A couple points here to consider in this discussion. The Imperial Japanese Navy have been running all around constantly from combat zone to combat zone from November, 1941 until June, 1942. The Japanese carrier strike force had fought at Pearl Harbor, Malaya, Dutch East Indies, attacked British Navy targets at Ceylon and elsewhere with raids on many Pacific islands including the Philippines. The Japanese also struck in the south Pacific around the Solomons, New Guinea and raided Darwin, Australia. Some experts will add more but the point here is the six main Japanese carriers had already seen constant combat before the battle of the Coral Sea. All these combat operations had resulted in a certain level of attrition and aircraft losses for the Japanese naval air corps. Heavy aircraft, pilot and aircrew losses at the Coral Sea meant the Japanese only had four carriers for the Midway operation in June, 1942. These naval aviation losses at the Coral Sea were a critical factor in the loss of the battle of Midway. But I think the sum total of all the losses incurred by the Japanese across the Pacific took their toll on combat efficiency by the time Midway rolled around. Japanese naval aviators, their aircrews, sailors, officers and aviation technical support, mechanics, bomb loaders, fuelers and the like were likely very tired, perhaps even exhausted from non-stop naval combat operations. So my argument is to NEvER overlook the fatigue factor from overwork. Many of these Japanese naval aviators had been heavily involved with training for Pearl Harbor and ramping up for the war for a period of about a year. However, the Japanese lacked adequate replacement pilots and aircrew. Many of these Japanese aircrew were veterans of the China war making them irreplaceable. So the loss of those four carriers really hurt Japanese naval aviation efficiency. It is amazing in some respects, bordering on recklessness, that Admiral Yamamoto would order his carrier crews into combat at Midway almost immediately after the Coral Sea operation. The real turning point of the Pacific war was the battles around Guadalcanal with the prolonged meatgrinder losses of naval warships, warplanes and troops that really stopped the Japanese offensive aspirations permanently. America had to lock Japan into a headlock and grind up Japanese forces in a sausage grinder type of campaign. Midway was an important battle but the battles around Guadalcanal were almost as important. Guadalcanal went poorly for the American Navy and Marine Corps for the first two months. The Marines on land held but the US Navy really did poorly against the Japanese cruisers and destroyers in night surface warfare actions. American nava losses due to our inferior torpedoes, the lack of knowledge about how to use radar, and our inadequate night fighting training really caused sever losses in several night actions around Guadalcanal. The US Navy got better for sure but only at heavy cost in men and ships. We lost many carriers too due to Japanese air or submarine attacks. So It is really important to understand in my estimation that the United States didn't really get its act together in terms of naval warfare until about mid-1943. The Mark XIV torpedo story is almost criminal negligence. But our fighter planes, like the Wildcat and Army P-40 were barely adequate against the Zero and Oscar. We didn't really start turning the tide in the Pacific until the P-38 fighter, the Hellcat and more heavy bombers made their way into the Pacific. The Gato class submarine was also extemely important from mid-1943 in turning the tide against the Japanese sinking tankers and the rest of the enemy merchant fleet with torpedoes that actualy worked. We got a little bit lucky at Midway to stop Japanese advance. But it took three long years of vicious grinding war on the air, land and sea against an implacable foe that fought to the death in most cases to win the Pacific War.
1:02:00 "Horatio Hornblower" - I discovered C S Forester in 1967, when I caught the film "Captain Horatio Hornblower" on my college dorm's TV. I spent that summer reading the entire series. In 2003 I saw "Master and Commander" and discovered the Jack Aubrey series of novels by Patrick O'Brian.
I believe another critical decision was for the IJN to hold back the 2 carriers damaged in the Coral Sea battle. They were no worse off than Yorktown but Nimitz ordered his carrier to enact emergency repairs and ready or not head out to join the task force. Now maybe the IJN would have lost all 6 carriers but those extra vessels might have made all the difference.
Only Shokaku was damaged. Zuikaku was not. She was ready to go and could have been used at Midway in a different capacity. What people cannot seem to do is think outside the box. Every vid like this one simply focuses on the carriers vs carriers battle. No US historian of today ever discusses the IJN utilizing their surface ships. Only a declassified vid of the Navy War College back in the late 40’s or 50’s contemplates the usage and can’t seem to find a way out for the US. What most Americans don’t want to face is that the USN only had 8 cruisers and 15 destroyers. The IJN had 17 cruisers and 49 destroyers. Plus 11 battleships where as the US had none. So split the surface ships up front and shell Midway at night. The IJN could have had 9 carriers at Midway. The 5 main with Zuikaku plus Ryujo, Junyo, Zuiho, and Hosho. Those 9 carriers should have been split into 3 groups. North, Mid, and South and kept behind the surface ships. The 9 carriers would have been loaded with 2/3 fighters and 1/3 bombers. Not the other way around like they did. This would have allowed over 500 planes. In this scenario the IJN would have lost no carriers and sunk the entire US Task Force.
Late to the party, I agree with you and F430 Ferrai but I feel the arrogance of the Japanese mindset, fueled by non stop victories and Pearl, was sure the Kido Butai was More then adequate to annihilate the remaining US carriers....
there's at least one big error. the fighters weren't pulled down to sea level by the torpedo bombers when Dick Best made his attack with 2 wingmen. (per Jon Parshall and Anthony Tully's book "Shattered Sword"). maybe this is a video from a long time ago, before their book came out.
The only problem for me with these types of seminars are they are aimed at people who only have limited or no knowledge of the battle. I would love to see a conference with a number of historians well versed on the Battle of Midway to ask more obscure questions about some of the nuances of the lead up to, the actual event, and the aftermath of the battle. At minimum, I would like to have this videos' historian, Craig Symonds along with John Lundstrom, Jon Parshall, Tony Tully, and Robert Mrazek. Those are authors of books about Midway or have large parts of them about Midway that I have read. If I won the Lottery, organizing such a conference would be one the things I would like to do. LOL!
Agreed, I have read several versions and have holes to fill. Like 1) japanese overconfidence, 2) island based aircraft after 10am? 3) if we broke their code here, after that?
Here's a jewel for you. Contrary to modern claims, three of the Japanese carriers (Kaga, Soryu, and Hiryu) had many aircraft on their flight decks when the U.S. dive bomber attack began. See the postwar statements of Soryu's executive officer (Cmdr. Hisashi Ohara) and Kaga's air officer (Cmdr. Takahisa Amagai). Look at the Nagumo report's statements regarding readiness for launch in the 1030- 1100 time frame. Look at the last landing times of aircraft on each carrier prior to the attack, because this is the only period when aircraft could be spotted. Look at Hiryu's launch of her retaliatory strike at 1050- just twenty minutes after the attack ended- and note that she could not possibly have spotted her strike in that time frame. Lastly, look for photographic and filmed interview evidence (it exists) that Japanese CAP sections could and did launch from abreast the island, and were not automatically cluttering the flight deck. Look carefully, and you'll find that our dive bomber crews were not painting "lurid portraits"- and that the "flight deck myth" is false. Cheers...
Your two year wait is over! Look at the channel Unauthorized History of the Pacific War Podcast where they cover these and have, as guests, John Parshall. They try to assume that listeners are not experts but also discuss some of the controversies. For example, Parshall discusses Japanese historian's view of Fuchida's book which was "the" view of the battle, and why they dismiss it, then he reviews the evidence that Fuchida was playing rather loose to create is "If ONLY we had FIVE MORE MINUTES" myth.
53:20 Canada DID help protect the west coast of the United States. Canadians landed on the beaches of Kiska Island alongside Americans when it was re-patriated. (The Japanese had evacuated by submarine already, but we helped damit.) 🍁
One aspect of the battle that wasn’t touched on was how Admiral Fletcher, overall “senior” tactical commander of USN forces marshalled (to defend Midway) during the action, purposely deferred much of the real-time decision making to his subordinate Admiral Spruance. I think that showed a significant command maturity on Fletcher’s part, and contributed to the battle’s success. I not absolutely certain, but I think the issue did come up at one point during the Midway operation and Fletcher did in fact verbally give his decision-making authority over to Spruance because he thought Spruance, at the time, had a better handle on unfolding events due to time and location of forces….
I note that "key decisions 2, 4 and 5" are all about correcting bad decisions or problems of the Spruance (Halsey trained) air groups. The fact that the air groups from Fletchers Yorktown, launched efficiently, flew to target and conducted a coordinated attack sinking the Soryu is just an afterthought in your presentation and totally ignored in the movie.
43.40 Luck People make their own luck. Decisions made the difference. If you are looking for your keys and find them is that luck? If you are looking for your keys and find the wedding band you lost 3 months ago, THAT is luck.
i have yet to hear any explanation about laps in position reporting of Japanese carriers. Up to two hour increments of lacking position acquisition knowledge! A B17 flying in constant contact and reporting Japanese carrier positions would have been nice. Was not anyone reporting position when attacking? Was anyone listening?
Agreed. USN should have been able to continuously track the IJN feet with PBY’s and B17. High level bombing never worked against stationary ground targets never mind moving ships. One of the most closely guarded secrets of the war was the Norden bombsight: not the sight itself but the fact that it didn’t work. The only application of high level bombing was against civilian populations where the bombardier was targeting something the size of Tokyo, Berlin, Hamburg or Dresden. The other thing that didn’t carry its own weight at Midway were the subs. There were a half dozen in the area but the only impact was indirect in that a IJN destroyer sent to harass a sub left a wake that Wade McClusky picked up.
The Japanese CAP that took out VT-8 had almost seven minutes to get back to patrol altitude before the next attack force arrived. I think the treatment of this narrative is a bit too simplified and contains at least this one error. I expect a little more from a historian of this caliber.
I was thinking the same thing. The CAP was actually displaced on the horizontal much more than the vertical, and they were out of cannon ammo, so they needed to land and resupply. Plus, their CAP vectoring sucked.
Even with our intelligence, the Japanese would have destroyed our carriers if Yamamoto had not been a fool suffering from 'winner's disease.' His battleships should have attacked the Midway Island, providing field artillery for the invading force. They could have had two flattops full of fighters to provide air support (top) for the battleships. Three of his carriers (including the one he sent to Alaska) should have had all of its bombers and torpedo planes armed and waiting for American naval force. No Japanese bomber should have been sent to attack Midway and use surface ordinance. Yamamoto was drunk with his victory at Pearl Harbor. Imagine if he had 200 bombers armed and fueled waiting for the American force to be spotted.
Another ridiculous commentary that parrots the good heart of Yamamoto...what a saintly fellow...a golden hearted love bird that sings with the angels above and would plant a wreath of flowers on the Arizona and weep if only he was here to do so. Better to remember him in his burning Betty bomber with a 50 caliber slug through his chest...justice served! Very sick that this video came from the Navy League of the United States. Short memories and misguided folks over that at NLUS.
The story that all of the Japanese attack aircraft were in their hangars when the dive bomber attack began is blatantly false. Multiple contemporary American and Japanese eyewitness accounts, the carrier's TROMs, and the available time frame in which to spot their aircraft, together make abundantly clear that only Akagi's attack aircraft were in her hangars. Two of the carriers had their strikes spotted on deck while a third had approximately 20 aircraft on deck (although only a few of these were spotted). Continuing to repeat the story that our aviators were painting "lurid portraits" simply denigrates men who risked their lives to gain the victory- and distorts the historical record.
@@wellsbengston4132 1. No U.S. pilots who attacked Kaga or Soryu categorically stated that they had a clear view of the flight decks of the carriers, and that the flight decks were empty. This is particularly significant since the pilots were aiming for a specific point on the flight deck or were looking for where their bomb hit- all while looking out for enemy fighters. 2. The pilots whose bombs hit Kaga and Soryu all stated that the two carriers had many aircraft on their flight decks. 3. The period of time in which the carriers could have begun spotting their strikes is the interval between the last landing time and the time at which the ship was attacked. These are Akagi 1010, Kaga 1005, Soryu 0950, and Hiryu 0910. 4. Hiryu and Soryu had no torpedo switching issue and thus had their aircraft ready for launch far sooner than did Akagi and Kaga. 5. Soryu's senior surviving officer- executive officer Cmdr. Hisaishi Ohara- stated for the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey that Soryu's aircraft for the attack on the U.S. carriers (18 Vals and 6 Zeros EDIT: 3 Zeros for the attack; 3 more added after the dive bomber attack ended) were on the flight deck awaiting the order to launch when the ship was attacked. 6. Kaga's senior surviving officer- air officer Lt. Cmdr. Takahisa Amagai- stated for the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey that Kaga had approximately 30 aircraft in her hangars, 6 fighters in the air, and the rest (approximately 20 aircraft) on her flight deck. 7. The dive bomber attacked ended at 1030. Hiryu's retaliatory strike against the U.S. carriers began to launch at 1050 and were all in the air by 1058. Twenty minutes was not enough time for the Japanese to spot 24 aircraft, warm up their engines, and begin launching- and Hiryu had more time to spot her strike than any other carrier. 8. Senshi Sosho- often referred to as the "Japanese Official History" and the primary source for revisionist claims on empty flight decks- is not an official history at all. It was neither commissioned nor endorsed by the Japanese Government. Wording in the forward of each of the 102 volumes clearly states that the contents of each volume are the responsibility of the authors and of the War History Office. 9. Recent Japanese testimony that the flight decks were largely empty consists of statements to the effect that "I never saw..." or "As far as I'm aware"- all made by men whose primary responsibility was something other than knowing the status of the ship's aircraft. No points of view or times in which the observation were made are provided. Lastly, filmed interview and photographic evidence clearly shows that Japanese fighter sections could and often did launch from abreast the carrier's islands. Cheers...
@@wellsbengston4132 Well, that's up to you, my friend. That said, when you next crack a book on this subject, you'll find that points 1-4 are historical fact, while points 5-9 are addressed by silence from those same "well- respected historians". You're far better off by finding out for yourself based on all available data- some of which some authors have avoided like the plague. But you do you. Cheers...
@@manilajohn0182 No disrespect intended to the author, I think the timeline presented in the book 'Shattered Sword' is quite convincing. That combined with high altitude deck photos of the Kido Butai carriers avoiding the B-17 bomb sticks with only CAP planes on deck and having to make evasive turns for the various different attacks leaves very little doubt about the state of the Japanese flight decks. In my view the Japanese loss lies with Nagumo sticking to his designated strike launch time without a complete scouting report. With the report he gets first carrier v carrier strike, without a complete report he lost.
Dude, several minutes to crank AA from low to high? Ridiculous statement...and if you make ridiculous statements nobody will believe anything you are selling...
Excellent
A couple points here to consider in this discussion. The Imperial Japanese Navy have been running all around constantly from combat zone to combat zone from November, 1941 until June, 1942. The Japanese carrier strike force had fought at Pearl Harbor, Malaya, Dutch East Indies, attacked British Navy targets at Ceylon and elsewhere with raids on many Pacific islands including the Philippines. The Japanese also struck in the south Pacific around the Solomons, New Guinea and raided Darwin, Australia. Some experts will add more but the point here is the six main Japanese carriers had already seen constant combat before the battle of the Coral Sea. All these combat operations had resulted in a certain level of attrition and aircraft losses for the Japanese naval air corps. Heavy aircraft, pilot and aircrew losses at the Coral Sea meant the Japanese only had four carriers for the Midway operation in June, 1942. These naval aviation losses at the Coral Sea were a critical factor in the loss of the battle of Midway. But I think the sum total of all the losses incurred by the Japanese across the Pacific took their toll on combat efficiency by the time Midway rolled around.
Japanese naval aviators, their aircrews, sailors, officers and aviation technical support, mechanics, bomb loaders, fuelers and the like were likely very tired, perhaps even exhausted from non-stop naval combat operations. So my argument is to NEvER overlook the fatigue factor from overwork. Many of these Japanese naval aviators had been heavily involved with training for Pearl Harbor and ramping up for the war for a period of about a year. However, the Japanese lacked adequate replacement pilots and aircrew. Many of these Japanese aircrew were veterans of the China war making them irreplaceable. So the loss of those four carriers really hurt Japanese naval aviation efficiency. It is amazing in some respects, bordering on recklessness, that Admiral Yamamoto would order his carrier crews into combat at Midway almost immediately after the Coral Sea operation.
The real turning point of the Pacific war was the battles around Guadalcanal with the prolonged meatgrinder losses of naval warships, warplanes and troops that really stopped the Japanese offensive aspirations permanently. America had to lock Japan into a headlock and grind up Japanese forces in a sausage grinder type of campaign. Midway was an important battle but the battles around Guadalcanal were almost as important. Guadalcanal went poorly for the American Navy and Marine Corps for the first two months. The Marines on land held but the US Navy really did poorly against the Japanese cruisers and destroyers in night surface warfare actions. American nava losses due to our inferior torpedoes, the lack of knowledge about how to use radar, and our inadequate night fighting training really caused sever losses in several night actions around Guadalcanal. The US Navy got better for sure but only at heavy cost in men and ships. We lost many carriers too due to Japanese air or submarine attacks.
So It is really important to understand in my estimation that the United States didn't really get its act together in terms of naval warfare until about mid-1943. The Mark XIV torpedo story is almost criminal negligence. But our fighter planes, like the Wildcat and Army P-40 were barely adequate against the Zero and Oscar. We didn't really start turning the tide in the Pacific until the P-38 fighter, the Hellcat and more heavy bombers made their way into the Pacific. The Gato class submarine was also extemely important from mid-1943 in turning the tide against the Japanese sinking tankers and the rest of the enemy merchant fleet with torpedoes that actualy worked. We got a little bit lucky at Midway to stop Japanese advance. But it took three long years of vicious grinding war on the air, land and sea against an implacable foe that fought to the death in most cases to win the Pacific War.
Thumbs up.
Pleasure hearing Dr. Symonds remarks on Midway.
1:02:00 "Horatio Hornblower" - I discovered C S Forester in 1967, when I caught the film "Captain Horatio Hornblower" on my college dorm's TV. I spent that summer reading the entire series. In 2003 I saw "Master and Commander" and discovered the Jack Aubrey series of novels by Patrick O'Brian.
I believe another critical decision was for the IJN to hold back the 2 carriers damaged in the Coral Sea battle. They were no worse off than Yorktown but Nimitz ordered his carrier to enact emergency repairs and ready or not head out to join the task force. Now maybe the IJN would have lost all 6 carriers but those extra vessels might have made all the difference.
Only Shokaku was damaged. Zuikaku was not. She was ready to go and could have been used at Midway in a different capacity.
What people cannot seem to do is think outside the box. Every vid like this one simply focuses on the carriers vs carriers battle.
No US historian of today ever discusses the IJN utilizing their surface ships. Only a declassified vid of the Navy War College back in the late 40’s or 50’s contemplates the usage and can’t seem to find a way out for the US.
What most Americans don’t want to face is that the USN only had 8 cruisers and 15 destroyers.
The IJN had 17 cruisers and 49 destroyers. Plus 11 battleships where as the US had none.
So split the surface ships up front and shell Midway at night.
The IJN could have had 9 carriers at Midway. The 5 main with Zuikaku plus Ryujo, Junyo, Zuiho, and Hosho. Those 9 carriers should have been split into 3 groups. North, Mid, and South and kept behind the surface ships.
The 9 carriers would have been loaded with 2/3 fighters and 1/3 bombers. Not the other way around like they did. This would have allowed over 500 planes.
In this scenario the IJN would have lost no carriers and sunk the entire US Task Force.
Late to the party, I agree with you and F430 Ferrai but I feel the arrogance of the Japanese mindset, fueled by non stop victories and Pearl, was sure the Kido Butai was More then adequate to annihilate the remaining US carriers....
This is an amazingly underrated interview and exposition. It is an excellent basic description of the Battle.
there's at least one big error. the fighters weren't pulled down to sea level by the torpedo bombers when Dick Best made his attack with 2 wingmen. (per Jon Parshall and Anthony Tully's book "Shattered Sword"). maybe this is a video from a long time ago, before their book came out.
The only problem for me with these types of seminars are they are aimed at people who only have limited or no knowledge of the battle. I would love to see a conference with a number of historians well versed on the Battle of Midway to ask more obscure questions about some of the nuances of the lead up to, the actual event, and the aftermath of the battle. At minimum, I would like to have this videos' historian, Craig Symonds along with John Lundstrom, Jon Parshall, Tony Tully, and Robert Mrazek. Those are authors of books about Midway or have large parts of them about Midway that I have read. If I won the Lottery, organizing such a conference would be one the things I would like to do. LOL!
Agreed, I have read several versions and have holes to fill. Like 1) japanese overconfidence, 2) island based aircraft after 10am? 3) if we broke their code here, after that?
Here's a jewel for you. Contrary to modern claims, three of the Japanese carriers (Kaga, Soryu, and Hiryu) had many aircraft on their flight decks when the U.S. dive bomber attack began. See the postwar statements of Soryu's executive officer (Cmdr. Hisashi Ohara) and Kaga's air officer (Cmdr. Takahisa Amagai). Look at the Nagumo report's statements regarding readiness for launch in the 1030- 1100 time frame.
Look at the last landing times of aircraft on each carrier prior to the attack, because this is the only period when aircraft could be spotted. Look at Hiryu's launch of her retaliatory strike at 1050- just twenty minutes after the attack ended- and note that she could not possibly have spotted her strike in that time frame.
Lastly, look for photographic and filmed interview evidence (it exists) that Japanese CAP sections could and did launch from abreast the island, and were not automatically cluttering the flight deck. Look carefully, and you'll find that our dive bomber crews were not painting "lurid portraits"- and that the "flight deck myth" is false. Cheers...
Is this expert enough ?
m.ua-cam.com/video/Au2tq6IEkLA/v-deo.html
Your two year wait is over! Look at the channel Unauthorized History of the Pacific War Podcast where they cover these and have, as guests, John Parshall. They try to assume that listeners are not experts but also discuss some of the controversies. For example, Parshall discusses Japanese historian's view of Fuchida's book which was "the" view of the battle, and why they dismiss it, then he reviews the evidence that Fuchida was playing rather loose to create is "If ONLY we had FIVE MORE MINUTES" myth.
@@DoctorX101 I have watched that channel just about from the start of it.
12.00 Nimitz considered writing off Midway. Would be a burden to Japan (distance) and since the fall of the PI the trans Pacific cable was not needed.
You can’t count on luck but luck counts.
53:20 Canada DID help protect the west coast of the United States. Canadians landed on the beaches of Kiska Island alongside Americans when it was re-patriated. (The Japanese had evacuated by submarine already, but we helped damit.) 🍁
Canada also did a lot in the Battle of the Atlantic , especially in the western Atlantic
One aspect of the battle that wasn’t touched on was how Admiral Fletcher, overall “senior” tactical commander of USN forces marshalled (to defend Midway) during the action, purposely deferred much of the real-time decision making to his subordinate Admiral Spruance. I think that showed a significant command maturity on Fletcher’s part, and contributed to the battle’s success. I not absolutely certain, but I think the issue did come up at one point during the Midway operation and Fletcher did in fact verbally give his decision-making authority over to Spruance because he thought Spruance, at the time, had a better handle on unfolding events due to time and location of forces….
I note that "key decisions 2, 4 and 5" are all about correcting bad decisions or problems of the Spruance (Halsey trained) air groups. The fact that the air groups from Fletchers Yorktown, launched efficiently, flew to target and conducted a coordinated attack sinking the Soryu is just an afterthought in your presentation and totally ignored in the movie.
43.40 Luck People make their own luck. Decisions made the difference.
If you are looking for your keys and find them is that luck? If you are looking for your keys and find the wedding band you lost 3 months ago, THAT is luck.
i have yet to hear any explanation about laps in position reporting of Japanese carriers. Up to two hour increments of lacking position acquisition knowledge! A B17 flying
in constant contact and reporting Japanese carrier positions would have been nice. Was not anyone reporting position when attacking? Was anyone listening?
and also the numerous PBY's what were they doing?
Agreed. USN should have been able to continuously track the IJN feet with PBY’s and B17. High level bombing never worked against stationary ground targets never mind moving ships. One of the most closely guarded secrets of the war was the Norden bombsight: not the sight itself but the fact that it didn’t work. The only application of high level bombing was against civilian populations where the bombardier was targeting something the size of Tokyo, Berlin, Hamburg or Dresden. The other thing that didn’t carry its own weight at Midway were the subs. There were a half dozen in the area but the only impact was indirect in that a IJN destroyer sent to harass a sub left a wake that Wade McClusky picked up.
Maps and diagrams would be helpful.
The Japanese CAP that took out VT-8 had almost seven minutes to get back to patrol altitude before the next attack force arrived. I think the treatment of this narrative is a bit too simplified and contains at least this one error. I expect a little more from a historian of this caliber.
I was thinking the same thing. The CAP was actually displaced on the horizontal much more than the vertical, and they were out of cannon ammo, so they needed to land and resupply. Plus, their CAP vectoring sucked.
out of ammo
Even with our intelligence, the Japanese would have destroyed our carriers if Yamamoto had not been a fool suffering from 'winner's disease.' His battleships should have attacked the Midway Island, providing field artillery for the invading force. They could have had two flattops full of fighters to provide air support (top) for the battleships. Three of his carriers (including the one he sent to Alaska) should have had all of its bombers and torpedo planes armed and waiting for American naval force. No Japanese bomber should have been sent to attack Midway and use surface ordinance. Yamamoto was drunk with his victory at Pearl Harbor. Imagine if he had 200 bombers armed and fueled waiting for the American force to be spotted.
Another ridiculous commentary that parrots the good heart of Yamamoto...what a saintly fellow...a golden hearted love bird that sings with the angels above and would plant a wreath of flowers on the Arizona and weep if only he was here to do so. Better to remember him in his burning Betty bomber with a 50 caliber slug through his chest...justice served! Very sick that this video came from the Navy League of the United States. Short memories and misguided folks over that at NLUS.
The story that all of the Japanese attack aircraft were in their hangars when the dive bomber attack began is blatantly false. Multiple contemporary American and Japanese eyewitness accounts, the carrier's TROMs, and the available time frame in which to spot their aircraft, together make abundantly clear that only Akagi's attack aircraft were in her hangars. Two of the carriers had their strikes spotted on deck while a third had approximately 20 aircraft on deck (although only a few of these were spotted).
Continuing to repeat the story that our aviators were painting "lurid portraits" simply denigrates men who risked their lives to gain the victory- and distorts the historical record.
Are we to discount the reports from the aviators that saw few or no aircraft on the flight decks? At best, we can say there are conflicting accounts.
@@wellsbengston4132
1. No U.S. pilots who attacked Kaga or Soryu categorically stated that they had a clear view of the flight decks of the carriers, and that the flight decks were empty. This is particularly significant since the pilots were aiming for a specific point on the flight deck or were looking for where their bomb hit- all while looking out for enemy fighters.
2. The pilots whose bombs hit Kaga and Soryu all stated that the two carriers had many aircraft on their flight decks.
3. The period of time in which the carriers could have begun spotting their strikes is the interval between the last landing time and the time at which the ship was attacked. These are Akagi 1010, Kaga 1005, Soryu 0950, and Hiryu 0910.
4. Hiryu and Soryu had no torpedo switching issue and thus had their aircraft ready for launch far sooner than did Akagi and Kaga.
5. Soryu's senior surviving officer- executive officer Cmdr. Hisaishi Ohara- stated for the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey that Soryu's aircraft for the attack on the U.S. carriers (18 Vals and 6 Zeros EDIT: 3 Zeros for the attack; 3 more added after the dive bomber attack ended) were on the flight deck awaiting the order to launch when the ship was attacked.
6. Kaga's senior surviving officer- air officer Lt. Cmdr. Takahisa Amagai- stated for the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey that Kaga had approximately 30 aircraft in her hangars, 6 fighters in the air, and the rest (approximately 20 aircraft) on her flight deck.
7. The dive bomber attacked ended at 1030. Hiryu's retaliatory strike against the U.S. carriers began to launch at 1050 and were all in the air by 1058. Twenty minutes was not enough time for the Japanese to spot 24 aircraft, warm up their engines, and begin launching- and Hiryu had more time to spot her strike than any other carrier.
8. Senshi Sosho- often referred to as the "Japanese Official History" and the primary source for revisionist claims on empty flight decks- is not an official history at all. It was neither commissioned nor endorsed by the Japanese Government. Wording in the forward of each of the 102 volumes clearly states that the contents of each volume are the responsibility of the authors and of the War History Office.
9. Recent Japanese testimony that the flight decks were largely empty consists of statements to the effect that "I never saw..." or "As far as I'm aware"- all made by men whose primary responsibility was something other than knowing the status of the ship's aircraft. No points of view or times in which the observation were made are provided. Lastly, filmed interview and photographic evidence clearly shows that Japanese fighter sections could and often did launch from abreast the carrier's islands.
Cheers...
@@manilajohn0182 Well-respected historians can't seem to agree, so I'll continue to believe that its an open question.
@@wellsbengston4132 Well, that's up to you, my friend. That said, when you next crack a book on this subject, you'll find that points 1-4 are historical fact, while points 5-9 are addressed by silence from those same "well- respected historians". You're far better off by finding out for yourself based on all available data- some of which some authors have avoided like the plague. But you do you.
Cheers...
@@manilajohn0182 No disrespect intended to the author, I think the timeline presented in the book 'Shattered Sword' is quite convincing. That combined with high altitude deck photos of the Kido Butai carriers avoiding the B-17 bomb sticks with only CAP planes on deck and having to make evasive turns for the various different attacks leaves very little doubt about the state of the Japanese flight decks. In my view the Japanese loss lies with Nagumo sticking to his designated strike launch time without a complete scouting report. With the report he gets first carrier v carrier strike, without a complete report he lost.
Dude, several minutes to crank AA from low to high? Ridiculous statement...and if you make ridiculous statements nobody will believe anything you are selling...
That number definitely jumped out at me.....