I'm thinking that the paradox only happens when you say that the murdering has already happened, or when you say that the murdering is definitely going to happen. As long as the murdering has not yet happened, or nobody has committed to do any murdering, then you don't get the paradox.
(I'm using [ ] either in the same vein as in mathematics/logic or for emphasis.) Let me restate the statement of the paradox: Smith murders Jones implies that Smith should murder Jones gently, which in turn implies that Smith should murder Jones - Smith should murder Jones [under the condition that] Smith murders Jones. I interpret "Smith murders Jones" as "it is an immutable fact that Smith would murder Jones". With this interpretation, this paradox seems to be just a "bug" of the deontological system, as [under the condition that] it is already "set in stone" that Smith would murder Jones, "Smith should murder Jones" seems to suggest nothing of what Smith should do (under the condition). That is, once we are in a possible world where the murder necessarily occurs, the question of whether Smith should murder Jones could be interpreted as meaningless/nonsensical, in which case the system "bugs out" and outputs that "Smith should murder Jones". This is similar to that everything is true under the condition of an impossibility. Also, the statement of the kind "should do [X in the manner of Y]" is clearly ambiguous. E.g. "you should eat slowly" in a daily life context usually (and not always) means "while you are eating, you should eat slowly", rather than "you should eat and you should eat slowly". Similarly, "you should kill gently" could mean "under the condition that you must kill, you should be gentle with the killing" or "you should kill and you should be gentle with the killing", and if we interpret it as the former, then it does not imply that "you should kill", since the former only says that "you should be gentle with the killing if you kill". I fail to see at least for the moment why this paradox is very meaningful.
I think that if you unpack "should" then the paradox goes away. 1. If P then should P gently. 2. If should P gently then should P. 3. P. Therefore P then should P. In 1., "should" can mean "it is less wrong" or "it would be better for Smith". It seems to me that 2. is where the issue is, because if it is better that P gently, it is not better that P. So, I deny the claim that "should" is transitive in the way that the principle claims. Waiting for your next video to see if my reasoning is off.
▪️ 1) Smith shouldn't murder Jones. 2) If Smith does murder Jones, He should do it gently. Part 1 has the word SHOULDN'T. Part 2 has the word SHOULD. So one goes from saying DON'T - to DO. 🟥
this is a very liberal way of thinking. this way of thinking is what is allowing people to justify anything and everything. here a thought. everybody be normal people. its really not that hard. critically think. stop going in circles into random and pointless theories which can all be dismissed by a slightly logical 8 year old. think critically and leave all this paradox bullshit to the side. there are many more things you could be doing g.
Yeah but thinking critically involves generating counterexamples, thinking about edge cases, considering whether a principle that seems like a good idea actually is one. I agree that this paradox is not quite right, but that's really the whole point here. Philosophy often consists of examining an idea against everything else we understand and believe and seeing if it squares. The existence of this paradox proves that something about the logic here doesn't square. In other words, it's being used to think critically and "be normal" and virtuous. But getting to the right idea often necessarily involves navigating through all the twists and turns of logic to understand what idea actually makes the most sense, and equally importantly, why that idea makes sense.
I'm thinking that the paradox only happens when you say that the murdering has already happened, or when you say that the murdering is definitely going to happen. As long as the murdering has not yet happened, or nobody has committed to do any murdering, then you don't get the paradox.
(I'm using [ ] either in the same vein as in mathematics/logic or for emphasis.)
Let me restate the statement of the paradox: Smith murders Jones implies that Smith should murder Jones gently, which in turn implies that Smith should murder Jones - Smith should murder Jones [under the condition that] Smith murders Jones.
I interpret "Smith murders Jones" as "it is an immutable fact that Smith would murder Jones". With this interpretation, this paradox seems to be just a "bug" of the deontological system, as [under the condition that] it is already "set in stone" that Smith would murder Jones, "Smith should murder Jones" seems to suggest nothing of what Smith should do (under the condition). That is, once we are in a possible world where the murder necessarily occurs, the question of whether Smith should murder Jones could be interpreted as meaningless/nonsensical, in which case the system "bugs out" and outputs that "Smith should murder Jones". This is similar to that everything is true under the condition of an impossibility.
Also, the statement of the kind "should do [X in the manner of Y]" is clearly ambiguous. E.g. "you should eat slowly" in a daily life context usually (and not always) means "while you are eating, you should eat slowly", rather than "you should eat and you should eat slowly". Similarly, "you should kill gently" could mean "under the condition that you must kill, you should be gentle with the killing" or "you should kill and you should be gentle with the killing", and if we interpret it as the former, then it does not imply that "you should kill", since the former only says that "you should be gentle with the killing if you kill".
I fail to see at least for the moment why this paradox is very meaningful.
I think that if you unpack "should" then the paradox goes away.
1. If P then should P gently.
2. If should P gently then should P.
3. P.
Therefore P then should P.
In 1., "should" can mean "it is less wrong" or "it would be better for Smith".
It seems to me that 2. is where the issue is, because if it is better that P gently, it is not better that P.
So, I deny the claim that "should" is transitive in the way that the principle claims.
Waiting for your next video to see if my reasoning is off.
"anything that does happen, should happen"
I still don’t get it after reading some comments…
I don't get it
▪️
1) Smith shouldn't murder Jones.
2) If Smith does murder Jones, He should do it gently.
Part 1 has the word SHOULDN'T.
Part 2 has the word SHOULD.
So one goes from saying DON'T - to DO.
🟥
this is a very liberal way of thinking. this way of thinking is what is allowing people to justify anything and everything. here a thought. everybody be normal people. its really not that hard. critically think. stop going in circles into random and pointless theories which can all be dismissed by a slightly logical 8 year old. think critically and leave all this paradox bullshit to the side. there are many more things you could be doing g.
Yeah but thinking critically involves generating counterexamples, thinking about edge cases, considering whether a principle that seems like a good idea actually is one. I agree that this paradox is not quite right, but that's really the whole point here. Philosophy often consists of examining an idea against everything else we understand and believe and seeing if it squares. The existence of this paradox proves that something about the logic here doesn't square. In other words, it's being used to think critically and "be normal" and virtuous. But getting to the right idea often necessarily involves navigating through all the twists and turns of logic to understand what idea actually makes the most sense, and equally importantly, why that idea makes sense.