It's July 6, 2024, and a long time since this was recorded. Seth and Bill have not only stayed the course to begin the 5th season, and have gotten better and better, and have gathered a stellar and loyal group of authors and other service professionals that are all very happy to be associated with Unauthorized Pacific Podcast. What a great success story. Well played, Seth and Bill. Keep on keeping on. We can't wait!
19:55-North Carolina was The Showboat because when she was shaking down there was a persistent vibration problem at high speed, so every night the builders (Brooklyn Navy Yard, iirc) would make adjustments to her propellers and shafts, and the next day she would go out into NY Harbor to run back and forth to test the mods. This went on for weeks and it became a “show” for people to come watch. “Showboat” was a big Broadway musical at the time.
Yup, the inner propshaft skegs, while a significant survivability advancement in that they enabled a wider, shallower hullform and therefore a deeper torpedo defense system in the stern, caused massive vibration problems. The crew of the Prince of Wales probably would have been very happy to have had such problems in 1941, though.
My dad was a veteran of world war ii, South Pacific us navy. He was stationed aboard the USS Montpelier which was a light Cruiser and saw a buttload of action. Anyway growing up we used to watch Victory at Sea every time it came on and it went when it came out in VHS we would binge watch it together. Your show totally helps me to reconnect with my dad and to further understand exactly what he went through because he didn't speak of it very often. He did tell me the regarding Japanese Sailors in the water or downed Airmen they tried to affect a rescue one time and for the effort they got three hand grenades throwing up on Deck killing several sailors. After that they would be on Deck with Thompson submachine guns M1 Garands, 45s and hand grenades and they took no prisoners period. He said it didn't bother the men one bit because they had lost several men and several more wounded so he just saw it as part of the war. And he had mentioned how the Japanese did the same to us in fact the Japanese Pilots would strafe our guys while they were coming down in parachutes. The Pacific War was a different Beast altogether then the ETO.
If you have not done so you must read "Pacific war diary" by James J. Fahey. He was a shipmate of your fathers and he kept a diary aboard Montpelier for most of the war.
ADM Fletcher was also harmed by the lack of accurate USN Intel. He was told the IJN fleet would attack "between Aug 23- Aug 27". It did not. He was told by naval intel it wouldn't happen until Aug 27- Aug 30- I think these last two dates are correct , if not spot on. The IJN changed their Naval code IJN 25 to IJN 26 and Fletcher was not getting "good Intel" about IJN intentions and timing. He had told Kincaid he "needed" to refuel before a major fleet engagement, (he did need to do this), and was ordered to detach 1 carrier at a time. He sent the USS Wasp, the smallest CV with her 66 or 68 airplanes and kept the 2 larger CV'S. Fletcher won this battle. He just didn't win "hard enough". He turned around the invasion fleet and sunk a smaller carrier, losing none of his own. The "Big E " was damaged but could still steam under her own power, and carry on with Flight Ops. Fletcher was a scapegoat. Why ? He was a "blackshoe" not a "brownshoe".
You haven't been doing these long but they have become a go-to for my podcast listening schedule. Great work, guys- I look forward to these every week.
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar And it shows my friends! As you can tell from all the glowing comments and reviews, you guys are well loved! As a bit of an aside, I'm a musician and have been teaching guitar for well over 30 years. And the one thing that I incorporate into my lessons and my teachings is passion! And I have to say, and I think many will agree with me, that the passion that you guys bring to the table is palpable, infectious, and a hell of a lot of fun! We all so look forward to our classroom which is "torpedo Tuesdays!"🇺🇲⚓️💖🙏👍☕️🚬
I was so satisfied to hear your discussion about Wildcat pilot Runyan (et al) and his 4 kills. Your comment that said in no uncertain terms that a somewhat inferior fighter plane, when flown by a GOOD pilot, will more than hold it's own against allegedly better airplanes really hit the nail on the head. Those guys held the line until the Hellcats and Corsairs arrived in theater and did it well. Talent trumps equipment virtually every time. Given a better airplane, these pilots are virtually unstoppable. I flew attack missions in an F4 Phantom over the DMZ in Vietnam and watched our TOPCAP (also flying Phantoms)manhandle MIG 21s flown by Russian pilots. It made me proud beyond words to watch those CAP pilots work. It made us attack pilots' job a LOT easier. If watching other pilots being killed can be called satisfying, it truly was satisfying to see that action evolve. Those days made me understand what is meant when it was said that we won all the battles but lost the war. Thanks for the high quality content and the spellbinding storytelling. You guys are the BEST !!! Absolutely non pareil. Maybe Big E is "as hard as the back wall of a shooting gallery".
I’d suggest that you read Lundstrom’s Black Shoe Carrier Admiral. It’s my contention that when you consider the totality of the circumstances Fletcher is the finest carrier commander of World War 2. He fought 3 carrier battles at the outset of the war the first 3 carrier battles in History. In those engagements he sinks 6 Japanese fleet carriers (4 Fleet and 2 Light) and comes away the victor every time. For those 6 carriers sunk he suffers 2 losses one of which (Lexington) is frankly bad luck. And as Jon Parshall has shown the person who is responsible for Yorktowns loss is Marc Mitcher. You have to consider that he won these battles at a time when the Carrier was a new and untested weapon system. The body of knowledge was slim and doctrine was still evolving. Fletcher also understood that the ships under his command could not be replaced. Thus he needed to fight carefully employing the principal of calculated risk that Nimitz embeds in his orders. He knew that the one sure fire way to lose Guadalcanal was to lose those carriers. Because as long as they were there the Japanese could not control the sea lanes. It should also be noted that Nimitz had confidence in Fletcher’s leadership and wanted him back from his leave period to resume command of the Pacific fleets carriers. That he didn’t get him back was King’s doing not Nimitz’s. Fletcher’s reputation has been unfairly maligned over the years by a number of groups. Richmond Turner tried to blame Fletcher for his own failings and the Marines of course unfairly claimed he sailed off and left them. Forgetting that Fletcher was doing exactly what he had said he would do which was in part preserving his carriers to fight the battle he knew would be coming. To this list add a number of aviators who wanted Fletcher out of the way so they could have the commands they knew they deserved. And finally Samuel Elliott Morrison who was exceedingly unfair to him. Finally I think it’s grossly unfair to even hint that Fletcher doesn’t deserve full credit for the victory at Midway. He was the man in command during the battle and it was on his direct orders that at the very least 3 carriers were sunk. That it wasn’t 4 in the first strike is again a direct result of Mitcher going off on his own.
I have to disagree that he was the finest carrier commander of the war. While I will admit that he was the most successful carrier commander of 1942, he was not the best in the war. I believe that moniker falls on Spruance in 1944, or Jocko Clark. And Fletcher didn't win 4 carrier battles in 42, he was the commanding officer in 3 successful battles (Coral Sea, Midway and Eastern Solomons). Not to nitpick your comment, which I applaud by the way, not very many Admirals sink ships, and Fletcher certainly didn't. In the cases you are referring to, Naval Aviators sank those ships, or heavily damaged them leading to their sinking or scuttling. In the case of Midway, Spruance (rightly or wrongly) gets the lion's share of credit due to the fact that 3 of the 4 CVs hit, were hit by fliers who took off from the deck of CV6, his flagship. To be honest, if you really look at US ops at Midway, it was CV6's air staff who "informed" Spruance of a great deal as the battle progressed and decisions had to be made. Not saying that Spruance didn't call the shots, I am saying that he heavily relied on his staff to inform him of the best course of action. Either way, thanks for the well-thought out comment.
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar your correct it was 3 of the 4 battles. Perhaps commenting while trying to get kids off to school isn’t ideal lol. I would argue by 44 Spruance isn’t really a carrier commander but a fleet commander. And while Clark unarguably performed well by that point in the war the degree of difficulty given the US’s overwhelming superiority and a much more mature doctrinal playbook is dramatically lower. The fact that Fletcher won all three of those early battles despite that degree of difficulty is a huge part of why I rate him so highly. A guy like Jocko Clark could have gotten his entire command blown away without seriously impacting the US war effort in the Pacific. That wasn’t remotely true of Fletcher and he knew it. Your right of course that Aviators not Admirals actually sink ships. But just like we hold those in command responsible for the failings of their organization it’s also tradition to credit them with its success. Regardless of why people credit Spruance with Midway the simple fact is the Officer in overall Command of the US Carriers that day was Frank Jack Fletcher. That’s not to say that Spruance’s own command didn’t fully justify Halsey’s confidence in him. Especially when he overrode Miles Browning who was trying to order a launch of SBDs at extreme range with 1000lb bombs. But if your going to pick an Admiral and give him credit for the victory at Midway it’s either Nimitz (who managed the lead up brilliantly) or Fletcher and Fletcher was the man on the scene. Thanks for your comments and these videos. I’m really enjoying getting caught up with all of them.
@@jetdriver I happen to admire Admiral Fletcher as well. He was the guinea pig for the USN during the darkest days of the USN early in WWII. He wasn’t flawless by any means but he won. He laid the foundation and made it possible for later Admirals to shine. Admiral Fletcher deserves far more credit than he is given. Thankfully there are a few historians and authors who are starting to shed a favorable light on the man.
Spruance is solely responsible for his Midway task force. Half of his task force goes on the "flight to nowhere" and the other half flies off in the wrong direction and only finds the targets by luck, following a Japanese DD. These issues did not plague Fletcher's task force.
At 1:05:09 there was mention of the next iconic Enterprise. I was pleased to read elsewhere that the next Enterprise, CVN-80, will incorporate four portholes from CV-6 and around 35,000 pounds of steel from CVN-65. Her keel has been laid down as of August 27, 2022.
I want to start off with a hearty "thank you" for your unselfish work in producing these programs. They show a tremendous amount study and work. I have watched scores of these WW2 discussions and no two of them are alike. That is a gift to us, the watchers. After all, variety, as they say, is the spice of life and your programs are the Serrano pepper sauce on the spice rack. I had the privilege of touring two fast BBs: USS North Carolina and USS Alabama. The tours were conducted by knowledgable people. They gave their canned presentations, but if you asked them a couple of questions that demonstrated that you were reasonably informed and were looking for that little something extra, they would fire broadsides at you. Some of those guys were sailors who actually served in the ship they were guiding us through. I have no basis of comparison with the non-"fast" BBs, but they impressed me a lot. I highly recommend a tour of one of the fast ones, or even the Iowa class (REALLY fast) BBS. Time well spent for the curious. Thanks again for your hard work.
Hi guys, I operate HF all the time as an Amateur Radio op. HF propagation is based off many things. Mainly how charged the ionosphere is by the sun. The skip zones change continuously depending on time of day and frequency. Lots to it.
Gentlemen, I thought Ive had my fill of WW2 history but damn it, youve gone and done it! Dont know who to blame more, Drach or you two! Thanks for the excellent videos, very insightful.
Guys! I hate to Fan Boi, but what you are doing here is awesome. You've ignited my inner geek in a way that standard WWII history media leaves flat. It's like a tutorial for a high level Grad Class, where side stories are used to tie the focus to the larger picture. I don't know anything about podcasts, but I'll try to find yours. Your enthusiasm for the topics is contagious!!!
I think that King took note of the fact that almost every time Fletcher goes out he loses something vital, i.e.: the Lady Lex at Coral Sea, the Yorktown at Midway, and the Enterprise (requiring yard repair which took her out of the fight for awhile) at Eastern Solomons.
The Enterprise (CV-6) is an absolute legend. I keep hoping the production company behind Band of Brothers (US Army), The Pacific (US Marines), and the upcoming Masters of the Air (US Army Air Forces), will eventually do a US Navy-focused miniseries, and I can't think of a better ship and crew to focus it on than the USS Enterprise. It is tragic she was scrapped instead of becoming a museum ship.
Captain, this was the first episode I discovered. Thanks so much for the advice. I went back and started with the intro and then episode 1. So much wonderful information and details. My only wish was that I could have know this information while I was in the Navy abroad BB-62 during Viet Nam. While in the Solomon's we stopped over "Musashi" to do honors to fellow Battleship Sailor s and didn't really understand the history behind it. Fair wind and fallowing Sea's Skipper. GMG-2 5"/38's
Seth & Bill, when I was a kid, I made models of the big E, Yorktown cv5, Hornet cv8, Lexington cv2, as a matter of fact I'm looking at that Enterprise right now because it is in my bookcase in my living room. thanks for all that you do. Rickm
Your level of detail continues to shine when compared to other online historical sites (Kings and Generals, Drachinifel, History Channel's Big E series, et al). In fact, serious history buffs can expand their knowledge by watching several different sources that describe the same battle. (Easterm Solomons sure isn't viewed as an unrecognized battle to many observers.) Drachinifel gives a comprehensive recounting of the Enterprise's official after action report that prompts the enormous buildout of highly effective anti aircraft armament.) You guys are performing a great sevice to the memories of the warriors who fought in these conflicts. Great job.
Each of those channels, along with Montemayor, has their own strengths, and you all mesh with each other, forming a whole, greater then the sum of the individual parts.
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar Oh well, soon enough hopefully - that kind of tech will be absolutely available to everybody. I can safely state so for having provided some modest bits of Drach's digital contents back in the day, and hopefully more in the future ;) Cheers and thank you for your very hard work and dedication.
@@DrydockDreamsGamesI don’t agree with having Kings and Generals in the same league as the others you listed. Nice animation but, over the years, questionable at best historical accuracy
Frank Jack Fletcher was "associated ","associated" with victories! He was in full tactical command at Coral Sea. He was in full tactical command at Midway and did not pass command to Spruance until all four Japanese carriers were burning hulks. All Spruance did at Midway was exactly what Fletcher would have done; retreat for the night. He was in full tactical command at Eastern Solomons. In these three battles, naval units under his command sank six Japanese carriers and destroyed the cream of Japanese naval aviation all without Hellcats, Avengers, reliable radar, 40 mm antiaircraft guns or proximity fuses. Fletchers failings, if they could be called failings, were his absolute reliance on the professional competence of his fellow flag officers and his complete eschewing of self promotion. Spruance is the Fletcher of 1944, except that he has a dozen aircraft carriers, superior equipment and was not up against Japans best. (note Spruance's tactics at Philippine Sea: Hold back the fighters and let the CAP and AA do their job) Fletcher is the guy who held the line, agains the odds, until Americas industrial might could come on line. He deserves a lot more respect than being "associated" with his victories and they were victories. Each one prevented a Japanese invasion.
I can't figure out what King had vs FrankJack. I guess, other than pointing this out, we won't be uncovering any new information on this bizarre "feud", which I can't understand. So far there is nothing in fitness reports or correspondence to shed light on this.
Here's an interesting fact: Right after Midway, Fletcher was promoted to Vice Admiral, three stars, on the recommendation of Nimitz and with the concurrence of King ( See Fletchers bio on Wikipedia, see also, "How They Won the War in the Pacific Nimitz and his Admirals" By Edwin P Hoyt, p.101) I don't know of any other flag officer who was promoted as a result of Midway. @@flparkermdpc
Need to add that with the introduction of aircraft carriers in order to command the seas you must command the air over the seas you want to control. Air power enables the use of sea power which enables the use of land power.
Great episode, as they all have been, Very much appreciate the way you present the material. A map now and again might help with the context of some of the battles, keep them coming!
To me, Fletcher was a good admiral early in the war. Consider Nimitz directive on calculated risk. Fletcher's failure, if it was a failure, lay in how he weighed the risk. He did fight and win while also conserving his forces - calculated risk. That said, I think he was relieved at about the right time.
Fletcher not being a naval aviator commanding carrier air wings rankled the brown shoe wearing aviators. There was a lot of jealousy and unfair blaming directed at Fletcher. Especially after Midway. Which got the ear of Admiral King. Fletcher won battles. Using the calculated risk as Nimitz directed his commanders use
FWIW, flying the C-130 over the South China Sea we made position reports via HF radio and due to atmospherics had to contact the reporting station Hickam due to the inability to communicate with either the stations at Clark Air Base or Anderson Air Base.
Fleet admirals could have kicked off long before Pearl Harbor to demand adequate logistical support. But they just didn’t concern themselves with such “trivia”.
Great episode on a little known but important battle. You can ‘feel’ the momentum slowly turning. That is accurate to the war and comes across better in an incremental history rather than what most of received in school: Pearl Harbor-Midway-Hiroshima.
My grandpa Leo Slesinski and great-uncle Raymond Szopa were both on Saratoga. Different sidesof the family, so quite the coincidence in ‘73 when they met at my parents wedding. Unfortunately they both died before I was old enough to ask questions. I got some of his Navy stuff which is pretty cool
Another excellent video... Really like the photos and video clips inserted. I found the first episode and I am working through them in order... This is first class, best material on this topic available I think.
BZ on the podcast. Thanks. Further clarity on the Showboat nickname. Someone else mentioned the propulsion issues, which was the reason for the frequent trips in and out of NY harbor during shakedown. Columnist Walter Winchell actually dubbed the ship Showboat because of those frequent trips, which coincided with a popular Broadway musical of 1941. Originally thought to be mocking, by others, (especially by the crew of her sister ship USSWashington, BB56)the crew later took it as a compliment, and today it is the proud nickname of the vessel in Wilmington, NC.
Didn't know much about this operation before--thanks for the history lesson. Like you Seth, the Big E was my ship also--painful to see her take hits and have to retire. Wonder how many bandits were shot down by the NC--what a load of firepower, which won't compare when the quad 40s get mounted! Thanks Seth and Bill--great program as I have come to expect from your channel. Nice to see the subscriber number slowly inching up!
Shaping Operations, by defeating the IJN at Midway you can shape future operations...hence operations in the Solomons. Then within the Solomons Campaign you have shaping operations and decisive operations. A specific battle, even if it is fantastic victory, may not be a decisive operation but shape and set conditions for a/the decisive operation(s).
Great episode. Every time you guys mentioned the ionosphere all I can think about is Carroll O’ Connor in Kellys Hero’s yelling ‘get the ionosphere the hell off the air and get them on!’
42:16 This is a great series! Love it. But i will admit that i wish you both would pronounce the Japanese names (ships & admirals) a bit better 😊. You mostly seem to need help with "ryu" and "ryo," both of which are a single syllable. It usually comes out "rayu" which is two syllables, a different word and a different meaning, and which may be familiar to you as a brand of hot chili sesame oil 😅. I will send you some links for help. Again, your videos (and especially this series on Guadalcanal) are riveting. Looking forward to viewing all of them in the coming months.
Getting late to these shows due to just finding them within the last week. I haven't gone back to the start yet, but just from before Midway until now. I think one thing not mentioned about this battle is that the Japanese did learn from Midway. The lesson was to put surface forces (not including fleet carriers) up front to cause the US Navy to attack them first. Then the Japanese Fleet carriers following behind can use their longer-ranged aircraft to attack the US fleet while being beyond the range of the American carrier aircraft.
Richard Frank describes the gunnery officer on USS Portland, who had seen several of these attacks earlier in the war, observing the 70 degree dives at seven second intervals, sniff that "he had seen better".
The reason that Fletcher was stretched so thin was because of the lack of fast oilers. It was always a complicated shuffling match to keep ships on station. This was true before Savo (where you unjustly slam Fletcher) as well as the Eastern Solomons. Fletcher did not have full control over his logistics train because there literally weren’t enough ships to keep the ships fully on station off of Guadalcanal in August 42. Also, tying carriers to a specific geographic location makes them vulnerable to attack, hence the torpedo losses of September when Saratoga and Wasp were both torpedoed. This was repeated off of Okinawa and the Philippines later in the war when the threat became kamikazes (our ASW practice was a lot better so that reduced the sub threat). Carriers are hit and run assets. We just didn’t realize that in 42 yet. Fletcher arguably did and was working as carefully as he could with his vulnerabilities and limited assets given the threats he perceived at the time.
To be fair, Seth and Bill do explain that Wasp carried less fuel than Saratoga and Enterprise. In addition , Bill brought out that when you double speed, you triple fuel consumption. They often ran over 25 knots for air operations.
@@keithranker3908 This was a really nice discussion of the logistics issues faced in the South Pacific, including those faced by Fletcher around the time of Savo that was recently featured on WW2TV. ua-cam.com/users/liveqJgQ3AskL-o?feature=share. I think it's clear that Savo involved a systemic failure driving in part by the shoestring nature of the operation. Fletcher had to protect the most valuable assets the navy had in August 42, her fleet carriers, and he had poor intelligence about the forces that he was facing. The last thing he wanted to chance was a fleet action on empty tanks. Mercogliano actually argues that Ghormley was most at fault because he didn't prioritize getting the fuel to Fletcher's task force, requiring him to break off and find a tanker. Lundquist, Hone, and others argue pretty persuasively that the narrative around Fletcher was due to a personal dislike of him by Samuel Eliot Morison (and arguably King as well). I think it's a stretch to imply that Savo was "his fault."
Love the podcast, immensely enjoying the episodes. It's fantastic. I do have one minor quibble; I've noticed a repeated tendency to use the terms "escort carrier" (CVE) and "light carrier" (CVL) interchangeably when referring to the smaller IJN carriers, when in fact these are distinctly separate ship types. Afaik, the IJN, at least during this period, didn't have small carriers of similar characteristics to what the USN would classify "CVE". Hosho is probably an exception, but she was a very early carrier more comparable to the USN's Langley (CV 1). Shoho (sunk at Coral Sea) and Ryujo (Eastern Solomons) were proper "light carriers", similar in speed and aircraft capacity to the USN's Independence-class CVLS (which of course proved very valuable and effective in the late-war US fast carrier task forces). I'm not remotely suggesting that these vessels' value approached that of true fleet carriers such as the Shokakus or Yorktowns. But I do perceive that bagging these still-capable ships in 1942 was a little bit bigger "prize" than is sometimes articulated. (And yes, Bill does give it proper credit here toward the end). While in pedantic "nitpick" mode, it's also worth mentioning that the IJN had two CVLs of extremely similar and easily-confused names: Ryujo and Ryuho. So it does make a difference how that second syllable is pronounced. Ryujo, sunk here at Eastern Solomons, was the more valuable of the two. Similar aircraft complements, but Ryuho (which lasted into 1945) was slower by several knots, thus far less operationally useful (which is exactly why she survived so long...simply wasn't used much in "high threat" environments, even as the IJN became increasingly desperate for flight decks).
Interesting, @about 30:30 an aircraft takes off rolling over arresting wires. Did CV's of the time have wires on the bow or was the plane taking off from the stern?
A solar flare or CME hitting the atmosphere during the battle could have been a factor with communications. High solar activity can interfere with shortwave communications.
Update on "Atmospheric issues" playing havoc with radio. It was relatively recently realized that during WW2 the sun had been active. I.e. solar flares. This undoubtedly effected radio operations during the war. Some have speculated this burst of electro-magnetic energy even created the famous foo fighters. Maybe it's true, maybe not. We'll probably never know.
As for the lone scouting aircraft that reports the position of the Riujo but returns to ship without making an attack… I’m a little surprised Enterprise’s Air Boss would be giving him shit about that. I’m not sure it was at all typical for scouting craft to make a single, lone (or even double) airplane bombing run. That wasn’t typically their job. Their job was to find and track the target so OTHER strike planes could be sent up on the attack. One little plane attacking the entire Kido Butai would attract every single AA gun, 5-inch and CAP aircraft in the fleet to concentrate fire on their one single airplane. That’s essentially a suicide run. Think about it- we usually say that the first several attacks on the Japanese carriers at Midway failed because they arrived “piecemeal”. And in that case we are talking about 7 or 8 torpedo planes arriving together…and still we think of that as insufficient. So for one single little airplane to attack all by its lonesome seems completely crazy to me. I can’t believe anybody would shame that pilot for not throwing his life away for little or no gain. I think these carrier strikes are meant to be 30, 40, 50 aircraft strong.
When Bill said Turner was the GOAT I thought he meant greatest of all time until he explained it and I actually was impressed that he knows that lol and I liked that he used it
My understanding is that Fletcher's intent was to rotate the carriers rearward one at a time for the periodic underway replenishment they all needed to sustain operations. The alternative was to periodically pull the entire carrier force southward to replenish all three at once...which would necessarily have left ZERO carriers on station for a day or two, roughly on a weekly basis. Instead, he could continuously maintain at least two carriers forward while one was back replenishing. Viewed from that perspective, the detachment of WASP makes much more sense...the battle occurred while it was simply WASP's turn to fuel. If the battle occurs later by a few days, could have been SARATOGA or ENTERPRISE absent instead. One could criticize this plan with the perfectly valid observation that Fletcher thus deprived himself of all three carriers present most of the time for the ongoing sea control mission he was executing. The alternative case, however, was equally or perhaps even more risky: what happens if the IJN carriers advance into the area when all US carriers are down south of position? A third option was riskiest of all; to maintain all three carriers on station, and to pull the refueling assets forward instead of sending combatants rearward in order to accomplish replenishment on station. This course of action obviously was either quickly discarded or perhaps not even considered at all (lol, what I remember often being termed as a "throwaway COA") due to the extremely vulnerable situation which not only the carriers but also-scarce oilers would be placed.
Amazing video on the Enterprise flight deck. I have seen many documentaries, but never these amazing scenes. How did the bombs not do significant internal damage?
Love the channel! One nitpick, IJN lost a LIGHT carrier not an ESCORT carrier. While both are small carriers, light carriers are fast enough to keep up with a fleet, escort carriers are not. IJN only fielded three CVE’s during the war. Taiyo, Un’yo, Chuyo. All three were torpedoed by Subs in late 1943 and 1944.
North Carolina was called the Show Boat because she was in and out of harbor so much post commissioning trying to resolve vibration issues that plagued the class at High Power.
Yeah solar activity was pretty strong in the war years so the communication problems aren't that surprising. I also think there is a magnetic anomaly in that area as well they play merry hell sometimes as well.
I would like to hear about our cruisers my father was on the uss Montpelier with James J Fahey the author of Pacific War Diary. They were shipmates and fought all thru the Solomon’s it’s an eye opener to daily life and battles , made me proud of my father he was only 15 went on Monty in 1942 all the way to Japan to pick up P0Ws after the bombs ended the war went into Hiro with Admiral Riggs, Thanks guys love your podcasts
My dad was on the Montpelier as well! He was 17 years old and he was on her from early 44 to the end of the war. I read James Fahey's book, which is an outstanding read, but I don't know if my dad knew him or not.🇺🇲⚓️🙏💯💖🍺
Guys, the area round the Solomons and New Guinea is known for making it difficult for radio transmissions additional interference from solar flares ect just makes it worse. . Strong made the right decision to not attack he would have known the time it took a zero to climb up to his altitude and had to assume one was boring in on him, or he watched the other SBD being attacked when they tried and knew it would probably end up with him shot down. The pin prick attacks by the single SBDs make sense, it's a chance to damage the carrier before the big strike gets there, with luck a fire would mark its spot and make navigation for the main strike easier.
That TBF pilot you mention flying from Midway with VT8 detached... those four TBF's flying from MIdway Island were the first 4 TBF's off the Grumman assembly line.
I did some arithmetic on the dive speed vs the release altitude. A typical dive speed of an SBD of 250 knots equates to about 422 feet per second. Along the 70 degree down-angle (20 degree from vertical) flight path length from an 1100 feet pull out altitude (after bomb release), which is about 1172 feet, assuming I got the math right, that means you have 2.75 seconds left to pull out of your dive before you hit the water. That's slightly less than calmly counting "1..2..3" to yourself. During that 2.75 seconds you have to retract the dive brakes, shove the throttle forward, and pull the stick back right into your stomach, then fight not to pass out from the four times the force of gravity g-force pulling your blood from your brain towards your feet, as your field of vision narrows like you are seeing through a tunnel. You may even lose vision or black out briefly, during which (hopefully) you don't stop pulling back hard on that control stick or you crash. Once (if) you manage to pull up just above the water, you have to immediately start weaving around to throw off all the AAA firing at close range trying to shoot you down, as you try to get the hell out of there as quickly as possible. Once (if) you have escaped the AAA, you are pursued by enemy fighters determined to shoot you down - perhaps very determined to get you if you scored a hit. To say this requires teeth-gritting courage is a bit of an understatement.
That’s well done figuring. Generally though, they would dive around 80 degrees-ish. So it would be even worse depending on your dive altitude. At Midway, for instance, VS-6 was at 20,000 feet when they dove, so Dusty Kleiss and the boys had a bit more time I think.
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar Right after posting this I found this page with a lot of details from a veteran of MIdway (albeit Stanhope Ring's wingman, so not someone who dove on the Japanese carriers) about dive bombing in an SBD, which I'm studying carefully to understand what I'm missing (a lot I'm sure) about how it was done. "Check list before diving: 1. Shift to Low Blower. 2. Shift to low prop pitch. (We wanted full maximum power setting as we broke our dives. 3. Hit full split flaps. (In early 1942 the SBD had to reduce speed to be able to split the flaps, which was tough when under attack. Douglas came out with an engineering change that allowed splitting the flaps at any speed. Also, we could dive at various split flap settings.) 4. Open the cockpit hatch. I think this was to prevent the windshield from fogging up due to the changes in temperatures during the dive. (Our gunner's hatch was always open due to the twin gun mounts. In combat, the gunner was facing the tail during the dive. For training dives, he turned his seat to face forward. Those gunners were some of the bravest!" Another thing that struck me as very interesting is this paragraph, especially the last line: "If I remember correctly, at our standard 70-degree dive with full extension of the dive flaps, our maximum diving speed was only about 240 knots. You felt like you were hanging on a string. That slow speed let us release a bomb between 1500 and 1000 feet. We could do a "snap pullout." The blackout was more severe but of a shorter time period. I always tried to lower my head for the pullout, and it reduced the blackout. In our standard dive, the plane was vertical to the water or ground, but the track downward was 70 degrees. " I'm not sure how you can have the plane in a vertical dive (by which I presume he means 90 degrees) and yet have the track downward be 70 degrees, unless perhaps the lift generated by the wings is pulling you "up", which in a vertical dive would be sideways towards the direction the track is sloping. If so, I wonder if they adjusted their aim by rolling the plane to cause the lift generated by the wings to pull the dive track in a new direction. www.midway42.org/RoundTable/ClayFisher_SBD.aspx
Why didn't the IJN send Junyo as part of this operation? Junyo had been part of the Aleutians operation in July with Ryujo. Was Zuiho not finished with its refit in time to participate in this operation?
Just a quick note on Japanese aircraft communications, that may apply to scouting here. It's a video Drachinifel did on the Zero. Drachinifel - The A6M Naval Carrier Fighter - Zero or Hero? From what his guest was saying is that part of the world in the South Pacific was just terrible for radio communications that (at least) their fighter planes had. They go on to say that most of the fighters operated in radio silence due to this, even in areas (like Midway) where the radios would have mostly worked ok. I heard a mention in your video of some scout planes not reporting fleets or ships, and wanted to bring the above point up. Thanks for the content this has been great to listen to so far! EDIT - I made the comment before getting into the 30 min part of your video where it goes over radio troubles in the area. =)
It’s a testament to the ship when a 500 pound x3 Japanese bombs only kill 78 outright. Those guys fought their ships to the very last, didn’t they. These type things should never be forgotten.
One minor technical inaccuracy. At the time of this battle BB55 was still “as built “ with her AA defenses. This included 20x 5”/38’s, 16x1.1”machine guns, some 20mm Oerlikons and .50 cal M2s. ( I don’t recall the exact numbers of those). After she was torpedoed by I-19, in September 42,were the 40mm quad mounts added. Ultimately she would have 15 quad mounts, but that was following subsequent refits.
I was wondering if you would be able to plot out the production of how many ships the japanese produced (their factory output of ships that could be commissioned) during the gadarukanaru (japanese foe guadalcanal) campaign and the same for the u.s. I understand that the u.s. could do more, but exactly how much more? Thank you.
Whomever Fletcher had in charge of fleet communications was the one of a handful of staff that failed the admiral during the battle. The problem of HF comm was known by that time and a number of suggestions had been forwarded up the chain of command regarding a program of simultaneous monitoring of multiple comm frequencies in the very event of atmospheric interference during critical battle operations as well as written suggestions by multiple fleet air sources that immediate training be initiated subsequent to radio discipline problems during periods of air combat that had occurred prior to the Eastern Solomons battle. Neither of these issues well known to the junior ranks were properly addressed prior to this battle.
Showboat was given to North Carolina by New Yorkers since she kept going in and out of the Navy Yard under the Brooklyn Bridge as if showing off, since she had so many teething issues being the first BB built in 15 years.
If radio transmission problems are from ionosphere, maybe there was some kind of major solar flare (a major solar flare can hard up the ionosphere). Other wise maintenance might have inadvertently not had all the radios correctly tuned.
It's July 6, 2024, and a long time since this was recorded. Seth and Bill have not only stayed the course to begin the 5th season, and have gotten better and better, and have gathered a stellar and loyal group of authors and other service professionals that are all very happy to be associated with Unauthorized Pacific Podcast. What a great success story. Well played, Seth and Bill. Keep on keeping on. We can't wait!
Many of us have watched several episodes multiple times.
Well said.
19:55-North Carolina was The Showboat because when she was shaking down there was a persistent vibration problem at high speed, so every night the builders (Brooklyn Navy Yard, iirc) would make adjustments to her propellers and shafts, and the next day she would go out into NY Harbor to run back and forth to test the mods. This went on for weeks and it became a “show” for people to come watch. “Showboat” was a big Broadway musical at the time.
Yup, the inner propshaft skegs, while a significant survivability advancement in that they enabled a wider, shallower hullform and therefore a deeper torpedo defense system in the stern, caused massive vibration problems.
The crew of the Prince of Wales probably would have been very happy to have had such problems in 1941, though.
My dad was a veteran of world war ii, South Pacific us navy. He was stationed aboard the USS Montpelier which was a light Cruiser and saw a buttload of action. Anyway growing up we used to watch Victory at Sea every time it came on and it went when it came out in VHS we would binge watch it together. Your show totally helps me to reconnect with my dad and to further understand exactly what he went through because he didn't speak of it very often. He did tell me the regarding Japanese Sailors in the water or downed Airmen they tried to affect a rescue one time and for the effort they got three hand grenades throwing up on Deck killing several sailors. After that they would be on Deck with Thompson submachine guns M1 Garands, 45s and hand grenades and they took no prisoners period. He said it didn't bother the men one bit because they had lost several men and several more wounded so he just saw it as part of the war. And he had mentioned how the Japanese did the same to us in fact the Japanese Pilots would strafe our guys while they were coming down in parachutes. The Pacific War was a different Beast altogether then the ETO.
If you have not done so you must read "Pacific war diary" by James J. Fahey. He was a shipmate of your fathers and he kept a diary aboard Montpelier for most of the war.
I did read James fahey's diary and it's an outstanding read! Highly recommended to anybody that's watching this show.
ADM Fletcher was also harmed by the lack of accurate USN Intel. He was told the IJN fleet would attack "between Aug 23- Aug 27". It did not. He was told by naval intel it wouldn't happen until Aug 27- Aug 30- I think these last two dates are correct , if not spot on. The IJN changed their Naval code IJN 25 to IJN 26 and Fletcher was not getting "good Intel" about IJN intentions and timing. He had told Kincaid he "needed" to refuel before a major fleet engagement, (he did need to do this), and was ordered to detach 1 carrier at a time. He sent the USS Wasp, the smallest CV with her 66 or 68 airplanes and kept the 2 larger CV'S. Fletcher won this battle. He just didn't win "hard enough". He turned around the invasion fleet and sunk a smaller carrier, losing none of his own. The "Big E " was damaged but could still steam under her own power, and carry on with Flight Ops. Fletcher was a scapegoat. Why ? He was a "blackshoe" not a "brownshoe".
You two gentlemen work so well together to bring the history alive. Thank you so much.
You haven't been doing these long but they have become a go-to for my podcast listening schedule. Great work, guys- I look forward to these every week.
Thanks. It’s a labor of love.
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar
And it shows my friends! As you can tell from all the glowing comments and reviews, you guys are well loved!
As a bit of an aside, I'm a musician and have been teaching guitar for well over 30 years.
And the one thing that I incorporate into my lessons and my teachings is passion!
And I have to say, and I think many will agree with me, that the passion that you guys bring to the table is palpable, infectious, and a hell of a lot of fun!
We all so look forward to our classroom which is "torpedo Tuesdays!"🇺🇲⚓️💖🙏👍☕️🚬
What a great and productive way to vary the class curriculum!
Gentlemen, you have a great series here. This is so good from an educational point of view, it’s what the internet should be used for!
I was so satisfied to hear your discussion about Wildcat pilot Runyan (et al) and his 4 kills. Your comment that said in no uncertain terms that a somewhat inferior fighter plane, when flown by a GOOD pilot, will more than hold it's own against allegedly better airplanes really hit the nail on the head. Those guys held the line until the Hellcats and Corsairs arrived in theater and did it well. Talent trumps equipment virtually every time. Given a better airplane, these pilots are virtually unstoppable. I flew attack missions in an F4 Phantom over the DMZ in Vietnam and watched our TOPCAP (also flying Phantoms)manhandle MIG 21s flown by Russian pilots. It made me proud beyond words to watch those CAP pilots work. It made us attack pilots' job a LOT easier. If watching other pilots being killed can be called satisfying, it truly was satisfying to see that action evolve. Those days made me understand what is meant when it was said that we won all the battles but lost the war. Thanks for the high quality content and the spellbinding storytelling. You guys are the BEST !!! Absolutely non pareil.
Maybe Big E is "as hard as the back wall of a shooting gallery".
"Are you afire?"
"Why, yes, thanks for noticing!
We're afirin' fast as we can!"
Loving every one of these podcasts! The enthusiasm, passion, and knowledge you both show is infectious. You both have great chemistry together!
Thanks so much!
Another great episode gentlemen. Always love hearing about the exploits of the Big E
I’d suggest that you read Lundstrom’s
Black Shoe Carrier Admiral.
It’s my contention that when you consider the totality of the circumstances Fletcher is the finest carrier commander of World War 2.
He fought 3 carrier battles at the outset of the war the first 3 carrier battles in History. In those engagements he sinks 6 Japanese fleet carriers (4 Fleet and 2 Light) and comes away the victor every time. For those 6 carriers sunk he suffers 2 losses one of which (Lexington) is frankly bad luck. And as Jon Parshall has shown the person who is responsible for Yorktowns loss is Marc Mitcher.
You have to consider that he won these battles at a time when the Carrier was a new and untested weapon system. The body of knowledge was slim and doctrine was still evolving.
Fletcher also understood that the ships under his command could not be replaced. Thus he needed to fight carefully employing the principal of calculated risk that Nimitz embeds in his orders. He knew that the one sure fire way to lose Guadalcanal was to lose those carriers. Because as long as they were there the Japanese could not control the sea lanes.
It should also be noted that Nimitz had confidence in Fletcher’s leadership and wanted him back from his leave period to resume command of the Pacific fleets carriers. That he didn’t get him back was King’s doing not Nimitz’s.
Fletcher’s reputation has been unfairly maligned over the years by a number of groups. Richmond Turner tried to blame Fletcher for his own failings and the Marines of course unfairly claimed he sailed off and left them. Forgetting that Fletcher was doing exactly what he had said he would do which was in part preserving his carriers to fight the battle he knew would be coming. To this list add a number of aviators who wanted Fletcher out of the way so they could have the commands they knew they deserved. And finally Samuel Elliott Morrison who was exceedingly unfair to him.
Finally I think it’s grossly unfair to even hint that Fletcher doesn’t deserve full credit for the victory at Midway. He was the man in command during the battle and it was on his direct orders that at the very least 3 carriers were sunk. That it wasn’t 4 in the first strike is again a direct result of Mitcher going off on his own.
I have to disagree that he was the finest carrier commander of the war. While I will admit that he was the most successful carrier commander of 1942, he was not the best in the war. I believe that moniker falls on Spruance in 1944, or Jocko Clark. And Fletcher didn't win 4 carrier battles in 42, he was the commanding officer in 3 successful battles (Coral Sea, Midway and Eastern Solomons).
Not to nitpick your comment, which I applaud by the way, not very many Admirals sink ships, and Fletcher certainly didn't. In the cases you are referring to, Naval Aviators sank those ships, or heavily damaged them leading to their sinking or scuttling. In the case of Midway, Spruance (rightly or wrongly) gets the lion's share of credit due to the fact that 3 of the 4 CVs hit, were hit by fliers who took off from the deck of CV6, his flagship. To be honest, if you really look at US ops at Midway, it was CV6's air staff who "informed" Spruance of a great deal as the battle progressed and decisions had to be made. Not saying that Spruance didn't call the shots, I am saying that he heavily relied on his staff to inform him of the best course of action.
Either way, thanks for the well-thought out comment.
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar your correct it was 3 of the 4 battles. Perhaps commenting while trying to get kids off to school isn’t ideal lol.
I would argue by 44 Spruance isn’t really a carrier commander but a fleet commander. And while Clark unarguably performed well by that point in the war the degree of difficulty given the US’s overwhelming superiority and a much more mature doctrinal playbook is dramatically lower. The fact that Fletcher won all three of those early battles despite that degree of difficulty is a huge part of why I rate him so highly. A guy like Jocko Clark could have gotten his entire command blown away without seriously impacting the US war effort in the Pacific. That wasn’t remotely true of Fletcher and he knew it.
Your right of course that Aviators not Admirals actually sink ships. But just like we hold those in command responsible for the failings of their organization it’s also tradition to credit them with its success. Regardless of why people credit Spruance with Midway the simple fact is the Officer in overall Command of the US Carriers that day was Frank Jack Fletcher. That’s not to say that Spruance’s own command didn’t fully justify Halsey’s confidence in him. Especially when he overrode Miles Browning who was trying to order a launch of SBDs at extreme range with 1000lb bombs. But if your going to pick an Admiral and give him credit for the victory at Midway it’s either Nimitz (who managed the lead up brilliantly) or Fletcher and Fletcher was the man on the scene.
Thanks for your comments and these videos. I’m really enjoying getting caught up with all of them.
@@jetdriver I happen to admire Admiral Fletcher as well. He was the guinea pig for the USN during the darkest days of the USN early in WWII. He wasn’t flawless by any means but he won. He laid the foundation and made it possible for later Admirals to shine. Admiral Fletcher deserves far more credit than he is given. Thankfully there are a few historians and authors who are starting to shed a favorable light on the man.
And not to mention that atthe time, Fletcher's foes on the Japanese side were at the top of their game.
Spruance is solely responsible for his Midway task force. Half of his task force goes on the "flight to nowhere" and the other half flies off in the wrong direction and only finds the targets by luck, following a Japanese DD. These issues did not plague Fletcher's task force.
At 1:05:09 there was mention of the next iconic Enterprise. I was pleased to read elsewhere that the next Enterprise, CVN-80, will incorporate four portholes from CV-6 and around 35,000 pounds of steel from CVN-65. Her keel has been laid down as of August 27, 2022.
Thanks guys, you two have been doing a great job with this series, I learn from every podcast!
Thanks Tracy!
I want to start off with a hearty "thank you" for your unselfish work in producing these programs. They show a tremendous amount study and work.
I have watched scores of these WW2 discussions and no two of them are alike. That is a gift to us, the watchers. After all, variety, as they say, is the spice of life and your programs are the Serrano pepper sauce on the spice rack.
I had the privilege of touring two fast BBs: USS North Carolina and USS Alabama. The tours were conducted by knowledgable people. They gave their canned presentations, but if you asked them a couple of questions that demonstrated that you were reasonably informed and were looking for that little something extra, they would fire broadsides at you. Some of those guys were sailors who actually served in the ship they were guiding us through.
I have no basis of comparison with the non-"fast" BBs, but they impressed me a lot. I highly recommend a tour of one of the fast ones, or even the Iowa class (REALLY fast) BBS. Time well spent for the curious.
Thanks again for your hard work.
Excellent point about Nagumo abandoning the transport convoy and thus assuring a strategic defeat in this battle for Japan.
Hi guys, I operate HF all the time as an Amateur Radio op. HF propagation is based off many things. Mainly how charged the ionosphere is by the sun. The skip zones change continuously depending on time of day and frequency. Lots to it.
Gentlemen, I thought Ive had my fill of WW2 history but damn it, youve gone and done it! Dont know who to blame more, Drach or you two! Thanks for the excellent videos, very insightful.
Guys! I hate to Fan Boi, but what you are doing here is awesome. You've ignited my inner geek in a way that standard WWII history media leaves flat. It's like a tutorial for a high level Grad Class, where side stories are used to tie the focus to the larger picture. I don't know anything about podcasts, but I'll try to find yours. Your enthusiasm for the topics is contagious!!!
I think that King took note of the fact that almost every time Fletcher goes out he loses something vital, i.e.: the Lady Lex at Coral Sea, the Yorktown at Midway, and the Enterprise (requiring yard repair which took her out of the fight for awhile) at Eastern Solomons.
The Enterprise (CV-6) is an absolute legend. I keep hoping the production company behind Band of Brothers (US Army), The Pacific (US Marines), and the upcoming Masters of the Air (US Army Air Forces), will eventually do a US Navy-focused miniseries, and I can't think of a better ship and crew to focus it on than the USS Enterprise. It is tragic she was scrapped instead of becoming a museum ship.
This has to be the best podcast/lecture about the Pacific War on the Tube! Just a matter of time before it gets the recognition it deserves.
Thank you!
Captain, this was the first episode I discovered. Thanks so much for the advice. I went back and started with the intro and then episode 1. So much wonderful information and details. My only wish was that I could have know this information while I was in the Navy abroad BB-62 during Viet Nam. While in the Solomon's we stopped over "Musashi" to do honors to fellow Battleship Sailor s and didn't really understand the history behind it. Fair wind and fallowing Sea's Skipper. GMG-2 5"/38's
Forgive me please ! While in the Philippines visited "Mushashi"
Great episode. I knew a bit about the Eastern Solomons, but still learned a lot.
Seth & Bill, when I was a kid, I made models of the big E, Yorktown cv5, Hornet cv8, Lexington cv2, as a matter of fact I'm looking at that Enterprise right now because it is in my bookcase in my living room. thanks for all that you do. Rickm
Your level of detail continues to shine when compared to other online historical sites (Kings and Generals, Drachinifel, History Channel's Big E series, et al). In fact, serious history buffs can expand their knowledge by watching several different sources that describe the same battle. (Easterm Solomons sure isn't viewed as an unrecognized battle to many observers.)
Drachinifel gives a comprehensive recounting of the Enterprise's official after action report that prompts the enormous buildout of highly effective anti aircraft armament.)
You guys are performing a great sevice to the memories of the warriors who fought in these conflicts.
Great job.
Thank you, Coffeeguyzz. We very much enjoy Drachenfel as well, and only wish we had his ability to do the simulation of the battles!
Each of those channels, along with Montemayor, has their own strengths, and you all mesh with each other, forming a whole, greater then the sum of the individual parts.
Imagine how spectacular a roundtable of all of you would be.
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar Oh well, soon enough hopefully - that kind of tech will be absolutely available to everybody. I can safely state so for having provided some modest bits of Drach's digital contents back in the day, and hopefully more in the future ;)
Cheers and thank you for your very hard work and dedication.
@@DrydockDreamsGamesI don’t agree with having Kings and Generals in the same league as the others you listed.
Nice animation but, over the years, questionable at best historical accuracy
Frank Jack Fletcher was "associated ","associated" with victories! He was in full tactical command at Coral Sea. He was in full tactical command at Midway and did not pass command to Spruance until all four Japanese carriers were burning hulks. All Spruance did at Midway was exactly what Fletcher would have done; retreat for the night. He was in full tactical command at Eastern Solomons. In these three battles, naval units under his command sank six Japanese carriers and destroyed the cream of Japanese naval aviation all without Hellcats, Avengers, reliable radar, 40 mm antiaircraft guns or proximity fuses. Fletchers failings, if they could be called failings, were his absolute reliance on the professional competence of his fellow flag officers and his complete eschewing of self promotion.
Spruance is the Fletcher of 1944, except that he has a dozen aircraft carriers, superior equipment and was not up against Japans best. (note Spruance's tactics at Philippine Sea: Hold back the fighters and let the CAP and AA do their job)
Fletcher is the guy who held the line, agains the odds, until Americas industrial might could come on line. He deserves a lot more respect than being "associated" with his victories and they were victories. Each one prevented a Japanese invasion.
I can't figure out what King had vs FrankJack. I guess, other than pointing this out, we won't be uncovering any new information on this bizarre "feud", which I can't understand. So far there is nothing in fitness reports or correspondence to shed light on this.
Here's an interesting fact: Right after Midway, Fletcher was promoted to Vice Admiral, three stars, on the recommendation of Nimitz and with the concurrence of King ( See Fletchers bio on Wikipedia, see also, "How They Won the War in the Pacific Nimitz and his Admirals" By Edwin P Hoyt, p.101) I don't know of any other flag officer who was promoted as a result of Midway. @@flparkermdpc
I don't understand why this person got so pissed, or appears to be pissed.
Have you no sense of justice, Sir?@@johnrisher3007
Need to add that with the introduction of aircraft carriers in order to command the seas you must command the air over the seas you want to control. Air power enables the use of sea power which enables the use of land power.
Great episode, as they all have been, Very much appreciate the way you present the material. A map now and again might help with the context of some of the battles, keep them coming!
Thank you Joseph!
To me, Fletcher was a good admiral early in the war. Consider Nimitz directive on calculated risk. Fletcher's failure, if it was a failure, lay in how he weighed the risk. He did fight and win while also conserving his forces - calculated risk.
That said, I think he was relieved at about the right time.
Fletcher not being a naval aviator commanding carrier air wings rankled the brown shoe wearing aviators. There was a lot of jealousy and unfair blaming directed at Fletcher. Especially after Midway. Which got the ear of Admiral King. Fletcher won battles. Using the calculated risk as Nimitz directed his commanders use
Thank you for another riveting presentation!
FWIW, flying the C-130 over the South China Sea we made position reports via HF radio and due to atmospherics had to contact the reporting station Hickam due to the inability to communicate with either the stations at Clark Air Base or Anderson Air Base.
Remember: USN was desperately short of fleet oilers early in WW2. Hard to blame admirals at sea for that.
Perhaps one of the most unnoticed logistically vital factors in the Pacific Theater.
Fleet admirals could have kicked off long before Pearl Harbor to demand adequate logistical support. But they just didn’t concern themselves with such “trivia”.
God forbid we blame the very admirals who's asses are on the line! Can't have that :P
@@Dave5843-d9m You can't blame Jack Fletcher solely for that.
About HF radio. When I was at Dong Ha in Vietnam, we had an HF radio, which we used to communicate with Clark Field in Luzon.
Thanks guys. You guys are doing a great job
Great episode on a little known but important battle. You can ‘feel’ the momentum slowly turning. That is accurate to the war and comes across better in an incremental history rather than what most of received in school: Pearl Harbor-Midway-Hiroshima.
Thank you for the wonderful history... Love hearing knowledgeable insights. Best wished to both of you.
Amazing. Your depth really works for me. Thanks.
Thank you, James
I just found you guys not long ago. Absolutely LOVE what you gentlemen are doing! Please keep up the good work!!
My grandpa Leo Slesinski and great-uncle Raymond Szopa were both on Saratoga. Different sidesof the family, so quite the coincidence in ‘73 when they met at my parents wedding. Unfortunately they both died before I was old enough to ask questions. I got some of his Navy stuff which is pretty cool
Great job Guys…enjoy the podcast… keep them coming…. Very informative
Will keep doing this as long as time and health allows, and as long as the viewers want to see it!
Very impressed by your historical accuracy, guys. I learned several things that I hadn't heard on any other channel!
Thanks! Our pleasure.
Nobody describes a divebomb as brilliantly as Seth!
Great podcast!!
Airmen pics: Love those Erol Flyn mustaches. My dad sported same back in the fifties.
Another excellent video... Really like the photos and video clips inserted. I found the first episode and I am working through them in order... This is first class, best material on this topic available I think.
just watched, another great job, learned a lot!
BZ on the podcast. Thanks. Further clarity on the Showboat nickname. Someone else mentioned the propulsion issues, which was the reason for the frequent trips in and out of NY harbor during shakedown. Columnist Walter Winchell actually dubbed the ship Showboat because of those frequent trips, which coincided with a popular Broadway musical of 1941. Originally thought to be mocking, by others, (especially by the crew of her sister ship USSWashington, BB56)the crew later took it as a compliment, and today it is the proud nickname of the vessel in Wilmington, NC.
Interesting!
Didn't know much about this operation before--thanks for the history lesson. Like you Seth, the Big E was my ship also--painful to see her take hits and have to retire. Wonder how many bandits were shot down by the NC--what a load of firepower, which won't compare when the quad 40s get mounted! Thanks Seth and Bill--great program as I have come to expect from your channel. Nice to see the subscriber number slowly inching up!
Shaping Operations, by defeating the IJN at Midway you can shape future operations...hence operations in the Solomons. Then within the Solomons Campaign you have shaping operations and decisive operations. A specific battle, even if it is fantastic victory, may not be a decisive operation but shape and set conditions for a/the decisive operation(s).
Loving your channel and your content. You guys are doing a great job and I look forward to more episodes.
USS Enterprise CVN-80, is due to launch in November 2025. Construction on her began in 2022, "officially" being laid down in August 2022.
Great episode. Every time you guys mentioned the ionosphere all I can think about is Carroll O’ Connor in Kellys Hero’s yelling ‘get the ionosphere the hell off the air and get them on!’
Same here!! Love that movie.
We ain’t got no booze.
We ain’t got booze. Well, we’re gonna get some booze!
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar Loot what?!? There’s nothin here to loot!!
Burning Bridges theme song. One of the best tongue in cheek war /robbery movies. "Get me my unee-formm!!!" I need go watch it!!
42:16 This is a great series! Love it. But i will admit that i wish you both would pronounce the Japanese names (ships & admirals) a bit better 😊. You mostly seem to need help with "ryu" and "ryo," both of which are a single syllable. It usually comes out "rayu" which is two syllables, a different word and a different meaning, and which may be familiar to you as a brand of hot chili sesame oil 😅. I will send you some links for help. Again, your videos (and especially this series on Guadalcanal) are riveting. Looking forward to viewing all of them in the coming months.
Love your work. Maps would be a nice to follow along. I find I have to google maps to relate.
Great episode as always!
You guys are the best.
Getting late to these shows due to just finding them within the last week. I haven't gone back to the start yet, but just from before Midway until now. I think one thing not mentioned about this battle is that the Japanese did learn from Midway. The lesson was to put surface forces (not including fleet carriers) up front to cause the US Navy to attack them first. Then the Japanese Fleet carriers following behind can use their longer-ranged aircraft to attack the US fleet while being beyond the range of the American carrier aircraft.
I love this Guadalcanal series.
I'm on board, working my way through the series.
Richard Frank describes the gunnery officer on USS Portland, who had seen several of these attacks earlier in the war, observing the 70 degree dives at seven second intervals, sniff that "he had seen better".
Great series!
The reason that Fletcher was stretched so thin was because of the lack of fast oilers. It was always a complicated shuffling match to keep ships on station. This was true before Savo (where you unjustly slam Fletcher) as well as the Eastern Solomons. Fletcher did not have full control over his logistics train because there literally weren’t enough ships to keep the ships fully on station off of Guadalcanal in August 42. Also, tying carriers to a specific geographic location makes them vulnerable to attack, hence the torpedo losses of September when Saratoga and Wasp were both torpedoed. This was repeated off of Okinawa and the Philippines later in the war when the threat became kamikazes (our ASW practice was a lot better so that reduced the sub threat). Carriers are hit and run assets. We just didn’t realize that in 42 yet. Fletcher arguably did and was working as carefully as he could with his vulnerabilities and limited assets given the threats he perceived at the time.
To be fair, Seth and Bill do explain that Wasp carried less fuel than Saratoga and Enterprise. In addition , Bill brought out that when you double speed, you triple fuel consumption. They often ran over 25 knots for air operations.
@@keithranker3908 This was a really nice discussion of the logistics issues faced in the South Pacific, including those faced by Fletcher around the time of Savo that was recently featured on WW2TV. ua-cam.com/users/liveqJgQ3AskL-o?feature=share. I think it's clear that Savo involved a systemic failure driving in part by the shoestring nature of the operation. Fletcher had to protect the most valuable assets the navy had in August 42, her fleet carriers, and he had poor intelligence about the forces that he was facing. The last thing he wanted to chance was a fleet action on empty tanks. Mercogliano actually argues that Ghormley was most at fault because he didn't prioritize getting the fuel to Fletcher's task force, requiring him to break off and find a tanker. Lundquist, Hone, and others argue pretty persuasively that the narrative around Fletcher was due to a personal dislike of him by Samuel Eliot Morison (and arguably King as well). I think it's a stretch to imply that Savo was "his fault."
Love the podcast, immensely enjoying the episodes. It's fantastic. I do have one minor quibble; I've noticed a repeated tendency to use the terms "escort carrier" (CVE) and "light carrier" (CVL) interchangeably when referring to the smaller IJN carriers, when in fact these are distinctly separate ship types. Afaik, the IJN, at least during this period, didn't have small carriers of similar characteristics to what the USN would classify "CVE". Hosho is probably an exception, but she was a very early carrier more comparable to the USN's Langley (CV 1). Shoho (sunk at Coral Sea) and Ryujo (Eastern Solomons) were proper "light carriers", similar in speed and aircraft capacity to the USN's Independence-class CVLS (which of course proved very valuable and effective in the late-war US fast carrier task forces). I'm not remotely suggesting that these vessels' value approached that of true fleet carriers such as the Shokakus or Yorktowns. But I do perceive that bagging these still-capable ships in 1942 was a little bit bigger "prize" than is sometimes articulated. (And yes, Bill does give it proper credit here toward the end).
While in pedantic "nitpick" mode, it's also worth mentioning that the IJN had two CVLs of extremely similar and easily-confused names: Ryujo and Ryuho. So it does make a difference how that second syllable is pronounced. Ryujo, sunk here at Eastern Solomons, was the more valuable of the two. Similar aircraft complements, but Ryuho (which lasted into 1945) was slower by several knots, thus far less operationally useful (which is exactly why she survived so long...simply wasn't used much in "high threat" environments, even as the IJN became increasingly desperate for flight decks).
I love your work!
Many thanks.
Well done as always gentlemen.
42:00 Capt Toti had Ryujo's pronunciation right. The Ryu pronunication, like So-ryu or Hi-ryu same sound. Awesome episode!
Thank you! And Captain Toti rarely gets pronunciation right so he's happy to hear this!
Reeyoo-zho
Interesting, @about 30:30 an aircraft takes off rolling over arresting wires. Did CV's of the time have wires on the bow or was the plane taking off from the stern?
A solar flare or CME hitting the atmosphere during the battle could have been a factor with communications. High solar activity can interfere with shortwave communications.
Would have affected both sides equally
Update on "Atmospheric issues" playing havoc with radio. It was relatively recently realized that during WW2 the sun had been active. I.e. solar flares. This undoubtedly effected radio operations during the war. Some have speculated this burst of electro-magnetic energy even created the famous foo fighters. Maybe it's true, maybe not. We'll probably never know.
As for the lone scouting aircraft that reports the position of the Riujo but returns to ship without making an attack… I’m a little surprised Enterprise’s Air Boss would be giving him shit about that. I’m not sure it was at all typical for scouting craft to make a single, lone (or even double) airplane bombing run. That wasn’t typically their job. Their job was to find and track the target so OTHER strike planes could be sent up on the attack.
One little plane attacking the entire Kido Butai would attract every single AA gun, 5-inch and CAP aircraft in the fleet to concentrate fire on their one single airplane. That’s essentially a suicide run. Think about it- we usually say that the first several attacks on the Japanese carriers at Midway failed because they arrived “piecemeal”. And in that case we are talking about 7 or 8 torpedo planes arriving together…and still we think of that as insufficient. So for one single little airplane to attack all by its lonesome seems completely crazy to me. I can’t believe anybody would shame that pilot for not throwing his life away for little or no gain. I think these carrier strikes are meant to be 30, 40, 50 aircraft strong.
When Bill said Turner was the GOAT I thought he meant greatest of all time until he explained it and I actually was impressed that he knows that lol and I liked that he used it
I love the series. As far as a "turning point" you are comparing a battle versus a campaign.
My understanding is that Fletcher's intent was to rotate the carriers rearward one at a time for the periodic underway replenishment they all needed to sustain operations. The alternative was to periodically pull the entire carrier force southward to replenish all three at once...which would necessarily have left ZERO carriers on station for a day or two, roughly on a weekly basis. Instead, he could continuously maintain at least two carriers forward while one was back replenishing. Viewed from that perspective, the detachment of WASP makes much more sense...the battle occurred while it was simply WASP's turn to fuel. If the battle occurs later by a few days, could have been SARATOGA or ENTERPRISE absent instead.
One could criticize this plan with the perfectly valid observation that Fletcher thus deprived himself of all three carriers present most of the time for the ongoing sea control mission he was executing. The alternative case, however, was equally or perhaps even more risky: what happens if the IJN carriers advance into the area when all US carriers are down south of position? A third option was riskiest of all; to maintain all three carriers on station, and to pull the refueling assets forward instead of sending combatants rearward in order to accomplish replenishment on station. This course of action obviously was either quickly discarded or perhaps not even considered at all (lol, what I remember often being termed as a "throwaway COA") due to the extremely vulnerable situation which not only the carriers but also-scarce oilers would be placed.
Thanks
Hah! Bill has coined the term "Sethism" for Seth's proclivity for memorable turn of phrase, such as the classic "Harder than woodpecker lips"!🤣
Thank you for the superb content
Our pleasure!
Amazing video on the Enterprise flight deck. I have seen many documentaries, but never these amazing scenes. How did the bombs not do significant internal damage?
Love the channel! One nitpick, IJN lost a LIGHT carrier not an ESCORT carrier. While both are small carriers, light carriers are fast enough to keep up with a fleet, escort carriers are not.
IJN only fielded three CVE’s during the war. Taiyo, Un’yo, Chuyo. All three were torpedoed by Subs in late 1943 and 1944.
Exactly right. Sorry for the imprecision in the episode.
Didn’t that third bomb on Enterprise take out her steering , as well as causing a fire. E temporarily looses helm control.
North Carolina was called the Show Boat because she was in and out of harbor so much post commissioning trying to resolve vibration issues that plagued the class at High Power.
Thanks, I was going to talk about this but you covered it.
Yeah solar activity was pretty strong in the war years so the communication problems aren't that surprising. I also think there is a magnetic anomaly in that area as well they play merry hell sometimes as well.
USS North Carolina was called the "Showboat" because she was cruising up and down close to the US coast during her shake down.
I would like to hear about our cruisers my father was on the uss Montpelier with James J Fahey the author of Pacific War Diary. They were shipmates and fought all thru the Solomon’s it’s an eye opener to daily life and battles , made me proud of my father he was only 15 went on Monty in 1942 all the way to Japan to pick up P0Ws after the bombs ended the war went into Hiro with Admiral Riggs, Thanks guys love your podcasts
My dad was on the Montpelier as well! He was 17 years old and he was on her from early 44 to the end of the war. I read James Fahey's book, which is an outstanding read, but I don't know if my dad knew him or not.🇺🇲⚓️🙏💯💖🍺
Guys, the area round the Solomons and New Guinea is known for making it difficult for radio transmissions additional interference from solar flares ect just makes it worse. . Strong made the right decision to not attack he would have known the time it took a zero to climb up to his altitude and had to assume one was boring in on him, or he watched the other SBD being attacked when they tried and knew it would probably end up with him shot down. The pin prick attacks by the single SBDs make sense, it's a chance to damage the carrier before the big strike gets there, with luck a fire would mark its spot and make navigation for the main strike easier.
Shangri LA Airedale here, enjoyed the podcast.
That TBF pilot you mention flying from Midway with VT8 detached... those four TBF's flying from MIdway Island were the first 4 TBF's off the Grumman assembly line.
Indeed.
I did some arithmetic on the dive speed vs the release altitude. A typical dive speed of an SBD of 250 knots equates to about 422 feet per second. Along the 70 degree down-angle (20 degree from vertical) flight path length from an 1100 feet pull out altitude (after bomb release), which is about 1172 feet, assuming I got the math right, that means you have 2.75 seconds left to pull out of your dive before you hit the water. That's slightly less than calmly counting "1..2..3" to yourself.
During that 2.75 seconds you have to retract the dive brakes, shove the throttle forward, and pull the stick back right into your stomach, then fight not to pass out from the four times the force of gravity g-force pulling your blood from your brain towards your feet, as your field of vision narrows like you are seeing through a tunnel. You may even lose vision or black out briefly, during which (hopefully) you don't stop pulling back hard on that control stick or you crash.
Once (if) you manage to pull up just above the water, you have to immediately start weaving around to throw off all the AAA firing at close range trying to shoot you down, as you try to get the hell out of there as quickly as possible.
Once (if) you have escaped the AAA, you are pursued by enemy fighters determined to shoot you down - perhaps very determined to get you if you scored a hit.
To say this requires teeth-gritting courage is a bit of an understatement.
That’s well done figuring. Generally though, they would dive around 80 degrees-ish. So it would be even worse depending on your dive altitude. At Midway, for instance, VS-6 was at 20,000 feet when they dove, so Dusty Kleiss and the boys had a bit more time I think.
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar Right after posting this I found this page with a lot of details from a veteran of MIdway (albeit Stanhope Ring's wingman, so not someone who dove on the Japanese carriers) about dive bombing in an SBD, which I'm studying carefully to understand what I'm missing (a lot I'm sure) about how it was done.
"Check list before diving:
1. Shift to Low Blower.
2. Shift to low prop pitch. (We wanted full maximum power setting as we broke our dives.
3. Hit full split flaps. (In early 1942 the SBD had to reduce speed to be able to split the flaps, which was tough when under attack. Douglas came out with an engineering change that allowed splitting the flaps at any speed. Also, we could dive at various split flap settings.)
4. Open the cockpit hatch. I think this was to prevent the windshield from fogging up due to the changes in temperatures during the dive. (Our gunner's hatch was always open due to the twin gun mounts. In combat, the gunner was facing the tail during the dive. For training dives, he turned his seat to face forward. Those gunners were some of the bravest!"
Another thing that struck me as very interesting is this paragraph, especially the last line:
"If I remember correctly, at our standard 70-degree dive with full extension of the dive flaps, our maximum diving speed was only about 240 knots. You felt like you were hanging on a string. That slow speed let us release a bomb between 1500 and 1000 feet. We could do a "snap pullout." The blackout was more severe but of a shorter time period. I always tried to lower my head for the pullout, and it reduced the blackout. In our standard dive, the plane was vertical to the water or ground, but the track downward was 70 degrees. "
I'm not sure how you can have the plane in a vertical dive (by which I presume he means 90 degrees) and yet have the track downward be 70 degrees, unless perhaps the lift generated by the wings is pulling you "up", which in a vertical dive would be sideways towards the direction the track is sloping. If so, I wonder if they adjusted their aim by rolling the plane to cause the lift generated by the wings to pull the dive track in a new direction.
www.midway42.org/RoundTable/ClayFisher_SBD.aspx
Very informative. The footage of the flight deck is very sobering indeed. Unfortunate about the radio communication mishap, what could have been!
Thank you for watching!
Why didn't the IJN send Junyo as part of this operation? Junyo had been part of the Aleutians operation in July with Ryujo.
Was Zuiho not finished with its refit in time to participate in this operation?
Just a quick note on Japanese aircraft communications, that may apply to scouting here. It's a video Drachinifel did on the Zero.
Drachinifel - The A6M Naval Carrier Fighter - Zero or Hero?
From what his guest was saying is that part of the world in the South Pacific was just terrible for radio communications that (at least) their fighter planes had. They go on to say that most of the fighters operated in radio silence due to this, even in areas (like Midway) where the radios would have mostly worked ok.
I heard a mention in your video of some scout planes not reporting fleets or ships, and wanted to bring the above point up. Thanks for the content this has been great to listen to so far!
EDIT - I made the comment before getting into the 30 min part of your video where it goes over radio troubles in the area. =)
It’s a testament to the ship when a 500 pound x3 Japanese bombs only kill 78 outright. Those guys fought their ships to the very last, didn’t they. These type things should never be forgotten.
One minor technical inaccuracy. At the time of this battle BB55 was still “as built “ with her AA defenses. This included 20x 5”/38’s, 16x1.1”machine guns, some 20mm Oerlikons and .50 cal M2s. ( I don’t recall the exact numbers of those). After she was torpedoed by I-19, in September 42,were the 40mm quad mounts added. Ultimately she would have 15 quad mounts, but that was following subsequent refits.
I was wondering if you would be able to plot out the production of how many ships the japanese produced (their factory output of ships that could be commissioned) during the gadarukanaru (japanese foe guadalcanal) campaign and the same for the u.s. I understand that the u.s. could do more, but exactly how much more? Thank you.
Whomever Fletcher had in charge of fleet communications was the one of a handful of staff that failed the admiral during the battle. The problem of HF comm was known by that time and a number of suggestions had been forwarded up the chain of command regarding a program of simultaneous monitoring of multiple comm frequencies in the very event of atmospheric interference during critical battle operations as well as written suggestions by multiple fleet air sources that immediate training be initiated subsequent to radio discipline problems during periods of air combat that had occurred prior to the Eastern Solomons battle. Neither of these issues well known to the junior ranks were properly addressed prior to this battle.
The USN submarine Sailfish sunk the small carrier Chuyo on December 4th, 1943. So, there was one Japanese carrier sunk in 1943.
Yes indeed. And there were more carriers present but the Sailfish broke off to reload and lost the opportunity to strike again.
Showboat was given to North Carolina by New Yorkers since she kept going in and out of the Navy Yard under the Brooklyn Bridge as if showing off, since she had so many teething issues being the first BB built in 15 years.
I'd say the turning point, assuming there was one, was in early 1943 when _Essex_ joined the Pacific fleet.
So glad I came accross this, amazing content! Is there anything simialr for the Vietnam war?
If radio transmission problems are from ionosphere, maybe there was some kind of major solar flare (a major solar flare can hard up the ionosphere).
Other wise maintenance might have inadvertently not had all the radios correctly tuned.
@@PHa-l6v get the ionosphere the hell off a here! We got the game on-BOOKER!