat gunner did not fire a shot according to Swede. The G's he was pulling in his turns and the fact that all of the attacks on both he and the planes coming at him were all head on attacks.
In industry we follow the principal that a large enough cloud of flammable vapor will always find an ignition source. On a fault tree the chance of ignition for a huge cloud of vapor is listed at 1 where 1 is absolutely certain. There have even been cases when a huge cloud of flammable vapor was ignited by an ignition source off the site such as a vehicle on a road or a static spark. On a ship a large confined cloud is similarly almost certain to find an ignition source.
Excellent discussion, guys! My grandfather, Chester Franklin Sparks, was a Chief Petty Officer on the flight deck of the Lexington during this battle.
Like many of the WW2 vets that survived the terrible events of this war, he very rarely talked about it. And never in detail.
I lived with him, and my Nana, as a young child in the mid 1970s. And after tiring of my relentless inquiries about his participation in the war, he finally agreed to answer my questions for one hour. With the agreement that the subject would never be brought up again.
In hindsight, I am glad I persisted, but also feel badly for how clearly upset he was at the end of that hour.
He described the attack in detail to me. And specifically how his life was saved by a man he knew. That man happened to be running in between him, and the point where a bomb hit the flight deck, at the exact moment of impact. The man was killed instantly by the splintered shards of the wooden decking that came flying towards them. One large piece through his head. He said that had the man not been there in that moment, it would have been him laying there.
He recounted going into the ocean, and treading water for almost two hours before being picked up, and taken back to Pearl Harbor. Being reassigned to the Yorktown, and then going to the Battle Of Midway.
He definitely had a rough time out there, like so many others.
One thing we didn't get to, was where he went after the Yorktown at Midway. Does anyone know where Yorktowns' men were reassigned to afterwards?
I do know he stayed in the Navy after the war, and worked on the flight deck of the U.S.S. Philippine Sea, during Korea.
He was a great man, and generous, and kind, outwardly. But was tough as nails, and didn't suffer any fools. I miss him every day.
Thanks again for the outstanding video. Subbed. 👍
As I study WWII this battle is one of the most frustrating of the war. I have to remember we were new to this type of warfare. People like your Granddad were invaluable to the American fleet. the knowledge they gain early in the war is what put us over the top. Respect to him and the other crewmen.
First, total respect for your detailed research and quality presentations. Second, I was taught that the Battle for the Coral Sea was a tactical defeat but a strategic victory (sort of like the Tet Offensive in many ways). Australian headlines at the time read "CORAL SEA BATTLE MAY DECIDE THE FATE OF AUSTRALIA." This is how we viewed it, and to this day we celebrate the outcome. On the 80th anniversary of the battle, the US Secretary of State press release: "Our countries joined forces and our service members fought side-by-side for four days in what would become a turning point in the war in the Pacific. Our nations are forever grateful for the heroism demonstrated by those courageous Americans and Australians. We will always remember the sacrifice they made for the cause of freedom in the Pacific." Now it may be all a myth, and the Australian involvement significantly overstated, but when you see Japanese script (money) designed for use in Australia you realize how real the threat was. (Please allow me this very soft criticism) I love the level of detail in your presentations but sometimes I think you do not see the forest for the trees. The Battle of the Coral Sea saved my country and we will be forever grateful to the USA. That is the strategic victory. In my humble view, you mention this aspect in passing and are more focused on how many fleet carriers are going to turn up to Midway. Thank you for the time and effort that goes into these excellent presentations.
The 1968 Tet Offensive was a VC/NVA strategic victory because Walter Cronkite said it was.
@@mjays0432 A good journalist doesn't just repeat the government line they are fed for years and ignore the facts that are unfolding on the ground.
@@carterjackson8033 He did ignore the facts on the ground… that’s the problem. The Vietcong was incapable of sustaining any significant operations after Tet, but we turned that victory into defeat. This was well acknowledged by their own leaders after the war.
@@JJJRRRJJJ It was a tactical lose and probably a strategic setback for the NVA. Because they probably could have used those offensive forces in a better way, but it is generally excepted that it was a surprise to the US military. They knew something was up, but didn't expect it to be so large and aggressive. Anyway, the US government was feeding the media and the Americans a line of bull for years regarding the war and the probable outcomes, and Tet was a wakeup to reality. The NVA had more resources and determination than expected and we could see that in the news video during those fierce days of battle of Tet. Walter Cronkite was just adding commentary to what we were already thinking. If you don't agree, that is fine, but I suggest you read the Pentagon Papers, and then come back and tell me how long you think we should have stayed and fought? (You can factor out Cronkite's commentary in this scenario, and just figure he somehow was gung ho about the whole thing and we as a people were not aware of Cronkite's thinking.) Were you on the ground in Vietnam? I was not, but I watched it on a daily basis from home and was wondering if I would have to go over there and kill people when I reached the age of 18 years.
@@carterjackson8033it was a propaganda lose b/c the media made it out to be just that. All attacks were repelled, even those fought mostly by ARVN. In addition the thousands of executions of Viet citizens by the VC during TET were covered up by the media and our supposed war crimes were all we heard.
What a time we live in where I can conveniently listen to a couple of subject matter experts share their passion and knowledge. Brilliant work gentlemen, brilliant.
I really love how cozy this podcast is
The Battalion Wars legend, HERE? Wow!
You have a follower here. My dad flew F6F off the Enterprise, at night he was on board when the elevator was blown off in May '45(I think). They figured the Kamikaze was attempting to fly to the bottom of the ship via the elevator shaft.
Such a joy to watch these two exchange riffs. Thank you again Gentlemen.
It's like hearing Oscar Peterson and Joe Pass trading riffs.
Such a pleasure watching your videos and listening to your podcasts. It’s like sitting down with knowledgeable friends over a beer. I’ve read quite a bit about many of the battles you discuss, but the level of detail and objective mess of your discussions are really icing on the cake.
Keep up the good work!
The knowledge and experience from these vids and the subsequent interpretation of events in the Pacific War is horrifically entertaining!
Thanks. We put a lot into each one.
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar and it shows!
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar excellent. My favorite episode. Underrated battle
_"The Owen Stanley Mountains are not the Smokies." - Seth Paridon_
That might well be the most concise summation of the Kokoda Campaign. 😎
I proud to say my dad was on the Lexington, he would at times talk about the battle, but you and your program have given me more insight into the battle then he could. But like it's said, hindsight is 20/20. I remember a gathering we went to in the late 60's, the book The Lexington goes down had just been finished and was given to each of the families there. I wish my pop was still around, he would have enjoyed your program, thanks for all your knowledge, great job.
Dad told me alot about Coral Sea.The time it was dusk and the Japanese tried to land on the Yorktown and the wild ride to avoid the Japanese Torpedo attacks.
Post script: The second of three that tried to land on Yorktown saw his mistake and gunned his engine and thumded his nose.Going passed the superstructure he banked right and the most forward .50 on the Starboard side shot him and he went nose first into the water.Everyone cheered dad said. The third ginned his engine and kept going.
Well done...im surprised to hear the criticism of Fletcher though. I felt he was a pretty under rated admiral all things considered by wars end. Nobody is perfect every time...especially in the early rounds of a fight
He makes a lot mistakes, and true, nobody is perfect, but he lacked some critical thinking in a lot of areas. Especially around Guadalcanal.
Great podcasts. My father was in the Navy, Pacific but did not talk about it unless it was something funny. I've learned a lot by reading the many fine books written about the war but with your podcasts I've picked up quite a bit of the history. Thanks and keep up the great work.
Excellent description of the battle. Hated to see the Lady Lex be lost--gallant efforts by her DC and crew to save her. Thanks Seth and Bill!
Brilliant presentation. I learned to understand the complexity of the Coral Sea fight minus the fog of war confusion. Also, experiencing ice cream as a patriotic salve is much appreciated. Thanks so much.
@11:11:37 Japanese multi-carrier doctrine - excellent point! Had we figured this out, it may have prevented the Midway battle "Flight to Nowhere" from Hornet.
We came to the same conclusion
Love the intro! Bill it had to be a total letdown stepping off the Indianapolis into a desk job. But the family time had to be tremendous. And as you say the collaboration between you both are what drew me into the Channel. Even without graphics and photos as Ryan and Drach provide. Thanks to you both a d your guests as well.
Thanks Frank!
I've heard from several sources that the SBD's had issues with their bombsights fogging up as they dove, which is why they weren't able to score more hits on Shokaku or Zuikaku.
Thanks as always, I've read & watched episodes on the coral sea battle &I agree with what you have described, plus I have enjoyed listening to you describing it.Rickm.
You guys are fantastic. So glad I found you guys. Started at #101 and I'm binge watching each episode.
Love the channel and the episodes. The inside stories of the battles and related history points make this one of the best military channels out there.
Thank's Guys I learnt a lot about the tactical and strategic implications of Coral Sea and it"s relationship to the New Guinea Campaign. Cheers from the land of Aus.
Thank you gentlemen. Loved it I've read many books on Guadel Cannel and the battle of Coral Sea. You coverage is outstanding...again, Thank-you for this podcast. Keep up the great work.
I'm thankful that these views are starting to rise. You guys rock. I've listened to everything. Thank u
So much detail! Love the content. Never knew all the negative stuff about Mcarthur. I grew up thinking he was a hero of sorts and only "negative" was Korean war incursion into China. Thank you!
Considering our torpedoes at the time. Lucky for USN the five torpedoes actually hit Shoho and detonated!
Guys, thank you so much for these informative and entertaining podcasts. Thank you for your service.
the battle of the coral sea saved Australia and the battle of the Bismark sea finished any threat to Australia say my dad who was in the 6th div aif who later in the war served with the Americans still have his aussie and american dog tags the aif ones are made of leather and the american ones are aluminum aluminium. cheers folks.
G'day to you as well. And much gratitude to your dad for his service in the PTO
The Pacific Ops. were such a HUGE area. Thanks you both and guests for making it more understandable.
I look forward to more!
At some point in time I hope you two go into exactly how the repair yard at Pearl Harbor fixed so much of Yorktown's damage that she was able to return to sea, battle ready, after only 72 hours in the harbor? I have read, and cannot remember the source, that the construction plans for Yorktown were at Pearl Harbor and the repair shops started "making" the broken frames and deck parts before she actually returned from the battle of the Coral Sea, in essence creating "prefabricated" parts such as support frames for the flight deck,etc. Is there any truth to this?
The aftermath of the battle of coral sea shows another difference between American and Japanese unit doctrine, and a flaw with the Japanese: shokaku herself was out of action, but her air group was relatively intact. Zuikaku was fine, but missing a functional air group. An American admiral would simply shuttle Shokaku’s air group over to Zuikaku and present a fifth complete carrier for the battle of Midway. Japanese doctrine held the carrier and air group were to be kept together; American doctrine considered them interchangeable. Japan Having a fifth carrier at Midway wouldn’t have been as bad for us as facing six, but we were pushing the odds as it was, so I’m glad we didn’t have to find out.
Agree! No need to shuttle over Shokaku's planes, because Zuikaku recovered Shokaku's surviving strike planes as well because of the damage to the latter. Post-battle, counting repaired aircraft, Zuikaku had 24 fighters, 13 dive bombers, and 8 torpedo planes on May 9th. And would've picked up more replacements upon return to Japan. But no one felt the situation for Midway was "desperate" enough to require a 5th carrier operating without her twin, outside of doctrine, an odd mix of planes, and a composite aircrew. And that led to why the IJN failed at Midway: their admirals did not do everything they could to prepare for a hard fight.
The Wildcat was not significantly inferior to the Zero if used to exploit its strengths. The major proviso for the Wildcat's pilot was not to get into a low speed. low altitude manoeuvre dogfight with the Zero
Am enjoying your dialog, etc. Have studied most of this pretty well but, there is always more to learn. thank you for your time and efforts
Hello Seth, I want to thank you and Mr. Totti and the other historian who's name I can't remember at this time. I enjoy your podcasts, I have been a historian of American warfare since I was a child. One of my hobbies is world naval aviation and that was part of my life serving both in the active duty and reserve United States Navy as an aircraft mechanic. In my opinion , you three gentlemen tell it was with flair and true compassion. I just wanted to say thank you for what you do.
Did not know about Yorktowns super heaters. Thanks for that tidbit!
Great discussion. In light on the outcome of Port Morsbey and the whole Papu New Guinea campaign in tandem with the Guadalcanal campaign....this has a positive outcome for the Allies.
Re: miscounting the Neosho detachment, I can easily see how it happened, if the scouts were above broken clouds. A cloud obscures you for a few seconds and now you’re at a different angle.
Very will done, Thank You.
Thanks for watching!
Thanks for doing your videos they are great, I had a uncle the flew PBY's with the Black Cat's sad to say like a lot of vets he would not talk about the battles that he was in. He would talk about flying and the told me about how he got in to PBY's. He was in advance training an the instructor told him to go inverted and then press one of the rudder peddles. my uncle said " I can't my feet don't reach the peddles" my uncle was on the short side. not to waste the training they put him in PBY's they don't invert. Maybe you could do a video about the Black Cat's you don't hear much about them.
The Black Cats were an awesome combination of machinery. Way ahead of tehir time.
In a previous video, You mentioned that early in the war, 42, if I remember correctly, that the Australians converted a medium bomber to a gun platform. And that it was a very successful tactic to use it first to deal with AA on a ship, then additional aircraft follow with bombs and/or torpedoes.
That seems to me like a high payoff tactic.
I haven’t run across following comments about how widely that might have been used.
Love your approach to your presentations. 23 year veteran, engineer by training, and occasionally got the privilege of going to the field to help sort problems that established process didn’t deal with. 90% of the job was listening. The other 10% was figuring out how to tell the story to the powers that be.
Dear sirs, you guys could use some props. Seth you would look good with Maybe a WWII Bayonet and some camo net around. Bill needs a Trident. And maybe an anchor. Think about it. I like what you guys are doing. I love the insight you have on things that went down. To me this is very exciting. Both of you have a way of explaining things that makes me feel close to the situation you are speaking of. Thank you for what you do.
I love your show gunna watch them all
I love your shows so much. I remember when I first learned how to read, my first memory was reading every WW2 book in the local library. I can’t explain why, but I couldn’t help myself. Same with your shows!
Thank you so much!
1:14:14
Wow!! So detailed! So interesting!! Thank you!
Very enjoyable, thank you.
Our pleasure!
Most excellent. Outstanding. History's telling at it's finest.
Great aynalisis of the Coral Sea's engagements. Learning curves are factors that make or break new technology especially in the application and implementation. Old methods and procedures seem to aquire a life of their own via the bureaucracy surrounding the obsolete.
I think one of the important lessons to be learned by the US was the proper control of the CAP. I remember from another source that the CAP controllers tried to direct the CAP using bearings from the ship rather than giving the CAP a bearing to intercept the enemy. Don't know if this is true or not.
Your podcasts are amazing, travelling through the pacific war going into depth looking at individual points. I have never seen a show this focused. Keep up the great work.
And Fletcher just may have learned from his error at Coral Sea. Also Fletcher gets his aircraft to the Kido Butai at Midway with no help from Arashio. Start tossing baseballs in a glass house....
Fletcher most certainly DID NOT get his aircraft anywhere. Max Leslie did that. Admirals don't fly airplanes in battle.
Excellent discussion again
The IJN pioneered coordinated composite strikes from multiple carriers at PH. The USN and RN didn't think that way. USN carriers were still operating individually throughout 1942 (though having just one or two carriers during much of the latter half of 1942 kind of limited the ability to try coordinating multiple carriers' groups into a coordinated strike).
Fantastic episode, as they all are. You guys are doing superb work with this series.
Much is made - and legitimately so, of course - of the cryptanalysts' crucial role in the days prior to Midway. One thing that has long struck me is that it was not unprecedented...something similar had already occurred here for Operation MO, as mentioned toward the beginning of this episode. My perception is that the IJN was just as surprised here at Coral Sea by the early presence of USN fleet carriers as they would later be at Midway. One could reasonably surmise that they would not have sent that invasion force through the Jomard so early, with only one CVL for air support, had they'd any inkling that US carriers might be in striking vicinity. I've always wondered if there is any primary source of the time (as opposed to later hindsight) indicating that anyone in the IJN stopped to ask "wait a minute...ok, so weve sunk these two carriers [as they thought] ... but how the heck did they know to be there in the first place?"
I have a suggestion for an episode. The evolution of air sea rescue. I understand the Tang helped develop submarine air sea rescue ops. Also the air rescue system set up in the Solomon island using coast watchers and natives.
Love these videos. Glad I found you. The knowledge you guys have is amazing!
Seth,sweed had said in an interview that these 3 zeros were making head on attacks at him.The sbd was a very tough and rugged aircraft.After shooting down 2 of the 3 zeros,the last one while making a head on attack tried to kamikaze him and he apparently hit the pilot in the head with gunfire from his 20mm cannons.The first 2 bailed out,but this pilots aircraft exploded in a ball of fire.You were spot on when you said he was a great pilot.After what he did,I think he was the best pilot in the PTOA.
A tremendous lesson in being knowledgeable in your craft and knowing you’re plane well
Excellent job.... well done... thanks you.
Thank you too!
Thank you for the overview. I learned much.
An observation on terminology: if your torpedo strikes the target, it seems to me that is a "hit". What happens after that is entirely down to the Bureau of Ordinance.
Great show. At almost the last minute of the podcast, Sean said the US didn't have a coordinated carrier strike until 1944. While I agree with the thrust of the comment, the two raids on Rabul in November 1943 were well coordinated.
love the videos guys, i'm binge watching your videos and they are awesome.
The USS Lexington had a library - which is now at the bottom of the Coral Sea; war is such a waste.
Like your podcast. Good accurate historical content.
Much appreciated!
You guys are the best. So glad I subscribed to this channel!
Between attrition in searches and pre-main-battle strikes and losses in the main battle, Sho's and Zui's air groups were depleted, crew and planes. There were enough pilots that they could have been close to a full air group, but IJN doctrine at the time was that ship and air crew were a unit. Thus combining the air groups didn't happen, and Zui was not in Kido Butai at Midway.
My uncle was a chief aircraft mechanic on the big E.Thanks guys.
Where did your uncle receive his training? The Navy trained carrier pilots at the Great Lakes Naval Base north of Chicago. They used two converted side wheeler steamships as aircraft carriers for practicing take-offs and landings. Those were berthed by Navy Pier where they trained the A&P mechanics and machinists using instructors provided by Chicago's Vocational schools.
@Bill Wilson Bill,I would have to look at his service record.I have it here a t my house.
I will get back with ya
@@billwilson-es5yn Yes,great lakes,Illinois, and camp parry virginia.
I have never looked at the timeline of the aftermath of coral sea versus the run up to midway. At what point did we realize the strategic value of the damage we caused here? Did we know midway was going to happen before or after this battle? At what point, before or after midway, did we realize we could’ve faced six carriers here rather than four?
By late May or early June Hypo informed Nimitz that Zuikaku's air wing was going to be involved elsewhere and that Zuikaku herself wasn't going to be at Midway.
Thank you fellas 👍👍
Really good presentation. Very interesting!
Excellent
The USN learned CAP fighter direction (and radio discipline) the slow and costly way in 1942.
I don't remember which battle it was, and it has been years since I heard the story... An American fighter pilot who was out of machine gun ammo lowered his landing gear and attacked a Japanese torpedo bomber with his wheels. He kept diving into the Japanese plane, impacting it with the landing gear until he broke the Japanese plane's back and sent it into the water in pieces.
That would have been one of the battles off Guadalcanal. Drachinifel has an episode that tells the story. 😎
@@CFarnwide yes. I believe it was the air action on November 12th, before the Battle of Friday the 13th.
That pilot was bound and determined to get a confirmed kill after failing to shoot one down.
@@billwilson-es5yn American Pilots were determined on the kill.
Not all radar is created equal. Lexington's CXAM detecting the incoming raid at 60+ miles, sure. This is a manually rotated radar giving good range if trained on the target, but only an A-Scope display (oscilloscope). Poor bearing resolution and NO altitude capability. Fade patterns (the only way to tell the targets altitude with these) were just beginning to be understood. Until the arrival of SG radar PPI displays are unknown, the air search sets were refitted with rotating drives and PPIs at the same time in late 1942. There seriously was good reason USN Admirals who had never seen a PPI did not trust radar. Ching Lee on the other hand is the one who brought the new technology back with him from the British, it was his initiative that made it a game changer.
17:48 question i have about detaching Crace's cruiser force is, despite weakening his AA cover doing this, he knew the Japanese carriers were around somewhere at this time and he was going after them...but i thought he wanted to make sure the invasion fleet didn't slip by him and land on Port Moresby, while he was pre-occupied with the carriers, so that was the reason for sending Crace's group to the Jomard Pass?
Yes but he left them bereft of air cover which put them at high risk of a visceral beating at the hands of IJN AirPower.
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar it was a calculated risk, after all he was hunting for a carrier strike force and would need every aircraft at his disposal
The Navy learned hard lessons about how to reduce the threat of fuel fed fires aboard ship. Its interesting to note that the risks are well managed today, yet even in modern times it remains a challenge - for example the USS Forrestal and Belknap collision disaster.
I have just discovered Unauthorized History, so please forgive me for being so late with my comment. (by the way, I think you guys are doing a magnificent job.) My comment is more about the Doolittle Raid than the Coral Sea, but you gave some prominence to the effect of the former on the latter, I think it is appropriate. I can personally attest to the morale boost the raid gave to the American civilian public. My best buddy at the time was the son of an aviation torpedoman on Hornet, so as soon as she got back to Pear Harbor he got word of where the planes flew from. I confess that from that day to this I don't understand why Roosevelt tried to keep it secret from the public with all that Shangri-La stuff; the Japanese knew it was a carrier, and we knew that they knew.
Put that aside. The point I want to make is that the negative effects of the raid weren't confined to the Japanese. We should consider the judgment of Admiral Richard Bates, who as head of the Naval War College deserves a very respectful hearing. Bates is emphatic in his objection to the raid (see the War College publication Battle of the Coral Sea: Tactical and Strategical Analysis}. His argument is basically what economists would refer to as opportunity costs: while Enterprise and Hornet were tied up with the Doolittle Raid, they weren't doing something else - like participating in the Battle of the Coral Sea. It doesn't take much imagination to see that if the US had has four fleet carriers instead of only two at the battle, the likelihood of a major victory would have a LOT greater.
Another, unimportant, comment. I have a personal tie to Lexington. My father served on her before the war, and some of my earliest memories are of having her pointed out to me while she was moored at San Diego (or was it Long Beach? --- it was a long time ago, and I wasn't aware of such fine distinctions.)
Great content!
At 26:00 you give not much more than passing notice of the plight of USS Neosho (AO-23) and USS Sims (DD-409) during the Battle of the Coral Sea. You could have done better.
Those two ships bore the brunt of a full- scale IJN attack who, had they been dispatched instead to TF-17 could have sent both USS Lexington (CV-2) and USS Yorktown (CV-5) to the bottom on 7 May. As it was the Neosho was saved through the damage control heroics of CPO Oscar Verner Peterson, USN, who after the battle died of his injuries, yet was awarded the MoH for his actions. His citation reads:
“For extraordinary courage and conspicuous heroism above and beyond the call of duty while in charge of a repair party during an attack on the U.S.S. Neosho by enemy Japanese aerial forces on 7 May 1942. Lacking assistance because of injuries to the other members of his repair party and severely wounded himself, Peterson, with no concern for his own life, closed the bulkhead stop valves and in so doing received additional burns which resulted in his death. His spirit of self-sacrifice and loyalty, characteristic of a fine seaman, was in keeping with the highest traditions of the U.S. Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life in the service of his country.”
Through his actions his ship stayed afloat, and became the refuge for about 200 survivors of that attack. Several days after that event, about 70 sailors manned life rafts, and left the ship in hopes of reaching land. They failed, and all were lost. Fortunately 125 stayed aboard, and were eventually rescued by USS Henley (DD-391) on 11 May. CPO Peterson suffered third-degree burns over much of his body, and succumbed to his injuries 13 May 1942, and was buried at sea.
Today there are thousands of Americans, descendants of those survivors, to the fourth or even fifth generation, who owe their lives to CPO Oscar Peterson. HE SHALL NOT BE FORGOTTEN.
Would have liked to cover CPO Peterson's actions. And yes, I'm sure we can do better in each of our episodes. But there is so much to cover, and a limited amount of time. We do as well as we can.
Lexington demonstrates why moving all of the aircraft on US carriers to jet fuel (which wasn't complete until the 1980s) was such a big deal. Hopefully the current transition to insensitive munitions will prove similarly impactful with respect to ordnance deflagrations.
Several historians have pointed out that the Japanese could have assembled an ad-hoc or composite air group from the remnants of Shokaku's and Zuikaku's groups and thereby enabled Zuikaku to sail to Midway, but their doctrine at the time envisioned operations in two-carrier divisions.
In the video, it mentions that this was ironically a well executed anvil and hammer attack and in subsequent battles, especially Midway, it all became very messy instead of improving. I am very interested to know (especially since it was not mentioned in the video) why the torpedoes worked in this battle when they did not in all previous as well as later engagements?
Never was the cruiser group's ordeal safer than when Mac's 5th fleet was flying overhead...for all the wrong reasons...
I think the turning point happened at home with the completion of Essex, Ticonderoga, Bunker Hill and company.
That the Japanese only had 4 instead of 5 carriers at Midway was down to a quirk of doctrine. To the US Navy, squadrons were pretty freely redistributable between carriers. To take a squadron from one and move to another was purely administrative and logistical - it was normal business. But to the Japanese, the air group was part of the ship, and you would no more take a squadron from one carrier and move it to another than you would borrow a turret from one battleship to lend to another. And so both S and Z stayed away from Midway...
Thank you for this video
@48:26 "Dauntli"
Shelley Berman had a joke about this. "There are many incongruities in the English language as far as plurals are concerned. For example, I believe the plural for yo-yo should be yo-yi. How about this: one sheriff, two sheriffim. One goof, a group of geefs. One Kleenex, several klenexi. Two jacki." All because the plural for stewardess should be stewardi.
One kleenex, two kleenices.
Love these!!!
Did the US use CO2 or nitrogen to flush the avgas lines? I've heard each cited. What was the source of these gases?
I'm a bit confused by the lack of significance of the oiler's loss. After Pearl Harbor a common assessment is 'Crikey, the Pacific fleet had only two. The US really would have been in trouble if it lost one or two.' Did something change in the following six month that an oiler's loss in May '42 isn't a big deal? Were Atlantic oilers re-stationed, US launched new ones, or did it pick up some of these vessels from the British, Aussies, and/or Dutch?
The War Department probably was requisitioning newer merchant tankers to serve as fleet oilers while the shipyards produced more built to military specs.
Most interesting. Thank you!
Glad you enjoyed it!
Just discovered your channel recently, and I'm playing catch up. Great podcasts! I don't normally like unscripted "shows", but I find your discussions lively and interesting. Just one specific comment on this episode, (perhaps it might be suitable for a future Q&A podcast):
It seems like Aubrey Fitch was punished for the loss of Lexington. After the battle he was given a land-based desk job and never got another carrier. Do you have any insight as to why this admiral, with more combat carrier ops than most, wasn't given another command, despite the huge number of fleet carriers added to the Pacific Fleet as the war went on?
Once again, great job with this series and keep up the good work! Looking forward to seeing more from you guys!
The same thing happened to Fletcher by the end of 1942. He got parked on a desk and never saw another carrier.
I would like to know more about the damage as a result of the Japanese war regarding oil spills from all of the ships that were damaged and or sunk.
Would have loved to hear John P talk about the Japanese trying to land on the wrong team... Lol
Yet another example of Providence in WW2. God was definitely on our side
I have always thought the Doolittle Raid was a great mistake as I believe it kept USS Hornet and or both Hornet & Enterprise from participating at Coral Sea. I know the conventional thinking is the raid was a great success as it provided a moral boost. I think it was a foolish risk of two vital U.S. Carriers.
What is your opinion of this position.
PS: Enjoy the series, thank you.
How far could a carrier fleet go before having to refuel? Would like to see a video on logistics?
A major problem with scouting was not the scouts, but the transmission of the report. Errors in coding and decoding were frequent, sometimes through operator error, or even coding equipment failure, not to mention weak transmission or poor reception. That's how 2 becomes 5 and destroyers become battleships.
First, I just discovered your videos and love the level of detail, such as, detailed descriptions of actions between individual opposing pilots. As I finish each video, I can't wait until I view the next. Now my question; In the battle of the Coral Sea, in the action you describe by Swede, who was flying an SBD, in shooting down three Japanese aircraft, do you know the relative roles the forward guns vs. the rear tail guns played in shooting down those planes?
Swde's rear seat gunner did not fire a shot according to Swede. The G's he was pulling in his turns and the fact that all of the attacks on both he and the planes coming at him were all head on attacks.
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar Thanks. It's hard to imagine what it must have been like for them. I am amazed at the things these young guys did.
In industry we follow the principal that a large enough cloud of flammable vapor will always find an ignition source. On a fault tree the chance of ignition for a huge cloud of vapor is listed at 1 where 1 is absolutely certain. There have even been cases when a huge cloud of flammable vapor was ignited by an ignition source off the site such as a vehicle on a road or a static spark. On a ship a large confined cloud is similarly almost certain to find an ignition source.
If the Japanese had not fallen for Halsey's feight, (before returning to Pearl Harbor for Midway,) could the forces assigned have taken Port Moresby?
nice job guys.
Right up there next to Drach. Minus the accent.
Ha! Stay tuned...
I believe Midway was the turning point in terms of offensive initiative.