Plato's Theory of Forms violates Occam's Razor by multiplying entities beyond necessity. Forms are already present in the physical world of matter. In our thinking, we abstract these forms from their matter, thus forming our conscious concepts of them.
This channel is amazing! Could you upload Peter Millican's lectures on Hume's Treatise again, though? I'm currently teaching this myself, and it would be great to be able to share Millican's lectures with my students.
What could it possibly mean to say 'justice is just' ? This is either an empty tautology, or, else, it is a category mistake. If you mean to indicate the essence of justice by saying it is just, your indication is meaningless. This is because one first has to know what it means to be just. However, once you know what it means to be just, there is no longer a need to ask, "What is justice ?" Thus, your indication is merely an empty tautology that fails to provide any real information. On the other hand, if you mean that justice is something that can be described as being just in the way that, say, impartiality in the enforcement of the laws of the land, could, then you are making a category mistake. For it is conceivable that such impartiality is not actually just. For example, children, and those who are declared 'insane', who are found guilty of committing crimes are not given the same sentences in the courts as 'sane' adults who commit the same exact crimes. This is considered 'just' according to our system of law. But it can be debated whether or not it is actually just to treat these juvenile and/or insane criminals differently from any other criminal ? In order to judge, we would have to determine what is actually just, then apply this standard of justice to our own system of justice. In contrast, it can never be debated whether justice itself is just, nor could we ever apply a standard of justice to the concept of justice itself without begging the question.
But equality does come from empirical reality -- or at least its appearance. Physical things sometimes appear to be equal. Of course, you can say that they are not really equal, they only appear that way. But here you are rejecting the notion from which you started -- when you claimed the empirical world is known only by appearances. For how can you reject the appearance of equality in the empirical world, but still say that the empirical world is merely appearance ? If it appears, then it is empirical; if it is empirical, it is known by means of the senses -- or, at least, not entirely without them; if it known by means of the senses, then the concept of 'equality' is derived by means of the senses -- or, at least not entirely without them. Yes, you say, but we only recognize equality in the physical world because we already have an innate concept of equality by which to compare it. So be it ! However, this innate concept did not arise in your conscious mind until equality appeared to your senses in the physical world. Thus, it was by means of the empirical world of appearances that you first consciously conceived of equality.
But why would concepts of objects belonging to another world apply to this world ? Of course, you can say that the things in this world reflect (or participate in) the objects of the metaphysical world of Ideas, but you would have to conceive of 'reflection' (or 'participation') itself. Why would the object of this concept exist in the metaphysical world ? What is this concept ? Equal but not quite equal ? Sharing the same form, yet having less real existence than the form itself ? Does such an uncertain object that is equal but not quite equal, participating in form yet not that form, and having less existence than the form itself exist in the metaphysical world ? Seems unlikely. Better turn to Aristotle here. Forms are not separate objects belonging to a metaphysical world, instead they are abstractions (or parts) of the one and only world -- the physical world of form and matter.
Thanks for all the Plato content. Really, thanks for everything, Philosophy Overdose.
lo ni
yes, but especially for all the Plato stuff
Your channel is one of the best on UA-cam.
Plato's Theory of Forms violates Occam's Razor by multiplying entities beyond necessity. Forms are already present in the physical world of matter. In our thinking, we abstract these forms from their matter, thus forming our conscious concepts of them.
This channel is amazing! Could you upload Peter Millican's lectures on Hume's Treatise again, though? I'm currently teaching this myself, and it would be great to be able to share Millican's lectures with my students.
Would you rather have a Bust of Plato or a Plate of Busto?
Plate of Busto , Period.
thank you
Who are the guys commenting in italian and german?
The Italian philosopher is Enrico Berti. I have no idea who the German guy is, but I hope someone who knows can tell us!
@@Philosophy_Overdose Thanks! Best youtube channel!
What could it possibly mean to say 'justice is just' ? This is either an empty tautology, or, else, it is a category mistake. If you mean to indicate the essence of justice by saying it is just, your indication is meaningless. This is because one first has to know what it means to be just. However, once you know what it means to be just, there is no longer a need to ask, "What is justice ?" Thus, your indication is merely an empty tautology that fails to provide any real information. On the other hand, if you mean that justice is something that can be described as being just in the way that, say, impartiality in the enforcement of the laws of the land, could, then you are making a category mistake. For it is conceivable that such impartiality is not actually just. For example, children, and those who are declared 'insane', who are found guilty of committing crimes are not given the same sentences in the courts as 'sane' adults who commit the same exact crimes. This is considered 'just' according to our system of law. But it can be debated whether or not it is actually just to treat these juvenile and/or insane criminals differently from any other criminal ? In order to judge, we would have to determine what is actually just, then apply this standard of justice to our own system of justice. In contrast, it can never be debated whether justice itself is just, nor could we ever apply a standard of justice to the concept of justice itself without begging the question.
But equality does come from empirical reality -- or at least its appearance. Physical things sometimes appear to be equal. Of course, you can say that they are not really equal, they only appear that way. But here you are rejecting the notion from which you started -- when you claimed the empirical world is known only by appearances. For how can you reject the appearance of equality in the empirical world, but still say that the empirical world is merely appearance ? If it appears, then it is empirical; if it is empirical, it is known by means of the senses -- or, at least, not entirely without them; if it known by means of the senses, then the concept of 'equality' is derived by means of the senses -- or, at least not entirely without them. Yes, you say, but we only recognize equality in the physical world because we already have an innate concept of equality by which to compare it. So be it ! However, this innate concept did not arise in your conscious mind until equality appeared to your senses in the physical world. Thus, it was by means of the empirical world of appearances that you first consciously conceived of equality.
But why would concepts of objects belonging to another world apply to this world ? Of course, you can say that the things in this world reflect (or participate in) the objects of the metaphysical world of Ideas, but you would have to conceive of 'reflection' (or 'participation') itself. Why would the object of this concept exist in the metaphysical world ? What is this concept ? Equal but not quite equal ? Sharing the same form, yet having less real existence than the form itself ? Does such an uncertain object that is equal but not quite equal, participating in form yet not that form, and having less existence than the form itself exist in the metaphysical world ? Seems unlikely. Better turn to Aristotle here. Forms are not separate objects belonging to a metaphysical world, instead they are abstractions (or parts) of the one and only world -- the physical world of form and matter.
He who knows does not speak, he who speaks does not know.
Lao Tzu.
@@danielm978 yet everyone speaks and has something to say or comment, including you, me, and Lao Tzu.