I thought this vid was 24 minutes 😂😂 after 50 minutes I realized it was 2hours and 44 minutes. Pallman, making me have to reshape my moral realism approach. I always had trouble defending Cuneos argument. Your articulation is superb! Thank you so much for this incredible resource, God bless!
Hola Dave, there's a lot to disagree (and agree) on, but the following in particular: 1:43:20 seems to express, "If a truth is necessary, then we need reason to think it's not fundamental." -Why not think otherwise? "If a truth is necessary, then we need reason to think it's fundamental." Why does a truth's necessity imply fundamentality? The best arguments for an explanatory principle (e.g., weak PSR) entail seeking explanations as far as they can go (stopping when we have reason to). Since there are relations of dependence between necessary truths, necessity alone doesn't give one reason to think that's the stopping point. -You added a "b/c at least some necessary moral truths are fundamental" condition, but why does this quantify over all necessary moral truths we come upon? We have more examples of non-fundamental necessary moral truths. Why couldn't we make the opposite inference (that we should be on the "let's seek an explanation" side)? At least some necessary metaphysical truths (e.g., causation, time, composition, identity, etc) are fundamental, but we can't extract the previous explanatory principle from that fact alone. I suppose you'd also have to be clear on the examples used (what is serving as the basis, how is it pertinently basic, is it just fundamental ontologically, normative-ethically, semantically, etc) 1:43:40 -Why is an explanation of necessary P1 needed if P1 is about necessary P2? Can't necessary P1 brutely be about necessary P2? -Even if P1 being about P2 entails a needed explanation, why think necessary moral truths (of the relevant type, whichever you take them to be) generally don't have this feature such that they don't need explaining (in the same way Evans' prime number example would)? With Love mi hermano en Cristo ❤️
Can we expect a new series for arguments that you do use? I like your approach and rigorous takes on these matters, so I'd be happy to see a defense of arguments you regard as sound.
I'm working up to an argument for Jesus' resurrection based upon all of these videos on NT reliability. I also plan to do a video series defending substance dualism which will conclude with an argument from substance dualism to theism.
My 3 Related Arguments for Moral Realism and God Let: * G = A transcendent, intelligent, and creative God * S = A body of developing human souls with free will * P = The purpose of creation, which is a birthing place for S (souls) * MR = Moral realism * MS = Moral subjectivism Argument 1: If G, S, and P exist, then MR must follow as true. 1. Premise 1: G, S, and P exist. * God (G) created the universe with an intentional purpose (P), which is the development and moral maturation of free-willed human souls (S). This establishes the idea that creation is not arbitrary but purposeful, with the goal of nurturing souls. 2. Premise 2: For souls to develop, there must be a moral framework. * To achieve their purpose (P), souls (S) must be guided by an objective moral framework. This is necessary because free will entails the capacity to make meaningful choices. Without an objective standard of right and wrong, moral development would lack direction, making it impossible for souls to grow in a meaningful way. An arbitrary or purely subjective framework would not provide a consistent basis for moral growth. 3. Conclusion: If G, S, and P exist, MR must follow. * Given the existence of God (G), souls (S), and a purposeful creation (P), moral realism (MR) must follow. The existence of these conditions logically implies the presence of objective moral truths that guide souls toward their intended moral and spiritual growth. These moral truths are not contingent on personal opinion or social convention; they are aligned with God’s will and the purpose of creation. Argument 2: If MR is true, then G, S, and P can or must be inferred. 1. Premise 1: MR is true. * If we accept that objective moral truths (MR) exist, we must account for their origin. Objective moral truths, by definition, are true regardless of human opinion, cultural background, or individual preferences. Therefore, their source must be independent of human subjectivity. 2. Premise 2: Moral realism requires a foundation. * Objective moral truths need a transcendent foundation because they are universal and unchanging. If moral truths are objective, they cannot be the product of fluctuating human perspectives. Instead, they must be grounded in something that transcends individual experience-something that is itself unchanging, intelligent, and capable of determining what is morally right or wrong. This is where the need for a higher, transcendent source, such as God (G), comes into play. 3. Why God? God is posited as the best candidate for this foundation because: * Universality: As a transcendent being, God provides a universally applicable source for moral truths that transcends cultures and contexts. * Objectivity: God’s unchanging nature ensures that these truths remain stable over time, offering a firm foundation for moral guidance. * Authority: If God is the creator, His moral laws carry binding authority, providing a reason why these truths should guide human behavior. 4. Conclusion: If MR is true, then G, S, and P must be inferred. * If we accept moral realism, it implies the existence of a transcendent source (G), morally significant agents (S), and a purposeful universe (P) in which these moral truths guide the development of human souls. The existence of G, S, and P can thus be inferred from the acceptance of MR, as objective moral truths would not exist in a purposeless, unguided universe. Christian Argument Against Moral Subjectivism (MS): 1. Premise 1: MS leads to self-contradiction and destruction. * Moral subjectivism (MS) asserts that morality is based on individual or cultural preference, leading to conflicting moral views without a universal standard to resolve them. This results in practical and philosophical contradictions. If all moral perspectives are equally valid, then we have no basis for resolving disputes, punishing crimes, or establishing justice. This leads to societal confusion and eventual breakdown. 2. Premise 2: MS is unworkable in societies. * The social, physical, and legal consequences of moral subjectivism reveal its impracticality. Without an objective framework, societies struggle to establish consistent laws or enforce justice. Individuals and groups may hold conflicting moral views, but subjectivism provides no way to mediate these differences. This leads to societal disorder, as no coherent moral framework exists to guide behavior or resolve moral conflicts. 3. Conclusion: Therefore, MR must be true. * Given that MS results in self-contradictory and destructive consequences, MR must be true, as it offers the only workable and coherent alternative. Moral realism provides the stable foundation needed for societies to function effectively and for souls to develop morally. From this, we can infer the existence of G (as the transcendent source of morality), S (as morally significant beings), and P (as the purpose behind creation and moral growth). Response to Criticisms: * Why must morality have a foundation? Objective morality requires a foundation to avoid becoming arbitrary or subjective. If there is no foundation, then moral truths are reduced to personal or cultural preferences, which leads to moral relativism. An objective foundation-like God-ensures that moral truths are universally binding and unchanging. * Why must God be the foundation? God is posited as the most plausible foundation because He provides universality, objectivity, and authority to moral truths. These are essential qualities for moral laws to be valid across time and space, independent of human opinion. While other transcendent sources could theoretically be proposed, God, as a transcendent, intelligent, and creative being, best fits the role of grounding objective moral truths.
@@faithbecauseofreason8381I love how, at about an hour into this three hour video, you say "I hope that this brief outline of the arguments for moral realism..." haha! My brother in Christ, there is nothing brief about this video 🤣
So I am just finishing this one now, @@faithbecauseofreason8381 , but this point at the end about ignoring why we believe what we believe (right wing, left wing, etc) reminds me of what frustrates me so much about the Jordan Peterson brand of political discourse - ie, "Everyone I don't like is a post-modern Neo-Marxist, and part of what it means to be a post-modern Neo Marxist simply is to be wrong. Therefore, everyone I don't like is wrong". Sorry, that really has nothing to do with the moral argument, I just reached the end of the video and wanted to add my two cents haha!
Your video is well structured, clear, rigorous, and representing engagement with some of the most well known moral apologists. I am impressed by your conscientious work.
Do you think Craig's first premise is similar to the presuppositionalist's transcendental argument (maybe one difference is Craig is arguing for a generic theism)? Also, how do you do such deep and broad research for so many videos? I'd love to see a video on it. For example, do you buy all these books? If not, how do you get them all? Do you read all of them? If not, how do you filter through all the content? How do you manage your time? How do you organize all your thoughts into a coherent picture?
Do you think the moral argument could be used as an argument against materialism, but not necessarily for theism? If so, then I think it’s still valuable, as a lot of people are materialists by default, but haven’t really considered it’s ramifications. Plus, consider someone like St Augustine. His movement away from materialism, was not a small step in his slow conversation to Christianity.
If I were persuaded of moral realism (of the non-naturalist variety) then yes, I think it would succeed as an argument against materialism. But I think there are so many much more obvious arguments to be urged against materialism. Things like thoughts, relations, intentions, and justification are absolutely essential to doing philosophy and none of them are compatible with materialism in my estimation. I guess I just see there as being so many stronger objections to materialism than moral realism.
@@tylerkroenke7804 The Substance of Consciousness - Rickabaugh and Moreland Objections to Physicalism - Robinson Measuring the Immeasurable Mind - Owen Knowledge, Thought, and the Case for Dualism - Fumerton The Waning of Materialism - Beale and Koons
As an atheist, i am a moral emotivist. The fact that humans create concepts such as good and evil is a reflection of our emotions towards some set of actions, and it is an attempt to make those actions socially reprehensible, and ultimately, prevent them. For example, people generally feel negative emotions about torture, so they claim it is evil. This is not a case against theism, as a theist can belive these emotions are given by God, and that is fair enough. But evolution by natural selection can also explain how such emotions evolved in primitive social groups, so the moral argument isn't very effective for me.
Chapters: 00:00:00 - Why This Series? 00:03:09 - Introduction 00:04:40 - Definitions 00:11:25 - Challenge 1: The Lack of Evidence for Moral Realism 00:17:32 - Moral Reliabilism 00:22:46 - Ethical Intuitionism 00:30:53 - Partners in Guilt 00:44:57 - Deliberative Indispensability 00:59:01 - Challenge 2: Do Moral Facts Need Grounding? 01:00:38 - Challenge 3: How Does God Explain Morality Anyway? 01:02:16 - Challenge 4: Wielenberg's Robust Moral Realism 01:08:00 - Challenge 5: Is God the Best Explanation of Morality? 01:11:01 - William Lane Craig 01:23:22 - Jerry Walls and David Baggett 01:37:25 - C. Stephen Evans 01:50:44 - Adam Lloyd Johnson 02:16:55 - The Bloated Model Objection 02:31:12 - The Lucky Coincidence Objection 02:44:02 - Conclusion
So, my problem with secular objective morality is that it makes little sense to say that moral facts or moral injunctions just "exist" out there without a mind. To give you an example to illustrate the absurdity of this, imagine if the non-moral injunction "You ought to buy coke at least once a month" existed out there in the cosmos. Surely you would conclude that this very personal injunction doesn't come from a non-personal source, right? The fact that it specifically refers to human actions and consequences strongly suggests it is the product of a mind. Ergo, moral facts or injunctions are the product of a mind. In other words, to attribute these personal (and very human) facts or injunctions to the world is anthropomorphism par excellence.
Well this is going to run into the dilemma I raised for Evans. If you try to ground obligations in agents, then you're going to lose any claim to them being stance-independent which constitutes an abandonment of moral realism.
Thinking this through a little to see where we can go with it... the moral law can be grounded in the intent of the lawmaker but also in the nature of the creation. For example, you could imagine a non eternal being with the power to create. When it creates a creature with a good end, the nature of that creature would be to act according to that end, not against it. If the being(creator) ceased to exist, the creatures that were created still have a nature that is designed toward a certain end. It would be moral to act in harmony toward that end independent of anyone's stance, because the initial idea was good and the creatures' nature was good, possibly on the basis of logic. It seems to me morality can be stance independent but also come from the mind of the initial cause based on the logic and design of the creation.
@@collin501 Thank you for your comment. Appreciate it. So, one potential problem with this suggestion is that Wielenberg's theory posits that moral facts are necessary such that they obtain in every possible world. However, if they were *created* by this being, then they are contingent, for there is a possible world in which they might not have existed. Now, you could dispense with this idea of necessity and say, "No problem.. all I want is objective morality; not metaphysically necessary morality." But I wonder whether that isn't in conflict with our intuition. Does that address your point?
@CosmologyPhlosophyPharmacology no, I think that it would still be true in every possible world. It's just that those creatures would not actually exist in every particular world. Similarly, I may never end up in 'x' moral scenario in this world. But it's still true in this world that were I to end up in 'x' moral scenario, there would be a definite right and wrong. If I'm thinking about this right, the particular design of the creature, and the particular design of the scenario, will create a certain morality, but you can't have the same creature and scenario in a different world and twist the morality of it so that good and evil were flipped. Edit: the morality is not contingent. It's simply either potential or actual depending on if and when the moral scenarios actually arise. Before the scenario arises, the morality exists as true but only a potential scenario. I'll have to think some more on Wielenberg's account, though.
@@collin501 "I think that it would still be true in every possible world. It's just that those creatures would not actually exist in every particular world." I'm not sure how that is possible. Remember the motivation for positing a mind: because it is absurd to propose that a moral fact or injunction (which is a personal thing) can obtain with no mind to generate it. If X is wrong in every possible world, it obtains independently of a lawmaker. So, your proposed creator would be useless in this scenario. It actualizes what is already actual. A moral truth isn't merely "potential". It is necessary (and therefore actual), which means it can't be actualized.
I've recently been researching more into the moral realism/anti-realism debate after having come across a channel "Lance Independent" who does good work on this topic, So Im very interested in this video. Also do you think an anti-realist moral argument for God is possible?
I actually had Lance take a look at my script for this video. I've appreciated a lot of what he brings to the discussion, though I have notable points of disagreement with him. I'm not sure how such an argument would work. Moral anti-realism is a thesis that a certain kind of thing does not exist. And I'm not sure how one could could argue that God does exist because some other type of thing does not exist.
@@faithbecauseofreason8381 I was thinking more along the lines of an argument for God's existence utilizing an anti-realism account of moral facts and values. On anti-realism accounts things are still right and wrong, good and bad, just not in the ontologically heavyweight manner supposed by moral realism, so wouldn't we still be able to ground right and wrong, good and bad in God somehow?
Man, after having finished the whole video I have to say I really don't know how to surmount the problems you've laid out here, and honestly the people I'd turn to to try are the very ones your addressing in the video. It'll be very interesting to see their responses and if they can craft one that meets all 5 challenges. But the first half of the video undermining prominent reasons for moral realism from some of its most prominent defenders is also a huge hurtle for them to overcome. All of that to say you've convinced me not to use the moral argument, at least in any of these current iterations. That's awesome because I love that it's making me think, but also sucks because the moral argument was one of my favorites and now I'm going to have to do a ton of research to try to understand what it means for God to be good on an anti-realist account of morality.😅 All that to say you've successfully changed my mind on the matter.
Interesting video, thank you. I would be interested in the argument for how theism could work without moral realism. In that situation, perhaps a deity could choose to be loving towards creation; but why couldn't a deity equally choose to be deceptive or whatever else? I'm guessing that there needs to be something morally valuable about certain actions, or a deity would just be making random decisions about their behaviour whether they act in ways that we typically call "good" or "bad". Certainly seems like a major step for a theist to deny the moral goodness of God.
I would also be interested in the details of how theism and moral anti-realism interact. From what I have seen talking with David and other anti-realists and reading about their views, I think they would say God can still be loving and good in a stance-dependent way given that those properties can coherently be said to be predicated from a being. But they would say that God being "morally good" in the sense of Him being "goodness itself" or something along those lines (as many theistic moral realists think) is incoherent or vacuous in the same way saying "God is kpuytirodh" is. The same could be said about the value of some state of affairs or actions. It might not be clear what we mean when we say a situation is "morally valuable" in a stance-independent sense. So it seems they could hold that many things are valuable indeed but in a stance-dependent way. God sees (and has always known) that loving someone is morally valuable given the different aspects of the situation itself, but such value and details of the situation are dependent on God's stance or perspective (which in this case would be infallible, so it couldn't be otherwise). There are obviously some extra questions one could pose to this, but that's my first guess on how they would think about that.
I may do a video on this at some point if enough people express interest. It seems to me that the major challenges would be to explain how moral non-realism is compatible with the proposition that God is good, and then to explain what it is to sin. I think both of these issues can be explained without committing to moral realism.
@@faithbecauseofreason8381 But do you know of any prominent philosopher who defends the view you just outlined? I would be very interested in reading their works.
@@faithbecauseofreason8381would it be something along the lines of there not being morality, but there still being a personal entity that created the world and rose Jesus from the dead etc etc and he has certain expectations and rewards and punishments, that are grounded in what he personally wants and has the power to do?
With all due respect, I still find morality to be persuasive in arguing against atheism and naturalism. If you are a naturalist, I don't understand how you can believe that there are immaterial truths that govern our universe such as love, justice, and generosity. Once you grant this premise, you've undermined the foundations of naturalism. Once you've undermined the foundations of naturalism, you have opened the door for non-scientific truths and reality. Once you've done this, then we seem to be on to a discussion of non-scientific obligations that are binding. If these truths have demands about personal relations between humans such as "love" and "generosity", it seems absurd to conclude there is no personal force behind the creation the universe. How can personal truths exist as non-personal? I realize there are steps in between, but all-in-all this seems to undercut naturalistic atheism, and if so, that seems worth arguing even if it doesn't prove the Christian faith. What am I missing?
Well first off let's be clear that there is a distinction between atheism and naturalism. While naturalists have to be atheists the reverse is not true. Atheists don't have to be naturalists. So even if you are right about naturalists being unable to appeal to immaterial things to explain morality, this doesn't mean that atheists who are not naturalists can't do this. But I also think that you may be confusing naturalism with scientism. Naturalism is the thesis that only natural things exist. And it's not really clear what exactly "natural things" means. Some naturalists take that to mean only physical things, but others don't.
@@faithbecauseofreason8381 I know a friend who is familiar with Mark Marphy's work and this is not his position at all On the contrary his position is that NLT strengthens the apologetic case because it renders the argument from evil meaningless.
@@faithbecauseofreason8381 you mentioned Mark Murphy and this is the premise of his entire work with NLT and "God's ethics" or were you referring to a different Mark Murphy? regardless NLT is the most metaphysically robust and sophisticated ethical theory and it is quite disappointing that a video above 1 hour does not even dedicate a minor section to it perhaps future video?
I will have to do a longer response to this at some point. But if I can get that done, it will be too long to fit in a UA-cam comment box. I'm exactly the opposite of you: I think that some version of the Moral Argument is the *only* argument that Christians should be using in an early to mid twenty first century context. Let me briefly explain why. The fundamental problem with both your critique and the people you are critiquing is a fundamental misunderstanding of what role the classical arguments for God play. All of the classical arguments for God start with an analytic proposition disguised as a synthetic proof and then go on to demonstrate the thing defined by the analytic proposition. This is true for the Ontological Arguments, the Cosmological Arguments, the Teleological Arguments, and the Moral Arguments. The Ontological Argument proposes that something gives rise to existence and calls that God. The Cosmological Argument proposes that something started the causal chain of events in the universe and calls that God. The Teleological Argument proposes that something gives us purpose and calls that God. Finally, the Moral Argument proposes that something gives us morality and calls that God. For this reason, I find the appeals to platonic explanations for morality to strengthen the Moral Argument, not weaken it. The only way they could weaken the moral argument is if someone is importing some other definition of God already. But then, what is that definition? The problem we have is that the word "God" (and the related terms in other languages) didn't mean in antiquity what we in the modern world are trying to debate. That's fine: words are vessels of meaning, and as long as the receiver unpacks a meaning close enough to what the sender intended to put in to it, communication is happening. But the person living in classical times has no problem "proving" there's a god: look, there's the Sun right there, that's one god, and there's the ground under our feet, that's another god, and there's Alexander of Macedon standing on that hill over there, that's a third god, and there's Appropriate standing in front of her temple, that god was carved by Andrew just last week. But when we modern monotheists talk about God being the only true God, we aren't saying that the Sun and sea and Alexander the Great and that statue don't exist, we're saying they aren't what we call God. But like I said, words are vessels of meaning, so before monotheistic philosophy dominated the landscape, that definition that the classical person used wasn't wrong, it was just different from what we use. Which leads naturally into, "Okay, then what do you mean?" The classical arguments for God outlined above answer that question. So when you have a platonist explanation for morality, that's just the Moral Argument with different words. The question to be asked is, "What distinguishes the platonist explanation from God?" If the only answer is that "the platonist explanation" is three words and "God" is only three letters, then they're the same thing. And that's why so many of the Church Fathers found common ground on moral ontology with the platonists of their day, and why a substantial amount of neo-Platonic thought was absorbed by Christianity. Post-Nicene Christianity is really the fusion of Early Christianity and Platonism, and rejection of the classical creeds is very often justified on the grounds that it is simply an attempt to remove platonic influences on the faith. Much more could be said on that, but I'm trying to keep this short enough to fit into a UA-cam comment. The Classical Arguments show us which God to look for. In antiquity, before Judeo-Christian ethics dominated, the Cosmological Argument was *the* argument to use. The reason was that it demonstrates God's power, and the ancients very much held that right makes right. One need look no further than the Athenatian response to Melos: "you know as well as we do the right, as the world goes, is only in question between equal power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." In the ancient world, showing that God was powerful was a necessary part of showing why we should obey him. In the early twenty first century, that is no longer the case. While I think the Fine Tuning Argument works very well to show that these four classical arguments actually point to the same thing, let's imagine for a moment that they don't. There's an Ontological God, a Cosmological God, a Teleological God, and a Moral God. And just so we can refer to them without the baggage of the term "God," I'll give all four of them names. I'll call the Ontological God: The Universe. I'll call the Cosmological God: the Big Bang. I'll call the Teleological God: Goals. And just to be totally neutral, I'll call the Moral God: Jesus. But really, if you object to any of these names and think you have a better name in any case, I'll hear you out. As long as they're at least as neutral as my names. And to be clear, I think that The Universe and Jesus are the same in the same way that Strider and Aragorn are the same. Now imagine with me that I'm wrong about the Fine Tuning Argument giving us reason to think that they are the same. In fact, not only am I wrong to think there's a reason to think they're the same, they are in fact four very real but very separate things. The ancients would have worshiped Existence or The Universe, because those are the contenders for the most powerful of the four. When the modern person said to them, "Might doesn't make right," they would look dumbfounded and say, "Yes it does." I think we can see this played out in the Guardians of the Galaxy Vol. 3. Rocket has two choices on which you build his identity. Both have demonstrated phenomenal power. One of them, the High Evolutionary, created him, gave him a purpose, and set him in motion. The other, Peter Quill, taught him right from wrong. Because of reasons, Peter has been nerfed. He can't take the High Evolutionary in a fair fight. I still say that the right one for Rocket to follow is Peter, and the right one for us to follow is Jesus. And a lot of arguments against Christianity these days are moral in nature. To appeal to Goals in light of modern Christian/Atheist dialog is to say that some people are just made to be slaves and they need to get over it. That's why I don't use the Teleological Argument. To appeal to the Universe in light of modern Christian/Atheist dialog is to say that God is strong so those who are weak just need to get over it. To appeal to Being in light of the modern Christian/Atheist dialog is to say that God put people in poverty and they just need to get over it. And on a subconscious level, that's what a lot of these arguments turn into. The Atheist is saying, "I don't care if God is strong enough to institute slavery or stomp on the weak or put people in poverty, it's wrong and I'm not going to worship what's wrong." Then the Moral Argument says, "Okay, so you think there is a right? And you think it is right to worship and do that right? We can work on the mechanism later. Now that we're talking about right, that's God. You may have a different God from us. But when you come down to it, you just see God's expectations differently than we do. But when you say there's a right answer and a wrong answer about how to treat other people, whether you understand that principle upon which that right or wrong answer is built is God to you. Now we can see if our morality or yours is right." That step wasn't necessary with the ancients because they just wanted to see that God was powerful, and then by virtue of his power he was correct.
*"The question to be asked is, "What distinguishes the platonist explanation from God?""* There are multiple differences: Platonic abstracta are said to be causally effete while God can bring about changes in the world. Further, abstracta are non-conscious while God is conscious. Abstracta don't have free will, while God has free will. There are infinitely many abstracta, e.g., numbers, logical laws, universals, but there is just one God. There are other differences, but this should suffice.
@@CosmoPhiloPharmaco Again, my response is quick and dirty. To respond to your particular points briefly, causally effete moral principles would be undetectable. At any rate, to say that we are studying moral objects in that way is more about not studying the changes they effect, not so much a statement about whether they can or do. They say the very least must cause a change in our minds. If a study of platonic moral objects also find that they effect other changes, they don't stop being moral abstract objects. Really, God in the prophets can be seen as just a study of the changes that the collection of abstract moral objects effect. Similarly, since modern concepts of consciousness rely on changes over time, we must at least mean something different when referring to God's consciousness than our own. Similarly for free will, since we talk about our free will as the ability to change the course of our lives but God knows the course of all history the idea of God's free will has to be very carefully considered. (Queue the tangent about Calvinism that I'm not going to engage.) The thoughts of God are infinite. Then of course you go and change the subject since I'm talking about only the moral platonic objects and you import numbers and logical laws. I'm tempted to respond to that, but it's really an attempt at distraction and I'm going to have enough to respond to with just responding to the actual topic, so I'm going to stay focused. The closer you example the particulars of the God of the Moral Argument and the abstract container of moral objects the more alike they look. This is exactly why church fathers such as Justin Martyr, Augustine, Clement of Alexandria, and Eusebius. The way that the Cappadocian Fathers borrow and adapt Plato is well studied. If even the heaviest hitters in the early development of Christian philosophy say that Plato's concepts are closer to God than they can account for without speculating about divine providence, then I think you're making a mountain out of a molehill in your differences. I get that there has been development in both schools since then, but who is to say that those new developments are improvements?
I have never understood why any argument citing some state of the world would support the idea of a God. The issue being that in the absence of being able to give reference to God and thus show that such is linked to some aspect of reality, any claim about God is itself an assertion and thus has no linkage to any fact of reality UNTIL God is substantiated as being an aspect of reality, Here's my attempt at a syllogism representing the problem... P1: Y is claimed to be associated with X such that the existence of Y denotes the existence of X. P2: Y is shown to exist C: Therefore, X exist I find all arguments of this form to be assertions of X as opposed to support of X. The issue being that unless X is shown to be existent, there is no basis to associate X with any aspect of reality. Thus, arguments of this form seem to be meaningful only to those that believe X exists and is associated with Y.
You seem to be assuming a principle according to which some entity must be known to exist before it can be invoked as the best explanation for some phenomenon. I guess I just don't see any reason to adopt that principle.
@@faithbecauseofreason8381 Any explanation wherein such is not known to be an aspect of reality is an appeal to imagination as opposed to reality and thus on my view would be inherently irrational. The motivation behind my principle is the understanding that humanity can construct all sorts of explanations, but unless the explanation is grounded in reality in a fashion that such can be considered supported, there is no reason to think that such an explanation actually applies to the state of affairs that such purports. Last Thursdayism (and other like explanations - which I take God claims to be an element in this set of claims) are assertions in need of substantiation, since, without the grounding within one's understanding of reality, there is no basis for such to be considered associated with anything. So, if this is insufficient, I guess the best question is: *What supports a narrative of whatever sort of being an actual explanation on your view?*
@MyContext so let's try a little experiment here which might make my concerns about this principle a bit more stark. So I am guessing that you believe that there is an physical world of three-dimensional objects external to your own mind, right? When you have a visual perception of a tree, you take it that this perception is veridical. My question, then, is how do you know that? My own answer would be that the reality of this tree is the best explanation of my having this visual perception. However, that move does not seem open to you since you have stipulated that you have to already know that the tree exists before you can infer it as the best explanation. But in that case, it seems like you can't even get started without begging the question. So since your principle precludes you from inferring the existence of a real external world without already knowing that there is an external world, how can you possibly know that there is an external world?
@@faithbecauseofreason8381 Your example of the tree doesn't link to the issue that I am citing of an appeal to an unknown. Perhaps this will aid in the dissection... We construct labels for the various things that we experience with it often being the case that these labels can be shared between individuals. The labels referencing things in the context of reality allow independent discovery and the are thus objectively (persistent without appeal to any person, have a criteria by which such can be identified) existent. (Please note that my ontology is neutral, since I do not lay claim that what we are denoting as reality is in fact reality, but is simply our labeling of our experiences as such interlinks to the overall tapestry as we individual understand such, regardless of whether such is a simulation, brain-in-vat, or some other alternative state to things being as they appear) IF I were blind, I have no basis to consider that sight is a thing until such is shown to be an aspect of reality and thus could easily think that such is an imaginary idea. (You might want to check out the series "See". ) However, it is fairly easy to show that sight exists to a blind individual. Since, one can demonstrate the capacity of sight such that the blind individual can know that such exists. A blind person knows what is in their hands. However, another blind person could not know what is in another's hand without touching such. A sighted person can tell the blind person about what is in their hand as well as which hand. Thus, the idea of sight is shown even as the details of how such works is not shown. So, my point is about SHOWING that whatever is being claimed IS existent before attempting to associate such with anything else. --- Once an item is known, then other claims about such can be made. However, when something is unknown, there is no basis to accept any associations. P1: Luck entails the existence of Tweens. P2: Luck exists. C: Therefore, Tweens exist. Tweens are insofar as I know imaginary (unsubstantiated as being an aspect of reality) creatures. Thus, the association of luck with tweens is fallacious on my view. One would need to know that luck is caused by tweens and thus SHOW that tweens exist by sharing the knowledge that allows one to know of such an association. If no existence can be shown, then on what basis can any claim of association be sustained? Further, there is grounds to dismiss the idea of luck as an actual state of affairs, but rather such a label referencing a psychological state of interpretation of a statistical state of affairs. --- My position is in part a product of the observation that we have limits with regard to what we can claim about reality before we are simply making up stuff. The moment we lay claim to a state of affairs beyond what we can actually know, we are in fact making up stuff. Please note that this should not be conflated with making extrapolations based on what is known even as we know that various extrapolations have the potential to break down with regard to such be correct.
@MyContext well it seems to me that you are begging the question. You are taking for granted that trees are not an unknown. But that's the very thing which I have asked you to justify. How do you know that trees exist if you have to already know that they exist before you can infer their existence?
So would you say that 'as a theist' you are a moral realist? But simply dont argue for moral realism outside that presupposition? Im also wondering, if you reject moral realism, what becomes of our obvious moral intuitions e.g that the degradation of innocent children for fun is not up for debate? What are those intuitions getting at? As a theist, surely you would want to give greater credence to such an intuition, especially if it also lines up with revelation?
I am actually not a moral realist. I'm not (yet) a moral anti-realist either, although my sympathies do lie in that direction. I'm content just to be a skeptic and say that I don't know. I am also an intuition skeptic. I don't see any reason to think that intuitions generally are indicative of truth. And so that same skepticism applies to moral intuitions. Now perhaps intuitions are a manifestation of conscience, which is a biblical concept. So it wouldn't surprise me if moral intuitions do, in fact, point us to God's law. I obviously do believe that God places legal obligations upon us and that he has endowed us with a conscience to help point us towards those obligations. I just don't think that's moral realism. So perhaps moral intuitions support the existence of a conscience, but I don't think that they will get you anywhere near to moral realism.
@@faithbecauseofreason8381 I see. So you would say our conscience is what is driving most moral realists to such a conclusion? Does this view entail mean that the laws of conscience are human specific? Surely God has some basis for why He would give laws one way over another? Wouldn't this set of meta principles be indistinguishable from what people describe as moral realism at that point?
@@racsooj456 it would just mean that God's laws are reflective of God's stances and so not stance-independent. Therefore, it would not be moral realism.
@racsooj456 I mean yeah. Eventually we reach a stopping point. Euthyphro's dilemma doesn't really apply here though because I'm not claiming that my theory is a realist theory.
@faithbecauseofreason8381 Thanks, I'll check it out. What is your favorite theodicy? I recently made a video about the Problem of Evil. You can watch it if you want to learn about my perspective. In the video, I gave some potential solutions, but I'm not very confident in them. I'd like to learn more about theodicies so if you know any good ones I'd appreciate it.
@faithbecauseofreason8381 I think UA-cam may be deleting my comments. Do you have email or Discord or something? I'd love to continue our conversations if you're up for it. You've been a great resource for me.
@@faithbecauseofreason8381 "A note on terminology here: I understand a DCT to be a species of moral realism, since it holds a realistic view of the good, and sees statements about human moral obligations as ones that have an objective truth value. The reason I do this is that I understand moral realism as the view that moral propositions have a truth value that is independent of human beliefs and desires. But obviously, on a DCT, propositions about moral obligations are not independent of God’s preferences and commands. Thomas Carson, in “Divine Will/Divine Command Moral Theories and the Problem of Arbitrariness,” (Religious Studies 2012, doi:10.1017/S00344125100031X) does not describe a DCT as a realist theory, since he thinks of realism as the view that moral facts hold independently of the preferences of any being, including God. So far as I can see, this disagreement between Carson and myself is purely semantic. Carson makes a case for a type of divine preference theory (at least a cousin of a DCT) and says that his case depends on moral realism being false. However, moral realism can be false in sense and true in mine." P 157 When you interpret moral arguments as attempts to vindicate moral realism and then interpret moral realism in Landau's terms as stance independence and then interpret Landau as holding stance independence of all beings including God. You are really attributing to people positions they clearly don't hold and in fact positions that appear constructed to make them appear contradictory.
lack of evidence? on your account of knowledge by acquaintance, would that not be justification for those with an intuition of objective morality/categorical normativity? if one can point out why Platonism won't work, it's the only option left for that account. ( virtues are intrinsic to persons, not abstract objects, i.e., abstract, ideal entities). to quote WLC: “I can understand what it means to say that a person is just or compassionate. But I have no inkling what is meant at all by justice or compassion just existing as abstract objects… Things like justice, compassion, fairness, loyalty, and kindness seem to be properties of persons. They are grounded in persons, but the idea that these things can just exist on their own is unintelligible.” “that this independent, physical realm through a blind evolutionary process should evolve just that kind of being that corresponds to the abstractly existing, casually independent moral realm.”
I disagree. Because while things like being just, and kind are intrinsically linked to persons, it becomes meaningless if there is not an realist, objective defintion of what it means to be just, or kind, apart from any persons stance on it.
I'm actually a moral skeptic. I don't take a position one way or the other on whether moral facts exist. But I do lean against moral realism at this time. 🙂
While America's children (if they're not aborted) are being told they can change their sex in almost every facet of American life, Pallmann is arguing against the moral argument. Slow claps for having your priorities straight.
While the planet collapses because of climate change, you choose to argue for politics that are responsible for an incredibly high, easily prevented suicide rate among transgender youth ... Don't talk about priorities when you habe such shitty ones. "Christians" who only burn for their faith in the rare circumstances were they can abuse it to make the lives of other people worse are proof that religion can create morals
Isn't the phrase "faith because of reason" an oxymoron? If you have reason, you don't need faith. That's simple logic. Unless you have your own definition of faith.
I use the dictionary definition of faith where faith refers absolute trust. Nothing about this precludes having reasons to trust (although it also doesn't entail this).
@@faithbecauseofreason8381 there are many dictionary definitions. But you must have a special dictionary that explains faith as anything other a feeling or the most I think it grants is reasonable confidence. Funny how apologetics stretch definitions to their max. The Bible doesn't define faith as absolute trust.
@@deadpiratetattoo2015 well, can you find me a standard dictionary which defines faith in such way that it is incompatible with being based upon reason?
@@faithbecauseofreason8381 strong belief in God or in the doctrines of a religion, based on spiritual apprehension rather than proof. "bereaved people who have shown supreme faith" that doesn't sound like absolute. Absolute is reasonable, but not in this situation. Not likely or probably, more so. Faith is believing in something without any evidence. You can spin it however you want, but it never reaches reason. It is "A" reason, but reasonable it's quite the stretch. Absolute trust sounds like blind faith to me. And that's neither reasonable nor absolute. Just call it what it is. You believe it because you want to and it feels good. Don't bring logic into it. That's dishonest.
@deadpiratetattoo2015 sounds like you can't cite a dictionary which supports your claim. It looks to me like you have a lot of blind faith that your definition of faith is correct. Imagine my surprise.
Here comes that copy/paste argument atheist who says that morals are subjective, and then in their next breath claims that religions and gods not existing would be an objectively good thing for all.
@briendoyle4680 dude you just made one of most idiotic claims a person can possibly make in saying that morals are subjective. I suppose you won't mind if I bash your skull in with a brick and take everything you own right? It's all subjective, right? You might not like having that done to you, but I think its great....see how stupid your beliefs can be rendered in a matter of a single sentence?
@briendoyle4680 "you can't prove your god!!!!1" is the quintessential baby blanket for atheists who can't argue or even really begin to grasp the arguments being put to them. Its like you have never heard of the words cumulative case, because for some reason you think just repeating "u can't proof god!!!" Again and again is some kind of epic defeater for everything a theist could possibly say.
I thought this vid was 24 minutes 😂😂 after 50 minutes I realized it was 2hours and 44 minutes. Pallman, making me have to reshape my moral realism approach. I always had trouble defending Cuneos argument. Your articulation is superb! Thank you so much for this incredible resource, God bless!
I’m not a big fan of the moral argument, but Baggett addresses most all of this in his book for beginners…
Which book are you referencing? I addressed his responses to my concerns in his academic books on this very video.
@@faithbecauseofreason8381 Morals of the story and God and Cosmos
@whatsinaname691 yeah, I addressed God and Cosmos directly in this video
@@whatsinaname691 Hello! Do you have discord? Their is some questions id like to ask you that hopefully you may answer if youd like
Thanks again!
Hola Dave, there's a lot to disagree (and agree) on, but the following in particular:
1:43:20 seems to express, "If a truth is necessary, then we need reason to think it's not fundamental."
-Why not think otherwise?
"If a truth is necessary, then we need reason to think it's fundamental." Why does a truth's necessity imply fundamentality?
The best arguments for an explanatory principle (e.g., weak PSR) entail seeking explanations as far as they can go (stopping when we have reason to). Since there are relations of dependence between necessary truths, necessity alone doesn't give one reason to think that's the stopping point.
-You added a "b/c at least some necessary moral truths are fundamental" condition, but why does this quantify over all necessary moral truths we come upon? We have more examples of non-fundamental necessary moral truths. Why couldn't we make the opposite inference (that we should be on the "let's seek an explanation" side)? At least some necessary metaphysical truths (e.g., causation, time, composition, identity, etc) are fundamental, but we can't extract the previous explanatory principle from that fact alone. I suppose you'd also have to be clear on the examples used (what is serving as the basis, how is it pertinently basic, is it just fundamental ontologically, normative-ethically, semantically, etc)
1:43:40
-Why is an explanation of necessary P1 needed if P1 is about necessary P2? Can't necessary P1 brutely be about necessary P2?
-Even if P1 being about P2 entails a needed explanation, why think necessary moral truths (of the relevant type, whichever you take them to be) generally don't have this feature such that they don't need explaining (in the same way Evans' prime number example would)?
With Love mi hermano en Cristo ❤️
Can we expect a new series for arguments that you do use? I like your approach and rigorous takes on these matters, so I'd be happy to see a defense of arguments you regard as sound.
I'm working up to an argument for Jesus' resurrection based upon all of these videos on NT reliability. I also plan to do a video series defending substance dualism which will conclude with an argument from substance dualism to theism.
My 3 Related Arguments for Moral Realism and God
Let:
* G = A transcendent, intelligent, and creative God
* S = A body of developing human souls with free will
* P = The purpose of creation, which is a birthing place for S (souls)
* MR = Moral realism
* MS = Moral subjectivism
Argument 1: If G, S, and P exist, then MR must follow as true.
1. Premise 1: G, S, and P exist.
* God (G) created the universe with an intentional purpose (P), which is the development and moral maturation of free-willed human souls (S). This establishes the idea that creation is not arbitrary but purposeful, with the goal of nurturing souls.
2. Premise 2: For souls to develop, there must be a moral framework.
* To achieve their purpose (P), souls (S) must be guided by an objective moral framework. This is necessary because free will entails the capacity to make meaningful choices. Without an objective standard of right and wrong, moral development would lack direction, making it impossible for souls to grow in a meaningful way. An arbitrary or purely subjective framework would not provide a consistent basis for moral growth.
3. Conclusion: If G, S, and P exist, MR must follow.
* Given the existence of God (G), souls (S), and a purposeful creation (P), moral realism (MR) must follow. The existence of these conditions logically implies the presence of objective moral truths that guide souls toward their intended moral and spiritual growth. These moral truths are not contingent on personal opinion or social convention; they are aligned with God’s will and the purpose of creation.
Argument 2: If MR is true, then G, S, and P can or must be inferred.
1. Premise 1: MR is true.
* If we accept that objective moral truths (MR) exist, we must account for their origin. Objective moral truths, by definition, are true regardless of human opinion, cultural background, or individual preferences. Therefore, their source must be independent of human subjectivity.
2. Premise 2: Moral realism requires a foundation.
* Objective moral truths need a transcendent foundation because they are universal and unchanging. If moral truths are objective, they cannot be the product of fluctuating human perspectives. Instead, they must be grounded in something that transcends individual experience-something that is itself unchanging, intelligent, and capable of determining what is morally right or wrong. This is where the need for a higher, transcendent source, such as God (G), comes into play.
3. Why God? God is posited as the best candidate for this foundation because:
* Universality: As a transcendent being, God provides a universally applicable source for moral truths that transcends cultures and contexts.
* Objectivity: God’s unchanging nature ensures that these truths remain stable over time, offering a firm foundation for moral guidance.
* Authority: If God is the creator, His moral laws carry binding authority, providing a reason why these truths should guide human behavior.
4. Conclusion: If MR is true, then G, S, and P must be inferred.
* If we accept moral realism, it implies the existence of a transcendent source (G), morally significant agents (S), and a purposeful universe (P) in which these moral truths guide the development of human souls. The existence of G, S, and P can thus be inferred from the acceptance of MR, as objective moral truths would not exist in a purposeless, unguided universe.
Christian Argument Against Moral Subjectivism (MS):
1. Premise 1: MS leads to self-contradiction and destruction.
* Moral subjectivism (MS) asserts that morality is based on individual or cultural preference, leading to conflicting moral views without a universal standard to resolve them. This results in practical and philosophical contradictions. If all moral perspectives are equally valid, then we have no basis for resolving disputes, punishing crimes, or establishing justice. This leads to societal confusion and eventual breakdown.
2. Premise 2: MS is unworkable in societies.
* The social, physical, and legal consequences of moral subjectivism reveal its impracticality. Without an objective framework, societies struggle to establish consistent laws or enforce justice. Individuals and groups may hold conflicting moral views, but subjectivism provides no way to mediate these differences. This leads to societal disorder, as no coherent moral framework exists to guide behavior or resolve moral conflicts.
3. Conclusion: Therefore, MR must be true.
* Given that MS results in self-contradictory and destructive consequences, MR must be true, as it offers the only workable and coherent alternative. Moral realism provides the stable foundation needed for societies to function effectively and for souls to develop morally. From this, we can infer the existence of G (as the transcendent source of morality), S (as morally significant beings), and P (as the purpose behind creation and moral growth).
Response to Criticisms:
* Why must morality have a foundation?
Objective morality requires a foundation to avoid becoming arbitrary or subjective. If there is no foundation, then moral truths are reduced to personal or cultural preferences, which leads to moral relativism. An objective foundation-like God-ensures that moral truths are universally binding and unchanging.
* Why must God be the foundation?
God is posited as the most plausible foundation because He provides universality, objectivity, and authority to moral truths. These are essential qualities for moral laws to be valid across time and space, independent of human opinion. While other transcendent sources could theoretically be proposed, God, as a transcendent, intelligent, and creative being, best fits the role of grounding objective moral truths.
Keep up the good work, David!
Thank you!
I am psyched out of my mind for this one! Starting now, will update this comment later if I have more constructive things to say haha!
Enjoy!
@@faithbecauseofreason8381I love how, at about an hour into this three hour video, you say "I hope that this brief outline of the arguments for moral realism..." haha! My brother in Christ, there is nothing brief about this video 🤣
@NontraditionalCatholic I mean I could have gone for 3 hours just talking about arguments for moral realism 😂
So I am just finishing this one now, @@faithbecauseofreason8381 , but this point at the end about ignoring why we believe what we believe (right wing, left wing, etc) reminds me of what frustrates me so much about the Jordan Peterson brand of political discourse - ie, "Everyone I don't like is a post-modern Neo-Marxist, and part of what it means to be a post-modern Neo Marxist simply is to be wrong. Therefore, everyone I don't like is wrong".
Sorry, that really has nothing to do with the moral argument, I just reached the end of the video and wanted to add my two cents haha!
Your video is well structured, clear, rigorous, and representing engagement with some of the most well known moral apologists. I am impressed by your conscientious work.
haha
I mean I feel like virtue ethics can be argued for rationally which necessarily leads to theism and Christianity. That’s what happened with MacIntyre
Do you think Craig's first premise is similar to the presuppositionalist's transcendental argument (maybe one difference is Craig is arguing for a generic theism)? Also, how do you do such deep and broad research for so many videos? I'd love to see a video on it. For example, do you buy all these books? If not, how do you get them all? Do you read all of them? If not, how do you filter through all the content? How do you manage your time? How do you organize all your thoughts into a coherent picture?
Do you think the moral argument could be used as an argument against materialism, but not necessarily for theism? If so, then I think it’s still valuable, as a lot of people are materialists by default, but haven’t really considered it’s ramifications. Plus, consider someone like St Augustine. His movement away from materialism, was not a small step in his slow conversation to Christianity.
If I were persuaded of moral realism (of the non-naturalist variety) then yes, I think it would succeed as an argument against materialism. But I think there are so many much more obvious arguments to be urged against materialism. Things like thoughts, relations, intentions, and justification are absolutely essential to doing philosophy and none of them are compatible with materialism in my estimation. I guess I just see there as being so many stronger objections to materialism than moral realism.
@@faithbecauseofreason8381 Thanks. Any suggestions on where to start with what you suggested as more obvious arguments against materialism?
@@tylerkroenke7804 are you asking for resources or actual arguments?
I was asking for resources if that works for you. Thanks!
@@tylerkroenke7804
The Substance of Consciousness - Rickabaugh and Moreland
Objections to Physicalism - Robinson
Measuring the Immeasurable Mind - Owen
Knowledge, Thought, and the Case for Dualism - Fumerton
The Waning of Materialism - Beale and Koons
Ur mic audio is so low
As an atheist, i am a moral emotivist. The fact that humans create concepts such as good and evil is a reflection of our emotions towards some set of actions, and it is an attempt to make those actions socially reprehensible, and ultimately, prevent them. For example, people generally feel negative emotions about torture, so they claim it is evil.
This is not a case against theism, as a theist can belive these emotions are given by God, and that is fair enough. But evolution by natural selection can also explain how such emotions evolved in primitive social groups, so the moral argument isn't very effective for me.
Well then you are just rejecting the moral realist commitments upon which moral arguments are based.
@@faithbecauseofreason8381 true
Chapters:
00:00:00 - Why This Series?
00:03:09 - Introduction
00:04:40 - Definitions
00:11:25 - Challenge 1: The Lack of Evidence for Moral Realism
00:17:32 - Moral Reliabilism
00:22:46 - Ethical Intuitionism
00:30:53 - Partners in Guilt
00:44:57 - Deliberative Indispensability
00:59:01 - Challenge 2: Do Moral Facts Need Grounding?
01:00:38 - Challenge 3: How Does God Explain Morality Anyway?
01:02:16 - Challenge 4: Wielenberg's Robust Moral Realism
01:08:00 - Challenge 5: Is God the Best Explanation of Morality?
01:11:01 - William Lane Craig
01:23:22 - Jerry Walls and David Baggett
01:37:25 - C. Stephen Evans
01:50:44 - Adam Lloyd Johnson
02:16:55 - The Bloated Model Objection
02:31:12 - The Lucky Coincidence Objection
02:44:02 - Conclusion
Cool bro, now address classical theistic based moral arguments
Could you offer an example?
So, my problem with secular objective morality is that it makes little sense to say that moral facts or moral injunctions just "exist" out there without a mind. To give you an example to illustrate the absurdity of this, imagine if the non-moral injunction "You ought to buy coke at least once a month" existed out there in the cosmos. Surely you would conclude that this very personal injunction doesn't come from a non-personal source, right?
The fact that it specifically refers to human actions and consequences strongly suggests it is the product of a mind. Ergo, moral facts or injunctions are the product of a mind.
In other words, to attribute these personal (and very human) facts or injunctions to the world is anthropomorphism par excellence.
Well this is going to run into the dilemma I raised for Evans. If you try to ground obligations in agents, then you're going to lose any claim to them being stance-independent which constitutes an abandonment of moral realism.
Thinking this through a little to see where we can go with it... the moral law can be grounded in the intent of the lawmaker but also in the nature of the creation. For example, you could imagine a non eternal being with the power to create. When it creates a creature with a good end, the nature of that creature would be to act according to that end, not against it. If the being(creator) ceased to exist, the creatures that were created still have a nature that is designed toward a certain end. It would be moral to act in harmony toward that end independent of anyone's stance, because the initial idea was good and the creatures' nature was good, possibly on the basis of logic. It seems to me morality can be stance independent but also come from the mind of the initial cause based on the logic and design of the creation.
@@collin501 Thank you for your comment. Appreciate it.
So, one potential problem with this suggestion is that Wielenberg's theory posits that moral facts are necessary such that they obtain in every possible world. However, if they were *created* by this being, then they are contingent, for there is a possible world in which they might not have existed.
Now, you could dispense with this idea of necessity and say, "No problem.. all I want is objective morality; not metaphysically necessary morality." But I wonder whether that isn't in conflict with our intuition.
Does that address your point?
@CosmologyPhlosophyPharmacology no, I think that it would still be true in every possible world. It's just that those creatures would not actually exist in every particular world. Similarly, I may never end up in 'x' moral scenario in this world. But it's still true in this world that were I to end up in 'x' moral scenario, there would be a definite right and wrong.
If I'm thinking about this right, the particular design of the creature, and the particular design of the scenario, will create a certain morality, but you can't have the same creature and scenario in a different world and twist the morality of it so that good and evil were flipped.
Edit: the morality is not contingent. It's simply either potential or actual depending on if and when the moral scenarios actually arise. Before the scenario arises, the morality exists as true but only a potential scenario.
I'll have to think some more on Wielenberg's account, though.
@@collin501 "I think that it would still be true in every possible world. It's just that those creatures would not actually exist in every particular world."
I'm not sure how that is possible. Remember the motivation for positing a mind: because it is absurd to propose that a moral fact or injunction (which is a personal thing) can obtain with no mind to generate it. If X is wrong in every possible world, it obtains independently of a lawmaker. So, your proposed creator would be useless in this scenario. It actualizes what is already actual. A moral truth isn't merely "potential". It is necessary (and therefore actual), which means it can't be actualized.
I've recently been researching more into the moral realism/anti-realism debate after having come across a channel "Lance Independent" who does good work on this topic, So Im very interested in this video. Also do you think an anti-realist moral argument for God is possible?
I actually had Lance take a look at my script for this video. I've appreciated a lot of what he brings to the discussion, though I have notable points of disagreement with him.
I'm not sure how such an argument would work. Moral anti-realism is a thesis that a certain kind of thing does not exist. And I'm not sure how one could could argue that God does exist because some other type of thing does not exist.
@@faithbecauseofreason8381 I was thinking more along the lines of an argument for God's existence utilizing an anti-realism account of moral facts and values. On anti-realism accounts things are still right and wrong, good and bad, just not in the ontologically heavyweight manner supposed by moral realism, so wouldn't we still be able to ground right and wrong, good and bad in God somehow?
@@PresbyterianPaladin it would probably depend upon what specific account of anti-realism one embraces
Sounds like a dope PhD thesis. Lol
Man, after having finished the whole video I have to say I really don't know how to surmount the problems you've laid out here, and honestly the people I'd turn to to try are the very ones your addressing in the video. It'll be very interesting to see their responses and if they can craft one that meets all 5 challenges.
But the first half of the video undermining prominent reasons for moral realism from some of its most prominent defenders is also a huge hurtle for them to overcome. All of that to say you've convinced me not to use the moral argument, at least in any of these current iterations. That's awesome because I love that it's making me think, but also sucks because the moral argument was one of my favorites and now I'm going to have to do a ton of research to try to understand what it means for God to be good on an anti-realist account of morality.😅
All that to say you've successfully changed my mind on the matter.
Interesting video, thank you.
I would be interested in the argument for how theism could work without moral realism.
In that situation, perhaps a deity could choose to be loving towards creation; but why couldn't a deity equally choose to be deceptive or whatever else?
I'm guessing that there needs to be something morally valuable about certain actions, or a deity would just be making random decisions about their behaviour whether they act in ways that we typically call "good" or "bad".
Certainly seems like a major step for a theist to deny the moral goodness of God.
I would also be interested in the details of how theism and moral anti-realism interact.
From what I have seen talking with David and other anti-realists and reading about their views, I think they would say God can still be loving and good in a stance-dependent way given that those properties can coherently be said to be predicated from a being. But they would say that God being "morally good" in the sense of Him being "goodness itself" or something along those lines (as many theistic moral realists think) is incoherent or vacuous in the same way saying "God is kpuytirodh" is. The same could be said about the value of some state of affairs or actions. It might not be clear what we mean when we say a situation is "morally valuable" in a stance-independent sense. So it seems they could hold that many things are valuable indeed but in a stance-dependent way. God sees (and has always known) that loving someone is morally valuable given the different aspects of the situation itself, but such value and details of the situation are dependent on God's stance or perspective (which in this case would be infallible, so it couldn't be otherwise). There are obviously some extra questions one could pose to this, but that's my first guess on how they would think about that.
Im interested on how you would defend moral non-realism with a christian perspective
I may do a video on this at some point if enough people express interest. It seems to me that the major challenges would be to explain how moral non-realism is compatible with the proposition that God is good, and then to explain what it is to sin. I think both of these issues can be explained without committing to moral realism.
@@faithbecauseofreason8381 But do you know of any prominent philosopher who defends the view you just outlined? I would be very interested in reading their works.
@CosmologyPhlosophyPharmacology there is one which someone pointed me to awhile back. I can't recall his name though.
@@faithbecauseofreason8381would it be something along the lines of there not being morality, but there still being a personal entity that created the world and rose Jesus from the dead etc etc and he has certain expectations and rewards and punishments, that are grounded in what he personally wants and has the power to do?
@@faithbecauseofreason8381I think you definitely should make a video on that. Many of us want more details of such a view.
Will you cover the contingency argument in the future ?
As an argument that I don't use or a defense of it?
@@faithbecauseofreason8381defense
@@faithbecauseofreason8381it’s most likely what ever your view of the contingency argument is
The argument against God from morality is absurd though.
Why?
With all due respect, I still find morality to be persuasive in arguing against atheism and naturalism.
If you are a naturalist, I don't understand how you can believe that there are immaterial truths that govern our universe such as love, justice, and generosity. Once you grant this premise, you've undermined the foundations of naturalism. Once you've undermined the foundations of naturalism, you have opened the door for non-scientific truths and reality. Once you've done this, then we seem to be on to a discussion of non-scientific obligations that are binding. If these truths have demands about personal relations between humans such as "love" and "generosity", it seems absurd to conclude there is no personal force behind the creation the universe. How can personal truths exist as non-personal? I realize there are steps in between, but all-in-all this seems to undercut naturalistic atheism, and if so, that seems worth arguing even if it doesn't prove the Christian faith.
What am I missing?
Well first off let's be clear that there is a distinction between atheism and naturalism. While naturalists have to be atheists the reverse is not true. Atheists don't have to be naturalists. So even if you are right about naturalists being unable to appeal to immaterial things to explain morality, this doesn't mean that atheists who are not naturalists can't do this.
But I also think that you may be confusing naturalism with scientism. Naturalism is the thesis that only natural things exist. And it's not really clear what exactly "natural things" means. Some naturalists take that to mean only physical things, but others don't.
Quite disappointing that there is no detailed section on natural law theory
I tend to agree with Mark Murphy that NLT allows one to keep God in their metaethic while losing their apologetic
@@faithbecauseofreason8381
I know a friend who is familiar with Mark Marphy's work and this is not his position at all
On the contrary his position is that NLT strengthens the apologetic case because it renders the argument from evil meaningless.
@@mousakandah5188 what does the POE have to do with this?
@@faithbecauseofreason8381
you mentioned Mark Murphy and this is the premise of his entire work with NLT and "God's ethics"
or were you referring to a different Mark Murphy?
regardless NLT is the most metaphysically robust and sophisticated ethical theory and it is quite disappointing that a video above 1 hour does not even dedicate a minor section to it
perhaps future video?
@mousakandah5188 Murphy doesn't think you can make a moral argument though. I mean he's forthright about this in God & Moral Law.
Pallmann is solid! (even in cases where I disagree with him, which I’m not sure that I do here). Excited to hear what you have to say. 🤘🏼
Awww ❤️
Man you wax on. This could have been half the length
I will have to do a longer response to this at some point. But if I can get that done, it will be too long to fit in a UA-cam comment box. I'm exactly the opposite of you: I think that some version of the Moral Argument is the *only* argument that Christians should be using in an early to mid twenty first century context. Let me briefly explain why.
The fundamental problem with both your critique and the people you are critiquing is a fundamental misunderstanding of what role the classical arguments for God play. All of the classical arguments for God start with an analytic proposition disguised as a synthetic proof and then go on to demonstrate the thing defined by the analytic proposition. This is true for the Ontological Arguments, the Cosmological Arguments, the Teleological Arguments, and the Moral Arguments.
The Ontological Argument proposes that something gives rise to existence and calls that God. The Cosmological Argument proposes that something started the causal chain of events in the universe and calls that God. The Teleological Argument proposes that something gives us purpose and calls that God. Finally, the Moral Argument proposes that something gives us morality and calls that God.
For this reason, I find the appeals to platonic explanations for morality to strengthen the Moral Argument, not weaken it. The only way they could weaken the moral argument is if someone is importing some other definition of God already. But then, what is that definition?
The problem we have is that the word "God" (and the related terms in other languages) didn't mean in antiquity what we in the modern world are trying to debate. That's fine: words are vessels of meaning, and as long as the receiver unpacks a meaning close enough to what the sender intended to put in to it, communication is happening. But the person living in classical times has no problem "proving" there's a god: look, there's the Sun right there, that's one god, and there's the ground under our feet, that's another god, and there's Alexander of Macedon standing on that hill over there, that's a third god, and there's Appropriate standing in front of her temple, that god was carved by Andrew just last week. But when we modern monotheists talk about God being the only true God, we aren't saying that the Sun and sea and Alexander the Great and that statue don't exist, we're saying they aren't what we call God. But like I said, words are vessels of meaning, so before monotheistic philosophy dominated the landscape, that definition that the classical person used wasn't wrong, it was just different from what we use. Which leads naturally into, "Okay, then what do you mean?" The classical arguments for God outlined above answer that question.
So when you have a platonist explanation for morality, that's just the Moral Argument with different words. The question to be asked is, "What distinguishes the platonist explanation from God?" If the only answer is that "the platonist explanation" is three words and "God" is only three letters, then they're the same thing. And that's why so many of the Church Fathers found common ground on moral ontology with the platonists of their day, and why a substantial amount of neo-Platonic thought was absorbed by Christianity. Post-Nicene Christianity is really the fusion of Early Christianity and Platonism, and rejection of the classical creeds is very often justified on the grounds that it is simply an attempt to remove platonic influences on the faith. Much more could be said on that, but I'm trying to keep this short enough to fit into a UA-cam comment.
The Classical Arguments show us which God to look for. In antiquity, before Judeo-Christian ethics dominated, the Cosmological Argument was *the* argument to use. The reason was that it demonstrates God's power, and the ancients very much held that right makes right. One need look no further than the Athenatian response to Melos: "you know as well as we do the right, as the world goes, is only in question between equal power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." In the ancient world, showing that God was powerful was a necessary part of showing why we should obey him.
In the early twenty first century, that is no longer the case. While I think the Fine Tuning Argument works very well to show that these four classical arguments actually point to the same thing, let's imagine for a moment that they don't. There's an Ontological God, a Cosmological God, a Teleological God, and a Moral God. And just so we can refer to them without the baggage of the term "God," I'll give all four of them names. I'll call the Ontological God: The Universe. I'll call the Cosmological God: the Big Bang. I'll call the Teleological God: Goals. And just to be totally neutral, I'll call the Moral God: Jesus. But really, if you object to any of these names and think you have a better name in any case, I'll hear you out. As long as they're at least as neutral as my names. And to be clear, I think that The Universe and Jesus are the same in the same way that Strider and Aragorn are the same.
Now imagine with me that I'm wrong about the Fine Tuning Argument giving us reason to think that they are the same. In fact, not only am I wrong to think there's a reason to think they're the same, they are in fact four very real but very separate things. The ancients would have worshiped Existence or The Universe, because those are the contenders for the most powerful of the four. When the modern person said to them, "Might doesn't make right," they would look dumbfounded and say, "Yes it does."
I think we can see this played out in the Guardians of the Galaxy Vol. 3. Rocket has two choices on which you build his identity. Both have demonstrated phenomenal power. One of them, the High Evolutionary, created him, gave him a purpose, and set him in motion. The other, Peter Quill, taught him right from wrong. Because of reasons, Peter has been nerfed. He can't take the High Evolutionary in a fair fight. I still say that the right one for Rocket to follow is Peter, and the right one for us to follow is Jesus. And a lot of arguments against Christianity these days are moral in nature. To appeal to Goals in light of modern Christian/Atheist dialog is to say that some people are just made to be slaves and they need to get over it. That's why I don't use the Teleological Argument. To appeal to the Universe in light of modern Christian/Atheist dialog is to say that God is strong so those who are weak just need to get over it. To appeal to Being in light of the modern Christian/Atheist dialog is to say that God put people in poverty and they just need to get over it. And on a subconscious level, that's what a lot of these arguments turn into. The Atheist is saying, "I don't care if God is strong enough to institute slavery or stomp on the weak or put people in poverty, it's wrong and I'm not going to worship what's wrong." Then the Moral Argument says, "Okay, so you think there is a right? And you think it is right to worship and do that right? We can work on the mechanism later. Now that we're talking about right, that's God. You may have a different God from us. But when you come down to it, you just see God's expectations differently than we do. But when you say there's a right answer and a wrong answer about how to treat other people, whether you understand that principle upon which that right or wrong answer is built is God to you. Now we can see if our morality or yours is right." That step wasn't necessary with the ancients because they just wanted to see that God was powerful, and then by virtue of his power he was correct.
*"The question to be asked is, "What distinguishes the platonist explanation from God?""*
There are multiple differences: Platonic abstracta are said to be causally effete while God can bring about changes in the world. Further, abstracta are non-conscious while God is conscious. Abstracta don't have free will, while God has free will. There are infinitely many abstracta, e.g., numbers, logical laws, universals, but there is just one God. There are other differences, but this should suffice.
@@CosmoPhiloPharmaco Again, my response is quick and dirty. To respond to your particular points briefly, causally effete moral principles would be undetectable. At any rate, to say that we are studying moral objects in that way is more about not studying the changes they effect, not so much a statement about whether they can or do. They say the very least must cause a change in our minds. If a study of platonic moral objects also find that they effect other changes, they don't stop being moral abstract objects. Really, God in the prophets can be seen as just a study of the changes that the collection of abstract moral objects effect. Similarly, since modern concepts of consciousness rely on changes over time, we must at least mean something different when referring to God's consciousness than our own. Similarly for free will, since we talk about our free will as the ability to change the course of our lives but God knows the course of all history the idea of God's free will has to be very carefully considered. (Queue the tangent about Calvinism that I'm not going to engage.) The thoughts of God are infinite. Then of course you go and change the subject since I'm talking about only the moral platonic objects and you import numbers and logical laws. I'm tempted to respond to that, but it's really an attempt at distraction and I'm going to have enough to respond to with just responding to the actual topic, so I'm going to stay focused.
The closer you example the particulars of the God of the Moral Argument and the abstract container of moral objects the more alike they look. This is exactly why church fathers such as Justin Martyr, Augustine, Clement of Alexandria, and Eusebius. The way that the Cappadocian Fathers borrow and adapt Plato is well studied. If even the heaviest hitters in the early development of Christian philosophy say that Plato's concepts are closer to God than they can account for without speculating about divine providence, then I think you're making a mountain out of a molehill in your differences. I get that there has been development in both schools since then, but who is to say that those new developments are improvements?
I do agree moral arguements are poor and easily dismissed
I have never understood why any argument citing some state of the world would support the idea of a God. The issue being that in the absence of being able to give reference to God and thus show that such is linked to some aspect of reality, any claim about God is itself an assertion and thus has no linkage to any fact of reality UNTIL God is substantiated as being an aspect of reality, Here's my attempt at a syllogism representing the problem...
P1: Y is claimed to be associated with X such that the existence of Y denotes the existence of X.
P2: Y is shown to exist
C: Therefore, X exist
I find all arguments of this form to be assertions of X as opposed to support of X. The issue being that unless X is shown to be existent, there is no basis to associate X with any aspect of reality. Thus, arguments of this form seem to be meaningful only to those that believe X exists and is associated with Y.
You seem to be assuming a principle according to which some entity must be known to exist before it can be invoked as the best explanation for some phenomenon. I guess I just don't see any reason to adopt that principle.
@@faithbecauseofreason8381
Any explanation wherein such is not known to be an aspect of reality is an appeal to imagination as opposed to reality and thus on my view would be inherently irrational.
The motivation behind my principle is the understanding that humanity can construct all sorts of explanations, but unless the explanation is grounded in reality in a fashion that such can be considered supported, there is no reason to think that such an explanation actually applies to the state of affairs that such purports.
Last Thursdayism (and other like explanations - which I take God claims to be an element in this set of claims) are assertions in need of substantiation, since, without the grounding within one's understanding of reality, there is no basis for such to be considered associated with anything.
So, if this is insufficient, I guess the best question is:
*What supports a narrative of whatever sort of being an actual explanation on your view?*
@MyContext so let's try a little experiment here which might make my concerns about this principle a bit more stark. So I am guessing that you believe that there is an physical world of three-dimensional objects external to your own mind, right? When you have a visual perception of a tree, you take it that this perception is veridical. My question, then, is how do you know that? My own answer would be that the reality of this tree is the best explanation of my having this visual perception. However, that move does not seem open to you since you have stipulated that you have to already know that the tree exists before you can infer it as the best explanation. But in that case, it seems like you can't even get started without begging the question. So since your principle precludes you from inferring the existence of a real external world without already knowing that there is an external world, how can you possibly know that there is an external world?
@@faithbecauseofreason8381
Your example of the tree doesn't link to the issue that I am citing of an appeal to an unknown. Perhaps this will aid in the dissection...
We construct labels for the various things that we experience with it often being the case that these labels can be shared between individuals. The labels referencing things in the context of reality allow independent discovery and the are thus objectively (persistent without appeal to any person, have a criteria by which such can be identified) existent.
(Please note that my ontology is neutral, since I do not lay claim that what we are denoting as reality is in fact reality, but is simply our labeling of our experiences as such interlinks to the overall tapestry as we individual understand such, regardless of whether such is a simulation, brain-in-vat, or some other alternative state to things being as they appear)
IF I were blind, I have no basis to consider that sight is a thing until such is shown to be an aspect of reality and thus could easily think that such is an imaginary idea. (You might want to check out the series "See". )
However, it is fairly easy to show that sight exists to a blind individual. Since, one can demonstrate the capacity of sight such that the blind individual can know that such exists.
A blind person knows what is in their hands. However, another blind person could not know what is in another's hand without touching such. A sighted person can tell the blind person about what is in their hand as well as which hand. Thus, the idea of sight is shown even as the details of how such works is not shown.
So, my point is about SHOWING that whatever is being claimed IS existent before attempting to associate such with anything else.
---
Once an item is known, then other claims about such can be made. However, when something is unknown, there is no basis to accept any associations.
P1: Luck entails the existence of Tweens.
P2: Luck exists.
C: Therefore, Tweens exist.
Tweens are insofar as I know imaginary (unsubstantiated as being an aspect of reality) creatures. Thus, the association of luck with tweens is fallacious on my view.
One would need to know that luck is caused by tweens and thus SHOW that tweens exist by sharing the knowledge that allows one to know of such an association. If no existence can be shown, then on what basis can any claim of association be sustained?
Further, there is grounds to dismiss the idea of luck as an actual state of affairs, but rather such a label referencing a psychological state of interpretation of a statistical state of affairs.
---
My position is in part a product of the observation that we have limits with regard to what we can claim about reality before we are simply making up stuff.
The moment we lay claim to a state of affairs beyond what we can actually know, we are in fact making up stuff. Please note that this should not be conflated with making extrapolations based on what is known even as we know that various extrapolations have the potential to break down with regard to such be correct.
@MyContext well it seems to me that you are begging the question. You are taking for granted that trees are not an unknown. But that's the very thing which I have asked you to justify. How do you know that trees exist if you have to already know that they exist before you can infer their existence?
So would you say that 'as a theist' you are a moral realist? But simply dont argue for moral realism outside that presupposition?
Im also wondering, if you reject moral realism, what becomes of our obvious moral intuitions e.g that the degradation of innocent children for fun is not up for debate? What are those intuitions getting at? As a theist, surely you would want to give greater credence to such an intuition, especially if it also lines up with revelation?
I am actually not a moral realist. I'm not (yet) a moral anti-realist either, although my sympathies do lie in that direction. I'm content just to be a skeptic and say that I don't know.
I am also an intuition skeptic. I don't see any reason to think that intuitions generally are indicative of truth. And so that same skepticism applies to moral intuitions.
Now perhaps intuitions are a manifestation of conscience, which is a biblical concept. So it wouldn't surprise me if moral intuitions do, in fact, point us to God's law. I obviously do believe that God places legal obligations upon us and that he has endowed us with a conscience to help point us towards those obligations. I just don't think that's moral realism. So perhaps moral intuitions support the existence of a conscience, but I don't think that they will get you anywhere near to moral realism.
@@faithbecauseofreason8381 I see. So you would say our conscience is what is driving most moral realists to such a conclusion?
Does this view entail mean that the laws of conscience are human specific?
Surely God has some basis for why He would give laws one way over another? Wouldn't this set of meta principles be indistinguishable from what people describe as moral realism at that point?
@@racsooj456 it would just mean that God's laws are reflective of God's stances and so not stance-independent. Therefore, it would not be moral realism.
@@faithbecauseofreason8381 A stance with no reason or foundation behind/undergirding it? The second horn of the euthyphro?
@racsooj456 I mean yeah. Eventually we reach a stopping point. Euthyphro's dilemma doesn't really apply here though because I'm not claiming that my theory is a realist theory.
What do you think of arguments for God from contingency?
Some are better than others. I think that Rasmussen's contingency argument has merit.
@faithbecauseofreason8381 Thanks, I'll check it out. What is your favorite theodicy? I recently made a video about the Problem of Evil. You can watch it if you want to learn about my perspective. In the video, I gave some potential solutions, but I'm not very confident in them. I'd like to learn more about theodicies so if you know any good ones I'd appreciate it.
@@faithnreason446 I'm favorable to Trent Dougherty's saint-making theodicy.
@faithbecauseofreason8381 I think UA-cam may be deleting my comments. Do you have email or Discord or something? I'd love to continue our conversations if you're up for it. You've been a great resource for me.
Did you miss the footnote on p 157 of Stephen Evan's book?
Possibly. Remind me what it says and why you think it's significant?.
@@faithbecauseofreason8381 "A note on terminology here: I understand a DCT to be a species of moral realism,
since it holds a realistic view of the good, and sees statements about human moral
obligations as ones that have an objective truth value. The reason I do this is that
I understand moral realism as the view that moral propositions have a truth value that
is independent of human beliefs and desires. But obviously, on a DCT, propositions
about moral obligations are not independent of God’s preferences and commands.
Thomas Carson, in “Divine Will/Divine Command Moral Theories and the Problem
of Arbitrariness,” (Religious Studies 2012, doi:10.1017/S00344125100031X) does not
describe a DCT as a realist theory, since he thinks of realism as the view that moral
facts hold independently of the preferences of any being, including God. So far as I can
see, this disagreement between Carson and myself is purely semantic. Carson makes a
case for a type of divine preference theory (at least a cousin of a DCT) and says that his
case depends on moral realism being false. However, moral realism can be false in
sense and true in mine." P 157
When you interpret moral arguments as attempts to vindicate moral realism and then interpret moral realism in Landau's terms as stance independence and then interpret Landau as holding stance independence of all beings including God. You are really attributing to people positions they clearly don't hold and in fact positions that appear constructed to make them appear contradictory.
I have contemplated on how I would debate an Atheist from a Theist view without using God as the main answer. I think you are on to something.
lack of evidence? on your account of knowledge by acquaintance, would that not be justification for those with an intuition of objective morality/categorical normativity?
if one can point out why Platonism won't work, it's the only option left for that account. ( virtues are intrinsic to persons, not abstract objects, i.e., abstract, ideal entities). to quote WLC:
“I can understand what it means to say that a person is just or compassionate. But I have no inkling what is meant at all by justice or compassion just existing as abstract objects… Things like justice, compassion, fairness, loyalty, and kindness seem to be properties of persons. They are grounded in persons, but the idea that these things can just exist on their own is unintelligible.”
“that this independent, physical realm through a blind evolutionary process should evolve just that kind of being that corresponds to the abstractly existing, casually independent moral realm.”
I disagree. Because while things like being just, and kind are intrinsically linked to persons, it becomes meaningless if there is not an realist, objective defintion of what it means to be just, or kind, apart from any persons stance on it.
So are you a Theist and a Moral Anti Realist ? i recognized it as a possibility but this is the first time i see that such a person exists : o
I'm actually a moral skeptic. I don't take a position one way or the other on whether moral facts exist. But I do lean against moral realism at this time. 🙂
i'd like to talk to you, sir. what is your discord name?
I'm not on discord
Nice video.
Thank you!
While America's children (if they're not aborted) are being told they can change their sex in almost every facet of American life, Pallmann is arguing against the moral argument. Slow claps for having your priorities straight.
Oh I'm sorry, is there some reason why everyone has to have the same priorities as you?
@@faithbecauseofreason8381 Gotcha. Well at least now we both know where our priorities are.
While the planet collapses because of climate change, you choose to argue for politics that are responsible for an incredibly high, easily prevented suicide rate among transgender youth ... Don't talk about priorities when you habe such shitty ones. "Christians" who only burn for their faith in the rare circumstances were they can abuse it to make the lives of other people worse are proof that religion can create morals
You miss the objective of this video and its not everywhere
Tell me you aren't an honest truth seeker, without telling me you aren't an honest truth seeker.
🤭 P R O M O S M
Isn't the phrase "faith because of reason" an oxymoron? If you have reason, you don't need faith. That's simple logic. Unless you have your own definition of faith.
I use the dictionary definition of faith where faith refers absolute trust. Nothing about this precludes having reasons to trust (although it also doesn't entail this).
@@faithbecauseofreason8381 there are many dictionary definitions. But you must have a special dictionary that explains faith as anything other a feeling or the most I think it grants is reasonable confidence. Funny how apologetics stretch definitions to their max. The Bible doesn't define faith as absolute trust.
@@deadpiratetattoo2015 well, can you find me a standard dictionary which defines faith in such way that it is incompatible with being based upon reason?
@@faithbecauseofreason8381 strong belief in God or in the doctrines of a religion, based on spiritual apprehension rather than proof.
"bereaved people who have shown supreme faith" that doesn't sound like absolute. Absolute is reasonable, but not in this situation. Not likely or probably, more so. Faith is believing in something without any evidence. You can spin it however you want, but it never reaches reason. It is "A" reason, but reasonable it's quite the stretch. Absolute trust sounds like blind faith to me. And that's neither reasonable nor absolute. Just call it what it is. You believe it because you want to and it feels good. Don't bring logic into it. That's dishonest.
@deadpiratetattoo2015 sounds like you can't cite a dictionary which supports your claim. It looks to me like you have a lot of blind faith that your definition of faith is correct. Imagine my surprise.
Because 'morality' is Subjective!!!!
and gods do NOT exist...
You need a hobby
Here comes that copy/paste argument atheist who says that morals are subjective, and then in their next breath claims that religions and gods not existing would be an objectively good thing for all.
@@praetoriandorn3154 Here comes that copy/paste argument theists always try when they KNOW that they canNOT prove their gods...
@briendoyle4680 dude you just made one of most idiotic claims a person can possibly make in saying that morals are subjective. I suppose you won't mind if I bash your skull in with a brick and take everything you own right? It's all subjective, right? You might not like having that done to you, but I think its great....see how stupid your beliefs can be rendered in a matter of a single sentence?
@briendoyle4680 "you can't prove your god!!!!1" is the quintessential baby blanket for atheists who can't argue or even really begin to grasp the arguments being put to them. Its like you have never heard of the words cumulative case, because for some reason you think just repeating "u can't proof god!!!" Again and again is some kind of epic defeater for everything a theist could possibly say.