Deep Intel on the Infamous Flight to Nowhere
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- Опубліковано 27 вер 2024
- While the Battle of Midway is generally considered as a great victory for the U.S. Navy in the opening phase of the Pacific Campaign during World War II, there is one chapter of it that lives in infamy: "The Flight to Nowhere."
Retired Navy Captain and former Hornet pilot Kevin "Hozer" Miller returns to the channel to discuss the missteps of the USS Hornet air wing that led to them losing 2/3 of their aircraft without inflicting any damage on the Japanese fleet.
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My great uncle flew F4U Corsairs in WWII and Korea. He was in a flight that was on patrol and heading in the wrong direction. They were under instructions not to break radio silence. After my great uncle noticed, he alerted their air wing to this mistake and they all were able to return with enough fuel. After the incident, my great uncle was promoted to flight lead. Cool story he told us.
A friend of mine through the internet, the very respected F4 pilot John Chesire passed away in december. 2 combat tours in nam, graduated like in the 5th top gun class or something.
He mentioned he was on a flight over N VN and his flight leads compass got fucked up, but they had orders for radio silence. He said he (the rest of the flight had separated in the bomb run and they had a meeting point for this) followed his flight leader NORTH towards China with increasing distress. He knew also there was a open Chinese offer of a few million USD or something if someone defected but he said the thought never crossed his mind during the flight the lead was doing that, but he was still super worried because thats the absolute wrong way for USN F4s to be going LOL.
The leads radios were messed up as well, because they tried to break radio silence (it turned out the lead plane had taken some AAA damage) John finally gave up trying to get his attention and flew to the meet up spot.
Apparently the lead flew on, realized something was very wrong and turned around and eventually showed up as they were about to head home.
I wish I remembered the story better to fill in a lot of holes =/ sry
My father dropped a practice depth-charge on a power-station by accident near Moncton in Canada. The locals didn't like it, so the air force had a meeting and my father was "cleared".
My cousin, Donald Runyon was the US Navy's top scoring Wildcat ace of the war. He shot down nine Japanese aircraft while assigned to VF-6 (USS Enterprise). Later, while flying Hellcats, he shot down two more Japanese airplanes.
I bet he had some strong arms cranking that landing gear
@@gradystein5765 He was an Aviation Machinists Mate before becoming an Aviator so he was probably used to working for a living. A good source of information on aces who flew the "Wildcat is Wildcat Aces of World War 2" by Barrett Tillman.
@@royrunyon1286 A badass American hero, the Greatest Generation for sure.
The Wildcat was the true hero of the Pacific, by the time the Hellcat and Corsair came along they were flying against poorly trained inexperienced Japanese pilots because the Wildcat had already shot down their experienced pilots who had been flying for years.
Like the P47 in Europe the Wildcat did the brunt of the work and heavy lifting just to have aircraft like the P51 in Europe and the Hellcat and Corsair in the Pacific swoop in later and grab all the glory.
It was the Wildcat and men like your cousin that already had the Japanese air forces beat to a pulp by the time the Hellcat and Corsair came along.
@@dukecraig2402 Yeah but the P-47 was *NOT* a great escort fighter for the 'Forts over Europe.
The only way they could engage the Me 109s & FW 190s was to fly 2,000 feet above the bombers, drop like a rock with ONE pass at the Hun then try not to become a lawn dart embedded in a German field - which sadly many brave guys ended up doing.
[The P-38s had much the same problem too - Just didn't have the manouverability to dogfight with the Luftwaffe so had to attempt a high level high speed 'bounce' attack].
As a low level ground attack plane that could blow the 💩out of anything whilst soaking up insane levels of punishment the Jug was a superb thing....
But if you check what the Bomber guys said about which plane they prefered to have on escort......
You may have a bit more of a case on the Wildcat thing - But ask the Pilots would they rather be in a Wildcat or a Bearcat - and these are the *same pilots* - and you know what the answer will be 🙄
My father, Donald Kirkpatrick was a VS-8 SBD pilot from the USS Hornet who was on the "Flight to Nowhere". His account of this mission as told to me personally align with the accounts in this video. He was in the pilot's ready room and witnessed discussions as to where the IJN carriers would be found. At about 6am - 7am on June 4th, word came down that a large flight Japanese planes had been sighted 165 miles northwest of Midway. He saw the squadron commanders and CHAG Ring cluster in VS-8's ready room to plot a course to intercept the IJN fleet. He didn't understand why Waldron was not part of this discussion. As a very junior ensign he sensed heavy confusion on their part. The consensus seemed to be that they would head for the spot where the Japanese planes were spotted by the PBY, 165 miles from Midway, then look for the carriers. After launch, my father's rear gunner Richard Woodson saw VT-8 break to port from Hornet's air group which confirms that the other Hornet squadrons missed the Japanese to the Northwest. My father said he tried to track his route on his plotting board, but unfortunately I was never able to find his documented heading. (His flight log book was lost when the Hornet was sunk at the Battle of Santa Cruz.) After landing back on the Hornet he said that Mitscher was so upset with Ring and his performance that he was not allowed on the bridge. In addition, my father suspected that on at least one subsequent mission, Ring intentionally "pickled" his bomb (prematurely dropped it on "accident") so he didn't have to dive on the Japanese cruisers.
Years after the war, he felt very badly as to Hornet's air group's performance. However, he puts the blame squarely on Ring for his navigational incompetence. This is supported by another story my father told about Ring trying to lead a training mission during a shakedown cruise shortly after Hornet was first commissioned. Ring got the squadron of SDBs completely lost and Gus Widhelm had to take over and get them back to the Hornet. There must have been a coverup wanting to raise spirits back in the US after the Battle of Midway because Ring was awarded the Navy Cross for his actions at Midway. My father was even more upset when he happened to see Ring at the Naval Weapons Center in Inyokern, CA near the end of the war wearing the Navy Cross. He ask what Ring got it for and was told it was for his actions at the Battle of Midway. It made my dad sick knowing what other pilots had sacrificed and done to earn their Navy Crosses. My father always suspected there was a coverup in the "official reports" as to what really happened at Midway.
According to several accounts, George Gay (the only survivor of Torpedo 8) squarely blamed Ring for VT-8 being wiped out. More than one account states that Gay nearly got in a fistfight with Ring. Again, according to various accounts, some of Bombing 8's pilots saw smoke from the Japanese carriers to their southwest, but incredulously, they erroneously believed it was from Midway, which was completely behind them. There still remains much controversy about the whole Flight To Nowhere.
My mom's Great Uncle was LCMDR Rodee, I've been hooked into WW2 era naval history because of the story that he had to come home in Marine fatigues after Santa Cruz. IT's great to see some first hand confirmation, I unfortunately only met RADM(RET) Rodee once when I was very young, and by the time I grew interested in history, he had already passed, so I unfortunately missed the chance to talk with him about his experiences.
I hope your father took pride in their action at Santa Cruz, I know they damaged Shokaku, which impacted later operations, and possibly saved the lives of hundreds of aviators who didn't have to contend with her fighters, and sailors whose ships weren't attacked by her strike group.
Your Great Uncle, LCMDR Rodee was my father's Air Group Commander on the Hornet (CV8) during the battle of Santa Cruz. Both your great uncle and my father are profiled in the March 22, 1943 issue of Life Magazine. The article is titled "Abroad the U.S.S. Hornet" by Tom Lea. It was published after the Hornet was sunk in October of 1942 and before it was made public that it was lost at Santa Cruz. Hopefully you can find a copy. I think you would enjoy reading about your great uncle. I am also hooked on the history of WWII in the Pacific, especially the battles my father was in. I really enjoyed visiting the National WWII Museum in New Orleans and the National Naval Aviation Museum in Pensacola.
@@BP-1988 I belive my grandparents recently found a copy they had saved and are holding it for me. I've visited CV-12 Hornet in Alameda twice now, they have abit about their namesake ship, but not much, and for my birthday, I went to Midway, and talked to my mom about the Flight to Nowhere, as they have an area dedicated to the Battle of Midway aboard. I'd love to visit many other museums eventually, my bucket list is basically a checklist of museum ships and a few regular museums as well.
Across the bay from the Hornet (CV-12) at the San Francisco wharf is the Baleo-class submarine USS Pampanito. A few years ago my daughter and I took the tour. I was especially interested in the sub because my father and his rear gunner were rescued by the USS Tang submarine another after being shot down at Truk Lagoon in May of 1944. The USS Tang was a Baleo-class sub commanded by LTCMDR Richard O'Kane. My father spend 2-3 weeks on the Tang which eventually got back to Pearl Harbor and delivered its 22 rescued airmen. The rescues of the downed flyers and the Tang's war record are detailed in O'Kane's book "Clear the Bridge!". The next Museum ship I plan to visit is the USS Lexington, (CV-16) in Corpus Christy, Texas. My father was assigned to the new Lexington after the Hornet went down.
My name is John Doey Waldron and John Charles Waldron was my great uncle. He mentored my father before his untimely death and I am SO glad that some officers have rehashed this. My family was very distraught that Great Uncle John did not receive the MOH, as he was 100% motivated and should have been the Hornets carrier airwing commander. Sadder still is that Waldron road and airfield have been a fixture for years in Corpus Christi and yet my history teacher knew NOTHING about the BOM and it's place in WWII (and military history). One of my boot camp company commanders attained E-9 and was a torpedoeman's mate and he too knew NOTHING about VT-8, the BOM or the USN's defective torpedo's. Truly a clusterf*** that happened to occur in our favor. (EX) IC2 John Doey Waldron-Desert Storm/Shield.
My father, Donald Kirkpatrick knew and flew with your great uncle and had the utmost respect for him. He flew an SBD and was part VS-8 on the Hornet. During the Battle of Midway (BOM) and about 20 to 30 minutes after Hornet's air group finished launching, my father's rear gunner saw your great uncle take his torpedo squadron and break to port (left) which led them to the directly to the Japanese carriers. His gunner, Richard Woodson, asked my father where they were going. My father said he didn't know but said they were under orders to remain in formation. It's a shame that more people (especially history teachers) don't know more about the BOM and its significance to the war effort in the Pacific. It has been debated, but I believe that your great uncle's actions and sacrifice contributed to allowing our SBD bombers from USS Enterprise and USS Yorktown to sink the first 3 Japanese carriers. My hope and goal is to keep my father's contributions and sacrifices (as well as others) alive for their part in WWII.
Something that Jonathan Parshall brought up in his book that I found very interesting was the relative inexperience and limited training of Hornet's air group. Hornet had only been in commission since late October of 1941, so her air group had only had at most 8 months of training and work up time - and some of that time was lost, because Hornet had a bunch of B-25s strapped to the deck.
I'm personally convinced the air group went out on a 265 heading. The big thing that sells me is that Japanese accounts of the battle are pretty much unanimous that VT-8 attacked from the Northeast, which means they would've deviated from a western heading to a south western one, and ultimately came head on with Kido Butai, which at that point was steaming Northeast. The other big thing to me is that Enterprise and Yorktown each had multiple after action reports presented, from each squadron commander, CAG, and Captain of the ship. The only after action report from the Hornet was Mitscher's. Nothing from Ring or any of the squadron COs. To me, that suggests Mitscher disobeyed Spruance’s orders, sent his airgroup on a 265 heading to locate this mythical second Japanese carrier division, and then covered up the evidence when it backfired by only presenting his report, the jist of which was "we flew 240 and just didn't find anything." Spruance evidently thought this was the case. After the battle, he told Nimitz that if he was receiving conflicting information from the Enterprise reports and the Hornet report, then he should believe Enterprise. For his part, Nimitz was okay to sweep the whole thing under the rug. At the time this was a much needed victory and he didn't want to air the Navy's dirty laundry to the public. Besides, if we really dig too deep into this, we have to wrestle with the fact that Waldron (who's a now a war hero who bravely sacrificed his life) was blatantly insubordinate to his superior and would've been court martialed if he survived. The end result was a mindset of "let's just not talk about this," and that, to me, explains the flight to nowhere.
This hits the nail on the head. I read/heard that Mitscher was one of the first naval aviators and hated to get orders from Spruance or Fletcher because they were black shoes. The commanders knew there were at least four flat tops out there and Mitscher got a wild hair about where the other two could be because no one thought the Japanese would put all there carriers in the same spot, basically. The infamous flight to no where has always intrigued me because I had a cousin that was the XO of VS-8 at the time and was apart of this flight. Would love to have been a fly on the wall in that situation.
@chrisw4755 I think the route of Mitscher's thought process was that the PBY that found the Japanese fleet reported only two carriers. He was probably thinking that the Japanese would be operating in two separate task forces, one to attack Midway and the other to trail 100 miles or so behind to provide cover because, after all, that's how we would do it. With hindsight, we know that's not true, but if I were in Mitscher's shoes, it wouldn't seem like a bad idea for Enterprise’s air group to attack the two spotted targets, and for Hornet’s airgroup to get the ones that he was sure were out there. My beef with Mitscher in this whole thing is that he did this without checking with Spruance first and then lied about it afterward, which is not OK. My other problem is that Mitscher is probably responsible for the loss of the Yorktown. Had he followed his orders, his airgroup would've found Kido Butai around 0930, and (granted this was an inexperienced airgroup) if they carried out a proper attack according to doctrine, Hornet’s airgroup could've destroyed one or possibly two carriers, allowing for Yorktown and Enterprise to mop up the rest of theman hour later. That would give the Americans a 4-0 victory before lunchtime. No Kido Butai means no counter attack that cripples Yorktown.
You have some great insights into the battle and various people's mindsets. I still don't understand why there wasn't a bingo fuel limit where everyone would understand we have to turn back in order to survive. Basically it sounds like pride became the overriding factor for too many people involved.
@theoneneo5024 I appreciate that! My impression was that all the pilots on each carrier understood the importance of that strike and were more willing to take risks with fuel than they normally would've been.
But the upshot of this flight to nowhere is that we loose the Yorktown. Had Hornets aircraft attacked Kido Butai there’s a very good chance they get the Hiryu or at least damage her enough that she can’t continue with the second attack on Yorktown.
As a current warbird pilot, it does my heart good to hear a good discussion on a WWII subject. Really enjoy your channel Ward, I watch them all!
Absolutely! Always great content.
What do you fly, B-25?
And;
Why no videos on your YT page? Lol
B-25 and PBY. Big fan of Ward’s channel!
Thanks for watching, John! Fly safe!
Thanks Ward!
Thank you for the great history lesson Hozer and thank you for continuing to honor those who were involved in such a historic battle, Ward. Fascinating as usual!
My father was a radio-man/gunner in the SBD Dauntless Bomber. After the war he obtained his pilots license and took us boys for rides in his Taylor tail dragger.
That is awesome.
Yorktown (CV-5) is my favorite ship and it’s a damn shame she was lost. There needs to be a CVN named Yorktown.
It's amazing to think about navigating over the ocean back in those days without more modern navigation systems on the aircraft. Imagine going through the stress of combat and then having to find your way back to the ship.
Mate, Captain Hoser knows his history,and his enthusiasm is contagious. Watched it twice to really take in all the details. Excellent presentation.
Excellent! Thank you for doing this! "Midway Inquest- Why the Japanese Lost the Battle of Midway" by Dallas Woodbury Isom and "The Unknown Battle of Midway" by Alvin Kernan are worth reading. The latter mentions Bowen Weisheit and his research. As an epitaph, and admittedly a personal opinion, I have always felt that Commander Waldron should have been awarded a medal of honor for his extraordinary airmanship, superb tactical assessment, and leadership in battle. He had a decision to make and did it, and in the process he led his squadron into battle knowing full well that he had no supporting elements.
Brave Aviators Waldrons Squadron
"Shattered Sword" is THE DEFINITIVE work on the Battle of Midway that connects the dots on a lot of the mysteries and inconsistencies of previous accounts of the battle.
And, btw, Waldron and his entire squadron got the Navy Cross. So did Stanhope Ring, the CAG who bungled the navigation on the Flight to Nowhere. The Navy Cross was a convenient award here given out more to cover up both Waldron's mutiny (for which he would have likely face a court martial, had he survived) and Ring's incompetence.
The fact that Waldron disobeyed a direct order and that Ring had royally effed up his navigation was papered over in all the older accounts of the battle.
The book by Weissheit that they are talking about is "The last flight of Ensign C. Markland Kelly, Junior, USNR". Kelly was one of the Wildcat fighter pilots who was lost at sea, and his father never got over the loss of his son. Being a wealthy businessman, he eventually funded the investigation and book that Weissheit wrote about this flight (the book is now out of print, and very hard to find - I did manage to snag a copy of it).
The preponderance of the testimony from the fliers that Weissheit interviewed was that Ring flew the 265 route. Fisher, being Ring's wingman, was the only one saying 240, most likely covering up for Ring's failure. This has become the most likely explanation for what happened. It still is not clear why Ring flew the 265 route, but some theorize that Mischer was the instigator of that decision, and his subsequent efforts to protect Ring (Mischer was the one who put Ring up for the Navy Cross) and taking him off flight command to be one of his staff officers is some proof of that.
@@gandalfgreyhame3425 There is a copy of "Shattered Sword" on the table to Captain Miller's right.
@@gordonbergslien30 Yes, but Ward and Capt. Miller did not mention "Shattered Sword" in this video, and the OP on this thread started by mentioning a couple of other books that pale in comparison to this definitive book.
Also, I wanted to fill in some of the background about the book written by Weissheit, as Capt. Miller didn't get a chance to talk more about how important this book was and didn't even name the book. This book was really the key to totally changing the long standing official narrative about what Ring actually did, as the official record had long stated that Ring took the 240 route. Weissheit's interviews of the surviving fliers provided pretty strong eyewitness testimony that no, he actually flew the 265 route, and so his book was really the key in completely contradicting the official record, although it only deepened the mystery as now we don't know exactly why Ring went the 265 route and why he lied about it and covered that up in the official record.
@@midtownmariner5250 Great topic to explore, except I don't think any historians bothered to find and interview these aviators in that battle, and so their stories are probably now lost forever. Unless somebody whose father was in that battle and managed to record some of that history.
The big focus was on the heroics of the sailors and the captains of the escort destroyers that charged the Japanese fleet. Their stories were what got recorded.
Another issue John Lundstrom brings up in his First Team at Midway book is, Captain Mitscher likely falsified the Hornet's log after the battle, an extremely serious offense. Perhaps our host can do a video on that subject sometime.
It’s not likely. It’s a fact. Symonds addresses this in his new Nimitz biography.
I knew a WW2 fighter pilot Byron Johnson that when you watch old war films the plane that comes in all shot up and splits in half landing is him. Was a really cool guy and was on the carrier Enterprise
Oh wow, that's a very well known film clip that's been used in countless documentaries and I think even the 1976 film Midway starring Charlton Heston.
I've seen that clip dozens of times. Always wondered what happened to the pilot. Thanks.
Funny thing about memory: When I was in 5th grade we were taking some kind of state test. Our teacher said if we, as a class, could get a high enough score she'd let us watch a movie.
We did get that score and I vividly remember watching Space Balls. There is just one small issue here. I was in 5th grade in 1981. Space Balls wasn't made until 1987.
I know in the movie they are able to access the movie, but they can only see it up to the point where it's now. I doubt anyone could watch the movie 6 years before it was made.
For the life of me, I can't remember what movie we saw. And even though I know it's not possible, I clearly remember watching Space Balls.
That is fascinating as I also vividly remember conversations with people in locations I was only ever in 10 years before I met them!! It is literally the freakiest thing😂😂
@@jimballantine4408 Time Warp. Happens more often than we will admit...
It’s a glitch in the Matrix…
We have blue glass goblets from🇯🇵.1 pair was purchased and,after decades from early 60s when pop bought them,an oddball 3rd 1 showed up.Mandela weirdness
Sounds like false memory, a common phenomena according to interview/interrogation training. Good example is the Clarence Thomas hearings for Supreme Court. A former female employee who worked with Thomas claimed he talked about or tried to have her watch a porn flic called Long Dong Silver.
One problem with her story....that porn flic wasn't even made until 7 years later. Putting political corruption aside, false memory is a real thing where two past events get intertwined in the brain cells. Both are legit separate events just not in proper space/time.
Great Book Kevin! The Silver Waterfall was a great read!
Thank you both for bringing this important component of the battle of Midway!!
It's always amazing to hear these stories that are not part of the general understanding of what happened in the past. Mr Carroll I really enjoy your work....
Have greatly enjoyed all your books Hozer. Please keep them coming.
Always appreciate having Hozer's considered and thoughtful input.
The problem is, most people cannot differentiate between what they know and what they believe.
Three notable works on the subject include:
Unskilled and Unaware of it, by Justin KRUGER & David DUNNING.
The Peter Principal
by Laurence J. Peter.
And my favorite;
The basic laws of Human Stupidity, by Carlo M. Cipolla.
How and why is that a problem today? They have the internet to correct them. LOL
My problem is I can, I wish I could live in the blissful ignorance most people do in their illusions of reality.
And what really sucks about it is when something is actually happening and you try to explain the reality of things to people you get the "Martha Mitchell Effect" from them, the good old "Yea right" from people, then afterwards when things tragically turn out they way they do because no one would listen to you then you have to put up with them saying "Who could have seen that coming?"
🤬🤬🤬🤬🤬🤬🤬🤬🤬🤬
I believe you are correct. I mean, I think I know you are correct...
And in most cases, no amount of convincing will change their minds.
Hozer is a national treasure.
I recommend the ' Silver Waterfall' book. Just finished the audiobook. I recommend it!
Thank you, z bud.
If corroboration between Mrazek (A Dawn Like Thunder), Kernan (The Unknown Battle Of Midway) and Bowen Weisheit (The Last Flight of Ensign C. Markland Kelly) is correct, then Ring should not have been in command of Hornet Air Group. There was such dissension between Ring and his pilots that some were actually plotting his death. According to Mrazek, one of them referred to Ring as “a pompous ass and a coward”. I would call that a very serious statement-especially in wartime. It appears that the higher-ups (possibly including even Nimitz) allowed a dangerous situation to continue escalating. The cream of Annapolis was aloft that morning and, in my belief, there was needless loss of life. Our Navy was darn blessed and fortunate to have turned the tide on 4 June 1942. I was Air Force enlisted (POL) in the early ‘70s. I thank you officers and gentlemen for your service.
The saddest aspect of the sacrifice of the torpedo bombers is the Mark 13 torpedoes. The Mark 13 torpedo was terrible. It was erratic, tended to break apart if dropped too fast, and the exploder tended not to work.
I very much enjoyed Hozer's book 'The Silver Waterfall.' So much so, that I have purchased several copies to give as gifts to friends who are not history nerds but enjoy a great story. Very good work, sir!
Thank you, sir, you are kind.
Superb! Well done gents!
Ward, Thanks for the heads up on Hozer's previous Midway episode on your channel. Will watch it now.
Great dive into the events, conversations, and personalities. Facinating throughout. 👍
In 1978 I had the honor of meeting Ensign George Gay [who was the guest of honor]
at the airshow in Titusville Florida that the Valiant Air Command put on ...
that I was a member of.....He was a very kind man
and talked with anybody who cared to speak to him......I remember the day fondly......
Paul in
Orlando, Florida
Excellent presentation.
Mooch I’d love to hear a deep dive on flight 19 and what your thoughts are on what led to its disappearance.
Great insight to a story I was unfamiliar with.
my wife's dad was on the Yorktown..... survived thankfully.
Fantastic. Thank you.
Midway was a classic example of "being lucky" - it was just luck that 3 squadrons of dive bombers took out 3 Japanese carriers (Kaga, Akagi, and Soryu) , without any coordination whatsoever. The sacrifice of Torpedo 8 cleared the skies of Zeroes, and by the time the carriers realized what was happening - it was too late to save them - almost no AA fire as the dive bombers plunged out of the sky. It was also luck that the planes on the Japanese carriers were just refueled and re-armed (with land attack bombs just scattered about (and not put into the magazines)) that made the American attack that much more devastating.
We also had on our side the breaking of the Japanese naval code so our carriers could be in position to spring the trap instead of the Japanese ambushing the Americans as they planned. Also we had the good fortune of Admiral Nagumo being naturally overcautious and disobeying Yamamoto's orders to leave a second striking force in reserve to deal with surface targets.
@@rabbitramen -- Nagumo did attack Midway with only half of his strength. Two carriers launched their Val dive bomber squadrons and the other two (one of which was Hiryu) launched their Kate torpedo bomber squadrons (equipped as level bombers). The other half was prepared for a naval strike. When the first strike failed to completely knock out Midway, the strike leader (Tomonaga) radioed Nagumo that a second strike was needed. While Nagumo was re-arming his Kates with contact bombs, the last of his scout planes sighted Yorktown (it was running ~30 minutes behind the other scouts due to technical delays). So Nagumo directed the crews to stop the rearming of the Kates and re-attach the torpedoes. The extra contact bombs were not yet returned to the magazines when the first American bombs hit.
Once the strike was fully armed, Nagumo had to delay the strike so the Midway strike force could land. That 30-minute delay meant that Nagumo was not able launch 4 bomber/torpedo squadrons at the American carriers. Those fully fueled, fully armed planes were on the hanger deck and their secondary explosions eventually sank Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu. Hiryu, which avoided detection, was immediately able to launch a counter-strike with its Val squadron (against Yorktown). Hiryu's Kate squadron, which attacked Midway, made the second strike against Yorktown.
The uncoordinated attacks, which lasted about 3 hours, left Nagumo's combat air patrol exhausted -- and out of position -- when Enterprise's and Yorktown's Dauntlesses coincidentally struck simultaneously. Before the CAP could regain its altitude.
Good presentation shipmates. 🇺🇸⚓️
Enjoyed the episode muchly! Was also amused to see my book sitting next to Hozer's elbow. :-) Thanks for bringing attention to this often misunderstood episode of such a critical battle.
Jon, that's the copy you signed for me; we met ~2007-8 when you were guest speaker at the Battle of Midway dinner at Army Navy Country Club. I coordinated with you.
Hope you'll give my historical fiction novel a read, would be honored.
@@kevinmiller5780 That's amazing! I remember that talk, now that you jogged my memory! Looks like you've managed to get out many more books than I have in the intervening years, haha! 🙂
Robert Mrazek's "A Dawn Like Thunder" covers the story of Torpedo 8 before and after Midway. No more moving book about naval aviation exists. He covers this topic fully. Some real if's arise.
1. If Ring had told his CO's that they were looking for a northern force of 2 carriers instead of the 2 reported by the PBY, there'd have been no 'mutiny'. The Japanese were thought to have split their carriers at Coral Sea (they hadn't, Shokaku and Zuikaku were the main force; the light carrier Shoho was in a secondary force aimed at Port Moresby) and they seemed to be doing that here.
2. If Ring had listened to Waldron and led the entire wing south, all four Japanese carriers would have probably been lost or crippled that morning and Yorktown would have been saved.
3. If Mitscher and Ring had admitted their plan of attack instead of gundecking it, they'd have been respected for making a reasonable, wrong guess and accepting responsibility. Instead it was known almost at once--Spruance's after action report said to taken Enterprize's log as the sole source for the actions of the task force--and both men were sidelined for a while as a result.
Especially suboptimal when you’re carrying that particular torpedo.
Read the book and really liked it, Hozer.
Thank you, sir.
@@kevinmiller5780 You are quite welcome sir, I just call 'em like I see 'em. In the middle of the Mooch Trilogy now, then it's Raven 1. Really good research on Waterfall.
Recommend reading John Lundstrom's "The First Team" for the history of the Battle of Midway.
And "Shattered Sword" by Tully and Parshall.
It would preety awesome to see either Mooch or Hoser play a mission from the Raven One DCS campaign
Hozer
@@AA-xo9uw woops
Thank you both!
Great vid Ward, thank you. 🙂
Gott wonder what the outcome might have been had Fletcher on Yorktown launched a full strike with both of his SBD squadrons instead of just one. Might they have bagged Hiryu in their first strike, and saved Yorktown from its fate.
There’s a good reason why, as only two Japanese carriers were reported. That other squadron was held back because of it. They were his reserve strike if and when the other two were located.
Hozer is the Man!
hoser is always a terrific guest…wonderful episode; and I learned much. many thanks…Glad to say I was also a Shipmate of Hosers at one time in the Pentagon.
Hello Paul!
Hozer
Midway could have used its radios all it wanted since the enemy would always know where they are. A central planning group should have been on the island, and sent out coded messages of where the sighting and direction of the enemy is, and given the orders for each carrier's flight to follow. And they could have spread out forces and sent additional scouts from Midway updating the enemy position, once the initial sighting were made they should have sent out a string of scouts to get periodic updates. It sounded like there was a position, and everyone decided what to do on their own without coordination because they had to remain radio silent on a carrier within striking distance of an enemy.
Thank you Commander for a very educational video, Congratulations on your 400 Hundred Thousand Plus Subscribers......You are the Best.....Paul in Florida,
Definitely a great example of the Fog of War. 😔
Its the YE3 homing beacon. the problem that is danced around here is that Ring and Mistcher had their own theories of where the fleet was...ok that is said. but what is not said is that those theories had really nothing to do with any tactical information. Mitscher was influenced heavily by Aubry Fitchs "read" of the Coral Sea, but MM really did not grasp what Fitch was saying. MM and Ring sort of worked up their own battle plan, based on either the 6 carrier theory or the dispersed carrier doctrine and went off to "nowhere".
this should have been the end of MM or Ring's career...MM was weak tactically until he got 31 knot Burke (a future CNO) and Ring was just arrogant. he remained that way to his death as this was fought out in Proceedings during the 80's
Ring just simply took most of Hornet's airgroup out of the fight.
What we can all be thankful for is that in accounting for all of the series of unfortunate events that occured during the Battle of Midway, most of the unfortunate events occured on the Japanese side.
As naval aviators, it might interest both of you to know that Lt. Commander Waldron had all of his men sew their own .45 holsters and carry them in flight. The other squadrons laughed at them, as this was not yet part of the USN flight uniform. Take a good look at John C. Waldron's M1911 leather laced holster and you will see that it was indeed homemade-(EX) IC2 John Doey Waldron-Desert Storm/Shield
Thank you both for discussing Real History! Not the sanitized version.
You and Hoser should get together to do a program on Swede Vejtasa. Downing 3 Zeros in the Battle of the Coral Sea with an SBD is beyond remarkable!
Hozer
Sounds like an incredible CF! How did we ever win that battle?
I met Ensign Gay in 1976 onboard the old Franklin D Roosevelt on a carrier qual. He seemed like a nice guy!
Well, let's check it out.
Good interview Mooch... Ramones shirt and all.
I think John Parshall pointed out that Hornet's air groups performance especially proved how unprepared American forces able to perform above the squadron level at Midway. Yorktown having obtained battle experience at Coral Sea,was the only carrier that put together a strike that arrived together. I believe John Lundstrom argued that if the US had chosen to forgo the Doolittle Raid and instead sent Enterprise and Hornet to Coral Sea, you might have saved Yorktown. Then you would've had four carriers experienced in group carrier tactics ready for Midway and instead of 3 carriers sunk on the first strike, you get all 4 and save Yorktown to boot. Hindsight is 20/20 and things turned out pretty well for us anyways but still...
I’ve read “Silver Waterfall” and thought it was well written.
Thank you, sir.
@@kevinmiller5780 I just looked at your other novels and plan to read them too. Always on the lookout for good reading.
Thank you gentleman. Think it’s time to reread The Silver Waterfall”. Terrific book!
Thank you, ma'am.
My apology if you have, but have you ever covered the 5 planes lost off Florida? Flight 19 1945.
I thought that was what this was going to be.
A librarian figured it out. No where near the Bermuda Triangle
Really not interested in the Triangle aspect. More interested in the HTF did these men not trust their instincts.
Pre flight brief on weather, clouds, wind direction......Sun angle and setting direction......always baffled me how all of that failed.
@@FranksFlights hey where did they end up I never heard that got solved. obviously dead in the water but where did they fly off to? the northeast? southeast? east?
@@jefclark It hasn't been solved. I had not heard of this being solved so I done some research. Nowhere credible says its solved. Naval History and Heritage Command says nothing conclusive has ever been found.
I think naval doctrine comes into play here. Prior to the January 1943 commanders conference, the doctrine for launching the carries was left to the ship captain or CAG. This is way Hornets planes took off in the order they did while Enterprise and Yorktown had their squadrons had longer range planes leave first so the fuel hungry aircraft left last. Post jan 1943 the doctrine was changed so that what happened to Hornet's aircraft would not happen again.
That’s some GOOD Historical stuff.
Great video. I've always had a strong interest in the Battle Of Midway. As an Australian, I really do appreciate its importance in the Pacific War.
The only after-action report from Hornet was submitted by Mitscher. The required reports from Ring and the surviving squadron COs were never written or discarded.
"Fair Winds and Following Seas" Brothers on your eternal patrol.🇺🇸⚓
i feel like i learnt something... not just the history of a battle gone wrong, but that navigation is hard.
i'm just a ground-pounder, but i know the feeling of "sumtin' ain't right" and it's fine to pretend we don't "know where we are" and re-examine everything in that light
Very interesting, it certainly adds a lot to the simplistic version of that battle that we see in the movies. Also a great illustration of the "fog of war".
My dad was Commo on Ike from 92-93.
Hard to reload airplanes while under assault. Torp squadrons kept 1st Air Fleet in purgatory while the SBDs got onto target.
War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. - von Clausewitz
The amount of hunches and guesswork involved back then is incredible. But that also worked both ways. Kind of makes the space race make total sense now, it was always about eyes in the sky.
You guys are fabulous. Having knowledge of real life at sea makes your commentary absolutely spellbinding.
27:00 this is what I find so interesting, the training is so choreographed, but on game day its such a mess and the attrition rate on some of these flights is pretty scary.
Very thankful our boys got it over the line on this one 🙏
No plan survives contact with the enemy aka nothing ever works as planned once the shit hits the fan in the middle of the fog of war.
Mooch, great short, with Hoser as always... the striking thing to me is, everything is on a hunch. You take a direction, following, sort of, leadership, out into the Pacific trolling for the Japanese Navy, knowing running out of fuel and ditching is a possibility and therefore more than likely death. Upon ditching if you didn't get shot down, you would now be a tiny spec in the Pacific Ocean with a war going on and probability of not getting picked up by either the Japanese or US Navy is 3; slim, fat and none. What it must have taken, manning up the airplane getting ready to launch knowing your chances of surviving the day are not very good. Similar is many respects to the guys getting cranked off the pointy end to go over the beach in Vietnam likely to get shot at and it turns out our own government through Secretary of State Dean Rusk, according to McMaster, would tip off the targets to the Swiss Embassy on that day so civilians could stay home. So where were the AAA guns waiting for the A-6's coming off the ships...?
The confusion of war is permanent.....Thanks guy's....
Shoe🇺🇸
It’s worth noting that Hornet was a brand new carrier and her pilots had virtually no combat experience. Enterprise and Yorktown squadrons did, with all the hit and run raids they had been doing before Hornet entered the theater… and when Hornet did enter the theater, she had 16 B-25s on her deck for the Doolittle Raid and she was late to Coral Sea. So Midway was really their first go at it.
Saying that. There was a missed opportunity to see combat earlier. As Hornet along with Enterprise had only missed The Battle of the Coral Sea by a couple of days.
What about the infamous Bermuda triangle flight 19 avengers that vanished .... ?
I know this is a different scenario, but it continues to intrigue..
thank you
In spite of all the errors, mistakes, inaccurate and unwritten after-action reports filed by Air Group and Task Force Commanders, the US Navy was victorious at Midway. CAG Ring received the Navy Cross for action against the Nippon Cruiser Mikuma on the 6th of June and retired as a Vice Admiral after the war. Admiral Micher was appointed Task Force Commander prior to the Battle of the Philippine Sea that helped crush Nippon naval aviation. The not so obvious issue here is that if the Hornet formation flew 240 instead of 265 they may have saved the Yorktown by attacking and possibly sinking the Hiryu!!
Btw I always listen to your videos the way I do most, which is at 2X speed and it just now occurred to me your outro music was composed at half the tempo I hear it at but just wanted to let you know it sounds awesome at 2X, not sure if that was deliberate or not haha
I think Russel Brand is the only person I listen to a 1X.
@@MikeStallings2023 Yeah, typical conversational pace is much slower than the information density of reading text (which is what most of these style videos are emulating) so unless someone already talks insanely fast 2x is the way to go.
One additional point that's hardly ever remarked upon during these "he said / she said" debates regarding, "Well, Clay Fisher saw Waldron turn right, but So-and-So saw them turn left," is that Waldron's VT-8 flew straight to Kido Butai, and approached it from *dead ahead.* KdB was steering 070 at that time. If Clay Fisher was correct, then VT-8 would have had to approach KdB from its starboard beam. SO, I don't care that the American sources may be in conflict; the Japanese account proves that Waldron *had* to have departed Ring's formation by peeling off to the *left,* then flying southwest, before running into KdB. And that, in turn, proves that Ring's formation was flying a base course of essentially due West, or 265.
That’s a great point Jon.
It’s also intersting that in directing his group to search for the second task force that was believed to be there Mitscher and Ring seemingly made no provision to attack the carriers already located in the event their search proved fruitless.
@@jetdriver Also a good point! Hadn't thought of that, but you're right. Mitscher was lucky that his ticket to RAdm was already punched, because otherwise I think his career might have been finished.
To me, it's inconceivable that this was all Mitscher's call. No way Ring is taking his air group out on that search without Mitscher's say-so. I mean, can you imagine the following conversation: "Where ya takin' the air group, Stan?" "None of yer business, Marc; I'll tell ya when I get back!" "Cool beans, Stan! Good luck out there. I'll keep the coffee warm til you make it back."
Of course, the seeds of Mitscher's wild goose chase actually lie in *Nimitz* situation appraisal in the operations plan (OP 29-42) for the battle, which specifically mention that it's anticipated that the Japanese will be operating in two TFs. That's a bit of mirror-imaging going on there. Even six months after Pearl, we really didn't have a good sense for how the Japanese operated their carriers. That coupled with broken cloud cover that led to Ady only sighting *two* IJN flight decks, meant that everyone got this notion that there was a second TF out there *somewhere*. Spruance was still operating on that assumption as late as the following morning.
@@jonparshall I think you meant to say that it's inconceivable that this wasn't all Mitcher's call. Thats certainly my view.
Like you I just can't imagine Ring thinking he could ignore his orders and fly down a different path on his own authority. Nor can I imagine Mitscher not dropping Ring's hind quarters in a meat grinder if he does. That Ring survives this event professionally is a pretty strong indication that he was following orders to fly out 265.
My guess is that Mitscher doesn't trust either Fletcher or Spruance. Thus, when he gets orders to attack the carriers sighted, he decides on his own that his group is going to find and sink the unlocated second task force that everyone believed was out there for the reasons you cite above. This of course ignores the fact that Yorktown will be launching later than Enterprise and Hornet and therefore remains available to attack that second task force if it's found. Thus, it wasn't remotely Mitscher's job to go find this second task force. His job was to sink the one that had been found.
Another interesting question is why Mitscher doesn't get on the TBS and suggest his airgroup go out 265 after the other carriers. I have to assume it's because he knows that request will be swiftly denied. So he follows the aviator's maxim that it's better to as forgiveness than permission.
I can understand Mitscher's thinking around the second task force. What blows my mind is that he was so utterly certain that he was right that he never considered the possibility that Ring wouldn't find the other task force. It's one thing to disobey orders if you find and sink the enemy doing so. It's a very different matter if your strike accomplishes absolutely nothing as a result.
@@jetdriver "Wasn't"! Exactly. Typo on my part.
@@jetdriver Re: "So he follows the aviator's maxim that it's better to as forgiveness than permission." This is exactly Trent Hone's thesis regarding why Mitscher's career ultimately survived: that the kind of mistake he made, i.e. aggressively swinging for the fences, was the sort of error that Nimitz was likely to forgive. And, eventually, he did--after being in the doghouse for a year or more commanding a PatWing.
The F4U is my favorite WWII aircraft. I love the way they look. Not an air man unfortunately.
This debacle was an example of not using existing intelligence and freelancing at suspected missing carriers, assuming the IJN separated their carriers, just like our naval doctrine.
Gundecking the factual post battle air operations could have destroyed Mitchner's career.
I'm guessing Hornet's air wing bet that the Kido Butai had separated, as they had done off Ceylon. This mirrored our own strategy early in the Pacific, so I see why they did it.
Our messy launch of the first strike was four times slower than the IJN. The lack of coordination of the USN and Midway strike forces was ineffective, and 180 degrees of luck swinging to the USN had much to do with winning the battle, as at 1025 , three carriers were mission killed by 3 dive bomber squadrons. It doesn't matter if they were scuttled or not.
The cap had sufficient time to climb to altitude, we may never know why.
I'm imagining the great IJN air cap was not back at patrol altitudes was they were flush with successful elimination of the Torpedo aircraft, several of the air cap Zeros had to either out ammunition, low on fuel and adrenaline. Waldrons squadron was destroyed by 1000. Then a 20 lull occurs.
It's also amazing that only 3 dive bombers attacked Akagi and one 1,000-pound bomb, courtesy of Dick Best ruined her day. Awareness, skill and fortune made up for the tactical errors.
In short, Nagumo went by the skinny doctrine to the letter.
Like Fletcher and Spruance, he wasn't the best carrier commander in the fleet, and his fateful choices cost Japan the Kido Butai.
Both sides screwed up and luck had much to do with the outcome, but it was enough to gain parity and experience with the seasoned and formerly unbeatable IJN.
Was it decisive?? I'm not sure.
Maybe there is no such thing in modern war.
Further..i didnt know the carriers had a 'homing beacon' i just assumed pilots were using radio direction finders and some charts/maps to get back to the carriers.
The torpedoes aboard VT8 were also highly flawed.
The sacrifice of Torpedo 8 allowed the Dive and Scout Bombers to dive unmolested on the CV's. With the Midway B-26s going first, then the 3 VTs going in uncoordinated brought down the CAP to intercept them. Total loss of focus of the IJN AAA and CAP allowed the US Dive Bombers to concentrate of their targets with devastating effect.
That was really interesting. It should also be noted that besides the Japanese task force drawing attention to itself with flak and smoke, another outcome of the first American attack was that the Japanese fighter cover was now on the deck chasing torpedo bombers, allowing the dive bombers to attack with a relatively unmolested run, decimating the carrier group.
The Battle of Midway
was as decisive as the Battle of Trafalgar!
Although I went towards the army side of the family,
my father was a Dartmouth-trained WW2 submarine officer ( DSC ),
who commanded T-class submarines postwar,
including HMS Tactician
in the Sea of Japan during the Korean War.
My father was a naval officer at Jutland in WW1,
and on his retirement,
the Royal Navy presented him
with the ship's bell from the Battleship HMS Colossus ( 1910 ) -
which was our front door bell.
So I was raised to a Dartmouth-style code of conduct,
and to respect the Royal Navy,
which has a very long history indeed.
/
Midway is all about the fog of war -
a stab in the dark.
Building on the brilliant decodes,
and the 'low on water' confirmation ruse,
the US Navy showed great courage in my opinion,
risking the vital carriers -
and the gamble paid off.
/
One of my father's best friends
was a Fleet Air Arm fighter pilot.
He trained in Florida,
and was out in the Pacific,
including Operation Meridian at Pelambang.
A good man!
Hey mooch i saw an F35 and an F22 fly over my location today(about 8 hours ago), Netherlands Zelhem/Doetinchem
it could possibly be just x2 F35's but it looked like an F22
Those to should be kind of easy to tell apart. if you got good visual on them. for one thing F35 is a singel engine and F22 is a dual engine plane.
@@exploatores the supposedly f22 looked more flat and its widess of the f22, it was like a shadow flying in the air i couldnt tell correctly
A lot of questions and what ifs
A shameful epilogue to the Midway story is that Joseph Rochefort, the cryptography unit leader, got re-assigned in a vindictive move by Admiral Redman, a classic Washington bureaucrat. Redman had a different interpretation of the intel and could not forgive Rochefort for proving him wrong. So the Navy's best comintel officer, also fluent in Japanese which was rare at the time, got transferred out of comintel for the rest of his career. Rochefort had studied the Japanese Navy, language, culture, and codes for more than a decade; a priceless resource sacrificed to serve a higher officer's ego.
Layton's great contribution was liaison with Rochefort. Hypo wasn't part of the Pacific fleet. Rochefort was supposed to decode intercepts and send them to Washington, then the geniuses in Washington would analyze the intel and pass it on to Nimitz. Layton established the direct link to Hypo because he knew Rochefort was the guy to listen to.
Nimitz was under tremendous pressure from King to ignore Hypo's analysis in favor of Washington's, that the real threat was the attack on Alaska. Redman had King's ear and convinced him Nimitz was going the wrong way. To his credit, King delegated the final call to Nimitz, a decision vindicated by history.
Also, Rochefort was technically insubordinate in continuing to work on the Japanese admirals' code. Washington had determined that the code was unbreakable and Rochefort was wasting his time trying to crack it. Rochefort did do the work DC wanted him to do, but continued working on JN-25 essentially on his own time (a lot of Rochefort's people followed his lead on this).
Those Devastators where widow makers!
That's some crazy ash ssit
I'm writing this in the first seconds of the video, and I'm wondering how he is going to work in an F-14 Tomcat...
This wouldn't have happened if they'd had the Tomcat.
Don’t be a Richard, Keith.