Schiphol airport is 4 m (13 feet) under mean sea level, so it is possible to attain -8 feet. Source: www.schiphol.nl/nl/jij-en-schiphol/pagina/luchthavenfeitjes/
I've read the accident report in the past -- over 200 information dense pages. There's a lot of work involved in reading and analyzing aviation reports and condensing them into 15 minute videos. Great job, sir!
They simply could have disconnected the auto pilot and land it manually, 9 lives could have been with us today Bad bad bad captain mistake He knew he has a problem especially the left auto pilot didn’t engage, so simple this happens every day Fly the plane manual
To answer your question on the 37 Max. If Boeing would have set it to be a double redundant system then it would have required more scrutiny from the FAA (So more time to get an approval) and simulator training for transitioning pilots. Since they were trying to avoid both to cut costs the decided not to do it. Boeing put profits ahead of safety.
It's sort of like training people who drive tanker trucks that haul milk to haul around gasoline or propane with an iPad and acting like you're not responsible when they level a city block because of static electricity or a tool spark etc. Boeing unfortunately inherited the profits-before-people mentality of McDonnell Douglas in the merger and the Max is just the latest in a series of safety bulletins and airworthiness directives that came about because people died due to business decisions. We had a Boeing campus here in Wichita along with Textron and Bombardier Learjet until 2008ish when they spun off subassembly to a wholly owned subsidiary [Spirit Aerosystems] to get rid of existing union contracts.
That's spot on. Any system that is deemed to warrant redundancy, automatically results in additional FAA certification requirements, as well as further training. Boeing basically wanted to match the newest A320 which didn't require additional training, and this was a major selling point for airlines. They took shortcuts on safety to ensure they get the sales that were otherwise heading to Airbus, and we can only hope that the heavy price of their decisions will cause them to think twice in the future on matters of aviation safety.
Back in 1972 the 'Windsor Incident' showed that there were risks of potentially-fatal hull-ruptures on the new DC-10s that could have been reduced or eliminated by the retrofitting of pressure-equalisation vents in the cabin-floors. The consequent production holdups were a threat to McConnell-Douglas's sales, so they fixed it with the FAA to take their time over the work. When a fully-loaded DC-10 jet was lost early in 1974, with 346 people turned mostly into mincemeat, the cause was loss of control consequent to hull damage resulting from depressurisation (in a plane that had been modified).
@@None-zc5vg while that DC-10 was modified, it didn't have all of the modifications recommended by the NTSB. The cargo door locks had been changed, however some time in between when the DC-10 left MD's manufacturing plant and the crash, the locking pins were modified again. That DC-10 also didn't have the floor holes to prevent the floor from collapsing during sudden decompression, which would sever the control cables to the tail control surfaces.
The pilots forgot the basic rules of flight, you always fly the plane first, aviate first if there is a problem with the automation system disconnect it and fly the aircraft then navigate to where it is you need to be then communicate. If they followed this basic rule the outcome would have been a safe landing.
Clearly you have never flown an aircraft . You think it’s that easy to analyze everything . You think you can read all yo instruments in a second . Mate they reacted faster than average
@@SizzlyPK I never said anything about it being easy but I have a multi certificate for commercial and private aircraft I am also retired now but I also have been trained on multi engine turbine aircraft and have over 12000 hours in both turbine and piston engine aircraft. So I have some ideas on what to do when things are not going to plan and we used to train for these types of events and almost every single one you are taught to first fly the plane and once you are in stable flight then you can work on whatever you need to do to resolve the problem 😉 to tell you the truth I always checked and rechecked the automation because I once had an issue with it and never really trusted it 100 percent after. It only takes a few seconds to verify that everything is going to plan and also having a copilot sitting next to me to verify that everything is operating correctly and or not is very useful 🙂.
I retired from this plane and saw this glitch a few times. Just a minor inconvenience. This crash is yet another sad example of pilots who should not have been there. Too unskilled to fly their planes with out all of the automation working. This isn't fair to the passengers, they buy a ticket, not a chance.
@rob737700 - I disagree. This is an example of how things can go wrong if they are not managed properly. It is also an example of how useless an untrained “safety” pilot is.
@@Trevor_Austin Well, sir, I believe there should be more flying going on instead of managing. Basic piloting skills are just too lacking these days. Pilots are struggling with their automation all they way to impact. Sad times..
I did not even watch the movie as i know the case so well.. When it happened within halve a day i had my conclusion which (appart from the political correctness bullshit) almost was the same as the official report a year later. If four pilots are not able to do what every hobby pilots does as general practice then they should stay on the ground. Much saver for them. I fully agree with Rob !!!
Huge mistake by the captain taking control at such a critical moment. The FO was doing the right things and if the captain had just continued to monitor and tell him what to do (eg. call go-around) they'd likely have missed the ground.
That is correct. The FO increased power and pushed the nose down, but the Captain took over control at he most critical moment, the throttle returned automatically to idle and whatever time they had left to recover from the stall evaporated. There were a series of other mistakes too ( for example they failed to monitor their speed), missed opportunities to diagnose the problem (the landing gear warning horn,the speed brake warning, the autopilot disconnect alarm etc.) but one thing is certain: the failure of a single antenna can't bring a plane down.
@@Trevor_Austin I agree that that's not human nature, but flying is not a natural situation. Hence the training. I saw another accident report recently, late take-off abort and ran off the end of the runway, where the Captain (PM) restrained that urge and just did the PM job. Everyone survived. If he'd taken over it would have been much worse.
@@mikes4163 Not sure what value these anecdotal stories add to this. There's been many emergencies where a captain have taken over and saved the plane as well. People make split second decisions in an emergencies, sometimes they are right, sometimes they are not. It's very much hindsight to blame a pilot for such a decision in retrospective.
3 professional pilots fail to monitor airspeed and they crash Day VFR When they knew the RA was inop they should have turned off the AP . Plane still flies perfectly without the RA.
Their is too much relying on the automation. When time comes to manually fly no one is wants too. Too much automation and very little hand flying capabilities.
@@portanav true. In this one pilots were not monitoring their air speed which is crucial for landings. So it wasn't only Antenna problem that crashed the plane
@Fidd88 The three causes you gave were, in my opinion Wrong, wrong and contributory. 1. We have no information anywhere to suggest these pilots were badly trained. They behaved as most normal pilots would and that is sort the problem or and get the job done. Overcoming the urge to get the job done and meet the schedule is very difficult to train out of pilots. I’ll suggest this airline’s training was as good as most. We also have to accept there were three pilots on this flight deck. The third pilot, an F/O was there as a “safety pilot.” These poor sods are placed there without training, with little authority and are sucked into the loop of trouble shooting. 2. We have no information anywhere to suggest these pilots were not current at hand flying. The RHS was an ex-airforce Phantom pilot with 2,000 hours. I’ll suggest he was very proficient at hand flying. What this guy didn’t expect was that when he advanced the thrust lever during the approach it would retard again. 3. This was an old fashioned 737 with 30 year old autothrottle design, hardly modern FBW. The undocumented traps were 1. RadAlt1 always drives the autothrottle. Boeing’s AOM’s did not state this as the time. 2. RETARD as an announciation on the PFD can be for two reasons a) Flight Idle selected to achieve preselected speed and b) Flight Idle selected as part of the Flare logic in the autoland. As a pilot you don’t know what is causing flight idle. Bear in mind they were intercepting the GS from above. Another design flaw present in virtually every aircraft is the nose-up trimming when the aircraft is flying a vertical mode but flying below selected speed. The only reason for this is to keep the autopilot engaged. Why? The scourges of modern airline flying are crap Flight Operations departments and pathetic, timid training departments full of prima-donnas who believe only they can fly. They demonstrate this with absurd SOP’s, reams of pointless notes, extra items checklists, ridiculous bloated briefings and stipulations that the automatics must be used to their fullest extent and punitive action for anything found “undesirable” on FDR’s. Flush these out and replace them with pragmatic pilots and we might have a chance.
As I watch these videos, one of the most "baffling" aspects is the failure to FLY THE PLANE!!! EVERY pilot KNOWS fly the damn plane. So why are so many pilots NOT flying the plane? This was an easy fix, turn off the damn outopilot and hand fly. Why 3 experienced pilots, no one could hand fly?????? STUPID yes, I am an instrument rated pilot.
I am a nervous flier. A very nervous flyer. If I fall asleep the plane will crash, my wakefulness is keeping that lump of old iron aloft. Am 100% with your comment. With emphasis, FLY the FUCKING PLANE! The basic flight systems RARELY EVER fail, y'know, up-down, left right, throttle, human EYESIGHT. Hoary old joke: "Flying scares shit out of me!" Seasoned air traveller, "Man, when yr number's up it's up." Me, "What if I'm onth plane and th pilot's number is up?"
@@ylstorage7085 You could use aircraft style autopilots You'll need to maintain 1 mile distance between cars front and back and 1000 feet between lanes. And only have one or two parking areas per city - maybe call them carports. And we'll have to straighten all the roads they are supposed to use so they run at compass directions between carports.
Good on TA for the 1000' policy. That is straight "safety over money" thinking. Bad on pilots for ignoring it. They were "that guy" in the left lane of a crowded 8-lane freeway who tries to get across to his exit in 1/4 mile instead of just going to the next exit.
Just a point to add as I think it was missed. The reason CMD A wouldn’t engage was because the FO accidentally tried to engage the autopilot first instead of pressing approach first which is needed to be done in order to have dual coupling. Because the pilot was essentially just switching from 1 autopilot to the other and because of the faulty RA, CMD A wouldn’t activate. FO reconnected CMD B but didn’t reattempt to connect CMD A. Not sure if it would have actually worked anyway
About the dual aoa sensor software, as far as I know: that is the obvious and safe choice however then the system would be flagged as safety critical in the documentation and would require extra training and certification which they wanted to avoid.
The problem was NOT that there was no comparator (or redundancy) it was that RadAlt No. 1 ALWAYS drives the Autothrottles no matter which autopilot is engaged. This was ‘feature” not documented.
IIRC the MAX also hat the ability to actually display a warning when both AOA-sensor-readouts didn't match up. But it was an optional feature that airlines had to pay extra for.
@@brkr78 an how does AOA-Disgagree indicator information help? Is there a system linked to only one AOA-sensor that behaves as automatic antistall using the trimming? Boeing still denies that. The Boeing 747 does not have an anti stall system linked to the AOA Sensor that autotrims the plane out of stall. MCAS is totally not an anti-stall system and pilot totally do not need to know, that MCAS is trimming their plane, because that totally only happens in certain flight configurations.
@@MisterFribble I assume because if your a little low, you could probably push it forward a bit, then have it return. Or it could be so that you don't accidentally bump it.
I am a retired airline captain with many hours in the 737 and it’s many variants. In order to disengage the autothrottles you had to press a button on the side of the throttle handle. If you didn’t do that, yes, you could overpower the servo and move the throttles forward but that wouldn’t make much sense when all you had to do was press the button.
@@MisterFribble It is like cruise control.. If you want to pass someone on cruise control you can either push a button to accelerate, or override that by stomping on the gas peddle. Neither disconnects the cruise, as soon as you take your foot off the peddle, the car will "resume" the speed it was set to originally. The only way to get a car off cruise is to either hit the brake, or disengage it with the switch. Auto throttle works much the same way, if you need a blip of power, you manually throttle up, then you can forget about it, and auto throttle will "resume" To disengage auto throttle, you have to press the auto throttle button, until the light goes off.
So long as it remains allowable to sacrifice lives for profit, there will be crashes like this and many other lives lost if more money was simply spent to do the things we know make things safer, not just in aviation, but seemingly in nearly everything these days.
"Adding more redundancy saves lives ... Do you think we've learned from our mistakes?" Clearly, Boeing hasn't. But at least we can trust Airbu- oh, they're developing a single-pilot A350. These companies don't give a shit about our lives, just our money.
The aircraft won’t be flown by a single pilot from takeoff to landing. There will be 2 pilots onboard and both will be up front for takeoff, climb, descent, approach and landing. It’s only during long cruise where one pilot will then go and rest, the other will monitor
@@tomstravels520 That absolutely does not instill any fit of confidence whatsoever. Is what you said supposed to be comforting or making it any better? Simply because "the most dangerous parts of flying is just taking off and landing guys, so its perfectly fine and okay during cruise"
I really enjoy your summaries of these accidents. They provide the non flying population with an easy to understand explanation of the events that transpired while being very entertaining and providing a glimpse into the world of aviation and the inner workings of the individual aircraft involved. Very interesting and fun to watch. Keep up the great work its appreciated! I always look forward to new videos from your channel. Take care and best wishes.
great video as usual i really love your narration style and your voice is really soothing(maybe just me?) your stuff is great and entertaining i just wanted to say thanks for making such great videos
At that speed and altitude the landing gear wouldn’t make much difference to the drag. I’d leave it down to cushion the impact of it were to happen. That’s why on a go around you wait until you have positive rate of climb before raising the gear, not as soon as you increase power
Regarding the 737 Max, I remember doing a deep dive on it when it happened. If I'm remembering correctly, they do use redundancy for the AoA sensors almost everywhere on the aircraft. Indeed, I think FAA regulations demand it. However from recollection the MCAS was developed initially for a USAF aircraft and didn't have redundancy. So they took that system without modifying it for redundancy and that became the MCAS we all know and... know? I'm vaguely recalling that the USAF aircraft couldn't use redundancy for some reason, possibly because the AoA sensor was moved or removed, possibly for another reason? But my memory isn't good enough to know for sure. And it may be FAA regulations demanding they couldn't modify the MCAS already in use without testing everything again somewhere along that story. Likely time constraints competing against the A320NEO played a role. Anyway there was a real reason for lacking redundant AoA sensors, albeit a bad one.
Money. I mean they moved the engines forward and put in software to mitigate without telling pilots. All so they didn't have to recertify it as a new airframe. The gov let them and Boeing is going to pay a lot more than just fucking penalties on contracts and licensing fees.
Great analysis. Sadly another case of Increasing dependancy in automation with less frequent hand flying. Procedurally drilled out of instinctive flying situational awareness.
B737s sure have unique fuselage fracture points when they crash but are not in small pieces. The fuselage seems to break apart into 2 or 3 pieces probably at bulkhead attachment areas a whole bunch of times. Good idea not to sit in those areas.
As soon as they realize the altimeter is faulty, shouldn't they immediately flip a switch or something to prevent the autopilot from using it? It's very odd no action is taken.
Great episode, I didn’t even get time to make a hot milk before I watch because the commercials were only 15 seconds long at the start , but then I got 2 more commercials both 15 seconds again a few mins before end of video, , I wouldn’t think. It will happen again from this day forward
CFIT is unfortunate when it occurs due to bad ATC instructions or unknown faults that could not reasonably be known. Relying on automation when you know it is not working correctly when you can turn it off and land the plane with the flight controls is insane.
I don’t understand much about aviation; I’m new to the study of. But I really enjoy your graphics AND the way you tell the story 👍👍👏👏 your channel is awesome 🤩
The problem is that there are way too many layers of automation that can interact with each other, and they're full of band-aid patches. The solution is to make it possible for the pilots to hand fly the plane without any of the scraps of automation trying to grab it away from them again.
Something else that I think may help situations such as this incident, is to have the flight control system take other actions in the event of pilot warning events (such as the stick shaker) and set a warning that would change the operation of the automation, such as to disable autothrottle so that the pilots are required to retard the throttle on landing, and that no thrust below, say, 10% below an appropriate cruse speed may not be permissible without verification from other sensors, such as weight switches on all three landing gear to indicate the airplane is actually on the ground. Sanity checks also shouldn't be too difficult to implement, such as the radio altimeter shall always read higher than 5 feet or something, as it is impossible for the bottom of the plane to be less than the height of the landing gear, so if it is less, the instrument is definitely lying.
Do you know the phenomenon, when too many people are involved, noone takes the correct action? If you're walking near a canal and you see a person in the water who is clearly in distress, with noone else around except you, chances are that you'll go into the water to try and save that person. If, however, there's someone in the water and there's a bunch of people standing nearby, you'll think 'oh, people already know, one of them will save that person.' And so we get those little news reports about a man drowning in front of a dozen people who did nothing. On this flight, an extra FO was sitting behind both pilots to monitor, for extra safety because the FO at the controls was being trained. However, I read in another report, while the incident started, the security FO was busy informing the passengers and crew to take landing positions. The security FO was just being used as an extra hand, not doing the job he was supposed to do but (in my view, doing menial 'household' chores while he should only have been focused on monitoring the pilots). Regarding the autothrottle working against the other system, automation is fine as long as it works. If it doesn't, we get tragic incidents and crashes like these. Just after this crash had happened, Turkish critics residing in Holland started pointing fingers at the Turkish Airlines tradition of hiring veteran airforce pilots as their Captains. In the end, those critics' instincts were correct. Without the gung-ho attitude of the Captain, who overruled his FO, who was taking the correct actions, the plane may not have crashed.
NO. No excuse for the pilots. They failed in the very first rule of aviation: Fly the plane. All automation should have been disengaged as soon as they started getting false readings. The pilots and only the pilots are at fault for this accident.
Neither this issue nor the 747 door latch failures prevented Boeing from cutting corners and FAA and NTSB from being too lenient if not straight up helping Boeing bypass the regulations. I might be a pessimist but I see next MAX as very likely, if not inevitable.
I would not be so affirmative for the NTSB nor whole FAA, but FAA west coast is known to be a little bit to "close" to boeing since decades. The MAX is just the last exemple and hopfully will definitively change this bad habit
Systems fail and will continue to do so. That is why as airline pilots, we go trough extensive simulator training and checking every 6 months. We learn how to cope with a multitude of different scenarios, each involving system failures. And the first adagio is systematically: fly the airplane first! Deal with the failure next.
I am not in general a sceptical person and certainly not about the older versions of the 737. The 737 Max I am not certain if I would fly on the plane. That said I was very lucky to be on a maiden flight of a 787 many years ago and that plane impressed me.
Sorry - the title of the video is WRONG. It was NOT a broken Radio Altimeter Antenna that crashed that plane. It was the chain of a non-functioning safety system / safety culture at Turkish Airlines and the non-functioning CRM (crew resource management /teamwork) of the three pilots in the cockpit that caused that bad accident,
Hi I agree but unfortunately UA-cam titles need to be a bit eye catching to get views. Purely objective titles rarely stand out. Like “how bad CRM caused this plane to crash is a factual title but it wouldn’t pique anyone’s interest and the video would fail. The title I have right now is the best of both worlds it’s eye catching and it’s also rooted in fact as the broken antenna played a big part in the crash. Thanks for understanding!
There's no technical reason the 737 max didn't use both AOA sensors - the whole idea with the max was that pilots wouldn't need to be re-certified to fly it. The MCAS system needed to compensate for the new engine position (which created a new moment arm) could use either one or both AOA sensors, but if it needed both then it's a critical system and pilots would have to be re-certified. So they made it use just one to fulfill their customers' wish to have a re-engined 737 with no new type certification required.
in the 737 MAX they actually only had 1 sensor installed, as to avoid both pilot re-training and a new certification. essentially, the system wasn't redundant
@Fidd88 Having two sensors and only using one is in therms of system engineering horrific. The software has all the information it needs and boeing very specifically decided against using it, because a redundant system is indicative of safety critical, which MCAS "totally" is not.
I'm sorry but if you realize the autopilot is being faulty why would you not disable it and land it yourself? Only makes sense to me. I'd rather rely on my skills/training then a faulty autopilot system.
I've watched a few things about this crash, and you have the clearest explanation of it by far. Thank you for your work. Sadly, I think another accident of this type will occur again. By the way, I will never fly on a max 8. They've recently had more issues with this line of aircraft. Electrical issues, they say.
Sounds like a plane from the computer stone age where computers are present but do not communicate with each other and where everyone makes his own game.
And they still havent fixed any of these communications issues. Like after watching a lot of these videos I'm baffled why more pilots dont rely on their skills and what they have been trained instead of relying on automation
Good pronounciation of Schiphol. Shorter I and O, and slightly stronger annunciation of the H, and it is perfect. Much better than other videos however!
This makes the huge task of training the large number of young four engine pilots for B-17 and B-24 to fly those planes during WW ll without computer assistance seem all that much more daunting.
@ 2:53 you mentioned the issues with the left hand autopilot. Somehow I missed why it couldn't be activated and if this played eventually into the crash. I also do not understand how an autothrottle could work against an autopilot, is there no hierarchical dependency? And how is this played when the two autopilots would have been activated?
CMD A wouldn’t activate because of the faulty RA. The autopilot cannot be engaged below (I think) 400ft unless you’re landing. It is not a case of hierarchy it’s depended on which system feeds which information to other system. Remember the autothrottle cannot see so it relies on the RA to know when to enter RETARD mode if the autopilot is in approach mode. The flaw I see here is the captains RA was used to control the autothrottle even thought the FO’s autopilot was the one activated when it should realistically be the FO’s RA being used
Situational awareness and all-around confusion. The final leg of the flight is busy enough and when you add this problem for the unskilled pilots, this will happen again. Time to take this problem seriously and fix it. Both, the pilots and the planes.
"His radio altimeter was showing a reading of -8 feet..." I'm sorry, but it does rather seem that if your aircraft, and those on board, are already 8 feet underground then it's a bit late to be telling the crew to put the landing gear down...
The same thing happened to a Boeing 777-200ER operating Asiana Airlines Flight 214 5 years later, the same sequence of events lead to the same outcome in both accidents. Neither watched the speed, and they both crashed nose high.
@@kickedinthecalfbyacow7549 The altimeter wasn't faulty on 1951 at all, it was all caused in a sequence by the first officer, who incorrectly dialed altimeter data and then used it in a dual channel, then used the captain's altimeter, which had incorrect information. Also in this case, the plane thought that the pilots wanted to descend *(EDIT: instead of hold the current altitude that they had assigned into autopilot command 1), therefore adding another reason as to why the autothrottle didn't allow the throttles to hold the 144 KIAS (knot/kt) speed on the approach.
I still don't understand. What is the point of having redundancy in the number of sensors, when you don't have a comparator to decide which sensor is giving the correct data?
A comparator doesn’t tell you which is correct. It just warns you they are different. It’s down to the pilots to work out which is correct. That’s why Airbus has 3 sensors for critical systems
One ironic detail... 3 of the 4 passengers that died in this crash were Boeing employees. That signal wasn't enough for the Boeing management to contemplate on the word 'redundancy' other than in relation to the HR department...
What i think is that they've made aircraft so complicated that nobody can fully understand them and they can't be flown by the pilot if something goes wrong. That's what I think.
A bigger problem is a lack of a safety culture. Previous times when the plane was not stabilize below 1000 feet it needed to be reported to the company's flight safety department. Acting on near misses prevents accidents.
Trusting a single point of data completely is a common cause of failure for spacecraft, as well. Flight software should be written to never put absolute trust in any one sensor.
You want to know why they can't do the calculations from 2 antennas? It would cost another $20 to figure that in...MD dba Boeing said that's too expensive and chances of failure is 1 in a million.
From the perspective of a complete novice, it seems to me that there are too many systems that can affect the flight controls. All the while the pilots think they are flying but not so. It's become almost too complex for a human to contend with in a short amount of time.
Regarding the 737-Max: They didn't add a second AOA sensor because the system should have been a non-critical system to begin with. If the system requires two sensors to be safe then that also requires additional training for the pilots which they tried to avoid.
@@tomstravels520 that is correct and probably the worst fact in all of this. The more reliable and safer option would have been to just use all sensors that were already installed. But due to a technical required that is supposed to make aircraft safer bit costs a tiny bit more money they didn't use it. Still makes me sick thinking about it.
Boeing didn't use redundant AoA sensors on the Max because tat would have triggered expensive retraining for all pilots. Boeing was playing catchup with Airbus and promised carriers that there would be no required sim time for the new training. Instead, pilots had a 1 hr iPad course that they could take to qualify, which didn't even mention the MCAS system. There is a new documentary/expose out. I think it's on 60 Minutes Australia's YT channel.
It seems to me that the key mistake was letting a plane with a known faulty altimeter leave the ground. Dual systems exist so that you have back-up in an emergency, not so you can conduct routine operations with one of them broken.
@@kickedinthecalfbyacow7549 I don't see that it makes any difference which kind of altimeter is broken. If a crucial instrument is broken you shouldn't leave the ground without it.
@@mbvoelker8448 it does make a difference, one is essential and one isn’t. If you don’t know what something is you can’t make a decision about how important it is.
@@kickedinthecalfbyacow7549 If it's failure leaves you without a backup and not having said backup means that you could crash the plane -- as happened here -- then you shouldn't have taken off with it broken. DUH!
Wish they would have turned off the autopilot for landing. I’m sure the cockpit crew had their reasons but … Thanks for this story and your great reading.
"The altimeter showed -8 feet, which was impossible for the plane to attain"
Well, it sure tried to.
Schiphol airport is 4 m (13 feet) under mean sea level, so it is possible to attain -8 feet.
Source: www.schiphol.nl/nl/jij-en-schiphol/pagina/luchthavenfeitjes/
@@zonzeven on a barometric altimeter yes. Not a radio altimeter
@@zonzeven And then there's Baku, at -28m.
@The crash recreator where's that?
@The crash recreator lol, where's that tho
I've read the accident report in the past -- over 200 information dense pages.
There's a lot of work involved in reading and analyzing aviation reports and condensing them into 15 minute videos. Great job, sir!
It’s just a shame Sydney Dekker’s analysis of the facts was not read as well.
BOOMNG 737 = FLYEING COFFIONES
@@ilovecops5499 coffiones?
They simply could have disconnected the auto pilot and land it manually, 9 lives could have been with us today
Bad bad bad captain mistake
He knew he has a problem especially the left auto pilot didn’t engage, so simple this happens every day
Fly the plane manual
Whatch aci ahaha
To answer your question on the 37 Max. If Boeing would have set it to be a double redundant system then it would have required more scrutiny from the FAA (So more time to get an approval) and simulator training for transitioning pilots. Since they were trying to avoid both to cut costs the decided not to do it. Boeing put profits ahead of safety.
It's sort of like training people who drive tanker trucks that haul milk to haul around gasoline or propane with an iPad and acting like you're not responsible when they level a city block because of static electricity or a tool spark etc. Boeing unfortunately inherited the profits-before-people mentality of McDonnell Douglas in the merger and the Max is just the latest in a series of safety bulletins and airworthiness directives that came about because people died due to business decisions. We had a Boeing campus here in Wichita along with Textron and Bombardier Learjet until 2008ish when they spun off subassembly to a wholly owned subsidiary [Spirit Aerosystems] to get rid of existing union contracts.
That's spot on. Any system that is deemed to warrant redundancy, automatically results in additional FAA certification requirements, as well as further training. Boeing basically wanted to match the newest A320 which didn't require additional training, and this was a major selling point for airlines. They took shortcuts on safety to ensure they get the sales that were otherwise heading to Airbus, and we can only hope that the heavy price of their decisions will cause them to think twice in the future on matters of aviation safety.
Sounds like the '737 MAX' again.
Back in 1972 the 'Windsor Incident' showed that there were risks of potentially-fatal hull-ruptures on the new DC-10s that could have been reduced or eliminated by the retrofitting of pressure-equalisation vents in the cabin-floors. The consequent production holdups were a threat to McConnell-Douglas's sales, so they fixed it with the FAA to take their time over the work. When a fully-loaded DC-10 jet was lost early in 1974, with 346 people turned mostly into mincemeat, the cause was loss of control consequent to hull damage resulting from depressurisation (in a plane that had been modified).
@@None-zc5vg while that DC-10 was modified, it didn't have all of the modifications recommended by the NTSB. The cargo door locks had been changed, however some time in between when the DC-10 left MD's manufacturing plant and the crash, the locking pins were modified again. That DC-10 also didn't have the floor holes to prevent the floor from collapsing during sudden decompression, which would sever the control cables to the tail control surfaces.
The pilots forgot the basic rules of flight, you always fly the plane first, aviate first if there is a problem with the automation system disconnect it and fly the aircraft then navigate to where it is you need to be then communicate. If they followed this basic rule the outcome would have been a safe landing.
As always, fly the damned aircraft!
Clearly you have never flown an aircraft . You think it’s that easy to analyze everything . You think you can read all yo instruments in a second . Mate they reacted faster than average
@@SizzlyPK I never said anything about it being easy but I have a multi certificate for commercial and private aircraft I am also retired now but I also have been trained on multi engine turbine aircraft and have over 12000 hours in both turbine and piston engine aircraft. So I have some ideas on what to do when things are not going to plan and we used to train for these types of events and almost every single one you are taught to first fly the plane and once you are in stable flight then you can work on whatever you need to do to resolve the problem 😉 to tell you the truth I always checked and rechecked the automation because I once had an issue with it and never really trusted it 100 percent after. It only takes a few seconds to verify that everything is going to plan and also having a copilot sitting next to me to verify that everything is operating correctly and or not is very useful 🙂.
@@SizzlyPK flying a jetliner is easy. Try riding a bicycle.
I retired from this plane and saw this glitch a few times. Just a minor inconvenience. This crash is yet another sad example of pilots who should not have been there. Too unskilled to fly their planes with out all of the automation working. This isn't fair to the passengers, they buy a ticket, not a chance.
Do airlines or regulators require their pilots to land manually on occassion (outside of the simulators)?
@@rowboat0317 Good airlines yes. But some airlines (Middle and Far East) expect autolands to be performed wherever possible.
@rob737700 - I disagree. This is an example of how things can go wrong if they are not managed properly. It is also an example of how useless an untrained “safety” pilot is.
@@Trevor_Austin Well, sir, I believe there should be more flying going on instead of managing. Basic piloting skills are just too lacking these days. Pilots are struggling with their automation all they way to impact. Sad times..
I did not even watch the movie as i know the case so well..
When it happened within halve a day i had my conclusion which (appart from the political correctness bullshit) almost was the same as the official report a year later.
If four pilots are not able to do what every hobby pilots does as general practice then they should stay on the ground. Much saver for them.
I fully agree with Rob !!!
Huge mistake by the captain taking control at such a critical moment. The FO was doing the right things and if the captain had just continued to monitor and tell him what to do (eg. call go-around) they'd likely have missed the ground.
But that’s not the way it works. This goes down to human nature that has to be overcome with astonishing self-control and regular training.
That is correct. The FO increased power and pushed the nose down, but the Captain took over control at he most critical moment, the throttle returned automatically to idle and whatever time they had left to recover from the stall evaporated. There were a series of other mistakes too ( for example they failed to monitor their speed), missed opportunities to diagnose the problem (the landing gear warning horn,the speed brake warning, the autopilot disconnect alarm etc.) but one thing is certain: the failure of a single antenna can't bring a plane down.
@@Trevor_Austin I agree that that's not human nature, but flying is not a natural situation. Hence the training.
I saw another accident report recently, late take-off abort and ran off the end of the runway, where the Captain (PM) restrained that urge and just did the PM job. Everyone survived. If he'd taken over it would have been much worse.
@@mikes4163 Not sure what value these anecdotal stories add to this. There's been many emergencies where a captain have taken over and saved the plane as well. People make split second decisions in an emergencies, sometimes they are right, sometimes they are not. It's very much hindsight to blame a pilot for such a decision in retrospective.
3 professional pilots fail to monitor airspeed and they crash Day VFR When they knew the RA was inop they should have turned off the AP . Plane still flies perfectly without the RA.
Wrong! The main problem was the effect of RadAlt 1 on the autothrottle system.
They should have immediately clicked off autothrottles and autopilot upon initiating a go around.
Their is too much relying on the automation. When time comes to manually fly no one is wants too. Too much automation and very little hand flying capabilities.
@@portanav true. In this one pilots were not monitoring their air speed which is crucial for landings. So it wasn't only Antenna problem that crashed the plane
@Fidd88 The three causes you gave were, in my opinion Wrong, wrong and contributory. 1. We have no information anywhere to suggest these pilots were badly trained. They behaved as most normal pilots would and that is sort the problem or and get the job done. Overcoming the urge to get the job done and meet the schedule is very difficult to train out of pilots. I’ll suggest this airline’s training was as good as most. We also have to accept there were three pilots on this flight deck. The third pilot, an F/O was there as a “safety pilot.” These poor sods are placed there without training, with little authority and are sucked into the loop of trouble shooting. 2. We have no information anywhere to suggest these pilots were not current at hand flying. The RHS was an ex-airforce Phantom pilot with 2,000 hours. I’ll suggest he was very proficient at hand flying. What this guy didn’t expect was that when he advanced the thrust lever during the approach it would retard again. 3. This was an old fashioned 737 with 30 year old autothrottle design, hardly modern FBW. The undocumented traps were 1. RadAlt1 always drives the autothrottle. Boeing’s AOM’s did not state this as the time. 2. RETARD as an announciation on the PFD can be for two reasons a) Flight Idle selected to achieve preselected speed and b) Flight Idle selected as part of the Flare logic in the autoland. As a pilot you don’t know what is causing flight idle. Bear in mind they were intercepting the GS from above. Another design flaw present in virtually every aircraft is the nose-up trimming when the aircraft is flying a vertical mode but flying below selected speed. The only reason for this is to keep the autopilot engaged. Why?
The scourges of modern airline flying are crap Flight Operations departments and pathetic, timid training departments full of prima-donnas who believe only they can fly. They demonstrate this with absurd SOP’s, reams of pointless notes, extra items checklists, ridiculous bloated briefings and stipulations that the automatics must be used to their fullest extent and punitive action for anything found “undesirable” on FDR’s. Flush these out and replace them with pragmatic pilots and we might have a chance.
Pilot sat there and let the computer fly them into the ground
VERY TRUE, whatever was the problem, the PILOTS still have control of the plane,
How about Max-8? Boeing pure greed killed all these people.
As I watch these videos, one of the most "baffling" aspects is the failure to FLY THE PLANE!!! EVERY pilot KNOWS fly the damn plane. So why are so many pilots NOT flying the plane? This was an easy fix, turn off the damn outopilot and hand fly. Why 3 experienced pilots, no one could hand fly?????? STUPID yes, I am an instrument rated pilot.
Watch the "Children Of The Magenta Line" video for why that happens.
@@k53847 Yep, I saw this some time ago. Very informative.
I am a nervous flier. A very nervous flyer. If I fall asleep the plane will crash, my wakefulness is keeping that lump of old iron aloft. Am 100% with your comment. With emphasis, FLY the FUCKING PLANE! The basic flight systems RARELY EVER fail, y'know, up-down, left right, throttle, human EYESIGHT.
Hoary old joke:
"Flying scares shit out of me!"
Seasoned air traveller, "Man, when yr number's up it's up."
Me, "What if I'm onth plane and th pilot's number is up?"
... because 1.3 millions lives were lost each year due to humans insisting pilotting something manually: their cars.
@@ylstorage7085 You could use aircraft style autopilots You'll need to maintain 1 mile distance between cars front and back and 1000 feet between lanes. And only have one or two parking areas per city - maybe call them carports. And we'll have to straighten all the roads they are supposed to use so they run at compass directions between carports.
when i see a upload, I instally have to come and watch straight away! loving the content :)
true! This is the only channel on which I have enabled notifications. Very good stuff!
Hey Mini - Request for you "West Caribbean Airways Flight 708" - The plane that flew too high.
Good on TA for the 1000' policy. That is straight "safety over money" thinking.
Bad on pilots for ignoring it. They were "that guy" in the left lane of a crowded 8-lane freeway who tries to get across to his exit in 1/4 mile instead of just going to the next exit.
It’s a small thing, but I love how you end your videos with the airplane landing safely. It’s a nice way to wrap things up.
I'm super excited ! cant wait to watch.Know it's gonna be a banger
Just a point to add as I think it was missed. The reason CMD A wouldn’t engage was because the FO accidentally tried to engage the autopilot first instead of pressing approach first which is needed to be done in order to have dual coupling. Because the pilot was essentially just switching from 1 autopilot to the other and because of the faulty RA, CMD A wouldn’t activate. FO reconnected CMD B but didn’t reattempt to connect CMD A. Not sure if it would have actually worked anyway
About the dual aoa sensor software, as far as I know: that is the obvious and safe choice however then the system would be flagged as safety critical in the documentation and would require extra training and certification which they wanted to avoid.
The problem was NOT that there was no comparator (or redundancy) it was that RadAlt No. 1 ALWAYS drives the Autothrottles no matter which autopilot is engaged. This was ‘feature” not documented.
IIRC the MAX also hat the ability to actually display a warning when both AOA-sensor-readouts didn't match up. But it was an optional feature that airlines had to pay extra for.
It's what happens when bean-counters get to decide technical choices.
@@brkr78 an how does AOA-Disgagree indicator information help? Is there a system linked to only one AOA-sensor that behaves as automatic antistall using the trimming? Boeing still denies that.
The Boeing 747 does not have an anti stall system linked to the AOA Sensor that autotrims the plane out of stall. MCAS is totally not an anti-stall system and pilot totally do not need to know, that MCAS is trimming their plane, because that totally only happens in certain flight configurations.
@@brkr78 extortion, for safety features. Nice ...we really have come far as a species
Amazing like always
Why does an autothrottle not disengage on manual input?
That's what I wanna know. Why isn't it like cruise control in a car, deactivating on manual input?
@@MisterFribble I assume because if your a little low, you could probably push it forward a bit, then have it return. Or it could be so that you don't accidentally bump it.
I am a retired airline captain with many hours in the 737 and it’s many variants. In order to disengage the autothrottles you had to press a button on the side of the throttle handle. If you didn’t do that, yes, you could overpower the servo and move the throttles forward but that wouldn’t make much sense when all you had to do was press the button.
@@MisterFribble It is like cruise control.. If you want to pass someone on cruise control you can either push a button to accelerate, or override that by stomping on the gas peddle. Neither disconnects the cruise, as soon as you take your foot off the peddle, the car will "resume" the speed it was set to originally. The only way to get a car off cruise is to either hit the brake, or disengage it with the switch. Auto throttle works much the same way, if you need a blip of power, you manually throttle up, then you can forget about it, and auto throttle will "resume" To disengage auto throttle, you have to press the auto throttle button, until the light goes off.
So long as it remains allowable to sacrifice lives for profit, there will be crashes like this and many other lives lost if more money was simply spent to do the things we know make things safer, not just in aviation, but seemingly in nearly everything these days.
So true
Loving the content, amazing as usual
"Adding more redundancy saves lives ... Do you think we've learned from our mistakes?"
Clearly, Boeing hasn't. But at least we can trust Airbu- oh, they're developing a single-pilot A350.
These companies don't give a shit about our lives, just our money.
The aircraft won’t be flown by a single pilot from takeoff to landing. There will be 2 pilots onboard and both will be up front for takeoff, climb, descent, approach and landing. It’s only during long cruise where one pilot will then go and rest, the other will monitor
Single pilot! What a chilling concept to save a buck
@@tomstravels520 That absolutely does not instill any fit of confidence whatsoever. Is what you said supposed to be comforting or making it any better? Simply because "the most dangerous parts of flying is just taking off and landing guys, so its perfectly fine and okay during cruise"
@@DrSabot-A would your rather have 1 pilot only or 2 pilots but one is resting during cruise?
@@tomstravels520 I think I'd rather just have two pilots not resting.
I really enjoy your summaries of these accidents. They provide the non flying population with an easy to understand explanation of the events that transpired while being very entertaining and providing a glimpse into the world of aviation and the inner workings of the individual aircraft involved. Very interesting and fun to watch. Keep up the great work its appreciated! I always look forward to new videos from your channel. Take care and best wishes.
great video as usual i really love your narration style and your voice is really soothing(maybe just me?) your stuff is great and entertaining i just wanted to say thanks for making such great videos
Amazing video as usual ❤️❤️❤️
Another great video. This channel has turned me into a aviation geek. Keep up the great content. 👍🙂✈✈✈✈
If you get a stall warning that close to the ground I would think going to full power and raising the landing gear to cut drag would be SOP.
At that speed and altitude the landing gear wouldn’t make much difference to the drag. I’d leave it down to cushion the impact of it were to happen. That’s why on a go around you wait until you have positive rate of climb before raising the gear, not as soon as you increase power
They did advance power to full thrust, but the autothrottle retarded the thrust levers immediately afterwards
Regarding the 737 Max, I remember doing a deep dive on it when it happened. If I'm remembering correctly, they do use redundancy for the AoA sensors almost everywhere on the aircraft. Indeed, I think FAA regulations demand it. However from recollection the MCAS was developed initially for a USAF aircraft and didn't have redundancy. So they took that system without modifying it for redundancy and that became the MCAS we all know and... know? I'm vaguely recalling that the USAF aircraft couldn't use redundancy for some reason, possibly because the AoA sensor was moved or removed, possibly for another reason? But my memory isn't good enough to know for sure. And it may be FAA regulations demanding they couldn't modify the MCAS already in use without testing everything again somewhere along that story. Likely time constraints competing against the A320NEO played a role. Anyway there was a real reason for lacking redundant AoA sensors, albeit a bad one.
Marry me pilot bitch!! 😍
Money.
I mean they moved the engines forward and put in software to mitigate without telling pilots. All so they didn't have to recertify it as a new airframe. The gov let them and Boeing is going to pay a lot more than just fucking penalties on contracts and licensing fees.
Great analysis. Sadly another case of Increasing dependancy in automation with less frequent hand flying. Procedurally drilled out of instinctive flying situational awareness.
You should do one of the Max accidents or both if possible
You’ve taught me SO much & you talk about exactly what I’m wondering. Suburb job on all your videos!
737Max has sold in "record" numbers.
"its the safest plane we have" - final words of Boeing CEO
This wasn’t a max
Great job explaining this complex accident.
The C-5a has SIX AOA fins on it's nose. 3 on each side. I am pretty sure they not there for decoration.
B737s sure have unique fuselage fracture points when they crash but are not in small pieces. The fuselage seems to break apart into 2 or 3 pieces probably at bulkhead attachment areas a whole bunch of times. Good idea not to sit in those areas.
I like to sit over the wings for that reason - it's a stronger part of the aircraft, and this safer in the event of a crash.
Can't stop bingeing.
The 3 killed pilots in the cockpit probably died from slamming into the yoke (head & chest injuries)
so we need airbags in plane yokes ?
@@BillCipher1337 prabobaly?
The jump seat has a yoke?
@@advorak8529 lol
@@advorak8529 It's not a functional yoke. It's just there to give him emotional security.
As soon as they realize the altimeter is faulty, shouldn't they immediately flip a switch or something to prevent the autopilot from using it? It's very odd no action is taken.
Flipped what switch and why? The linking of the RadAlt 1 to the Autothrottle was not documented. It was assumed that it was linked to side in control.
You explained VERY, VERY WELL.
Great episode, I didn’t even get time to make a hot milk before I watch because the commercials were only 15 seconds long at the start , but then I got 2 more commercials both 15 seconds again a few mins before end of video, , I wouldn’t think. It will happen again from this day forward
CFIT is unfortunate when it occurs due to bad ATC instructions or unknown faults that could not reasonably be known. Relying on automation when you know it is not working correctly when you can turn it off and land the plane with the flight controls is insane.
I don’t understand much about aviation; I’m new to the study of. But I really enjoy your graphics AND the way you tell the story 👍👍👏👏 your channel is awesome 🤩
As far as the Max goes, it was built by a company that was out to make money, not airplanes. A departure from its earlier years unfortunately
Not a 737Max
Wonderful video, thanks, very informative. The graphics were amazing, too. Istanbul and Schiphol wwere both recognisable.
The problem is that there are way too many layers of automation that can interact with each other, and they're full of band-aid patches. The solution is to make it possible for the pilots to hand fly the plane without any of the scraps of automation trying to grab it away from them again.
Something else that I think may help situations such as this incident, is to have the flight control system take other actions in the event of pilot warning events (such as the stick shaker) and set a warning that would change the operation of the automation, such as to disable autothrottle so that the pilots are required to retard the throttle on landing, and that no thrust below, say, 10% below an appropriate cruse speed may not be permissible without verification from other sensors, such as weight switches on all three landing gear to indicate the airplane is actually on the ground. Sanity checks also shouldn't be too difficult to implement, such as the radio altimeter shall always read higher than 5 feet or something, as it is impossible for the bottom of the plane to be less than the height of the landing gear, so if it is less, the instrument is definitely lying.
Rip to the people who died amazing video btw
Do you know the phenomenon, when too many people are involved, noone takes the correct action?
If you're walking near a canal and you see a person in the water who is clearly in distress, with noone else around except you, chances are that you'll go into the water to try and save that person.
If, however, there's someone in the water and there's a bunch of people standing nearby, you'll think 'oh, people already know, one of them will save that person.' And so we get those little news reports about a man drowning in front of a dozen people who did nothing.
On this flight, an extra FO was sitting behind both pilots to monitor, for extra safety because the FO at the controls was being trained.
However, I read in another report, while the incident started, the security FO was busy informing the passengers and crew to take landing positions.
The security FO was just being used as an extra hand, not doing the job he was supposed to do but (in my view, doing menial 'household' chores while he should only have been focused on monitoring the pilots).
Regarding the autothrottle working against the other system, automation is fine as long as it works.
If it doesn't, we get tragic incidents and crashes like these.
Just after this crash had happened, Turkish critics residing in Holland started pointing fingers at the Turkish Airlines tradition of hiring veteran airforce pilots as their Captains. In the end, those critics' instincts were correct. Without the gung-ho attitude of the Captain, who overruled his FO, who was taking the correct actions, the plane may not have crashed.
Lessons from history are never truly learnt, the best you can hope for is that one generation will take notice!
Not Bad Video!
I was flying on a 737 MAX 8 Recently to Turkey
Amazing video!
Excellent report - thank you.
NO. No excuse for the pilots. They failed in the very first rule of aviation: Fly the plane. All automation should have been disengaged as soon as they started getting false readings. The pilots and only the pilots are at fault for this accident.
The engineers and trainers bear responsibility too. A single point of failure for a major system is asking for trouble.
Mentour pilot has done a very detailed analysis of this
Neither this issue nor the 747 door latch failures prevented Boeing from cutting corners and FAA and NTSB from being too lenient if not straight up helping Boeing bypass the regulations. I might be a pessimist but I see next MAX as very likely, if not inevitable.
I would not be so affirmative for the NTSB nor whole FAA, but FAA west coast is known to be a little bit to "close" to boeing since decades. The MAX is just the last exemple and hopfully will definitively change this bad habit
Oh 737 the gift that keeps on killing
Systems fail and will continue to do so. That is why as airline pilots, we go trough extensive simulator training and checking every 6 months. We learn how to cope with a multitude of different scenarios, each involving system failures. And the first adagio is systematically: fly the airplane first! Deal with the failure next.
I am not in general a sceptical person and certainly not about the older versions of the 737. The 737 Max I am not certain if I would fly on the plane. That said I was very lucky to be on a maiden flight of a 787 many years ago and that plane impressed me.
Sorry - the title of the video is WRONG. It was NOT a broken Radio Altimeter Antenna that crashed that plane. It was the chain of a non-functioning safety system / safety culture at Turkish Airlines and the non-functioning CRM (crew resource management /teamwork) of the three pilots in the cockpit that caused that bad accident,
Hi I agree but unfortunately UA-cam titles need to be a bit eye catching to get views. Purely objective titles rarely stand out. Like “how bad CRM caused this plane to crash is a factual title but it wouldn’t pique anyone’s interest and the video would fail. The title I have right now is the best of both worlds it’s eye catching and it’s also rooted in fact as the broken antenna played a big part in the crash. Thanks for understanding!
GOOD SHOW AS ALWAYS.
LET'S ALL GET CHANNEL TO ONE MILLION SUBS BY END OF YEAR.
Thank you!
There's no technical reason the 737 max didn't use both AOA sensors - the whole idea with the max was that pilots wouldn't need to be re-certified to fly it. The MCAS system needed to compensate for the new engine position (which created a new moment arm) could use either one or both AOA sensors, but if it needed both then it's a critical system and pilots would have to be re-certified. So they made it use just one to fulfill their customers' wish to have a re-engined 737 with no new type certification required.
in the 737 MAX they actually only had 1 sensor installed, as to avoid both pilot re-training and a new certification. essentially, the system wasn't redundant
No. All 737 Max had 2 sensors. But only 1 fed data to the MCAS and it was switched every flight so there was no comparison of data
@@tomstravels520 ooo thanks i wasn't aware of that
@Fidd88 Having two sensors and only using one is in therms of system engineering horrific.
The software has all the information it needs and boeing very specifically decided against using it, because a redundant system is indicative of safety critical, which MCAS "totally" is not.
I'm sorry but if you realize the autopilot is being faulty why would you not disable it and land it yourself? Only makes sense to me. I'd rather rely on my skills/training then a faulty autopilot system.
Because only 1 was faulty. CMD B was still working
I've watched a few things about this crash, and you have the clearest explanation of it by far. Thank you for your work. Sadly, I think another accident of this type will occur again. By the way, I will never fly on a max 8. They've recently had more issues with this line of aircraft. Electrical issues, they say.
This was not a 737Max
Another wonderful video!
as soon as the issue with the radio antenna started surely the next thought would be the automation would be a bad idea with faulty information.
Sounds like a plane from the computer stone age where computers are present but do not communicate with each other and where everyone makes his own game.
And they still havent fixed any of these communications issues. Like after watching a lot of these videos I'm baffled why more pilots dont rely on their skills and what they have been trained instead of relying on automation
A problem with relying on automation is that people don't know what to do when the automation goes wrong...
Good pronounciation of Schiphol. Shorter I and O, and slightly stronger annunciation of the H, and it is perfect. Much better than other videos however!
This makes the huge task of training the large number of young four engine pilots for B-17 and B-24 to fly those planes during WW ll without computer assistance seem all that much more daunting.
@ 2:53 you mentioned the issues with the left hand autopilot. Somehow I missed why it couldn't be activated and if this played eventually into the crash. I also do not understand how an autothrottle could work against an autopilot, is there no hierarchical dependency? And how is this played when the two autopilots would have been activated?
This seems incredibly stupid. The two computers should act in tandem, not push the plane into stall. It's so dumb.
CMD A wouldn’t activate because of the faulty RA. The autopilot cannot be engaged below (I think) 400ft unless you’re landing. It is not a case of hierarchy it’s depended on which system feeds which information to other system. Remember the autothrottle cannot see so it relies on the RA to know when to enter RETARD mode if the autopilot is in approach mode. The flaw I see here is the captains RA was used to control the autothrottle even thought the FO’s autopilot was the one activated when it should realistically be the FO’s RA being used
Situational awareness and all-around confusion. The final leg of the flight is busy enough and when you add this problem for the unskilled pilots, this will happen again. Time to take this problem seriously and fix it. Both, the pilots and the planes.
"His radio altimeter was showing a reading of -8 feet..."
I'm sorry, but it does rather seem that if your aircraft, and those on board, are already 8 feet underground then it's a bit late to be telling the crew to put the landing gear down...
-8 is what it reads when the nose gear is on the ground
A LOT OF PEOPLE ARE GETTING COMPLACENT WITH ISSUES ON PLANES.
I SAW SOME GUY DISMISS AN ISSUE SAYING PLANES ARE STILL SAFEST WAY TO TRAVEL.
The same thing happened to a Boeing 777-200ER operating Asiana Airlines Flight 214 5 years later, the same sequence of events lead to the same outcome in both accidents. Neither watched the speed, and they both crashed nose high.
Similar but not the same. The 777 wasn’t a faulty Rad Alt
@@kickedinthecalfbyacow7549 The altimeter wasn't faulty on 1951 at all, it was all caused in a sequence by the first officer, who incorrectly dialed altimeter data and then used it in a dual channel, then used the captain's altimeter, which had incorrect information. Also in this case, the plane thought that the pilots wanted to descend *(EDIT: instead of hold the current altitude that they had assigned into autopilot command 1), therefore adding another reason as to why the autothrottle didn't allow the throttles to hold the 144 KIAS (knot/kt) speed on the approach.
@@gaztastic I’ve read your post a couple of times, I can’t make any sense of it
Loving your content ❤️❤️
Good work ~ from a former avionics tech
Welp, yuo´ve just earned a subscriber :)
You haven't done Stockport 1967 yet, or Staines 1972 for that matter. Or Manchester 1985 either. All would be good ones for you to do.
Nice video 👍
I still don't understand. What is the point of having redundancy in the number of sensors, when you don't have a comparator to decide which sensor is giving the correct data?
A comparator doesn’t tell you which is correct. It just warns you they are different. It’s down to the pilots to work out which is correct. That’s why Airbus has 3 sensors for critical systems
One ironic detail... 3 of the 4 passengers that died in this crash were Boeing employees.
That signal wasn't enough for the Boeing management to contemplate on the word 'redundancy' other than in relation to the HR department...
I’ve got your voice in my head! THIS …. is the story of…🤣
What i think is that they've made aircraft so complicated that nobody can fully understand them and they can't be flown by the pilot if something goes wrong.
That's what I think.
Manual flying on an NG when she's drunk..its a life and license saver.
Okay guys I have played MS-FS and I think he should have gone fully inverted to land quicker
A bigger problem is a lack of a safety culture. Previous times when the plane was not stabilize below 1000 feet it needed to be reported to the company's flight safety department. Acting on near misses prevents accidents.
What this crash really underscored wasn't the issue of unreliable data but rather the lack of basic airmanship at THY.
Nice vid! Learned a lot, becouse I have seen the Dutch news video s but they don't know sh* about aviation. Can you also mabay do el al flight 1862?
12:05 Pilots - "The code is more what you’d call ‘guidelines’ than actual rules."
8 died, how many survived? Did the pilots survive?
Trusting a single point of data completely is a common cause of failure for spacecraft, as well. Flight software should be written to never put absolute trust in any one sensor.
You want to know why they can't do the calculations from 2 antennas? It would cost another $20 to figure that in...MD dba Boeing said that's too expensive and chances of failure is 1 in a million.
From the perspective of a complete novice, it seems to me that there are too many systems that can affect the flight controls. All the while the pilots think they are flying but not so. It's become almost too complex for a human to contend with in a short amount of time.
My understanding is that there was NOT a redundant AOA sensor on the Max... It was a single point of failure.
There were 2 sensors but only one fed MCAS at a time
Regarding the 737-Max:
They didn't add a second AOA sensor because the system should have been a non-critical system to begin with. If the system requires two sensors to be safe then that also requires additional training for the pilots which they tried to avoid.
The Max always had a second sensor. Only one was used for MCAS at a time though
@@tomstravels520 that is correct and probably the worst fact in all of this. The more reliable and safer option would have been to just use all sensors that were already installed. But due to a technical required that is supposed to make aircraft safer bit costs a tiny bit more money they didn't use it. Still makes me sick thinking about it.
I was hoping it was not another Boeing, but damn... MD really did buy Boeing with their own money.
Boeing didn't use redundant AoA sensors on the Max because tat would have triggered expensive retraining for all pilots. Boeing was playing catchup with Airbus and promised carriers that there would be no required sim time for the new training. Instead, pilots had a 1 hr iPad course that they could take to qualify, which didn't even mention the MCAS system. There is a new documentary/expose out. I think it's on 60 Minutes Australia's YT channel.
thank you! : )
No thank you for watching!
It seems to me that the key mistake was letting a plane with a known faulty altimeter leave the ground. Dual systems exist so that you have back-up in an emergency, not so you can conduct routine operations with one of them broken.
Depends what it says in the MEL
Radio Altimeter, it’s different to the Altimeter.
@@kickedinthecalfbyacow7549 I don't see that it makes any difference which kind of altimeter is broken. If a crucial instrument is broken you shouldn't leave the ground without it.
@@mbvoelker8448 it does make a difference, one is essential and one isn’t. If you don’t know what something is you can’t make a decision about how important it is.
@@kickedinthecalfbyacow7549 If it's failure leaves you without a backup and not having said backup means that you could crash the plane -- as happened here -- then you shouldn't have taken off with it broken. DUH!
Wish they would have turned off the autopilot for landing.
I’m sure the cockpit crew had their reasons but …
Thanks for this story and your great reading.
Turning off autopilot wouldn’t have fixed the problem. It was the autothrottle. The autopilot was still tracking the localiser and glideslope