Bit of an aside. In the mid 1990s I interviewed an RAAF fighter pilot Ian Kinross. When the Japanese conducted their raid into the India Ocean Australian authorities were concerned that the Japanese would turn south and attack the West coast of Australia. Ian was at an operational training unit in West Australian at that time. Had a West coast raid eventuated Ian and his mates were to attack the Japanese in Fairy Battles and Avro Ansons. This sends chills down my spine just thinking about it. Thankfully it didn't happen. Later Ian flew Kittyhawks in defence of Darwin. The fuselage of his P40 is now at the aviation museum at Moorabbin airport in Victoria, Australia
Hah! At 17:30, JP casually uses the word "grok", as if it's just a regular word, that everyone, well, groks!!😂 A nice homage to Naval Academy grad & sci fi author Robert Heinlein.
The early developers of Unix (later Linux) picked up on Heinlein as well, naming a utility tool in that language after that expression. The tool organizes raw data into formats that are easier to understand - hence "grok."
What a crazy coincidence! I'm halfway through Stranger in a Strange Land right now! What a great read, it's been probably 25/30 years since I read it so it's almost like it's a new book to me! I must get with my elders and grok this to fulfillment!😅
I am negligent about commenting my feelings about the "unauthorized history", which is that this is a captivating series! I have shared the video link with my father and brother, both retired Naval Aviators. All three of us are pilots and students of the Battle of Midway. This is a fantastic production filled with new information about a battle that we thought we knew.
If you haven't already I hope you read Jonathon Parshall's book about Midway: Shattered Sword. His book was written after examining much of the flight logs from the Japanese carrier's and many accounts written by Japanese pilots and included a lot of new information and corrected some misunderstandings.
I just finished re-reading Martin Caidin's "The Ragged, Rugged Warriors." I read that in high school about 40 years ago. The last two chapters are about the 22nd Bomb Group and Jim Muri's wild ride in attacking the Japanese carriers at Midway. Caidin originally published this book in the early 1960s and had the luxury of interviewing many of those who fought the Japanese in the six months leading up to the Midway battle which lends credence to his writing. According to Caidin, the Navy trained the Marauder crews in torpedo attacks while they were in Hawaii prior to them being sent to Midway. Muri said the cruisers escorting the carriers blasted away at them with their big guns to create massive columns of water for them to dodge. He said at least two of the Avengers were slapped out of the air by them. Then there was the epic story of Muri tearing across the flight deck of one of the carriers, something I believe deserves more than a passing mention. At minimum it reinforces Jon Parshall's contention that the decks of the Japanese carriers were devoid of aircraft. Also I'd love to see someone take a stab at discussing the 22nd Bomb Group and their work out of the Seven Mile Aerodrome complex in Port Moresby area while tangling with the Japanese fighter bases at Salamaua and Lae. According to career USAF officer and, at that time, one of the most experienced Marauder pilot in the USAAF, Walt Krell, the B-26B was the best medium bomber in the world. When asked if they were experiencing problems with the airplane, he said basically "yeah, send us more of them!" In short, these guys were not only tangling with the best Zero pilots in the Southwest Pacific without escorts but were flying from a patch grass and had to contend with clouds of mosquitoes, blazing heat, towering tropical storms, lack of food and supplies, dysentery, ankle deep mud, and of all things, cannibalistic natives. Add to that, these guys didn't have the nifty uniforms their British based counterparts had, they were sent to war on a moments notice. Some even flew in their bedroom slippers. There no time to pack and go, it was just go at zero dark thirty. My dad was enlisted Navy, but he was 14 when the war ended. I think newsreels of the Pacific war that inspired him. I was born at what was then called the Naval Ordnance Test Station China Lake in 1957. I grew up on military bases around 1950s jets and they were the focus of my history reading for the most part. But, in high school when other young'ns were skipping class to hang out off campus, I skipped class to go the library and read books like "Incredible Victory," and almost anything concerning aerial warfare. I'm very pleased to have discovered your channel and others with a similar passion for learning about that conflict.
Wow! The discussion you had regarding Midway was so useful in destroying the misinformation I had about that battle. I told my son that what I told him about the battle was so far off the truth he should watch your Midway video which he did. He enjoyed it just like did. My son enjoyed the thinking behind the key players of the battle. Thank you
Prior to the internet, I read every thing I found about the war in the Pacific. After the internet , I viewed every thing I could find. Your podcasts are wonderful. Keep them coming. I believe this podcast about preparing for Midway is absolutely the singular beat ever. Thank you profusely.
Thank you guys so very much for this fantastic episode! The addition of Jon is always a special treat and I appreciate you guys dispelling all the myths about Midway. I thought I knew so much about that battle but it turns out I knew very little and most of it was wrong! Thank you for setting the record straight and taking the time to do so! 🇺🇲⚓️💯❤️☕️🍻🙏
Wow, at last the supporting details of the interactions of air operations and how they derived at their battle planning for the Midway campaign. There are a lot of situations of the battle that one cannot figure out without knowing what the positions of the commanding personal took on the battle plan.
I started out with you all with your most recent videos. Now I'm going back to the beginning. Parshall is definitely at his strongest here. Really enjoying this.
I consider myself a keen student of WW2 history, and have had a long interest in Battle of Midway in particular. I watched the 1976 movie many times, and read several books on the Battle before discovering the transformative work Shattered Sword. Not surprisingly I am a big fan of Jon Parshall and would love to discuss logistics and war economics with him but but will likely never get that opportunity. I am only the first episode in and was really interested to hear the accounts of the US airmen which is not something I have heard much about before. Seems there is always something new to learn. Great work.
Regarding the Japanese disrespect for U.S. carrier effectiveness at this stage of the war, I wonder about another possible nuance. IIRC, the Japanese believed the torpedo plane to be the arm of decision of carrier warfare and up to this point - particularly in the Coral Sea attacks against Shokaku - the Devastator did not fare well. That may have led Japanese admirals to crucially underrate U.S. carrier attack capability. They were looking at the torpedo plane when it was the Dauntless dive bomber that was the arm of decision in the U.S. Navy. Also, the Devastator attacks at Midway that were so catastrophic for the Americans in terms of combat effectiveness and lives lost may have confirmed that misapprehension in the minds of the brass aboard Akaki, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu.
I’m not sure they believed the ineffectiveness of US torpedo bombers in and of themselves was the issue. They simply knew that we didn’t have a coherent carrier air doctrine yet, so our torpedo bombers and dive bombers were typically both left exposed at this point in the war (other than one raid on a light carrier at Coral Sea). The dive bombers were just a lot more maneuverable, so they could tangle with fighters in a pinch, while the Devastators couldn’t. Japan didn’t have that problem though, because they were escorting and protecting their attack aircraft well. Midway would have confirmed our lack of correct attack doctrine, not the ineffectiveness of our attack aircraft. A bunch of unescorted Japanese torpedo bombers would have been just as easy pickings got Wildcats, if we were using their doctrine (or our post-Midway/Guadalcanal doctrine) and they were using our 1942 doctrine.
The navy of the time was hobbled with terrible torpedo performance. Submarines, Destroyers, and Aircraft. At Midway the IJN expected the American torpedoes to be as effective as their own torpedoes. So whether carried my Vindicators or Avengers it didn’t matter because they rarely worked. Essentially and sadly the torpedo bombers were decoys that engaged the IJN’s CAP
Actually, before the war broke out, the IJN had assessed that the dive bomber would be the critical weapon in carrier battles due to the fragile flight deck. Once the carriers were cleared and air superiority was established, the torpedo (aerial, submarine, and surface ship), would be used to attrit the USN surface fleet prior to the Decicive Gun Battle. Per Evans & Peattie KAIGUN
Seth, I’m from the Gulf Coast and call Bay St Louis as my home. The work you guys do at Shelby is outstanding. My Father Kenneth McLaughlin served on USS Gambier Bay, can y’all cover the Battle off Samar. The coast had a couple of people serve on Gambier Bay, Boyce Holleman served in the composite air group VC-10 and a Edro Lee was a crewman on Gambier Bay. My father passed when I was 3 in 1969.
When the topic of quotes by Admiral Yamamoto came up, I couldn’t help but smile. The story is told that, when asked about the prospective invasion of the US mainland, he said it would never happen, because in America there was, behind every blade of grass, a farmer with a gun. Anyway, thanks for all your effort and time. Great presentation!
He was no fool. He'd been to America for education, work, and to travel. And he wasn't the only well-educated and well-traveled foreigner to have come to America and notice how much guns were an ingrained part of American culture. He was a bit like Alexis de Tocqueville in the previous century. That culture remains in most of the country today, and is going through a bit of a resurgence even in the more urban areas thanks in part to the internet and recent legal victories. It's a civic virtue that I hope continues to spread and can be exported, even as other civic virtues like freedom of speech are under severe attack right now.
I do wish the intro music was a bit quieter... I find myself falling asleep listening to these... But everytime it's the beginning of end of a episode... It wakes me up.. loudly
The ineffectiveness of the B26 Marauders at Midway is well known, and you noted the combination of inexperienced flight crews flying a tricky aircraft, but what about the unreliability of the the torpedo itself? The problems of flying the B26 were eliminated when Jimmy Doolittle was tasked with showing the crews how to fly it. They were used with great success in Italy and Germany. Thanks for this great channel!
At Midway the B26 crews suffered not only from a lock of training, but also from an airplane with a landing speed only a few miles per hour slower than the lowest drop speed for a 1942 Mark 13 torpedo.
Given what Jon said about the closeness of available strength at the point of the spear, his point is extremely valid. It is a fact that even by the time of Coral Sea, the Japanese were having problems getting replacement aircraft to the front in a timely manner. As a for instance, the four Japanese carriers at Midway had fewer planes per carrier air group available, than the six carriers on the Pearl Harbor attack. And that was keenly felt by the land-based IJN air forces in the SouWesPac, who had lost an alarming number of Betty's out of the original complement stationed at Rabaul, as well as losses, of fighters in transit from Truk to Rabaul. All of the actions, at Coral Sea and Midway, as well as attrition at Rabaul really put the Japanese behind the eight ball, which was compounded by later bad decisions in the Solomons Campaign, which was the REAL turning point of the war in the PTO.
Parshall points out in "Shattered Sword" the issues Japan was having with attack plane production. Nakajima and Aichi were discontinuing production of the Kate and Val for newer designs and only produced 56 attack planes in all of 1942.
My understanding from another source is that many of the civilian drydock workers sailed with Yorktown to continue the damage mitigation on the way to the Midway battle.
I love Commodore Toti's often comments of MacArthur's capabilities. He is a better leader than I will admit. When his plan goes as mapped it was good but when it goes south he was MIA and looking for scape goats.
GOOD JOB!! I honestly ddn't realize Midway was so close to Hawaii. Less than 2 days steaming for a Japanese "Strike Force"... It's actually part of the volcanic "Hotspot" that ended up forming the Hawaii Islands as we know them today.
I was going to say, the 1976 film Midway brought up that exact point, that they were only actually reading one word in ten. And STILL cant get my head wraped around the fact that Chester Nimitz was a submariner, no matter how many times I hear it.
The Fins were flying against obsolete Russian aircraft for the most part. That did have some success against Messerschmitts, but by then they were veteran pilots flying in heroic fashion. They were not inexperienced flyers up against fast and nimble Zeros. By the way you guys are great. I’m back in History class with the best.
I almost did not watch this series, simply because I was burned-out from the same old canned Midway histories, that never seem to have anything new to add. So glad I did. 😃
Man I could listen to you guys discussing this or any operation for hours. Great information--Seth I really like how you take it down to the level of individuals you have talked with. Brings a whole new perspective. Thanks Seth, Bill, and Jon!
I was going to say earlier just looking at dusty's picture you can see confidence in his eyes. He was good and he knew it. I would have loved to have met him.
Always a pleasure to see John Parshall speak, and I have to admit I have so far found the quality of this channel (only recently found by myself) excellent. Two questions I do have however, will you at some point be covering the fighting on Papua New Guinea? Especially the role of the Australian's on that Island? And do you consider the actions of 14th Army under Slim part of the Pacific war? I know the actions of the 14th army did not have any direct impact on the American operations in most of the Pacific but do you see that in the perview of your channel? If you do I would be fascinated to see an American perspective on the Battle of Imphal and Kohima, and of the very real issues Slim had in forging what was very much a multinational army, one with something like 30 different languages, 4 major religions, and so on.
Slim and Stillwell were handicapped by essentially being relegated to logistical backwaters, underequipped, undermanned in a much lower priority theater. Being outspoken, Vinegar Joe got little credit as a tactician and especially a politician that had to deal with Chang Ki Shmuck. I'll be patient, Seth.
I also wonder what were the Marines were thinking about on Midway. The Heroic defense of Wake Island was still fresh on their minds. Would they be able to mount the same stubborn defense and repulse the invasion or would it be similar to the second invasion. I believe they wanted revenge.
Honestly, I don't think a defense land victory of the island would have been possible without the naval victory. The more troops on the island, the more casualties. The Japanese shore bombardment group would have leveled the island. There were no underground tunnel networks or anywhere to hide from cruiser and battleship bombardment rounds. Having spent a year on Johnston Island, which has an 8 foot above sea level as the high ground, defensive positions are far and few to come by. However, Midway would be under long-range bomber attack from the Hawaiian Islands, as well as US Navy submarines circling like sharks. Then again, with the torpedo situation, submarines might not be effective for the defense.
What a conversation! I come away so impressed with the expertise and effort it took to win that victory. I imagine it is so difficult to train incoming sailors to understand what it takes today.
Second season was great, especially the submarine and aviation episodes! You get a lot of stuff here that you don't see in the standard DVDs on the Pacific War.
The comparison between the air group on Midway tactics and the carrier group tactics of the SBD's and their success rate. It becomes a comparison of dive bombing versus glide bombing. Is the SBD the last of the single purpose Aircraft? Was that a part of the decision to use glide bombing?
Got to wonder how those risk assessments would've gone had we recognized the range of Long lance torpedoes or the functionality issues of Mark 14 and 15 torpedoes considering their numerical advantage in destroyers . . . which they might also not have realized previous to the battle. And yeah, obsolescence in the late '30s and early '40s sometimes happened by the time prototypes of an aircraft were done with their work and the types had barely become operational. Brewster's F2F might be an example.. As advanced as the TBD was in 1936 they were arguably made obsolete upon Nakajima's B5N having become operational. With that said torpedo passes with any aircraft were just crazy risky as long as AA were waiting.
How is this unauthorized?! This is legit some of the best history there is. I e learned so much more from a few episodes of your content than I have the whole year in 10th grade history. P.S Mr Parshall, may I entice you to get a podcast mic like Seth’s sir?
Let’s jump in on the F2A. The single airframe of WWII with the most kills was almost certainly 42.5 kills on the Finnish Buffalo with fuselage ID of BW364. Admittedly, pilot skill and Finnish doctrine was extremely important, but they also did modifications on it to make it a competent fighter.
There's an interesting parallel between Admiral Yamamoto and General Grant, who Yamamoto studied. They both got policy changed by threatening their resignations.
Just found this and love it listened to several. Ajaki-battle cruiser as Saratoga and Lexington. On MacArthur-well done. Will you cover King and his infidelities and professional faults? Halsey made grievous errors not just at Leyte but was best at the start of the war.
41:55 - I don't hear much about it, but one thing that hurt flexibility in Japanese carrier aviation was their practice of linking the air group closely to a specific carrier, as if the pilots and technicians were part of the ship's crew. This limited their options after losses. The USN did not do that.
I really enjoyed this 'pre Midway' video. The back stories of such events so are often ignored or lost in thick, regrettably unread, history books. Your early in the video comments about the first actions the US made in the Pacific after Pearl Harbor were interesting especially to their motivation. They did some hit and run raids and of course the Dolittle Raid before more serious affairs began to occur like Coral Sea and then Midway. I think we need to remember that the US forces in general had only began a lack luster refurbishment starting around 1940 and then into 1941. Even in late 1941, perhaps some thought the US would get into it and perhaps some wanted to, but FDR was pretty reluctant to commit active duty forces to offensive action. The Japanese may have miscalculated at PH because it is quite possible that they could have had their empire and consolidated it to some extent before the US finally got involved. Without PH, I am not sure that Nazi Germany would have declared war and so there would have been delays of some type before, if ever, the US got involved. As such, in '40 and '41 I think there was still a great general reluctance of the citizenry to get involved in these 'foreign wars' 1941 was Ted Williams and Joe DiMaggio far more than Barbarossa or the Battle of the Atlantic. So, it is no surprise to me that the Army and the Navy, so quickly enlarged, had thousands of troops who were still very, very green. I think that one of the responsibilities of commanders is make sure as best they can that young lives are not wasted on stupid attacks for 'PR' or so some General or Admiral can look good. These are sons and fathers and I fervently hope that whatever action troops are sent into, the reason is sufficiently good for the commander (at whatever level) to explain it to the families of the casualties. I'm not so sure it always was. So, if it were me, I can see some of the early hit and run tactics, but I think they would be far more useful in training the flyers and the carriers crews under battle conditions, but then you can get out and away without a strategic loss. The Doolittle Raid was a stunt, but involved only a few voluntary troops and planes. I can see the need to attend the Battle of the Coral Sea as Australian access was in jeopardy. However, as was mentioned in this video, the USN's tactics were pell-mell compared to those of the comparatively seasoned IJN. So, maybe CS was a battle we were not ready for, but given the stakes they probably had to do it. I am not sure why Yamamoto was so hot to take Midway (or Pearl Harbor for that matter ...). I realize the main point is to lure the remainder of the USN into battle and destroy it. However, even though the USN were pretty new at this, their planes could sting and the IJN got very unlucky at Midway. It could easily have gone differently (as is true for many battles) and given the weight and experience of the forces it probably should have. You suggest that Midway was important, but not a turning point etc. I beg to disagree. While I submit that it was not THE turning point. The IJN lost hundreds of irreplaceable pilots AND perhaps even more importantly, I am told, they lost most of their best airplane mechanics when the Kaga exploded. No matter the desire, you cannot replace skilled technicians be they pilots or mechanics in a few months. I think the Kido Butai was irreparably damaged after Midway, not just in the loss of 4 Capital ships, but also in these ancillary losses of skilled crew. It was just an awful day for the IJN. While there were many naval maneuvers I don't think the IJN ever operated like the striking force it had been up until then. THAT is a pretty big deal I think. Again, a great video topic and thanks for spending the time on it. Perhaps, you might talk about who was behind the awesome production of naval ships in the US and all the new ideas that came to the fore in 1944 and beyond.
Jonathan Parshall suggested that if you want the full story on Midway you have to read the books equivalent to "Shattered Sword" but which cover the American side. Can you suggest one or two that are as comprehensive, detailed and scholarly as "Shattered Sword"? Thanks
Interestingly, both the TBD and Kate entered service in 1937. The TBD's max speed was ~30 mph slower. Its engine was 100 HP less, and its empty weight was ~600 lbs. greater. The Kate's rate of climb was almost double the TBD's. Did the Kate trade ruggedness for speed and rate of climb? The second sad aspect of the TBD was that the torpedo it carried was a POS, just like those of submarines and destroyers.
REQUEST:. Would luv a Podcast to analyze the conflict (and hate) between the the Japanese Imperial Army and the Imperial Navy QUESTION: Could Japan had 'won' the Battle of the Pacific had the Japanese Army and Navy closely worked together ❓
I had read that the Aleutian campaign was not a diversion but another operation apparently the Japanese did this with out a problem, because the enough assets
I will forever be impressed by Nimitz decision to confer with Halsey to name his replacement. Giving command of Task Force 16 to a cruiser skipper!!!! OMG, the decision to elevate Ray Spruance must have raised some eyebrows all the way to Washington! This must have really wrinkled Adm. Pete Mitscher panty hose since he was a qualified aviator who had just commanded Hornet during the Doolittle Raid. He had to have felt being ''Passed over'' so to speak and led to his faulty decision to send Stanley Ring off on course 265 leading his flight in Parade formation that burns more fuel, especially for first time squadrons in actual combat. Between Adm. Fletchers decision to hold back a squadron of SBD to hit the ''imaginary second group'' of two carriers that Mitscher was supposedly after (to save his rep) and ''Petes'' decision to improvise his own course to send his ships' flight groups on, really highlights to me having Spruance in charge was a battle winning decision. It was Halseys staff (Cpt. Miles Browning) who put course 240 together and Mitscher must have been signaled that!!!!! What a difference Hornets flight group would have made with a coordinated attack and the second SBD squadron from Yorktown following up the strike on Soryu to sink Hiryu would have saved the Yorktown from any damage....Great shows!!
I completely agree with you regarding Admiral Turner. It is a testament to Nimitz’s ability to assess people that a total mental case that was Richmond Kelly Turner, whom history indicates preformed his job successfully, was retained as commander of the overall amphibious forces during the war. Anybody else would’ve been locked up in a mental hospital. Imagine being stuck in a life raft with Turner, Patton, and MacArthur….
Mitscher had just been promoted to Rear-Admiral. Spruance had been in the Pacific and been in combat since December 7th. He was already slated to be Chief of Staff to Nimtz. King considered Spruance the second most intelligent officer in the navy. King considered himself the most intelligent officer in the US Navy. He was not an aviator, but he apparently had learned about aviation. My understanding is that the Japanese tried to out think Spruance several times and failed. Halsey actually put the recommendation in writing. Keep in mind air power and aircraft carriers were very much new tech. The navy was still learning how to use its aircraft carriers.
@29:15 talking about the reinforcements for Midway Island in the month before the battle, I presume the 7" guns came with the Marine Defense Battalions much earlier in the year, but when exactly was that?
It was not really discussed, but Nimitz was risking his command and his stars. Fair or not, American history is littered with Admirals and Generals that failed and were relieved. He was willing to gamble, and he won, but it could have easily gone the other way. It was mentioned that Nimitz would have gone ahead even if only two carriers were available. This is very like General US Grant. No moping or complaining about the material situation. Instead, Nimitz did the best he could with what he had. US Grant did the same in the Civil War. The 1976 movie describes it best where the acting playing Nimitz says we have a chance to push the enemy back 3000 miles. Nimitz was willing to take that chance.
The Midway movies (both I think) stressed that in the Japanese wargames of the battle the premise is that the American Carriers will be at Pearl Harbor when the Midway attack begins. The Japanese carriers will be lying in wait for the American carriers once the air attacks on Midway are completed. In one scene Nagumo is chastising some officers because they had surprised the fleet with American carrier attacks and inflicted heavy damage. Yamamoto came in and directs that the American Carriers be based in Pearl when the attach happens, and the wargame should proceed with that assumption. Did this happen? Also, presumably, once the anticipated reaction by the Americans occurs, the Japanese fleet would beef up their air reconnaissance well beyond what they had on the first day of the battle.
Bill responding: you can have long and laborious conversations regarding "capability" versus "probability." In wargaming, it's important to understand the most likely outcome as well as the "what if" that comes when the enemy uses its full capability.
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar Understood. However, the Japanese officers were seemingly chastised for their audacity in deviating what the plan called for in relation to American actions.
At the 40 min mark Parshall is saying that Point Luck is 360 nm from where the IJN will be sighted. And this means it will take until mid pm to steam closer to get in plane strike range. He doesn't say it, but our CVs will be spotted well before they reach strike range, unless the IJN is asleep. So, given that Nimitz ordered the CV to move closer a day or 2 earlier, IMHO, Parshall is wrong there. Nimitz put Point Luck there to be able to decide to run away and not fight at all, and let the Marines hold Midway by themselves, rather than fight a losing battle. If Yorktown isn't there, or if Zuikaku is there, or the 2 CV from the northern force are there, Nimitz intended to not commit 2 CV to fight 5 to 7 IJN CVs. Especially, if the ambush is off because the 2 US CV are too far away to make the ambush possible.
Can you imagine the incredulity that Ernest King felt that his intelligence office HYPO asserted that Yamamoto would want to strand that much combat power in the middle of nowhere on Gooney Bird Island? At minute 54:00, `Fleet boats´, does not define the models of submarines or this age. I assume these predated the Gato, Balao, and Tench Classes of submarines as the first Gato entered service in 1941. What were these pre-war submarines besides slow and dangerous? The 1927-designed Narwhale Class could steam at 17 knots downhill, dive down to 320 feet, had two 6" deck guns (technically a cruiser), and 96 crew. Nautilus was of the Type Narwhale, other subs of this class were the USS Barracuda, USS Bass, USS Bonita, USS Argonaut, USS Dolphin, USS Cachalot, and USS Cuttlefish (source: Wikipedia.de). At the beginning of the war, there were 29 US subs in the Philipines alone. What other classes of US subs were used in WW2? The Nautilus was highly successful for its ancient development.
Guys don’t ever worry about running long on these shows. I’m sure I’m speaking for everyone we could listen to you all day. Great job guys!!
Shattered Sword is a great book. Highly recommended. Props to Jon Parshall and Tony Tully.
Does anyone besides me wish they could imbibe a frosty adult beverage with these guys? You've got to love their conversations.
I prefer bourbon whiskey
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar beer to start Bourbon to finish...?
I would probably become a boring companion because I would have so many questions.
At 7:39 Jon Parshall is, indeed, imbibing something frosty! 😂
@@williamyalen6167 water
I compliment Jon on correctly acknowledging Fuchida’s role as coordinator, despite Fuchida’s postwar errors
My dad volunteered for the defense Midway as a U.S Marine , next was the Battle Of Tarawa
Nearly 4 hours with Jon Parshall about the Battle of Midway. Thank you for this episodes. And all the other ones. This is like christmas!
I really like Jon. He is a good historian, and a nice guy.
loved Dusty's book. it informed me how well trained many of our pilots were prior to the battle. the win, wasn't an accident
Bit of an aside. In the mid 1990s I interviewed an RAAF fighter pilot Ian Kinross. When the Japanese conducted their raid into the India Ocean Australian authorities were concerned that the Japanese would turn south and attack the West coast of Australia. Ian was at an operational training unit in West Australian at that time. Had a West coast raid eventuated Ian and his mates were to attack the Japanese in Fairy Battles and Avro Ansons.
This sends chills down my spine just thinking about it. Thankfully it didn't happen. Later Ian flew Kittyhawks in defence of Darwin. The fuselage of his P40 is now at the aviation museum at Moorabbin airport in Victoria, Australia
Yikes, talk about a thankless task! Taking on anybody while in a Battle was a bad idea!
Hah! At 17:30, JP casually uses the word "grok", as if it's just a regular word, that everyone, well, groks!!😂 A nice homage to Naval Academy grad & sci fi author Robert Heinlein.
The early developers of Unix (later Linux) picked up on Heinlein as well, naming a utility tool in that language after that expression. The tool organizes raw data into formats that are easier to understand - hence "grok."
What a crazy coincidence! I'm halfway through Stranger in a Strange Land right now! What a great read, it's been probably 25/30 years since I read it so it's almost like it's a new book to me! I must get with my elders and grok this to fulfillment!😅
I am negligent about commenting my feelings about the "unauthorized history", which is that this is a captivating series!
I have shared the video link with my father and brother, both retired Naval Aviators. All three of us are pilots and students of the Battle of Midway. This is a fantastic production filled with new information about a battle that we thought we knew.
Thank you
If you haven't already I hope you read Jonathon Parshall's book about Midway: Shattered Sword. His book was written after examining much of the flight logs from the Japanese carrier's and many accounts written by Japanese pilots and included a lot of new information and corrected some misunderstandings.
Love Captain Toti's swipes at MacArthur. He just can't help himself.
Anyone else enjoy watching these as much as I do lol or rewatching them. Again and again.
Especially when Jon is there. I love getting the economy and high level strategy that he brings.
I just finished re-reading Martin Caidin's "The Ragged, Rugged Warriors." I read that in high school about 40 years ago. The last two chapters are about the 22nd Bomb Group and Jim Muri's wild ride in attacking the Japanese carriers at Midway. Caidin originally published this book in the early 1960s and had the luxury of interviewing many of those who fought the Japanese in the six months leading up to the Midway battle which lends credence to his writing. According to Caidin, the Navy trained the Marauder crews in torpedo attacks while they were in Hawaii prior to them being sent to Midway. Muri said the cruisers escorting the carriers blasted away at them with their big guns to create massive columns of water for them to dodge. He said at least two of the Avengers were slapped out of the air by them. Then there was the epic story of Muri tearing across the flight deck of one of the carriers, something I believe deserves more than a passing mention. At minimum it reinforces Jon Parshall's contention that the decks of the Japanese carriers were devoid of aircraft.
Also I'd love to see someone take a stab at discussing the 22nd Bomb Group and their work out of the Seven Mile Aerodrome complex in Port Moresby area while tangling with the Japanese fighter bases at Salamaua and Lae. According to career USAF officer and, at that time, one of the most experienced Marauder pilot in the USAAF, Walt Krell, the B-26B was the best medium bomber in the world. When asked if they were experiencing problems with the airplane, he said basically "yeah, send us more of them!" In short, these guys were not only tangling with the best Zero pilots in the Southwest Pacific without escorts but were flying from a patch grass and had to contend with clouds of mosquitoes, blazing heat, towering tropical storms, lack of food and supplies, dysentery, ankle deep mud, and of all things, cannibalistic natives. Add to that, these guys didn't have the nifty uniforms their British based counterparts had, they were sent to war on a moments notice. Some even flew in their bedroom slippers. There no time to pack and go, it was just go at zero dark thirty.
My dad was enlisted Navy, but he was 14 when the war ended. I think newsreels of the Pacific war that inspired him. I was born at what was then called the Naval Ordnance Test Station China Lake in 1957. I grew up on military bases around 1950s jets and they were the focus of my history reading for the most part. But, in high school when other young'ns were skipping class to hang out off campus, I skipped class to go the library and read books like "Incredible Victory," and almost anything concerning aerial warfare. I'm very pleased to have discovered your channel and others with a similar passion for learning about that conflict.
Wow! The discussion you had regarding Midway was so useful in destroying the misinformation I had about that battle. I told my son that what I told him about the battle was so far off the truth he should watch your Midway video which he did. He enjoyed it just like did. My son enjoyed the thinking behind the key players of the battle. Thank you
That’s cool!
Love these guys
Prior to the internet, I read every thing I found about the war in the Pacific. After the internet , I viewed every thing I could find. Your podcasts are wonderful. Keep them coming. I believe this podcast about preparing for Midway is absolutely the singular beat ever. Thank you profusely.
Thank you guys so very much for this fantastic episode! The addition of Jon is always a special treat and I appreciate you guys dispelling all the myths about Midway. I thought I knew so much about that battle but it turns out I knew very little and most of it was wrong! Thank you for setting the record straight and taking the time to do so! 🇺🇲⚓️💯❤️☕️🍻🙏
Ah, the first episode with John. Love it! Three's a party!
Gawd-damn, these podcasts are awesome. Well done, fellas!
Great show!
Being a wwII buff this is precious information on what really happened, thank you for your time to share.
I enjoy all the episodes, but my favorites are the ones with Jon Parshall. The chemistry between the three of you is wonderful.
@@christopherwilliams9866 undeniable
Wow, at last the supporting details of the interactions of air operations and how they derived at their battle planning for the Midway campaign. There are a lot of situations of the battle that one cannot figure out without knowing what the positions of the commanding personal took on the battle plan.
Great job - love the broadcast and especially the way you give each other the freedom to comment!!
awesome...
I started out with you all with your most recent videos. Now I'm going back to the beginning. Parshall is definitely at his strongest here. Really enjoying this.
I consider myself a keen student of WW2 history, and have had a long interest in Battle of Midway in particular. I watched the 1976 movie many times, and read several books on the Battle before discovering the transformative work Shattered Sword. Not surprisingly I am a big fan of Jon Parshall and would love to discuss logistics and war economics with him but but will likely never get that opportunity. I am only the first episode in and was really interested to hear the accounts of the US airmen which is not something I have heard much about before. Seems there is always something new to learn. Great work.
Outstanding presentation ... simply outstanding.
Thanks!
Regarding the Japanese disrespect for U.S. carrier effectiveness at this stage of the war, I wonder about another possible nuance. IIRC, the Japanese believed the torpedo plane to be the arm of decision of carrier warfare and up to this point - particularly in the Coral Sea attacks against Shokaku - the Devastator did not fare well. That may have led Japanese admirals to crucially underrate U.S. carrier attack capability. They were looking at the torpedo plane when it was the Dauntless dive bomber that was the arm of decision in the U.S. Navy. Also, the Devastator attacks at Midway that were so catastrophic for the Americans in terms of combat effectiveness and lives lost may have confirmed that misapprehension in the minds of the brass aboard Akaki, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu.
This is an interesting perspective. Would be interesting to see if anything exists in the Japanese literature to support your theory.
The Vindicator divebombers, as shown from 0:11 didn't fare well either.
I’m not sure they believed the ineffectiveness of US torpedo bombers in and of themselves was the issue. They simply knew that we didn’t have a coherent carrier air doctrine yet, so our torpedo bombers and dive bombers were typically both left exposed at this point in the war (other than one raid on a light carrier at Coral Sea). The dive bombers were just a lot more maneuverable, so they could tangle with fighters in a pinch, while the Devastators couldn’t. Japan didn’t have that problem though, because they were escorting and protecting their attack aircraft well. Midway would have confirmed our lack of correct attack doctrine, not the ineffectiveness of our attack aircraft. A bunch of unescorted Japanese torpedo bombers would have been just as easy pickings got Wildcats, if we were using their doctrine (or our post-Midway/Guadalcanal doctrine) and they were using our 1942 doctrine.
The navy of the time was hobbled with terrible torpedo performance. Submarines, Destroyers, and Aircraft. At Midway the IJN expected the American torpedoes to be as effective as their own torpedoes. So whether carried my Vindicators or Avengers it didn’t matter because they rarely worked. Essentially and sadly the torpedo bombers were decoys that engaged the IJN’s CAP
Actually, before the war broke out, the IJN had assessed that the dive bomber would be the critical weapon in carrier battles due to the fragile flight deck. Once the carriers were cleared and air superiority was established, the torpedo (aerial, submarine, and surface ship), would be used to attrit the USN surface fleet prior to the Decicive Gun Battle.
Per Evans & Peattie KAIGUN
Seth, I’m from the Gulf Coast and call Bay St Louis as my home. The work you guys do at Shelby is outstanding. My Father Kenneth McLaughlin served on USS Gambier Bay, can y’all cover the Battle off Samar. The coast had a couple of people serve on Gambier Bay, Boyce Holleman served in the composite air group VC-10 and a Edro Lee was a crewman on Gambier Bay. My father passed when I was 3 in 1969.
Again thank you for all the hard work put in this episode.
Many thanks
Second time through. So much great info. Always enjoy Jon. Thank you for sharing your passion.
Extremely well done...all three episodes.
Many thanks.
When the topic of quotes by Admiral Yamamoto came up, I couldn’t help but smile. The story is told that, when asked about the prospective invasion of the US mainland, he said it would never happen, because in America there was, behind every blade of grass, a farmer with a gun. Anyway, thanks for all your effort and time. Great presentation!
He was no fool. He'd been to America for education, work, and to travel. And he wasn't the only well-educated and well-traveled foreigner to have come to America and notice how much guns were an ingrained part of American culture. He was a bit like Alexis de Tocqueville in the previous century. That culture remains in most of the country today, and is going through a bit of a resurgence even in the more urban areas thanks in part to the internet and recent legal victories. It's a civic virtue that I hope continues to spread and can be exported, even as other civic virtues like freedom of speech are under severe attack right now.
Do you think the Japanese still think that we will come to thd table like the Russians did after the huge sea battle tsumi straight
Tsushima straight
1905
@@scottbeck5369 Apparently. They seemed to have underestimated the United States on every level.
Grat episode!
While I have heard Jon talk about Midway before, that ''point Luck'' nugget was very interesting!
I do wish the intro music was a bit quieter...
I find myself falling asleep listening to these...
But everytime it's the beginning of end of a episode... It wakes me up.. loudly
The ineffectiveness of the B26 Marauders at Midway is well known, and you noted the combination of inexperienced flight crews flying a tricky aircraft, but what about the unreliability of the the torpedo itself? The problems of flying the B26 were eliminated when Jimmy Doolittle was tasked with showing the crews how to fly it. They were used with great success in Italy and Germany. Thanks for this great channel!
At Midway the B26 crews suffered not only from a lock of training, but also from an airplane with a landing speed only a few miles per hour slower than the lowest drop speed for a 1942 Mark 13 torpedo.
Given what Jon said about the closeness of available strength at the point of the spear, his point is extremely valid. It is a fact that even by the time of Coral Sea, the Japanese were having problems getting replacement aircraft to the front in a timely manner. As a for instance, the four Japanese carriers at Midway had fewer planes per carrier air group available, than the six carriers on the Pearl Harbor attack. And that was keenly felt by the land-based IJN air forces in the SouWesPac, who had lost an alarming number of Betty's out of the original complement stationed at Rabaul, as well as losses, of fighters in transit from Truk to Rabaul. All of the actions, at Coral Sea and Midway, as well as attrition at Rabaul really put the Japanese behind the eight ball, which was compounded by later bad decisions in the Solomons Campaign, which was the REAL turning point of the war in the PTO.
Parshall points out in "Shattered Sword" the issues Japan was having with attack plane production. Nakajima and Aichi were discontinuing production of the Kate and Val for newer designs and only produced 56 attack planes in all of 1942.
My understanding from another source is that many of the civilian drydock workers sailed with Yorktown to continue the damage mitigation on the way to the Midway battle.
I love Commodore Toti's often comments of MacArthur's capabilities. He is a better leader than I will admit. When his plan goes as mapped it was good but when it goes south he was MIA and looking for scape goats.
Awesome conversation gentleman! Looking forward to more episodes.
GOOD JOB!! I honestly ddn't realize Midway was so close to Hawaii. Less than 2 days steaming for a Japanese "Strike Force"... It's actually part of the volcanic "Hotspot" that ended up forming the Hawaii Islands as we know them today.
Thanks, you guys always do a great job and always love to hear from Jon Parshall.
I was going to say, the 1976 film Midway brought up that exact point, that they were only actually reading one word in ten.
And STILL cant get my head wraped around the fact that Chester Nimitz was a submariner, no matter how many times I hear it.
Again, I'm impressed.
I wish I could sit in one of these
Fantastic! Loving this. I'm gaining new insights into the Pacific war. Thanks, guys!
The Fins were flying against obsolete Russian aircraft for the most part. That did have some success against Messerschmitts, but by then they were veteran pilots flying in heroic fashion. They were not inexperienced flyers up against fast and nimble Zeros. By the way you guys are great. I’m back in History class with the best.
I almost did not watch this series, simply because I was burned-out from the same old canned Midway histories, that never seem to have anything new to add. So glad I did. 😃
We can be accused of many things, but being "canned" is not one of them!
Man I could listen to you guys discussing this or any operation for hours. Great information--Seth I really like how you take it down to the level of individuals you have talked with. Brings a whole new perspective. Thanks Seth, Bill, and Jon!
Great Podcast….great detailed discussion amongst you three pros! Scott
I was going to say earlier just looking at dusty's picture you can see confidence in his eyes. He was good and he knew it. I would have loved to have met him.
Dusty was fantastic. One of the finest men I have ever had the honor of knowing and calling a friend. Miss him every single day.
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar You are a lucky man, I miss him, and I never knew him. Thank you, sir, for your reply.
Well done as always gentlemen.
Always a pleasure to see John Parshall speak, and I have to admit I have so far found the quality of this channel (only recently found by myself) excellent.
Two questions I do have however, will you at some point be covering the fighting on Papua New Guinea? Especially the role of the Australian's on that Island? And do you consider the actions of 14th Army under Slim part of the Pacific war? I know the actions of the 14th army did not have any direct impact on the American operations in most of the Pacific but do you see that in the perview of your channel?
If you do I would be fascinated to see an American perspective on the Battle of Imphal and Kohima, and of the very real issues Slim had in forging what was very much a multinational army, one with something like 30 different languages, 4 major religions, and so on.
This is exactly the kind of feedback we were hoping for. We will put PNG on the list!
Slim and Stillwell were handicapped by essentially being relegated to logistical backwaters, underequipped, undermanned in a much lower priority theater.
Being outspoken, Vinegar Joe got little credit as a tactician and especially a politician that had to deal with Chang Ki Shmuck.
I'll be patient, Seth.
Im happy that I found this channel
Thoroughly enjoyed this discussion, I hope I can meet Seth on my next visit to the museum.
I also wonder what were the Marines were thinking about on Midway. The Heroic defense of Wake Island was still fresh on their minds. Would they be able to mount the same stubborn defense and repulse the invasion or would it be similar to the second invasion. I believe they wanted revenge.
Yes-- great perspective!
Honestly, I don't think a defense land victory of the island would have been possible without the naval victory. The more troops on the island, the more casualties. The Japanese shore bombardment group would have leveled the island. There were no underground tunnel networks or anywhere to hide from cruiser and battleship bombardment rounds. Having spent a year on Johnston Island, which has an 8 foot above sea level as the high ground, defensive positions are far and few to come by. However, Midway would be under long-range bomber attack from the Hawaiian Islands, as well as US Navy submarines circling like sharks. Then again, with the torpedo situation, submarines might not be effective for the defense.
What a conversation! I come away so impressed with the expertise and effort it took to win that victory. I imagine it is so difficult to train incoming sailors to understand what it takes today.
In the photo where Nimitz is handing out a medal, Doris Miller is the sailor standing to the right. As in CVN81 USS Doris Miller .
Second season was great, especially the submarine and aviation episodes! You get a lot of stuff here that you don't see in the standard DVDs on the Pacific War.
The comparison between the air group on Midway tactics and the carrier group tactics of the SBD's and their success rate. It becomes a comparison of dive bombing versus glide bombing. Is the SBD the last of the single purpose Aircraft? Was that a part of the decision to use glide bombing?
Got to wonder how those risk assessments would've gone had we recognized the range of Long lance torpedoes or the functionality issues of Mark 14 and 15 torpedoes considering their numerical advantage in destroyers . . . which they might also not have realized previous to the battle.
And yeah, obsolescence in the late '30s and early '40s sometimes happened by the time prototypes of an aircraft were done with their work and the types had barely become operational. Brewster's F2F might be an example.. As advanced as the TBD was in 1936 they were arguably made obsolete upon Nakajima's B5N having become operational. With that said torpedo passes with any aircraft were just crazy risky as long as AA were waiting.
Great Episode - lots of insights and good discussion.
Great broadcast pure and simple. Thanks
How is this unauthorized?!
This is legit some of the best history there is. I e learned so much more from a few episodes of your content than I have the whole year in 10th grade history.
P.S
Mr Parshall, may I entice you to get a podcast mic like Seth’s sir?
This is my second time watching. So interesting and so well presented. Thank God I found you. Had enough politics. WW II is so much better.
Midway was the great equalizer. It provided the US with confidence, experience, and leveled the playing field enough to allow offensive action.
Parshall, wow! I read his "Shattered Sword" cover to cover ... twice!
Indeed. Great read.
Only twice?
Let’s jump in on the F2A. The single airframe of WWII with the most kills was almost certainly 42.5 kills on the Finnish Buffalo with fuselage ID of BW364. Admittedly, pilot skill and Finnish doctrine was extremely important, but they also did modifications on it to make it a competent fighter.
If they would have let Ching Lee shoot the “fishing “boats we would have saved a lot of ammunition. Love the channel guys!!!
Thank you.
You're welcome!
I believe Dusty could poop in a swinging jug. Hit it every time. Great job guys!!
There's an interesting parallel between Admiral Yamamoto and General Grant, who Yamamoto studied. They both got policy changed by threatening their resignations.
This may well be the best discussion I have viewed. Editting to include that I have observed at least a dozen appearances by Paschall.
Jon and I have known each other for years and years. Makes for easy talking.
Just found this and love it listened to several.
Ajaki-battle cruiser as Saratoga and Lexington.
On MacArthur-well done. Will you cover King and his infidelities and professional faults?
Halsey made grievous errors not just at Leyte but was best at the start of the war.
I have that exact edition of Shattered Sword. :)
Does Jon have his own books or TV (other than ww2 in color, which was awesome
Curious: When did the U.S. start using 'proximity fuses' for their fleet AA guns?
41:55 - I don't hear much about it, but one thing that hurt flexibility in Japanese carrier aviation was their practice of linking the air group closely to a specific carrier, as if the pilots and technicians were part of the ship's crew. This limited their options after losses. The USN did not do that.
Nimitz had balls the size of bowling balls. God bless Texas
I really enjoyed this 'pre Midway' video. The back stories of such events so are often ignored or lost in thick, regrettably unread, history books.
Your early in the video comments about the first actions the US made in the Pacific after Pearl Harbor were interesting especially to their motivation. They did some hit and run raids and of course the Dolittle Raid before more serious affairs began to occur like Coral Sea and then Midway.
I think we need to remember that the US forces in general had only began a lack luster refurbishment starting around 1940 and then into 1941. Even in late 1941, perhaps some thought the US would get into it and perhaps some wanted to, but FDR was pretty reluctant to commit active duty forces to offensive action. The Japanese may have miscalculated at PH because it is quite possible that they could have had their empire and consolidated it to some extent before the US finally got involved. Without PH, I am not sure that Nazi Germany would have declared war and so there would have been delays of some type before, if ever, the US got involved.
As such, in '40 and '41 I think there was still a great general reluctance of the citizenry to get involved in these 'foreign wars' 1941 was Ted Williams and Joe DiMaggio far more than Barbarossa or the Battle of the Atlantic. So, it is no surprise to me that the Army and the Navy, so quickly enlarged, had thousands of troops who were still very, very green.
I think that one of the responsibilities of commanders is make sure as best they can that young lives are not wasted on stupid attacks for 'PR' or so some General or Admiral can look good. These are sons and fathers and I fervently hope that whatever action troops are sent into, the reason is sufficiently good for the commander (at whatever level) to explain it to the families of the casualties. I'm not so sure it always was.
So, if it were me, I can see some of the early hit and run tactics, but I think they would be far more useful in training the flyers and the carriers crews under battle conditions, but then you can get out and away without a strategic loss. The Doolittle Raid was a stunt, but involved only a few voluntary troops and planes.
I can see the need to attend the Battle of the Coral Sea as Australian access was in jeopardy. However, as was mentioned in this video, the USN's tactics were pell-mell compared to those of the comparatively seasoned IJN. So, maybe CS was a battle we were not ready for, but given the stakes they probably had to do it.
I am not sure why Yamamoto was so hot to take Midway (or Pearl Harbor for that matter ...). I realize the main point is to lure the remainder of the USN into battle and destroy it. However, even though the USN were pretty new at this, their planes could sting and the IJN got very unlucky at Midway. It could easily have gone differently (as is true for many battles) and given the weight and experience of the forces it probably should have.
You suggest that Midway was important, but not a turning point etc. I beg to disagree. While I submit that it was not THE turning point. The IJN lost hundreds of irreplaceable pilots AND perhaps even more importantly, I am told, they lost most of their best airplane mechanics when the Kaga exploded. No matter the desire, you cannot replace skilled technicians be they pilots or mechanics in a few months. I think the Kido Butai was irreparably damaged after Midway, not just in the loss of 4 Capital ships, but also in these ancillary losses of skilled crew. It was just an awful day for the IJN.
While there were many naval maneuvers I don't think the IJN ever operated like the striking force it had been up until then. THAT is a pretty big deal I think.
Again, a great video topic and thanks for spending the time on it.
Perhaps, you might talk about who was behind the awesome production of naval ships in the US and all the new ideas that came to the fore in 1944 and beyond.
Well said!
Thank-you.. Excellent.
Jonathan Parshall suggested that if you want the full story on Midway you have to read the books equivalent to "Shattered Sword" but which cover the American side. Can you suggest one or two that are as comprehensive, detailed and scholarly as "Shattered Sword"?
Thanks
Frankly, there haven't been any written that are that deep on the US side of the battle yet.
Great information. Thanks.
Interestingly, both the TBD and Kate entered service in 1937. The TBD's max speed was ~30 mph slower. Its engine was 100 HP less, and its empty weight was ~600 lbs. greater. The Kate's rate of climb was almost double the TBD's. Did the Kate trade ruggedness for speed and rate of climb? The second sad aspect of the TBD was that the torpedo it carried was a POS, just like those of submarines and destroyers.
On Yorktown there was a fuel bowser on the deck and it was full I was told at a reunion.Without being told a chief ordered it pushed over the stern.
Very, very informative. So thanks a lot!
REQUEST:. Would luv a Podcast to analyze the conflict (and hate) between the the Japanese Imperial Army and the Imperial Navy
QUESTION: Could Japan had 'won' the Battle of the Pacific had the Japanese Army and Navy closely worked together ❓
I'll drink to that!!!
I had read that the Aleutian campaign was not a diversion but another operation apparently the Japanese did this with out a problem, because the enough assets
I will forever be impressed by Nimitz decision to confer with Halsey to name his replacement. Giving command of Task Force 16 to a cruiser skipper!!!! OMG, the decision to elevate Ray Spruance must have raised some eyebrows all the way to Washington! This must have really wrinkled Adm. Pete Mitscher panty hose since he was a qualified aviator who had just commanded Hornet during the Doolittle Raid. He had to have felt being ''Passed over'' so to speak and led to his faulty decision to send Stanley Ring off on course 265 leading his flight in Parade formation that burns more fuel, especially for first time squadrons in actual combat. Between Adm. Fletchers decision to hold back a squadron of SBD to hit the ''imaginary second group'' of two carriers that Mitscher was supposedly after (to save his rep) and ''Petes'' decision to improvise his own course to send his ships' flight groups on, really highlights to me having Spruance in charge was a battle winning decision. It was Halseys staff (Cpt. Miles Browning) who put course 240 together and Mitscher must have been signaled that!!!!! What a difference Hornets flight group would have made with a coordinated attack and the second SBD squadron from Yorktown following up the strike on Soryu to sink Hiryu would have saved the Yorktown from any damage....Great shows!!
It did indeed rankle Mitscher. Perhaps two of Nimitz's biggest mistakes-- his tolerance of Mitscher and Turner. But you can't argue with the results.
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar U.S. industrial advantage was going to win the war, short term geographic advantage was just that: temporary.
I completely agree with you regarding Admiral Turner. It is a testament to Nimitz’s ability to assess people that a total mental case that was Richmond Kelly Turner, whom history indicates preformed his job successfully, was retained as commander of the overall amphibious forces during the war. Anybody else would’ve been locked up in a mental hospital.
Imagine being stuck in a life raft with Turner, Patton, and MacArthur….
@@parrot849 george WOULD have slapped them both silly and blamed monty!
Mitscher had just been promoted to Rear-Admiral. Spruance had been in the Pacific and been in combat since December 7th. He was already slated to be Chief of Staff to Nimtz. King considered Spruance the second most intelligent officer in the navy. King considered himself the most intelligent officer in the US Navy. He was not an aviator, but he apparently had learned about aviation. My understanding is that the Japanese tried to out think Spruance several times and failed. Halsey actually put the recommendation in writing. Keep in mind air power and aircraft carriers were very much new tech. The navy was still learning how to use its aircraft carriers.
@29:15 talking about the reinforcements for Midway Island in the month before the battle, I presume the 7" guns came with the Marine Defense Battalions much earlier in the year, but when exactly was that?
What was the purpose of surgical tale on the Wind Indicators? Identification?
Plugging up oil and hydraulic leaks!
@cUnauthorized History of the Pacific War Podcast .... and all this time, I thought that was what bubble gum was for !!!
It was not really discussed, but Nimitz was risking his command and his stars. Fair or not, American history is littered with Admirals and Generals that failed and were relieved. He was willing to gamble, and he won, but it could have easily gone the other way. It was mentioned that Nimitz would have gone ahead even if only two carriers were available. This is very like General US Grant. No moping or complaining about the material situation. Instead, Nimitz did the best he could with what he had. US Grant did the same in the Civil War. The 1976 movie describes it best where the acting playing Nimitz says we have a chance to push the enemy back 3000 miles. Nimitz was willing to take that chance.
Did we ever do B-25 Bombers, again, from a Carrier?
Negative.
No.
The Midway movies (both I think) stressed that in the Japanese wargames of the battle the premise is that the American Carriers will be at Pearl Harbor when the Midway attack begins. The Japanese carriers will be lying in wait for the American carriers once the air attacks on Midway are completed. In one scene Nagumo is chastising some officers because they had surprised the fleet with American carrier attacks and inflicted heavy damage. Yamamoto came in and directs that the American Carriers be based in Pearl when the attach happens, and the wargame should proceed with that assumption. Did this happen?
Also, presumably, once the anticipated reaction by the Americans occurs, the Japanese fleet would beef up their air reconnaissance well beyond what they had on the first day of the battle.
Bill responding: you can have long and laborious conversations regarding "capability" versus "probability." In wargaming, it's important to understand the most likely outcome as well as the "what if" that comes when the enemy uses its full capability.
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar Understood. However, the Japanese officers were seemingly chastised for their audacity in deviating what the plan called for in relation to American actions.
At the 40 min mark Parshall is saying that Point Luck is 360 nm from where the IJN will be sighted. And this means it will take until mid pm to steam closer to get in plane strike range. He doesn't say it, but our CVs will be spotted well before they reach strike range, unless the IJN is asleep. So, given that Nimitz ordered the CV to move closer a day or 2 earlier, IMHO, Parshall is wrong there. Nimitz put Point Luck there to be able to decide to run away and not fight at all, and let the Marines hold Midway by themselves, rather than fight a losing battle. If Yorktown isn't there, or if Zuikaku is there, or the 2 CV from the northern force are there, Nimitz intended to not commit 2 CV to fight 5 to 7 IJN CVs. Especially, if the ambush is off because the 2 US CV are too far away to make the ambush possible.
82 years ago today in the words of Raymond spruance we bushwacked them
Can you imagine the incredulity that Ernest King felt that his intelligence office HYPO asserted that Yamamoto would want to strand that much combat power in the middle of nowhere on Gooney Bird Island? At minute 54:00, `Fleet boats´, does not define the models of submarines or this age. I assume these predated the Gato, Balao, and Tench Classes of submarines as the first Gato entered service in 1941. What were these pre-war submarines besides slow and dangerous? The 1927-designed Narwhale Class could steam at 17 knots downhill, dive down to 320 feet, had two 6" deck guns (technically a cruiser), and 96 crew. Nautilus was of the Type Narwhale, other subs of this class were the USS Barracuda, USS Bass, USS Bonita, USS Argonaut, USS Dolphin, USS Cachalot, and USS Cuttlefish (source: Wikipedia.de). At the beginning of the war, there were 29 US subs in the Philipines alone. What other classes of US subs were used in WW2? The Nautilus was highly successful for its ancient development.