Hi, your videos have been very helpful to me in terms of learning and revising Philosophy but I was wondering if at any point in the near future you would be doing any videos on normative ethical theories ?
Please continue the metaethics series. I find your work very useful and would like treatment on moral realist naturalism (Alex Miller's Chapter 9). Many thanks!
I used to share your issue with H2O actually not being water, since the hydrogens could be tritium (although the half-life is relatively small) or deuterium, rather than just protium. There are two responses to that argument. First, one could simply argue that hydrogen refers to all isotopes of hydrogen, which seems plausible. However there's a second major flaw which is more consequential: heavy water is actually toxic in large quantities. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heavy_water#Toxicity_in_humans I think this probably implies that heavy water molecules are impurities in water (in the same way that salts contained in water are impurities, previously unknown to people saying 'water'), and we mean H2O (H being protium), as did our pre-discovery-of-H2O ancestors. This argument presumably applies equally well to the three stable oxygen isotopes (it's the mass of heavy water which makes incompatible with our finely tuned biochemical processes).
I hope you will touch upon Habermas and Kant at one point in these series. Thanks. In regards to the N1-B-N2 problem, we could also say that while B supervenes on N1, B has certain strongly emergent systemic (non-physical, symbolic) properties which although causally depend on N1 for their sheer occurrence, they are however not entirely reducible to N1 without a certain loss in the amount of information gained directly from B's system being active, therefore the supposed informational surplus occurring in B's symbolic level, accounts for its causal necessity to arrive at N2. Based on the emergentist idea, that systems as a whole produce properties which are in their content directly and necessarily supervenient only on the emergent system's whole (B) and only secondarily (as a necessary condition to their existence) supervenient on (N1) - (the whole is more than the sum of its parts, because the whole as a whole generates properties of its own, which by definition can not exist without the whole being active). Therefore N2 can only be understood as operating in an abstract space of such derived symbolic qualities, that is, it always already can only exist within the syntax of meanings created by B. PS> an overwiev of Christine M. Korsgaard and constructivist ethics would also be appreciated
Your Ted Bundy example (18:32) presupposes that a world with different moral properties is at all possible. The moral absolutist would contend that in all possible worlds (differing in their natural properties) the moral properties must be the same. Nothing compels him to grant the possibility of a world with the same natural properties but different moral properties, thus the supervenience of moral properties over natural properties, at least in his eyes, is never instantiated. To this kind of moral realist, supervenience is a vacuously fulfilled conceptual premise and thus cannot bring about a refutation of his position.
The empirical investigation of the good might be determined non-naturally through statistical significance within a cohort that claim good refers to a functionalist description of a state of affairs that most agents agree to participant as a group to make realisable through coordinated actions where each member has a role that is a link in a coordinated sequence to bring about a social state of affairs. It's an open question if a social state of affairs is the case due to a sense of purpose based on ideology where ideology is a map of belief based on concepts such as person, property, rights, legitimate ownership etcetera. The state of affairs is given a term once realised as 'the good' which is a symbolic hence non-natural and marked with a full stop or whatever symbolises as a marker of success rather than failure. The good in a sense never is achieved because statistical significants is less than 100 percent but close enough that most members are satisfied to not rebel and form a resistance movement which would be bad for group cohesion as fragmentation entails failure of that state of affairs.
Very interesting video. Are you ever going to talk about a non-intuitionistic form of moral non-naturalism? Does anyone know of a view of this kind (aside from perhabs Divine Command Theory, even tho it being realist and not subjectivist is debatable).
Could these moral values be emergent properties. Not non natural in the sense that its floating around, but as an emergent non natural property that emerges on each new situation from the materials at hand. Like choice, we as conscious creatures, have a choice, this is an emergent property of the universe but it is non natural in the sense that it is composed of natural properties, but there is no property that consists of choice. (maybe there is) So goodness would be an emergent property of the universe but would never be able to tell us how we ought to behave like a moral law, but gives us a tool, along with choice to navigate what we should do. I myself am not convinced that there is good/bad, more so believe in helpful/harmful to our desires. but im still working it out... love the videos. Great content, very helpful :)
Well, this video has me pursuaded that moral judgememts, like mathematical judgements are non-existing conceptual representations of existing things. However, at 40:46, have you considered whether moral consequences (which are different from moral judgements) might be an existing part of the natural world? (i.e., existing positive and negative experoences serve as the basis or our non-existing moral judgements)
39:19 perhaps I am unclear. Here is what I mean: from the perspective of an outsider passing a moral judgement (N2) of a cat being lit on fire (N1) with its corresponding moral property of wrongness (B), (B), (N1), and (N2) are seemingly seperate things. However, from the CATS point of view, both (B) and (N2) are a mere part of (N1).
Im kind of confused as to why 8:42 is an open question... If we assume that knowledge = "a justified true belief", are "John has justified true belief that P" and "John knows that P" not, by definition, the same thing, making it a closed question?
This series is the best I've seen. Please go through moral realism : Naturalism as well. Thank you.
Hi, your videos have been very helpful to me in terms of learning and revising Philosophy but I was wondering if at any point in the near future you would be doing any videos on normative ethical theories ?
I could really use an episode on moral naturalism! Your videos are awesome! Basically a free philosophy class
Please continue the metaethics series. I find your work very useful and would like treatment on moral realist naturalism (Alex Miller's Chapter 9). Many thanks!
Brilliant stuff. I hope you do naturalism as well someday.
I used to share your issue with H2O actually not being water, since the hydrogens could be tritium (although the half-life is relatively small) or deuterium, rather than just protium.
There are two responses to that argument. First, one could simply argue that hydrogen refers to all isotopes of hydrogen, which seems plausible.
However there's a second major flaw which is more consequential: heavy water is actually toxic in large quantities.
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heavy_water#Toxicity_in_humans
I think this probably implies that heavy water molecules are impurities in water (in the same way that salts contained in water are impurities, previously unknown to people saying 'water'), and we mean H2O (H being protium), as did our pre-discovery-of-H2O ancestors.
This argument presumably applies equally well to the three stable oxygen isotopes (it's the mass of heavy water which makes incompatible with our finely tuned biochemical processes).
I hope you will touch upon Habermas and Kant at one point in these series. Thanks.
In regards to the N1-B-N2 problem, we could also say that while B supervenes on N1, B has certain strongly emergent systemic (non-physical, symbolic) properties which although causally depend on N1 for their sheer occurrence, they are however not entirely reducible to N1 without a certain loss in the amount of information gained directly from B's system being active, therefore the supposed informational surplus occurring in B's symbolic level, accounts for its causal necessity to arrive at N2. Based on the emergentist idea, that systems as a whole produce properties which are in their content directly and necessarily supervenient only on the emergent system's whole (B) and only secondarily (as a necessary condition to their existence) supervenient on (N1) - (the whole is more than the sum of its parts, because the whole as a whole generates properties of its own, which by definition can not exist without the whole being active). Therefore N2 can only be understood as operating in an abstract space of such derived symbolic qualities, that is, it always already can only exist within the syntax of meanings created by B.
PS> an overwiev of Christine M. Korsgaard and constructivist ethics would also be appreciated
***** Oh, come on.
This series was really helpful and informative! However, I can't find part 8 anywhere 🍃
Your Ted Bundy example (18:32) presupposes that a world with different moral properties is at all possible. The moral absolutist would contend that in all possible worlds (differing in their natural properties) the moral properties must be the same. Nothing compels him to grant the possibility of a world with the same natural properties but different moral properties, thus the supervenience of moral properties over natural properties, at least in his eyes, is never instantiated. To this kind of moral realist, supervenience is a vacuously fulfilled conceptual premise and thus cannot bring about a refutation of his position.
The empirical investigation of the good might be determined non-naturally through statistical significance within a cohort that claim good refers to a functionalist description of a state of affairs that most agents agree to participant as a group to make realisable through coordinated actions where each member has a role that is a link in a coordinated sequence to bring about a social state of affairs. It's an open question if a social state of affairs is the case due to a sense of purpose based on ideology where ideology is a map of belief based on concepts such as person, property, rights, legitimate ownership etcetera. The state of affairs is given a term once realised as 'the good' which is a symbolic hence non-natural and marked with a full stop or whatever symbolises as a marker of success rather than failure. The good in a sense never is achieved because statistical significants is less than 100 percent but close enough that most members are satisfied to not rebel and form a resistance movement which would be bad for group cohesion as fragmentation entails failure of that state of affairs.
Thanks for this. You do a good job of clarifying some important points.
Very interesting video. Are you ever going to talk about a non-intuitionistic form of moral non-naturalism? Does anyone know of a view of this kind (aside from perhabs Divine Command Theory, even tho it being realist and not subjectivist is debatable).
Thank you for sharing your knowledge with us... it has been very very helpful!!!
The choice not to mute while coughing is an interesting one (:
Isn't Moore presupposing what Wittgenstein criticised as 'ostensive conception of language'? Isn't he being too essentialist?
Superb course. Very grateful to you.
Could these moral values be emergent properties. Not non natural in the sense that its floating around, but as an emergent non natural property that emerges on each new situation from the materials at hand.
Like choice, we as conscious creatures, have a choice, this is an emergent property of the universe but it is non natural in the sense that it is composed of natural properties, but there is no property that consists of choice. (maybe there is)
So goodness would be an emergent property of the universe but would never be able to tell us how we ought to behave like a moral law, but gives us a tool, along with choice to navigate what we should do.
I myself am not convinced that there is good/bad, more so believe in helpful/harmful to our desires. but im still working it out... love the videos. Great content, very helpful :)
Well, this video has me pursuaded that moral judgememts, like mathematical judgements are non-existing conceptual representations of existing things. However, at 40:46, have you considered whether moral consequences (which are different from moral judgements) might be an existing part of the natural world? (i.e., existing positive and negative experoences serve as the basis or our non-existing moral judgements)
39:19 perhaps I am unclear. Here is what I mean: from the perspective of an outsider passing a moral judgement (N2) of a cat being lit on fire (N1) with its corresponding moral property of wrongness (B), (B), (N1), and (N2) are seemingly seperate things. However, from the CATS point of view, both (B) and (N2) are a mere part of (N1).
Brilliant series.
Im kind of confused as to why 8:42 is an open question... If we assume that knowledge = "a justified true belief", are "John has justified true belief that P" and "John knows that P" not, by definition, the same thing, making it a closed question?
Great videos! Are you planning to do a part 8?
11:30 to 12:00 was too funny
LOLOLOLOL
Why does it sound like you are saying "Help!" at the very beginning 0:00😂
15:07
можно по-русски?