Why would one want the forms to be self predicating? why should the form of largeness have the physical property of being large? Anyway, assuming one accepts self predication, why not allow self containment?
Personally I don’t believe this was an issue for Plato. The One is made up of all Forms so there is no infinite regress. The Form is pure, nothing can be purer than pure, you don’t need a 3rd man, but if you do, the One would qualify it pretty well.
Plato (in the form of the protagonist Socrates) does respond to this criticism in the Parmenides. He essentially argues that Forms are thoughts, and that Forms as thoughts reside in the soul. The form Large exist as a thought on the commonality of all that are large; the form Large is not a separate entity but a thought of largeness, that does not itself participate in Large. Whether this is a fair answer to the Third-Man Argument is up to the reader, but Plato, to his credit, does show a fair criticism of the Forms and provides his defense. There is a good explanation of Plato's defense of the Forms in M.F. Burnyeat's "Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed" (1982) page 20.
This critique is awful (Not a critique to you, dear content creator. Your content is great). Why should the Form be a particular instance of itself? Why should the Form of the large be itself large, rather than just the concept of largeness? I also don't think it is "canonical" to say that the Forms are intersectional properties of the particulars, otherwise, there might be different Forms, all without qualitative difference (since the properties of all Forms are the same), yet, all containing the exact same particulars. Consider it this way: 1. There are two objects, A and B, who share properties 1 and 2. 2. Why should there be two different Forms containing the exact same terms A and B, namely, 1ness and 2ness? Furthermore, Plato argues against all sensible knowledge in the Phaedo. Surely properties are sensibly communicated? So, once again, why should intersections of properties be called the Forms? Either we argue that Plato was inconsistent, or that such a problem does not exist.
What an awful accent, mister thinking man. The Earth has a different behaviour than the Moon, because is larger than the Moon and smaller than the Sun. If you think well, as you are supposed to do, there are not two exactly big or small human beings. That's why the behaviour of every single creature on planet Earth differ in respect to their summary appearance, as do the behaviour of every individual of the human race, no matter how similar they might seem. The argument may be called the third man argument, as Aristóteles called it, or the aporia of the notion of quantity. I call it the aporia of the predication, as it concerns the characterization of a given subject.
Thank you very much!! Excellent explanation!
Why would one want the forms to be self predicating? why should the form of largeness have the physical property of being large? Anyway, assuming one accepts self predication, why not allow self containment?
Personally I don’t believe this was an issue for Plato. The One is made up of all Forms so there is no infinite regress. The Form is pure, nothing can be purer than pure, you don’t need a 3rd man, but if you do, the One would qualify it pretty well.
and even there is something greater than a form already, the supreme good.
i finally understand the argument after watching this, thank you very much :)
Very helpful, thank you.
Did Plato ever respond to the third man arguement?
No
Plato (in the form of the protagonist Socrates) does respond to this criticism in the Parmenides. He essentially argues that Forms are thoughts, and that Forms as thoughts reside in the soul. The form Large exist as a thought on the commonality of all that are large; the form Large is not a separate entity but a thought of largeness, that does not itself participate in Large. Whether this is a fair answer to the Third-Man Argument is up to the reader, but Plato, to his credit, does show a fair criticism of the Forms and provides his defense. There is a good explanation of Plato's defense of the Forms in M.F. Burnyeat's "Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed" (1982) page 20.
@@danielzimmerman958 nice one ☝️
brilliant video helps a lot
This critique is awful (Not a critique to you, dear content creator. Your content is great). Why should the Form be a particular instance of itself? Why should the Form of the large be itself large, rather than just the concept of largeness? I also don't think it is "canonical" to say that the Forms are intersectional properties of the particulars, otherwise, there might be different Forms, all without qualitative difference (since the properties of all Forms are the same), yet, all containing the exact same particulars. Consider it this way:
1. There are two objects, A and B, who share properties 1 and 2.
2. Why should there be two different Forms containing the exact same terms A and B, namely, 1ness and 2ness?
Furthermore, Plato argues against all sensible knowledge in the Phaedo. Surely properties are sensibly communicated? So, once again, why should intersections of properties be called the Forms? Either we argue that Plato was inconsistent, or that such a problem does not exist.
I got so lost
What an awful accent, mister thinking man.
The Earth has a different behaviour than the Moon, because is larger than the Moon and smaller than the Sun.
If you think well, as you are supposed to do, there are not two exactly big or small human beings. That's why the behaviour of every single creature on planet Earth differ in respect to their summary appearance, as do the behaviour of every individual of the human race, no matter how similar they might seem.
The argument may be called the third man argument, as Aristóteles called it, or the aporia of the notion of quantity. I call it the aporia of the predication, as it concerns the characterization of a given subject.
Bruh what
@@thomaswest4033 Bruh, bruh. As simple as that.