I think that this perspective is developed primarily from a philosophical perspective, without any real care for what the scripture says about God's nature and what He does regarding time and the future (which was Dr. Alan Rhoda's stated goal at the start of the video) but if the argument ignores that the foundation of a Christian argument must be centered on the text of scripture, it misses the point entirely of being a Christian argument. 9 Remember the former things, those of long ago; I am God, and there is no other; I am God, and there is none like me. 10 I make known the end from the beginning, from ancient times, what is still to come. I say, ‘My purpose will stand, and I will do all that I please.’ 11 From the east I summon a bird of prey; from a far-off land, a man to fulfill my purpose. What I have said, that I will bring about; what I have planned, that I will do. 12 Listen to me, you stubborn-hearted, you who are now far from my righteousness. 13 I am bringing my righteousness near, it is not far away; and my salvation will not be delayed. I will grant salvation to Zion, my splendor to Israel. Isaiah 46:9-13 God not only knows the future, He accomplishes His purposes exactly as He is pleased to do, who are we to question his ability to make wise decisions, can we instruct God? 20 But who are you, a human being, to talk back to God? “Shall what is formed say to the one who formed it, ‘Why did you make me like this?’” - Romans 9:20 1 Then the Lord spoke to Job out of the storm. He said: 2 “Who is this that obscures my plans with words without knowledge? Job 38:1-2 1 The Lord said to Job: 2 “Will the one who contends with the Almighty correct him? Let him who accuses God answer him!” Job 40:1-2 I don't say any of that to say that people who think this way are stupid, but to urge you to trust in God's wisdom above your own, even when things do not seem to make sense, He is fully in control and working out His will. For those who love God, His will is for good things for you Psalm 147:11, “The Lord takes pleasure in those who fear him, in those who hope in his steadfast love.” Zephaniah 3:17, “The Lord your God is in your midst, a mighty one who will save; he will rejoice over you with gladness.”
This is a clear and logical presentation of OT. Thank you very much. Have to disagree on the final backpedaling re importance ... the tired line "It's ok, we're all brothers regardless where one comes down on the debate." No! Full theistic determinism blasphemes God's character and it's attendant idea of a limited atonement directly attacks the Gospel. That kind of error is diabolical and can be spiritually fatal if fully embraced.
The point being made around 18:20 is what I find most compelling as an argument for Open Theism, and I was very pleased to see this highlighted, as I see it often not discussed in OT discussions and debates, and I think it’s one of the strongest points. If God can exhaustively foresee what and free will creature He created would do, and such foreknowledge in no way impedes the creature’s freedom (which is what non Open atheists affirm), then why would God choose to create a free will being He knew with certainty would sin as opposed to one whom He knew with certainty would not? (i.e. Why create Adam or Lucifer?). I’ve never seen a reasonable answer to this question, nor can I conceive of one.
I feel like Romans 9 has the most clear answer to that 22 What if God, desiring to show his wrath and to make known his power, has endured with much patience vessels of wrath prepared for destruction, 23 in order to make known the riches of his glory for vessels of mercy, which he has prepared beforehand for glory- 24 even us whom he has called, not from the Jews only but also from the Gentiles? 25 As indeed he says in Hosea, “Those who were not my people I will call ‘my people,’ and her who was not beloved I will call ‘beloved.’” 26 “And in the very place where it was said to them, ‘You are not my people,’ there they will be called ‘sons of the living God.’” God's desire was to make known His Glory, both in the punishing of people who have rejected Him of their own accord, and in the saving of those who did not love Him to begin with, in doing this the glory of His justice and Grace are shown, not to mention the glory that Christ has received because of his emptying of Himself and taking on Calvery for the sake of sinners
The Molinist can either reject the fixity of the independent or say that counterfactuals depend on our choices. The dependence theorist can reject that the future-tense story of the world contains contradictions by saying that the explanatory network only contains the outcomes of future contingents. So although this is a very interesting argument, I don't think it would be persuasive to many people.
Hi Chris. Thanks for the comment! I appreciate the push-back, but I don't think those suggestions are going to work. (1) Regarding the fixity of the independent, that factors that are explanatorily / ontologically independent of our actual choices constrain those choices is an independently plausible idea that is easy to motivate with everyday examples. It's not an easy principle to reject. If you have a counter-example to propose, I'd like to see it. Furthermore, as I pointed out in the interview, Molinism is already implicitly committed to the fixity of the independent-that's why middle knowledge limits God's pre-volitional options from all possible worlds to all "feasible" worlds. (2) If you say that middle knowledge "depends" on our choices, that requires some clarification. What sort of dependence is in view? On the one hand, if you say that it's explanatory / ontological dependence, then Molinism collapses into the so-called Dependence view. Middle knowledge loses its providential utility. Other the say that it's mere "counterfactual dependence", then Molinism collapses into theistic determinism. Mere counterfactual dependence is too weak to preserve future contingency. (3) Regarding the Dependence view and the idea that the "explanatory network" only contains the outcomes of future contingents, this ignores the fact (which I argued for) that future contingency requires a transition from an information state where the outcome is an "open question" to one where it isn't. Because those two states are mutually incompatible, the transition has to be *temporally* sequential and not merely a logical sequence. This means that the complete "story of the future" has to be built up sequentially by the actual resolution of future contingencies. It can't exist at all once from the get-go as traditional views on God's foreknowledge would have it. Anyways, thanks again, and God bless!
@@alanrhoda228 Hello Dr. Rhoda, wow I didn’t think you would respond! It is a real privilege to be able to discuss this with you. (1) I tend to agree with this, but Molinists do not. For example, Kirk MacGregor says that “any Molinist who is a presentist already rejects the fixity of the independent”. One of my Molinist friends Jeremy Kidd explicitly rejects it. Molinists such as MacGregor and Tim Stratton seem to think that the only constraints for humans are causal ones. (And of course, the constraint of not causing a contradiction.) So no, Molinism is not committed to fixity of the independent with regard to CCFs constraining human choices. They would just say “You can choose otherwise, and if you were to do so, then the relevant CCF would be (independently) different”. So MacGregor would say we have counterfactual control over CCFs (as well as aspects of the past). (2) Others, such as Justin Mooney, defend that non-brute circularity is okay here-human actions, CCFs, and God’s decrees are part of a large loop. In which case the Molinist can affirm fixity of the independent but just say that CCFs are metaphysically dependent on our choices. The human choice explains the CCF, which explains middle knowledge, which explains God’s decree, which explains the human choice. Of course, that last link is an indeterministic explanation, so free will is preserved. (3) Why can't the logical sequence contain temporal indexes? If I were a dependence theorist, my story of the future would look like this: “At time 1, contingent event 1 happens, and event 2 could either happen or fail to happen. At time 2, contingent event 2 happens because of contingent event 1”. I don’t see any problem here-that is, with affirming that certain things indeed _will_ happen but that there are other things that _could_ happen. (Isn't that what we do with the past? We say that certain things _did_ happen but that other things _could have_ happened.) If you're saying that the dependence view actually contain a contradiction, maybe you could point out an example of two contradictory beliefs that the dependence view would entail. (4) Since you asked for a counterexample, here's a possible one: Suppose I know that if I were to offer you an orange, you would freely accept it. Also suppose that I would have offered you an orange even if I did not know this fact. Then I offer you an orange because of this knowledge. Therefore my knowledge of that counterfactual explains whatever choice you make, but it still seems reasonable to think that you are free to refuse. Obviously you won't refuse, but you can. If you were to refuse, then I simply would have not known that fact, but I still would have offered it to you. This is, I think, how Molinists would think about normal free choices.
@@ChrisBandyJazz, thanks for the reply. I'll take up your four points in turn. (1) First, MacGregor et al. are conflating "counterfactual dependence" with explanatory / ontological dependence. Causal dependence is a kind of explanatory dependence. Counterfactual dependence ("If you were to chose otherwise the relevant CCFs would have had different truth values") is just a kind of necessary *correlation*. It is not an explanatory relation and so has no relevance to rebutting my argument that Molinism entails fatalism. Second, the fixity of the independent is in fact definitionally true. "Independent" simply means "*not* up to the chooser", i.e., not explanatorily downstream of the chooser's actions. Everyone agrees that there are many things that are not up to us (e.g., the laws of nature, God's creative decree, logical and mathematical truths, basic moral truths, what happened in the past, etc.). We have no say-so about such matters. There may be counterfactual relationships between some of those things and our choices (e.g., assuming theistic determinism it follows that if I had chosen otherwise then God would have decreed otherwise), but there's no explanatory or causal arrow running from our choices to those things. That's all the fixity of the independent principle says. If I have no causal power over something, either directly or indirectly, then that something is "fixed" as far as my actions are concerned. If I could by my choices causally affect whether some fact is true, then it ipso facto would not be "fixed" (for me) because it would not be "independent" of my choice. (2) Mooney's point requires conflating different kind of dependency. In particular, it relies on conflating counterfactual dependence with "metaphysical" and/or "explanatory" dependence. They are not the same thing. So-called counterfactual dependence is not a genuine type of dependence. alanrhoda.net/wordpress/2022/03/the-myth-of-counterfactual-dependence/ (3) Temporal indexing is fine, but it doesn't avoid the problem. If I am now (at t1) about to make a free choice between vanilla and chocolate ice cream, then it is now (at t1) an open question whether I choose chocolate or whether I choose vanilla. Upon making my choice (at t2) that question is now longer open but closed (or settled). So the total information state of reality changes from t1 to t2. My choice introduces new information that didn't exist before. If you insist that it's true at t1 that I (say) choose vanilla at t2 then you introduce a contradiction because then it is *both* an open question at t1 whether I choose vanilla at t2 *and* a settled question at t1 that I choose vanilla at t2. The same question can't both be open and closed (settled) at the same time. This is the sort of contradiction that the Dependence view saddles us with. (4) I don't follow your counterexample. Your hypothetical knowledge in no sense "explains" my choice. It may explain your offering me the orange, but not my response. In addition, it seems to me that you can't possibly have had that knowledge beforehand (not with absolute certainty). If I am genuinely free to accept or reject the orange, then it isn't true that I "would" accept it if offered (because I very well might not), and it isn't true that I "would" reject it if offered (because I very well might accept it). At the very least, it can't be true either way *until I make my choice*, in which case you couldn't have known it *beforehand*.
@@alanrhoda228 Thank you so much for the engagement Dr. Rhoda! Here's my response: (1) Since there is disagreement about definitions, I'll avoid using the disputed term. I think the salient question is this: are we able to perform actions such that if we were to perform them, something independent of our action (e.g., some CCF) would be different than it actually is? Some Molinists say Yes-CCFs bear necessary connections to our choices without being dependent on our choices. It seems you think such an answer is self-contradictory. So what is the contradiction? Could you point to an inconsistent set of propositions that such an answer commits us to? (2) There is nothing self-contradictory about genuine metaphysical dependence going in a loop, and at least one link in that loop being indeterministic. No conflation needed. (3) The dependence theorist rejects that future contingents are an open question and thus avoids the contradiction. You most certainly will choose vanilla, but you could choose otherwise. (4) My offer indeterministically explains your choice because it is part of the explanatory network leading up to your choice. What you say next just begs the question against Molinism. The Molinist explicitly affirms that you would freely take the orange and that you could freely refuse it.
@@ChrisBandyJazz, Re (1), you say "the salient question is this: are we able to perform actions such that if we were to perform them, something independent of our action (e.g., some CCF) would be different than it actually is?" No, that is not the salient question. To put it that way is conflate ontological/explanatory dependence with merely counterfactual "dependence". I've already addressed this at some length. Of course the Molinist should say "yes" to your question. My point is that it's irrelevant. Counterfactual dependence is not real dependence. It's merely a kind of correlation. Re (2), this is a bald assertion on your part that ignores my repeated insistence on the need for clarity wrt the kind of dependence in view. What is "metaphysical dependence"? Suppose Mooney can define that relation univocally in a way that allows for closed loops. So what? If the relation has the right properties to allow for a closed non-vicious loop between CCFs, God's decree, and human choices, then it's *too weak* (along the lines of so-called counterfactual dependence) to account for future contingency. Future contingency requires that information about the resolution of future contingents come into being as a result of the actual occurrences of those events (as the Dependence theorist rightly acknowledges). This is a kind of ontological dependence. That sort of dependence is asymmetrical or at least anti-symmetrical (plato.stanford.edu/entries/dependence-ontological/). Loops are only possible with symmetrical relations. So Mooney's idea is a non-starter. (3) You say, "the dependence theorist rejects that future contingents are an open question and thus avoids the contradiction." No, they can't avoid it that way. The Dependence theorist's whole position is that determinate information about the resolution of future contingencies is asymmetrically *posterior* to (because it depends on) the actual occurrences of those events. It follows that asymmetrically *prior* to that event it is an open question how the contingency is resolved. So the Dependence theorist can't deny the existence of the prior "open question" moment. Doing that undercuts the whole position and renders it indistinguishable from theistic determinism, which gets rid of the "open question" moment by denying future contingency altogether. So all the Dependence theorist can do is try to argue that this priority is *not* temporal but, say, merely "logical". The problem with that, as I emphasize in the video, is that the prior "open question" moment and the posterior "settled question" moment are *mutually incompatible* and so cannot both be actualized at the same temporal (or timeless) moment. Hence, I argued, the "open question" moment must be *temporally* and not merely logically prior. Re (4), you say that your "offer" (partly) explains my choice, but before you said that it was your "knowledge" of the counterfactual that (partly) explains my choice. I don't think either explains my choice *in the relevant sense*. Your knowledge might explain why you make the offer. And the offer might explain why I have such a choice to begin with. But neither explains why I make the specific choice that I do. In any case, I don't see the point of this example. How does it even begin to be a counterexample to the fixity of the independent? Above I argue that the principle is definitionally true, in which case it doesn't admit of counterexamples. But suppose we set that aside. A counterexample to the principle would need to be a case where something is *independent* (in the relevant sense) of someone's free choice and yet *not fixed* (in the relevant sense) with respect to that choice. Your initial example didn't set up any clear opposition between *independent* and *not fixed*, and so it doesn't even have the right structure to be a counterexample. Finally, you accuse me of "begging the question" against the Molinist. I disagree. Whether a question has been begged depends on the dialectical context and what one's argument is aiming at. I'm not trying to refute Molinists *on their own terms* by taking *all* of their assumptions for granted. That would be as pointless as trying to refute a radical skeptic after first conceding his entire epistemic standpoint. Rather, I'm appealing to *some* of their assumptions (e.g., future contingency), along with independently plausible ideas-such as that it can't be true that something "would" happen if it "might not"-to challenge other assumptions that they might hold. Molinists may believe that conditional excluded middle is true, but they don't get a free pass on that. It's a controversial idea that requires argument. Besides, this was supposed to be *your* counterexample to the fixity of the independent, not some hypothetical Molinist's, and you have studiously avoided identifying your own position.
As an atheist, I appreciate the approach of observing the world & making inferences about its workings. 'Traditional' Christianity often involves a divine plan, 6-day creation, etc - how does 'open theism' explain the origin & longevity of these ideas which, presumably, it regards as incorrect?
Hi Dave. Open theism per se is silent on a lot of issues. It's not a comprehensive worldview or theology. It's simply the combination of monotheism (broadly conceived) and open futurism, the idea that there is no complete, fully determinate "story of the future". The future is partly open-ended, not just from our limited perspective, but also from the proverbial "God's eye" view of things. As such, open theism is *compatible* with most of traditional Christianity, with the exception of certain traditional views concerning God's foreknowledge and providence, but it doesn't *entail* traditional Christianity or any specific form of theism (Judaism, Islam, deism, etc). Open theism per se is silent on the age of creation. As a view about divine providence it does entail that there is some sort of "divine plan", but it doesn't tell us much about what that plan is, except that, rather than writing the complete script Himself, God *wanted* an open-ended creation in which some of His creatures would be at least sometimes free to contribute in significant ways to the overall story.
There’s a chart with three options labeled “2, 3 and 4”? What happened to 1? Are there 4 choices? If only there, how about labeling them 1, 2 and 3? These concepts are already complex enough metaphysically without having to fundamentally realign my understanding of math.
3 minutes into the video he lists 4 tenets of Open Theism. #1 is theism. #1 doesn’t appear in the chart you’re referring to because of the views being considered in this video, all are theists, so there was no need to put it on the chart. The chart is intended to show where there are differences. Hope that helps.
“There is nothing new under the sun.” The heresy of open theism will be forgotten and relegated to a shameful corner of obscurity in history, and its adherents will be judged by the God they hate.
@ Like any false religion, OT fashions a god in the preference and likeness of its adherents. Their highest good is not God’s glory, but their delusion of autonomy and self-determinism, and so they attempt to rob the true God of His Divine prerogatives and attributes-namely sovereignty and free choice- and lay claim to those attributes for themselves as finite, sinful creatures. It is glaring idolatry under the guise of Christianity.
I disagree with this, as I do not see a contradiction between causal openness and an epistemically settled universe from a trans-temporal POV. I drank coffee yesterday. This is now "settled", but it doesn't mean I didn't have a choice. Whether I will drink coffee tomorrow is "unsettled" because I do not yet know what the choice will be, but if I were not limited by the arrow of time, I could perhaps see my free choice tomorrow the same way I can see the free choice I made yesterday. I agree that the Calvinists et. al are wrong, and that our libertarian free will is quite real, but to even say that God has "foreknowledge" is an anthropomorphic construction, because it assumes God's perspective is framed by time in a way similar to how we experience it. If God is omniscient, then He can see everything (akin to how we can see yesterday) in a way that doesn't impinge on our free will.
If God knows His future choices exhaustively has he any freedom to do differently? My view is that God is always free and for that reason the future is not settled, just like in the Bible.
God knows his future choices and doesn't need to choose differently because his eternal decrees or plan is perfect from eternity past. God's choices are free in the sense that they are not contingent on his creation
@@4jchan, but if you are right God is a captive of what He already decided to do. You call them “eternal decrees.” If His decrees are eternal when did he decide them?
@@garyh2100 His decrees are eternal there was no point in eternity past that He didn't decide what the decrees were. And no God is not "captive" because nothing else existed apart form Him. Again He is free in the sense He isn't contingent on anything outside of Him which includes creation. A perfect plan which He always accomplishes needs no change An all knowing God doesn't need to figure out what to do. That is what is so mind boggling
I hope that Jordan remembers his roots and remains firmly grounded in the wisdom of God and defers to Scripture and divine revelation, and does not succumb to the temptation to wander off into heresy or error. Philosophy is a gift of God, a true treasure and indeed, very exciting! But it is not a game where you can make any choices you wish to build the nicest looking or most trendy worldview. Its ouput must be constrained by the word of God. (Col 2:8)
Thank you! I am not an open theist. Dr. Rhoda’s argument did not persuade me, though I need to figure out exactly what goes wrong with his argument at the end. But I do not think open theists are heretics. My goal is to present a range of views on my channel so that people can be aware of the best arguments for and against a position.
@@TheAnalyticChristian And that is indeed a noble pursuit! I suppose I'm just wondering what self-identity the channel aspires to. On the one hand, this is a philosophy channel run by a Christian (nothing at all wrong with that!). In that case, there would be neutral discussions of the case for atheism, the case against Christianity etc. OTOH, this channel is a Christian channel which seeks to build up the body of Christ with a knowledge of philosophy and an awareness of the range and depth of philosophical ideas which have a bearing on Christian life and theology. In that case, there is no room for playing loose with error and saying (not that *you* say this!) "well shucks, I was just trying to expose people to ideas". Such an approach would be an abdication of the mission of the channel as building up the mystical body. Again, *both* such kinds of channels are noble and worthy of time! But the latter is so rare among self-styled Christian philosophy channels. I remember first encountering this channel and being relieved at the apparent embrace of the alternative mission described above, as it is so rare to find. And again, if the channel is first and foremost a philosophy channel run by someone who happens to be Christian, then I can recalibrate my expectations of the kind of "leaving it up to the viewer" which takes place. I could never imagine Paul, say, after founding a local church, being tolerant of any activity by its members of open welcoming of dangerous teaching for the purposes of education, which was also *explicitly done as a Christian enterprise* (this part is key). Would Paul say "Hey Galatians, that's great that your building up of young Christians includes neutral reviews and assessments of the circumcision party's heresy. It's good just to expose your sheep to the range of views which are out there!" That speech would never be made. The Christian teacher (whether official in the Church, or unofficial) has a duty to warn the sheep of error, and make clear the teaching of God. By contrast, the philosopher *qua philosopher* has no such burden. As I say, I suppose it depends on what this channel is trying to be.
Open Theism is what makes most sense of the Scriptures when one approaches it without any preconceived ideas. Unfortunately, the church has attributed to God attributes that are taken out context. May be it is you that has added to the Word of God things that were never intended by the authors of the Bible.
If you are trying to convert people today I wouldn't recommend using the word of god as a convincing reason. These are just a few of the many immoral verse & practices in the bible, look it up for yourselves, I am not lying. 1 Kings 20:36"Because you have not obeyed the voice of the Lord, a lion will kill you as soon as you leave me. 1 Samuel 15:3 "but kill men and women, children and infants, oxen and sheep, camels and asses. Ezekiel 35:8 "Your hills, your valleys, and your streams will be filled with the people slaughtered by the sword. Hosea 9:16"I will slaughter their beloved children" Leviticus "I will release wild animals that will kill your children and destroy your cattle." Ezekiel 9:5-7 5As I listened, he said to the others, "Follow him through the city and kill, without showing pity or compassion. 6Slaughter old men, young men and maidens, women and children, but do not touch anyone who has the mark. Begin at my sanctuary." So they began with the elders who were in front of the temple. 7Then he said to them, "Defile the temple and fill the courts with the slain. Go!" So they went out and began killing throughout the city. Leviticus 25: 44-46 (NIV) "Your male & female slaves are to come from the nations around you; from them you may buy slaves. You may also buy some of the temporary residents living among you & members of their clans born in your country, and they will become your property. You can will them to your children as inherited property & can make them slaves for life, but you must not rule over your fellow Israelites ruthlessly." Exodus 21:20-21 (NIV) "If a man beats his male or female slave with a rod and the slave dies as a direct result, he must be punished, but he is not to be punished if the slave gets up after a day or two, since the slave is his property."
@@SalemK-ty4ti often times, a lot of these scenarios are where God was choosing to act with people where they are. He didn't say "fix all your problems and then I'll help you". He was also acting inside the preexisting culture so that the people could understand and actually reason with what God was telling them. Otherwise they would have been highly confused. Before ripping me a new one, just ponder on the ideas proposed. Just think about human nature and how people receive and comprehend information.
Well it depends on what part of the Bible you read and if you try and systematize your doctrines or take them as they develop throughout scripture. For example, it seems like in Genesis God doesn’t know the future because he asks Adam where he is in the garden, etc.
Open Theism can make a biblical, philosophical, theological, practical case. Like other views, there are philosophical issues that are not found in proof texts, per se.
@Sage If someone reads what the bible actually says then you realize this is NOT an all moral god, but a god that has the same morals as ancient people. I mean we see god commanding his people to throw rocks at someone until they died because he picked up sticks on the Sabbath. There are many rules that god commands people to be stoned to death, such as a disruptive, unruly child. Let's look at how god helps his people murder everyone in Jericho(except a treasonous prostitute and her family- so we can see god didn't care if a person in Jericho was wicked since he let the wicked treasonous prostitute live) so they could steal the rightful owners land and possessions. Exodus to Joshua - the murder and genocide of Jericho. Well you have a problem here. See if murder & stealing were objectively wrong then it would always be objectively wrong to murder and steal, no exceptions. That is what an objective moral would be. But we see god doesn't have objective morals but his morals are arbitrary to his ever changing whims. For example in the book of Exodus god gives his chosen people 10 commandments - 1 of which is not to murder and another one is not to steal. Then just a few books later in Joshua, god says "he will give his people the chosen land". The problem is the rightful owners are already living there with their homes with their possessions. You would think god would buy the land from the people who are already living there, maybe give them some other place to live. Nope, god is not going to buy the rightful owners land, he isn't even going to asked them to leave. Instead he helps his chosen people steal the land from the rightful owners by murdering everyone in Jericho(except a prostitute and her family-It seems as god has no problem with prostitution, good moral values this god has). If murder and stealing are Objectively wrong god wouldn't have had all the people already living in Jericho murdered so his chosen people could steal it.
I think that this perspective is developed primarily from a philosophical perspective, without any real care for what the scripture says about God's nature and what He does regarding time and the future (which was Dr. Alan Rhoda's stated goal at the start of the video)
but if the argument ignores that the foundation of a Christian argument must be centered on the text of scripture, it misses the point entirely of being a Christian argument.
9 Remember the former things, those of long ago;
I am God, and there is no other;
I am God, and there is none like me.
10 I make known the end from the beginning,
from ancient times, what is still to come.
I say, ‘My purpose will stand,
and I will do all that I please.’
11 From the east I summon a bird of prey;
from a far-off land, a man to fulfill my purpose.
What I have said, that I will bring about;
what I have planned, that I will do.
12 Listen to me, you stubborn-hearted,
you who are now far from my righteousness.
13 I am bringing my righteousness near,
it is not far away;
and my salvation will not be delayed.
I will grant salvation to Zion,
my splendor to Israel.
Isaiah 46:9-13
God not only knows the future, He accomplishes His purposes exactly as He is pleased to do, who are we to question his ability to make wise decisions, can we instruct God?
20 But who are you, a human being, to talk back to God? “Shall what is formed say to the one who formed it, ‘Why did you make me like this?’” - Romans 9:20
1 Then the Lord spoke to Job out of the storm. He said: 2 “Who is this that obscures my plans with words without knowledge? Job 38:1-2
1 The Lord said to Job: 2 “Will the one who contends with the Almighty correct him? Let him who accuses God answer him!” Job 40:1-2
I don't say any of that to say that people who think this way are stupid, but to urge you to trust in God's wisdom above your own, even when things do not seem to make sense, He is fully in control and working out His will. For those who love God, His will is for good things for you
Psalm 147:11, “The Lord takes pleasure in those who fear him, in those who hope in his steadfast love.”
Zephaniah 3:17, “The Lord your God is in your midst, a mighty one who will save; he will rejoice over you with gladness.”
Would LOVE to see a dialogue between Rhoda and Craig on Molinism/the openness of the future
This is a clear and logical presentation of OT. Thank you very much.
Have to disagree on the final backpedaling re importance ... the tired line "It's ok, we're all brothers regardless where one comes down on the debate."
No!
Full theistic determinism blasphemes God's character and it's attendant idea of a limited atonement directly attacks the Gospel. That kind of error is diabolical and can be spiritually fatal if fully embraced.
Ten minutes in, and this is really interesting. Thanks for putting this paper on my radar.
The point being made around 18:20 is what I find most compelling as an argument for Open Theism, and I was very pleased to see this highlighted, as I see it often not discussed in OT discussions and debates, and I think it’s one of the strongest points. If God can exhaustively foresee what and free will creature He created would do, and such foreknowledge in no way impedes the creature’s freedom (which is what non Open atheists affirm), then why would God choose to create a free will being He knew with certainty would sin as opposed to one whom He knew with certainty would not? (i.e. Why create Adam or Lucifer?). I’ve never seen a reasonable answer to this question, nor can I conceive of one.
I feel like Romans 9 has the most clear answer to that
22 What if God, desiring to show his wrath and to make known his power, has endured with much patience vessels of wrath prepared for destruction, 23 in order to make known the riches of his glory for vessels of mercy, which he has prepared beforehand for glory- 24 even us whom he has called, not from the Jews only but also from the Gentiles? 25 As indeed he says in Hosea,
“Those who were not my people I will call ‘my people,’
and her who was not beloved I will call ‘beloved.’”
26 “And in the very place where it was said to them, ‘You are not my people,’
there they will be called ‘sons of the living God.’”
God's desire was to make known His Glory, both in the punishing of people who have rejected Him of their own accord, and in the saving of those who did not love Him to begin with, in doing this the glory of His justice and Grace are shown, not to mention the glory that Christ has received because of his emptying of Himself and taking on Calvery for the sake of sinners
It’s heresy. Don’t be “compelled”by heresy.
I've been looking forward to this one!
Well I am an atheist but If I were a theist, I would be an open theist. I mean it is just so obviously true
The Molinist can either reject the fixity of the independent or say that counterfactuals depend on our choices. The dependence theorist can reject that the future-tense story of the world contains contradictions by saying that the explanatory network only contains the outcomes of future contingents. So although this is a very interesting argument, I don't think it would be persuasive to many people.
Hi Chris. Thanks for the comment! I appreciate the push-back, but I don't think those suggestions are going to work.
(1) Regarding the fixity of the independent, that factors that are explanatorily / ontologically independent of our actual choices constrain those choices is an independently plausible idea that is easy to motivate with everyday examples. It's not an easy principle to reject. If you have a counter-example to propose, I'd like to see it. Furthermore, as I pointed out in the interview, Molinism is already implicitly committed to the fixity of the independent-that's why middle knowledge limits God's pre-volitional options from all possible worlds to all "feasible" worlds.
(2) If you say that middle knowledge "depends" on our choices, that requires some clarification. What sort of dependence is in view? On the one hand, if you say that it's explanatory / ontological dependence, then Molinism collapses into the so-called Dependence view. Middle knowledge loses its providential utility. Other the say that it's mere "counterfactual dependence", then Molinism collapses into theistic determinism. Mere counterfactual dependence is too weak to preserve future contingency.
(3) Regarding the Dependence view and the idea that the "explanatory network" only contains the outcomes of future contingents, this ignores the fact (which I argued for) that future contingency requires a transition from an information state where the outcome is an "open question" to one where it isn't. Because those two states are mutually incompatible, the transition has to be *temporally* sequential and not merely a logical sequence. This means that the complete "story of the future" has to be built up sequentially by the actual resolution of future contingencies. It can't exist at all once from the get-go as traditional views on God's foreknowledge would have it.
Anyways, thanks again, and God bless!
@@alanrhoda228 Hello Dr. Rhoda, wow I didn’t think you would respond! It is a real privilege to be able to discuss this with you.
(1) I tend to agree with this, but Molinists do not. For example, Kirk MacGregor says that “any Molinist who is a presentist already rejects the fixity of the independent”. One of my Molinist friends Jeremy Kidd explicitly rejects it. Molinists such as MacGregor and Tim Stratton seem to think that the only constraints for humans are causal ones. (And of course, the constraint of not causing a contradiction.) So no, Molinism is not committed to fixity of the independent with regard to CCFs constraining human choices. They would just say “You can choose otherwise, and if you were to do so, then the relevant CCF would be (independently) different”. So MacGregor would say we have counterfactual control over CCFs (as well as aspects of the past).
(2) Others, such as Justin Mooney, defend that non-brute circularity is okay here-human actions, CCFs, and God’s decrees are part of a large loop. In which case the Molinist can affirm fixity of the independent but just say that CCFs are metaphysically dependent on our choices. The human choice explains the CCF, which explains middle knowledge, which explains God’s decree, which explains the human choice. Of course, that last link is an indeterministic explanation, so free will is preserved.
(3) Why can't the logical sequence contain temporal indexes? If I were a dependence theorist, my story of the future would look like this: “At time 1, contingent event 1 happens, and event 2 could either happen or fail to happen. At time 2, contingent event 2 happens because of contingent event 1”. I don’t see any problem here-that is, with affirming that certain things indeed _will_ happen but that there are other things that _could_ happen. (Isn't that what we do with the past? We say that certain things _did_ happen but that other things _could have_ happened.) If you're saying that the dependence view actually contain a contradiction, maybe you could point out an example of two contradictory beliefs that the dependence view would entail.
(4) Since you asked for a counterexample, here's a possible one: Suppose I know that if I were to offer you an orange, you would freely accept it. Also suppose that I would have offered you an orange even if I did not know this fact. Then I offer you an orange because of this knowledge. Therefore my knowledge of that counterfactual explains whatever choice you make, but it still seems reasonable to think that you are free to refuse. Obviously you won't refuse, but you can. If you were to refuse, then I simply would have not known that fact, but I still would have offered it to you. This is, I think, how Molinists would think about normal free choices.
@@ChrisBandyJazz, thanks for the reply. I'll take up your four points in turn.
(1) First, MacGregor et al. are conflating "counterfactual dependence" with explanatory / ontological dependence. Causal dependence is a kind of explanatory dependence. Counterfactual dependence ("If you were to chose otherwise the relevant CCFs would have had different truth values") is just a kind of necessary *correlation*. It is not an explanatory relation and so has no relevance to rebutting my argument that Molinism entails fatalism.
Second, the fixity of the independent is in fact definitionally true. "Independent" simply means "*not* up to the chooser", i.e., not explanatorily downstream of the chooser's actions. Everyone agrees that there are many things that are not up to us (e.g., the laws of nature, God's creative decree, logical and mathematical truths, basic moral truths, what happened in the past, etc.). We have no say-so about such matters. There may be counterfactual relationships between some of those things and our choices (e.g., assuming theistic determinism it follows that if I had chosen otherwise then God would have decreed otherwise), but there's no explanatory or causal arrow running from our choices to those things. That's all the fixity of the independent principle says. If I have no causal power over something, either directly or indirectly, then that something is "fixed" as far as my actions are concerned. If I could by my choices causally affect whether some fact is true, then it ipso facto would not be "fixed" (for me) because it would not be "independent" of my choice.
(2) Mooney's point requires conflating different kind of dependency. In particular, it relies on conflating counterfactual dependence with "metaphysical" and/or "explanatory" dependence. They are not the same thing. So-called counterfactual dependence is not a genuine type of dependence. alanrhoda.net/wordpress/2022/03/the-myth-of-counterfactual-dependence/
(3) Temporal indexing is fine, but it doesn't avoid the problem. If I am now (at t1) about to make a free choice between vanilla and chocolate ice cream, then it is now (at t1) an open question whether I choose chocolate or whether I choose vanilla. Upon making my choice (at t2) that question is now longer open but closed (or settled). So the total information state of reality changes from t1 to t2. My choice introduces new information that didn't exist before. If you insist that it's true at t1 that I (say) choose vanilla at t2 then you introduce a contradiction because then it is *both* an open question at t1 whether I choose vanilla at t2 *and* a settled question at t1 that I choose vanilla at t2. The same question can't both be open and closed (settled) at the same time. This is the sort of contradiction that the Dependence view saddles us with.
(4) I don't follow your counterexample. Your hypothetical knowledge in no sense "explains" my choice. It may explain your offering me the orange, but not my response. In addition, it seems to me that you can't possibly have had that knowledge beforehand (not with absolute certainty). If I am genuinely free to accept or reject the orange, then it isn't true that I "would" accept it if offered (because I very well might not), and it isn't true that I "would" reject it if offered (because I very well might accept it). At the very least, it can't be true either way *until I make my choice*, in which case you couldn't have known it *beforehand*.
@@alanrhoda228 Thank you so much for the engagement Dr. Rhoda! Here's my response:
(1) Since there is disagreement about definitions, I'll avoid using the disputed term. I think the salient question is this: are we able to perform actions such that if we were to perform them, something independent of our action (e.g., some CCF) would be different than it actually is? Some Molinists say Yes-CCFs bear necessary connections to our choices without being dependent on our choices. It seems you think such an answer is self-contradictory. So what is the contradiction? Could you point to an inconsistent set of propositions that such an answer commits us to?
(2) There is nothing self-contradictory about genuine metaphysical dependence going in a loop, and at least one link in that loop being indeterministic. No conflation needed.
(3) The dependence theorist rejects that future contingents are an open question and thus avoids the contradiction. You most certainly will choose vanilla, but you could choose otherwise.
(4) My offer indeterministically explains your choice because it is part of the explanatory network leading up to your choice. What you say next just begs the question against Molinism. The Molinist explicitly affirms that you would freely take the orange and that you could freely refuse it.
@@ChrisBandyJazz,
Re (1), you say "the salient question is this: are we able to perform actions such that if we were to perform them, something independent of our action (e.g., some CCF) would be different than it actually is?"
No, that is not the salient question. To put it that way is conflate ontological/explanatory dependence with merely counterfactual "dependence". I've already addressed this at some length. Of course the Molinist should say "yes" to your question. My point is that it's irrelevant. Counterfactual dependence is not real dependence. It's merely a kind of correlation.
Re (2), this is a bald assertion on your part that ignores my repeated insistence on the need for clarity wrt the kind of dependence in view. What is "metaphysical dependence"? Suppose Mooney can define that relation univocally in a way that allows for closed loops. So what? If the relation has the right properties to allow for a closed non-vicious loop between CCFs, God's decree, and human choices, then it's *too weak* (along the lines of so-called counterfactual dependence) to account for future contingency. Future contingency requires that information about the resolution of future contingents come into being as a result of the actual occurrences of those events (as the Dependence theorist rightly acknowledges). This is a kind of ontological dependence. That sort of dependence is asymmetrical or at least anti-symmetrical (plato.stanford.edu/entries/dependence-ontological/). Loops are only possible with symmetrical relations. So Mooney's idea is a non-starter.
(3) You say, "the dependence theorist rejects that future contingents are an open question and thus avoids the contradiction." No, they can't avoid it that way. The Dependence theorist's whole position is that determinate information about the resolution of future contingencies is asymmetrically *posterior* to (because it depends on) the actual occurrences of those events. It follows that asymmetrically *prior* to that event it is an open question how the contingency is resolved. So the Dependence theorist can't deny the existence of the prior "open question" moment. Doing that undercuts the whole position and renders it indistinguishable from theistic determinism, which gets rid of the "open question" moment by denying future contingency altogether. So all the Dependence theorist can do is try to argue that this priority is *not* temporal but, say, merely "logical". The problem with that, as I emphasize in the video, is that the prior "open question" moment and the posterior "settled question" moment are *mutually incompatible* and so cannot both be actualized at the same temporal (or timeless) moment. Hence, I argued, the "open question" moment must be *temporally* and not merely logically prior.
Re (4), you say that your "offer" (partly) explains my choice, but before you said that it was your "knowledge" of the counterfactual that (partly) explains my choice. I don't think either explains my choice *in the relevant sense*. Your knowledge might explain why you make the offer. And the offer might explain why I have such a choice to begin with. But neither explains why I make the specific choice that I do. In any case, I don't see the point of this example. How does it even begin to be a counterexample to the fixity of the independent? Above I argue that the principle is definitionally true, in which case it doesn't admit of counterexamples. But suppose we set that aside. A counterexample to the principle would need to be a case where something is *independent* (in the relevant sense) of someone's free choice and yet *not fixed* (in the relevant sense) with respect to that choice. Your initial example didn't set up any clear opposition between *independent* and *not fixed*, and so it doesn't even have the right structure to be a counterexample.
Finally, you accuse me of "begging the question" against the Molinist. I disagree. Whether a question has been begged depends on the dialectical context and what one's argument is aiming at. I'm not trying to refute Molinists *on their own terms* by taking *all* of their assumptions for granted. That would be as pointless as trying to refute a radical skeptic after first conceding his entire epistemic standpoint. Rather, I'm appealing to *some* of their assumptions (e.g., future contingency), along with independently plausible ideas-such as that it can't be true that something "would" happen if it "might not"-to challenge other assumptions that they might hold. Molinists may believe that conditional excluded middle is true, but they don't get a free pass on that. It's a controversial idea that requires argument. Besides, this was supposed to be *your* counterexample to the fixity of the independent, not some hypothetical Molinist's, and you have studiously avoided identifying your own position.
As an atheist, I appreciate the approach of observing the world & making inferences about its workings.
'Traditional' Christianity often involves a divine plan, 6-day creation, etc - how does 'open theism' explain the origin & longevity of these ideas which, presumably, it regards as incorrect?
Hi Dave.
Open theism per se is silent on a lot of issues. It's not a comprehensive worldview or theology. It's simply the combination of monotheism (broadly conceived) and open futurism, the idea that there is no complete, fully determinate "story of the future". The future is partly open-ended, not just from our limited perspective, but also from the proverbial "God's eye" view of things.
As such, open theism is *compatible* with most of traditional Christianity, with the exception of certain traditional views concerning God's foreknowledge and providence, but it doesn't *entail* traditional Christianity or any specific form of theism (Judaism, Islam, deism, etc). Open theism per se is silent on the age of creation. As a view about divine providence it does entail that there is some sort of "divine plan", but it doesn't tell us much about what that plan is, except that, rather than writing the complete script Himself, God *wanted* an open-ended creation in which some of His creatures would be at least sometimes free to contribute in significant ways to the overall story.
34:35 Philip Swinson
53:39 bookmark
Very cool!
There’s a chart with three options labeled “2, 3 and 4”? What happened to 1? Are there 4 choices? If only there, how about labeling them 1, 2 and 3? These concepts are already complex enough metaphysically without having to fundamentally realign my understanding of math.
3 minutes into the video he lists 4 tenets of Open Theism. #1 is theism. #1 doesn’t appear in the chart you’re referring to because of the views being considered in this video, all are theists, so there was no need to put it on the chart. The chart is intended to show where there are differences. Hope that helps.
@@TheAnalyticChristian Yes, thank you. Now I can sleep at night.
Proud to say I am an Open Theist, Coventant Creation Preterist who loves the Lord and hate the tradition of men☝🏾🙌🏾🙏🏾
“There is nothing new under the sun.” The heresy of open theism will be forgotten and relegated to a shameful corner of obscurity in history, and its adherents will be judged by the God they hate.
Wow, such hostility and conviction. Care to share why you think OT is so diabolical?
@ Like any false religion, OT fashions a god in the preference and likeness of its adherents. Their highest good is not God’s glory, but their delusion of autonomy and self-determinism, and so they attempt to rob the true God of His Divine prerogatives and attributes-namely sovereignty and free choice- and lay claim to those attributes for themselves as finite, sinful creatures. It is glaring idolatry under the guise of Christianity.
it boils down to living theism verse dead theism...open theism is living theism, closed theism is dead theism having no life.............Willie
Molinism is just rebranded Calvinism...
From the comments it is clear that there is no single view of what Open Theism is or what the entails in relation to God's Ontology
What is that terrible and awful squeaking sound that no one bothered to correct??
@@tedfordhyde his dog if I remember. There no way to fix that
@@TheAnalyticChristian ok, thanks, brother. Thanks also for having Alan on!
I disagree with this, as I do not see a contradiction between causal openness and an epistemically settled universe from a trans-temporal POV. I drank coffee yesterday. This is now "settled", but it doesn't mean I didn't have a choice. Whether I will drink coffee tomorrow is "unsettled" because I do not yet know what the choice will be, but if I were not limited by the arrow of time, I could perhaps see my free choice tomorrow the same way I can see the free choice I made yesterday. I agree that the Calvinists et. al are wrong, and that our libertarian free will is quite real, but to even say that God has "foreknowledge" is an anthropomorphic construction, because it assumes God's perspective is framed by time in a way similar to how we experience it. If God is omniscient, then He can see everything (akin to how we can see yesterday) in a way that doesn't impinge on our free will.
If God knows His future choices exhaustively has he any freedom to do differently? My view is that God is always free and for that reason the future is not settled, just like in the Bible.
God knows his future choices and doesn't need to choose differently because his eternal decrees or plan is perfect from eternity past. God's choices are free in the sense that they are not contingent on his creation
@@4jchan, but if you are right God is a captive of what He already decided to do. You call them “eternal decrees.” If His decrees are eternal when did he decide them?
@@garyh2100 His decrees are eternal there was no point in eternity past that He didn't decide what the decrees were. And no God is not "captive" because nothing else existed apart form Him. Again He is free in the sense He isn't contingent on anything outside of Him which includes creation. A perfect plan which He always accomplishes needs no change An all knowing God doesn't need to figure out what to do. That is what is so mind boggling
I hope that Jordan remembers his roots and remains firmly grounded in the wisdom of God and defers to Scripture and divine revelation, and does not succumb to the temptation to wander off into heresy or error. Philosophy is a gift of God, a true treasure and indeed, very exciting! But it is not a game where you can make any choices you wish to build the nicest looking or most trendy worldview. Its ouput must be constrained by the word of God. (Col 2:8)
Thank you! I am not an open theist. Dr. Rhoda’s argument did not persuade me, though I need to figure out exactly what goes wrong with his argument at the end. But I do not think open theists are heretics. My goal is to present a range of views on my channel so that people can be aware of the best arguments for and against a position.
@@TheAnalyticChristian And that is indeed a noble pursuit! I suppose I'm just wondering what self-identity the channel aspires to. On the one hand, this is a philosophy channel run by a Christian (nothing at all wrong with that!). In that case, there would be neutral discussions of the case for atheism, the case against Christianity etc. OTOH, this channel is a Christian channel which seeks to build up the body of Christ with a knowledge of philosophy and an awareness of the range and depth of philosophical ideas which have a bearing on Christian life and theology. In that case, there is no room for playing loose with error and saying (not that *you* say this!) "well shucks, I was just trying to expose people to ideas". Such an approach would be an abdication of the mission of the channel as building up the mystical body.
Again, *both* such kinds of channels are noble and worthy of time! But the latter is so rare among self-styled Christian philosophy channels. I remember first encountering this channel and being relieved at the apparent embrace of the alternative mission described above, as it is so rare to find. And again, if the channel is first and foremost a philosophy channel run by someone who happens to be Christian, then I can recalibrate my expectations of the kind of "leaving it up to the viewer" which takes place. I could never imagine Paul, say, after founding a local church, being tolerant of any activity by its members of open welcoming of dangerous teaching for the purposes of education, which was also *explicitly done as a Christian enterprise* (this part is key). Would Paul say "Hey Galatians, that's great that your building up of young Christians includes neutral reviews and assessments of the circumcision party's heresy. It's good just to expose your sheep to the range of views which are out there!" That speech would never be made. The Christian teacher (whether official in the Church, or unofficial) has a duty to warn the sheep of error, and make clear the teaching of God. By contrast, the philosopher *qua philosopher* has no such burden. As I say, I suppose it depends on what this channel is trying to be.
Open Theism is what makes most sense of the Scriptures when one approaches it without any preconceived ideas. Unfortunately, the church has attributed to God attributes that are taken out context. May be it is you that has added to the Word of God things that were never intended by the authors of the Bible.
If you are trying to convert people today I wouldn't recommend using the word of god as a convincing reason. These are just a few of the many immoral verse & practices in the bible, look it up for yourselves, I am not lying.
1 Kings 20:36"Because you have not obeyed the voice of the Lord, a lion will kill you as soon as you leave me.
1 Samuel 15:3 "but kill men and women, children and infants, oxen and sheep, camels and asses.
Ezekiel 35:8 "Your hills, your valleys, and your streams will be filled with the people slaughtered by the sword.
Hosea 9:16"I will slaughter their beloved children" Leviticus "I will release wild animals that will kill your children and destroy your cattle."
Ezekiel 9:5-7 5As I listened, he said to the others, "Follow him through the city and kill, without showing pity or compassion. 6Slaughter old men, young men and maidens, women and children, but do not touch anyone who has the mark. Begin at my sanctuary." So they began with the elders who were in front of the temple. 7Then he said to them, "Defile the temple and fill the courts with the slain. Go!" So they went out and began killing throughout the city.
Leviticus 25: 44-46 (NIV) "Your male & female slaves are to come from the nations around you; from them you may buy slaves. You may also buy some of the temporary residents living among you & members of their clans born in your country, and they will become your property. You can will them to your children as inherited property & can make them slaves for life, but you must not rule over your fellow Israelites ruthlessly."
Exodus 21:20-21 (NIV) "If a man beats his male or female slave with a rod and the slave dies as a direct result, he must be punished, but he is not to be punished if the slave gets up after a day or two, since the slave is his property."
@@SalemK-ty4ti often times, a lot of these scenarios are where God was choosing to act with people where they are. He didn't say "fix all your problems and then I'll help you". He was also acting inside the preexisting culture so that the people could understand and actually reason with what God was telling them. Otherwise they would have been highly confused.
Before ripping me a new one, just ponder on the ideas proposed. Just think about human nature and how people receive and comprehend information.
Not surprising that this isn't a biblical case.
Well it depends on what part of the Bible you read and if you try and systematize your doctrines or take them as they develop throughout scripture. For example, it seems like in Genesis God doesn’t know the future because he asks Adam where he is in the garden, etc.
@Sage exactly. The God of Genesis learns.
Open Theism can make a biblical, philosophical, theological, practical case. Like other views, there are philosophical issues that are not found in proof texts, per se.
@Sage If someone reads what the bible actually says then you realize this is NOT an all moral god, but a god that has the same morals as ancient people. I mean we see god commanding his people to throw rocks at someone until they died because he picked up sticks on the Sabbath. There are many rules that god commands people to be stoned to death, such as a disruptive, unruly child.
Let's look at how god helps his people murder everyone in Jericho(except a treasonous prostitute and her family- so we can see god didn't care if a person in Jericho was wicked since he let the wicked treasonous prostitute live) so they could steal the rightful owners land and possessions.
Exodus to Joshua - the murder and genocide of Jericho.
Well you have a problem here. See if murder & stealing were objectively wrong then it would always be objectively wrong to murder and steal, no exceptions. That is what an objective moral would be. But we see god doesn't have objective morals but his morals are arbitrary to his ever changing whims. For example in the book of Exodus god gives his chosen people 10 commandments - 1 of which is not to murder and another one is not to steal. Then just a few books later in Joshua, god says "he will give his people the chosen land". The problem is the rightful owners are already living there with their homes with their possessions. You would think god would buy the land from the people who are already living there, maybe give them some other place to live. Nope, god is not going to buy the rightful owners land, he isn't even going to asked them to leave. Instead he helps his chosen people steal the land from the rightful owners by murdering everyone in Jericho(except a prostitute and her family-It seems as god has no problem with prostitution, good moral values this god has). If murder and stealing are Objectively wrong god wouldn't have had all the people already living in Jericho murdered so his chosen people could steal it.
Would LOVE to see a dialogue between Rhoda and Craig on Molinism/the openness of the future