The criticism that moral naturalism cannot provide a motivation to do moral things is as irrelevant as a criticism of logic being unable to provide motivation to be logical. They are separate questions from the truth value of the morality or the logic. You simply must value logic or correctness in order to be motovated by a logical conclusion. If you are not, then logic will not provide reason to adopt a belief. Same with morality. You may simply not care about being correct, so there ia no reason to adopt the moral framework, or you DO care, in which case, you have motivation.
I think there are many types of questions in meta-ethics that somehow get lumped together: - What is moral value? What things have moral value? What things are moral values? - What is an "ought" ("should")? How does it work in the system? - How are we motivated?
I love your channel man. I've found your videos on ethics very helpful in understanding the nuances of the realist vs. anti-realist debate more generally. Additionally, I've found your logic videos helpful in getting through my Logic I course 🤣
you are amazing!!! watching your videos genuinely helps me with my philosophy degree! Do you have any videos on sensitivity/safety conditions for knowledge?
really good video! One question though: where can I read more about the whole ordeal of conceptual analysis and the nature of concepts? Which area of philosophy covers this? Philosophy of language?
Fair enough. Changed it back to Kane B. I don't care at all about my youtube name; it's just that a couple days ago I discovered that it was possible to change it, and I couldn't really see any reason not to have my full name up.
I mean comparing relativity of motion: Which is an empirically verifiable fact, with relativity of normativity of morals? I mean it is equivalent to comparing attraction between to charged particles to deduce that compassion is good. I mean, how ? P1)Motion is relative, and is a true empirical fact. P2) Normativity is relative. C) Therefore relative normativity is true. Does this make sense in any way?
I think the meaning is 1) Moral terms are relative. 2) Spacial terms are relative 3) Spacial terms are objective. 4) Relative terms can be objective 5) Moral terms can be objective. It's supposed to block the inference from relativity to subjectivity.
Very interesting video and metaethical position. It seems like the argument from the supervinience of morality for moral naturalism isn't that good. I think that other metaethical positions can explain this supervinience. Metaethical divine command theory and ideal observer theory can explain this by claiming that there are certain natural proprties that are the reasons as to why God or an ideal observer approve of a certain action. Moral nonnaturalists could explain this by claming that the presence of a moral property in some action is caused/explained by the presence of the natural properties in that action. Those are all of the universalist theories in metaethics (I think) and they can all explain supervinience.
39:00 "Natural facts alone do not involve reference to standards." Natural facts often involve reference to standards. For example, the Eiffel Tower is 324 metres tall. This is a fact that involves reference to a standard: the metre. There can be no measure of distance without a standard to measure it by, but surely distances are natural facts. 44:36 "Morality has a special authority over us in that it provides reasons for action that are independent of our desires." How can morality provide reasons for action if it doesn't coincide with any desire that we have? What does it even mean to have a reason for action independent of our desires? This doesn't seem to be only a challenge for moral naturalism, but it seems that no metaethical theory could possibly satisfy this condition. Of course we ought not enslave people no matter what our desires are, but a moral imperative like that is not in itself a reason to not enslave people. It only becomes a reason when it is connected to some person's goals, and then it can be a reason for that person. A bigger issue for moral naturalism is that the whole point of metaethics should be to faithfully represent how the idea of morality is used in life. Metaethics describes the nature of morality, and moral naturalism must spectacularly fail to be an accurate description in a world where people so often tie the idea of morality with the supernatural. Perhaps moral naturalism is an attempt to prescribe how people ought to think about morality, but what would be the point? In real life people think of morality both in supernatural contexts and natural contexts, so a correct metaethical theory has to be compatible with both, or else it fails to do its job to describe morality.
Regarding your second point, it does seem unlikely that many if any actions are motivated for reasons beyond those motivated by desires, but there does seem to be a special position within our account of our actions reserved for those motivated by moral considerations simply because there seem to be so many cases in which people act for reasons completely contrary to any desire fulfilment. The most common example is the man who throws himself on the grenade for his squad. But a more everyday case would be someone choosing to self-isolate when they are not the at-risk category only stand to lose financially and psychologically but do it anyway because they think (importantly not feel as this would then be desire fulfilment) that that is what they should do. I do not think you are necessarily wrong; just we will need a lot of additional work to explain away these instances.
@@thereal8ball975 "The most common example is the man who throws himself on the grenade for his squad." That's not completely contrary to any desire. He wants his squad to live. Only a man who wants his squad to live would do such a thing. A person who self-isolates also has relevant desires, as surely almost everyone does. People don't self-isolate on some crazy whim. We do it because we want to put a stop to a terrible situation. We want to starve an infection of its supply of victims and stamp it out, or at least slow it down, so that maybe life can get back to normal.
This lecture is the most metaphysical and most fallacy ridden video I have ever encountered as philosophy. P.S: Not any fault of Kane B. He is just citing other people.
My Patreon: www.patreon.com/kanebaker91
IT IS FINALLY HERE!!! Thank you!!!! WE ARE NOT WORTHY
The criticism that moral naturalism cannot provide a motivation to do moral things is as irrelevant as a criticism of logic being unable to provide motivation to be logical. They are separate questions from the truth value of the morality or the logic. You simply must value logic or correctness in order to be motovated by a logical conclusion. If you are not, then logic will not provide reason to adopt a belief. Same with morality. You may simply not care about being correct, so there ia no reason to adopt the moral framework, or you DO care, in which case, you have motivation.
Just in time for the serious metaethics binge im on. Cheers.
I think there are many types of questions in meta-ethics that somehow get lumped together:
- What is moral value? What things have moral value? What things are moral values?
- What is an "ought" ("should")? How does it work in the system?
- How are we motivated?
I love your channel man. I've found your videos on ethics very helpful in understanding the nuances of the realist vs. anti-realist debate more generally. Additionally, I've found your logic videos helpful in getting through my Logic I course 🤣
you are amazing!!! watching your videos genuinely helps me with my philosophy degree! Do you have any videos on sensitivity/safety conditions for knowledge?
really good video! One question though: where can I read more about the whole ordeal of conceptual analysis and the nature of concepts? Which area of philosophy covers this? Philosophy of language?
@Otávio Rapôso ba, muito obrigado
Is asking "what does 'ought' mean?" in the purview of meta-ethics? Would like be willing to take on this question some day?
Come one Kane B was more mysterious and just a groovier name overall
Still great video tho
Fair enough. Changed it back to Kane B. I don't care at all about my youtube name; it's just that a couple days ago I discovered that it was possible to change it, and I couldn't really see any reason not to have my full name up.
Great video.
Great Video
I mean comparing relativity of motion: Which is an empirically verifiable fact, with relativity of normativity of morals? I mean it is equivalent to comparing attraction between to charged particles to deduce that compassion is good.
I mean, how ?
P1)Motion is relative, and is a true empirical fact.
P2) Normativity is relative.
C) Therefore relative normativity is true.
Does this make sense in any way?
I think the meaning is
1) Moral terms are relative.
2) Spacial terms are relative
3) Spacial terms are objective.
4) Relative terms can be objective
5) Moral terms can be objective.
It's supposed to block the inference from relativity to subjectivity.
This was so helpful!!!
Very interesting video and metaethical position. It seems like the argument from the supervinience of morality for moral naturalism isn't that good. I think that other metaethical positions can explain this supervinience. Metaethical divine command theory and ideal observer theory can explain this by claiming that there are certain natural proprties that are the reasons as to why God or an ideal observer approve of a certain action. Moral nonnaturalists could explain this by claming that the presence of a moral property in some action is caused/explained by the presence of the natural properties in that action. Those are all of the universalist theories in metaethics (I think) and they can all explain supervinience.
39:00 "Natural facts alone do not involve reference to standards."
Natural facts often involve reference to standards. For example, the Eiffel Tower is 324 metres tall. This is a fact that involves reference to a standard: the metre. There can be no measure of distance without a standard to measure it by, but surely distances are natural facts.
44:36 "Morality has a special authority over us in that it provides reasons for action that are independent of our desires."
How can morality provide reasons for action if it doesn't coincide with any desire that we have? What does it even mean to have a reason for action independent of our desires? This doesn't seem to be only a challenge for moral naturalism, but it seems that no metaethical theory could possibly satisfy this condition.
Of course we ought not enslave people no matter what our desires are, but a moral imperative like that is not in itself a reason to not enslave people. It only becomes a reason when it is connected to some person's goals, and then it can be a reason for that person.
A bigger issue for moral naturalism is that the whole point of metaethics should be to faithfully represent how the idea of morality is used in life. Metaethics describes the nature of morality, and moral naturalism must spectacularly fail to be an accurate description in a world where people so often tie the idea of morality with the supernatural. Perhaps moral naturalism is an attempt to prescribe how people ought to think about morality, but what would be the point?
In real life people think of morality both in supernatural contexts and natural contexts, so a correct metaethical theory has to be compatible with both, or else it fails to do its job to describe morality.
Regarding your second point, it does seem unlikely that many if any actions are motivated for reasons beyond those motivated by desires, but there does seem to be a special position within our account of our actions reserved for those motivated by moral considerations simply because there seem to be so many cases in which people act for reasons completely contrary to any desire fulfilment. The most common example is the man who throws himself on the grenade for his squad. But a more everyday case would be someone choosing to self-isolate when they are not the at-risk category only stand to lose financially and psychologically but do it anyway because they think (importantly not feel as this would then be desire fulfilment) that that is what they should do. I do not think you are necessarily wrong; just we will need a lot of additional work to explain away these instances.
@@thereal8ball975 "The most common example is the man who throws himself on the grenade for his squad."
That's not completely contrary to any desire. He wants his squad to live. Only a man who wants his squad to live would do such a thing.
A person who self-isolates also has relevant desires, as surely almost everyone does. People don't self-isolate on some crazy whim. We do it because we want to put a stop to a terrible situation. We want to starve an infection of its supply of victims and stamp it out, or at least slow it down, so that maybe life can get back to normal.
This lecture is the most metaphysical and most fallacy ridden video I have ever encountered as philosophy.
P.S: Not any fault of Kane B. He is just citing other people.
Interesting! Could you cite some fallacies as examples?