Legacy Conversations - Marius Scheepers - OPS Firewood 1987
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- Опубліковано 12 вер 2024
- We speak to Marius Scheepers. He is an officer of the elite 32Bn, attorney, historian and author. In this episode, he tells us about OPS Firewood, 1987, the bloodiest battle of the South African Border War (1966-1989). On no other day did the SADF suffer more casualties (including wounded). This is the story of Ops Firewood as set out in Marius's book "Move the Border."
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LINKS:
Marius's article - scientiamilita...
Marius's books can be found at -
"Move the Border" at www.30degreesso...
"Striking inside Angola" www.30degreesso...
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Awesome that the story has finally come out … for years “There was never such an ops called Firewood “… Another thing to note was that the mortar teams on the 81 ratels were from 7SAI Oscar company… Corporal Steenkamp who got burnt in the ratel from charges lying at his feet was the Oscar company instructor
I was there Delta company 1 Parachute Battalion 31 October 1987 . One hell of a battle and journey to the battle and journey back to base was something else . Rest in peace my fallen brothers.
sad story: All I can say is this at age 70 and an x Batt: I did my service in 74/75, 1 Parachute Battalion. B Company Captain Hills was our company commander. We all loved him and would do anything for HIM and our mates. I have been on ops with 2 Battalion prior to this Op. All I can say is that mortars should have been more effectively utilised and also some 122mm prior to the engagement. The use of RPG7 should have been used. Lest we Forget.
Samora, Durbs and Matt Thomas. Some might remember me.
Thanks Koos.
Baie dankie vir die inligting , my broer is in ops Firewood oorlede. Ek was by Mapacha lugmag basis ten tyde van die operasie.
@Sakkie, van Rooyen, Ons is jammer vir julle verlies, dis baie sleg, Koos
Hi Sakkie was your brother Dirk Van Rooyen. I was with him at Operation Firewood and he was with me in platoon 3 . So very sorry. A magnificent soldier and fantastic young man. Extremely brave.
What an incredible body of research of the battle. Many thanks for the share Marius and Koos!
Koos/Marius, thank you gents. I was fortunate enough to have been on Firewood with 1 Para Bn. To hear the “back story” and simultaneous other incidents that took place is a real eye opener. Strangely enough, a few of us that had been together at Infanterieskool in 86, crossed paths on Firewood in 87, namely Chris Snyman and Dave Bok. All I can say, is that the drive up and down on Buffels, was no picnic. Specifically the drive-out in the dark.
@Simon Campbell-Young - We really need to hear what happened from the Bats' side, Koos
@@LegacyConversations With great pleasure Koos. I believe we spent almost three months in Angola in the lead up to firewood. We also did an Op, pre the camp attack to Ambush a FAPLA convoy. It was a busy year in 87. FYI, After Firewood, we went down to Ondangwa, and re-deployed into Angola again. On the next op, we hit a massive land mine in a Buffel, which resulted in me being shipped down to 1 Mil at end Nov 87.
@Simon, please contact me at 4xsamil@gmail.com, Koos
This was great listening. Nice to hear how a operation was planned,done and the lessons from it. That what make military history one of the greatest subjects.
Absolutely enthralling objective account of a little known battle! A complex event well researched, simplified and described. Brilliant effort Maruis, a fine contribution in understanding and honouring our combat history. Clarifies and refutes a number of misconceptions. Enjoyed both of your books. Appreciate both your and Koos effort. It is indeed enriching.
Johan Kryus was my platoon leader along side luitenant Wiese and our Captain Paul Pienaar all fought along side all us troops on the ground. Am happy to answer any questions on operation firewood.
You are welcome to contact us to tell your story, 4xsamil@gmail.com, Koos
Thank you Koos. Will be in touch.
Mr Kotze ,Mr Scheepers ..thank you!
James Hills was a major and OC of B Comp. 1 Bats in 1975/76 and an excellent soldier and para. In 76/77 the Spoorsny unit reported to Frank Bestbier for whom I have the greatest respect.
Dankie Koos and Marius. A really fascinating analysis on this operation.
Great historical account thank you Marius, thanks for the in depth detail of such a significant battle. Look forward to getting the book. Thanks Koos
Lots of facts were wrong
Caspir 33B was Steenkanp's Caspir that was left behind.
The picture with 2 x Caspirs, the front one was Blikkies Blignaut's vehicle, I recovered it.
3 x Caspirs were left behind. 2 was still burning (Botes & Rademyer) was to hot to recover and 33B
Only 2 x bodies was left behind (Note, 101Bn only lost 3 x bodies, 2 during Firewood and one in the visinity of Calueke Dam)
The Major Kruger referred to was JK, Kmdt Kruger.
I recovered the body of 2Lt Botes and Blignaut's Caspir.
I was the 101Bn group 2IC CS OB, Obie
Dit sal help as jy ons kom vertel sodat die geskiedenis reg vasgevat is, Koos
You could also said that it was the probably the first time South African lost two vehicles caputured intact. It seems that there is a relactance in thst regard to be said by whoever giving interviews.
Hi Joseph . I was there . The one Buffel was left behind as it had rolled in tank tranks right in front of my vechile . So you are correct as this vechile was left behind and in tact.
@@ewensmith6671 it is called a Tank Trap.. Deep excavations in the ground to trap vehicles during an attack. 101Bn have also encountered a lot of them during the exfiltration phase
RIP Dylan Cobbold & all those who lost their lives.
Marius's last interview ,"signals rock star" was also brilliant
Let me come in the base being attacked was a Northern Eastern command head quarter,it was in command at the time of Chief of staff Thomas Hamunyela"Nopoudyuu" Other units that came to help the headquarter were Moscow battalion, Eithgth battalion and Striking artillery unit,just to mentioned a few,8th battalion made contact probably with one of the stopper groups, and fighting started before they reached the base.What is not being said in all these interviews is that 101 lost a Caspire captured and a Buffel was Caputured as well,these vehicles reached Lubango and were photographed.And shipped out someothers knows where. Again one or probably morethan one were shot out.The base itself was not taken ,though it was entered at somepoint.
Could one draw some parallels between mobile warfare and blitzkrieg?
Thanks Marius very interesting...
Salute / Saluut.
10 Panse gestasioneer in Osikati, en was ook afgedeel aan Ruakana.....Hoop dit help
Dankie Pieter. Waardeer jou inligting. Ek sou baie meer oor julle optrede wou leer. Dalk kan jy dit met Koos bespreek?
This fiasco highlights 2 points 1.Swapo learnt the lessons of previous engagements and where ready, organised, aggressive,and capable to fight this mobile SADF force 2. This was a black day for the permanent force Rank up to the highest levels and even Special forces at that, who seem to not have learnt the lessons from '75 Sevanah onwards
till the end of the war '87
Was Swapo brighter? Is that why Sam Injoma claimed that they had the" Boors running "when he entered Windhoek
With all respect some of these rank and glamour should come clean.
Hallo, I respect your sentiments raised above. In my talk I specifically said the enemy in 1987 was not a shadow who they were in the period 1977 to 1978.
Why, do you perhaps think, the SA force had to travel 285 km into Angola to find the enemy? The reason is rather the opposite, of what you stated. In war nothing goes as planned. Firewood was also not the exception.
I dont agree Yes, the did drive up far to get a bloody nose. Not having planned for affective Fire Support etc. has nothing to do with the fog of war. They
sent troops in harms way full well knowing that it was
a gamble with the far distance, limited Air support and no Amour support against an entrenched Swapo HQ's This is not what was taught at Staff Cource and the sop was against SADF
doctrine. Maybe all available armament and aircraft was allocated to the
Cuito front and this was seen as"like going to a shopping mall" in comparison.Hence no need for artillary? In comparison with Op Savannah 36
troops lost their lives in 6 months of severe fighting in 3 battlegroups ,also against the Cubans,with inferior weapons etc.
Here 16 lost there lives in one day Now what does that say?
The statement is definitely correct in that Swapo of 1987 was a much better organized and aggressive force than the Swapo of Savannah. They were extremely ferocious and brave soldiers. How do i measure this? Please remember we as 101BN were also in Operation Modular where we fought against Fapla on 9 September and 13 September 1987. about 1 month before Firewood. There we lost 0 dead of our 904 & 901 SDK troops with only 1 of my troops with a leg wound. We eliminated in excess of 300 Faplas in the two contact's and lost 2 burnt out Caspirs. So measured agains Fapla soldiers of 1987 Swapo was woes verby. Thanks Chris
Well said
Baie dankie vir die bydrae.
Marius..you recheach is very swallow..I am am JK the 101 group leader..only my myself and James Hills can tell the truth
Kom vertel ons wat daardie dag gebeur het as. Koos