The Third Man Argument

Meet the biggest objection to Plato's Forms!

[@justiniani3585]

2:06 Why would the form of penness have to be a pen? In Mathematics, the property of "evenness" is not an even number, it's a property shared by even numbers. The form is a universal definition and can therefore have only one instance (if there was another slightly different definition it would cease to be the same form). The objects that fit this definition are instances and there can be many of them because they can have variations but still fit the definition, e.g. 2 and 4 are different numbers but they both fit the definition of an even number, namely having a remainder of 0 when divided by 2.

[@TeacherOfPhilosophy]

I think you got it, Justinian. And I think that's part of why I think I still believe in the Forms!

[@weamhaleemi4984]

I agree but then aristotle comes in a way and says that if evenness is dependant on a specific number "0" since it is the remainder of division , then evenness is not separate from numbers themselves and thus it cannot be a form independant of the numbers.
Please refute me if im wrong i really want to understand

[@MrSerafou]

Very clear. Thanks a lot. I had a hard time trying to phrase this argument correctly. You made it way eaisier.

[@stevennurahmed5105]

The form 'pen' being perfect within the Platonic paradigm has no prior cause.

[@gavinwhelan8960]

youre a good man to take the time to put this up on youtube, fair play

[@MattHerrettMusic]

Pen-ness - hur hur hur...
One of my logic professors used to (with no sense of irony) talk about the letter P having P-ness.
I know. Childish.
Anyway, thanks! Useful stuff!

[@tedbaltz2164]

penness

[@ilkeuyankerstudent5347]

thanks for this comment because I don't feel like a creepy human being that laugh "penness" anymore

[@priyaldesai3620]

thankyou sir helped me tons

[@genesiscanngieter7380]

I actually love you. Currently doing an essay and needed help with this concept. Thank you.

[@TeacherOfPhilosophy]

Glad to help.

[@WithASideOfFries]

I LOL'd at the joke about the taxes! Well done!

[@TeacherOfPhilosophy]

Thank you.

[@michellespremich1813]

I can't thank you enough. Well done.

[@mellypjr]

Thanks a lot. It was very clear and I understood everything. I wish you could be my varsity teacher but anyway. Thanks again.

[@vishwaskhandelwal8562]

I still feel the other video was more helpful than this.

[@lucyayoub3984]

Really helpful! Thank you

[@tomrobingray]

The third man argument goes: A form must partake in itself, but a form must NOT partake in itself so we have to invent a meta-form. It is a ridiculous argument.

[@TeacherOfPhilosophy]

Awesome comment.

[@tomrobingray]

@@TeacherOfPhilosophy I didn't expect that reaction. Thank you for confirming. Very encouraging.

[@BobBob-cy9cu]

Wonderful video, I think this is the form of the explanation of the third man argument.

[@TeacherOfPhilosophy]

On the contrary, this is a concrete particular thing. You don't get to incarnate Forms in concrete particulars.
Unless you're Jesus.

[@TeacherOfPhilosophy]

But, seriously, thank you.

[@TeacherOfPhilosophy]

Did I say that about Jesus? Good for me.
"Is there something here or am I to dumb to understand what all of you talk about?"
There's probably something there, but we should be careful. Images/illustrations/analogies for the Trinity tend to break down if we take them too far.
But something weaker is probably safe--like _glimmers_ of the Trinity. I think it works as _glimmers_ !
"Form" is a technical term referring to a particular metaphysical theory from Plato.

[@TeacherOfPhilosophy]

You're ahead of most academics at least. You know something about the Bible, and you know what you don't know!

[@TeacherOfPhilosophy]

Maybe. Or maybe you should keep trying as long as you enjoy it. I don't know.

[@bigjothinks]

Thanks man!

[@tomrobingray]

While it is true that a such-ness cannot BE a this-ness, it is just as true that a this-ness, IS a such-ness. When we say X = X, the first X represents the this-ness of X and the second X represents the such-ness of X, so if we cannot equate the two then all logic falls apart. The Third Man Argument confuses being with predication on being. Once this is realized the problem just evaporates.

[@TeacherOfPhilosophy]

I don't follow. Maybe with an example of "X is X" I could follow.

[@tomrobingray]

@@TeacherOfPhilosophy If I say "a cat is a cat", the first reference to cat is a this-ness and the second is a such-ness reference. It has to be because you cannot have two this-ness references to the same thing. Similarly I can say "blue-ness is blue" because blue-ness is a this-ness reference and blue is a such-ness reference. In nether case do I have to create a super-cat-ness or a super-blue-ness to explain these statements.

[@TeacherOfPhilosophy]

But is that equating the two? Isn't "A cat is a cat" only saying that a particular cat falls into the category of things that are cats? Is that an equating?

[@tomrobingray]

@@TeacherOfPhilosophy Well exactly, but it falls within the category of cats NOT a set of cats. It is saying that a thing called a cat has the connotations of a cat, or equivalently: its this-ness = its such-ness.

[@TeacherOfPhilosophy]

But the statement "X is X" is not an equating of one X and the other X.

[@LostArchivist]

How would say a mathematical model that perfectly predicts how a given thing such as a given atom behave relate to forms and universals? Espescially considering complexity or chaos theory, this seems to describe just such things as certain classes of arrangements or relationships.

[@TeacherOfPhilosophy]

Provisional answer: Correct mathematical models _are_ universals.

[@LostArchivist]

@@TeacherOfPhilosophy I considered something like that, but there is a great cascade of implications there; espescially with how mathematics is so embedded in things and how interconnected math is with itself. You pull this one string and a galaxy smacks you in the face.
I am a scientist and an amateur Catholic apologist, so I know how much science depends on mathematics to anchor its understanding, along with philosophy.

[@TeacherOfPhilosophy]

What's the problem with a galaxy of implications?

[@LostArchivist]

@@TeacherOfPhilosophy No one is paying any attention to them.

[@LostArchivist]

@@TeacherOfPhilosophy And I don`t know how to get them to, when I do try to I usually get radio silence in response.

[@lotteg7508]

thank you, this really helped me!!!

[@MBarberfan4life]

You cannot give what you do not have. If everything is participating but nothing is unparticipated, then we haven't explained a thing. It doesn't matter if you have an infinite amount of forms or a finite amount; it would be like saying an infinite amount of box cars could move a train, but there's no engine!

[@TeacherOfPhilosophy]

Well said.
And therefore . . . what exactly? Aristotelian universals? Platonic Forms that don't participate in anything?

[@MBarberfan4life]

@@TeacherOfPhilosophy, Scholastic realism---universals exist in physical things, finite minds, and an Infinite Mind. That's my view, but of course, I would have to write a book in order to properly defend it.

[@iamthatis4]

At around 4:30 in the video, you say that Aristotle doesn't believe a universal can be substance. However, in Metaphysics Book 7 Chapter 3, he discusses whether matter or form, or both could be substance and settles on form. Wouldn't this form that he is talking about be a universal? I hope I'm not horribly misunderstanding this.

[@TeacherOfPhilosophy]

Well done! You've hit on one of the best Aristotle questions ever! I am not really an Aristotle scholar, so I can only do my best!
I believe the word here is _morpheh_ which can be translated "form" but is not the same as the word for a Platonic Form.
But that doesn't avoid the problem, does it? If the _morpheh_ is a substance, since it seems to be a universal (since the chairness _morpheh_ in two different chairs seems to be the same thing), universals would have to be substances.
It's quite a puzzle.
Apparently I don't keep any solution to the puzzle in my head! But I checked my notes, and found this solution, which I favor: Perhaps the “form” that is a substance is not really a _universal_ but is to be understood as _a particular instantiation of a universal_ and therefore an individual thing. (I think this is what Aristotle means.)
My notes also point to plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/#AriAccSub. The fourth paragraph of that section suggests this interpretation.

[@charlesboyer6623]

@@TeacherOfPhilosophy Bertrand Russell in "A History of Western Philosophy" talks about this, in a passage I just read, pp. 163-165. "A substance is a this and a universal is a such--it indicates the sort of thing and not a particular thing." Elsewhere he differentiates between a universal and Aristotle's form (which is different from Plato's Ideas) and between these terms and Aristotle's "essence." (Oops. I guess form and essence are "identical" (p.167).
Russell says, in a typical passage, "If I have failed to make Aristotle's theory of universals clear, that is (I maintain) because it is not clear. But it is certainly an advance on the theory of ideas" [of Plato]. Russell says universals present a linguistic problem that will need advances in symbolic logic before it's clarified. But Aristotle's forms actually control matter's shape but also matter's teleology. (As I understand it.) Anyway, check out Russell. He's if nothing else clear.
Also: "Forms are substantial and universals are not" (166).

[@TeacherOfPhilosophy]

Sounds good, Boyer!
Shape _and_ teleology--that sounds right! In Aristotelian hylomorphism, matter _plus_ that form makes an object, and that form is also what determines the purpose and function of the object.

[@jakelm4256]

@@charlesboyer6623Russell’s History of Western Philosophy is filled with so many errors, mischaracterizations, and straw men of other philosophers - especially Aristotle - that correcting his work would be far larger than the work itself.

[@HalTuberman]

Does Plato think that the forms have substance? I thought it had to do with intelligibility. For instance, the quality of "pen-ness" is discernible to those who understand what a pen is. The form of the pen, then, is a mere artifact of it being an intelligible thing. To me, it seems that the theory of forms makes sense when understood in this way.
The problem (as you point out) is that Plato considers the third man argument in Parmenides. If it was as simple as what I have put forward here, then you'd think Plato would have simply said that. But he didn't.

[@TeacherOfPhilosophy]

If I understand rightly, we should definitely call the Forms intelligible, and also substance. Forms are intelligible, not sensible, substance--realities known by the mind, not the body.
I think Plato has his reasons for not stating things directly. Even if the truth can be stated directly (and maybe it can't), we wouldn't learn as much. The dialogues are there to train us to be able to know the truth for ourselves--not to just have it handed to us.

[@arunjetli7909]

Thanks but Plato is explained within the Aristotelian framework that rejects infinity. Working backwards from invite gave rise a real number called zero an enigma to the west but considered real by Aryabhatta and Brahmagupta

[@mysticmouse7261]

Forms are not things

[@BRLPodcast]

This dude just wanted to say "penness" in a professional setting.

[@garbanzosteve6012]

u look like you're crying in the thumbnail

[@TeacherOfPhilosophy]

Ha! That's funny.

[@hyperduality2838]

Objective is dual to subjective, absolute is dual to relative. The words objective and absolute imply generalizations, globalization, universals, eternals or constants which are everywhere at once, they are singular in nature!
Objective forms are singular by definition! Duality is being conserved.
The conservation of duality is the 5th law of thermodynamics, energy is duality, duality is energy.
Duality refutes the third man argument of Aristotle!
Energy is dual to mass -- Einstein.
Dark energy is dual to dark matter, the universe or reality is the relationship between these two concepts, a third concept would violate energy conservation!
Positive is dual to negative, the two cancel out to give nothing! Duality!

[@arunjetli7909]

Negation of infity is zero and vice versatility therefore forms precede the real world only when the world is spatio temporal