My father fought in the pacific from Pearl harbor (19th inf) to 1945 without leave to the US. He landed in Buna, Hollandia and the whole New Guinea campaign to the Leyte landings. The last year training Alamo scouts - Great lecture, next time i'll have to make the trip. Cheers.
My Father had a first cousin who was captured at Corregadore and endured the Bataan Death March plus spending most of the war as a POW. He said they were fed by the Japanese throwing cooked rice through the barbed wire and onto the ground. McArthur would not let the Air Corp fly their planes South to Mindinao Island where they would be safe despite his staff begging him to do so. They were destroyed on the ground by air attacks shortly afterward.
The Bataan Museum in Santa Fe, New Mexico is worth a visit if you happen to be in town. New Mexico sent a National Guard artilary unit to the Philippines shortly before the start of the war.
Dug out Doug, was a military genius in his own mind, his soldiers thought not so much. Lots of miscalculation in to the run up to the attack. Lots of BS afterward.
War Plan Orange (more accurately, the Pacific component of Plan Rainbow-5) , on the eve of Pearl Harbor, did not envision the Navy steaming across the Pacific to fight the decisive battle off the Philippines. The Philippines were considered to be indefensible. MacArthur changed that somewhat at the 11th hour. But the reinforcements and additional new equipment he got was not enough to change the operational balance, and it ended up being just more men and materiel to be lost in the defeat.
I have been studying WW II for over 35 years, and have over 20 books and at least 20 DVD documentaries, some of which are series. So, I an commenting here with lots of knowledge of the war. In the Pacific, the goal was to defeat Japan, as quick as possible, with the littlest loss of life as well. The Army essentially did NOT follow this plan. While there is no doubt that there were many battles that the army fought, and with a relatively large number of army soldiers, that their efforts were great and were quite a struggle. But the whole army campaign was essentially just to satisfy MacArthur's 'whim', to return to the Philippines since he had done so poorly prior and during the Japanese attack, and to save his reputation. So, if you look at the overall Pacific war, it was the Marines, the Navy, and Army Air Force that actually won the war, first taking the Solomon islands to be able to use and support Australia, and then the movement up the central Pacific, aiming at Japan. Even thou there were at least 8-10 times more army soldiers than Marines, it was where the Marines fought, and their progression towards Japan. It is also possible the the Battle of Iowa Jima may not have been necessary since the B-29's switched to night bombing, and did not really need fighter cover, although it was a nice place for the damaged B-29s to land if needed. In addition, if the invasion of the Philippines had not been done, then the attack on Peleliu would not have been necessary either, and may not have been necessary in the first place, even with the taking of the Philippines! But MacArthur insisted on that too. The taking of the Philippines had little to do with winning the war. The navy with their very effective Silent Service had and would continue to starve Japan from getting supplies, so the capturing of the Philippines was not really needed to win the war. And the attack on the Philippines essentially required moving up thru New Guinea, which was mainly unnecessary as well. Again, this was all servicing MacArthur's huge ego. Of course, there were some US army efforts needed during the Pacific campaign that really led to defeating Japan, but not many. The US assistance in Burma was one, with Merrill's Marauders, or assisting the Australian in defending Port Morsby, or their assistance on Guadalcanal, and on some of the other Solomon islands. or their role in supply, and no doubt a few others. But the army, all at MacArthur's insistence, resulted in the needless deaths of over 200,000 people. On the other hand, MacArthur did an absolutely outstanding job of rebuilding Japan, starting from their surrender on Sept. 2, 1945.
The Philippines was absolutely necessary if Operation Downfall actually occurred before Japanese capitulation. By mid-1944 the US military only had two plans on the strategic timetable for the remainder of 1944 and 1945. One was to liberate the Philippines as advocated by the War Department, and the other was to invade Formosa (Taiwan) as advocated by the Navy Department. Both plans were presented to FDR during the Honolulu conference in July 1944, and it was there that the Philippine strategy was decided over Formosa; not just because of the moral aspect of liberating a former US territory, but also because the Navy's plan involved too much preparation, too much time, and too much risk for not enough payoff compared to establishing bases in the Philippines. So contrary to popular belief, the Philippines was invaded for strategic purposes and not just to satisfy MacArthur. Some also argue that the invasion of Okinawa should have deprecated operations in the Philippines, but such an argument is anachronistic since Operation Iceberg wasn't even approved by Admiral King and the JCS until after the July conference. Additionally, even if the Philippines itself can be dismissed as a waste of lives and resources because of the Army, the invasion of Peleliu and Operation Stalemate was exclusively a Navy plan. Despite MacArthur's name frequently being attached to Peleliu, the plan to invade that island, as well as Angaur and Ulithi, was actually decided by Navy leaders several weeks before the JCS approved MacArthur's plan to return to the Philippines in 1944. The Navy considered the island vital to defending their new anchorage at Ulithi. Ulithi was in fact the largest single naval base of the war after the US Navy took the island (using Army troops), but was vulnerable to air and submarine attacks, so taking Peleliu not only denied the Japanese an air base to taxi air sorties but also provided an airfield to conduct long range reconnaissance to protect Ulithi from incoming raids. At least that was the Navy's justification. Finally, even if we dismiss the entire SWPA, there were still only a few battles in the central Pacific where the Army only had a peripheral role; Tarawa, Tinian, and Iwo Jima for example. In other operations, such as the invasion of the Kwajalein, Saipan, Guam, and Okinawa, the Army contributed to a huge portion of the ground fighting. For that reason, I don't think it's fair to exclude the Army when considering the impact that the services had in defeating Japan, even if you disregard the Philippines despite its strategic necessity.
Pray silence, for the oricle wishes to speak.... "I have been studying WW II for over 35 years, and have over 20 books and at least 20 DVD documentaries, some of which are series. So, I am commenting here with lots of knowledge of the war" Take heed of what the oricle has spoken, for he is all knowledgable in things world war two.......... Good God Almighty, your ego defines all logic.
You speak of winning Guadalcanal as if it were in isolation from the PNG fighting. The attacks along the northern PNG coast especially at Buna and Goa were critical in sapping the IJA and IJN of men and matériel which would otherwise have been used to help recapture Guadalcanal. In addition, Guadalcanal started as a Marine operation, but the Army played a significant role in the end (and overall). Cutting the Japanese off from the oilfields of Kalimantan was greatly assisted by the Philippines operation. Subs alone could restrict and eventually sink every tanker, but it was the mining of Japanese shipping in home waters that was the biggest contributor - Operation Starvation. Peleliu was definitely Nimitz overriding Halsey, not MacArthur’s whim. All that said, MacArthur did have a very strong desire to return to the Philippines and his strategy was a very Army one - to the man with a hammer, everything is a nail. His stupidity on attacking Rabaul, and his awful treatment of his commanders at Buna/Gona (including Eichelberger) would have cashiered less well connected commanders. His dismissal of the Australian forces still burns here in Australia and his self publicity and false claims make him a very poor “hero”. How he got away with publicity talking about invading the Solomons (as seen in Jon’s presentation) is past understanding. He was fortunate in having good commanders at the front who could overcome his arrogance and incompetent staff assessments.
I disagree with the assessment that the Phillipines were indefensible. If the war had waited until the Spring of 1942, there were substantial reinforcements planned. Mainly artillery units, anti-aircraft units, and more modern fighter units. Also the plan was to reinforce the Phillipines Army units with the Phillipine Scouts and disperse them throughout the native army in order to provide more backbone to those units.
But those tactical efforts would not have mattered, because the US navy could not have kept the forces in the Phillipines supplied, no matter how strong they were. I think the US Army did a magnificent job in spite of MacArthur's poor planning. By continuing to fight for nearly six months, despite knowing the situation was hopeless, they forced the Japanese to continue committing forces to defeat them. This aided the overall effort and is a huge contrast to the British collapse (in a far better strategic situation) in Singapore.
33.25 Airlift is mentioned as important (how about critical) and never identified as Troop Carrier units. The work horse C-47 and the logistic support allowed the Australian and US Army forces overwhelm and destroy the Japanese forces in the Southwest Pacific Theater.
A FRIENDLY PIECE OF ADVICE : The key point should appear in the HEADLINE - not buried in the 35-line inner description behind the 2nd click. Would generate quadruple amount of views, though 2K is very promising in 24h in 2,4K sub ch. 2) VERY commendable for the Nimitz shrine to present the Army effort in its premises thru this historian - very noble ! The Peleliu disaster against Halsey s serious pleas only days prior to commencement is the saddest mistake Nimitz ever made. May his soul rest in peace despite the decision. See : ROSS, Bill D : Peleliu -Tragic Triumph - Random House (1991) = the most penetrating dissident research into the futile battle. The simultaneous Morotai landing under Kinkaid/Mac A did the strategic trick virtually w 0 casualties, both started sept 15 44. Concerning the army s role, recommend also the significant recent studies by BORNEMAN. Or the amphibious ones, the still valid book by adm BARBEY : MacArthur s Amphibious Navy - NIP (1969). Barbey was in charge of more landings than any other flag rank person during WW2 ! NOT a little feat .... Memento Mori. SEMPER FINN
Au contraire, (too) many people think that Eisenhower was in charge of the American forces in Europe and MacArthur was in charge of American forces in the Pacific.
There are detailed accounts of whose allied troops took Buna January 1943. The account here is inaccurate, but is a start to the blooding of citizen soldier US infantry in second half 1942 to become effective by 1944. In 1942 MacArthur had 500k Australians, many having had active service in Africa, and about 50k inexperienced US forces.
@Executive Director The other way of saying it is that the Japanese were the toughest, deadliest enemy the Australians fought. Not many of the 1m Japanese that fought in New Guinea survived. They called it Death Island. Several reasons are jungle, disease, lack of support, and Australian opposition. Australia’s total servicemen deaths for WW2 were 34k, nothing like 1m, they certainly did something right.
I loved the Presentation, and all the various and diverse talking Points. In my opinion, it was very well done... I must say didn't care very much for the some of the questions& answers part.
The australians warned the gi command about attemting a frontal assult at buna inexperienced national guards soldier's left their radio's when they got to heavy to carry so they had no contact with comand or artillery a lot of bad battle tactics sadly cost a lot of army men thier lives.god bless the american and Australian service men&women.
Not 17,000 islands: 7,641 islands. Not many different religions: 80% of Filipinos are Roman Catholic. Most Filipinos speak English and Tagalog and a local dialect. Filipinos have far more in common than you suggest. Please get your facts straight.
The US Army under MacArthur LOST the Philippines because he was a horrible tactician and did not listen to reality. The US Army for the most part were 2nd line troops in the Island hopping campaign with the US Marines leading the way in the initial waves and tearing down the majority of Japanese forces on each island. I have been reading everything about world war for many decades, and this video screams the same excuse the Army always comes up with in that era "We fought too". Yeah you did, mostly no were nearly as good as you should have been, nowhere near as good as the Marines did, You didn't get along with the US Navy or Marines because your leadership were assholes.
Not sure why you have a beef with the guy. He was asked a question regarding race and answered it. He didn't bring it up on his own. So yes, you should be sorry.
I watched his entire presentation after reading and trying to understand to try to understand your comment. Is “reevaluating your position on race“ too much for you?
Whenever, wherever I have opportunity to listen to or hear or read John McManus,, I'm much rewarded.
Mr McManus is a superb speaker and very knowledgeable historian on World War II. Any presentation he makes is worth a watch. Thx!!!
My father fought in the pacific from Pearl harbor (19th inf) to 1945 without leave to the US. He landed in Buna, Hollandia and the whole New Guinea campaign to the Leyte landings. The last year training Alamo scouts - Great lecture, next time i'll have to make the trip. Cheers.
O7
The 19th was part of the 24th Infantry Division, they didn't land at Buna. Their first action was at Hollandia in 1944.
Happy you got to enjoy his company & have him for your father.
Terrific! And very glad I stuck with it for the short Q & A.
My Father had a first cousin who was captured at Corregadore and endured the Bataan Death March plus spending most of the war as a POW. He said they were fed by the Japanese throwing cooked rice through the barbed wire and onto the ground.
McArthur would not let the Air Corp fly their planes South to Mindinao Island where they would be safe despite his staff begging him to do so. They were destroyed on the ground by air attacks shortly afterward.
Thanks for remembering the Army's massive effort and losses.
Good job fair analysis of General MacArthur
Great lecture about a theater of war I knew little about.
The Bataan Museum in Santa Fe, New Mexico is worth a visit if you happen to be in town. New Mexico sent a National Guard artilary unit to the Philippines shortly before the start of the war.
Dug out Doug, was a military genius in his own mind, his soldiers thought not so much. Lots of miscalculation in to the run up to the attack. Lots of BS afterward.
That was a fascinating talk - thanks!
War Plan Orange (more accurately, the Pacific component of Plan Rainbow-5) , on the eve of Pearl Harbor, did not envision the Navy steaming across the Pacific to fight the decisive battle off the Philippines. The Philippines were considered to be indefensible. MacArthur changed that somewhat at the 11th hour. But the reinforcements and additional new equipment he got was not enough to change the operational balance, and it ended up being just more men and materiel to be lost in the defeat.
I have been studying WW II for over 35 years, and have over 20 books and at least 20 DVD documentaries, some of which are series. So, I an commenting here with lots of knowledge of the war. In the Pacific, the goal was to defeat Japan, as quick as possible, with the littlest loss of life as well. The Army essentially did NOT follow this plan. While there is no doubt that there were many battles that the army fought, and with a relatively large number of army soldiers, that their efforts were great and were quite a struggle. But the whole army campaign was essentially just to satisfy MacArthur's 'whim', to return to the Philippines since he had done so poorly prior and during the Japanese attack, and to save his reputation.
So, if you look at the overall Pacific war, it was the Marines, the Navy, and Army Air Force that actually won the war, first taking the Solomon islands to be able to use and support Australia, and then the movement up the central Pacific, aiming at Japan. Even thou there were at least 8-10 times more army soldiers than Marines, it was where the Marines fought, and their progression towards Japan. It is also possible the the Battle of Iowa Jima may not have been necessary since the B-29's switched to night bombing, and did not really need fighter cover, although it was a nice place for the damaged B-29s to land if needed. In addition, if the invasion of the Philippines had not been done, then the attack on Peleliu would not have been necessary either, and may not have been necessary in the first place, even with the taking of the Philippines! But MacArthur insisted on that too. The taking of the Philippines had little to do with winning the war. The navy with their very effective Silent Service had and would continue to starve Japan from getting supplies, so the capturing of the Philippines was not really needed to win the war. And the attack on the Philippines essentially required moving up thru New Guinea, which was mainly unnecessary as well. Again, this was all servicing MacArthur's huge ego.
Of course, there were some US army efforts needed during the Pacific campaign that really led to defeating Japan, but not many. The US assistance in Burma was one, with Merrill's Marauders, or assisting the Australian in defending Port Morsby, or their assistance on Guadalcanal, and on some of the other Solomon islands. or their role in supply, and no doubt a few others. But the army, all at MacArthur's insistence, resulted in the needless deaths of over 200,000 people.
On the other hand, MacArthur did an absolutely outstanding job of rebuilding Japan, starting from their surrender on Sept. 2, 1945.
The Philippines was absolutely necessary if Operation Downfall actually occurred before Japanese capitulation. By mid-1944 the US military only had two plans on the strategic timetable for the remainder of 1944 and 1945. One was to liberate the Philippines as advocated by the War Department, and the other was to invade Formosa (Taiwan) as advocated by the Navy Department. Both plans were presented to FDR during the Honolulu conference in July 1944, and it was there that the Philippine strategy was decided over Formosa; not just because of the moral aspect of liberating a former US territory, but also because the Navy's plan involved too much preparation, too much time, and too much risk for not enough payoff compared to establishing bases in the Philippines. So contrary to popular belief, the Philippines was invaded for strategic purposes and not just to satisfy MacArthur. Some also argue that the invasion of Okinawa should have deprecated operations in the Philippines, but such an argument is anachronistic since Operation Iceberg wasn't even approved by Admiral King and the JCS until after the July conference.
Additionally, even if the Philippines itself can be dismissed as a waste of lives and resources because of the Army, the invasion of Peleliu and Operation Stalemate was exclusively a Navy plan. Despite MacArthur's name frequently being attached to Peleliu, the plan to invade that island, as well as Angaur and Ulithi, was actually decided by Navy leaders several weeks before the JCS approved MacArthur's plan to return to the Philippines in 1944. The Navy considered the island vital to defending their new anchorage at Ulithi. Ulithi was in fact the largest single naval base of the war after the US Navy took the island (using Army troops), but was vulnerable to air and submarine attacks, so taking Peleliu not only denied the Japanese an air base to taxi air sorties but also provided an airfield to conduct long range reconnaissance to protect Ulithi from incoming raids. At least that was the Navy's justification.
Finally, even if we dismiss the entire SWPA, there were still only a few battles in the central Pacific where the Army only had a peripheral role; Tarawa, Tinian, and Iwo Jima for example. In other operations, such as the invasion of the Kwajalein, Saipan, Guam, and Okinawa, the Army contributed to a huge portion of the ground fighting. For that reason, I don't think it's fair to exclude the Army when considering the impact that the services had in defeating Japan, even if you disregard the Philippines despite its strategic necessity.
Pray silence, for the oricle wishes to speak....
"I have been studying WW II for over 35 years, and have over 20 books and at least 20 DVD documentaries, some of which are series. So, I am commenting here with lots of knowledge of the war"
Take heed of what the oricle has spoken, for he is all knowledgable in things world war two..........
Good God Almighty, your ego defines all logic.
You speak of winning Guadalcanal as if it were in isolation from the PNG fighting. The attacks along the northern PNG coast especially at Buna and Goa were critical in sapping the IJA and IJN of men and matériel which would otherwise have been used to help recapture Guadalcanal. In addition, Guadalcanal started as a Marine operation, but the Army played a significant role in the end (and overall).
Cutting the Japanese off from the oilfields of Kalimantan was greatly assisted by the Philippines operation. Subs alone could restrict and eventually sink every tanker, but it was the mining of Japanese shipping in home waters that was the biggest contributor - Operation Starvation.
Peleliu was definitely Nimitz overriding Halsey, not MacArthur’s whim.
All that said, MacArthur did have a very strong desire to return to the Philippines and his strategy was a very Army one - to the man with a hammer, everything is a nail.
His stupidity on attacking Rabaul, and his awful treatment of his commanders at Buna/Gona (including Eichelberger) would have cashiered less well connected commanders. His dismissal of the Australian forces still burns here in Australia and his self publicity and false claims make him a very poor “hero”. How he got away with publicity talking about invading the Solomons (as seen in Jon’s presentation) is past understanding.
He was fortunate in having good commanders at the front who could overcome his arrogance and incompetent staff assessments.
I disagree with the assessment that the Phillipines were indefensible. If the war had waited until the Spring of 1942, there were substantial reinforcements planned. Mainly artillery units, anti-aircraft units, and more modern fighter units. Also the plan was to reinforce the Phillipines Army units with the Phillipine Scouts and disperse them throughout the native army in order to provide more backbone to those units.
But those tactical efforts would not have mattered, because the US navy could not have kept the forces in the Phillipines supplied, no matter how strong they were.
I think the US Army did a magnificent job in spite of MacArthur's poor planning. By continuing to fight for nearly six months, despite knowing the situation was hopeless, they forced the Japanese to continue committing forces to defeat them. This aided the overall effort and is a huge contrast to the British collapse (in a far better strategic situation) in Singapore.
You might mention the Australians in all of this.
33.25 Airlift is mentioned as important (how about critical) and never identified as Troop Carrier units. The work horse C-47 and the logistic support allowed the Australian and US Army forces overwhelm and destroy the Japanese forces in the Southwest Pacific Theater.
A FRIENDLY PIECE OF ADVICE : The key point should appear in the HEADLINE - not buried in the 35-line inner description behind the 2nd click. Would generate quadruple amount of views, though 2K is very promising in 24h in 2,4K sub ch.
2) VERY commendable for the Nimitz shrine to present the Army effort in its premises thru this historian - very noble ! The Peleliu disaster against Halsey s serious pleas only days prior to commencement is the saddest mistake Nimitz ever made. May his soul rest in peace despite the decision. See : ROSS, Bill D : Peleliu -Tragic Triumph - Random House (1991) = the most penetrating dissident research into the futile battle. The simultaneous Morotai landing under Kinkaid/Mac A did the strategic trick virtually w 0 casualties, both started sept 15 44. Concerning the army s role, recommend also the significant recent studies by BORNEMAN. Or the amphibious ones, the still valid book by adm BARBEY : MacArthur s Amphibious Navy - NIP (1969). Barbey was in charge of more landings than any other flag rank person during WW2 ! NOT a little feat ....
Memento Mori.
SEMPER FINN
Au contraire, (too) many people think that Eisenhower was in charge of the American forces in Europe and MacArthur was in charge of American forces in the Pacific.
Dunning Kruger.
There are detailed accounts of whose allied troops took Buna January 1943. The account here is inaccurate, but is a start to the blooding of citizen soldier US infantry in second half 1942 to become effective by 1944. In 1942 MacArthur had 500k Australians, many having had active service in Africa, and about 50k inexperienced US forces.
The Australian Army oddly did not perform well in the Pacific despite being probably the best soldiers the British had in North Africa.
@Executive Director The other way of saying it is that the Japanese were the toughest, deadliest enemy the Australians fought. Not many of the 1m Japanese that fought in New Guinea survived. They called it Death Island. Several reasons are jungle, disease, lack of support, and Australian opposition. Australia’s total servicemen deaths for WW2 were 34k, nothing like 1m, they certainly did something right.
I loved the Presentation, and all the various and diverse talking Points. In my opinion, it was very well done... I must say didn't care very much for the some of the questions& answers part.
The race part?
The australians warned the gi command about attemting a frontal assult at buna inexperienced national guards soldier's left their radio's when they got to heavy to carry so they had no contact with comand or artillery a lot of bad battle tactics sadly cost a lot of army men thier lives.god bless the american and Australian service men&women.
Hernandez Sharon Davis Dorothy Martin Amy
Definite sanitized version of the pedi file Dugout Doug. Not accurate.
Not 17,000 islands: 7,641 islands. Not many different religions: 80% of Filipinos are Roman Catholic. Most Filipinos speak English and Tagalog and a local dialect. Filipinos have far more in common than you suggest. Please get your facts straight.
Thank you for your feedback. We will pass this comment along to all relevant parties.
The US Army under MacArthur LOST the Philippines because he was a horrible tactician and did not listen to reality. The US Army for the most part were 2nd line troops in the Island hopping campaign with the US Marines leading the way in the initial waves and tearing down the majority of Japanese forces on each island. I have been reading everything about world war for many decades, and this video screams the same excuse the Army always comes up with in that era "We fought too". Yeah you did, mostly no were nearly as good as you should have been, nowhere near as good as the Marines did, You didn't get along with the US Navy or Marines because your leadership were assholes.
His opinion on MacArthur is way WAY off. Other stuff seems ok
You had me until the last ten minutes. You brought race into this. You are way out of line on this. Sorry the last ten was BS. Sorry.
Ah, yes, the race blind 1940s
Actually, he's pretty much dead on. My father saw it.
Not sure why you have a beef with the guy. He was asked a question regarding race and answered it. He didn't bring it up on his own. So yes, you should be sorry.
Okay Simple Jack…
I watched his entire presentation after reading and trying to understand to try to understand your comment. Is “reevaluating your position on race“ too much for you?
When you start your presentation with such a butt-hurt attitude it immediately turns off most of your audience. You might want to work on that.
Haha . A bit overstated but true