Election Software

Vanessa Teague
linux.conf.au/schedule/present...
Australian elections rely increasingly on software to compute outcomes and even to record and transfer votes. Like any other software, election software can be buggy, insecure, mistakenly configured, or running on a platform not controlled by those who think they control it.
So how do Australian voters and scrutineers get evidence of the accuracy of our election results? What's the role of open source software? Should we be voting over the Internet?
Victoria has an open-source end-to-end verifiable pollsite e-voting system. NSW has a closed-source not-verifiable Internet voting system. Other states and territories have a variety of approaches. Don't even ask for the Senate counting code.
Where are our elections headed? And how can people who understand computers try to help?

[@jmcharette]

Great presentation.
Reviewing our election process to simply, seems also in order

[@fortisfortunaadiuvat9262]

PARIS -- French voters in Sunday's presidential election will use the same system that's been used for generations: paper ballots that are cast in person and counted by hand. Despite periodic calls for more flexibility or modernization, France doesn’t do mail-in voting, early voting or use voting machines en masse like the United States. Each voter is required to show a government picture ID

[@inf0stud]

To avoid a single-point of failure use government computers around the country specially loaded temporarily with a highly secure OS to receive e-votes. Not perfectly secure but much better than cardboard boxes.

[@pm71241]

I know that Australia has a geography problem, making it hard to do old style manual voting for all. - and they have ranged voting.
But... All these concerns are really not present in the Danish pen/paper election system. - AND the security is explainable to the average voter.

[@phishinfool]

Corrupt software !!