Accident Animation, Goodwell, OK
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- Опубліковано 25 лют 2013
- Animation
Head-On Collision of Two Union Pacific Freight Trains
Goodwell, Oklahoma
June 24, 2012
DCA12MR005
This animation reconstructs the sequence of events leading to the head-on collision of two Union Pacific freight trains near Goodwell, Oklahoma, which occurred on June 24, 2012, at 10:01 am local time.
The animation shows the position and speed of each train and illustrates the sequence of signals presented to both train crews, beginning at 9:56 am up until the collision at 10:01 am. Locomotive event recorder data was used to determine the position, speed and braking status for each train. The surveyed track data, consist data of both trains, and recorded signal events were also used in the animation development. The animation does not depict the weather or visibility conditions at the time of the accident. The animation includes audio.
The animation begins with an overall map showing the accident site at Goodwell, Oklahoma. The map also shows the point of departure of the westbound train (Pratt, Kansas), and the point of departure of the eastbound train (Dalhart, Texas). The animation transitions into a view showing a 10-mile length of track in the vicinity of the Goodwell siding. The North direction, scale and time are shown in the upper left hand side of the screen. The train track is oriented from southwest to northeast (from the lower left hand side of the screen to the upper right hand side of the screen) with the 2-mile long Goodwell siding in about the center of the screen. The trains are shown as arrows; the length of each arrow is scaled to the length of the train. The eastbound train, ZLAAH-22 proceeds on the track from the lower left hand side of the screen to the upper right. The westbound train, AAMMLX-22 proceeds on the track from the upper right hand side of the screen toward the lower left. Five signals are shown along the track. The eastbound train passes three of the signals before the collision, and the westbound train passes the other two signals before the accident. The animation ends with a photograph of the accident. The photograph was taken about 11 hours after the accident, and the two locomotives in the photograph had been shifted from their original post-crash positions.
Yes...a nightmare for all of us. I was a locomotive engineer for 34 years and had experience times when I was inattentive.
Everyone says the crew must’ve fallen asleep. But, the lead locomotive had an “alerter” system that requires the engineer do something every 15 seconds or else the train goes into emergency. Either he found a way to disable that (virtually impossible) or the system was nonfunctional. A decade later, and this collision is still a mystery on why it happened.
Seems to me the EB crew is fully responsible... The WB crew seemed to do everything basically proper...
Nearly four years after the collision, I remain interested in this disaster because of what I DIDN'T read in the final report, except as a brief dismissive remark -- that both the engineer and the conductor were probably asleep. The dismissive comment noted that there had been throttle and dynamic brake action, inferring that the engineer had to have been awake, but because of his eyesight problems he wasn't seeing the signals that he passed.
My unanswered question is -- can someone who is colorblind recognize whether a specific signal light is on or is darkened? Isn't aspect a valid indicator of what to do -- color or no color.
The FLASHING YELLOW certainly would've got the attention of at least one of the crewmen in the EASTBOUND train -- regardless of whether you could recognize that it was YELLOW or not.
IF THEY'D BEEN AWAKE.
I'm not sure, at least from my view and knowledge. I'm not colorblind so I really can't say. They might be able to, or might not be able to. (There are different degrees of colorblindness)
That's where certain signal designs and standards come into place. See this for signals on the North-East Corridor:
www(dot)railroadsignals(dot)us/rulebooks/amtraknec/AmtrakNECaspects.jpg
One can differentiate between the indications by color and/or the angle shown on the signal.
I am colorblind, (red/green) and although I am not on a railraod (I am just a foamer), I have learned to read the aspect by the position of the signal. Unlike a "regular" traffic signal, green is on top, red on bottom. Even though -- at times -- I have have a hard time telling them apart, I can tell by where it is, what it is.
If the engineer and/or the conductor had been awake, one or both of them would've seen the flashing yellow and acted accordingly. They didn't do a thing, THEY WERE ASLEEP -- no matter how anybody tried to sugar coat it.
Every section of track is different. With our 4 or 5 remaining railroads using track & signals installed by 100s of of now defuct railroads, there are dozens of signal types. New Mexico, Illinois, and New Jersey still have some old 1920s semaphore signals. No need to see colors for those at all. Straight up position of the arm is green, 45 degrees is a yellow, and horizontal is red. The old PRR 7 lamp is a lighted version of the semaphore. The 3 color 1 lamp targets fell out of favor, because of the color blindness issue, and no way to show an malfunction default signal of red. The old mechanical semaphore signals are nice in that gravity makes the arm fall to indicate stop should ANYTHING fail on the signal. Falling asleep, or playing cards or just f'ing off and not paying attention was/is pretty easy for train crews. It's on rails, so you don't have to steer. We are getting more and more self automated with trains now. Wholes strings of locomotives run by remote control with no personnel in them now. This is in the yards. Once a train is made up into a consist, it must be manned before it can proceed out of the yard.
And this happened at 10 AM!
I might understand late at night but, 10AM?
Months before it happened, the engineer of the eastbound train had corrective eye surgery but was complaining he couldn't see too well. Wasn't sure if he attempted to get it done right the second time or thought it would heal on its own.
+jmm2000 The engineer may have been color blind, but even assuming that he was, shouldn't he have been able to distinguish between signal lights that were on or off?
If he could, then the light(s) position(s) relative to the others, and their behavior (solid or flashing) of the lights -- in toto, the aspect of that signal -- should have told him what the rules meant for him to do.
That he could have: (1) been able to distinguish between whether light (s) were on or off, and (2) been able to see and understand the signal's aspect -- would have given him the complete benefit of the doubt!
Those things MIGHT have possible -- IF BOTH HE AND/OR THE CONDUCTOR had been ALERT. Obviously , neither of them was.
Related topic/question:
In maritime collisions, groundings, etc., the Investigations always back track from the point of an incident's occurrence to determine the location of the last possible location at which the incident could have been prevented by an action of one or both participants. I didn't get the feeling that this was done. Am I forgetting something?.
I have to say that Mr. DeWeese is absolutely correct. Red over yellow is "diverging approach" (i.e. diverge off of the main track in any case). Yellow over yellow is "approach diverging" (i.e. diverge if the power switch is set that way). It's not the same. He is also correct: the real problem is that the eastbound crew was inattentive or asleep. It's a nightmare for all of us.
Interesting, I thought red over yellow medium approach(Proceed, MEDIUM speed passing signal and through turnouts, preparing to stop at next signal.)
and yellow is a approach slow (Proceed, approaching next signal at SLOW speed.)
On UP territory a yellow over yellow aspect is an approach diverging signal. On BNSF territory it is known as an approach medium. Red over Yellow is a diverging approach.
That really does seem like the EB crew were asleep, right up until the point they pulled the e-brake. I wonder how many crews are still asleep on their way.
It's the eastbound trains crews fault that this happened. They were ignorant of the signals
Not ignorant of the signals, their brain never 'saw' the signals.
I thought only Europe suffered from different train signals between territories. But even in our mess, I think the only trains without automatic breaking (ATC) are veteran steam engines and service / shunting vehicles. Heavy trains at speed on single track shouldn't be allowed without it.
Sounds like something only Gomez Adams would have allowed into the 3rd millennium.
I've read a few comments about the engineer having eye issues leading up to the accident. My question is, was their a requirement for locomotive crews to undergo regular medical check ups to esure fitness for duty? Was there a requirement during that time for crews to declare if there was a question on their fitness?
Train engineer's vision problems led to deadly wreck (3 people died). NTSB: “the engineer suffered from glaucoma and cataracts for much of his life, and in the three years leading up to the crash, he made about 50 visits to eye doctors and underwent about a dozen procedures. He had even complained about not being able to distinguish between the red and green stop and go signals that govern train traffic”.
At the time of the accident, were loco crews required to pass regular medical examinations to ensure they were fit to conduct duties?
At that point, one has to ask why the Railroad permitted him to operate trains?
The video does show all of us how this could happen when both trains passed their last signal leaving the WB crew unaware something was wrong and the EB coming at them @65 MPH. Now how are they going to use the results to stop the next one?
Rest in peace to engineer Dan hall engineer John hall and conductor Brian stone
Imagine seeing that on the highway in the morning 🤯
Flashing yellow is diverging approach, NOT ADVANCE APPROACH, and solid yellows on top of eachother is ADVANCE APPROACH, not DIVERGING APPROACH.
so east bound was sleeping? what is final report..
thats what i think
They say " crew " but there is really only 1 employee on each train. 1 engineer who has been in taxis 12 hiurs and worked a 12 hiur shift, meaning no sleep for days
Even if the engineer couldn't read the signals, BOTH crew members are supposed to announce aloud the aspect and indication of all signals and if there is a disagreement they have to take the most restricting indication. Any signal that is blocked, dark(no aspect showing) or otherwise unreadable by the train crew, the crew must assume it is displaying the most restricting indication possible, ie: STOP!
Wow the conductor made it(of the westbound obv), he jumped off just before the collision while the train was going 20-something miles an hour
Blame the line-ups, blame the managers, blame the RR but at the end of the day the last line of defense against that collision were the humans in the cab of the engine. Railroading is much safer and more predictable than when I started 30+ years ago. The railroad lifestyle is what you signed up for and if you cannot adapt you need to choose another occupation. When PTC gets to the point where its 100% safe they won't need the people anymore and that will be a very sad day indeed.
As a former class 1 and class 2 railroad engineer i can safely and confidently state that the eastbound crew was completely at fault, their literal failure to make any change to their speed from the advance approach signal to the approach signal proves totally that they were oblivious as well as not paying attention to their signals along the route. You have to always be eyeballing the signals, you can not afford to miss even a simple advance approach one and still do nothing. This incident could totally have been prevented if the eastbounds crew was awake at the controls, my question is simple.....why did the emergency brakes not auto apply uncommanded??? Either the engineer or conductor had to have been awake and at least quickly cycling the throttle or dynamic brakes or something. An alerter is default set to activate after only 10 seconds of inactivity which would have caused that train to come to a stop well before the east end of the siding or even before the train made it past the signal at the switch entering the west end of the siding. So someone was awake just totally incoherent.
PTC was not invented yet to control brakes. Neither man was functionally 'awake'. See my comment above from experience.
June 24th, 2012
10:01 AM
MasterBear2, you are missing the point. Both Approach Diverging and Approach Medium require action from the crew, and there was none. Pending PTC, the dispatcher telling crews where they will meet would help. I believe all crews are now required to call aspects less favorable than Proceed. The silence that preceded the collision could have been a strong clue. Another approach would be to hold the signal red at the west end and east end until the crews called the dispatcher.
Thanks for the clarification. I believe there is a need to standardize the signal systems of all the railroads in this country.
I disagree... you need to know where you're operating to know more than just the signals in a particular area, grade, crossings, and control points need to be known so you as an operator aren't screaming into a switch with the brakes on fire.
I agree with you kleetus92.
Thought theres a dead man pedal to prevent runaway or emergency braking kicks in place if they run a red.
Sadly it's common practice for engineers to put something heavy on a pedal like a metal lunchbox or brick so they can sleep on long hauls due to overwork and stress
also the crew might be awake (meaning continually reset the alerter) and still SPAD, the engineer have some vision problems and the conductor, idk why he didn't catch the signals but he didn't
I kind of understand train lights but also am ignorant to them as well so from my understanding, a yellow over yellow. Shouldn't that of been a red flag for that crew because doesn't that mean you're diverting from the main line at solid yellow speed while the top also says you're staying on the main line at solid yellow speed? Or is their something I am not getting?
Caesar Seriona read the signal from the top down
The Yellow over Yellow means the train must be slowed to not exceed the speed of the diverging switch at the next signal. Each yellow aspect doesn't mean anything on its own, you have to take them together.
The signal at the track switch would have shown Red over Yellow, telling them to proceed on the diverging route at the appropriate speed and to prepare to stop at the next signal. But the train never got that far.
Automatic Train Protection is in widespread use in Europe.
Also most everyone of these videos I've watched could have been prevented by this 1980s era technology.
"De-regulation" is not always a good thing.
The French already had automatic train protection systems in 1872. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crocodile_(train_protection_system)
The French already had automatic train protection systems in 1872
IF _"The engineer of the eastbound train was unable to visually detect and correctly interpret the signals and he operated the train as if the signal aspects were green."_ why would he not use binoculars to read signals or resign his position of locomotive engineer? If a conductor was present, would he not verify signal aspects? Anyone killed?
phillyslasher Thank you. Sad that he did not jump. Yes, that was enough time to get down and get away.
Damn, but this thread is fascinating. After nearly five years, it still draws us to it.
Phillyslasher, if you'll listen again to the narration you'll hear that the westbound train plugged it TWELVE seconds before the collision,
The eastbound did it with EIGHT seconds left. But these times weren't additive, so the westbound engineer had only 12 seconds left, not TWENTY.
Although I'm not familiar with the ways out of a locomotive, It's seriously doubtful that he could've escaped -- even if his name had been Harry Houdini.
As a point of interest -- to me, at least -- all we know about the conductor who jumped is that he survived and was able to testify about the westbound's approach to disaster. I've read the report. Unless I missed something there was no mention of how he got out and off, and what condition he was in when he was found along the ROW.
Does anybody know?
I don't know the disposition of the condr who jumped but there are two ways to exit a locomotive. The front door and the back door. As far as him jumping from the loco goes...that's 50/50 as it relates to survive or die. There are stories where folks ride it out and survive and stories of those who ride it out and die. Same for jumping from the loco. Some jump and survive. Some jump and die. The hazards of riding it out are obvious. The hazards of jumping though aren't always clear to most. First, you have to hope you land on ground firm enough. God forbid you leap into a swamp or mud up to your neck. Doing this makes trouble for the second part...running away from the ensuing derailed cars that will be flying, bumbling and tumbling all over the place. But it gets worse. IF you are lucky enough to land in a good solid spot and lucky enough to avoid being crushed by the derailed freight cars flying all over the place...then you have to worry about coming in contact with the CONTENTS of those same freight cars. Lumber, chemicals (sulphuric acid, molten phenol) automobiles, automobile parts ( ie: engines/transmissions), giant steel coils...all this stuff is also chasing once you exit the loco. It's a TOUGH spot to be in for sure.
TWENTY seconds, Fritzy ol' boy, TWENTY! Your hearing apparently matches the sight of the eastbound engineer. ; ] Twenty seconds in which to jump at 30 miles per hour and land mere feet from a train that's going to end up scattering who knows where -- or face likely death. That's a hell of a crisis decision right there.
theoriginalbillholt Depending upon what I am hitting, I'd stay in the cab.
I don't know what, if any, protocol governs the setting up a of pass like this one, i.e., which train holds the main and which goes into the hole. Was the way it was mandatory, or was it at the dispatcher's discretion? For discussion's sake assume that it was the dispatcher's call and that he or she had set it up the other way, i.e., the eastbound train would go into the hole and the westbound would've held the main.
In that situation the westbound would've kept coming on at track speed (or with some mandatory slowing -- is there such a requirement???)) but in any event its crew would not have been planning to stop.
Now consider the eastbound crew's behavior. They had already ignored signal(s) requiring them to slow their train in preparation for going into the hole at the west end of the Goodwell siding. As things eventuated they still weren't paying attention because they were going 68 mph when they'd have run through a switch set to divert their train into the siding. IMO that would've derailed them and put the power (both) on the ground. -- HARD -- at 0958. Who knows what would've happened to the following cars, but it would've been UGLY -- all of it.
In this scenario, the westbound train crew would've been much closer to the eastern end of the siding but probably still would have been able to plug it in time to stop before running into the westbound on the ground -- after all, they were awake
The eastbound crew would've waked up just as they hit the ground and then been knocked out -- permanently.
What a darned shame!!
navy57 Not sure what the Reg's are these days, but years ago, Eastbound trains had priority over Westbounds. Of course, when that rule was brought about over a hundred years ago, we didn't have too many different classes of train, like Intermodal, grain, oil, container, etc. Back then there were freights or passenger, or sometimes mixed trains.Nowadays with so many different classes of trains with different priority levels, who knows anymore what gives one train higher priority over any other train. For example, even though EB usually gets priority over WB, a WB container train about to meet an EB drag freight might get priority due to the urgency that the RR places on getting those cans to destination. Could be any number of factors nowadays that affect how trains get priorities. But that's the way it used to be, was that the train with the priority (however determined) would hold the main, the inferior would take the hole.
+navy57 -- I'm Navy '67 to '72. I like your comments. Consider that the locomotives had 2-way radios. So, why weren't the Engineers talking? They both knew that they would be passing each other and that the eastbound train had Timetable Orders to go on the siding. ANOTHER MISSED ITEM: Why was the track switch in a position to allow that eastbound train to stay on the main line instead of going into the siding (hole?) Did the Dispatcher fail to align it by remote control? QUESTION for the NTSB: WHO was responsible for aligning the track switch on the west end of the siding??? Why didn't the NTSB discuss that issue in their reports?
+OhioInvestigator I can't really answer most of your questions, but I'd like to address the part about radios in the form of an observational comment.A few years back, in light of all that was happening in North America with respect to incidents and accidents, Canadian Pacific instituted a directive that the Engineer call out verbally on the radio (on the main running channel) what s/he sees the signal being displayed as s/he approaches that lit signal, as well as naming the point that s/he is passing (as a reference to CP waypoints). Whether or not the radio chatter is recorded, I don't know, but as someone who listens a lot via scanning radio, I can say that you can hear it usually 4 miles away, further if using better equipment and antennae. Where I live, CP has mostly single-track, with recently enhanced sidings, some of which are now approaching 3 miles in length. While trains are waiting on the sidings, they should be able to hear what is approaching by these signal calls. Then would be the time to either summon the approaching train by radio contact, or begin evacuating their own cab if they think the oncoming train may not be fully under control. Not sure if this sort of scenario would have prevented the incident in Goodwell, but I think that every little activity performed in the cab of a locomotive can only help alleviate boredom and help fight fatigue. Oh, and standing/waiting crews of stopped CP trains usually disembark from the cab with radios and flashlights, and perform a visual inspection as meeting/passing trains go by on the main.
+Stan Patterson STAN, good and informative comments. One has to wonder what was going on with the 2 UP crews leading up to the June 24, 2012 head-on crash. It appears there was no communication between them. BUT, the real concern I have is the track switch on the west end of the siding. Why was it aligned for the main track when that eastbound train was supposed to go on the siding? Was the track switch going to be moved remotely by a Dispatcher after the eastbound train stopped at the RED light, which it didn't? There seems to be a lot of mis-communication / lack of communication involved in the horrific Goodwell crash. Since the U.S. put a man on the Moon in July 1969, why is the U.S. railroad industry, in many ways, in the Dark Ages of technology? From my investigations over 25 years, I have found that the RR industry is just about the most bottom-line industry in our country. Meaning: Profit First, Safety Last. They could have gone to concrete ties many decades ago AND the FRA should have mandated getting rid of the wooden ties. Concrete ties are about 10 times stronger than wood and are especially important to maintain track gauge on curves---lateral force moves rails!
+OhioInvestigator Actually I believe you've dropped a minor typo there. I believe that you meant to type "Why was it (the switch at the EAST end of the siding) aligned for the main track when that WESTbound train was supposed to go on the siding?", as the animation shows that the EB was to hold the main track, and the WB was to have taken the siding. Based on whether one scenario was to have taken place against another, you do have a valid question as to how switches were aligned. While I don't have definitive answers, I can only surmise that dispatchers and controllers cannot know for sure when or which train will arrive at the meeting point first. It is a possibility that both end switches are left in the main track alignment until they (dispatchers/controllers) hear contact from one train or the other, and then make adjustments as needed. Also, sometimes the length of trains dictates which shall take the siding and which shall hold the main; sometimes this takes precedence over the old rules-of-thumb of EB trains having priority over WB trains. For example, if one is physically too long to safely fit in the siding, but the other will easily fit, then it would just make more sense to have the longer train hold the main track before passing the end switch, then let the shorter opposing train park in the siding, re-align the switch so that then the longer train can simply proceed to pass on the main and be on its' way, and then have the shorter train depart in the opposite direction from the siding. I do know that when no one is present and actually using a switch, it is generally accepted that it always be lined and locked in the normal (straight through) position. In the Goodwell case, I have no idea why both trains were not in contact with either each other or a controller, but from what little experience and knowledge that I do have, dispatchers/controllers have lots going on to draw their attention. I suppose that it is possible that one (or both) of the trains made an attempt to contact a controller, but that the controller had a bigger fire (no pun intended) to put out at the time, and was in a position to deal with new contact as soon as the more important issue had been dealt with. It is safe for the dispatcher or controller to assume that trains under his/her guidance are going to be alert and observant, and reacting prudently to the signals that face train Engineers, and that the Engineers will operate within the confines of the rules of operation, and upon encountering unusual circumstances, call in for guidance or instructions.
I find it hard to believe that the crew ignored signals. But maybe they should have mandatory check ups on engineers and conductors throughout the entire system to make sure that their meeting the requirements of the federal regulations
Anybody else notice that the NTSB showed the signals upside down (red on top)?
Railroad Signals are made this way.. Green on top and Red on Bottom..
Please, visit the GCOR on line, before commenting any further.
@@generobertson2847 that is the new ones. the old ones were like a traffic light
It does not take a major investment for railways to install technology available since the 1930's that would bring a train to a stop should it fail to respond after passing an approach signal. I guess the cost of lives lost, equipment and infrastructure destroyed is no great enough to justify such an investment.
I know this from word of mouth from my dad and other railway employees when I was young, so I might be mistaken and would welcome any feedback to the contrary.
3:21 is when my comment for signal aspects was sent. 👇
Elimination of double track with dedicated directions combined with too few employees requiring 6 hour taxi ride before their 12 hour shifts, causes employees to get no sleep and fall asleep at the controls.
The ATCS/PTC completely computer controlled no humans locomotives and control systems will prevent these disasters from ever happening again
Anyway you spin it... Human error remains the cause and effect.
Was there no radio communications with either train. Was there nothing, such as a dead man switch, to assure crew was awake and active
bogoto247 Good Question. These were modern Loco's and would have been equipped with the Alert er" system that should have stopped the train if the Engineer were asleep ??? IDK maybe there is a way to by-pass the thing.
being modernized locomotives you are correct in the Alerter system to keep the engineer's attention, but its not a complete protection to keep the engineer's or conductor's attention, you can get into a repetition to hit the alerter when it starts to let you know its trying to get your attention not sure what style would have been on these particular locomotives, one's i'm familiar with have flashing lights and a beeper that comes in beeping then goes steady light over a short time and the beep goes to a steady LOUD beep with the light before it applies the brakes
From what I understand it's possible to wake up, deactivate the beeping device, and fall right back asleep again. As you said, I'm not sure which sort of design is used on these locomotives, but I do know it's possible to sort of 'cheat the system' before it activates the brakes.
Its built that way to prevent an accidental stop in the flow of profits.
Kim O'Brien - Well, you know, the stockholders and the Board of Directors have to be kept happy.
Why not divert stopping train?
How?
Was that guy high or drunk??!?
neither..... he was most likely asleep
The engineer of 8542 East has vision problems.
Sleeping is the cause, and I am a 37 year vet. of the railroad, sad but it happens
Very
I don't think that's cab signal territory is it ?
dHidd they deids ¿ ¿
200 yards before a train passes other than a clear signal both an alam in cab will fire.Both the condr and engineer would have to push a reset buttons to turn it off.After that point the railroad might want other restrictions if they fail to respond such as emergency application of air.If my memory serves me right that streach of track just west of Dalhart to just west of guymon is the longest straight track on us railroads
Having family and aquaintances in trucking and railroading, I will say this.
Diesel fuel, though requiring higher temperatures to ignite than some other fuels, burns hotter.
Yep, more thermal energy.
I saw a collision whenever I was 12 years old before I going to amarillo
I used to live down in that area.
What is the reason for leaving that comment here? Did it require being published, regardless of where?
I deleted. Bill of Attainders were so feared by the Founding Fathers of this country that the included their use anywhere in these United States in Article I. Any "crime" in which a legal fiction is the injured party is a Bill of Attainder. Traffic tickets are also such Bills as the victim does not even exist so long as there is no damage or injury. What was once the most feared instrument of the legal US Constitution now makes us slaves to legal fictions, such as TEXAS COUNTY OKLAHOMA, STATE OF OKLAHOMA, CITY OF GOODWELL OKLAHOMA as it is impossible that they can testify to the damages claimed an Common Law insists real damages must exist. Do some research as to why the President's personal Commander in Chief's flags are in our courtrooms and one will learn real fast that false military tribunals ARE our courts and that is fraud and I fight corruption every single day. See Uniform Bonding Code Section 5.1, "Lawyer". Who are the judges? Attorneys and I rest my case.
P.s. we all should know what the damn signals mean!!!! These people were obviously exhausted and probably , due to shitty lineups, caught off gaurd when called to go to work
la doña del vídeo de franco
If this were Amtrak territory,the EB train crew would been at fault as well.Our organization requires an automatic braking system to prevent any head on collision from happening.
The east bound crea WAS at fault.
when it comes to railway safety, the US is a third world country. It's just unimaginable from a european perspective, that such an accident is not only possible, but occuring frequently on the network.
I hope they will install PTC soon.
Socialist& Democrat - What world is Spain in? Remember when (2013) a high-speed train derailed by entering a curve too fast? Speed-limiting technology was available, but not implemented at that location.
nice lie and bull crap
I've been driving semis for years . the problem is people .weather is trains planes boats semi's etc . all these companies are worried only about money an that's there bottom line . I've drove semi's tired an falling asleep before .when you tell them your tired they get pissed an tell you that you have to be there no matter what an if you can't do it they will fire you an find somebody else's that can . bottom line is they don't care on till something happens then they blame it in the driver's or engineer pilot etc an say well we didn't tell him to do that an they been doing this for years an people get hurt an people die . the boss man an women what their money an don't care till something happens.
That's it the NTSB is just a professional cover up squad. At the end of the day it's always 'human error' capitalist greed is never ever even considered as the cause. They should change the name of the Federal Railroad administration to the Railroad Federal administration.
@@kimobrien. --Never trust a capitalist.
FYI: The speed of a head on collision is not additive. Check your physics book. The combine speed is not useful information.
I disagree with the westbound train receiving a YELLOW OVER YELLOW as being an "approach diverging signal" at 10:00AM; as a YELLOW OVER YELLOW is an "approach medium" signal indication. An "approach diverging" signal should be RED OVER YELLOW.
For Union Pacific. Yellow over yellow is a Approach Diverging. Proceed prepared to advance on diverging route at prescribed speed thru turnout
@@Supercell2 can you please link to the Union Pacific signal rail operating rules? I may be interested in reading more
why? The signals are pretty clear, and every single one has its one rule and description. What they should invent is somehting like an automatic emergency, that plugs you once you pass a red signal without authority from dispatcher (this system exists in Germany). Both, Conductor and Engineer of the Z-Train failed to comply with the Rules of the Signals. Why? I don't know. But it was important for them to Die for
WB fall asleep?
I mean the whole track layout is kinda pathetic. Why not use a third switch which turns the diverging path to a dead end by default and need to be switched when the other train passed by? Apart from locomotives which should be unable to continue after passing a red indication by electronic pickups applying emergency brakes in this case, this is pretty much a no-brainer to implement which would provide much more safety
Why can't we have two tracks instead? Safety matters more than the cost!
You don't think like a railroad executive. Money always trumps safety.
unfortunatly its not that easy
accidents, collisions, and derailments happen even on a double main line. Imperfect beings living in an imperfect world shall *always* beget accidents.
Wouldn’t a train derail if the switch was going against it?! I would think the EB freight would’ve derailed!?!?
Does anyone remember the cell phone towers and the ATM's going down the night before? Think that could have possibly tripped the timing on the trains? Did anyone mention that to the boys who investigated that hell of a mess. Let's not be so quick to blame this on human error.
Why r y'all arguing over what the signals mean??!! Foamers!!! This is a tragedy! Someone lost their dad, brother, son! New technology to take someone's job is NOT the answer!!! The lineups suck!! We r overworked and nothing on any rr is predictable!!! Maybe managers and excpectially the mco's should implement common sense and preplanning into their jobs!!
overworked ?? seriously, all they do is sit there....real tough work....
If ATS (Auto Train Stop) was available for them...
The railroads reject that years ago as to expensive. Anything slowing train movement interferes with profits.
Kim O'Brien - But train wrecks don't?
Any business school will teach their students that what's important is not risk (accidents) but management of risk (accidents). Cold bloody decisions are made when safety is concerned.
Of course. After all, life is getting cheaper and cheaper. Who gives a damn if anyone lives or dies? There's plenty more of 'em come down the pike! Just look at the population stats!
A coal miner asked a coal boss, "What cost more a dead mule or a dead man?" The boss replied. "A dead mule of course. We have to buy another mule. We can always hire another man."
incidents such as these will be a thing of the past when everything becomes automated.
human error in transportation is borderline laughable.
Great world of electronics, they had less wrecks when a train had humans running it and not computors, engineer, brakeman,conductor,fireman,etc etc etc etc, give me awaving red n green lantern any day- oops, i just offened new school people.