Thank you for starting explaining Marxism so clearly. I learned new perspectives on Marx. I look forward to future videos. Thanks for the education. I love this channel.
This poem by Marx has a very dark and somber tone (especially considering he was once a professed Christian): "So a god has snatched from me my all In the curse and rack of Destiny. All his worlds are gone beyond recall! Nothing but revenge is left to me! On myself revenge I'll proudly wreak, On that being, that enthroned Lord, Make my strength a patchwork of what's weak, Leave my better self without reward! I shall build my throne high overhead, Cold, tremendous shall its summit be. For its bulwark-- superstitious dread, For its Marshall--blackest agony. Who looks on it with a healthy eye, Shall turn back, struck deathly pale and dumb; Clutched by blind and chill Mortality May his happiness prepare its tomb. And the Almighty's lightning shall rebound From that massive iron giant. If he bring my walls and towers down, Eternity shall raise them up, defiant".
"So as human beings, we have material needs, so we all need to eat, drink, and find shelter to survive. And if we don't meet these needs, nothing else matters. And Marx puts it simply, 'Life involves, before everything else, eating and drinking, housing and clothing, and various other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself'. Marx argues that it doesn't make sense to start a philosophical theory by talking about God, morality, or justice if we haven't first explained how people actually satisfy their basic material needs." Now, while it is undeniable that humans have material needs (food, shelter, clothing, etc.), to define the human being only in terms of material needs is to neglect the rational and moral dimensions of human nature. Human beings are not simply animals that act to satisfy their instincts; they are rational beings, capable of discerning truth, understanding moral principles, and engaging in deliberate action based on these principles. Thus, our most fundamental need is not the satisfaction of material needs, but the duty to live according to the truth-specifically, the truth about what is morally right and just. To live morally right is to live in a way that honors our nature as rational, responsible beings who are capable of discerning good from evil, and who have an obligation to act according to that discernment. One of the distinguishing features of humanity is that reason and moral conscience must guide our decisions. Humans are aware of moral obligations-for instance, the duty not to murder, to respect others, and to live in harmony with others. These moral duties are evident to us, not simply because they are social conventions or pragmatic guidelines, but because we have an inherent understanding of what is morally right. In the words of the philosopher Immanuel Kant, humans are called to live according to the moral law inscribed within us-a law which commands us to treat others always as ends in themselves, and not merely as means to an end. While fulfilling basic needs can support the biological life, they do not suffice for the true flourishing of human life, which is realized in the pursuit of moral goodness. The duty to live morally right is something that we are aware of and have the capacity to follow, even if it is difficult or goes against our immediate desires. For example, we may feel tempted to act selfishly, but the moral law teaches us to act selflessly for the good of others. In this way, the fulfillment of our material needs may be necessary for survival, but it is the moral imperative to live in accordance with the truth and to will what is good that forms the essence of the good life. Thus, the moral life-the pursuit of virtue, justice, and truth-is not an optional or secondary aspect of human existence, but the most fundamental need of human beings. This is what gives meaning to our lives. Our rational nature compels us to ask questions about goodness, justice, and purpose, and it is through living morally that we fulfill our true human potential. This calls for more than simply satisfying material needs; it calls for the formation of our will and intellect according to the highest standards of truth and morality. Material needs, though important for biological survival, do not define what it means to be truly human. What defines us is our capacity to choose what is good, to act justly, and to live according to the truth-a truth that transcends mere materialism. Therefore, the highest human calling is to live in moral harmony with the truth, for in doing so, we fulfill our true nature as rational and moral beings. This is what gives life its ultimate meaning and purpose. Moreover, the provision of material needs does not necessarily guarantee bodily life. For it is not enough, for the preservation of the body’s life, to have food and drink, clothing, shelter, and medicine. We will all eventually die, and then the important issue will not be any material possessions, nor even the presence of those with whom we share the closest blood relation, but rather our spiritual and moral condition before God.
What happens when intellect, sophistication and overwhelming loveliness come together and manifest in one human being?...............this channel has the answer! Greetings from Germany.
Material conditions driving ideas make a lot sense when civilizations were isolated from each other, each one developing based on their geography and climate. In early civilizations, these material conditions shaped the childhood, so to speak, of civilizations and countries. However, it is hard to deny that once these ideas are created (mostly by material conditions), they have a very strong inertia. Even with industrialization, East and West have taken very different paths
Denying the possibility of metaphysical knowledge is self-contradictory because doing so requires ultimate knowledge of reality, which is precisely what metaphysics seeks to investigate. To deny the possibility of metaphysical knowledge is to claim that human beings cannot attain reliable or meaningful knowledge about the ultimate nature of reality. Such denial implies an epistemological position that either limits knowledge to empirical or scientific inquiry (e.g., logical positivism), or asserts that reality is inherently unknowable (e.g., some forms of skepticism). To deny the possibility of metaphysical knowledge implicitly makes a claim about the ultimate nature of reality. It presupposes that reality is such that metaphysical knowledge cannot be attained. This is itself a metaphysical assertion about the limits of human cognition and the nature of reality. The claim assumes some understanding of what "ultimate reality" entails (e.g., that it is inaccessible or unknowable). It implicitly claims to know the boundaries of what can or cannot be known, which is itself a metaphysical judgment. So to deny metaphysical knowledge requires a level of ultimate knowledge about reality to justify the denial. However, possessing such knowledge would itself be an instance of metaphysical knowledge. Therefore, the denial undermines itself by presupposing what it denies. Then even the rejection of metaphysics involves implicit metaphysical assumptions about the nature of reality and knowledge. For example, scientific naturalism assumes a metaphysical framework where only natural phenomena exist and can be known. And we have to note that denying metaphysical inquiry contradicts the nature of human reason, which seeks to understand the ultimate causes and principles underlying experience. Any coherent philosophical system must address metaphysical questions, even indirectly. Even attempts to limit knowledge to empirical or observable phenomena rely on metaphysical frameworks. Therefore, metaphysical inquiry is not only possible but necessary for a coherent understanding of reality. The denial of metaphysics ultimately collapses into affirming it. If it is said that Marx does not explicitly deny the possibility of metaphysical knowledge in a philosophical sense but rather rejects its relevance or utility for understanding and transforming the material conditions of human life, even that raises a significant issue. By elevating material conditions and economic structures as the primary realities, he implicitly endorses an ontological hierarchy where the material is fundamental, and the ideal or abstract is secondary and derivative. This constitutes a metaphysical claim about the nature of reality, specifically that material reality is the most basic or "real" aspect of existence. There are also epistemological assumptions: Marx assumes that knowledge about the material world (e.g., economic and social structures) is the most relevant and reliable form of knowledge for understanding and transforming reality. This presupposes an epistemological stance that privileges material and empirical inquiry over metaphysical or idealist approaches. His critique of traditional metaphysics as irrelevant or ideological does not exempt his own system from metaphysical scrutiny. His materialism operates as a metaphysical framework, even if he does not explicitly label it as such. Marx’s historical materialism can be seen as a metaphysical system that asserts the primacy of matter over mind, the economic base over the superstructure, and practical activity over speculative thought. This system implicitly denies the independent existence or primacy of abstract entities (e.g., universal truths or ideals) unless they are rooted in material reality. His dialectical approach further emphasizes that change and progress in reality are driven by contradictions within material conditions, not by abstract or transcendent principles. This is itself a metaphysical view of how reality functions. If Marx critiques metaphysics for being ideological or irrelevant, how does he justify his own materialist framework without appealing to metaphysical assumptions? His critique of metaphysics could be seen as undermined by the unacknowledged metaphysical commitments of his materialism. Marx’s prioritization of material conditions shows us that metaphysical inquiry is unavoidable. By asserting the primacy of the material, he effectively participates in a metaphysical debate about the nature of reality. The tension between Marx’s rejection of traditional metaphysics and his implicit reliance on materialist metaphysics raises questions about the coherence of his position. Should we consider his critique of metaphysics valid if it depends on unacknowledged metaphysical commitments? Of course we shouldn't!
Okay I don't speak such fancy english, respect to you! To say it in my words, although there might be some incoherence in Marx, I still think he provides some important ideas that shouldn't be discarded as invalid. Although there is no natural law that condemns inequality or violence, still we are all physical beings inseparable from our materialist reality. Take for example those indigenous tribes where people lived 'free from oppression': in the end, their way of living was violently replaced. So my question to you is how could any meaningful metaphyical knowledge be obtained without basing it on material reality?
@@alexzimmi4827That is a very good question (by the way, indeed, oppression is evidently something wrong. I do not claim that all of Marx's criticisms are incorrect, but rather that we should not assume it is possible to start a philosophical system without metaphysics and an ethical framework). And the answer to your question would be: Metaphysical knowledge is possible without being based on material reality, as it is grounded instead in the immaterial reality that is the subject of metaphysical investigation. Metaphysics deals with the ultimate reality of things, and this reality cannot be material, since thoughts or ideas themselves are not material, nor is the mind from which they originate and in which those thoughts or ideas exist. Thus, ideas must be well-ordered (according to logic), which leads us to truths that transcend sensory experience, and therefore, material objects. These truths about immaterial objects, especially those that form the foundation of reality, are the subject of metaphysics. Concepts such as causality, contingency, necessity, and being, among others, are addressed by metaphysics, especially being qua being, that is, what it means for something to exist in the most fundamental sense. Knowledge of these matters is not properly based on material reality, since it transcends that very reality and does not have it as its object. I hope this helps. If you need further explanation, feel free to ask.
Saying that Marx denied metaphysical thought is just a lie in an effort to discredit the legitimacy of his work. Your entire essay is a waste of time since it operates on hallucinations
This doesn't really engage with Marx, or for that matter the Scottish Enlightenment figures that are the source for his "material" response to Hegel, on the question so much as the vulgar Marxists of the 20th century. It doesn't address Hegel, which should be the starting point on Marx's philosophy broadly. Even if you're going for a strictly materialist early Marx, say around his dissertation, you'd want to deal with the fact that the majority of Marx's notes aren't actually on the ancients, but on Hume and Spinoza, who were clearly shaping his approach to these problems. Marx, and Smith for that matter, simply isn't doing what you're suggesting he's doing.
@@gianrodrigues150 First, I really appreciate your comprehensive answer and us being able to communicate despite our different way of doing it. I think I got a much better understanding about the term metaphysics. So you say that he basically didn't 'believe in' metaphysics and wanted to base his philosophy in materialist reality instead?
It's true, Marx’s materialism is not properly about denying the reality of ideas, but about rejecting the notion that ideas or consciousness are the primary forces shaping material reality. Instead, Marx argued that the material conditions of life-such as economic structures, the relations of production, and the material needs of human beings-shape human consciousness and ideas. This view is encapsulated in his historical materialism, which holds that the material conditions of society fundamentally determine its development. That said, he was opposed to religion because he considered it to be something that produces alienation. For him, Religion helps to obscure the material causes of suffering, such as exploitation, inequality, and oppression, providing a way to endure pain and suffering, but doing so, according to him, by masking its true sources. He critiques religion as illusory happiness-a false or distorted sense of fulfillment that distracts people from their real, material needs. For Marx, religion serves as an opiate, providing consolation for suffering and alienation, but only by disguising the true sources of these issues. He thinks that Religion offers people a sense of hope and joy, but that it does so in a way that keeps them from addressing the real conditions causing their suffering. He argues that true happiness for human beings is not found in religion or spiritual consolation, but in material well-being and the transformation of the social conditions that cause alienation and exploitation. Real happiness would come when people have control over their material existence, when they are no longer "oppressed by unjust systems like capitalism". Thus, the abolition of religion is tied to a deeper goal-the abolition of the material conditions that cause human suffering. For him religion must be critiqued because it would serve as a barrier to real liberation by making people accept their alienated state and their suffering as part of a divine plan or inevitable reality. Marx emphasizes that the "disillusionment" brought about by the critique of religion is liberating because it enables people to regain their senses. In the "alienated condition", people are unable to truly recognize themselves or shape their own reality. Instead, they are trapped in a fantasy world supposedly created by religion and other ideologies. Religion for him serves as an illusory Sun that revolves around humans, offering them meaning and direction, but only by distorting their actual lived experiences. Once the "illusion of religion" is removed, people can regain their agency-they can begin to shape their lives according to real, material conditions. The true Sun around which they should revolve is not an external divine force but their own human potential and capacity for self-realization. This is Marx’s humanism-the belief that human beings, when free from alienation and oppression, can act consciously to shape their own destinies. For him, human life is first and foremost a biological and material process. Without food, shelter, and clothing, survival itself becomes impossible, and other human pursuits-like philosophy, art, or morality-are meaningless. This is Marx’s materialism in action: before any higher-level concerns (such as ideas about justice, morality, or religion) can even be addressed, human beings must first ensure that their basic, material needs are met. If a society or an individual fails to meet these needs, they will be in a state of suffering and privation, which prevents any further development of ideas or social progress. He argues that these abstract discussions can’t be the starting point for a genuine understanding of human society. For him, such abstract ideas (God, morality, justice) are secondary. They emerge from material life, not the other way around. Religion, for example, in his view arises when people face material hardship and alienation in society, and use religion to explain or justify their suffering. Morality and justice have meanings and functions based on the material conditions of society-what's considered "just" or "moral" in one society may not be the same in another, and it usually reflects the interests of those who hold power. Thus, he critiques philosophical approaches that ignore material realities. For him it doesn’t make sense to talk about justice or morality if we haven’t first looked at how people meet their material needs and how society organizes that production. Now, while it is undeniable that humans have material needs (food, shelter, clothing, etc.), to define the human being only in terms of material needs is to neglect the rational and moral dimensions of human nature. Human beings are not simply animals that act to satisfy their instincts; they are rational beings, capable of discerning truth, understanding moral principles, and engaging in deliberate action based on these principles. One of the distinguishing features of humanity is that reason and moral conscience must guide our decisions. Humans are aware of moral obligations-for instance, the duty not to murder, to respect others, and to live in harmony with others. These moral duties are evident to us, not simply because they are social conventions or pragmatic guidelines, but because we have an inherent understanding of what is morally right. In the words of the philosopher Immanuel Kant, humans are called to live according to the moral law inscribed within us-a law which commands us to treat others always as ends in themselves, and not merely as means to an end. Thus, our most fundamental need is not the satisfaction of material needs, but the duty to live according to the truth-specifically, the truth about what is morally right and just. To live morally right is to live in a way that honors our nature as rational, responsible beings who are capable of discerning good from evil, and who have an obligation to act according to that discernment. Furthermore, material needs do not sustain the soul, which is immaterial. Even if our physical needs (food, water, shelter) are met, this does not guarantee the flourishing of the soul or the moral life. In fact, the life of the soul is not dependent on the mere fulfillment of material needs or desires, but on living in a way that reflects truth, goodness, and justice. The immaterial aspects of human existence-such as our intellect, will, and moral conscience-cannot be nourished by physical things. Human beings have an inherent moral nature that calls us to live in accordance with objective moral truths. While fulfilling basic needs can support the biological life, they do not suffice for the true flourishing of human life, which is realized in the pursuit of moral goodness. For instance, the satisfaction of hunger or thirst doesn’t necessarily make us virtuous or moral individuals. It is the moral decisions we make-whether we choose to be kind, just, truthful, or courageous-that define the true quality of our lives as rational beings. The duty to live morally right is something that we are aware of and have the capacity to follow, even if it is difficult or goes against our immediate desires. For example, we may feel tempted to act selfishly, but the moral law teaches us to act selflessly for the good of others. In this way, the fulfillment of our material needs may be necessary for survival, but it is the moral imperative to live in accordance with the truth and to will what is good that forms the essence of the good life. When we say that human beings have a duty to live according to the truth, we mean that we are responsible for living in a way that corresponds to objective moral principles-principles that are not contingent on individual desires, cultural norms, or material conditions. Thus, the moral life-the pursuit of virtue, justice, and truth-is not an optional or secondary aspect of human existence, but the most fundamental need of human beings. This is what gives meaning to our lives. Our rational nature compels us to ask questions about goodness, justice, and purpose, and it is through living morally that we fulfill our true human potential. This calls for more than simply satisfying material needs; it calls for the formation of our will and intellect according to the highest standards of truth and morality. Material needs, though important for biological survival, do not define what it means to be truly human. What defines us is our capacity to choose what is good, to act justly, and to live according to the truth-a truth that transcends mere materialism. Therefore, the highest human calling is to live in moral harmony with the truth, for in doing so, we fulfill our true nature as rational and moral beings. This is what gives life its ultimate meaning and purpose.
Calling focus on labor materialism prevents true materialism from taking root. In fact, value can only be subtracted, never added. The raw materials and things produced are all that matter. The pollution produced is always worse that just leaving it in the ground. Obviously we have to survive, but there are ways to minimize the harm that survival does.
Congrats -- I see your video has inspired some provocative discussions via the comments. When viewers engage and interact like this, you should be pleased.
Wow this is better than my college lectures on marxism. Marx made a lot of sense especially in today's world of inequality, inflation, and risk of AI replacing workers. However, i dont agree with a revolution id rather have stronger unions for employees. i hope you have other social media accounts like instagram. thanks again and cheers.
While Marx rejected traditional metaphysical and ethical systems, his philosophy cannot escape normative presuppositions. His critique of capitalism and call for revolution implicitly rely on ideals of justice, equality, and human flourishing. These ideals manifest that Marx’s thought contains an ethical dimension, even if he supposedly sought to ground it in material conditions rather than abstract principles.
Speaking of presupossitions, Marx and Engels never rejected Hegel or ethics unilaterally, they were Hegel fanboys in their early years after all. In their criticism, Hegellian dialectics was being misapplied to very real social issues that were coming up due to massive industrialization, whereas it was only a metaphysical concept meant to describe the nature of thought and reason. The disagreement here is that for the idealist reality can be understood from thought alone, but for the materialist matter precedes thought. In other words, ethics are useless if they bear no relation to the physical world. In materialist dialects, the dialectical opposition itself develops the object in to it's new state. It is meant as an empirical method for studying various processes in society. Applying the more abstract ideas from idealism to real problems often leads to well-intenioned people doing massive damage, e.g liberals spreading their ideology across the globe, used as a justification for colonization and imperialism.
@@Marzaries Denying the possibility of metaphysical knowledge is self-contradictory because doing so requires ultimate knowledge of reality, which is precisely what metaphysics seeks to investigate. To deny the possibility of metaphysical knowledge is to claim that human beings cannot attain reliable or meaningful knowledge about the ultimate nature of reality. Such denial implies an epistemological position that either limits knowledge to empirical or scientific inquiry (e.g., logical positivism), or asserts that reality is inherently unknowable (e.g., some forms of skepticism). To deny the possibility of metaphysical knowledge implicitly makes a claim about the ultimate nature of reality. It presupposes that reality is such that metaphysical knowledge cannot be attained. This is itself a metaphysical assertion about the limits of human cognition and the nature of reality. The claim assumes some understanding of what "ultimate reality" entails (e.g., that it is inaccessible or unknowable). It implicitly claims to know the boundaries of what can or cannot be known, which is itself a metaphysical judgment. So to deny metaphysical knowledge requires a level of ultimate knowledge about reality to justify the denial. However, possessing such knowledge would itself be an instance of metaphysical knowledge. Therefore, the denial undermines itself by presupposing what it denies. Then even the rejection of metaphysics involves implicit metaphysical assumptions about the nature of reality and knowledge. For example, scientific naturalism assumes a metaphysical framework where only natural phenomena exist and can be known. And we have to note that denying metaphysical inquiry contradicts the nature of human reason, which seeks to understand the ultimate causes and principles underlying experience. Any coherent philosophical system must address metaphysical questions, even indirectly. Even attempts to limit knowledge to empirical or observable phenomena rely on metaphysical frameworks. Therefore, metaphysical inquiry is not only possible but necessary for a coherent understanding of reality. The denial of metaphysics ultimately collapses into affirming it. If it is said that Marx does not explicitly deny the possibility of metaphysical knowledge in a philosophical sense but rather rejects its relevance or utility for understanding and transforming the material conditions of human life, even that raises a significant issue. By elevating material conditions and economic structures as the primary realities, Marx implicitly endorses an ontological hierarchy where the material is fundamental, and the ideal or abstract is secondary and derivative. This constitutes a metaphysical claim about the nature of reality, specifically that material reality is the most basic or "real" aspect of existence. There are also epistemological assumptions: Marx assumes that knowledge about the material world (e.g., economic and social structures) is the most relevant and reliable form of knowledge for understanding and transforming reality. This presupposes an epistemological stance that privileges material and empirical inquiry over metaphysical or idealist approaches. Marx’s critique of traditional metaphysics as irrelevant or ideological does not exempt his own system from metaphysical scrutiny. His materialism operates as a metaphysical framework, even if he does not explicitly label it as such. Marx’s historical materialism can be seen as a metaphysical system that asserts the primacy of matter over mind, the economic base over the superstructure, and practical activity over speculative thought. This system implicitly denies the independent existence or primacy of abstract entities (e.g., universal truths or ideals) unless they are rooted in material reality. Marx’s dialectical approach further emphasizes that change and progress in reality are driven by contradictions within material conditions, not by abstract or transcendent principles. This is itself a metaphysical view of how reality functions. If Marx critiques metaphysics for being ideological or irrelevant, how does he justify his own materialist framework without appealing to metaphysical assumptions? His critique of metaphysics could be seen as undermined by the unacknowledged metaphysical commitments of his materialism. Marx’s prioritization of material conditions suggests that metaphysical inquiry is unavoidable. By asserting the primacy of the material, he effectively participates in a metaphysical debate about the nature of reality. The tension between Marx’s rejection of traditional metaphysics and his implicit reliance on materialist metaphysics raises questions about the coherence of his position. Should we consider his critique of metaphysics valid if it depends on unacknowledged metaphysical commitments? Of course we shouldn't!
@Marzaries Denying the possibility of metaphysical knowledge is self-contradictory because doing so requires ultimate knowledge of reality, which is precisely what metaphysics seeks to investigate. To deny the possibility of metaphysical knowledge is to claim that human beings cannot attain reliable or meaningful knowledge about the ultimate nature of reality. Such denial implies an epistemological position that either limits knowledge to empirical or scientific inquiry (e.g., logical positivism), or asserts that reality is inherently unknowable (e.g., some forms of skepticism). To deny the possibility of metaphysical knowledge implicitly makes a claim about the ultimate nature of reality. It presupposes that reality is such that metaphysical knowledge cannot be attained. This is itself a metaphysical assertion about the limits of human cognition and the nature of reality. The claim assumes some understanding of what "ultimate reality" entails (e.g., that it is inaccessible or unknowable). It implicitly claims to know the boundaries of what can or cannot be known, which is itself a metaphysical judgment. So to deny metaphysical knowledge requires a level of ultimate knowledge about reality to justify the denial. However, possessing such knowledge would itself be an instance of metaphysical knowledge. Therefore, the denial undermines itself by presupposing what it denies. Then even the rejection of metaphysics involves implicit metaphysical assumptions about the nature of reality and knowledge. For example, scientific naturalism assumes a metaphysical framework where only natural phenomena exist and can be known. And we have to note that denying metaphysical inquiry contradicts the nature of human reason, which seeks to understand the ultimate causes and principles underlying experience. Any coherent philosophical system must address metaphysical questions, even indirectly. Even attempts to limit knowledge to empirical or observable phenomena rely on metaphysical frameworks. Therefore, metaphysical inquiry is not only possible but necessary for a coherent understanding of reality. The denial of metaphysics ultimately collapses into affirming it. If it is said that Marx does not explicitly deny the possibility of metaphysical knowledge in a philosophical sense but rather rejects its relevance or utility for understanding and transforming the material conditions of human life, even that raises a significant issue. By elevating material conditions and economic structures as the primary realities, Marx implicitly endorses an ontological hierarchy where the material is fundamental, and the ideal or abstract is secondary and derivative. This constitutes a metaphysical claim about the nature of reality, specifically that material reality is the most basic or "real" aspect of existence. There are also epistemological assumptions: Marx assumes that knowledge about the material world (e.g., economic and social structures) is the most relevant and reliable form of knowledge for understanding and transforming reality. This presupposes an epistemological stance that privileges material and empirical inquiry over metaphysical or idealist approaches. Marx’s critique of traditional metaphysics as irrelevant or ideological does not exempt his own system from metaphysical scrutiny. His materialism operates as a metaphysical framework, even if he does not explicitly label it as such. Marx’s historical materialism can be seen as a metaphysical system that asserts the primacy of matter over mind, the economic base over the superstructure, and practical activity over speculative thought. This system implicitly denies the independent existence or primacy of abstract entities (e.g., universal truths or ideals) unless they are rooted in material reality. Marx’s dialectical approach further emphasizes that change and progress in reality are driven by contradictions within material conditions, not by abstract or transcendent principles. This is itself a metaphysical view of how reality functions. If Marx critiques metaphysics for being ideological or irrelevant, how does he justify his own materialist framework without appealing to metaphysical assumptions? His critique of metaphysics could be seen as undermined by the unacknowledged metaphysical commitments of his materialism. Marx’s prioritization of material conditions shows us that metaphysical inquiry is unavoidable. By asserting the primacy of the material, he effectively participates in a metaphysical debate about the nature of reality. The tension between Marx’s rejection of traditional metaphysics and his implicit reliance on materialist metaphysics raises questions about the coherence of his position. Should we consider his critique of metaphysics valid if it depends on unacknowledged metaphysical commitments? Of course we shouldn't!
@@hugevibezMy point is that proposing something, simply having an end or purpose, presupposes an ideal of a highest good. Thus, a call for revolution, through opposing exploitation and fighting for equality, presupposes the idea that this is the right thing to do, and therefore a system of ethics. It presupposes universal principles, and thus something not dependent on contingent things like material conditions and economic structures. Therefore, Marx does not really avoid an ethical system with universal a priori principles. In fact, this is impossible for any rational being, as we move only with a view to an ultimate end, which is what we consider to be our highest good (*which consideration subjectively constitutes the act of establishing an ethical system). What he does, then, is simply to determine this equality as his highest good. *When someone considers something the highest good, they are already establishing an ethical system, because the highest good is that which determines all actions and subordinates all things to itself, which provides a subjective justification for actions, which one supposes to also have objective validity. Thus, every ethical system begins subjectively, with a priori principles. The question is whether it is or is not grounded in objective truth, the investigation of which is the task of metaphysics.
Do not envy the ones who have the by using violence. Their need to control each other will spiral out of control. By their infighting, their system will collapse.
I think you skipped the concept of 'surplus' (not to be confused with 'surplus value') in your short excourse to historical materialism. The ability to produce more than necessary for one's own survival is what allowed the development of the society.
@@literature.café Oh yeah, sorry, it was so quick I missed it.😄 I still think it warranted some expansion. Like the fact that surplus is produced thanks to the productivity increase from technological advancements. And that various forms of human exploitation were historically designed to expropriate the produced surplus.
How did you miss Marx's tautology? Marx caught it, and explained it away with a non-explanation explanation... Marx's Foundational Tautology Marx writes (Chapter 24, first paragraph, Capital, 1867), "Hitherto we have investigated how surplus-value emanates from capital; we have now to see how capital arises from surplus-value." See the tautology? How did this tautology get past the initial reviews? How did this tautology survive the intervening 157 years without being discovered, except for this political scientist? This again illustrates the magnitude of the Marxist co-option of our institutions. Let's analyze the sentence's tautology... Surplus value is generated by capital, but capital is created by surplus value!* A conversation that clarifies the capital/surplus value tautology: John: What do we need to start the capitalist economy? Peter: Capital would help, because Marx said, "capital arises from surplus value". John: Okay, I'm looking for capital, but I can't find it! Peter: That's because you need surplus value, because Marx said, "surplus value emanates from capital". John: Okay, I'm looking for surplus value, but I can't find it either! Peter: That's because you need capital! In Capital, Marx begins his analysis with an already existing capitalist economy. Marx can't explain how the capitalist economy came into existence because such an economy couldn't come into existence according to Marx's peculiar analysis of the capitalist economy where surplus-value created capital must first exist, but since surplus-value doesn't exist yet, there can be no capital to begin the capitalist economy. To overcome this inherent contradiction in Marx's "investigation", he begins Capital where we find an already existing capitalist economy: “The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as “an immense accumulation of commodities," its unit being a single commodity. Our investigation must therefore begin with the analysis of a commodity.” Let's rewrite that first paragraph from Capital, correcting the errors... “The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as “an immense accumulation of capital," its unit being the rate of interest. Our investigation must therefore begin with the analysis of interest rates.” ------------------------------------ * Marx recognizes the tautology, and, as usual with other self-imploding observations, erects a non-defense defense: "Chapter Twenty-Six: The Secret of Primitive Accumulation We have seen how money is changed into capital; how through capital surplus-value is made, and from surplus-value more capital. But the accumulation of capital presupposes surplus-value; surplus-value presupposes capitalistic production; capitalistic production presupposes the pre-existence of considerable masses of capital and of labour power in the hands of producers of commodities. The whole movement, therefore, seems to turn in a vicious circle, out of which we can only get by supposing a primitive accumulation (previous accumulation of Adam Smith) preceding capitalistic accumulation; an accumulation not the result of the capitalistic mode of production, but its starting point." Marx's solution to his tautology ("vicious circle") is to tell us that the Capitalist mode of production commenced by "supposing"! Marx magically creates a primitive accumulation of capital base upon which the capitalist mode of production flowered from, but this "supposing" primitive accumulation of capital doesn't solve the tautology, it merely pushes the tautology further back in time. According to Marx, In order to have capital one needs surplus value ("capital arises from surplus value"), but surplus value can't exist without first capital existing ("surplus value emanates from capital")! Pushing back a tautology to an earlier time period doesn't solve the tautology. Nothing can.
Addendum Marx's latent vindictive nature emerges... Soon after transferring university from Bonn to Berlin, the young Karl Marx, up until then a warm-hearted Lutheran, ended up waging a war against God, because he accepted as true the Lutheran belief that his libertine behavior in Berlin consigned him to Hell. So Marx concocted a materialist philosophy to wage war against God and humanity, as the following poems identify: "Thus Heaven I've forfeited, I know it full well, My soul, once true to God, Is chosen for hell." ...and... "With disdain I will throw my gauntlet Full in the face of the world, And see the collapse of this pygmy giant Whose fall will not stifle my ardour. Then will I wander godlike and victorious Through the ruins of the world And, giving my words an active force, I will feel equal to the Creator." Hence, in 1843 Marx directed his followers to implement the "abolition of religion", and the destruction of those civilizations "whose spiritual aroma is religion".* ------------------------- * In 1843 Marx directed his followers to implement the "abolition of religion", and the destruction of those civilizations "whose spiritual aroma is religion"... Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Karl Marx (1843) "The struggle against religion is, therefore, indirectly the struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion." ...and... "The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is required for their real happiness. The demand to give up the illusion about its condition is the demand to give up a condition which needs illusions." ...and... "It is, therefore, the task of history, once the other-world of truth has vanished, to establish the truth of this world." Now you know what Marxists are referring to when they utter the phrase, "The Struggle"... "The struggle against religion is, therefore, indirectly the struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion."
Marx worked non stop, just not on an industrial factory floor. He was a prolific journalist, editor, academic, author and philosopher. He was not a member of the bourgeoisie, but was bankrolled by Engels, who is better described as a class traitor to the ruling class than a hypocrite.
@@lechienchaud3904 he was never working class and never knew anything about them. he is a fraud and at least his partner Engles was a racist and pretty sure Marx was all up using the N word as well
@@kylecooper6740 can you write or read without your hands? if so, you might still be forced to acknowledge what you already know but are facetiously misrepresenting here - "intellectual" work is as much "work" as any work.
Thank you for starting explaining Marxism so clearly. I learned new perspectives on Marx. I look forward to future videos. Thanks for the education. I love this channel.
This poem by Marx has a very dark and somber tone (especially considering he was once a professed Christian): "So a god has snatched from me my all
In the curse and rack of Destiny.
All his worlds are gone beyond recall!
Nothing but revenge is left to me!
On myself revenge I'll proudly wreak,
On that being, that enthroned Lord,
Make my strength a patchwork of what's weak,
Leave my better self without reward!
I shall build my throne high overhead,
Cold, tremendous shall its summit be.
For its bulwark-- superstitious dread,
For its Marshall--blackest agony.
Who looks on it with a healthy eye,
Shall turn back, struck deathly pale and dumb;
Clutched by blind and chill Mortality
May his happiness prepare its tomb.
And the Almighty's lightning shall rebound
From that massive iron giant.
If he bring my walls and towers down,
Eternity shall raise them up, defiant".
"So as human beings, we have material needs, so we all need to eat, drink, and find shelter to survive. And if we don't meet these needs, nothing else matters. And Marx puts it simply, 'Life involves, before everything else, eating and drinking, housing and clothing, and various other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself'. Marx argues that it doesn't make sense to start a philosophical theory by talking about God, morality, or justice if we haven't first explained how people actually satisfy their basic material needs."
Now, while it is undeniable that humans have material needs (food, shelter, clothing, etc.), to define the human being only in terms of material needs is to neglect the rational and moral dimensions of human nature. Human beings are not simply animals that act to satisfy their instincts; they are rational beings, capable of discerning truth, understanding moral principles, and engaging in deliberate action based on these principles.
Thus, our most fundamental need is not the satisfaction of material needs, but the duty to live according to the truth-specifically, the truth about what is morally right and just. To live morally right is to live in a way that honors our nature as rational, responsible beings who are capable of discerning good from evil, and who have an obligation to act according to that discernment.
One of the distinguishing features of humanity is that reason and moral conscience must guide our decisions. Humans are aware of moral obligations-for instance, the duty not to murder, to respect others, and to live in harmony with others. These moral duties are evident to us, not simply because they are social conventions or pragmatic guidelines, but because we have an inherent understanding of what is morally right. In the words of the philosopher Immanuel Kant, humans are called to live according to the moral law inscribed within us-a law which commands us to treat others always as ends in themselves, and not merely as means to an end.
While fulfilling basic needs can support the biological life, they do not suffice for the true flourishing of human life, which is realized in the pursuit of moral goodness.
The duty to live morally right is something that we are aware of and have the capacity to follow, even if it is difficult or goes against our immediate desires. For example, we may feel tempted to act selfishly, but the moral law teaches us to act selflessly for the good of others. In this way, the fulfillment of our material needs may be necessary for survival, but it is the moral imperative to live in accordance with the truth and to will what is good that forms the essence of the good life.
Thus, the moral life-the pursuit of virtue, justice, and truth-is not an optional or secondary aspect of human existence, but the most fundamental need of human beings. This is what gives meaning to our lives. Our rational nature compels us to ask questions about goodness, justice, and purpose, and it is through living morally that we fulfill our true human potential. This calls for more than simply satisfying material needs; it calls for the formation of our will and intellect according to the highest standards of truth and morality.
Material needs, though important for biological survival, do not define what it means to be truly human. What defines us is our capacity to choose what is good, to act justly, and to live according to the truth-a truth that transcends mere materialism. Therefore, the highest human calling is to live in moral harmony with the truth, for in doing so, we fulfill our true nature as rational and moral beings. This is what gives life its ultimate meaning and purpose.
Moreover, the provision of material needs does not necessarily guarantee bodily life. For it is not enough, for the preservation of the body’s life, to have food and drink, clothing, shelter, and medicine. We will all eventually die, and then the important issue will not be any material possessions, nor even the presence of those with whom we share the closest blood relation, but rather our spiritual and moral condition before God.
Always a pleasure to get a new video from this channel. Interesting topics, presented in a way that pleases the eyes and the ears. Top content.
❤️
What happens when intellect, sophistication and overwhelming loveliness come together and manifest in one human being?...............this channel has the answer!
Greetings from Germany.
I salute your parents on inspiring your curiosity via great books, travel, and learning languages --- bravo👏👏Kampai !
Material conditions driving ideas make a lot sense when civilizations were isolated from each other, each one developing based on their geography and climate. In early civilizations, these material conditions shaped the childhood, so to speak, of civilizations and countries. However, it is hard to deny that once these ideas are created (mostly by material conditions), they have a very strong inertia. Even with industrialization, East and West have taken very different paths
Really informative. Kudos!
You’re amazing at what you do!
Good job. Thank you.
Denying the possibility of metaphysical knowledge is self-contradictory because doing so requires ultimate knowledge of reality, which is precisely what metaphysics seeks to investigate.
To deny the possibility of metaphysical knowledge is to claim that human beings cannot attain reliable or meaningful knowledge about the ultimate nature of reality. Such denial implies an epistemological position that either limits knowledge to empirical or scientific inquiry (e.g., logical positivism), or asserts that reality is inherently unknowable (e.g., some forms of skepticism). To deny the possibility of metaphysical knowledge implicitly makes a claim about the ultimate nature of reality. It presupposes that reality is such that metaphysical knowledge cannot be attained. This is itself a metaphysical assertion about the limits of human cognition and the nature of reality. The claim assumes some understanding of what "ultimate reality" entails (e.g., that it is inaccessible or unknowable). It implicitly claims to know the boundaries of what can or cannot be known, which is itself a metaphysical judgment. So to deny metaphysical knowledge requires a level of ultimate knowledge about reality to justify the denial. However, possessing such knowledge would itself be an instance of metaphysical knowledge. Therefore, the denial undermines itself by presupposing what it denies.
Then even the rejection of metaphysics involves implicit metaphysical assumptions about the nature of reality and knowledge. For example, scientific naturalism assumes a metaphysical framework where only natural phenomena exist and can be known.
And we have to note that denying metaphysical inquiry contradicts the nature of human reason, which seeks to understand the ultimate causes and principles underlying experience. Any coherent philosophical system must address metaphysical questions, even indirectly. Even attempts to limit knowledge to empirical or observable phenomena rely on metaphysical frameworks. Therefore, metaphysical inquiry is not only possible but necessary for a coherent understanding of reality. The denial of metaphysics ultimately collapses into affirming it.
If it is said that Marx does not explicitly deny the possibility of metaphysical knowledge in a philosophical sense but rather rejects its relevance or utility for understanding and transforming the material conditions of human life, even that raises a significant issue. By elevating material conditions and economic structures as the primary realities, he implicitly endorses an ontological hierarchy where the material is fundamental, and the ideal or abstract is secondary and derivative. This constitutes a metaphysical claim about the nature of reality, specifically that material reality is the most basic or "real" aspect of existence.
There are also epistemological assumptions: Marx assumes that knowledge about the material world (e.g., economic and social structures) is the most relevant and reliable form of knowledge for understanding and transforming reality. This presupposes an epistemological stance that privileges material and empirical inquiry over metaphysical or idealist approaches.
His critique of traditional metaphysics as irrelevant or ideological does not exempt his own system from metaphysical scrutiny. His materialism operates as a metaphysical framework, even if he does not explicitly label it as such.
Marx’s historical materialism can be seen as a metaphysical system that asserts the primacy of matter over mind, the economic base over the superstructure, and practical activity over speculative thought. This system implicitly denies the independent existence or primacy of abstract entities (e.g., universal truths or ideals) unless they are rooted in material reality.
His dialectical approach further emphasizes that change and progress in reality are driven by contradictions within material conditions, not by abstract or transcendent principles. This is itself a metaphysical view of how reality functions.
If Marx critiques metaphysics for being ideological or irrelevant, how does he justify his own materialist framework without appealing to metaphysical assumptions? His critique of metaphysics could be seen as undermined by the unacknowledged metaphysical commitments of his materialism.
Marx’s prioritization of material conditions shows us that metaphysical inquiry is unavoidable. By asserting the primacy of the material, he effectively participates in a metaphysical debate about the nature of reality.
The tension between Marx’s rejection of traditional metaphysics and his implicit reliance on materialist metaphysics raises questions about the coherence of his position. Should we consider his critique of metaphysics valid if it depends on unacknowledged metaphysical commitments? Of course we shouldn't!
Okay I don't speak such fancy english, respect to you! To say it in my words, although there might be some incoherence in Marx, I still think he provides some important ideas that shouldn't be discarded as invalid. Although there is no natural law that condemns inequality or violence, still we are all physical beings inseparable from our materialist reality. Take for example those indigenous tribes where people lived 'free from oppression': in the end, their way of living was violently replaced. So my question to you is how could any meaningful metaphyical knowledge be obtained without basing it on material reality?
@@alexzimmi4827That is a very good question (by the way, indeed, oppression is evidently something wrong. I do not claim that all of Marx's criticisms are incorrect, but rather that we should not assume it is possible to start a philosophical system without metaphysics and an ethical framework). And the answer to your question would be: Metaphysical knowledge is possible without being based on material reality, as it is grounded instead in the immaterial reality that is the subject of metaphysical investigation. Metaphysics deals with the ultimate reality of things, and this reality cannot be material, since thoughts or ideas themselves are not material, nor is the mind from which they originate and in which those thoughts or ideas exist.
Thus, ideas must be well-ordered (according to logic), which leads us to truths that transcend sensory experience, and therefore, material objects. These truths about immaterial objects, especially those that form the foundation of reality, are the subject of metaphysics. Concepts such as causality, contingency, necessity, and being, among others, are addressed by metaphysics, especially being qua being, that is, what it means for something to exist in the most fundamental sense. Knowledge of these matters is not properly based on material reality, since it transcends that very reality and does not have it as its object. I hope this helps. If you need further explanation, feel free to ask.
Saying that Marx denied metaphysical thought is just a lie in an effort to discredit the legitimacy of his work. Your entire essay is a waste of time since it operates on hallucinations
This doesn't really engage with Marx, or for that matter the Scottish Enlightenment figures that are the source for his "material" response to Hegel, on the question so much as the vulgar Marxists of the 20th century. It doesn't address Hegel, which should be the starting point on Marx's philosophy broadly. Even if you're going for a strictly materialist early Marx, say around his dissertation, you'd want to deal with the fact that the majority of Marx's notes aren't actually on the ancients, but on Hume and Spinoza, who were clearly shaping his approach to these problems.
Marx, and Smith for that matter, simply isn't doing what you're suggesting he's doing.
@@gianrodrigues150 First, I really appreciate your comprehensive answer and us being able to communicate despite our different way of doing it. I think I got a much better understanding about the term metaphysics.
So you say that he basically didn't 'believe in' metaphysics and wanted to base his philosophy in materialist reality instead?
Thanks :)
Verry well explained. Tank you.
It's true, Marx’s materialism is not properly about denying the reality of ideas, but about rejecting the notion that ideas or consciousness are the primary forces shaping material reality. Instead, Marx argued that the material conditions of life-such as economic structures, the relations of production, and the material needs of human beings-shape human consciousness and ideas. This view is encapsulated in his historical materialism, which holds that the material conditions of society fundamentally determine its development.
That said, he was opposed to religion because he considered it to be something that produces alienation. For him, Religion helps to obscure the material causes of suffering, such as exploitation, inequality, and oppression, providing a way to endure pain and suffering, but doing so, according to him, by masking its true sources.
He critiques religion as illusory happiness-a false or distorted sense of fulfillment that distracts people from their real, material needs. For Marx, religion serves as an opiate, providing consolation for suffering and alienation, but only by disguising the true sources of these issues. He thinks that Religion offers people a sense of hope and joy, but that it does so in a way that keeps them from addressing the real conditions causing their suffering.
He argues that true happiness for human beings is not found in religion or spiritual consolation, but in material well-being and the transformation of the social conditions that cause alienation and exploitation. Real happiness would come when people have control over their material existence, when they are no longer "oppressed by unjust systems like capitalism".
Thus, the abolition of religion is tied to a deeper goal-the abolition of the material conditions that cause human suffering. For him religion must be critiqued because it would serve as a barrier to real liberation by making people accept their alienated state and their suffering as part of a divine plan or inevitable reality.
Marx emphasizes that the "disillusionment" brought about by the critique of religion is liberating because it enables people to regain their senses. In the "alienated condition", people are unable to truly recognize themselves or shape their own reality. Instead, they are trapped in a fantasy world supposedly created by religion and other ideologies. Religion for him serves as an illusory Sun that revolves around humans, offering them meaning and direction, but only by distorting their actual lived experiences.
Once the "illusion of religion" is removed, people can regain their agency-they can begin to shape their lives according to real, material conditions. The true Sun around which they should revolve is not an external divine force but their own human potential and capacity for self-realization. This is Marx’s humanism-the belief that human beings, when free from alienation and oppression, can act consciously to shape their own destinies.
For him, human life is first and foremost a biological and material process. Without food, shelter, and clothing, survival itself becomes impossible, and other human pursuits-like philosophy, art, or morality-are meaningless.
This is Marx’s materialism in action: before any higher-level concerns (such as ideas about justice, morality, or religion) can even be addressed, human beings must first ensure that their basic, material needs are met. If a society or an individual fails to meet these needs, they will be in a state of suffering and privation, which prevents any further development of ideas or social progress.
He argues that these abstract discussions can’t be the starting point for a genuine understanding of human society. For him, such abstract ideas (God, morality, justice) are secondary. They emerge from material life, not the other way around. Religion, for example, in his view arises when people face material hardship and alienation in society, and use religion to explain or justify their suffering. Morality and justice have meanings and functions based on the material conditions of society-what's considered "just" or "moral" in one society may not be the same in another, and it usually reflects the interests of those who hold power. Thus, he critiques philosophical approaches that ignore material realities. For him it doesn’t make sense to talk about justice or morality if we haven’t first looked at how people meet their material needs and how society organizes that production.
Now, while it is undeniable that humans have material needs (food, shelter, clothing, etc.), to define the human being only in terms of material needs is to neglect the rational and moral dimensions of human nature. Human beings are not simply animals that act to satisfy their instincts; they are rational beings, capable of discerning truth, understanding moral principles, and engaging in deliberate action based on these principles.
One of the distinguishing features of humanity is that reason and moral conscience must guide our decisions. Humans are aware of moral obligations-for instance, the duty not to murder, to respect others, and to live in harmony with others. These moral duties are evident to us, not simply because they are social conventions or pragmatic guidelines, but because we have an inherent understanding of what is morally right. In the words of the philosopher Immanuel Kant, humans are called to live according to the moral law inscribed within us-a law which commands us to treat others always as ends in themselves, and not merely as means to an end.
Thus, our most fundamental need is not the satisfaction of material needs, but the duty to live according to the truth-specifically, the truth about what is morally right and just. To live morally right is to live in a way that honors our nature as rational, responsible beings who are capable of discerning good from evil, and who have an obligation to act according to that discernment.
Furthermore, material needs do not sustain the soul, which is immaterial. Even if our physical needs (food, water, shelter) are met, this does not guarantee the flourishing of the soul or the moral life. In fact, the life of the soul is not dependent on the mere fulfillment of material needs or desires, but on living in a way that reflects truth, goodness, and justice. The immaterial aspects of human existence-such as our intellect, will, and moral conscience-cannot be nourished by physical things.
Human beings have an inherent moral nature that calls us to live in accordance with objective moral truths. While fulfilling basic needs can support the biological life, they do not suffice for the true flourishing of human life, which is realized in the pursuit of moral goodness. For instance, the satisfaction of hunger or thirst doesn’t necessarily make us virtuous or moral individuals. It is the moral decisions we make-whether we choose to be kind, just, truthful, or courageous-that define the true quality of our lives as rational beings.
The duty to live morally right is something that we are aware of and have the capacity to follow, even if it is difficult or goes against our immediate desires. For example, we may feel tempted to act selfishly, but the moral law teaches us to act selflessly for the good of others. In this way, the fulfillment of our material needs may be necessary for survival, but it is the moral imperative to live in accordance with the truth and to will what is good that forms the essence of the good life.
When we say that human beings have a duty to live according to the truth, we mean that we are responsible for living in a way that corresponds to objective moral principles-principles that are not contingent on individual desires, cultural norms, or material conditions.
Thus, the moral life-the pursuit of virtue, justice, and truth-is not an optional or secondary aspect of human existence, but the most fundamental need of human beings. This is what gives meaning to our lives. Our rational nature compels us to ask questions about goodness, justice, and purpose, and it is through living morally that we fulfill our true human potential. This calls for more than simply satisfying material needs; it calls for the formation of our will and intellect according to the highest standards of truth and morality.
Material needs, though important for biological survival, do not define what it means to be truly human. What defines us is our capacity to choose what is good, to act justly, and to live according to the truth-a truth that transcends mere materialism. Therefore, the highest human calling is to live in moral harmony with the truth, for in doing so, we fulfill our true nature as rational and moral beings. This is what gives life its ultimate meaning and purpose.
It’s always been class war love ❤
Calling focus on labor materialism prevents true materialism from taking root. In fact, value can only be subtracted, never added. The raw materials and things produced are all that matter. The pollution produced is always worse that just leaving it in the ground. Obviously we have to survive, but there are ways to minimize the harm that survival does.
Have you read philosophy of Swami Vivekananda?
Congrats -- I see your video has inspired some provocative discussions via the comments. When viewers engage and interact like this, you should be pleased.
Wow this is better than my college lectures on marxism. Marx made a lot of sense especially in today's world of inequality, inflation, and risk of AI replacing workers.
However, i dont agree with a revolution id rather have stronger unions for employees.
i hope you have other social media accounts like instagram. thanks again and cheers.
I agree with you and yes, I do. - @annekathrrin
While Marx rejected traditional metaphysical and ethical systems, his philosophy cannot escape normative presuppositions. His critique of capitalism and call for revolution implicitly rely on ideals of justice, equality, and human flourishing. These ideals manifest that Marx’s thought contains an ethical dimension, even if he supposedly sought to ground it in material conditions rather than abstract principles.
In the beginning of capital he didn't seem distant from the use of abstractions.
Speaking of presupossitions, Marx and Engels never rejected Hegel or ethics unilaterally, they were Hegel fanboys in their early years after all. In their criticism, Hegellian dialectics was being misapplied to very real social issues that were coming up due to massive industrialization, whereas it was only a metaphysical concept meant to describe the nature of thought and reason.
The disagreement here is that for the idealist reality can be understood from thought alone, but for the materialist matter precedes thought. In other words, ethics are useless if they bear no relation to the physical world. In materialist dialects, the dialectical opposition itself develops the object in to it's new state. It is meant as an empirical method for studying various processes in society.
Applying the more abstract ideas from idealism to real problems often leads to well-intenioned people doing massive damage, e.g liberals spreading their ideology across the globe, used as a justification for colonization and imperialism.
@@Marzaries Denying the possibility of metaphysical knowledge is self-contradictory because doing so requires ultimate knowledge of reality, which is precisely what metaphysics seeks to investigate.
To deny the possibility of metaphysical knowledge is to claim that human beings cannot attain reliable or meaningful knowledge about the ultimate nature of reality. Such denial implies an epistemological position that either limits knowledge to empirical or scientific inquiry (e.g., logical positivism), or asserts that reality is inherently unknowable (e.g., some forms of skepticism). To deny the possibility of metaphysical knowledge implicitly makes a claim about the ultimate nature of reality. It presupposes that reality is such that metaphysical knowledge cannot be attained. This is itself a metaphysical assertion about the limits of human cognition and the nature of reality. The claim assumes some understanding of what "ultimate reality" entails (e.g., that it is inaccessible or unknowable). It implicitly claims to know the boundaries of what can or cannot be known, which is itself a metaphysical judgment. So to deny metaphysical knowledge requires a level of ultimate knowledge about reality to justify the denial. However, possessing such knowledge would itself be an instance of metaphysical knowledge. Therefore, the denial undermines itself by presupposing what it denies.
Then even the rejection of metaphysics involves implicit metaphysical assumptions about the nature of reality and knowledge. For example, scientific naturalism assumes a metaphysical framework where only natural phenomena exist and can be known.
And we have to note that denying metaphysical inquiry contradicts the nature of human reason, which seeks to understand the ultimate causes and principles underlying experience. Any coherent philosophical system must address metaphysical questions, even indirectly. Even attempts to limit knowledge to empirical or observable phenomena rely on metaphysical frameworks. Therefore, metaphysical inquiry is not only possible but necessary for a coherent understanding of reality. The denial of metaphysics ultimately collapses into affirming it.
If it is said that Marx does not explicitly deny the possibility of metaphysical knowledge in a philosophical sense but rather rejects its relevance or utility for understanding and transforming the material conditions of human life, even that raises a significant issue. By elevating material conditions and economic structures as the primary realities, Marx implicitly endorses an ontological hierarchy where the material is fundamental, and the ideal or abstract is secondary and derivative. This constitutes a metaphysical claim about the nature of reality, specifically that material reality is the most basic or "real" aspect of existence.
There are also epistemological assumptions: Marx assumes that knowledge about the material world (e.g., economic and social structures) is the most relevant and reliable form of knowledge for understanding and transforming reality. This presupposes an epistemological stance that privileges material and empirical inquiry over metaphysical or idealist approaches.
Marx’s critique of traditional metaphysics as irrelevant or ideological does not exempt his own system from metaphysical scrutiny. His materialism operates as a metaphysical framework, even if he does not explicitly label it as such.
Marx’s historical materialism can be seen as a metaphysical system that asserts the primacy of matter over mind, the economic base over the superstructure, and practical activity over speculative thought. This system implicitly denies the independent existence or primacy of abstract entities (e.g., universal truths or ideals) unless they are rooted in material reality.
Marx’s dialectical approach further emphasizes that change and progress in reality are driven by contradictions within material conditions, not by abstract or transcendent principles. This is itself a metaphysical view of how reality functions.
If Marx critiques metaphysics for being ideological or irrelevant, how does he justify his own materialist framework without appealing to metaphysical assumptions? His critique of metaphysics could be seen as undermined by the unacknowledged metaphysical commitments of his materialism.
Marx’s prioritization of material conditions suggests that metaphysical inquiry is unavoidable. By asserting the primacy of the material, he effectively participates in a metaphysical debate about the nature of reality.
The tension between Marx’s rejection of traditional metaphysics and his implicit reliance on materialist metaphysics raises questions about the coherence of his position. Should we consider his critique of metaphysics valid if it depends on unacknowledged metaphysical commitments? Of course we shouldn't!
@Marzaries Denying the possibility of metaphysical knowledge is self-contradictory because doing so requires ultimate knowledge of reality, which is precisely what metaphysics seeks to investigate.
To deny the possibility of metaphysical knowledge is to claim that human beings cannot attain reliable or meaningful knowledge about the ultimate nature of reality. Such denial implies an epistemological position that either limits knowledge to empirical or scientific inquiry (e.g., logical positivism), or asserts that reality is inherently unknowable (e.g., some forms of skepticism). To deny the possibility of metaphysical knowledge implicitly makes a claim about the ultimate nature of reality. It presupposes that reality is such that metaphysical knowledge cannot be attained. This is itself a metaphysical assertion about the limits of human cognition and the nature of reality. The claim assumes some understanding of what "ultimate reality" entails (e.g., that it is inaccessible or unknowable). It implicitly claims to know the boundaries of what can or cannot be known, which is itself a metaphysical judgment. So to deny metaphysical knowledge requires a level of ultimate knowledge about reality to justify the denial. However, possessing such knowledge would itself be an instance of metaphysical knowledge. Therefore, the denial undermines itself by presupposing what it denies.
Then even the rejection of metaphysics involves implicit metaphysical assumptions about the nature of reality and knowledge. For example, scientific naturalism assumes a metaphysical framework where only natural phenomena exist and can be known.
And we have to note that denying metaphysical inquiry contradicts the nature of human reason, which seeks to understand the ultimate causes and principles underlying experience. Any coherent philosophical system must address metaphysical questions, even indirectly. Even attempts to limit knowledge to empirical or observable phenomena rely on metaphysical frameworks. Therefore, metaphysical inquiry is not only possible but necessary for a coherent understanding of reality. The denial of metaphysics ultimately collapses into affirming it.
If it is said that Marx does not explicitly deny the possibility of metaphysical knowledge in a philosophical sense but rather rejects its relevance or utility for understanding and transforming the material conditions of human life, even that raises a significant issue. By elevating material conditions and economic structures as the primary realities, Marx implicitly endorses an ontological hierarchy where the material is fundamental, and the ideal or abstract is secondary and derivative. This constitutes a metaphysical claim about the nature of reality, specifically that material reality is the most basic or "real" aspect of existence.
There are also epistemological assumptions: Marx assumes that knowledge about the material world (e.g., economic and social structures) is the most relevant and reliable form of knowledge for understanding and transforming reality. This presupposes an epistemological stance that privileges material and empirical inquiry over metaphysical or idealist approaches.
Marx’s critique of traditional metaphysics as irrelevant or ideological does not exempt his own system from metaphysical scrutiny. His materialism operates as a metaphysical framework, even if he does not explicitly label it as such.
Marx’s historical materialism can be seen as a metaphysical system that asserts the primacy of matter over mind, the economic base over the superstructure, and practical activity over speculative thought. This system implicitly denies the independent existence or primacy of abstract entities (e.g., universal truths or ideals) unless they are rooted in material reality.
Marx’s dialectical approach further emphasizes that change and progress in reality are driven by contradictions within material conditions, not by abstract or transcendent principles. This is itself a metaphysical view of how reality functions.
If Marx critiques metaphysics for being ideological or irrelevant, how does he justify his own materialist framework without appealing to metaphysical assumptions? His critique of metaphysics could be seen as undermined by the unacknowledged metaphysical commitments of his materialism.
Marx’s prioritization of material conditions shows us that metaphysical inquiry is unavoidable. By asserting the primacy of the material, he effectively participates in a metaphysical debate about the nature of reality.
The tension between Marx’s rejection of traditional metaphysics and his implicit reliance on materialist metaphysics raises questions about the coherence of his position. Should we consider his critique of metaphysics valid if it depends on unacknowledged metaphysical commitments? Of course we shouldn't!
@@hugevibezMy point is that proposing something, simply having an end or purpose, presupposes an ideal of a highest good. Thus, a call for revolution, through opposing exploitation and fighting for equality, presupposes the idea that this is the right thing to do, and therefore a system of ethics. It presupposes universal principles, and thus something not dependent on contingent things like material conditions and economic structures. Therefore, Marx does not really avoid an ethical system with universal a priori principles. In fact, this is impossible for any rational being, as we move only with a view to an ultimate end, which is what we consider to be our highest good (*which consideration subjectively constitutes the act of establishing an ethical system). What he does, then, is simply to determine this equality as his highest good.
*When someone considers something the highest good, they are already establishing an ethical system, because the highest good is that which determines all actions and subordinates all things to itself, which provides a subjective justification for actions, which one supposes to also have objective validity. Thus, every ethical system begins subjectively, with a priori principles. The question is whether it is or is not grounded in objective truth, the investigation of which is the task of metaphysics.
What did Marx say about planned obsolescence and Vanadium Steel?
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🌟🌟🌟
Uh oh! I'm scared!
To be pessimistic, the system that survives is the one that can create the most effective form of violence(power).
That’s how we even got here in the first place. The essence of modern political thought is that power alone gets the job done at the end of the day.
Do not envy the ones who have the by using violence. Their need to control each other will spiral out of control. By their infighting, their system will collapse.
Real capitalism has never been tried 😂
I think you skipped the concept of 'surplus' (not to be confused with 'surplus value') in your short excourse to historical materialism. The ability to produce more than necessary for one's own survival is what allowed the development of the society.
Yes, that‘s true. I mentioned that shortly in the later part of the video where is was referring to the rise of classless society.
@@literature.café Oh yeah, sorry, it was so quick I missed it.😄 I still think it warranted some expansion. Like the fact that surplus is produced thanks to the productivity increase from technological advancements. And that various forms of human exploitation were historically designed to expropriate the produced surplus.
genial!!!!
How did you miss Marx's tautology? Marx caught it, and explained it away with a non-explanation explanation...
Marx's Foundational Tautology
Marx writes (Chapter 24, first paragraph, Capital, 1867), "Hitherto we have investigated how surplus-value emanates from capital; we have now to see how capital arises from surplus-value."
See the tautology? How did this tautology get past the initial reviews? How did this tautology survive the intervening 157 years without being discovered, except for this political scientist? This again illustrates the magnitude of the Marxist co-option of our institutions.
Let's analyze the sentence's tautology...
Surplus value is generated by capital, but capital is created by surplus value!*
A conversation that clarifies the capital/surplus value tautology:
John: What do we need to start the capitalist economy?
Peter: Capital would help, because Marx said, "capital arises from surplus value".
John: Okay, I'm looking for capital, but I can't find it!
Peter: That's because you need surplus value, because Marx said, "surplus value emanates from capital".
John: Okay, I'm looking for surplus value, but I can't find it either!
Peter: That's because you need capital!
In Capital, Marx begins his analysis with an already existing capitalist economy. Marx can't explain how the capitalist economy came into existence because such an economy couldn't come into existence according to Marx's peculiar analysis of the capitalist economy where surplus-value created capital must first exist, but since surplus-value doesn't exist yet, there can be no capital to begin the capitalist economy. To overcome this inherent contradiction in Marx's "investigation", he begins Capital where we find an already existing capitalist economy:
“The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as “an immense accumulation of commodities," its unit being a single commodity. Our investigation must therefore begin with the analysis of a commodity.”
Let's rewrite that first paragraph from Capital, correcting the errors...
“The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as “an immense accumulation of capital," its unit being the rate of interest. Our investigation must therefore begin with the analysis of interest rates.”
------------------------------------
* Marx recognizes the tautology, and, as usual with other self-imploding observations, erects a non-defense defense:
"Chapter Twenty-Six: The Secret of Primitive Accumulation
We have seen how money is changed into capital; how through capital surplus-value is made, and from surplus-value more capital. But the accumulation of capital presupposes surplus-value; surplus-value presupposes capitalistic production; capitalistic production presupposes the pre-existence of considerable masses of capital and of labour power in the hands of producers of commodities. The whole movement, therefore, seems to turn in a vicious circle, out of which we can only get by supposing a primitive accumulation (previous accumulation of Adam Smith) preceding capitalistic accumulation; an accumulation not the result of the capitalistic mode of production, but its starting point."
Marx's solution to his tautology ("vicious circle") is to tell us that the Capitalist mode of production commenced by "supposing"! Marx magically creates a primitive accumulation of capital base upon which the capitalist mode of production flowered from, but this "supposing" primitive accumulation of capital doesn't solve the tautology, it merely pushes the tautology further back in time. According to Marx, In order to have capital one needs surplus value ("capital arises from surplus value"), but surplus value can't exist without first capital existing ("surplus value emanates from capital")! Pushing back a tautology to an earlier time period doesn't solve the tautology. Nothing can.
Addendum
Marx's latent vindictive nature emerges...
Soon after transferring university from Bonn to Berlin, the young Karl Marx, up until then a warm-hearted Lutheran, ended up waging a war against God, because he accepted as true the Lutheran belief that his libertine behavior in Berlin consigned him to Hell. So Marx concocted a materialist philosophy to wage war against God and humanity, as the following poems identify:
"Thus Heaven I've forfeited, I know it full well, My soul, once true to God, Is chosen for hell."
...and...
"With disdain I will throw my gauntlet Full in the face of the world, And see the collapse of this pygmy giant Whose fall will not stifle my ardour. Then will I wander godlike and victorious Through the ruins of the world And, giving my words an active force, I will feel equal to the Creator."
Hence, in 1843 Marx directed his followers to implement the "abolition of religion", and the destruction of those civilizations "whose spiritual aroma is religion".*
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* In 1843 Marx directed his followers to implement the "abolition of religion", and the destruction of those civilizations "whose spiritual aroma is religion"...
Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Karl Marx (1843)
"The struggle against religion is, therefore, indirectly the struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion."
...and...
"The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is required for their real happiness. The demand to give up the illusion about its condition is the demand to give up a condition which needs illusions."
...and...
"It is, therefore, the task of history, once the other-world of truth has vanished, to establish the truth of this world."
Now you know what Marxists are referring to when they utter the phrase, "The Struggle"...
"The struggle against religion is, therefore, indirectly the struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma is religion."
Amazing :)))
Philo- Bunny :D:D:D
Ok, very nice. Now do Julius Evolas: "Eros and the mistery of love"
Or some Nietzsche?
I want to do Nietzsche soon :)
first?
Was Marx a worker?
never
Marx worked non stop, just not on an industrial factory floor. He was a prolific journalist, editor, academic, author and philosopher. He was not a member of the bourgeoisie, but was bankrolled by Engels, who is better described as a class traitor to the ruling class than a hypocrite.
Marx spent his time complaining in pubs. He was not a man that worked with his hands.
@@lechienchaud3904 he was never working class and never knew anything about them. he is a fraud and at least his partner Engles was a racist and pretty sure Marx was all up using the N word as well
@@kylecooper6740 can you write or read without your hands? if so, you might still be forced to acknowledge what you already know but are facetiously misrepresenting here - "intellectual" work is as much "work" as any work.
Suddenly the ladies are digging Marx.
Good or bad?
@@ManoverSuperman
Good