The Best Argument For Moral Realism?

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  • Опубліковано 25 гру 2024

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  • @lanceindependent
    @lanceindependent 2 роки тому +55

    I raised objections mostly to spur conversation, because this is my favorite topic. I'm self-conscious that my way of engaging: "why do you think that? I disagree!" etc. can come off as oppositional in an unpleasant way.
    But in case it doesn't come through clearly, while I object to the comments made in the video, I am enthusiastically in support of posting this content and am thrilled to see it here! While a part of me would be happy if everyone shared my philosophical positions, another, selfish part would be bored if there wasn't anyone who disagreed. So I'm glad there are moral and epistemic realists out there, so we can argue about it!
    Putnam came to Tufts about 10 years ago to give a talk, and he was incredible. Fast with the quips, a lot of fun to listen to, and really engaging and self-deprecating. The remark that stuck out most to me was when someone during the Q&A asked him if his current work conflicted with work he'd written many decades ago. He responded with something like "I don't know. I'm not a Putnam scholar."

    • @Philosophy_Overdose
      @Philosophy_Overdose  2 роки тому +6

      Assuming that you want to reduce categorical oughts to something like hypothetical oughts, what kind of status do you take hypothetical oughts to have? I mean, if they are themselves normative (and not descriptive), are they any less problematic or mysterious than their categorical counterparts?

    • @lanceindependent
      @lanceindependent 2 роки тому +7

      @@Philosophy_Overdose I reduce them to descriptive claims, so I also reject hypothetical oughts. I don't believe in irreducible normativity.
      ---
      Longer explanation
      Hypothethical oughts might be *less* problematic and mysterious than categorical oughts , but they're still too problematic and mysterious for me.
      I don't think that hypothetical norms "provide us with reasons" or furnish us with conditional "oughts" that somehow "apply" to us. I tend to think of such language as conceptually confused, and unable to be cashed out that is intelligible (at the very least, *I* can't make sense of them).
      Currently, my preferred way of describing my position would be "normative quietism." My general take on the contemporary literature on moral realism is that it relies on what regard as the same flawed methods as much of analytic philosophy. As a result of their methods, I think philosophers end up generating a variety of pseudoproblems that that result from various conceptual and lingusitic errors and confusions, one of these being the mistaken notion that there is a substantive, meaningful account of normative realism.
      My preferred way of reducing or eliminating normativity is to redescribe normative claims as consistency relations: there are facts about what would be consistent and inconsistent with the pursuit of particular goals, but I don't think these facts "provide" us with oughts (I put this in scare quotes because I think it's unintelligible; it's the sort of language that e.g., Parfit uses and that other moral realists like Huemer might use).
      With respect to normative realist accounts, I tend to favor a kind of trilemma challenge: I maintain that all such accounts are trivial (e.g., naturalism), false (e.g., theistic realism), or unintelligible (non-naturalist realism), or a combination of these.

    • @Philosophy_Overdose
      @Philosophy_Overdose  2 роки тому +5

      @@lanceindependent I thought you wanted to say that normativity was something stance dependent, not nonexistent and bunk. But if all purported normativity turns out to be something descriptive in the end, then it looks like there simply isn't anything normative to begin with. It's just a kind of illusion. And in that case, there are no reasons for doing anything, and there are no reasons for believing anything. But insofar as there are no reasons for believing anything, then that applies to that very view itself (i.e. there are no reasons for believing the view which itself tells us that there are no reasons for believing anything).

    • @lanceindependent
      @lanceindependent 2 роки тому +11

      @@Philosophy_Overdose Yea, that’s a natural assumption to make: If someone goes around saying that there are no stance-independent normative facts, it’s natural to assume they think that there are stance-dependent ones. But I don’t think there are either. Not really. I just don’t typically bother talking about the absence of the latter.
      //But if all purported normativity turns out to be something descriptive in the end, then it looks like there simply isn't anything normative to begin with. It's just a kind of illusion. //
      It may be an illusion to normative realists. I don’t think I am subject to any kind of illusion. That’s going to depend on each person’s phenomenology. I don’t have realist phenomenology.
      //And in that case, there are no reasons for doing anything, and there are no reasons for believing anything//
      I’d agree there aren’t the kinds of reasons realists (and some antirealists) think that there are.
      I do have a notion of reasons, but it's cashed out descriptive terms. Specifically, I take my “reasons” for doing things to involve relations between means and ends, e.g., “If you want to X, it would be consistent with this goal to Y.” This is similar to but not exactly a hypothetical imperative; it retains the conditional element but converts the normative element into a descriptive one.
      So if I said I have a reason to reject normative realism, this could be understood as “it is consistent with my goal to have true beliefs (at least about normative realism) to reject normative realism.”
      I want to believe normative realism is true iff it is true. I would bet you do, too. I don’t think we need any special kind of reason to believe things. We need simply *want* to believe it.
      Ultimately, if normative realists are going to insist that, given their stipulative use of the term “reason,” that I don’t have any reasons for belief, I am inclined to simply shrug. I’m not concerned with whether my belief-forming practices conform to philosophical criteria that have nothing to do with the pursuit of my goals and interests. I could simply say that I am only interested in having “shmeasons” for belief, where “shmeasons” are facts about what is and isn’t conducive to achieving my goals.
      I could then go around having no “reasons” for my beliefs, but nevertheless achieving all my goals, having a highly predictively accurate model of the world around me, and so on. If a normative realist wants to balk at me for going around believing without any “reasons,” I think the best way to show how meaningless this is to just go ahead and believe things without their notion of reasons, and show them that nothing terrible happens when you do this.
      I just shared this quote from David Lewis with someone else, but I’ll share it again, because I think it perfectly captures the spirit of my objections to normative realism:
      “Why care about objective value or ethical reality? The sanction is that if you do not, your inner states will fail to deserve folk-theoretical names. Not a threat that will strike terror into the hearts of the wicked! But whoever thought that philosophy could replace the hangman?”
      It’s the same with epistemic realism. If my belief-forming practices don’t conform to philosophical notions of what a “reason” is, well, so what? The only apparent consequence to this is that, according to the labeling systems of academic philosophers, I don’t have “reasons” for my beliefs. This is not a concern that is going to strike terror in my heart. It won’t even make me blink.

    • @Philosophy_Overdose
      @Philosophy_Overdose  2 роки тому +3

      @@lanceindependent Would you wanna come on the channel and discuss some of these things, if not with me, then with someone I choose to bring on? I've never hosted a debate or discussion before, but I've considering it....

  • @lugus9261
    @lugus9261 2 роки тому +10

    This is exactly what I wanted when I checked this channel

  • @rodolfo9916
    @rodolfo9916 Рік тому +7

    Epistemic values aren't stance independente, since they are only valuable for those who want to acquire knowledge, whereas, moral value should be stance independent.
    Therefore, you can belive in epstemic values without beliving in stance independente values (including moral values).

    • @irish_deconstruction
      @irish_deconstruction Рік тому

      Yeah, but I think the whole thing is that they are both stance independent in terms of axiology, as there is no way or no point of trying to seek out knowledge if knowledge is not stance independent.

    • @rodolfo9916
      @rodolfo9916 Рік тому

      @@irish_deconstruction Yes, knowledge is stance independente, you don't need to be a moral realist to agree with that.
      Knowledge isn't a value term, therefore, the fact that knowledge is stance independente does nothing to prove the existence of stance independente values.

  • @AccountingCNumberz
    @AccountingCNumberz Рік тому +2

    Do you still have the Brain in a Vat clip of Putnam? I remember seeing it a few years ago. It's the same interview setting, same background; and in it Putnam gives the back-story of the BIV thought experiment and briefly goes over the argument. It would be much appreciated!!

  • @johnnywilley8522
    @johnnywilley8522 2 роки тому +47

    Worst Larry David impression ever

    • @bpatrickhoburg
      @bpatrickhoburg 2 роки тому +2

      Funny but I think according to age David would be impersonating Putnam

    • @rodrigovega79
      @rodrigovega79 Рік тому +2

      ​@@bpatrickhoburgCorrect, but I think getting your facts straight isnt a rule in comedy

    • @Simulera
      @Simulera 8 місяців тому

      Other way around

  • @samadams1998
    @samadams1998 Рік тому +7

    I feel like this is argument is like saying “if you deny objective aesthetic value, you’d have to deny the objectivity of all normative values”. Like, why do moral realists accept the subjectivity of aesthetic values, but refuse to see the possibility that moral values might act the same. I’m not even saying the moral realist has to/should agree with that, I’m asking why they see holding that position as invalid?

    • @andreasplosky8516
      @andreasplosky8516 10 місяців тому

      Excellent point.

    • @Nexus-jg7ev
      @Nexus-jg7ev 7 місяців тому +4

      No, the argument is that if you want to deny objective moral values for certain reasons, consistency requires that you also give up objective epistemic values, which is self-defeating for any argument because it means that it doesn't matter how rational, plausible or coherent an argument is because that wouldn't make the conclusion of an argument objectively true and that it doesn't have to be believed even if it is true, which is self-evidently absurd.

    • @samadams1998
      @samadams1998 7 місяців тому +1

      @@Nexus-jg7ev this sounds like the companions in guilt argument, which I don’t think works. I’ll try to keep my response brief but my main response is that just because one set of objective norms existing does not imply that other objective norms exist. Just because objective epistemic norms exist doesn’t imply that, for instance, objective norms about sanctity also exist. If a theist says “X is sacred” and the atheist replies “no it’s not, because sanctity values don’t exist”, nobody accuses the atheist of also threatening epistemic values. They seem to intuitively understand that what the atheist is denying is the source of the norms of sanctity. Similarly, I can accept the source of epistemic norms, while realizing that I have no reason to believe there is anything which establishes moral norms.
      I agree that, if you deny moral values for very specific reasons, you would also have to deny epistemic values. I think the CIG works as a response to a basic form of error theory. But my argument is simply that I see no epistemic reason or justification to believe that objective moral values exist, in the same way the atheist sees no reason to believe god exists.
      My argument is essentially:
      (1) an agent has a reason to X when Xing would promote or obtain their valuable state of affairs
      (2) value is, and can only be, an attitude of approval conferred onto things by each individual agent based on their subjective attitudes
      (3) so the states of affairs valuable for each agent are relative to that agents evaluative attitudes
      (4) so what each agent has reason to do is relative to their subjective evaluative attitudes.
      Edit: I should probably add that I think norms for action, aka what we have reason to to, are established by what we subjectively place value on, whereas epistemic norms don’t take ‘value’ into account at all

    • @Nexus-jg7ev
      @Nexus-jg7ev 7 місяців тому

      @@samadams1998 Yeah, I think that you are right about the CIG argument being a response against a more basic form of error theory that says that there are no objective values whatsoever. I think that it is also a response to the is-oght gap, as it shows that evaluative beliefs can give us reasons to take certain actions, for example the theory A being better than theory B giving us a strong reason to prefer theory A over theory B, where theory A is better because it is simpler and at least on par in terms of explanatory power. These values - being simpler and equal or better in terms of explanatory power - are an objective standard that makes theory A better than theory B. They need not be agreed upon by individuals and they do not depend on the attitudes of individuals.
      What you might be right about is that the CIG does not necessarily entail that moral values are also objective. I have been thinking about this myself, actually. I don't think that this is entailed. The best this argument can achieve is refute some anti-realist objections to general objectivity and is-ought derivation. Also, this argument shows that the common objections like disagreement, diversity, etc do not work against both epistemic and moral values. The anti-realist will need better arguments. I think that objective moral values will also require some things to have intrinsic moral value like the things that have intrinsic epistemic value. It is not implausible at least that some things might be values because they are valuable, rather than things being valuable because they are valued. It seems at least prima facie equiprobable that humans either superimpose value onto things, or that they detect value that is already in things. I actually think that in certain cases the latter is more probable. I do think that there are things that have intrinsic moral value. Disagreement can be explained with error and moral blindness just as it can be explained with moral value depending on the attitudes of observers.

    • @Nexus-jg7ev
      @Nexus-jg7ev 7 місяців тому

      @@samadams1998 Hmm, or am I too quick to agree with you? Perhaps I'll need to think more. Because there does seem to be at least one similarity between epistemic and moral facts - that they can be normative and action guiding.

  • @paulheinrichdietrich9518
    @paulheinrichdietrich9518 2 роки тому +3

    I've been looking for this wonderful interview for a long time now. It was uploaded to UA-cam but was soon taken down. Do you happen to have the entire thing?

  • @marcusshera1232
    @marcusshera1232 2 роки тому +1

    Would anyone know where to go to cite Putnam on this issue?

  • @jeremyhansen9197
    @jeremyhansen9197 2 роки тому +5

    I would categories this as technically true, but no more convincing then any other argument for objective moral values. I agree that I'd you wish to be consistent, and you don't believe in objective moral value, then you should also not believe that consistency is an objective epistemic value. I for one wish to be consistent, so I accept the conclusion. Its not that big of a bullet.
    At the end of the day even if consistency is an "objective epistemic value", those who don't care to be consistent probably don't care enough to follow the category anyway so what difference does it really make?

    • @bozdowleder2303
      @bozdowleder2303 Рік тому

      The difference is that there really is a world out there and it places limits on what you can believe without experience supplying a correction. With morality, even the idea that the value of a moral system is judged by its consequences is itself done within the framework of the ethical theory called consequentialism. If we all become consequentialists, and if all agree on what makes a world good, then morality becomes empirical except that in that it would not any longer be morality but social science. And of course we don't agree on what a good world looks like. And we don't even agree on consequentialism. The stance of the moral anti-realist is merely that if we have moral differences, then we cannot settle the question in some neutral territory. It's a matter of taste

    • @jeremyhansen9197
      @jeremyhansen9197 Рік тому

      @bozdowleder2303 The real world can only impact your world view if you care about being consistent with empirical data. Ultimately it comes down to whether or not you value truth. I care about truth personally, but what could you actually say to a person that doesn't care about truth other than to appeal to other things they value personally?
      As for consequentialism I see no reason why I can't dabble in the the consequences of particular normative theories while rejecting the metaethical justifications.
      After thinking about it I think my original comment actually concedes too much. After all let's say you prove that empirical norms are categorical. So what? That doesn't mean mean all norms are categorical. People used to debate about aesthetics being objective yet most agree that isn't so. At best it shows that certain arguments for moral antirealism aren't convincing. It does nothing to show that moral realism is true.

    • @bozdowleder2303
      @bozdowleder2303 Рік тому

      ​​@@jeremyhansen9197When we look for facts though, we have to be consistent. But with morality, it is not clear that good moral choices are those which have good consequences. And it is not clear that there is any objective standard of goodness we can measure those consequences by anyway. So there is a difference between facts and values. That's precisely the distinction Putnam is trying to blur here

  • @andreasplosky8516
    @andreasplosky8516 10 місяців тому +2

    Wow, if that is supposed to be the best argument for moral realism, then obviously moral realism is false.

  • @GottfriedLeibnizYT
    @GottfriedLeibnizYT 2 роки тому +7

    Why does this argument come off as a cheap trick?

    • @jejethejeplalq821
      @jejethejeplalq821 Рік тому +6

      Because it is...
      The lamest argument for moral realism i've ever heard.

    • @jeevacation
      @jeevacation 8 місяців тому

      It almost says that morality can be falsifiable because its compared to science which just isn't true. It's a really bad argument

    • @RickyVids2001
      @RickyVids2001 2 місяці тому

      @@jeevacation Where did he compare morality to science? He compared morality to epistemology. Also, I don't think you know what "falsifiable" means.

    • @jeevacation
      @jeevacation 2 місяці тому

      @RitiksVideos Hi, I was bad at philosophy back then, so I apologize for my hubris. I am still bad but less so comparative to old me, so I may look at morality again when I get the time.

  • @jm-lc3jp
    @jm-lc3jp Рік тому +3

    "you should have good reasons for the things you believe" could just mean, "I WANT/PREFER/ADORE others to give good reasons for their beliefs, but don't believe this is objective in any sense of that word. If you don't agree with my "should" we cant dialog and my want/preference/desire is not satisfied, but there's no objective grounding of this belief no matter how strongly I hold it"

  • @Khuno2
    @Khuno2 2 роки тому +16

    Once the fact value distinction is abandoned, there doesn't seem to be much left for the moral anti-realist to argue about.

    • @StopFear
      @StopFear 2 роки тому +1

      ok, but what would inherently be wrong with abandoning value distinction?

    • @lanceindependent
      @lanceindependent 2 роки тому +1

      Can you elaborate? I'm not sure what you mean by abandoning the distinction, or why there'd be nothing much left for antirealists like me to talk about. I've got a lot to talk about.

    • @Khuno2
      @Khuno2 2 роки тому +4

      @@lanceindependent My bad, I didn't see this. If we give up on the distinction between fact and value, we are not eliminating values or facts. That is, we're not saying that everything is mind dependent (including that?! Yikes), or mind independent (including that?! Yikes), but that the distinction between mind dependence and independence is itself incoherent, ushering in a new post realist/antirealist discourse. That could be a controversial read, but it's what I mean by it. Such a discourse leaves no room for the ethical antirealist to deny ethical truths, because it denies them the very ground that they articulate their position upon.

    • @TeaParty1776
      @TeaParty1776 2 роки тому +1

      @@Khuno2 What about the is-tree distinction?

    • @lanceindependent
      @lanceindependent 2 роки тому

      @@Khuno2 I don't know what it means to give up the distinction between facts and values.

  • @radscorpion8
    @radscorpion8 Місяць тому

    This just seems so easy to defeat. They provide no argument except, it feels bad to reject epistemic values. You may as well say it feels bad to think a moral crime is only relative and not "really wrong". Aren't these really bad arguments? Especially the using of emotion - a subjective response - to indicate whether we should accept something as objective or not? The whole point of objectivity is that it is stance-independent, so whether or nor you "like" that epistemic values might be subjective, should be irrelevant to the discussion?

  • @luszczi
    @luszczi 2 роки тому +18

    It seems like the kind of argument that can only convince the already convinced. Those who reject moral realism would usually have no problem accepting the consequences outlined here.

    • @Philosophy_Overdose
      @Philosophy_Overdose  2 роки тому +22

      This type of argument actually has convinced many moral anti-realists, myself included.

    • @Djdu7228xnxj
      @Djdu7228xnxj 2 роки тому +6

      I think Moral Realism is way more based than Cultural Relativism.

    • @lanceindependent
      @lanceindependent 2 роки тому +5

      I agree. I don't even see the allegedly undesirable consequences as undesirable. I'm a global normative antirealist, and reject realism both objective moral and epistemic facts.

    • @lanceindependent
      @lanceindependent 2 роки тому +1

      @@Philosophy_Overdose This convinced you?Why? Why not just reject epistemic realism, too?

    • @skepticlvl1897
      @skepticlvl1897 2 роки тому +2

      I think the point is that whatever argument convinced you to reject moral realsim requires the belive in realism about epistimic values. So for example if your argument is that objective moral values must be proven empirically to exist before a belive in their existence is justified then you are saying that having empirical evidence for your believes is an epistimic value. You are basically saying that moral anti realists will reject both moral and epistimic values due to their commitment to epistimic values which they don't believe actually exist.

  • @CMVMic
    @CMVMic Рік тому

    Isnt Hilary Putnam a functionalist? If so, wouldn't his definition of physicalism dissolve the object/subject distinction? If so, then a moral fact is simply a physical event, not an objective abstract object.

  • @dandiacal
    @dandiacal Рік тому +1

    I think philosophy goes wrong when it engages in what I would call excessive specificity. I think all the arguments against moral realism are reactions to this specificity rather than moral realism. One of the forms of specificity of course is traditional even fundamentalist religious faith. These I think tarnish moral realism and make people suspicious that moral realism must be virtually synonymous with those ideals. It is true that religion in the forms I just described do claim to be morally realist but I take that to be an accidental relation and that, moreover they might actually be wrong about what moral realism is. It is a little like having only eaten fast food and thinking that this is the essence of what food is all about or should be about, in ignorance of all other possibilities of cuisine. I think a lot of scientific materialist arguments are deflationary like that. The problem is with bad forms of realism, not realism itself.

    • @Riskofdisconnect
      @Riskofdisconnect Рік тому

      To be honest with you I don't think there need to be such a thing as arguments for moral antirealism beyond general skeptical arguments. antirealism seems to me the logical starting point as it assumes nothing, or at least the minimal necessary to have moral discussion, not to mention how it appeals to me intuitively. Moral realism on the other hand has always seemed a very difficult thing to believe in unless you take for granted the existence of the supernatural, which I try not to. I'd be interested to hear any "good form" of realism you know of as I have been trying for very long to find any convincing realist argument, even from atheist realists, and haven't found one.

    • @dandiacal
      @dandiacal Рік тому

      @@Riskofdisconnect Well if you are predisposed to be against realism because of an a priori commitment to atheism, your intuitions will of course be different. I think that is an intuitional thing maybe. And I certainly don't know of any arguments you would accept. The ones I think are bad and for the reason I stated however doesn't make me an anti-realist.

    • @bozdowleder2303
      @bozdowleder2303 Рік тому

      ​​@@RiskofdisconnectActually even the existence of the supernatural contributes nothing to the debate. If there were a deity with moral opinions, those are just as arbitrary as anybody else's unless you believe in the claim(which most people would reject if presented in this form) that might makes right

  • @ohrobert65
    @ohrobert65 2 місяці тому

    Moral impulses are driven by our perceptions of value. Moral facts are bound to objective value based on replaceability and exclusive effects to create and preserve possibilities for the future.
    Everything that anyone values can be described according to their perceptions of possibilities for the future. Our perceptions are limited by our knowledge and can be distorted by our preferences, but the qualities of rarity and exclusive effects are objective facts that can be quantified and compared.
    If it is irrational to sacrifice a valuable thing to create a less valuable thing, then it must be immoral to diminish a priceless thing to produce a less than priceless effect.
    Killing children for fun is objectively immoral because fun is infinitely replaceable with limited possibilities and children are each unique and irreplaceable with immeasurable possibilities.
    It is impossible for most modern people to enslave other people groups because science demonstrates that the differences in people groups are superficial and we all suffer from the loss of our freedom because of our representational thinking imposes a concept of time and mortality on all people that requires us to want and worry about the future.
    People have developed an understanding of humanity that makes slavery obviously wrong, no matter what the Bible says.
    Our moral impulses change as we learn more about ourselves and the world because there are moral facts to discover in the Naturalistic universe.

  • @lanceindependent
    @lanceindependent 2 роки тому +14

    Thanks for posting this! These are versions of Companions in Guilt arguments. Such arguments appeal to a parity premise, which holds that criticisms about norms in the moral domain would extend to criticisms in some other normative domain, typically epistemic normativity (though one could appeal to norms in other domains, such as prudential norms).
    I find the best response to be a simple, blunt, and straightforward one: I completely accept the parity premise, but I also deny stance-independent normativity and categoricity for epistemic norms as well. My problem with moral realism isn't the moral part, it's the realism part. And the same would be true of epistemic realism and any other type of normative realism.
    So I don't find the points raised in this video to be good arguments for moral realism. I find them to be good arguments against epistemic realism. I agree that moral and epistemic norms are in the same boat. I simply think that both boats sink, as does every other boat. Happy to discuss this any time!

    • @pinecone421
      @pinecone421 2 роки тому +1

      Is this Lance?
      Also I agree. It always seemed like the anti-realist would just as readily deny epistemic norms as she would moral norms.

    • @samcopeland3155
      @samcopeland3155 2 роки тому +10

      How do you have access to a stance-independent truth like that there is no stance-independent normativity without recourse to stance-independent epistemic norms? I would like to learn this trick.

    • @77capr3
      @77capr3 2 роки тому +2

      So, is it true that these are versions of Companions in Guilt arguments?

    • @lanceindependent
      @lanceindependent 2 роки тому +1

      @@77capr3 They're not formally presented as such but they seem to gesture in that direction.

    • @lanceindependent
      @lanceindependent 2 роки тому +2

      @@MrLcowles No. That's not a position I endorse and it's not something I said. That also wouldn't be solipisim even if I did say that.

  • @joshtooze7698
    @joshtooze7698 2 роки тому +9

    They're basically saying "it would really suck if we had to give up objectivity of epistemic values, Truth with a capital T, and so we should keep objective moral values because its essentially the same thing." That's really not a good argument. Im with Rorty on this one, the pragmatist fallibilist framework is the only one that makes sense. Morals not only differ between and within cultures, they also change over time. To claim that your view of morality is objective is really just you claiming power and omniscience.

    • @lanceindependent
      @lanceindependent 2 роки тому +4

      I don't think it's really saying that. Epistemic realism is simply the claim that there are stance-independent epistemic facts about which epistemic practices we should employ.
      You don't have to be an epistemic realist to endorse truth (or "Truth" with a capital T).
      For instance, you could be an epistemic relativist, and believe that there are no categorical epistemic norms, but that there are hypothetical epistemic norms. If so, you could say something like this:
      "If you want to have true beliefs, then you ought to accept the conclusions of valid arguments with true premises."
      If you construe all epistemic claims as conditional claims where, given some goal, you ought to employ a particular practice, one can simply point to that set of epistemic practices that are truth-conducive and, presto, you can have true beliefs.
      I'm a normative antirealist, and thus also an epistemic antirealist, and one of my goals is to raise awareness about how all forms of normative realism are at best trivial or false, but in most cases are simply unintelligible.
      Realists often frame their views as being more "commonsense" but this isn't true. See Polzler and Wright's Antirealist Pluralism paper, and Taylor Davis's Beyond Objectivism paper. Our best and most recent studies tend to find that most participants in studies reject moral realism. There isn't similar research on epistemic realism, but we may find much the same: philosophers make assumptions about how people think without any empirical evidence to support those claims.
      Yet they'll also imply that there's something self-defeating or impossible about not accepting various forms of realism. I don't think their arguments are convincing.

    • @joshtooze7698
      @joshtooze7698 2 роки тому +1

      @@lanceindependent After reading your response, I think we are in agreement on antirealism. You seem to take issue with me conflating the phrase "Truth with a capital T" with objective normative epistemic and moral claims?
      I would say the example of arriving at truth you gave isnt my idea of "Truth with a capital T." I was talking about the foundationalist approach where there is thought to be some objective Truth independent of our perception that is discovered, not invented. I dont think normative/moral/value claims exist objectively, apart from our minds. That's why I didnt find Putnam's argument particularly persuasive in favor of moral realism.

    • @lanceindependent
      @lanceindependent 2 роки тому +2

      @@joshtooze7698 Not too much issue. Just not sure exactly what you meant by that. Thanks for clarifying.
      I don't find his argument persuasive for a reason that doesn't seem to have gained much attention in the academic literature: I don't think there are any nontrivial notions of moral realism that are even intelligible. If you ask realists to explain what they mean by a stance-independent normative factL
      (1) Naturalists are going to identify it with some kind of natural fact, which is going to look descriptive, and strips it of all the normativity I take as essential for it to be nontrivial
      (2) Or they're going to go the non-naturalist route, and things immediately become very obscure. Parfit talks of object-given reasons, and others similarly speak of external reasons, but I have no idea what these are, and I suspect it's because the whole concept is meaningless. When asked to explain, I'll get unsatisfying accounts, e.g., they're things that "count in favor" of an action. This just trades one meaningless term for another. Or I'll be told the concepts are "primitive" and thus cannot be explained. I find this highly suspicious, and, at the very least, I do not appear to have such primitive concepts.

    • @lanceindependent
      @lanceindependent 2 роки тому +1

      @Bagpuss Bagpuss Thanks!
      Are you presenting that with any metaethical presuppositions in mind? I endorse the normative stance that, all else being equal, one ought to keep promises. But insofar as that's a "moral fact," it's a moral fact about my personal moral standards. It might be a fact about other people's moral standards, but I don't take it to be something that is true independent of and without being relativized to any particular standard.

    • @ericchristen2623
      @ericchristen2623 2 роки тому

      Nonsense. It's culturally acceptable to enslave children and then kill young girls who refuse an arranged marriage in some countries. Wrong in any eternity, society or planet...

  • @manavkhatarkar9983
    @manavkhatarkar9983 2 роки тому +2

    whenever I see Hillary Putnam, im reminded of Rick Hoffman (Louis Litt) 😬...

  • @gamerhegel7780
    @gamerhegel7780 2 роки тому +5

    This doesn't consider one of Rorty's key objections to the concept of objectivity. Putnam seems to me to implicitly want to justify a universal community of justification, where arguments are considered by everyone on the planet equally. But this kind of justification community is not necessarily desireable for someone like Rorty. Are modern hunter-gatherers, cows, or ppl with dementia really part of some universal community of justification? I don't think so, and if you don't want to think so, you'll just make up a lot of issues to have headaches about, I tell ya. Another objection would be that worrying about the difference between subjectivity and objectivity is useless for people who aren't in philosophy just because they need to be right all the time.

    • @gamerhegel7780
      @gamerhegel7780 2 роки тому

      This is all so useless. Go outside and have a life, don't worry wether your opinions are 'objectively' true or not bruv

  • @mojdemarvast2366
    @mojdemarvast2366 2 роки тому +2

    It seems to me that maybe social life solved the moral aspect through binding laws and regulations...
    Does it come from our expectations in our individual life?
    Or does it lead us to our expectations in our individual life?

    • @ericchristen2623
      @ericchristen2623 2 роки тому

      Binding laws for the general poor but not the ruling elite. Shakespeare was right. Before we can have civilisation we must shoot all the lawyers...

    • @mohamedkharashi846
      @mohamedkharashi846 2 роки тому

      I said it come form both. Experience live is creative us. Before we recognise any things in this world, before we know the different between the right and wrong we find a system of moral in our society. After that when we start thinking in this society values we can make a new values, we will choose our morality. It’s dialectic.

  • @cpolychreona
    @cpolychreona 2 роки тому +5

    The obvious difference between moral and epistemic values is that the latter are falsifiable. Non-adherence will sooner or later result in contradiction, or, at the very least, objectively demonstrable inefficiency. No such thing is possible with moral values.

    • @Dgilstrapnature
      @Dgilstrapnature 2 роки тому

      Moral values are falsifiable through assessments of human flourishing, both individually and collectively, no?

    • @cpolychreona
      @cpolychreona 2 роки тому

      @@Dgilstrapnature You just discovered the guiding principle of ethics: flourishing. Now, we only need to find an answer to questions like "does flourishing include the right to bear battle-grade semi-automatic rifles? "

    • @Dgilstrapnature
      @Dgilstrapnature 2 роки тому +1

      @@cpolychreona Indeed we must, but the point still stands.

    • @martinbennett2228
      @martinbennett2228 2 роки тому

      I do not think you are right about that: even statements of emotive dispositions are falsifiable if it is accepted that emotive dispositions are the outcome of neurobiology.

    • @deryaalkan5766
      @deryaalkan5766 Рік тому

      ⁠@@martinbennett2228this doesn’t make much sense to me. How are emotive dispositions falsifiable just because they derive from a common source (neurobiology). Even deriving from a common objective material source doesn’t universalize emotive dispositions. We all conjure up moral beliefs from our brain. But does this mean that just because we all have brains, that there is some objective moral disposition? The mere existence of two different moral dispositions both coming from a common source (a human brain) immediately invalidates this theory. If I said that killing was good, would you say that this is falsifiable because we both have brains?

  • @DaKoopaKing
    @DaKoopaKing 2 роки тому +19

    Normativity antirealists rise up!

  • @martinbennett2228
    @martinbennett2228 2 роки тому

    The fundamental value judgement is that of choosing objective material reality over solipsism. Whilst most without thinking flip between the two, I do not think anyone manages to be a consistent solipsist. Maintaining a consistent commitment to objective material reality is possible (though not that easy either). However, I think this includes accepting that all states are dependent on prior material causes.
    Value judgements and emotional dispositions are also the result of material causes, so objective in the sense that material reality is objective.
    How science is carried out, how and where it is reported, how it is transmitted involves a series of value judgements. These value judgements are secondary to the value judgement that rejects solipsism. The commitment to objective material reality, however, lacks an ontological place for any kind of non-real agency.

    • @bozdowleder2303
      @bozdowleder2303 Рік тому

      But even if you are a solipsist you still have to explain your perceptual reality. Solipsists and idealists may think they have evaded the problem of explaining the world But they have merely changed the semantics. There is still a world out there. Even if it's all in your head, its complexity, its organizing laws, the origin stories of various things you see - all need explanation

  • @rareword
    @rareword 2 роки тому +2

    It's more overdose than philosophy.

  • @oioi9372
    @oioi9372 Рік тому

    We live in the world where people ask for justification that morals are real😂 like it is not self evident

    • @bozdowleder2303
      @bozdowleder2303 Рік тому +2

      How exactly is it self-evident? What exactly is self-evident? Tastes in food exist certainly but nobody claims there is an objective correct taste. Similarly just because people have morals doesn't mean there is an objective morality

    • @oioi9372
      @oioi9372 Рік тому

      ​@@bozdowleder2303since conscious rational creatures are moral agents, it follows that morality is true by definition, and since moral agents are real, it is true that morals are objective facts. Due to all of us having immediate experience of moral consciousness, it is self evident that this is our reality. Self evident means it is true by observation, namely, we directly experience morals so it is true that morals are evident

  • @djl8710
    @djl8710 2 роки тому +2

    I still eat meat though

  • @uhadme
    @uhadme 2 роки тому +2

    Mind reader wannabe babbled hypothetical strawmen to 2 mins.. nuff said

    • @Rudi361
      @Rudi361 2 роки тому +1

      Then read John Mackies works on anti realism and then you see how it isn‘t a straw man