I have read Shattered sword and found it outstanding. Extremely thorough, covering all aspects of Midway well beyond the clichés. Beside the book, your lectures are great. I hope you will publish more on the Pacific war. Thanks for your fantastic work.
That is exactly right. (1) The Japanese perspective and (2) the vivid explanation of spotting and (3) accuracy and interest in the narrative - make for a great book. This one right up there with the best. When I read SS I immediately re-read it. I have only ever done that once before - Beevor's Berlin.
One other consideration that would complicate and add to the timeframe in changing ammo is that Japanese planes didn’t use the “same” mounting brackets for contact bombs and torpedos. They had different brackets for each weapon. As such, the addt’l step of removing and mounting brackets added more time to re-arm each plane than some understand.
Great discussion. The problems of language are even deeper than discussed. Japanese characters (KANJI) have a minimum of two pronunciations (ON and KUN), and as many as six or even more. This means that even something as basic as pronouncing names can provide problems, even to educated Japanese. The simplification of characters adds yet another dimension. Having done a good deal of translation over the years, I can completely empathize. There are indeed plenty of things still out there that Western scholars have not yet touched.
FWIW, I worked for a Japanese company from the mid 80s through the early 90s. I was surprised at how uninformed highly educated Japanese concerning the pacific war actually were at that time. Any time we got the chance to visit a historic ship or similar site they insisted I take them there. At the ex- USS Little Rock in Buffalo, they were amazed at the maps and track charts. No war history was taught at the time. I asked one fellow to translate the early characters on a preserved original Japanese aircraft at willow grove NAS, a single line, he was unable to read any of it, even though he was native Japanese, with a master’s degree. None of the characters matched up with the three character sets of now. ( katakana, hirigani, or kanji ) all have different uses. Absolutely none of the earlier characters match the modern ones, nor is it taught except in postgraduate courses in linguistics, but not in the context of military applications. I hope the situation has improved in the last 30-40 years!
@@Zephyrmec Sadly, it hasn't! I'm working on a translation now where three different Japanese sources cite a personal name phonetically (in kana) three different ways! When I lived in Japan, it was not unusual for a Japanese national, when meeting someone for the first time, would literally draw the kanji for their name with their finger on the palm of their own hand, so the new friend could see how it was written. The simplified kanji have only made it more difficult for even native speakers to read pre-1945 writings. When it comes to technical or military terminology, this situation is even worse.
this is part of why I question some of Parshalls sources, and the complete disregard of the after action reports of guys like future admiral Wade McCluskey
I remember the first time that something I believed and never considered even the possibility that it could be wrong ... was wrong. My 6th grade history was wrong. A US Naval historian at NAS Pensacola was was right. This story a out Midway urges me - again - not to take things like this at face value. Continue to study, read, do the research.
An excellent presentation, and yes, the Japanese logs of flight operations looked quite daunting, am glad you were able to bring the information contained in them to light for western readers. I have read your excellent book and what articles I can find of yours on line, as well as watched many of your other lectures, and you continue to illuminate. Thank you for your efforts.
Also, Shattered Sword gives Admiral Fletcher the credit he is due. Few other Admirals have led naval forces in combat against superior forces and come out on top three times. And that was over several months not years. He did a well as Admiral Nelson and the Korean admiral Yi who also fought the Japanese.
Fletcher wasn't a Admiral King Favorite. He was a serviceable Commander. It was Mitchner that failed miserably. Scouting was poor compared to 1943 standards for both sides.
Coral Sea was the first time the US Navy successfully told Japan ‘No.’ Midway was giving Japan the ‘decisive battle’ they wanted, but on the US Navy’s terms. And Guadalcanal (including Eastern Solomons) was the beginning of chasing Japan back to where they belonged. Fletcher was the Senior Officer Present Afloat for all three. He came through in the clutch, at a time when the enemy had numerical superiority.
@richardbennett There's no "N" in Mitscher. Here is where he proves why he was LAST in his Annapolis class. FLETCHER was not in the top ten, but he was much higher than Mitscher. Why King allowed Nimitz to give him back a carrier command, I'll never understand. Stupid decisions and then lying about it had him in exile for two years. Stanhope Ring was relieved after the Midway reports came in, and he never was in charge of a big combat air wing ever again. He was a classic jerk.
@@richardbennett1856I think he was better than serviceable. The criticism that he didn't pursue the defeated enemy was a case of armchair quarterbacking by aviators who weren't there and didn't have command responsibilities. Things like remembering to refuel his escorting destroyers was crucial to his fleet's combat efficiency. After the combats his task force had endured they were bone dry, and Fletcher expected more trials were coming. As Seth and Bill wrote on their podcast, "Admiral King was right about ALMOST EVERYTHING!" THAT was the title of one of the first season episodes. I'm not saying that Fletcher should have been kept as task force commander. Seth said he wasn't a fan of Fletcher in spite of his three wins against superior forces. I'd like to hear his re🎉asons. He could have been rotated home like Spruance was after Philippine Sea. Given what happened in late 1944 and mid1945 with Halsey in command of Third fleet, the signs were there that he,too, was tired. Halsey had been due for a rest, and should have been "given" one! After the hurricane disasters it should have been obvious that something was wrong with him.
I had the pleasure of meeting Jonathan when he spoke to my class at the the Naval War College in 2010( makes me old). I also have the honor of having an uncle, RADM William (Bill) Leonard who was a VF42 pilot on Yorktown during the battle. I have read Shattered Sword and think it is one of the finest examples of military history published on the Naval War in the Pacific
I am a huge fan of the authors in this presentation. Shattered Sword and Battle of Surigao Straight are two of my favorite books along with Mr. Frank's Guadalcanal masterpiece. Thank you all for the incredible work you do.
I flew reciprocating aircraft in T-34s and T-28s in flight training as well as TS-2As (twin engined) and the then S-2Es in the fleet off the USS Randolph and USS Yorktown. I do not remember ever spending 20 minutes to warm up the engines as and air cooled engine warms up rapidly. On land we were heading to the runway in less than 5 minutes, and on the carriers, certainly no more than that if we were the first in line to the cat. There is a pre-start check list, then start, then pre-flight check list and then launch. Film of US Flight Deck operations show the ones in front of the pack starting first and within a short period of time they started their take off roll as the ranks in the back were just starting. You did not want to spend an excessive amount of time idling an air cooled engine, for while you got some air over the engine off the prop, you didn't get anywhere near what you got when airborne. Refueling US aircraft is done on the flight deck. However, when we were still flying props with avgas vs JP, the gasoline vapors would go down, and when leaving our readyroom to go up to the flight deck, once in the passage way you could smell the gasoline vapor in the air. That is the reason before fueling was done the announcement would be made to extinguish the smoking lamp (an old traditional command that basically said NO SMOKING). Once the fuel vapors were vented out of all compartments after completing fueling, the would announce that the smoking lamp was lit. I do not know if the use of JP fuel has the same issues or not.
Mr. O'Hara took the words from my mouth. My first fascination with WWII was the Nazi-Soviet War (to the point of driving me to learn German and now attempt to learn Russian.) The colossal nature of that war simply boggles the mind. But over the years, with the opening of the archives in Russia, old myths (It was all Hitler's fault, General Winter and General Mud, overwhelming Soviet hordes) are being given a new workover. True, that also means re-examining bloody failures that have been swept under the carpet (the Rzhev salient for example); but it also means showing that Stavka became increasingly proficient at the strategic level (especially at deception - "maskirovka.") while its troops improved on the operational level (thanks to the Studebakers and tons of canned beef through Lend/Lease.) The fact is that the RKKA 'learned' in part from the Wehrmacht about modern warfare and used that knowledge to beat the snot out of them. It is an enormous tragedy that it cost them some 20+ million souls in the process. My new fascination with the Pacific War began when on a chance I ordered and read E.B.Sledge's "With the Old Breed." And then I devoured Ian Toll's trilogy. And "The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors." I just got done reading "Never Call Me A Hero" by Jack "Dusty" Kleiss when I stumbled upon this video. Well Mr. Parshall, you have another viewer, customer and fan. Just headed over to Amazon to place my order for Shattered Sword.
Thats pretty imoressive stuff! Can I suggest you learn Chinese as well so that you can be one of the first historians to write about World War 3, which is already in full swing.
@@jonparshall Thoroughly enjoyed it Mr. Parshall! I LOVE it when myths get busted by cold, hard facts... and nothing is colder than numbers! I happy refer to your work anytime that old myth about Midway pops up during argu... .er, "discussions" 🙂
The Red Army was caught by surprise and the Red Air Force destroyed on the ground was directly due to Stalin., just as the purge, political commissars and political generals caused the Red Army to become the Red Carpet in the first part of the war. make no mistake, stalin is the person most responsible for the 20 million dead
Jon's Midway book is a classic. I have heard him speak several times at the International WW2 Conference in New Orleans and he always does a great job.
My thoughts. Japanese practice of rearming in the hangar was a hold over from their adoption of British policies. Would have been ok if they had adopted armored flight decks along with it. But they didnt, originally, so that had to adapt. Chaotic hangers explains why Hiryu didnt get her strike off until half an hour after the 1020 strike. Even then it was an anaemic strike of fighters and divebombers without Kates. This was in stark contrast to their usual coordinated operations. I can see Yamaguchi yelling " just get them out there"
@@navyreviewer Yeah, Japanese carriers were something of a hybrid--internal hangars, but also a two-deck design to maximize air group size. Armored flight decks was a no-go--they only used it on Taiho and Shinano.
John your mythos quote is well written and quite applicable across most historical events. Curiously now that anyone with a phone and internet access can now say 'I was there' two bits to the storyline. Now you don't have to wait 60 years for records to appear or translations to be scribed, now you can get input and access to a world of knowledge in a matter of minutes. This has revolutionized our understanding of History and created whole new cottage industries of historical revision and storytelling. Of course with all this wonderful information comes an enormous tsunami of ignorance and opinion because people become instant experts with their 20 minutes of reading it online. 🤔😆
The history of the Pacific War is basically naval history. The European war was army and the focus was essencially Europe First in the same focus as the policital focus. I started as an adult with Morrison's books, (even then it took a lot of imagination and toleration) and ended with my mind in the Pacific. Thank you for your updates and service to History.
It makes perfect sense that IJN carrier-ops changed after Midway. It is a shame they didn't change their damage-control hierarchy/training as well. The result: Taiho go BOOM. Thanks for producing this video.
Shattered Sword is on the Mount Rushmore of accurate history books. MIDWAY was such a complicated battle, the research is outstanding. Serious and Cronological accounts, great reading. 23:23 John and Tony, with John Lundstrom's IJN Kido Butai flight 23:28 records, the SOP on Car Div#1. tells the rest of the story. John, 10 AM is AIRSTRIKE TIME. How many Pacific War battles had poor aircap on both sides then? I.E. Santa Cruz.
Love the lectures. Slowly but surely you are all coming to the real conclusion that too much of the upper leadership in the US Navy during WWII was exceedingly poor. What won WWII was the unbelievable logistics of the industrialists, lower ranks in the services, and the workers in the US. It was very sad that we did not have exceptional leadership that knew how to use such power. For some reason the US is able to produce good lower ranks but just about everything falls apart and gets worse as you go higher than CDR's. The same problems exist today so a good dose of reality is really needed starting at WWII and destroying the myths.
Great conversation here! It was nice to see other Pacific War scholars like Richard Frank, as well. I think much of this points to the difficulty and frustration in acquiring and using non-English primary sources (for western historians in this case). I have a B.A. in Japanese Studies and having lived in Japan for 5 years, I can attest to the difficulty in communicating and in translating an East Asian language (I'm conversant, but *not fluent*, in Japanese). As I recall, the U.S. State Dept. lists Japanese as one of the most difficult languages for western English-speakers to learn. I have Parshall, Frank, Evans, and Peattie (among many others) to thank for providing excellent and well-researched accounts of the Pacific War which really encouraged my own research (read: obsession) on the IJN. Unfortunately, I don't have the time and resources to deal with more primary sources (like the Senshi Sosho), so I'm largely stuck with secondary sources. Like many, I've read translated materials from surviving Japanese officers and I've always found myself wondering about the validity of some of their claims. Specifically, I've often wondered if Captain Tameichi Hara is being entirely honest in his book "Japanese Destroyer Captain." In any case, it's a problem of historiography, corroborating evidence, and making judgments on what evidence to use.
Most reports from the frontline personnel at te time, commanders & subordinates, Officers & enlisted, would have been as honest & truthful as possible, attempts to "Stat Pad" would have been actively discouraged. But the "Fog of War" is a VERY real thing. I am currently working my way thru Lundstrom's "With the First Team" books, & the vast differences between the air-to-air actions & ship spotting/post attack damage assessments & reality are staggering, but these are a facet of warfare. The pilots, intelligence & damage assessment analysists were FREQUENTLY not just wrong, but critically & fundamentally wrong. But the problem with assign "malice" to the reports undercuts the fact that these personnel KNOW that over inflation of kills/damage done could skew any follow on response that would be necessary to win the battle, increasing the probability of damage/loss of assets like vessels & air frames & even the deaths of comrades that would be needed in future battles, so I suspect that the reports were usually made to be as honest as possible. Over inflation of post-mission reports can lead to dead comrades in later action, like reporting that all enemy resistance was swept from the skies & there are no enemy fighters left so the follow on attack might remove escorts from the roster to give extra time to rest the piolets & perform maintenance on airframes & the attack aircraft of the second wave flies face first into a Buzzsaw of pissed off defenders. Things like that are heavily discouraged simply for practicalities sake, by both sides. As another example, torpedo bombers report hits when the mistake near misses from dive bombers that are making a simultaneous attack. It is a mistake, but it is an error made from incomplete data with some pilot influence since "We're The Best & We Wouldn't Miss Would We?". But that is a simple & easy mistake to make.
It baffles me that if, as Yamamoto planned, the operation was intended to be a SURPRISE, then as soon as Midway aircraft began attacking, Nagumo should have known that things were off kilter. Recover strike, retire westward, await further instructions.
Not really. The Japanese communiques are full of pompous drivel, from the direction that a few thousand troops would be able to overwhelm Midway's defenders, to the reckoning that all mail was to be redirected to Midway considering it was practically in Japanese hands. You have to remember that the Japanese including Yamamoto had utter contempt for the American ability to fight - Yamamoto even published an article in the Asahi and all the rest of the Empire's newspapers encouraging the Japanese emperor and military to march on the American mainland and set terms in Washington. It's referenced around the world, including German, Italian and American newspapers. This, combined with his drive to make war on America, even threatening to resign if he wasn't given the go-ahead for Pearl Harbor, was always the understanding of Yamamoto in the American public in the 1940s and 50s. This original understanding was corrupted by "new research" of Yamamoto's diary which demonstrated that Yamamoto was a "reluctant warrior. This completely changed the popular understanding of Yamamoto and the Japanese in World War 2, and ws chiefly promulgated by Two Japanese directors and a Jewish director in their movie "Tora Tora Tora". Except it was a Japanese lie. There is no Yamamoto diary. There never was. The "13-part message" which was supposed to be the Japanese "Honorable" Declaration of War on the Americans BEFORE they attacked Pearl Harbor? But was only "delayed" mistakenly? Another Japanese Lie. The message wasn't a Declaration of War. It had nothing to do with Pearl Harbor, but was a normal diplomatic communique that didn't even break diplomatic relations. The real Declaration of War was printed in Japanese Newspapers the following day. Japanese "Honor"? Another lie. "Bushido" was never a Code of Honor among feudal Japanese, it was the invention of a Japanese-American in San Fransisco in the early 20th century who modeled it after European Chivalry. The purpose was to lie about real Japanese culture and behavior, by creating a false Mythology called "Bushido" which would make the Japanese seem more Honorable than they actually were - and also denigrate Truthful appraisals of Japanese culture by Americans as "Ignorant". Bottom line: The Japanese and Yamamoto had always intended Pearl Harbor to be a sneak attack, in the most treacherous mindset. This has largely been the common theme of Japanese history as promulgated by Japanese and Jewish "historians", particular during and after the Cold War. Parshall is right in that he's not actually revising history - he's simply reverting American popular understanding back towards the original understanding when Americans knew that their attacks were VERY effective against the Japanese carriers* *The reason why the Japanese destroyed their log books is probably because those log books exposed Japanese claims about the Battle of Midway as lies; the idea that you can destroy information, giving you the "credibility" to make up whatever story you want, is a distinctly Jewish and Japanese trait - I find it likely that those so-called "ineffective Midway attacks" did far more real damage to the Japanese carriers than they wanted to admit - which would ruin their story about "incompetent Americans who just got lucky". That, after all, has always been the entire point of these gargantuan and widespread lies promulgated by Jews and Japanese Regarding the Japanese-Jewish alliance, the San Fransisco Federal Reserve and its subsidiary Jewish banks financed the Japanese Empire, which is how the Japanese were able to purchase so much American materiel and why the American media (particularly Jewish media) were so favorable to the Japanese to the point they would cover for them during the sinking of the Panay, and the war in China overall; the Japanese didn't sell America much at the time, so the only way to acquire hard currency was through debt-lending though their Jewish friends - this of course, led to a detente with other Jewish-dominated powers like the Soviet Union (Jewish Bolsheviks by this time dominated the Nomenklatura, which controlled all aspects of the Soviet economy from manufacture to media) Needless to say, the Jewish heirarchy was very pronounced in Japan itself - something that was well known among Americans in 50s but was denigrated as "anti-semitic" (ie True) - today, new researchers are discovering that "Hey, the Japanese permitted large numbers of Jews to live in Japan", not knowing they've stumbled on something they're not supposed to (it's comical, really). The Jewish community and Japanese were practically joined at the hip and have had an alliance long before World War 2 which has only strengthened through the Cold War unto the present day. Tora Tora Tora and Midway are only a couple of the acidic Lies that have poisoned American culture today.
But don't forget that actual communication between the Japanese fleets was faulty at the time with weather factors and atmosphere conditions affecting their reliability. Also, Nagumo's flagship Akagi communications equipment, was not as powerful as Yamamoto's IJN Yamato.
Franks was on my shelf for a long time, then lost in a move and more recently replaced. The use of those flight logs from the Japanese carriers tells me I need to get into Shattered Swoes too.
I lived in same town (Cresskill, NJ) as Fuchida in the 1970s. Knew his grandson. Poor fella was relentlessly bullied. Fuchida probably lived there due to its proximity to NYC publishing houses?
One thing that reading Shatters Sword uncinfused me about was why the 10:20 dive bomber attack was so devastating. If all the strike planes wereally on the deck, the exploding of the bombs would have blown most overboard. Being still in the hanger make much more sense. The bomb blasts above them would have shredded the fully fueled and armed planes in place. The hanger was a nice little kettle in which they could burn and exploded.
@@manilajohn0182 My point exactly. The instant fuses the Americans used would have blown most of the aircraft overboard. Had they been on the deck when the bombs hit not all of the ships would have been destroyed. They would have been out of commission but salvable.
@@martinarthurfleming9747 I'm fairly certain that the Americans were not using bombs with instantaneous fuse settings. IIRC, they were using 3/4 second fuses. Japanese sources (I don't mean Fuchida) state that Soryu's strike was on the flight deck waiting the order to launch, while Kaga had approxi.ately 20 aircraft on the flight deck, with possibly a few spotted.
Nice to see a fellow student forum the operations department at the University of Minnesota Carlson School of Management at the university of Minnesota
Fuchida was an interesting man, you must give him his due . He became a Christian minister and made many visits to the US . His visit to Pearl Harbor on an anniversary of the attack was awesome !
I have to add a little of my knowledge regarding Japanese information on the war. It seems to me that the Japanese population overall, have put the war behind them, and fundamentally do not know much or anything about the war. This became very obvious when Clint Eastwood made his two WW II movies about the battle of Iwo Jima. One of these was 'Letters from Iwo Jima', which was in Japanese, which this was because all the actors were Japanese actors, and almost none of then new anything about the war. So, given a population that essentially has 'no interest' in this part of their history would easily result in producing very little documentation about the war being that would relatively currently written. So, if there is Japanese documentation from the war, or soon afterwards still waiting to be useful historically, it needs to be translated for the rest of the world to have meaningful access to it since the Japanese are not typically interested. On the other hand, Germans have accepted their terrible role in WW II, and have made memorials, and admitted to their terrible role in the world back in the 20's, 30's, and 40's. Japan has never accepted any of this guilt from the war, and has essentially just swept it under the rug. Perhaps someone or some organization should hire a person who can read Japanese from the war era, and translate it all into English. This could be a professional job for someone that could take many years!
Great video. Lived with my brother, he took 3 yrs Japanese because he had Japanese business associates. His homework made my brain hurt. PS: the Kodo's were amazing to see the image.
It is certainly a good thing that the story of the Battle of Midway and the Pacific War in general is now being examined in light of Japanese sources now available. What is regrettable is that it is happening at this late date when the actual participants in the engagement(s) have mostly passed away and can no longer be interviewed. Still, this has to be said with a grain of salt, as eyewitness accounts of Midway, on both sides, have turned out not to be 100% reliable and should have never been thought of as such. Perhaps the use of Fuchida as a source (not just his book but his interviews) by authors such as Walter Lord is the most egregious example. There are other examples in Lord's book "Incredible Victory". That is not to demean Lord's scholarship and his great efforts to obtain accounts from those who fought the battle. Wherever and however they may be flawed, those accounts remain important material in the historical record.
I didn't go look through the video again, but did you read Akagi instead of Amagi? There was a Japanese carrier named Amagi in 1945. Here is the wiki page link: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_aircraft_carrier_Amagi
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I find it fascinating how this story is a lot like Guderian deeply influencing the american view on the second world war in Europe and the "Panzers". And in his case his myths even came back via american books to germany and keep influencing public opinion.
Your work bringing to the West the true japanese perspective of the battle is amazing, Jon. I found it totally fascinating. I wonder if you plan to do the same with some other specific battle of the Pacific War
@@jonparshall oh. If you want a good building block I recommend "1942: the year that doomed the axis." Dont remember the author or year but it was a good one.
@@jonparshall so you are aiming for a book broader in scope? Whew. I'm not saying it can't be done but I hope you know what you're getting yourself into.
@@navyreviewer It's like boiling the ocean, yeah. I'm covering all the theaters. I've been working on it for quite a while now. But then again, I wanted to learn more about the year, and this was a good way to do that.
Excellent discussion and video. I've been curious about the hanger deck environment on the Japanese carriers, and the differences between their design and that of the American carriers. Specifically, it was my understanding that the Japanese hanger deck was much more dangerous and vulnerable than its counterpart. The ventilation was inadequate, the fuel lines not well protected and difficult to seal off during an attack, and the storage and handling of ordinance rendered these spaces into bombs. Is this impression approximately correct? Thanks
I highly recommend reading Parshall/Tully's book Shatter Sword as it really details the entire way this battle folded out from Japan to DC. I just finished it a few days ago and was absolutely mesmerized by the story and how much my perception of Midway was changed.
Their work should be read with extreme caution. Their primary source is 'not' the official history which they claim it to be (and it represents the view of Japanese veterans rather than historians anyway), and they omitted key statements from senior Japanese officers aboard the carriers at the battle which directly contradict the central "revelation" in their book. Buyer beware.
@@manilajohn0182 I've read many histories of Midway and have found some enlightening things in this book and with their methodology. I'd need something more than an anonymous UA-cam comment to disparage any "buyer beware" warnings about the book.
@@chipsawdust5816 Okay, here are a few items to start. 1. Their primary source- Senshi Sosho- is 'not' the official Japanese history which they claim it to be. 2. The central 'revelation' of their work- that all of the Japanese attack aircraft were in their hangars when the dive bomber attack began- is false. The claim relies on conditional statements from former Japanese pilots who were in their 80s and even 90s. 3. They ignored after- action report statements of U.S. dive bomber pilots and gunners (from three squadrons aboard two carriers) that Japanese aircraft cluttered the flight decks of Kaga and Soryu, stating that they were telling "lurid tales" for which they can be "forgiven". They suggest that some U.S. pilots and gunners contradicted this when actually, none did. 4. They ignored the USSBS statement from the executive officer of Soryu (Cmdr. Hisaishi Ohara) that her first wave strike for the attack on the U.S. carriers was on Soryu's flight deck awaiting the order to launch when the ship was attacked- even though he's repeatedly mentioned in the book. 5. They ignored the USSBS statement from Kaga's air officer (Lt. Cmdr. Takahisa Amagai) that Kaga had about 30 aircraft in her hangars, 6 fighters in the air, and the rest (about 20+ aircraft) on her flight deck when the ship was attacked- even though he's repeatedly mentioned in the book. 6. The gloss over in silence the short 20- minute gap between the end of the dive bomber attack at 1030 and the beginning of the launch of Hiryu's retaliatory attack on the U.S. carriers because the authors’ own criteria for spotting and launching a strike shows that Hiryu’s strike had to have been on her flight deck when the dive bomber attack began. 7. They state that repeated U.S. attacks and the rearming and launching of Japanese CAP fighters prevented the Japanese from spotting a strike in the early morning. In fact, the Naguno report makes clear that the Japanese planned a “grand scale” (two- wave) strike to be launched in the 1030- 1100 time frame. Additionally, both photographic and filmed interview evidence shows that the Japanese could and often did launch CAP fighters from abreast carriers’ islands. 8. They present as a fact that Yamamoto ordered Nagumo to retain half of his aircraft in reserve. In fact, this is a claim from ‘one’ man- who was a former member of Yamamoto’s staff. No evidence exists to support this claim.
I remember reading years ago a newspaper article about Fuchida's rendition of events coming into question in Japan. That was years ago but I am almost positive that they were talking about Pearl Harbor but it's interesting that (apparently) the Japanese were the first to discover and doubt his stories. He even claimed to have been on board the Missouri during the surrender ceremony!!! Apparently grandiose self advertising isn't something unique to North America lol.
I find this whole thing rather hilarious. Because, in my mind, I NEVER thought or ever even imagined that the actual flight deck itself had a large number of aircraft on it. I didn't read Fuchido's book about Midway. I had imagined that underneath the flight decks were numerous aircraft with fuel tanks full & that they were hurriedly filling other planes with fuel and rearming them with armor piercing bombs while removing "HE bombs" that were to be used on Midway Island against land targets. AND if ALL those airplanes had been on the flight deck instead of down in the hanger they may have had a better chance. Cuz pilots could have started taking off & the fires would have been on top of the ship in an open air environment instead of confined & making every explosion lead to a chain reaction of another & then another explosion! Plus, those explosions being inside the hanger, also made the cast iron pipes that they used for pumping water to the fire fighting hoses were made to shatter. And so they had no water to fight the ever growing number of fires! But YEAH, I never read or even heard tale about the book Fuchida wrote saying that the flight decks were full of aircraft. If that had been true there would have been a large number of aircraft all around on the bottom of the ocean in the vicinity of each carrier. However, the ONLY aircraft that survived were either in the air or on the Hiryu. All the planes on Kaga, Akagi, & Soryu were burned or blown to pieces. If any planes within the hangers survived, I myself would be very amazed!!!
Three of the carriers each had approximately 20 aircraft on their flight decks. Only one (Akagi) still had all of her attack aircraft in her hangars- and she had 6 zeros at the fantail in the process of taking off. See the USSBS statements of Soryu's executive officer and Kaga's air officer. The brief 20- minute time gap between the end of the dive bomber attack and the beginning of launch of Hiryu's retaliatory strike- and the last landing time of aircraft on her flight deck- shows conclusively that Hiryu's first wave strike was also on her flight deck when the dive bomber attack began.
I always love to see Mr. Parshall doing a talk, but there's one question that I never found in Shattered Sword: how did the kodochosho documents make it into the record? Was there some intrepid air operations officer that grabbed them as the carriers sank?
There was a talk where he answered this in passing…. I’ll try find it and post it here for you if I can. In essence he said in effect the documents detailing the ops are taken off if when the ship is ordered abandoned.
Its fairly common to take the bridge logs when a abandon ship order is given. The USN still has some of the log books from ships it lost. Sometimes the bridge watch is incapacitated, or the bridge is destroyed & the logs lost, but a surprising number are preserved. The Japanese also made it a point to save the emperors porait. Im unsure if that was official policy.
@@Carlschwamberger1 It was official policy in how ships were abandoned. 1st the Emperors portrait, followed by any senior officer in command i.e. admirals then the crew by division. Found that out when doing some reading on the Kirishima during the naval battles at Guadalcanal in 42-43
One of the hosts seemed to indicate that Hara's Japanese Destroyer Captain was biased. I read the book earlier this year (It's August 2024 now) and found it thrilling and fascinating. He certainly downplayed the atrocities of Nanking in one sentence. Can somebody tell me what is wrong with that book? Or direct me to a good critique?
Yeah, considering that Nagumo had planes coming back from Midway that were low on fuel & needed to land & the strikes on the Japanese Carriers from the Midway aircraft, Nagumo didn't have the time to spot & launch a strike on the American Carriers. Cuz by the time the attacks were over he needed to start landing strike planes.
The majority were recovered. But there was a group of four SBDs that went down in a group, and all 8 aviators were lost. There were other onesy-twosey losses as well. Cressman et. al's "A Glorious Day in our History" would probably give you the blow-by-blow of all those losses.
Those pilots and gunners whose bombs registered hits on Kaga and Soryu reported many aircraft on the carrier's flight deck. Lt. Best recorded 6- 7 Zeros in the act of launching from Akagi when he attacked. This squares with the USSBS statement of Kaga's and Soryu's senior surviving officers (Air officer Lt. Cmdr. Takahisa Amagai and Cmdr. Hisaishi Ohara respectively), who stated that Soryu's strike of 18 Vals and 3 Zeros was on her flight deck awaiting the order to launch when the ship was attacked, and that Kaga had about 30 aircraft in her hangars, six fighters in the air, and the rest (about 20 aircraft) on her flight deck. Cmdr. Fuchida aboard Akagi reported that Zeros were in the act of launching from Akagi just as Best's section attacked the ship (although it's clear that Fuchida conflated the launch of these fighters with the beginning of the launch of the strike which he knew was being prepared). While Fuchida clearly suffered from some form of PTSD (as evidenced by the multiple errors in his memoirs over issues of no historical significance at all), he did state the correct number of aircraft which attacked the ship, as well as the correct number of hits which the Japanese recorded. The last landing time of aircraft on these carriers (0950 on Soryu,1005 on Kaga, and 1010 on Akagi) supports the statements of the three Japanese officers, although few of Kaga's aircraft were likely spotted.
In 1945, the US military interviewed four survivors from three of the Japanese carriers. One was an air officer named Takahashi Amagi who was on the Hiryu. He says that at the time of the dive bomb attack, the were "about 30 planes in the hanger loaded and fueled, remainder on deck, six VF in air." Fascinating material. Another of the four indicates (not as direct) that aircraft (no number of) were being serviced in the hanger.
Air officer Lt. Cmdr. Takahisa Amagai was the senior surviving officer from Kaga. The senior surviving officer from Soryu was her executive officer, Cmdr. Hisaishi Ohara. He stated that Soryu's aircraft for the attack on the U.S. carriers was on her flight deck awaiting the order to launch when the ship was attacked. Neither of these statements were mentioned in Shattered Sword (although the two officers were), despite the fact that the information has been available for decades.
I greatly enjoyed this video. Thank you. A question: Is it necessary to call Fuchida's statements "lies" (27:28)? Instead of blame shifting, could he have merely experienced the fog of war?
Any comments on Midway 2019? or the original Midway Heston movie? LOL. Just want to know what Parshall thinks. Also, FDR had to know about PH (George Victor's PH Myth.)
I think Jon's work figured into Midway 2019. I went to the movie with the expectation that Jon's work would be evidenced. I was not disappointed. The role that Best & McClusky played in the battle is very close to what Jon has said. Some of the stuff in the latest movie is still the old info from Reluctant Admiral, which has some unsubstantiated baloney. I think the latest movie is closer to the truth in many ways. The first movie starts with the Doolittle Raid, and the latest starts with Pearl Harbor, which gives it better context. But I do love Henry Fonda as Nimitz. Layton is missing from the first movie, whereas he is a main character in the latest. The latest movie provides a better explanation about Station Hypo's role in using JN-25 intercepts to guess at Japanese intentions, and the role of the USS California's band in helping with this work. One of the things missing from both movies, is the importance of the surge in JN-25 radio traffic resulting from the Japanese immediate reaction to the Doolittle's Raid. It was a gold mine of traffic, more data points. I'm waiting on a good movie about the Battle of the Coral Sea. As to the 'FDR knew" before Pearl Harbor Myth: Sheer fantasy without any actual historical basis in fact. For the myth to be true, FDR would have had to learn about specific Japanese Plans (that were Secret), without anyone else in the UK & US knowing. I guess Yamamoto would have had to tell FDR personally by phone (without anyone else listening). People have a hard time believing that Surprise sneak attacks could actually be kept secret. But all the historical evidence for many centuries points to the success of well-planned surprise attacks. Then you would have to believe that FDR was callous enough to want an attack. One of the great myths of the Pearl Harbor attack is about the Diplomatic Message decoded before the attack (Magic/Purple). It was not an intercept of JN-25. The message was not a Declaration of War. It is called the 14 Part Message, and its words can be found on the internet. The Japanese did not issue a Declaration of War until many hours AFTER the attacks at Hawaii. The Japanese Cabinet met in Tokyo at 1210 hours on 7 December (Pearl Harbor time) to discuss a Declaration of War, and finally voted on a Declaration at 1530 hours (PH time). The 14 Part Message sent & decoded earlier by the US (0450 hours 7 December Pearl Harbor time) ends with the following: "6. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of yen and dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the Empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation. 7. The Japanese Government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements to be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American Government. However, since the American Government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultation with Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and Chungking, and presumably by catering to me wishes of the Chungking regime in the questions of China, it must be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position. 8. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's effort toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interest by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiation. Thus the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost. The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations."
I don’t understand why they organized their carriers in the way they did. Why didn’t they have one carrier that was dedicated to CAP? Load it with fighters and let it handle CAP and allow the other carriers to deal with strike aircraft? Then you can spot aircraft for strikes without worrying about needing to land, rearm and launch CAP fighters.
@@f430ferrari5 An intriguing approach. Question is could the battleships remain out of scouting range from Midway during daylight and sprint into bombardment range after dusk fell?
@@Whitpusmc the answer is yes. I already calculated this out. The thing is that the IJN would be split into 6 main bodies as follows: Northern - 150 miles north Central - nearly in line approach Midway but from northerly direction heading south Southern - 100 miles south of Midway Lead Surface and Trail Carrier sub groups. The Northern Force is covered under storm just like the Kido Butai was. The Northern Lead Force is furthest ahead but isn’t detected until the next morning where they are near where Kido Butai is. The Central Force which consists of the IJN battleships Yamato plus Ise and Fuso class are the slowest can do 23.5 knots. Yamato 27.5 knots. They have destroyers escorts plus subs sent out in front. The IJN needs to be around 250 miles away from Midway by 5 pm June 3rd. Now of US scout planes spot this large body by this time or even earlier the problem is relaying this message to Midway and launching attack planes perhaps at 5:30 pm at the earliest. Would the US do this though. It would take over 1 hour to get there and the attack planes still have to find the vessels. By the time they battle and attack it would be too dark to return back. In 10 hours under darkness the IJN arrived 20 miles off of Midway at 3 am to 4 am. Since no IJN carriers reported Jun 3rd could the US carrier planes really do anything this late in the evening? Would they move closer? What’s looming behind the storm clouds though. The Southern Force is 100 miles further behind the Central Force. The Carrier Trail Forces are 50-100 miles behind their respected lead forces but not necessarily in a direct line. The Carrier forces are in tighter. I see the IJN making use of 9 carriers. The Aleutians is canceled. Northern - Akagi, Kaga, Ryujo. 210 planes 2/3 fighters Central - Zuikaku, Junyo, Zuiho, Hosho 155 planes 110 fighter planes Southern - Hiryu and Soryu. 130 planes 80 fighter planes It would see the dilemma is on the Us carrier pilots side at day break: 1. Attack lead surface ships? 2. Skip over then and look for the carriers 3. Don’t attack at all. Rumors says Yamamoto was against a lead surface ship attack because he felt the Us would pull back. Imagine that. To me this works for the IJN anyhow. Had the US carriers retreated back one would have probably been hit by an IJN sub. Most likely Yorktown. The US may have tried to do one bombing run of the Northern surface ships. It’s hard to know. Maybe the US would have changed Point Luck but if they did the IJN subs would have got them. I think we should wonder as to why this isn’t explored more. Instead we always get Nagumo’s dilemma which is irrelevant anyhow.
We floated the notion a few years ago to Nebraska Press--they didn't bite. Which, ummm, to the Marketing Guy in me, didn't show a lot of imagination on their part, seeing as how 1) the 75th anniversary of the battle was (then) right around the corner, 2) Tony in particular has all sorts of new stuff he'd like to add, and 3) I have all the InDesign work files, meaning production costs would probably be minimal. But, ummm, so it goes.
@@jonparshall Dr Parshall. I loved your book and greatly respect the research that went into it. If you are ever in Southern California, could I treat you to dinner?
@@jonparshall I would be very honored. I have the greatest respect for the intense detail of your research. Please feel free to email me at BillyJack1@hotmail.com. May I ask a fun question? If you could give Yamamoto advice the day after the Doolittle Raid, what advice would you give him? I know you are busy thus a short answer is fine.
Jon, For Fuchida's version of events were to be correct, then wouldn't the Hiryu have been launching the counter-strike simultaneous with the US Dauntless attacks? As we all know, she was not struck in this morning strike and would presumably have been able to launch immediately. I can't take credit for exposing this obvious discrepancy in Fuchida's account, because a person posting on one of your earlier Midway lectures/talks on UA-cam asked the question. Another question: If Yamamoto had directed Nagumo to keep half of his aircraft in reserve readiness for a naval strike, then couldn't Nagumo have handled the task differently? Why not assign two of the four carriers to strike Midway & fly the CAP, while the other two were armed & ready for a naval strike. Yes that would have meant two waves (deckloads) against Midway, but why do we all assume that 50% means 50% of all four vs. 100% of two? Four carriers should provide more flexibility.
Because that’s not really how the Kido Buttai was set up to work. For a Japanese Carrier to launch all of it’s planes it required two cycles of spotting the deck and launching. So a full carrier launch required two waves with about 45-60 minutes between them. By combining the Carriers the way they did to mass air power it meant they could launch two highly effective full strength strike waves, where each wave carried a full attack compliment. That was the strength of the Kido Buttai. That was the big innovation. They weren’t going to attempt to rewrite doctrine on the fly. Especially not when the Doctrine they had was unquestionably the worlds most powerful strike weapon.
@@andrewtaylor940 Yes, I understand completely. My point is that the Hiryu not hit, could have launched. About the method of attack against Midway itself: More than one way to do it, and stay within doctrine (2 carriers working together). Was it necessary to hold all four flight decks hostage to the returning strike?
@@dans.5745 Was it necessary? Technically no. Rather obviously Fletcher did just that, holding Yorktown's launch to recover scouts and wait for additional contact reports. But it was Doctrinal. And while Nagumo was not the bumbling fool he often gets portrayed as, he was a very strict doctrinaire. Japanese Carrier Doctrine says do it this way, he would do it that way. And in his defense following that doctrine created the most powerful naval weapon the world had ever seen. There was no incentive up until that point to experiment. Remember they really did think they had two more days until the American Carriers showed up. There's some similar longstanding myth's regarding the Zuikaku, and "why didn't she join them using Shokaku's air group?" What everyone misses is that while Zuikaku sailed into port with a full hanger, the hanger almost entirely contained Zero's and not much else. Most of the air losses at Coral Sea were the strike planes from both Carriers (which itself was a point Yamamoto didn't give enough thought to on his way to Midway. American Air Defenses were stronger than expected against his attack planes) . So Zuikaku while having a lot of airplanes had maybe 6 strike aircraft left and no effective strike power. Now 20/20 hindsight tells us they should have sailed her and used her as the Fighter CAP. But at that time the Doctrine of the Kido Buttai had no concept of a Fighter Carrier. And that late in the game, as they were readying departure for Midway nobody was thinking outside the box.
Yes, if Fuchida's account had been true and the strike planes were mere seconds from launching when the Dauntless attacks struck, then Hiryu's planes should have been taking off even as the other three carriers were being bombed. But they didn't, for the simple reason that Fuchida's account of the timeline of events was made up.
@@andrewtaylor940 Carrier Air group doctrine was very restrictive as well, they did not integrate aircraft from other carriers. So even even with 20/20 hindsight I am not sure they would've done that since as you point out Kido Butai doctrine did not have that concept. Its interesting how the US Navy while developing doctrine remained more flexible when it came to integration. Such as Enterprise recovering aircraft from both Hornet and Yorktown and integrating them to strike Hiryu.
One aspect of of the early history of WWII in the Pacific theater especially in New Guinea is the absence of how and who of airlift units. Australian and US troop carrier squadrons and groups succeeded in support of infantry forces whereas Japanese aviation failed. The entire Kokoda battles could not have happened without airlift support.
ok so if ordinance was rolling around on the hangar deck-what if nugamo launched and struck at the usn with land bombs-different outcome?OR if he launched the second strike against midway-less damage on board? the delay due to the munitions change over is disastrous
The first time I read Shattered Sword... I was so exited to reach the attack of 10.20 hs that I lost many details.I am reading it now for second time. My question is, how was possible the lack of accuracy in the information that McClusky and Best (VB-6) and Leslie (VB3) received?. Kido Butay was under attack since early in the morning by Midway planes. No pilot was able to transmit the position of his plane during the attack? Why was not even a Catalina trying to keep contact and screen the Japanese flat tops?
There were intermittent attacks by Midway aircraft, but they had ended by 0830 or so. The Catalinas had only caught a couple glimpses earlier in the morning. You have to recall that the whole art of aerial scouting was in its infancy at this time, communications were lousy, and over-water navigation approximate at best. There weren't any navigation satellites telling you where you were. It took quite a while for a message to make it back to its point of origin, then be disseminated up the food chain and re-transmitted to folks who needed it. Often times it took hours, or it didn't happen at all. Lousy spotting and communications were a feature of all the 1942 carrier battles.
Please upload in 1080p. Webcam clarity is poor enough as is and needs all the help it can get. I'm sure you can afford high speed internet connections.
Jon, I haven't watched THIS video yet, but heard you discuss the topic in another Midway-related video. Do you think Fuchida's misrepresentation of the flight deck situation was an honest mistake, or did he have ill intentions ?
anyone know of the new book on the battle of coral sea that Rob has just published, frustrating that they don't give full names or links to panel participants
We're not that sophisticated. Thanks for the suggestion. Also, anyone can participate. Rob's book is Scratch One Flattop: The First Carrier Air Campaign and the Battle of the Coral Sea. (Indiana University Press, 2019). His forthcoming book will continue the story up through the Battle of Santa Cruz
It sounds totally counterintuitive, but I wonder if it's possible Fuchida really didn't know much about the fine details of flight deck operations. In my line of work I write orders for medications every day. I know what the meds do, when they're indicated and when they're contraindicated, and what the dosage and frequency should be. But if you ask me whether it's a big pill that's hard to swallow or whether it tastes bad, I will probably have to ask the nurses who actually give the meds. There are certainly a lot of other things Fuchida would know in exacting detail. But unless he was the air group commander or a mechanic or the IJN equivalent of an Airedale, he there could be a lot of flight deck operations he's only distantly familiar with.
Fuchida wasn't lying, and a careful reading of their work will reveal that the authors never presented any evidence that he actually was. As his personal memoirs contain a number of errors of no historical consequence whatsoever, a solid case can be made that Fuchida was suffering from PTSD (a.k.a. shell shock or battle fatigue) and conflated the launch of two CAP sections with the launch of the strike which he knew was being prepared). His statement regarding the attack on Akagi is in fact partially accurate. He correctly recorded the (unusual) number of aircraft (3) which attacked Akagi, the number of hits which the Japanese recorded, and the fact that A6Ms were launching from the ship (one of which was seen by Lt. Best through his bombsight). It's worth pointing out that Senshi Sosho (the author's primary source) is 'not' the official history which they claim it to be (it predominantly represents the viewpoint of Japanese veterans, and not historians), and that "Japanese sources" do not universally support the authors' contention that all of the Japanese attack aircraft were in their hangars when the dive bomber attack began. In fact the senior surviving officers of both Kaga and Soryu (whose jobs involved actually knowing the status of the ship's aircraft) both directly contradict this. They state that Kaga had approximately 20 aircraft on the flight deck in the process of being spotted and that Soryu's strike was awaiting the order to launch. Lastly, the short time gap of 20 minutes between the end of the dive- bombing attack and the launch of Hiryu's retaliatory strike shows clearly enough that Hiryu's strike was likewise on her flight deck awaiting the order to launch.
So... are there no accounts from the American dive bomber pilots of there being planes rearming on the deck? I find it hard to believe that this "accepted knowledge" is based solely on Fuchida's book.
That's actually a relatively common meme in history. The Battle of Britain is another example. If you believe the common versions of the battle - the British just hung on by their finger nails and if a Luftwaffe Night Bomber hadn't gotten lost and accidentally bombed London - why - we'd all be speaking German now!!! The Truth(!!!) is that the Luftwaffe was never close to beating the RAF and if they had tried Sea Lion - the end result would have just been a lot of drowned German Troops. But - if that's true (which it is) why did the Germans try it? Well ... no one had ever done anything like that before for one thing. Another is that it might have all just been a partial bluff. I.E. if they acted like they were going to do it - and scared the British into coming into terms - then they wouldn't need to do it. And ... if they tried it and ... it was all going well ... then they might have gone for it. So - they tried. The British didn't come to terms and the battle did not go well enough for them to think of trying Sea Lion. And ... besides that - Hitler really wanted to attack the Russians anyway - so that was the end of that. .
The fog of war and the chaos within is difficult to understand. It has always been up to the poets, scholars, and liars to interperate this for those who were not there.
I wonder if Fuchida made up this whole fiction, or whether it was a joint effort led by the politicians in Tokyo to push an interpretation of “bad luck“ regarding Midway rather than “ Bad performance?”
Adm Ugacki’s diary illustrates how aviators exaggerate their accomplishments. Observers would see the air battles at Guadalcanal , the aviators would claim a dozen planes shot down. The observers would see the same amount of planes land that had taken off. In his Diary he had the entire US Navy sunk, 1945 level, by December 8, 1942. In the Army we’d call this CYA. He was there and it is harsh to call an old soldier a liar, I wonder what military experience any of his critics have? From personal experience what people say happened in a battle and what really happened are two different things. The outcome of battle did not change because of planes on a deck. Japanese doctrine was massing aircraft carriers for an overwhelming strike.
I honestly don't give that many talks, and they're often for private audiences on some of the tours I do. But you never know; I may be back on WNHA one of these days!
I have Fuchida's book and long considered it the definitive account, as he was actually on the deck of the Akagi at the time of the American dive bomber strikes and wrote up the official IJN after action report. It was a real eye opener to read Shattered Sword and the proof laid out in scrupulous detail like a prosecutor's case that Fuchida was, to put it as delicately as I can, a self-serving liar!
@@lukewalken1316 What Fuchida did goes well beyond mere exaggeration. In his book he dramatically describes the whole Japanese strike force on deck with their engines warmed up, seconds away from launch when the American dive bombers struck. But since he himself was ON DECK when it happened he knew damn well that the strike planes were all still down in the hanger decks, waiting to be brought topside where they could only then start warming up their engines. (Unlike American carriers which had open sides on their hanger decks, Japanese were fully enclosed, so their planes' engines could only be warmed up once they were brought up onto the flight deck)
Read Shattered Sword, enjoyed it, but did not find it that earth shattering or significantly different from the other books, such as Fuchida's account or Miracle at Midway or Incredible Victory. One question though about Parshalls question of the crowded decks and Fuchida's account is why such a discrepancy is present. Could it be faulty memory, or a translation problem?
Senshi Sosho- the authors' primary source- is 'not' the official history that the authors claim it to be. The 102- volume series generally represents the view not of Japanese historians, but of Japanese veterans (a number of them worked on the series). A tendency in the series is to avoid that which might smear the officer corps of the Imperial Army or Navy. Regarding Midway for example, much of the responsibility for the defeat at Midway is placed onto the shoulders of a petty officer, while the fact that Japanese fighter exhibited poor aerial discipline and left the air above their carriers wide open to a dive bomber attack is glossed over. The reality is that the Japanese were overconfident and attempted too much with too few aircraft (the squadrons aboard the carriers were operating at from 10- 20% under authorized strength, and the ships carried no reserve aircraft). These are some of the likely reasons why the series was neither commissioned nor endorsed by the Japanese government. Additionally, the authors left out statements from the Executive officer of Soryu and the Air officer of Kaga which directly contradict their claim that all of the Japanese attack aircraft were in their hangars when the dive bomber attack began (the former stated that the ship's strike of 21 aircraft was on the flight deck awaiting the order to launch, while the latter stated that the ship had what amounted to approximately 20 aircraft on her flight deck. They also pass over in silence the short 20- minute time gap between the end of the dive bomber attack at 1030 and the beginning of the launch of Hiryu's retaliatory strike at 1050 on the U.S. carriers- which makes it clear that Hiryu's attack aircraft could not possibly have been in the ship's hangars. Lastly, the authors never provided any evidence that Fuchida was lying. He was actually a prime candidate for PTSD, as his personal memoirs contain a number of errors of no historical significance at all- and Lt. Best corroborated much of Fuchida's statements regarding the U.S. attack on Akagi anyway. A likely reason why some Japanese don't like Fuchida is that he "slept with the enemy". He left Japan, moved to the U.S., and adopted Christianity after the war- so many Japanese likely see him as a turncoat of sorts. The work has a great deal of information regarding the details of Japanese carrier operations which can't be found in any other single volume- but the author's analysis of the battle is greatly flawed. The authors did establish however, that there was no strike 5 minutes away from launch. Genda stated postwar that they were about 15 minutes out- and based on performance of Japanese flight deck crews in early 1942, they were likely half an hour out at least. The aircraft of CarDiv 2 were ready for launch (they had no torpedo rearming issue), Kaga had approximately 20 of her 27- aircraft strike on her flight deck but with few if any spotted, and all of Akagi's strike aircraft were in her hangars. Cheers...
@@manilajohn0182 Interesting points. Thanks for the info. Over confidence or Victory Disease, was one of the final conclusions the IJN General Staffs conclusions why the defeat at the battle occurred. Also, as Fuchida mentions, many of the Pilots were suffering from Combat exhaustion, which would be understandable considering they had been through extensive operations in the Indian Ocean and South East Asia region, which I also believe led to the lack of CAP discipline by the pilots. As for the below authorized strength levels of the Carrier squadrons, that is new to me, thanks for that. I suspect that was the case both because of extensive operational history, I mentioned in the previous paragraph, and the IJN's policy with regards to keeping squadrons and pilots assigned to the same carrier, and the slow replacement of both planes and pilots to those squadrons. As for the rest of your comment, I agree with your assessment of the book.
@@coleparker You're welcome. The difference in individual squadron strengths between Pearl Harbor and Midway was small in number, but the percentage is accurate. No reserve aircraft for the squadrons was significant however, because of the different procedure for repairing damaged aircraft in the Imperial Navy.
The battle of Midway consisted of so many, so many fluke happenings that always happen in battle. Important was a what the f moment, was also the earliest. The Japanese Destroyer rushing back to the fleet at flank speed
Well, this certainly conflicts with the 1970s Midway film, I need to watch the newer version now and see how its portrayed with strike planes on or not on the flight deck.
I have seen both; the 1970s one when it first came out (that is how old I am). Just take these into account when you see the earlier one; first there was no CGI back then, so much of the film relied on stock footage from earlier movies and thus there are a lot of plane inaccuracies. Second, as Charlton Heston states; a number of the actual participants were still alive when they made the movie, so they had to be careful in how they portray them, and last they had to make a fictional backstory to keep the movie entertaining.
interesting brought up mythos of the battle of midway in regards to fuchida's book on Midway. David Rigby has written a book about Wade McClusky, and disputes Parshall and Symonds conclusion that Wade McClusky was unfamiliar with dive bombers, and unfamiliar with dive bomber doctrine. which caused confusion between Richard Best and Wade McClusky on which squadron was to to attack the carriers Akagi and Kaga.
I haven't read it, but I have read George Walsh's dreadful "The Battle of Midway: Search for the Truth" which also goes after me and Tony in Wade's defense as well. Rigby's a serious historian, though: winner of the Lyman Award just like me and Tony. So, I'm certainly not going to bash him. Here's the bottom line, though: somebody screwed up. One carrier got clobbered by a couple dozen planes; the other by three. That ain't right. So, somebody messed up. And from a counterfactual standpoint, I'll just mention, if Akagi escapes, Wade's got some 'splainin to do, because it was his command, and if nothing else, he needed to have gotten positive confirmation from his subordinate commander (Best) as to who's hittin' who, instead of just assuming all was good. The other thing is, though, I just don't see this as worth 300 pages of argumentation. It's not like Wade has been ill-served by history. Tony and I give him full props for his command decisions that got VS-6/VB-6 within striking distance of Kido Butai. That was superlative work. He won the Navy Cross, the Distinguished Flying Cross, and retired a Rear Admiral. And furthermore, I don't get the sense that Wade felt that he had been slighted by history, either. There's room enough here for two heroes here.
@@jonparshall The book is more of an overall biography of McClusky with a large section on the Battle of Midway. I think his argument is with assuming that McClusky didn't know dive bombing doctrine. He thought it was an unprovable assertion by other authors. I think that he thought it was more likely a communication/radio error or talking over each other. I know you have made this idea a possibility in other talks I have heard from you.
another question mark to me arises on fuchidas statement about seeing "HELLDIVERS" descending, to my knowledge the us navy sb2c helldiver was not present at midway
If I'm not mistaken, Admiral Yamamoto instructed Admiral Nagumo to only use two of his carriers to attack Midway and retain the other two in readiness to attack any U.S. carriers that were detected. Any explanation why Nagumo failed to obey Yamamoto's instructions? And why Nagumo wasn't demoted after Midway and Admiral Ozawa given command of the remaining Japanese carrier force?
Yamamoto recommended to Nagumo that he retain half of his aircraft in reserve while attacking Midway in case the U.S. carriers appeared in the vicinity while the 1CSF was attacking Midway. One man- former Captain Yasuji Watanabe- has claimed that Yamamoto ordered Nagumo to do this, and a number of historians have repeated it. However, no such record of this order has ever been found- and the Nagumo report contains no suggestion at all that Yamamoto ever issued such an order. Yamamoto was relatively intolerant of those who failed him. Admiral Takeo Takagi was relieved of his command after Coral Sea, and Admiral Hosogaya was relieved of his after the battle of the Komandorski Islands. It stands to reason that had Nagumo violated such an order and lost four carriers, he would likewise have been relieved. Instead, he retained his command in two additional carrier battles. Yamamoto and Nagumo were not on good terms for much of their careers, and the most likely scenario here is that Watanabe- who was a member of Yamamoto's staff- was attempting to cover for his former chief by casting responsibility for the disaster at Midway away from Yamamoto.
what time zone is used for u.s. actions & to compare with tokyo time. JUN42 hawaii time was HWT(DST) UTC-9.30; tokyo time was UTC+9; Midway time was UTC-11. jun0501:28tokyo would be jun0406:58hawaii; jun0405:28midway. if hawaii standard time UTC- 10.30 was used, that would be 05:58.
In the spotting return to hangar and re-spotting, wouldn't some of the planes engines have been at least partially warmed, so rewarming would have taken less time?
That would be a good thought if any strike planes were on deck and warmed up at any time during the time between 5 to 10 AM. I don't think there is any evidence that the strike planes ever came out of the hanger deck. Why would they until scout planes found a target? You could not land and launch CAP fighters without breaking the spot every so often. It would be more efficient to have the planes gassed and armed in the hanger deck(s.) When an enemy fleet was spotted, it would be at most 45 minutes to spot, warm up engines, and start launching planes.
rondav41: the other two main postwar Japanese sources that made it into English are Nagumo's after-battle report (referred to, appropriately enough as "The Nagumo Report"), which was captured on Saipan and translated in 1947, and the sets of interviews conducted with Japanese officers immediately after the war by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS or "Us-Bus" in the trade). Of those three, the Nagumo Report was the bedrock of the operational details, and Fuchida's the bedrock of the narrative Japanese account. Using the Nagumo Report is very tricky, because it is an amalgam of several different ship's logs, and it's movement track is primarily that of the light cruiser Nagara. So, there's a lot of stuff in it that can seem contradictory, and that makes you scratch your head. Fuchida was useful to historians primarily because it read so well, and seemed internally consistent.
In the volumes of Interrogation of Japanese Officers conducted by the US Strategic bombing survey after the war, both the CO of the Akagi and the Air Officer aboard Kaga, state categorically that there was no aircraft for an airstrike on their respective flight decks. One could safely deuce that Hiryu and Soryu were in similar states of readiness, re the second strike. Anyone with that bit of information could have easily refuted Fuchida’s assertion. The aircraft/flight deck logs of the Japanese carriers provide further additional proof. I will take the word of a Commanding Officer over a staff officer’s recollection a decade later.
In the interrogation of former Japanese officers in the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, the executive officer of Soryu (Cmdr. Hisaishi Ohara) stated that Soryu's aircraft for the first wave (18 Vals and 3 Zeros) of the attack on the U.S. carriers were "...all lined up on the flight deck ready to take off" when the ship was attacked. The air officer of Kaga (Lt. Cmdr. Takahisa Amagai) stated that Kaga had approximately 30 aircraft in her hangar, 6 fighters in the air, and the rest (approximately 20 aircraft) on the flight deck when the ship was hit. It's worth noting that both of these men are mentioned in Shattered Sword, but their USSBS statements are not. The reason for this is clear enough. These two men are not only Japanese sources, but they are contemporary Japanese sources and they directly contradict Parshall's and Tully's version of events. Hiryu had more time to spot her strike than any other carrier, and they literally 'had' to have been on her flight deck. The dive bomber attack ended at 1030, yet Hiryu began launching her retaliatory strike at 1050 (they were all in the air by 1058). The Japanese could not possibly have even spotted 24 aircraft (much less warmed up their engines) in just 20 minutes. Fuchida was not lying. His memory partially failed him just as it did in his personal memoirs when he confused a number of personal issues which had nothing whatsoever to do with history. He was correct that Akagi was launching aircraft (Best saw 6-7 Zeros in the act of launching; one of them passed through his bombsight as he approached 3,500 feet). Fuchida was also correct on the number of aircraft which attacked Akagi (3) and the number of hits which the Japanese recorded on her (2). Fuchida just conflated the launch of the CAP fighters from Akagi with the launch of the strike which he knew was being prepared. Parshall's and Tully's primary source for Shattered Sword is "Senshi Sosho". They refer to it as the "official Japanese History". However, Senshi Sosho is not an official history at all. It was neither commissioned nor endorsed by the Japanese government. Statements in the forward of each of the 102 volumes make clear that responsibility for the contents of each volume lie with the author(s) and with the Japanese War History Office. This is significant because "Senshi Sosho" is not simply the work of historians; it is the work of both historians and veterans. There was (and still is) great debate in Japan over the war. They isn't even a consensus on how the Japanese refer to it.
@@jonparshall So Ring had Mitscher by the short hairs. I read your section on doctrine enough to be very surprised to learn that the individual carrier commander decided the course the strike off his carrier took. I think you said in your book that Hornet never filed an after action report. In my biased mind they were both senior officers and the reports and the conclusions drawn from them would have been highly classified and locked in the pentagon until long after Mitscher was dead and Ring had retired. Officer CYA at its very best. Thank you for taking the time to reply, I didn't expect it. I'm sure you are quite busy and I am honestly full of beans. P.S. If you and Mr Tully ever get the funds to write the follow on book I'll be first in line to buy it.
@@jonparshall I have been watching a WW2-Pacific lecture series by Professor Craig L. Symonds of the US Naval War College (on the Great Courses program). He mentioned the issue with the Hornet's strikes, and how Admiral Nimitz handled Mitscher's mistakes & falsehoods in the after-action report . So apparently Nimitz found out & took action. It took a year or more for Mitscher to get out of the dog-house.
@@paulpeterson5214 I have been watching a WW2-Pacific lecture series by Professor Craig L. Symonds of the US Naval War College (on the Great Courses program). He mentioned the issue with the Hornet's strikes, and how Admiral Nimitz handled Mitscher's mistakes & falsehoods in the after-action report . So apparently Nimitz found out & took action. It took a year or more for Mitscher to get out of the dog-house.
I read Shattered Sword once a year, its a favorite.
I have read Shattered sword and found it outstanding. Extremely thorough, covering all aspects of Midway well beyond the clichés. Beside the book, your lectures are great. I hope you will publish more on the Pacific war. Thanks for your fantastic work.
That is exactly right. (1) The Japanese perspective and (2) the vivid explanation of spotting and (3) accuracy and interest in the narrative - make for a great book. This one right up there with the best. When I read SS I immediately re-read it. I have only ever done that once before - Beevor's Berlin.
@jon parshall Maybe he was pushing the flight-deck people MOVE Themselves and ranged the second wave
One other consideration that would complicate and add to the timeframe in changing ammo is that Japanese planes didn’t use the “same” mounting brackets for contact bombs and torpedos. They had different brackets for each weapon. As such, the addt’l step of removing and mounting brackets added more time to re-arm each plane than some understand.
Yes. I learned this reading Shattered Sword.
Great discussion. The problems of language are even deeper than discussed. Japanese characters (KANJI) have a minimum of two pronunciations (ON and KUN), and as many as six or even more. This means that even something as basic as pronouncing names can provide problems, even to educated Japanese. The simplification of characters adds yet another dimension. Having done a good deal of translation over the years, I can completely empathize. There are indeed plenty of things still out there that Western scholars have not yet touched.
Thanks for the great information.
It helps complete the picture.
FWIW, I worked for a Japanese company from the mid 80s through the early 90s. I was surprised at how uninformed highly educated Japanese concerning the pacific war actually were at that time. Any time we got the chance to visit a historic ship or similar site they insisted I take them there. At the ex- USS Little Rock in Buffalo, they were amazed at the maps and track charts. No war history was taught at the time. I asked one fellow to translate the early characters on a preserved original Japanese aircraft at willow grove NAS, a single line, he was unable to read any of it, even though he was native Japanese, with a master’s degree. None of the characters matched up with the three character sets of now. ( katakana, hirigani, or kanji ) all have different uses. Absolutely none of the earlier characters match the modern ones, nor is it taught except in postgraduate courses in linguistics, but not in the context of military applications. I hope the situation has improved in the last 30-40 years!
@@Zephyrmec Sadly, it hasn't! I'm working on a translation now where three different Japanese sources cite a personal name phonetically (in kana) three different ways! When I lived in Japan, it was not unusual for a Japanese national, when meeting someone for the first time, would literally draw the kanji for their name with their finger on the palm of their own hand, so the new friend could see how it was written. The simplified kanji have only made it more difficult for even native speakers to read pre-1945 writings. When it comes to technical or military terminology, this situation is even worse.
c!’ Jojpuuuiitzpuj ya what points😮😊😅😊😮😊😮😮❤
this is part of why I question some of Parshalls sources, and the complete disregard of the after action reports of guys like future admiral Wade McCluskey
read his book, probably the best regarding midway.
I remember the first time that something I believed and never considered even the possibility that it could be wrong ... was wrong. My 6th grade history was wrong. A US Naval historian at NAS Pensacola was was right. This story a out Midway urges me - again - not to take things like this at face value. Continue to study, read, do the research.
Love a good, educational WW2 lecture, and Jonathan Parshall's lectures on the Battle of Midway and others fulfill my needs
An excellent presentation, and yes, the Japanese logs of flight operations looked quite daunting, am glad you were able to bring the information contained in them to light for western readers. I have read your excellent book and what articles I can find of yours on line, as well as watched many of your other lectures, and you continue to illuminate. Thank you for your efforts.
Also, Shattered Sword gives Admiral Fletcher the credit he is due. Few other Admirals have led naval forces in combat against superior forces and come out on top three times. And that was over several months not years. He did a well as Admiral Nelson and the Korean admiral Yi who also fought the Japanese.
Fletcher wasn't a Admiral King Favorite. He was a serviceable Commander. It was Mitchner that failed miserably.
Scouting was poor compared to 1943 standards for both sides.
Coral Sea was the first time the US Navy successfully told Japan ‘No.’ Midway was giving Japan the ‘decisive battle’ they wanted, but on the US Navy’s terms. And Guadalcanal (including Eastern Solomons) was the beginning of chasing Japan back to where they belonged.
Fletcher was the Senior Officer Present Afloat for all three. He came through in the clutch, at a time when the enemy had numerical superiority.
@richardbennett There's no "N" in Mitscher. Here is where he proves why he was LAST in his Annapolis class. FLETCHER was not in the top ten, but he was much higher than Mitscher. Why King allowed Nimitz to give him back a carrier command, I'll never understand. Stupid decisions and then lying about it had him in exile for two years. Stanhope Ring was relieved after the Midway reports came in, and he never was in charge of a big combat air wing ever again. He was a classic jerk.
@@richardbennett1856I think he was better than serviceable. The criticism that he didn't pursue the defeated enemy was a case of armchair quarterbacking by aviators who weren't there and didn't have command responsibilities. Things like remembering to refuel his escorting destroyers was crucial to his fleet's combat efficiency. After the combats his task force had endured they were bone dry, and Fletcher expected more trials were coming. As Seth and Bill wrote on their podcast, "Admiral King was right about ALMOST
EVERYTHING!" THAT was the title of one of the first season episodes. I'm not saying that Fletcher should have been kept as task force commander. Seth said he wasn't a fan of Fletcher in spite of his three wins against superior forces. I'd like to hear his re🎉asons. He could have been rotated home like Spruance was after Philippine Sea. Given what happened in late 1944 and mid1945 with Halsey in command of Third fleet, the signs were there that he,too, was tired. Halsey had been due for a
rest, and should have been "given" one! After the hurricane disasters it should have been obvious that something was wrong with him.
I had the pleasure of meeting Jonathan when he spoke to my class at the the Naval War College in 2010( makes me old). I also have the honor of having an uncle, RADM William (Bill) Leonard who was a VF42 pilot on Yorktown during the battle. I have read Shattered Sword and think it is one of the finest examples of military history published on the Naval War in the Pacific
I am a huge fan of the authors in this presentation. Shattered Sword and Battle of Surigao Straight are two of my favorite books along with Mr. Frank's Guadalcanal masterpiece. Thank you all for the incredible work you do.
I flew reciprocating aircraft in T-34s and T-28s in flight training as well as TS-2As (twin engined) and the then S-2Es in the fleet off the USS Randolph and USS Yorktown. I do not remember ever spending 20 minutes to warm up the engines as and air cooled engine warms up rapidly. On land we were heading to the runway in less than 5 minutes, and on the carriers, certainly no more than that if we were the first in line to the cat. There is a pre-start check list, then start, then pre-flight check list and then launch.
Film of US Flight Deck operations show the ones in front of the pack starting first and within a short period of time they started their take off roll as the ranks in the back were just starting. You did not want to spend an excessive amount of time idling an air cooled engine, for while you got some air over the engine off the prop, you didn't get anywhere near what you got when airborne.
Refueling US aircraft is done on the flight deck. However, when we were still flying props with avgas vs JP, the gasoline vapors would go down, and when leaving our readyroom to go up to the flight deck, once in the passage way you could smell the gasoline vapor in the air. That is the reason before fueling was done the announcement would be made to extinguish the smoking lamp (an old traditional command that basically said NO SMOKING). Once the fuel vapors were vented out of all compartments after completing fueling, the would announce that the smoking lamp was lit. I do not know if the use of JP fuel has the same issues or not.
Mr. O'Hara took the words from my mouth. My first fascination with WWII was the Nazi-Soviet War (to the point of driving me to learn German and now attempt to learn Russian.) The colossal nature of that war simply boggles the mind. But over the years, with the opening of the archives in Russia, old myths (It was all Hitler's fault, General Winter and General Mud, overwhelming Soviet hordes) are being given a new workover. True, that also means re-examining bloody failures that have been swept under the carpet (the Rzhev salient for example); but it also means showing that Stavka became increasingly proficient at the strategic level (especially at deception - "maskirovka.") while its troops improved on the operational level (thanks to the Studebakers and tons of canned beef through Lend/Lease.) The fact is that the RKKA 'learned' in part from the Wehrmacht about modern warfare and used that knowledge to beat the snot out of them. It is an enormous tragedy that it cost them some 20+ million souls in the process.
My new fascination with the Pacific War began when on a chance I ordered and read E.B.Sledge's "With the Old Breed." And then I devoured Ian Toll's trilogy. And "The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors." I just got done reading "Never Call Me A Hero" by Jack "Dusty" Kleiss when I stumbled upon this video. Well Mr. Parshall, you have another viewer, customer and fan. Just headed over to Amazon to place my order for Shattered Sword.
I really appreciate that! Hope you enjoy it!
Thats pretty imoressive stuff! Can I suggest you learn Chinese as well so that you can be one of the first historians to write about World War 3, which is already in full swing.
you should also read Hornfischers Neptunes Inferno and Tullys Battle of Surigao Strait.
@@jonparshall Thoroughly enjoyed it Mr. Parshall! I LOVE it when myths get busted by cold, hard facts... and nothing is colder than numbers! I happy refer to your work anytime that old myth about Midway pops up during argu... .er, "discussions" 🙂
The Red Army was caught by surprise and the Red Air Force destroyed on the ground was directly due to Stalin., just as the purge, political commissars and political generals caused the Red Army to become the Red Carpet in the first part of the war. make no mistake, stalin is the person most responsible for the 20 million dead
Jon's Midway book is a classic. I have heard him speak several times at the International WW2 Conference in New Orleans and he always does a great job.
I have really enjoyed the your analysis of the 'fateful five minutes' good use of deductive reasoning. Thanks for mentioning your sources.
My thoughts.
Japanese practice of rearming in the hangar was a hold over from their adoption of British policies. Would have been ok if they had adopted armored flight decks along with it. But they didnt, originally, so that had to adapt.
Chaotic hangers explains why Hiryu didnt get her strike off until half an hour after the 1020 strike. Even then it was an anaemic strike of fighters and divebombers without Kates. This was in stark contrast to their usual coordinated operations. I can see Yamaguchi yelling " just get them out there"
Dr Parshall's book said an amored deck would have made the Japanese ships too top heavy and unstable.
@@BillMorganChannel oh definitely. It would have required a totally different design.
@@navyreviewer Yeah, Japanese carriers were something of a hybrid--internal hangars, but also a two-deck design to maximize air group size. Armored flight decks was a no-go--they only used it on Taiho and Shinano.
John your mythos quote is well written and quite applicable across most historical events. Curiously now that anyone with a phone and internet access can now say 'I was there' two bits to the storyline. Now you don't have to wait 60 years for records to appear or translations to be scribed, now you can get input and access to a world of knowledge in a matter of minutes. This has revolutionized our understanding of History and created whole new cottage industries of historical revision and storytelling. Of course with all this wonderful information comes an enormous tsunami of ignorance and opinion because people become instant experts with their 20 minutes of reading it online. 🤔😆
The history of the Pacific War is basically naval history. The European war was army and the focus was essencially Europe First in the same focus as the policital focus. I started as an adult with Morrison's books, (even then it took a lot of imagination and toleration) and ended with my mind in the Pacific. Thank you for your updates and service to History.
It makes perfect sense that IJN carrier-ops changed after Midway.
It is a shame they didn't change their damage-control hierarchy/training as well.
The result: Taiho go BOOM.
Thanks for producing this video.
Shattered Sword is on the Mount Rushmore of accurate history books. MIDWAY was such a complicated battle, the research is outstanding. Serious and Cronological accounts, great reading. 23:23
John and Tony, with John Lundstrom's IJN Kido Butai flight 23:28 records, the SOP on Car Div#1. tells the rest of the story.
John, 10 AM is AIRSTRIKE TIME.
How many Pacific War battles had poor aircap on both sides then?
I.E. Santa Cruz.
Love the lectures. Slowly but surely you are all coming to the real conclusion that too much of the upper leadership in the US Navy during WWII was exceedingly poor. What won WWII was the unbelievable logistics of the industrialists, lower ranks in the services, and the workers in the US. It was very sad that we did not have exceptional leadership that knew how to use such power.
For some reason the US is able to produce good lower ranks but just about everything falls apart and gets worse as you go higher than CDR's. The same problems exist today so a good dose of reality is really needed starting at WWII and destroying the myths.
Just listened to this on another site... Incredible job guys this is one I'll be adding to my library!
Great conversation here! It was nice to see other Pacific War scholars like Richard Frank, as well. I think much of this points to the difficulty and frustration in acquiring and using non-English primary sources (for western historians in this case). I have a B.A. in Japanese Studies and having lived in Japan for 5 years, I can attest to the difficulty in communicating and in translating an East Asian language (I'm conversant, but *not fluent*, in Japanese). As I recall, the U.S. State Dept. lists Japanese as one of the most difficult languages for western English-speakers to learn.
I have Parshall, Frank, Evans, and Peattie (among many others) to thank for providing excellent and well-researched accounts of the Pacific War which really encouraged my own research (read: obsession) on the IJN. Unfortunately, I don't have the time and resources to deal with more primary sources (like the Senshi Sosho), so I'm largely stuck with secondary sources. Like many, I've read translated materials from surviving Japanese officers and I've always found myself wondering about the validity of some of their claims. Specifically, I've often wondered if Captain Tameichi Hara is being entirely honest in his book "Japanese Destroyer Captain." In any case, it's a problem of historiography, corroborating evidence, and making judgments on what evidence to use.
Most reports from the frontline personnel at te time, commanders & subordinates, Officers & enlisted, would have been as honest & truthful as possible, attempts to "Stat Pad" would have been actively discouraged. But the "Fog of War" is a VERY real thing. I am currently working my way thru Lundstrom's "With the First Team" books, & the vast differences between the air-to-air actions & ship spotting/post attack damage assessments & reality are staggering, but these are a facet of warfare.
The pilots, intelligence & damage assessment analysists were FREQUENTLY not just wrong, but critically & fundamentally wrong. But the problem with assign "malice" to the reports undercuts the fact that these personnel KNOW that over inflation of kills/damage done could skew any follow on response that would be necessary to win the battle, increasing the probability of damage/loss of assets like vessels & air frames & even the deaths of comrades that would be needed in future battles, so I suspect that the reports were usually made to be as honest as possible.
Over inflation of post-mission reports can lead to dead comrades in later action, like reporting that all enemy resistance was swept from the skies & there are no enemy fighters left so the follow on attack might remove escorts from the roster to give extra time to rest the piolets & perform maintenance on airframes & the attack aircraft of the second wave flies face first into a Buzzsaw of pissed off defenders. Things like that are heavily discouraged simply for practicalities sake, by both sides.
As another example, torpedo bombers report hits when the mistake near misses from dive bombers that are making a simultaneous attack. It is a mistake, but it is an error made from incomplete data with some pilot influence since "We're The Best & We Wouldn't Miss Would We?". But that is a simple & easy mistake to make.
It baffles me that if, as Yamamoto planned, the operation was intended to be a SURPRISE, then as soon as Midway aircraft began attacking, Nagumo should have known that things were off kilter. Recover strike, retire westward, await further instructions.
Yes, the island was a costly distraction.
Not really. The Japanese communiques are full of pompous drivel, from the direction that a few thousand troops would be able to overwhelm Midway's defenders, to the reckoning that all mail was to be redirected to Midway considering it was practically in Japanese hands.
You have to remember that the Japanese including Yamamoto had utter contempt for the American ability to fight - Yamamoto even published an article in the Asahi and all the rest of the Empire's newspapers encouraging the Japanese emperor and military to march on the American mainland and set terms in Washington. It's referenced around the world, including German, Italian and American newspapers. This, combined with his drive to make war on America, even threatening to resign if he wasn't given the go-ahead for Pearl Harbor, was always the understanding of Yamamoto in the American public in the 1940s and 50s.
This original understanding was corrupted by "new research" of Yamamoto's diary which demonstrated that Yamamoto was a "reluctant warrior. This completely changed the popular understanding of Yamamoto and the Japanese in World War 2, and ws chiefly promulgated by Two Japanese directors and a Jewish director in their movie "Tora Tora Tora".
Except it was a Japanese lie.
There is no Yamamoto diary.
There never was.
The "13-part message" which was supposed to be the Japanese "Honorable" Declaration of War on the Americans BEFORE they attacked Pearl Harbor? But was only "delayed" mistakenly?
Another Japanese Lie.
The message wasn't a Declaration of War. It had nothing to do with Pearl Harbor, but was a normal diplomatic communique that didn't even break diplomatic relations. The real Declaration of War was printed in Japanese Newspapers the following day.
Japanese "Honor"?
Another lie.
"Bushido" was never a Code of Honor among feudal Japanese, it was the invention of a Japanese-American in San Fransisco in the early 20th century who modeled it after European Chivalry. The purpose was to lie about real Japanese culture and behavior, by creating a false Mythology called "Bushido" which would make the Japanese seem more Honorable than they actually were - and also denigrate Truthful appraisals of Japanese culture by Americans as "Ignorant".
Bottom line: The Japanese and Yamamoto had always intended Pearl Harbor to be a sneak attack, in the most treacherous mindset.
This has largely been the common theme of Japanese history as promulgated by Japanese and Jewish "historians", particular during and after the Cold War. Parshall is right in that he's not actually revising history - he's simply reverting American popular understanding back towards the original understanding when Americans knew that their attacks were VERY effective against the Japanese carriers*
*The reason why the Japanese destroyed their log books is probably because those log books exposed Japanese claims about the Battle of Midway as lies; the idea that you can destroy information, giving you the "credibility" to make up whatever story you want, is a distinctly Jewish and Japanese trait - I find it likely that those so-called "ineffective Midway attacks" did far more real damage to the Japanese carriers than they wanted to admit - which would ruin their story about "incompetent Americans who just got lucky". That, after all, has always been the entire point of these gargantuan and widespread lies promulgated by Jews and Japanese
Regarding the Japanese-Jewish alliance, the San Fransisco Federal Reserve and its subsidiary Jewish banks financed the Japanese Empire, which is how the Japanese were able to purchase so much American materiel and why the American media (particularly Jewish media) were so favorable to the Japanese to the point they would cover for them during the sinking of the Panay, and the war in China overall; the Japanese didn't sell America much at the time, so the only way to acquire hard currency was through debt-lending though their Jewish friends - this of course, led to a detente with other Jewish-dominated powers like the Soviet Union (Jewish Bolsheviks by this time dominated the Nomenklatura, which controlled all aspects of the Soviet economy from manufacture to media) Needless to say, the Jewish heirarchy was very pronounced in Japan itself - something that was well known among Americans in 50s but was denigrated as "anti-semitic" (ie True) - today, new researchers are discovering that "Hey, the Japanese permitted large numbers of Jews to live in Japan", not knowing they've stumbled on something they're not supposed to (it's comical, really). The Jewish community and Japanese were practically joined at the hip and have had an alliance long before World War 2 which has only strengthened through the Cold War unto the present day.
Tora Tora Tora and Midway are only a couple of the acidic Lies that have poisoned American culture today.
@@isolinear9836 Someone ban this neo-nazi
But don't forget that actual communication between the Japanese fleets was faulty at the time with weather factors and atmosphere conditions affecting their reliability. Also, Nagumo's flagship Akagi communications equipment, was not as powerful as Yamamoto's IJN Yamato.
Shattered Sword and Richard Franks Guadalcanal are two of my favorite reads.
If you haven't yet, I would strenuously recommend Neptune's Inferno by James Hornfischer.
Franks was on my shelf for a long time, then lost in a move and more recently replaced. The use of those flight logs from the Japanese carriers tells me I need to get into Shattered Swoes too.
I lived in same town (Cresskill, NJ) as Fuchida in the 1970s. Knew his grandson. Poor fella was relentlessly bullied. Fuchida probably lived there due to its proximity to NYC publishing houses?
One thing that reading Shatters Sword uncinfused me about was why the 10:20 dive bomber attack was so devastating. If all the strike planes wereally on the deck, the exploding of the bombs would have blown most overboard. Being still in the hanger make much more sense. The bomb blasts above them would have shredded the fully fueled and armed planes in place. The hanger was a nice little kettle in which they could burn and exploded.
After action reports of our aviators state that many of the aircraft on the flight deck were destroyed and/or blown overboard.
@@manilajohn0182 My point exactly. The instant fuses the Americans used would have blown most of the aircraft overboard. Had they been on the deck when the bombs hit not all of the ships would have been destroyed. They would have been out of commission but salvable.
@@martinarthurfleming9747 I'm fairly certain that the Americans were not using bombs with instantaneous fuse settings. IIRC, they were using 3/4 second fuses. Japanese sources (I don't mean Fuchida) state that Soryu's strike was on the flight deck waiting the order to launch, while Kaga had approxi.ately 20 aircraft on the flight deck, with possibly a few spotted.
Nice to see a fellow student forum the operations department at the University of Minnesota Carlson School of Management at the university of Minnesota
Fuchida was an interesting man, you must give him his due . He became a Christian minister and made many visits to the US . His visit to Pearl Harbor on an anniversary of the attack was awesome !
I have to add a little of my knowledge regarding Japanese information on the war. It seems to me that the Japanese population overall, have put the war behind them, and fundamentally do not know much or anything about the war. This became very obvious when Clint Eastwood made his two WW II movies about the battle of Iwo Jima. One of these was 'Letters from Iwo Jima', which was in Japanese, which this was because all the actors were Japanese actors, and almost none of then new anything about the war. So, given a population that essentially has 'no interest' in this part of their history would easily result in producing very little documentation about the war being that would relatively currently written. So, if there is Japanese documentation from the war, or soon afterwards still waiting to be useful historically, it needs to be translated for the rest of the world to have meaningful access to it since the Japanese are not typically interested.
On the other hand, Germans have accepted their terrible role in WW II, and have made memorials, and admitted to their terrible role in the world back in the 20's, 30's, and 40's. Japan has never accepted any of this guilt from the war, and has essentially just swept it under the rug. Perhaps someone or some organization should hire a person who can read Japanese from the war era, and translate it all into English. This could be a professional job for someone that could take many years!
Great video. Lived with my brother, he took 3 yrs Japanese because he had Japanese business associates. His homework made my brain hurt. PS: the Kodo's were amazing to see the image.
It is certainly a good thing that the story of the Battle of Midway and the Pacific War in general is now being examined in light of Japanese sources now available. What is regrettable is that it is happening at this late date when the actual participants in the engagement(s) have mostly passed away and can no longer be interviewed. Still, this has to be said with a grain of salt, as eyewitness accounts of Midway, on both sides, have turned out not to be 100% reliable and should have never been thought of as such. Perhaps the use of Fuchida as a source (not just his book but his interviews) by authors such as Walter Lord is the most egregious example. There are other examples in Lord's book "Incredible Victory". That is not to demean Lord's scholarship and his great efforts to obtain accounts from those who fought the battle. Wherever and however they may be flawed, those accounts remain important material in the historical record.
Excellent presentation! Minor - note: The IJN Akagi was not afloat in 1945. Check the example date given on the 'Kodochoshos' sequence at (22:38) .
I didn't go look through the video again, but did you read Akagi instead of Amagi? There was a Japanese carrier named Amagi in 1945. Here is the wiki page link: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_aircraft_carrier_Amagi
I find it fascinating how this story is a lot like Guderian deeply influencing the american view on the second world war in Europe and the "Panzers". And in his case his myths even came back via american books to germany and keep influencing public opinion.
Man, the actor who played Fuchida in _Tora! Tora! Tora!_ looks _exactly_ like him.
Great new stuff on this very twisty and complicated battle.
Your work bringing to the West the true japanese perspective of the battle is amazing, Jon. I found it totally fascinating. I wonder if you plan to do the same with some other specific battle of the Pacific War
I'm actually working on a new history of the year 1942. So, more of a general history, rather than another deep dive on one battle.
@@jonparshall oh. If you want a good building block I recommend "1942: the year that doomed the axis." Dont remember the author or year but it was a good one.
@@navyreviewer I read it. Way too American-o-centric for my tastes. Understandable for the time frame.
@@jonparshall so you are aiming for a book broader in scope? Whew. I'm not saying it can't be done but I hope you know what you're getting yourself into.
@@navyreviewer It's like boiling the ocean, yeah. I'm covering all the theaters. I've been working on it for quite a while now. But then again, I wanted to learn more about the year, and this was a good way to do that.
Thanks for the clarifications and comparisons. Great content and thanks for posting.
Excellent discussion and video. I've been curious about the hanger deck environment on the Japanese carriers, and the differences between their design and that of the American carriers. Specifically, it was my understanding that the Japanese hanger deck was much more dangerous and vulnerable than its counterpart. The ventilation was inadequate, the fuel lines not well protected and difficult to seal off during an attack, and the storage and handling of ordinance rendered these spaces into bombs.
Is this impression approximately correct?
Thanks
I highly recommend reading Parshall/Tully's book Shatter Sword as it really details the entire way this battle folded out from Japan to DC. I just finished it a few days ago and was absolutely mesmerized by the story and how much my perception of Midway was changed.
Their work should be read with extreme caution. Their primary source is 'not' the official history which they claim it to be (and it represents the view of Japanese veterans rather than historians anyway), and they omitted key statements from senior Japanese officers aboard the carriers at the battle which directly contradict the central "revelation" in their book. Buyer beware.
@@manilajohn0182 I've read many histories of Midway and have found some enlightening things in this book and with their methodology. I'd need something more than an anonymous UA-cam comment to disparage any "buyer beware" warnings about the book.
@@chipsawdust5816 Okay, here are a few items to start.
1. Their primary source- Senshi Sosho- is 'not' the official Japanese history which they claim it to be.
2. The central 'revelation' of their work- that all of the Japanese attack aircraft were in their hangars when the dive bomber attack began- is false. The claim relies on conditional statements from former Japanese pilots who were in their 80s and even 90s.
3. They ignored after- action report statements of U.S. dive bomber pilots and gunners (from three squadrons aboard two carriers) that Japanese aircraft cluttered the flight decks of Kaga and Soryu, stating that they were telling "lurid tales" for which they can be "forgiven". They suggest that some U.S. pilots and gunners contradicted this when actually, none did.
4. They ignored the USSBS statement from the executive officer of Soryu (Cmdr. Hisaishi Ohara) that her first wave strike for the attack on the U.S. carriers was on Soryu's flight deck awaiting the order to launch when the ship was attacked- even though he's repeatedly mentioned in the book.
5. They ignored the USSBS statement from Kaga's air officer (Lt. Cmdr. Takahisa Amagai) that Kaga had about 30 aircraft in her hangars, 6 fighters in the air, and the rest (about 20+ aircraft) on her flight deck when the ship was attacked- even though he's repeatedly mentioned in the book.
6. The gloss over in silence the short 20- minute gap between the end of the dive bomber attack at 1030 and the beginning of the launch of Hiryu's retaliatory attack on the U.S. carriers because the authors’ own criteria for spotting and launching a strike shows that Hiryu’s strike had to have been on her flight deck when the dive bomber attack began.
7. They state that repeated U.S. attacks and the rearming and launching of Japanese CAP fighters prevented the Japanese from spotting a strike in the early morning. In fact, the Naguno report makes clear that the Japanese planned a “grand scale” (two- wave) strike to be launched in the 1030- 1100 time frame. Additionally, both photographic and filmed interview evidence shows that the Japanese could and often did launch CAP fighters from abreast carriers’ islands.
8. They present as a fact that Yamamoto ordered Nagumo to retain half of his aircraft in reserve. In fact, this is a claim from ‘one’ man- who was a former member of Yamamoto’s staff. No evidence exists to support this claim.
Nagumo was following IJN doctrine by landing the Midway attack group and THEN attacking the American ships.
Great that James Sadkovich was acknowledged for his contribution on the Italian Navy in WW2.
I'm reading Shattered Sword, please do the same, it is fantastic.
I remember reading years ago a newspaper article about Fuchida's rendition of events coming into question in Japan. That was years ago but I am almost positive that they were talking about Pearl Harbor but it's interesting that (apparently) the Japanese were the first to discover and doubt his stories. He even claimed to have been on board the Missouri during the surrender ceremony!!! Apparently grandiose self advertising isn't something unique to North America lol.
Who are the other authors in the video? I only recognize Richard Franks.
Outstanding discussion. Looking forward to hearing more.
I find this whole thing rather hilarious. Because, in my mind, I NEVER thought or ever even imagined that the actual flight deck itself had a large number of aircraft on it. I didn't read Fuchido's book about Midway. I had imagined that underneath the flight decks were numerous aircraft with fuel tanks full & that they were hurriedly filling other planes with fuel and rearming them with armor piercing bombs while removing "HE bombs" that were to be used on Midway Island against land targets. AND if ALL those airplanes had been on the flight deck instead of down in the hanger they may have had a better chance. Cuz pilots could have started taking off & the fires would have been on top of the ship in an open air environment instead of confined & making every explosion lead to a chain reaction of another & then another explosion! Plus, those explosions being inside the hanger, also made the cast iron pipes that they used for pumping water to the fire fighting hoses were made to shatter. And so they had no water to fight the ever growing number of fires! But YEAH, I never read or even heard tale about the book Fuchida wrote saying that the flight decks were full of aircraft. If that had been true there would have been a large number of aircraft all around on the bottom of the ocean in the vicinity of each carrier. However, the ONLY aircraft that survived were either in the air or on the Hiryu. All the planes on Kaga, Akagi, & Soryu were burned or blown to pieces. If any planes within the hangers survived, I myself would be very amazed!!!
Three of the carriers each had approximately 20 aircraft on their flight decks. Only one (Akagi) still had all of her attack aircraft in her hangars- and she had 6 zeros at the fantail in the process of taking off. See the USSBS statements of Soryu's executive officer and Kaga's air officer. The brief 20- minute time gap between the end of the dive bomber attack and the beginning of launch of Hiryu's retaliatory strike- and the last landing time of aircraft on her flight deck- shows conclusively that Hiryu's first wave strike was also on her flight deck when the dive bomber attack began.
I am going to read my copy of Shattered Sword again...
Wish You wrote a book about First Battle of Philippine Sea, Mr Parshall.
The first battle? What was the second? Letye Gulf?
@@lukewalken1316 Yes
First: Marianas
Second: Leyte
Thank you for posting.
Just came over from Drack's podcast, and hit like and subscribe.
Good show!
I always love to see Mr. Parshall doing a talk, but there's one question that I never found in Shattered Sword: how did the kodochosho documents make it into the record? Was there some intrepid air operations officer that grabbed them as the carriers sank?
There was a talk where he answered this in passing…. I’ll try find it and post it here for you if I can.
In essence he said in effect the documents detailing the ops are taken off if when the ship is ordered abandoned.
Its fairly common to take the bridge logs when a abandon ship order is given. The USN still has some of the log books from ships it lost. Sometimes the bridge watch is incapacitated, or the bridge is destroyed & the logs lost, but a surprising number are preserved. The Japanese also made it a point to save the emperors porait. Im unsure if that was official policy.
He mentions that other logs were also rescued before the ships were scuttled, but they were destroyed at the end of the war.
They had time to grab them, SOP pretty much
@@Carlschwamberger1 It was official policy in how ships were abandoned. 1st the Emperors portrait, followed by any senior officer in command i.e. admirals then the crew by division. Found that out when doing some reading on the Kirishima during the naval battles at Guadalcanal in 42-43
Shattered Sword is a great book.
Great video. I have read Fuchida’s account and after this video. Need to get Shattered Sword.
One of the hosts seemed to indicate that Hara's Japanese Destroyer Captain was biased. I read the book earlier this year (It's August 2024 now) and found it thrilling and fascinating. He certainly downplayed the atrocities of Nanking in one sentence. Can somebody tell me what is wrong with that book? Or direct me to a good critique?
Yeah, considering that Nagumo had planes coming back from Midway that were low on fuel & needed to land & the strikes on the Japanese Carriers from the Midway aircraft, Nagumo didn't have the time to spot & launch a strike on the American Carriers. Cuz by the time the attacks were over he needed to start landing strike planes.
I’ve always wanted to know about all the aircrew survivors shot down or ditched. What percentage got picked up vs list?
The majority were recovered. But there was a group of four SBDs that went down in a group, and all 8 aviators were lost. There were other onesy-twosey losses as well. Cressman et. al's "A Glorious Day in our History" would probably give you the blow-by-blow of all those losses.
What did the American pilots say about the presence of planes on the deck? Wouldn’t this be a highly reliable source? More so than the logs?
Those pilots and gunners whose bombs registered hits on Kaga and Soryu reported many aircraft on the carrier's flight deck. Lt. Best recorded 6- 7 Zeros in the act of launching from Akagi when he attacked. This squares with the USSBS statement of Kaga's and Soryu's senior surviving officers (Air officer Lt. Cmdr. Takahisa Amagai and Cmdr. Hisaishi Ohara respectively), who stated that Soryu's strike of 18 Vals and 3 Zeros was on her flight deck awaiting the order to launch when the ship was attacked, and that Kaga had about 30 aircraft in her hangars, six fighters in the air, and the rest (about 20 aircraft) on her flight deck.
Cmdr. Fuchida aboard Akagi reported that Zeros were in the act of launching from Akagi just as Best's section attacked the ship (although it's clear that Fuchida conflated the launch of these fighters with the beginning of the launch of the strike which he knew was being prepared). While Fuchida clearly suffered from some form of PTSD (as evidenced by the multiple errors in his memoirs over issues of no historical significance at all), he did state the correct number of aircraft which attacked the ship, as well as the correct number of hits which the Japanese recorded.
The last landing time of aircraft on these carriers (0950 on Soryu,1005 on Kaga, and 1010 on Akagi) supports the statements of the three Japanese officers, although few of Kaga's aircraft were likely spotted.
In 1945, the US military interviewed four survivors from three of the Japanese carriers. One was an air officer named Takahashi Amagi who was on the Hiryu. He says that at the time of the dive bomb attack, the were "about 30 planes in the hanger loaded and fueled, remainder on deck, six VF in air." Fascinating material. Another of the four indicates (not as direct) that aircraft (no number of) were being serviced in the hanger.
Air officer Lt. Cmdr. Takahisa Amagai was the senior surviving officer from Kaga. The senior surviving officer from Soryu was her executive officer, Cmdr. Hisaishi Ohara. He stated that Soryu's aircraft for the attack on the U.S. carriers was on her flight deck awaiting the order to launch when the ship was attacked. Neither of these statements were mentioned in Shattered Sword (although the two officers were), despite the fact that the information has been available for decades.
I greatly enjoyed this video. Thank you. A question: Is it necessary to call Fuchida's statements "lies" (27:28)? Instead of blame shifting, could he have merely experienced the fog of war?
Just bought Shattered Sword. Thank you.
Any comments on Midway 2019? or the original Midway Heston movie? LOL. Just want to know what Parshall thinks. Also, FDR had to know about PH (George Victor's PH Myth.)
I think Jon's work figured into Midway 2019. I went to the movie with the expectation that Jon's work would be evidenced. I was not disappointed. The role that Best & McClusky played in the battle is very close to what Jon has said. Some of the stuff in the latest movie is still the old info from Reluctant Admiral, which has some unsubstantiated baloney. I think the latest movie is closer to the truth in many ways. The first movie starts with the Doolittle Raid, and the latest starts with Pearl Harbor, which gives it better context. But I do love Henry Fonda as Nimitz. Layton is missing from the first movie, whereas he is a main character in the latest. The latest movie provides a better explanation about Station Hypo's role in using JN-25 intercepts to guess at Japanese intentions, and the role of the USS California's band in helping with this work. One of the things missing from both movies, is the importance of the surge in JN-25 radio traffic resulting from the Japanese immediate reaction to the Doolittle's Raid. It was a gold mine of traffic, more data points. I'm waiting on a good movie about the Battle of the Coral Sea.
As to the 'FDR knew" before Pearl Harbor Myth: Sheer fantasy without any actual historical basis in fact. For the myth to be true, FDR would have had to learn about specific Japanese Plans (that were Secret), without anyone else in the UK & US knowing. I guess Yamamoto would have had to tell FDR personally by phone (without anyone else listening). People have a hard time believing that Surprise sneak attacks could actually be kept secret. But all the historical evidence for many centuries points to the success of well-planned surprise attacks. Then you would have to believe that FDR was callous enough to want an attack. One of the great myths of the Pearl Harbor attack is about the Diplomatic Message decoded before the attack (Magic/Purple). It was not an intercept of JN-25. The message was not a Declaration of War. It is called the 14 Part Message, and its words can be found on the internet. The Japanese did not issue a Declaration of War until many hours AFTER the attacks at Hawaii. The Japanese Cabinet met in Tokyo at 1210 hours on 7 December (Pearl Harbor time) to discuss a Declaration of War, and finally voted on a Declaration at 1530 hours (PH time). The 14 Part Message sent & decoded earlier by the US (0450 hours 7 December Pearl Harbor time) ends with the following:
"6. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of yen and dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the Empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.
7. The Japanese Government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements to be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American Government. However, since the American Government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultation with Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and Chungking, and presumably by catering to me wishes of the Chungking regime in the questions of China, it must be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.
8. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's effort toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interest by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiation.
Thus the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.
The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations."
I don’t understand why they organized their carriers in the way they did. Why didn’t they have one carrier that was dedicated to CAP? Load it with fighters and let it handle CAP and allow the other carriers to deal with strike aircraft? Then you can spot aircraft for strikes without worrying about needing to land, rearm and launch CAP fighters.
Better yet. Why not all the carriers mainly loaded with CAP and have battleships shell Midway at night to start the attack.
@@f430ferrari5 An intriguing approach. Question is could the battleships remain out of scouting range from Midway during daylight and sprint into bombardment range after dusk fell?
@@Whitpusmc the answer is yes. I already calculated this out.
The thing is that the IJN would be split into 6 main bodies as follows:
Northern - 150 miles north
Central - nearly in line approach Midway but from northerly direction heading south
Southern - 100 miles south of Midway
Lead Surface and Trail Carrier sub groups.
The Northern Force is covered under storm just like the Kido Butai was.
The Northern Lead Force is furthest ahead but isn’t detected until the next morning where they are near where Kido Butai is.
The Central Force which consists of the IJN battleships Yamato plus Ise and Fuso class are the slowest can do 23.5 knots. Yamato 27.5 knots. They have destroyers escorts plus subs sent out in front.
The IJN needs to be around 250 miles away from Midway by 5 pm June 3rd. Now of US scout planes spot this large body by this time or even earlier the problem is relaying this message to Midway and launching attack planes perhaps at 5:30 pm at the earliest.
Would the US do this though. It would take over 1 hour to get there and the attack planes still have to find the vessels. By the time they battle and attack it would be too dark to return back.
In 10 hours under darkness the IJN arrived 20 miles off of Midway at 3 am to 4 am.
Since no IJN carriers reported Jun 3rd could the US carrier planes really do anything this late in the evening? Would they move closer?
What’s looming behind the storm clouds though.
The Southern Force is 100 miles further behind the Central Force.
The Carrier Trail Forces are 50-100 miles behind their respected lead forces but not necessarily in a direct line. The Carrier forces are in tighter.
I see the IJN making use of 9 carriers. The Aleutians is canceled.
Northern - Akagi, Kaga, Ryujo. 210 planes 2/3 fighters
Central - Zuikaku, Junyo, Zuiho, Hosho 155 planes 110 fighter planes
Southern - Hiryu and Soryu. 130 planes 80 fighter planes
It would see the dilemma is on the Us carrier pilots side at day break:
1. Attack lead surface ships?
2. Skip over then and look for the carriers
3. Don’t attack at all.
Rumors says Yamamoto was against a lead surface ship attack because he felt the Us would pull back. Imagine that. To me this works for the IJN anyhow.
Had the US carriers retreated back one would have probably been hit by an IJN sub. Most likely Yorktown.
The US may have tried to do one bombing run of the Northern surface ships. It’s hard to know.
Maybe the US would have changed Point Luck but if they did the IJN subs would have got them.
I think we should wonder as to why this isn’t explored more. Instead we always get Nagumo’s dilemma which is irrelevant anyhow.
Wow the algorithm suggested a good video from a new to me channel!
OK here's a question (2 years later): Why is there only one book on Raymond Spruance?
A fairly late question; Jon are you planning any kind of 2nd edition of Shattered Sword? Based upon any updates from retranslation of primary sources.
We floated the notion a few years ago to Nebraska Press--they didn't bite. Which, ummm, to the Marketing Guy in me, didn't show a lot of imagination on their part, seeing as how 1) the 75th anniversary of the battle was (then) right around the corner, 2) Tony in particular has all sorts of new stuff he'd like to add, and 3) I have all the InDesign work files, meaning production costs would probably be minimal. But, ummm, so it goes.
@@jonparshall Dr Parshall. I loved your book and greatly respect the research that went into it. If you are ever in Southern California, could I treat you to dinner?
@@BillMorganChannel Thanks for the invite! And I apologize for the slow response rate--I need to be better on checking this thread. Would love to!
@@jonparshall I would be very honored. I have the greatest respect for the intense detail of your research. Please feel free to email me at BillyJack1@hotmail.com. May I ask a fun question? If you could give Yamamoto advice the day after the Doolittle Raid, what advice would you give him? I know you are busy thus a short answer is fine.
Jon, For Fuchida's version of events were to be correct, then wouldn't the Hiryu have been launching the counter-strike simultaneous with the US Dauntless attacks? As we all know, she was not struck in this morning strike and would presumably have been able to launch immediately. I can't take credit for exposing this obvious discrepancy in Fuchida's account, because a person posting on one of your earlier Midway lectures/talks on UA-cam asked the question.
Another question: If Yamamoto had directed Nagumo to keep half of his aircraft in reserve readiness for a naval strike, then couldn't Nagumo have handled the task differently? Why not assign two of the four carriers to strike Midway & fly the CAP, while the other two were armed & ready for a naval strike. Yes that would have meant two waves (deckloads) against Midway, but why do we all assume that 50% means 50% of all four vs. 100% of two? Four carriers should provide more flexibility.
Because that’s not really how the Kido Buttai was set up to work. For a Japanese Carrier to launch all of it’s planes it required two cycles of spotting the deck and launching. So a full carrier launch required two waves with about 45-60 minutes between them. By combining the Carriers the way they did to mass air power it meant they could launch two highly effective full strength strike waves, where each wave carried a full attack compliment. That was the strength of the Kido Buttai. That was the big innovation. They weren’t going to attempt to rewrite doctrine on the fly. Especially not when the Doctrine they had was unquestionably the worlds most powerful strike weapon.
@@andrewtaylor940 Yes, I understand completely. My point is that the Hiryu not hit, could have launched. About the method of attack against Midway itself: More than one way to do it, and stay within doctrine (2 carriers working together). Was it necessary to hold all four flight decks hostage to the returning strike?
@@dans.5745 Was it necessary? Technically no. Rather obviously Fletcher did just that, holding Yorktown's launch to recover scouts and wait for additional contact reports. But it was Doctrinal. And while Nagumo was not the bumbling fool he often gets portrayed as, he was a very strict doctrinaire. Japanese Carrier Doctrine says do it this way, he would do it that way. And in his defense following that doctrine created the most powerful naval weapon the world had ever seen. There was no incentive up until that point to experiment. Remember they really did think they had two more days until the American Carriers showed up.
There's some similar longstanding myth's regarding the Zuikaku, and "why didn't she join them using Shokaku's air group?" What everyone misses is that while Zuikaku sailed into port with a full hanger, the hanger almost entirely contained Zero's and not much else. Most of the air losses at Coral Sea were the strike planes from both Carriers (which itself was a point Yamamoto didn't give enough thought to on his way to Midway. American Air Defenses were stronger than expected against his attack planes) . So Zuikaku while having a lot of airplanes had maybe 6 strike aircraft left and no effective strike power. Now 20/20 hindsight tells us they should have sailed her and used her as the Fighter CAP. But at that time the Doctrine of the Kido Buttai had no concept of a Fighter Carrier. And that late in the game, as they were readying departure for Midway nobody was thinking outside the box.
Yes, if Fuchida's account had been true and the strike planes were mere seconds from launching when the Dauntless attacks struck, then Hiryu's planes should have been taking off even as the other three carriers were being bombed. But they didn't, for the simple reason that Fuchida's account of the timeline of events was made up.
@@andrewtaylor940 Carrier Air group doctrine was very restrictive as well, they did not integrate aircraft from other carriers. So even even with 20/20 hindsight I am not sure they would've done that since as you point out Kido Butai doctrine did not have that concept. Its interesting how the US Navy while developing doctrine remained more flexible when it came to integration. Such as Enterprise recovering aircraft from both Hornet and Yorktown and integrating them to strike Hiryu.
One aspect of of the early history of WWII in the Pacific theater especially in New Guinea is the absence of how and who of airlift units. Australian and US troop carrier squadrons and groups succeeded in support of infantry forces whereas Japanese aviation failed. The entire Kokoda battles could not have happened without airlift support.
If John’s presenting I listen.
ok so if ordinance was rolling around on the hangar deck-what if nugamo launched and struck at the usn with land bombs-different outcome?OR if he launched the second strike against midway-less damage on board? the delay due to the munitions change over is disastrous
The first time I read Shattered Sword... I was so exited to reach the attack of 10.20 hs that I lost many details.I am reading it now for second time. My question is, how was possible the lack of accuracy in the information that McClusky and Best (VB-6) and Leslie (VB3) received?. Kido Butay was under attack since early in the morning by Midway planes. No pilot was able to transmit the position of his plane during the attack? Why was not even a Catalina trying to keep contact and screen the Japanese flat tops?
There were intermittent attacks by Midway aircraft, but they had ended by 0830 or so. The Catalinas had only caught a couple glimpses earlier in the morning. You have to recall that the whole art of aerial scouting was in its infancy at this time, communications were lousy, and over-water navigation approximate at best. There weren't any navigation satellites telling you where you were. It took quite a while for a message to make it back to its point of origin, then be disseminated up the food chain and re-transmitted to folks who needed it. Often times it took hours, or it didn't happen at all. Lousy spotting and communications were a feature of all the 1942 carrier battles.
@@jonparshall Very clear answer. Thanks a lot.
Please upload in 1080p. Webcam clarity is poor enough as is and needs all the help it can get. I'm sure you can afford high speed internet connections.
Jon, I haven't watched THIS video yet, but heard you discuss the topic in another Midway-related video. Do you think Fuchida's misrepresentation of the flight deck situation was an honest mistake, or did he have ill intentions ?
anyone know of the new book on the battle of coral sea that Rob has just published, frustrating that they don't give full names or links to panel participants
We're not that sophisticated. Thanks for the suggestion. Also, anyone can participate. Rob's book is Scratch One Flattop: The First Carrier Air Campaign and the Battle of the Coral Sea. (Indiana University Press, 2019). His forthcoming book will continue the story up through the Battle of Santa Cruz
Vincent O'Hara thank you, Mr. O’Hara, I found the book and just finished reading it. Looking forward to his next work, already.
I thought Fujida was recovering the sick bay from an appendix operation, during that famous attack? Or is that mixed up?
According to his account, he climbed out of sick bay because he didn't want to be cooped up
It sounds totally counterintuitive, but I wonder if it's possible Fuchida really didn't know much about the fine details of flight deck operations. In my line of work I write orders for medications every day. I know what the meds do, when they're indicated and when they're contraindicated, and what the dosage and frequency should be. But if you ask me whether it's a big pill that's hard to swallow or whether it tastes bad, I will probably have to ask the nurses who actually give the meds. There are certainly a lot of other things Fuchida would know in exacting detail. But unless he was the air group commander or a mechanic or the IJN equivalent of an Airedale, he there could be a lot of flight deck operations he's only distantly familiar with.
Fuchida wasn't lying, and a careful reading of their work will reveal that the authors never presented any evidence that he actually was. As his personal memoirs contain a number of errors of no historical consequence whatsoever, a solid case can be made that Fuchida was suffering from PTSD (a.k.a. shell shock or battle fatigue) and conflated the launch of two CAP sections with the launch of the strike which he knew was being prepared). His statement regarding the attack on Akagi is in fact partially accurate. He correctly recorded the (unusual) number of aircraft (3) which attacked Akagi, the number of hits which the Japanese recorded, and the fact that A6Ms were launching from the ship (one of which was seen by Lt. Best through his bombsight).
It's worth pointing out that Senshi Sosho (the author's primary source) is 'not' the official history which they claim it to be (it predominantly represents the viewpoint of Japanese veterans, and not historians), and that "Japanese sources" do not universally support the authors' contention that all of the Japanese attack aircraft were in their hangars when the dive bomber attack began. In fact the senior surviving officers of both Kaga and Soryu (whose jobs involved actually knowing the status of the ship's aircraft) both directly contradict this. They state that Kaga had approximately 20 aircraft on the flight deck in the process of being spotted and that Soryu's strike was awaiting the order to launch. Lastly, the short time gap of 20 minutes between the end of the dive- bombing attack and the launch of Hiryu's retaliatory strike shows clearly enough that Hiryu's strike was likewise on her flight deck awaiting the order to launch.
So... are there no accounts from the American dive bomber pilots of there being planes rearming on the deck? I find it hard to believe that this "accepted knowledge" is based solely on Fuchida's book.
It's not.
Sounds like the German narrative of "it was the Russian winter that beat us! we were so close!"
That's actually a relatively common meme in history. The Battle of Britain is another example. If you believe the common versions of the battle - the British just hung on by their finger nails and if a Luftwaffe Night Bomber hadn't gotten lost and accidentally bombed London - why - we'd all be speaking German now!!!
The Truth(!!!) is that the Luftwaffe was never close to beating the RAF and if they had tried Sea Lion - the end result would have just been a lot of drowned German Troops.
But - if that's true (which it is) why did the Germans try it? Well ... no one had ever done anything like that before for one thing. Another is that it might have all just been a partial bluff.
I.E. if they acted like they were going to do it - and scared the British into coming into terms - then they wouldn't need to do it.
And ... if they tried it and ... it was all going well ... then they might have gone for it.
So - they tried. The British didn't come to terms and the battle did not go well enough for them to think of trying Sea Lion. And ... besides that - Hitler really wanted to attack the Russians anyway - so that was the end of that.
.
The fog of war and the chaos within is difficult to understand. It has always been up to the poets, scholars, and liars to interperate this for those who were not there.
Could the audio be remastered? The sound volume is too low. Excellent talk thank you!
has anyone involved considered audio. what else is there?
Do you think the improvements in AI translation will speed up the accessibility of these untranslated documents?
I wonder if Fuchida made up this whole fiction, or whether it was a joint effort led by the politicians in Tokyo to push an interpretation of “bad luck“ regarding Midway rather than “ Bad performance?”
Adm Ugacki’s diary illustrates how aviators exaggerate their accomplishments. Observers would see the air battles at Guadalcanal
, the aviators would claim a dozen planes shot down. The observers would see the same amount of planes land that had taken off. In his Diary he had the entire US Navy sunk, 1945 level, by December 8, 1942. In the Army we’d call this CYA. He was there and it is harsh to call an old soldier a liar, I wonder what military experience any of his critics have? From personal experience what people say happened in a battle and what really happened are two different things. The outcome of battle did not change because of planes on a deck. Japanese doctrine was massing aircraft carriers for an overwhelming strike.
Huge fan and serious amateur midway student. Thanks for your passion and insights. What are the chances of being included in any future zoom forums?
I honestly don't give that many talks, and they're often for private audiences on some of the tours I do. But you never know; I may be back on WNHA one of these days!
WNHA Q&As are open to all members. Check out WNHA.net
Thank you both for responding.
I have Fuchida's book and long considered it the definitive account, as he was actually on the deck of the Akagi at the time of the American dive bomber strikes and wrote up the official IJN after action report. It was a real eye opener to read Shattered Sword and the proof laid out in scrupulous detail like a prosecutor's case that Fuchida was, to put it as delicately as I can, a self-serving liar!
The Japanese back then were prone to gross exaggerations
@@lukewalken1316 What Fuchida did goes well beyond mere exaggeration. In his book he dramatically describes the whole Japanese strike force on deck with their engines warmed up, seconds away from launch when the American dive bombers struck. But since he himself was ON DECK when it happened he knew damn well that the strike planes were all still down in the hanger decks, waiting to be brought topside where they could only then start warming up their engines. (Unlike American carriers which had open sides on their hanger decks, Japanese were fully enclosed, so their planes' engines could only be warmed up once they were brought up onto the flight deck)
John parshall, you are what the japanese call a tensai
Read Shattered Sword, enjoyed it, but did not find it that earth shattering or significantly different from the other books, such as Fuchida's account or Miracle at Midway or Incredible Victory. One question though about Parshalls question of the crowded decks and Fuchida's account is why such a discrepancy is present. Could it be faulty memory, or a translation problem?
The answer to that is Senshi Sosho.
@@manilajohn0182 Please Clarify.
Senshi Sosho- the authors' primary source- is 'not' the official history that the authors claim it to be. The 102- volume series generally represents the view not of Japanese historians, but of Japanese veterans (a number of them worked on the series). A tendency in the series is to avoid that which might smear the officer corps of the Imperial Army or Navy. Regarding Midway for example, much of the responsibility for the defeat at Midway is placed onto the shoulders of a petty officer, while the fact that Japanese fighter exhibited poor aerial discipline and left the air above their carriers wide open to a dive bomber attack is glossed over. The reality is that the Japanese were overconfident and attempted too much with too few aircraft (the squadrons aboard the carriers were operating at from 10- 20% under authorized strength, and the ships carried no reserve aircraft). These are some of the likely reasons why the series was neither commissioned nor endorsed by the Japanese government.
Additionally, the authors left out statements from the Executive officer of Soryu and the Air officer of Kaga which directly contradict their claim that all of the Japanese attack aircraft were in their hangars when the dive bomber attack began (the former stated that the ship's strike of 21 aircraft was on the flight deck awaiting the order to launch, while the latter stated that the ship had what amounted to approximately 20 aircraft on her flight deck. They also pass over in silence the short 20- minute time gap between the end of the dive bomber attack at 1030 and the beginning of the launch of Hiryu's retaliatory strike at 1050 on the U.S. carriers- which makes it clear that Hiryu's attack aircraft could not possibly have been in the ship's hangars. Lastly, the authors never provided any evidence that Fuchida was lying. He was actually a prime candidate for PTSD, as his personal memoirs contain a number of errors of no historical significance at all- and Lt. Best corroborated much of Fuchida's statements regarding the U.S. attack on Akagi anyway. A likely reason why some Japanese don't like Fuchida is that he "slept with the enemy". He left Japan, moved to the U.S., and adopted Christianity after the war- so many Japanese likely see him as a turncoat of sorts.
The work has a great deal of information regarding the details of Japanese carrier operations which can't be found in any other single volume- but the author's analysis of the battle is greatly flawed. The authors did establish however, that there was no strike 5 minutes away from launch. Genda stated postwar that they were about 15 minutes out- and based on performance of Japanese flight deck crews in early 1942, they were likely half an hour out at least. The aircraft of CarDiv 2 were ready for launch (they had no torpedo rearming issue), Kaga had approximately 20 of her 27- aircraft strike on her flight deck but with few if any spotted, and all of Akagi's strike aircraft were in her hangars.
Cheers...
@@manilajohn0182 Interesting points. Thanks for the info. Over confidence or Victory Disease, was one of the final conclusions the IJN General Staffs conclusions why the defeat at the battle occurred. Also, as Fuchida mentions, many of the Pilots were suffering from Combat exhaustion, which would be understandable considering they had been through extensive operations in the Indian Ocean and South East Asia region, which I also believe led to the lack of CAP discipline by the pilots.
As for the below authorized strength levels of the Carrier squadrons, that is new to me, thanks for that. I suspect that was the case both because of extensive operational history, I mentioned in the previous paragraph, and the IJN's policy with regards to keeping squadrons and pilots assigned to the same carrier, and the slow replacement of both planes and pilots to those squadrons.
As for the rest of your comment, I agree with your assessment of the book.
@@coleparker You're welcome. The difference in individual squadron strengths between Pearl Harbor and Midway was small in number, but the percentage is accurate. No reserve aircraft for the squadrons was significant however, because of the different procedure for repairing damaged aircraft in the Imperial Navy.
The battle of Midway consisted of so many, so many fluke happenings that always happen in battle.
Important was a what the f moment, was also the earliest.
The Japanese Destroyer rushing back to the fleet at flank speed
Thank you.
Well, this certainly conflicts with the 1970s Midway film, I need to watch the newer version now and see how its portrayed with strike planes on or not on the flight deck.
I have seen both; the 1970s one when it first came out (that is how old I am). Just take these into account when you see the earlier one; first there was no CGI back then, so much of the film relied on stock footage from earlier movies and thus there are a lot of plane inaccuracies. Second, as Charlton Heston states; a number of the actual participants were still alive when they made the movie, so they had to be careful in how they portray them, and last they had to make a fictional backstory to keep the movie entertaining.
interesting brought up mythos of the battle of midway in regards to fuchida's book on Midway. David Rigby has written a book about Wade McClusky, and disputes Parshall and Symonds conclusion that Wade McClusky was unfamiliar with dive bombers, and unfamiliar with dive bomber doctrine. which caused confusion between Richard Best and Wade McClusky on which squadron was to to attack the carriers Akagi and Kaga.
I haven't read it, but I have read George Walsh's dreadful "The Battle of Midway: Search for the Truth" which also goes after me and Tony in Wade's defense as well. Rigby's a serious historian, though: winner of the Lyman Award just like me and Tony. So, I'm certainly not going to bash him. Here's the bottom line, though: somebody screwed up. One carrier got clobbered by a couple dozen planes; the other by three. That ain't right. So, somebody messed up. And from a counterfactual standpoint, I'll just mention, if Akagi escapes, Wade's got some 'splainin to do, because it was his command, and if nothing else, he needed to have gotten positive confirmation from his subordinate commander (Best) as to who's hittin' who, instead of just assuming all was good. The other thing is, though, I just don't see this as worth 300 pages of argumentation. It's not like Wade has been ill-served by history. Tony and I give him full props for his command decisions that got VS-6/VB-6 within striking distance of Kido Butai. That was superlative work. He won the Navy Cross, the Distinguished Flying Cross, and retired a Rear Admiral. And furthermore, I don't get the sense that Wade felt that he had been slighted by history, either. There's room enough here for two heroes here.
@@jonparshall The book is more of an overall biography of McClusky with a large section on the Battle of Midway. I think his argument is with assuming that McClusky didn't know dive bombing doctrine. He thought it was an unprovable assertion by other authors. I think that he thought it was more likely a communication/radio error or talking over each other. I know you have made this idea a possibility in other talks I have heard from you.
another question mark to me arises on fuchidas statement about seeing "HELLDIVERS" descending, to my knowledge the us navy sb2c helldiver was not present at midway
The term was a "knickname" for dive bombers.
If I'm not mistaken, Admiral Yamamoto instructed Admiral Nagumo to only use two of his carriers to attack Midway and retain the other two in readiness to attack any U.S. carriers that were detected. Any explanation why Nagumo failed to obey Yamamoto's instructions? And why Nagumo wasn't demoted after Midway and Admiral Ozawa given command of the remaining Japanese carrier force?
Yamamoto recommended to Nagumo that he retain half of his aircraft in reserve while attacking Midway in case the U.S. carriers appeared in the vicinity while the 1CSF was attacking Midway. One man- former Captain Yasuji Watanabe- has claimed that Yamamoto ordered Nagumo to do this, and a number of historians have repeated it. However, no such record of this order has ever been found- and the Nagumo report contains no suggestion at all that Yamamoto ever issued such an order.
Yamamoto was relatively intolerant of those who failed him. Admiral Takeo Takagi was relieved of his command after Coral Sea, and Admiral Hosogaya was relieved of his after the battle of the Komandorski Islands. It stands to reason that had Nagumo violated such an order and lost four carriers, he would likewise have been relieved. Instead, he retained his command in two additional carrier battles. Yamamoto and Nagumo were not on good terms for much of their careers, and the most likely scenario here is that Watanabe- who was a member of Yamamoto's staff- was attempting to cover for his former chief by casting responsibility for the disaster at Midway away from Yamamoto.
what time zone is used for u.s. actions & to compare with tokyo time. JUN42 hawaii time was HWT(DST) UTC-9.30; tokyo time was UTC+9; Midway time was UTC-11. jun0501:28tokyo would be jun0406:58hawaii; jun0405:28midway. if hawaii standard time UTC- 10.30 was used, that would be 05:58.
Shattered Sword is an amazing book.
In the spotting return to hangar and re-spotting, wouldn't some of the planes engines have been at least partially warmed, so rewarming would have taken less time?
That would be a good thought if any strike planes were on deck and warmed up at any time during the time between 5 to 10 AM. I don't think there is any evidence that the strike planes ever came out of the hanger deck. Why would they until scout planes found a target? You could not land and launch CAP fighters without breaking the spot every so often. It would be more efficient to have the planes gassed and armed in the hanger deck(s.) When an enemy fleet was spotted, it would be at most 45 minutes to spot, warm up engines, and start launching planes.
What are the other 2 Japanese primary sources translated to English Jonathan mentioned?
rondav41: the other two main postwar Japanese sources that made it into English are Nagumo's after-battle report (referred to, appropriately enough as "The Nagumo Report"), which was captured on Saipan and translated in 1947, and the sets of interviews conducted with Japanese officers immediately after the war by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS or "Us-Bus" in the trade). Of those three, the Nagumo Report was the bedrock of the operational details, and Fuchida's the bedrock of the narrative Japanese account. Using the Nagumo Report is very tricky, because it is an amalgam of several different ship's logs, and it's movement track is primarily that of the light cruiser Nagara. So, there's a lot of stuff in it that can seem contradictory, and that makes you scratch your head. Fuchida was useful to historians primarily because it read so well, and seemed internally consistent.
In the volumes of Interrogation of Japanese Officers conducted by the US Strategic bombing survey after the war, both the CO of the Akagi and the Air Officer aboard Kaga, state categorically that there was no aircraft for an airstrike on their respective flight decks. One could safely deuce that Hiryu and Soryu were in similar states of readiness, re the second strike. Anyone with that bit of information could have easily refuted Fuchida’s assertion. The aircraft/flight deck logs of the Japanese carriers provide further additional proof. I will take the word of a Commanding Officer over a staff officer’s recollection a decade later.
In the interrogation of former Japanese officers in the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, the executive officer of Soryu (Cmdr. Hisaishi Ohara) stated that Soryu's aircraft for the first wave (18 Vals and 3 Zeros) of the attack on the U.S. carriers were "...all lined up on the flight deck ready to take off" when the ship was attacked.
The air officer of Kaga (Lt. Cmdr. Takahisa Amagai) stated that Kaga had approximately 30 aircraft in her hangar, 6 fighters in the air, and the rest (approximately 20 aircraft) on the flight deck when the ship was hit.
It's worth noting that both of these men are mentioned in Shattered Sword, but their USSBS statements are not. The reason for this is clear enough. These two men are not only Japanese sources, but they are contemporary Japanese sources and they directly contradict Parshall's and Tully's version of events.
Hiryu had more time to spot her strike than any other carrier, and they literally 'had' to have been on her flight deck. The dive bomber attack ended at 1030, yet Hiryu began launching her retaliatory strike at 1050 (they were all in the air by 1058). The Japanese could not possibly have even spotted 24 aircraft (much less warmed up their engines) in just 20 minutes.
Fuchida was not lying. His memory partially failed him just as it did in his personal memoirs when he confused a number of personal issues which had nothing whatsoever to do with history. He was correct that Akagi was launching aircraft (Best saw 6-7 Zeros in the act of launching; one of them passed through his bombsight as he approached 3,500 feet). Fuchida was also correct on the number of aircraft which attacked Akagi (3) and the number of hits which the Japanese recorded on her (2). Fuchida just conflated the launch of the CAP fighters from Akagi with the launch of the strike which he knew was being prepared.
Parshall's and Tully's primary source for Shattered Sword is "Senshi Sosho". They refer to it as the "official Japanese History". However, Senshi Sosho is not an official history at all. It was neither commissioned nor endorsed by the Japanese government. Statements in the forward of each of the 102 volumes make clear that responsibility for the contents of each volume lie with the author(s) and with the Japanese War History Office. This is significant because "Senshi Sosho" is not simply the work of historians; it is the work of both historians and veterans. There was (and still is) great debate in Japan over the war. They isn't even a consensus on how the Japanese refer to it.
@@manilajohn0182 parshall and Tully just wanted something to sell their book.
It's been happening for millennia, e.g. Tacitus on the battle of Mons Graupius.
Why wasn't Stanhope Ring court marshaled for his failure and non-combat losses and the loss of most of his attack group to fuel starvation off midway?
The same might be asked of Mitscher. And Ring basically hitched his wagon to Mitscher for the rest of the war.
@@jonparshall So Ring had Mitscher by the short hairs. I read your section on doctrine enough to be very surprised to learn that the individual carrier commander decided the course the strike off his carrier took.
I think you said in your book that Hornet never filed an after action report. In my biased mind they were both senior officers and the reports and the conclusions drawn from them would have been highly classified and locked in the pentagon until long after Mitscher was dead and Ring had retired. Officer CYA at its very best.
Thank you for taking the time to reply, I didn't expect it. I'm sure you are quite busy and I am honestly full of beans.
P.S. If you and Mr Tully ever get the funds to write the follow on book I'll be first in line to buy it.
@@jonparshall I have been watching a WW2-Pacific lecture series by Professor Craig L. Symonds of the US Naval War College (on the Great Courses program). He mentioned the issue with the Hornet's strikes, and how Admiral Nimitz handled Mitscher's mistakes & falsehoods in the after-action report . So apparently Nimitz found out & took action. It took a year or more for Mitscher to get out of the dog-house.
@@paulpeterson5214 I have been watching a WW2-Pacific lecture series by Professor Craig L. Symonds of the US Naval War College (on the Great Courses program). He mentioned the issue with the Hornet's strikes, and how Admiral Nimitz handled Mitscher's mistakes & falsehoods in the after-action report . So apparently Nimitz found out & took action. It took a year or more for Mitscher to get out of the dog-house.
@@dans.5745 Thank you for this information, I will look up the great courses program.