Although Dennett is most certainly a competent philosopher, he suffers from what one could call "conceptual elasticity". He has set himself the admirable task of speaking/writing in layman’s terms so that the more general audience can reap the fruits of (sometimes extremely difficult) scientific and philosophical work, but he oftentimes does so at the cost of conceptual precision. For example, his notion of an “algorithm” is so broad, that even the laws of nature fall under it, depriving it of much of its practical value. Another example is his treatment of evolutionary theory, which is based on an outdated 20th century Dawkinsian picture of ‘mutation + natural selection’, which leaves out important developments in, for example, genomics, epigenetics, ecology, symbiosis, developmental biology, horizontal gene-transfer and molecular biology - developments that severely complicate the easy-on-the-eye picture Dennett paints of the way evolution works. The principles that he abstracts from evolutionary theory and applies to other domains of thinking are a form of 'folk biology' if you will -- they are simply too broadly stated to do justice to contemporary evolutionary theory and, consequently, any subject matter he applies it to. Dennett offers a good place to start thinking, but too broad a place to end up in.
You have clearly not read Dennett's 'Darwin's Dangerous idea' where he talks extensively about genomics, epigenetics, horizontal gene-transfer and molecular biology.
Actually, I did read it. You on the other hand must have missed that Dennett pays mostly lip service to those fields and developments, which is to say lip service to the idea that some features of an evolutionary system are "undesigned". At the core, Dennett is an adaptationist who assumes that biological features (or traits, etc.) were fixated by natural selection and hence adaptive, without seriously considering alternatives to such fixation. What's worse, he has a tendency to (rather unforgivingly) go after scientists and philosophers who dare to seriously propose alternative explanations. And the strange thing is, it's not so obvious why. Some years ago, biochemist Larry Moran wondered aloud on his blog whether Dennett's faith in the central importance of adaptation in evolution was justified. Dennett responded with a lengthy letter defending his views. Here's an excerpt. "Duplication events just happen, of course, and not for any reason. The vast majority of them, we may safely suppose, disappear in a few generations or even sooner, but when they persist, it is because they get exploited and preserved for their functional roles." There's adaptationist thinking for you: 'If it persists, it must be adaptive.' This line of reasoning runs throughout his work. While in truth evolutionary theory demands no such thing. I've wondered over the years why Dennett is so preoccupied with this one aspect of evolutionary theory and has given it a primacy beyond what the theory actually demands. I've been able to come up with two explanations. The first is, that the simple assumption of adaptationism allows Dennett to armchair-speculate at will about what sort of function this or that biological feature has without getting his hands experimentally dirty or seriously consider alternatives. The second is, I believe, that he thinks that anybody who proposes alternative explanations to fixation by natural selection is motivated by the secret desire to keep mysterious what he so urgently wishes to demystify, i.e. of inventing a "skyhook". Whatever his motivations, his strong adaptationist stance strikes me as being not only based on a deep misunderstanding of what the theory of evolution allows and predicts, but also as antithetical to what science is actually about. Science isn't, or shouldn't be, in the business of vehemently shooting down alternative explanations ad hominem-style (I've yet to come across any public debate with Dennett in which he did not resort to that type of fallacy) but about ruling explanations out via careful experimentation. Yet it seems that Dennett's ego demands that he not only be right, but that others be wrong. He thrives on coming out on top (or as he calls it "skewering and roasting" his opponents) even if that is to the detriment of fair debate and open inquiry. And while I'm on a roll - where better to let slip the dogs of war than in the comments section on UA-cam? - I'd like to say one last thing about his urge to demystify. To me it seems that if Dennett cannot account for (seemingly natural) phenomena such as qualia or consciousness within any prevailing scientific framework, he dismisses them as illusory. However, when it comes to dismissing things that nevertheless appear to be ineliminably central to our lives, I believe it is far more intellectually honest to admit there exists a deep and as of yet unresolved tension between human experience and the causal network in which science tries to locate that experience, than to brush off the latter as illusory out of fear that even a little openness to unresolved mystery equals and invitation to religious, ungrounded, skyhookery nonsense. There, it's all out now. I feel much better. Suffice it to say, I'm not a fan of Dennett.
I'M BLACK BUT I LIKE WATHING THIS
Although Dennett is most certainly a competent philosopher, he suffers from what one could call "conceptual elasticity". He has set himself the admirable task of speaking/writing in layman’s terms so that the more general audience can reap the fruits of (sometimes extremely difficult) scientific and philosophical work, but he oftentimes does so at the cost of conceptual precision. For example, his notion of an “algorithm” is so broad, that even the laws of nature fall under it, depriving it of much of its practical value. Another example is his treatment of evolutionary theory, which is based on an outdated 20th century Dawkinsian picture of ‘mutation + natural selection’, which leaves out important developments in, for example, genomics, epigenetics, ecology, symbiosis, developmental biology, horizontal gene-transfer and molecular biology - developments that severely complicate the easy-on-the-eye picture Dennett paints of the way evolution works. The principles that he abstracts from evolutionary theory and applies to other domains of thinking are a form of 'folk biology' if you will -- they are simply too broadly stated to do justice to contemporary evolutionary theory and, consequently, any subject matter he applies it to. Dennett offers a good place to start thinking, but too broad a place to end up in.
Interesting opinion. I'll pay attention to it, when listening to Dennett,
You have clearly not read Dennett's 'Darwin's Dangerous idea' where he talks extensively about genomics, epigenetics, horizontal gene-transfer and molecular biology.
Actually, I did read it. You on the other hand must have missed that Dennett pays mostly lip service to those fields and developments, which is to say lip service to the idea that some features of an evolutionary system are "undesigned". At the core, Dennett is an adaptationist who assumes that biological features (or traits, etc.) were fixated by natural selection and hence adaptive, without seriously considering alternatives to such fixation. What's worse, he has a tendency to (rather unforgivingly) go after scientists and philosophers who dare to seriously propose alternative explanations. And the strange thing is, it's not so obvious why.
Some years ago, biochemist Larry Moran wondered aloud on his blog whether Dennett's faith in the central importance of adaptation in evolution was justified. Dennett responded with a lengthy letter defending his views. Here's an excerpt. "Duplication events just happen, of course, and not for any reason. The vast majority of them, we may safely suppose, disappear in a few generations or even sooner, but when they persist, it is because they get exploited and preserved for their functional roles." There's adaptationist thinking for you: 'If it persists, it must be adaptive.' This line of reasoning runs throughout his work. While in truth evolutionary theory demands no such thing.
I've wondered over the years why Dennett is so preoccupied with this one aspect of evolutionary theory and has given it a primacy beyond what the theory actually demands. I've been able to come up with two explanations. The first is, that the simple assumption of adaptationism allows Dennett to armchair-speculate at will about what sort of function this or that biological feature has without getting his hands experimentally dirty or seriously consider alternatives. The second is, I believe, that he thinks that anybody who proposes alternative explanations to fixation by natural selection is motivated by the secret desire to keep mysterious what he so urgently wishes to demystify, i.e. of inventing a "skyhook". Whatever his motivations, his strong adaptationist stance strikes me as being not only based on a deep misunderstanding of what the theory of evolution allows and predicts, but also as antithetical to what science is actually about.
Science isn't, or shouldn't be, in the business of vehemently shooting down alternative explanations ad hominem-style (I've yet to come across any public debate with Dennett in which he did not resort to that type of fallacy) but about ruling explanations out via careful experimentation. Yet it seems that Dennett's ego demands that he not only be right, but that others be wrong. He thrives on coming out on top (or as he calls it "skewering and roasting" his opponents) even if that is to the detriment of fair debate and open inquiry.
And while I'm on a roll - where better to let slip the dogs of war than in the comments section on UA-cam? - I'd like to say one last thing about his urge to demystify. To me it seems that if Dennett cannot account for (seemingly natural) phenomena such as qualia or consciousness within any prevailing scientific framework, he dismisses them as illusory. However, when it comes to dismissing things that nevertheless appear to be ineliminably central to our lives, I believe it is far more intellectually honest to admit there exists a deep and as of yet unresolved tension between human experience and the causal network in which science tries to locate that experience, than to brush off the latter as illusory out of fear that even a little openness to unresolved mystery equals and invitation to religious, ungrounded, skyhookery nonsense.
There, it's all out now. I feel much better. Suffice it to say, I'm not a fan of Dennett.
@borjon23 Just felt like committing some mindless slander.
LOL
@borjon23 Explain yourself, sir or ma'am.