I don't understand the constant references to Patton. He was an Army commander, not an Army Group commander like Montgomery, their roles and responsibilities were completely different. Bradley was Montgomery's American equivalent.
You completely ignore the impact of the failure to take Nijmegen Bridge on the outcome of OMG. 30 Corps reached Nijmegen on 19th September, pretty much on schedule, having made up most of the time lost at Son when the bridge there was blown. The failure to take Nijmegen Bridge on Day one, when it was virtually unguarded, meant that by the time the bridge was taken, after heavy fighting, on the evening of the 20th, it was too late to relieve 2nd Para Bn at Arnhem Bridge.
when lead elements of 30 Corps arrived at Grave at 0820 on day three they were still 25 miles/40km from Arnhem, over 1/3 the distance from Joes Bridge to Arnhem. on day 4 Frosts' men ran out of food, ammo and water.
Market-Garden reminds me of Yamamoto’s plan for Midway. Overly complex and synchronized actions. For it to go as plan requires that your enemy do as you expect them to do. When the enemy doesn’t act as predicted the timetable and the plan goes sideways
@@matthewfisher-sp5fq - I'm only aware that Tokyo was formerly known as Edo at the time of the 1603 Tokugawa shogunate, the basis of James Clavell's classic 1975 novel Shōgun.
It still nearly suceeded and was the fastest allied advance against German opposition in the entire September 1944 to February 1945 period. If not for the overly cautious decisions by Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst it likely would have suceeded.
I’ve read lots about this battle & never really looked into what they would have done if 30 Corps had got to Arnhem. Having watched this I think Chris Parry is right & that a much greater disaster would have occurred! Thanks all.
According to TIK's channel, the plan was to drive a 2nd army corp parallel or behind 30 corps in order to secure the Netherlands and surround the Ruhr area.
@fazole No move on the Ruhr could have occurred until the US 1st Army got beyond Aachen and to the Rhine. British 2nd Army could never have taken the Ruhr by itself. As we know, the US 1st Army wasn't able to get much further than Aachen and got bogged down in the Hurtgen Forest. So there would have been a bridgehead over the Rhine that couldn't be utilised for a move on the Ruhr. The immediate next phase if Arnhem was captured was to be a move north to the coast to cut off the western Netherlands. Then there would have to be a wait to move into Germany until the US 1st Army got to the Rhine, which it never did until March 1945.
This is a great discussion of Market Garden. It probably could have mentioned why the drop zones were so far away. They could have dropped a battalion of paratroopers south of the river without heavy equipment but airborne divisions were largely glider-borne and it was the closest location that could accommodate that many gliders. It would have also been worth talking about if they had focused on opening the Scheldt as the British Chiefs of Staff wanted. A single airborne division landed north of the Scheldt and a short push northwest from Arnhem might have cut off the entire 15th Army in Normandy.
I do not understand why they did use more air support. In the falsie pocket they used `cab ranks` where fighter bombers where on call to targets called out by i think RAF controllers. you prob. know already lol. Oh on another note if you have not read try `SAS The Italian Job`
General Brereton rejected Montgomery's alternative to Market Garden. Montgomery toyed with the idea of a paratroop drop at Walcheren Island to clear the Scheldt. Brereton said no. He insisted the terrain was not suitable and the Flak too intense. From September 1st, Eisenhower took Montgomery's job of C-in-C of all ground forces, as well as still remaining Supreme Commander. Eisenhower gave no priority to concentrating on the Scheldt. Eisenhower told Montgomery the second week in September his initial objectives were to attain the Ruhr and Saar and then Antwerp should be ready to supply the advance to Berlin.
A small correction and apologies if it’s already been mentioned in a previous comment. The pontoon bridge at Arnhem was not blown up as was stated. A section of the bridge had been removed (as it was designed to be to allow shipping through) thereby preventing the British forces using it to cross to the south side of the river. It was the railway bridge just outside of Oosterbeek that was blown up by the Germans, just as C Company from 2nd Parachute Battalion were making their crossing.
Love your channel James! A fresh approach to over argued battles. I especially enjoy the use of REAL maps, with "generals" poring over them. So much better than computer graphics! Good job my friend - hope your channel grows exponentially. You leave one with the feeling of a real briefing room. Hint: Imagine shoud you partner up with a modeller or two - and start building sandboxes for the critical little battles within the bigger operations...
Thank you for this episode. It is a fun and interesting series of events that are highlighted. Too bad the number of viewers is so limited. This deserves better.
@34:45 Little correction if I may. The former HQ of Walter Model is not the same place as the current location of the Airborne museum. Model was located at hotel de Tafelberg. Just a couple of hundred meters away.
The headquarters staff were in the Hartenstein, where the museum is located, and Model himself was in the smaller Tafelberg. Elements of the headquarters and signals staff took over most, if not all, of the hotels in the Oosterbeek area.
On the first day 'elements' of a US Para Battalion (1st/508th PIR) did somewhat belatedly move into Nijmegen hours after landing but got stopped in the town. A single patrol finally reached the bridge just before 10 pm and disarmed the 17 'sailors' who were guarding it just as the SS recce battalion arrived obliging them to retreat (this was the motorised unit that gets shot up the next morning on Arnhem bridge). There was lots of mistakes made in this operation (but show me an operation where no mistakes are made!) but the failure to even try to capture Nijmegen bridge on the first day doomed it. I mean its why they were there to capture the bridge. The leading elements of the Guards Armoured arrive on the morning of the 19th and if they had been able to drive straight across the bridge then its only the 10 odd kms to Arnhem. John Frosts forces finally surrender on the evening of the 21st.
before 740 men BLOCKED the last intact bridge in Arnhem area (rail bridge 4 miles/6km from LZ Z destroyed 4 hours after 1st AB landed) the 82nd had captured the 500m bridge north of Grave, the last intact bridge over the Maas Waal canal and the Heights for Brownings' useless HQ brought in by 38 of 1st AB's gliders (capacity 1,000 infantrymen) when lead elements of 30 Corps arrived at Grave at 0820 on day three they were still 25 miles/40km from Arnhem, over 1/3 the distance from Joes Bridge to Arnhem.
@@nickdanger3802 When did 30 corps arrive at Nijmegen is the important question. And the important fact is the Bridge (and the town) was already supposed to be in allied hands on the first day. And the reason it wasn't is because Colonel Lindquist’s 508th regiment made no move to do so until 1800 hrs on the 17th and made an anaemic attempt to capture the bridge with just 2 companies of the 1/508. Had it been elements of 30 corps could have crossed it on the 19th. Instead they had to fight their way through the town and wait for boats to be brought forwards which delayed the capture to the late afternoon of the 20th. By this time it had become too late for the British Paras at Arnhem. All of the other Paratrooper Brigades tasked with capturing Bridges made rapid and heroic attempts on the first day. Except the 508th who dithered and made a limp wristed and far too late attempt to capture Nijmegen. Plenty of errors in the operation to go around but failure to capture the Bridge at Nijmegen on day 1 was the one that doomed the op.
Great video idea, we all like the "what if" questions about history's big moments. But rarely see them discussed so thoroughly and with real detail from qualified experts on the matter. Great video, as has become customary!
Marching one armored column single file over one road on top of an elevated lane for 55 of the 70 miles was a disaster waiting to happen. One big choke pointand in fact a shooting gallery
@@patrickschellen737 John Keegan for the most part a great British historian stated that the so called leaders and great Allied minds failed across the board.There were at least 600 more flights than D-Day 3 months earlier. That was maybe 30 miles across the channel and another 20 miles inland.
These flights took off from airfields at least 50 miles west of london and the distance to Arnhem was 300 miles - one way.That's a lot of time 80 yrs ago in prop driven cargo planes. Not only that there was over 2hrs less daylight plus fog and mist from the cool night air every morning. And the whole sale bombing of the Reich had started and was going almost 24/7. Bomber Harris and Hap Arnold weren't letting go of any more of there valuable flight crews/mechanics for Montgomery's operations that would hinder theirs. British Planners had canceled similar operations Linnet and Comet for very good reasons. Monty getting his grubby little mitts on two US Air Borne Divisions changes not of the difficulties - Monty Garden
The Germans had been slaughtered badly at the Falaise Gap and were in headlong route into Holland. I can see that the allies wanted to strike while the iron was hot. They were over confident and Urqhart, not having much airborne experience, was probably not the best man for the job for the Arnhem landing. A para drop should have been attempted on the town, despite risk and on the southern end of bridge from the beginning in order to sieze it in the classic coupe d' main tactic. An experienced airborne general would have insisted on this. The The resting SS reserve units near the LZs was just bad luck.
@@fazole Urqhart demanded it as did boy browning but transport command refused for night drops more than one drop a day double tow gliders and coup de main attacks on the bridge and ridgeway sided with the american commander of transport command
The Allies greatly underestimated the German Speed of reaction on all Levels - Not only Generals. The German Officer Corps was trained to always seek the initiative. Even Captains were putting together small Kampfgruppen near Arnheim an were Counter attacking - a mindset Allied Officers with the exception of maybe the Paras and the Rangers- were Never trained to have. German Officers were often wondering, why allied troops were waiting for support or New orders instead of exploiting Chances brought by a quick breakthrough. With this Training in the Sense of „Auftragstaktik“ and „Schwerpunkt“ the Allies May have had a better chance. In the setup for market Garden it is hard to See and chance of winning Arnheim
They could have suceeded with double missions on day one, closer drops to the Arnhem bridge, the 82nd taking the Nijmegen bridge early and Brereton not preventing tactical ground attack air support.
Yes lots of inaccuracies here. Kompanie Hummel was 200km away in Bielefeld, Germany when the paratroops were dropping on the 17th. It was then put on trains and sent to the Netherlands, arriving on the 19th. Interestingly, Kompanie Mielke, with Panzer IIIs and IVs, was also in Bielefeld when the paras were dropping. This was the first German tank unit to attack Frosts men at the Arnhem bridge. Just goes to show the overall lack of German armour in the Netherlands if they had to call on units 200 km away in Germany. Also the famous pictures of Stug IIIs alongside Waffen SS panzergrenadiers in Arnhem weren't SS Stugs. They were Heer, from Sturmgeschutz Brigade 280, which also arrived from Germany on the 19th. This unit was heading for the Aachen area before being diverted to the Netherlands.
Yeah. This was very well done both men had a good grasp of the situation. One thing I was surprised to see not mentioned - as the alternative plan - to clear the Scheldt Estuary so that Antwerp could be used as a port. Antwerp was a very good port and the allies had captured it - in tact. The Germans had units sacrificed in holding out to the Channel Ports as long as they could - to keep the Allies from using them - and - to blow up these ports before they surrendered so that they would have to have extensive repairs done - as at Cherbourg - before they could be used. The trouble was - Antwerp was at then end of the Scheldt Estuary and the German15th Army controlled the North Bank of it. If you contrast the Market air drops to the D-Day drops - those had months of planing and coordination. They had to take place during a fixed period of time so the tides, the moon and the other considerations were taken into account. Market - Garden was thrown together in a week in order to try and take advantage of the Germans weakness - but - they just didn't manage to do it. .
When reading known history, back then, it was still expected that the Western Allies, not the Soviets, would reach Berlin 1st. The Soviets had not yet taken Belgrade. Meanwhile, it gradually became clear that the US was becoming the senior partner in the Western Alliance. A successful Market Garden would have reasserted UK status in the Alliance.
Clearing the Scheldt estuary was not an "alternative" plan. It was scheduled to be done after MARKET GARDEN, which needed to be executed as soon as possible to take advantageof the Germans disarray. They were scrambling to establish defence lines along tha major rivers and canals, while the defences and troops around the Scheldt estuary had been part of Hitler's Atlantic Wall since 1943. Montgomery originlly requested an airborne operation - INFATUATE - on Walcheren to assist the Canadians in this on 4 September at the same time he was planning the first Arnhem operation - COMET. The Walcheren operation was refused by Brereton and the plan was resurrected in November with amphibious landings instead of airborne. MARKET GARDEN was not thrown together in a week but was developed from earlier Arnhem operation COMET and a three division air plan for LINNET I and II, all recycled from earlier plans being developed since the NOrmandy invasion and in some cases before. The reason MARKET failed was because the 508th PIR did not send a battalion to seize the undefended Nijmegen bridge immediately after landing as the 82nd Airborne divisional commander had instructed. The plan, compromised as it was by the air planners, wasn't followed on the ground by an officer who was not a good field commander and had not performed well in Normandy.
@@davemac1197 Browning was overall AB commander and he never ordered an immediate siezure of the Nijmegen bridge. It is speculation, but quite possible that Ultra intercepts deduced the German Ardennes attack planned for Nov. originally, but placed it as staging from the the Dutch border and this is why so much effort was put into defending and probing the Reichswald zone instead of immediately siezing the Nijmegen bridge. Also the 82nd's objectives were spread far apart. They had to hold from Nijmegen, the Groesbeek heights all the way down to Veghel bridge; a huge area to cover with limited motor transport. When Ryan wrote A Bridge Too Far, Ultra had not been declassified either.
@@fazole Ryan was very selective about what he chose to put into his book. He had far, far more information at his fingertips that didn't suit his narrative and others such as Bergstrom and Neillands have made full use of it to dispel many of the myths that Ryan's book had created (and the thoroughly entertaining, but borderline fictitious "A Bridge Too Far", which is pretty clearly as much "knowledge" about Market Garden as many of the commentators on these pages seem to have!)
There are many books about the Allies and their problems, few from the German side. The exception is It Never Snows in September by Robert J Kershaw. The thing that stood out for me was the Germans improvisation. All the times I have wargamed this, the Allies I have won.
A German post battle report concludes that the biggest mistake made by the allies were too dispersed drops and over a number of days. That was the fault of Brereton and Williams of the USAAF and Hollinghurst of the RAF.
@@lyndoncmp5751 Hollinghurst was overuled by the USAAF as they commanded allied transport command he said he could have done coup de main he said 2 or even 3 flights per day was possible he said his men could do double tows the americans said no to every one of them
@@wargey3431 Yes I've read that Brereton rejected requests from the RAF to fly double missions for Arnhem etc, but also I've read that it was Hollinghurst who gave the final say so for the drop and landing zones around Arnhem. And also that Urquhart didn't protest strongly enough against them.
@@lyndoncmp5751 I think it was more beresford blocked it and Hollinghurst and Urqhart pushed back but he refused to acquiesce so they had to ok the final plan The lack of use of the 2nd tactical airforce really didn’t help we know how scared German armour was of typhoons
None of the paras could hold a bridge as it took to long for the column to advance the y weren't dropping with that much artillary the Gerries still had 88s in the area
For the delays being outlined, GADs HC were in the out skirts of Nijmegen before lunch on the 19th 42 hours after the start. Grenadier Group has crossed the Grave Bridge by mid morning 19th before being stopped by Boy Browning, I assume for O’Gp as 82nd hasn’t taken the Nijmegen bridge. If the Nijmegen had been taken on 17th, guarded only by a Platoon-, or even the morning of 18th, GAD would have been across the Waal 7 miles from Arnhem at D+48, with the full combat power of the Grenadier Group.
There was even a three hour delay on the 19th when the 82nd admin were preparing the battle through Nijmegen towards the bridge. Gavin got frustrated by this delay.
Excellent thought provoking video. What happens if the para drop on Arnhem is delayed but the other two bridges are captured first, 30 Corps advance and then the drop on Arnhem takes place?
In that scenario the Germans would have sent forces across the Arnhem bridge towards Nijmegen (as they did after Frosts men were defeated) and would have blocked any allied advance to Arnhem. A later paratroop drop into Arnhem would have been impossible, especially as more German forces would have been in the Arnhem area by then.
@@lyndoncmp5751 which is also the reason why Market Garden needed to be done before the clearing of the Scheldt, as if the order of operations had been reversed, the Germans would simply have destroyed all of the bridges across all of the waterways, effectively boxing 21AG into a corner and making EVERY waterway an amphibious crossing, with the only difference being the scope.
The same goes for the troops being dropped on the other bridges - drop in amongst the enemy (which is what paratroops are supposed to do) on the far sides of the bridges, diminish the enemy defence, and work backward to take them. Instead they are not only fighting to cross water obstacles but simultaneously fighting to overwhelm the enemy entrenched.
The Germans ability to form cohesive and effective Kampfgruppen from the remnants of shattered divisions and regiments was amazing, especially in the defense. When many of these same units went on the offensive on the same ground later on, they were far less successful. Granted, allied airpower and artillery had a say in that.
the americans are always said to be the superior fire masters if anything it was actually the british the work the artillery did in NWE was amazing at Arnhem 30 corps guns were nothing short of spectacular they were hitting german positions without hitting their own with almost no fire control orders if it wasnt for the arrival of those guns none of 6th airborne would have got out
I agree. It's novice stuff that they talk about Montgomery or Patton, as if Patton was the American's Army Group commander. Bradley was, and they don't even mention Hodges US 1st Army in between, which was given priority for nearly 3 months with its Hurtgen Forest, Aachen and Lorraine campaigns end September to end December.
Dissapointed , was expecting a full episode about why the bulge would be succesfull if Arnhem would have been won. instead the majority is the story about the battle of arnhem, lost as historic. While pretty well presented, but it is not the thing the title is proclaiming, unfortunately :(
I'm not sure they mentioned it, but II SS PzKorps were specifically trained for Paratrooper insertion. This would be specifically the 9th SS and 10th SS. But nonetheless a very detailed list of events they covered. Another great movie to watch instead of A Bridge too Far is "Theirs is the Glory"
The results would be the same. At the end of the day neither Patton or 30 Corps would be going anywhere until the Nijmegen Waal bridge was cleared for the advance to Arnhem.
Another great episode. Thank you very much, gentlemen. This series is so fascinating. Maybe Jutland, Yorktown, Saratoga or, heaven help us, .Carthage defeats Rome?
It was a huge gamble; maybe Patton and Middleton could have pulled it off, but Monty and Horrocks had never showed and never would show any evidence they were capable of a balls-to-the-wall thrust like was needed.
@@sumivescent & the next two following months'as well....... I can never understand the obsession with Patton that so many have. As a commander, he was adequate, at best.
Swap 101st and 1st airborne around. So the division that drops in 3 waves is closest to reinforcement. And order 30 corps to advance at dawn rather then 1430.
What was the reason to wait so late for 30 corps to get started. I am not sure I have ever seen it explained. The film portrayed the delay as foolish arrogance with Michael Cain as Vandeleur saying "It wouldn't do to arrive early, nicely on time is better".
@@fazole I think it was because 16 other airborne drops had been cancelled before so 30 corps wanted to wait till the airplanes flew over so they knew for certain thay the drops would take place before committing to the attack. I was also thinking that maybe if 30 corps had attacked earlier it would of removed the element of surprise for the airborne troops. So the drops had to happen first then 30 corps advances. Like with d day. But because the airborne wanted to drop in day light the advance of 30 corps was pushed back. So in that regard a night time drop might of been better meaning that 30 corps could of started at dawn. Meaning they would have more time to advance so they could of got to Eindhoven on day 1 rather then day 2. However a nighttime drop of course means the airborne wouldn't of been as coordinated..
Apologies for changing the subject, but under the heading of “future topics,” I’d like to ask an unrelated question. We’ve all heard about the Doolittle raid on Tokyo in 1942, with most reports noting that it was actually a much needed publicity stunt/morale boost, doing relatively minor material damage. What would have happened if Doolittle’s raiders had targeted the Imperial Palace, killing Hirohito in the process?
It's a good question about if Carrington had died. He negotiated a settlement between Greece and Turkey in 1987 (?) when there was a flare up in the Aegean and the Lancaster House agreement re Zimbabwe Rhodesia. Would there have been another negotiator capable of doing so? (Probably yes, tbh)
@@johndawes9337 Did Browning order Gavin to take the Waal bridge immediately? No, he wanted the LZs heavily defended and the Reichswald probed. Then, the 82nd's AO was huge, from Veghel to Nijmegen to the German border. And doing it with limited Jeep transport...
@@fazoleBrowning authorised Gavin to move on the bridge immediately if the situation was doable, and in fact Gavin TWICE ordered Lindquist to do so. Browning never prevented the 82nd from taking the bridge on day one if they could do it.
@@wargey3431Emphasising and prioritising the heights is not the same as ignoring the bridge though and not allowing Gavin to strike for the bridge on day one. Gavin was emphatic that he had authorisation to strike for the bridge ASAP if the situation in the 508th's sector permitted it. Browning did not prevent Gavin from striking for the bridge immediately if the 508th's sector was quiet enough, which it was. The problem was a mix up in communication between Gavin and Lindquist (likely Lindquist at fault there) and then Lindquist dilly dallying around for another 2 hours after Gavin repeated his order to strike for the bridge. The 508th was ready and had secured it's drop zone by 3.30pm. It didn't move on the bridge for another 5 hours.
If the Germans had some how won the bulge it would have done little. The Germans had few reserves , the eastern front was collapsing and the allies still had plenty reinforcements and the French army was growing weekly to help in manpower with plenty of equipment coming in and the allies were still climbing up the Italian peninsular.
41:06 I am not convinced. If Gavin had taken the Niemagen bridge ,the armor could have gotten to Arnham w/in 3 day. The Brits in arnham held out for 7.
@@bbbabrock 4 days at least, not 3, it wasn't just open roads between Nijmegen and Arnhem. And first part of convoy only reached Nijmegen on D+2 afternoon, had the bridge been taken they likely spend the night in Nijmegen. You battle your way forward on D+3, incur casualties (both men and machine) and use lots of supplies along the way. And reaching outskirts Arnhem isn't the same as linking up. So after that what do you have left to fight with and to supply Airborne? And that's when the major cutting of supply lines comes in.
@@patrickschellen737 D+4 Frost still holds the northern side german armour is still almost all on the north bank apart from the recon battalion with mainly scout cars they would have quite easily in all likelihood reached john frosts position with the entire corps
@@wargey3431 yes, but you don't account for the running out of stuff like ammunition and not being able to get supplies. Weapons don't just magically appear out of thin air
Note: It is generally known, I believe, that the airborne operations proposed prior to Market Garden were cancelled because the objectives were overtaken by the allied advance, not because they were not deemed feasible. ( Why are the gentlemen calling Nijmegen "Nijmwegen"?)
9th SS Panzer and 10th SS Panzer had barely 3000 soldiers and no significant armour. Where does James get his figures of 7000 each?? The Hamilcars were used to bring in the 17pdr AT guns, and their tow vehicles. Urquhart elected to go in "heavy" on that first lift at the expense of additional troops. 1st AB were not "lightly armed paras" at all. They had their 17pdr and 6pdr AT guns, the 75mm howitzers, the 20mm Polsten AAA guns, the 3" mortar teams, the Vickers teams and their usual compliment of PIATs, all brought in on that first drop. In fact, this included the 6pdrs that were part of the 1st Polish Independent Bde, even though the Poles, themselves, were not being put down on the ground until later.
I like the show and the what if at the end. What doesn't work is the oblique angle closeups if the maps..too hard to follow...using real maps is great but also other websites use graphics which simplify and make more understandable...perhaps simplifued maps would help
Leave the maps on screen for longer! Some peeps might actually want to orientate themselves and understand the key terrain of the battle! The maps are much more useful than wide shots of your three mugs against a studio graphic!
I really enjoy this channel thank you! But please remove the logo in the top right corner. Show it for 20 seconds and let it go, it’s distracting imho. Keep up the good work 🙏🏻
All battleplans, in all wars, in all of history - have one thing in common: The moment contact is made with the enemy - the battleplan doesn't work anymore. That's why you need good leadership at platoon level. Wars are not won by generals in planning rooms, but by leaders of small groups of men - tired, crawling through mud, under fire..
MG had no OVERALL field commander. The AB commander was Browning and the 30 Corps commander was Horrocks. Monty was nowhere to be seen or even heard. No overall leadership when things went off the rails, indicating Monty was more concerned about recriminatiions if it failed, so he CYA'd.
There was evidence before they landed of an ss armoured unit in the area, they knew their radios didn’t work but it was unreported, they didn’t have enough transport aircraft for the mission yet the plan wasn’t rejected, it was a self inflicted failure. And the Germans were aware of how important those bridges were, why was success believed?✌️❤️🇬🇧
The plan was upgraded from COMET to MARKET because they were aware of the SS units in the Arnhem area, and they didn't know how badly the radios would be affected by the terrain. The self-inflicted failure was by the USAAF air planners reducing the airlifts to one per day and ruling out the dawn glider coup de main assaults on the three big bridges. Also by Gavin ruling out a parachute coup de main drop on the Nijmegen bridge, and by Colonel Lindquist on the ground when he failed to follow Gavin's instruction to send his 1st Battalion 508th PIR to the Nijmegen bridge immediately after landing.
@davemac1197 On top of that, Brereton wanting the skies clear for his planned 3 days of drops (which ballooned into a week or so), preventing the use of tactical air support. More caution from Brereton.
@@lyndoncmp5751 - my understanding was that while the airborne transports were in the air, the 2nd TAF in Belgium were grounded to deconflict the traffic, which was also the reason for GARDEN starting 90 minutes after MARKET, partly because Horrocks wanted to be sure the airlift was not cancelled before committing to the advance, but also because he had no tactical air support until the transports were on their way home. The real problem was that Brereton's 1st AAA failed to inform 2nd TAF when the airlifts were delayed by weather in England, but the skies over Belgium and the Netherlands were still clear - so the 2nd TAF were grounded according to the planned schedule, when they could have been flying. Part of the problem may be Brereton's own absence, since he had decided to travel up the corridor by car to visit his divisions, with Matthew Ridgway just a few miles behind him doing the same thing. Ridgway had no role in MARKET GARDEN as Browning's HQ was the Corps HQ on the ground, but his staff in England were managing the resupply flights and ensuring there were enough red berets and... things... being supplied.
Market Garden was actually the fastest allied advance against German opposition in the entire September 1944 to February 1945 period. Nearly 100km of German held ground taken, and kept, in just 3 days. If not for the overly cautious decisions by Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst, the operation likely would have suceeded.
Armies generally do not make great sweeping advances in winter. MG took some land, at great tactical and strategic costs, to acquire mostly valueless boggy land. Too much invested- little of worth achieved.
@@finallyfriday. While the ultimate goal of breaching the Rhine and turning the west wall failed, By the 25th September, 5 major water crossings had been achieved (including the Waal and Maas rivers) and a 65 mile salient/bridgehead had been driven into Southern Holland. This bridgehead formed a constant threat of a renewed allied thrust into Southern Holland and the plains of Northern Germany, which was realised the following February. The strongest German forces in the area (II SS Panzer Corps, and Student's Fallschirmjaeger army) were split and their ability to conduct offensive operations never recovered. Neutralisation of the bridge at Arnhem after the battle debilitated German offensive operations in Southern Holland as well as creating a springboard into Germany.
General Frederick 'Boy' Browning who commanded the 1st Airborne Corp for Market Garden has been criticised for using desperately needed transport planes to bring in his HQ to be dropped with 82nd Airborne. Planes that could of been used by the British to bring in more men at Arnhem.
Not much of a win..The Sheldt Estuary was still in German hands, Antwerp still had to be cleared..without Antwerp and it's supplies, the Bulge battle was moot. Germany needed the Fuel there.
Whatever happened to consolidation of forces and comprehensive logistics? Did the allied commanders learn nothing from the problems that Hitler had in Russia?
A better idea would have been to leave Arnheim, and try for the ports in and around Antwerp. This might have partially alleviated the Dutch starvation that winter and given a deep water port several hours steaming closer to the front and not wasted so much fuel transporting fuel, ammo, food, fresh troops to the front.
The biggest allies problem is logistics. Without Antwerp in operation they can't support the troops going into the Ruhr. So taken Arnhem they have to stop to first take Zeeland to control the waterway into Antwerp. To do that they will need most of the material brought all the way from France on trucks. The corridor to Arnhem is also too narrow and vulnerable, so they have to widen that first. That operation did not start until mid October also because of logistics.
That was Eisenhower in a nutshell. Eisenhowers broad front strategy was a dispersal of forces across a 500 km front, which was far harder to supply, and it severely weakened the allied striking power. As a result the Germans were able to resist this for months. Montgomery's idea was a more concentrated northern thrust with all armies sticking together in the powerful punch aimed first at the Ruhr then across the north German plain to Berlin. This was strategically and logistically more sound. What benefit was there in trying to get across the Vosges Mountains in the Alsace? Zero strategic benefits there. Eisenhower simply wanted all American armies to share in the victory and didnt want the victory to be British/Canadian heavy in the north.
@@ducthman4737The plan was to attain the Ruhr first and THEN build up supplies from Antwerp for the advance across Germany. Eisenhower said this to Montgomery on the 7th September. Eisenhower was now C-in-C of all allied ground forces from 1st September, as well as Supreme Commander. Eisenhower gave zero priority in early September to stopping the chase to Germany and to open Antwerp instead.
@@PeteOttonIt would still have taken a month or so to clear the Scheldt and open Antwerp. Clearing the mines alone took ages. We could argue if that happened and British 2nd Army advanced across southern Netherlands in late October/November in worse weather it might have been far more difficult and the Germans would have been stronger, so there could have been far more casualties. Also the Dutch might have still done what they did and tried to help the allies so the same thing likely would have occurred from the Germans.
If market garden had succeeded then the threat to the corridor would have been very obvious and therefore presumably very heavily defended against. I think a lot of the US forces to the South would have been moved North if 30th corps had broken out of the Arnhem bridgehead.
The US 1st Army was planned to break out of their own bridgehead at the same time in a pincer double envelopment of the Ruhr. The British bridgehead would not be Arnhem itself, it was planned to be on the river Ijssel, the final distributary of the Rhine delta in the Netherlands before the German border and the bridgeheads were to be at Deventer, Zutphen, Doesburg, and Westervoort east of Arnhem.
The US 1st Army already started going into the Hurtgen Forest as Market Garden was happening. They should have used the opportunity to strike at Aachen itself while the panzer units were being diverted to the Netherlands.
The German forces, particularly armoured, diverted to Market Garden in September, with more sent there for the German counter attack in early October SHOULD have helped the Americans take Aachen and move beyond it. That never happened and the Americans got themselves bogged down in the Hurtgen Forest instead of taking the opportunity to get beyond Aachen against weakened German forces that momentarily lacked much armour in the Aachen region, as much of it was sent to the Netherlands .
@@flashgordon6670 Hurtgen Forest didn't need to be done at all. All it did was waste lives and time and ensured that there were insufficient transports for the following drops for Market Garden.
If you are going to talk about history at least take the time to get the details right. Just a couple of examples. The pontoon bridge at Arnhem was not blown up, in fact the Germans had dismantled the central element which was designed to allow river traffic. The missing element was anchored outside the area controlled by the British. Another howler. There was no 710th Panzer Brigade at Son. It was the 107th Panzer Brigade commanded by Oberst Freiherr von Maltzahn. There are other mistakes. You need to do better!!!
even the bit about the "two options, Monty's or Patton's" is incorrect. The one that Montgomery REALLY wanted was to have Bradley's 1st US Army and his own Second Army to go side by side through Aachen (or similar). Pushing Patton through the Saar was never an efficient way of getting into Germany, which is why it was never done in the end. Eisenhower's insistence on the flawed broad front curtailed everyone's ability to get anything done.
We have wrapped this in rosy self-perpetuating myths for 80 years. It was a ghastly disaster, we got thoroughly thrashed and beaten, we inconvenienced the enemy trying to cross a bridge for two days. Our Commanders offered little exceptional in terms if their performance. We forgot to make sure our radios worked. And we blamed it all on the Poles and the RAF when it went to rat poo, and gave Boy Browning one of the least well deserved Knighthoods in history. Our nostalgia has prevented a deep and incisive analysis for almost a century.
I don’t accept this for one moment. If Market Garden had been successful then the Allied forces would have pushed straight into the Ruhr. The German Bulge forces would have been drawn northward to protect the fatherland from the invaders and therefore no advance through the Ardennes in December.
The "German Bulge forces" in December were engaged in September fighting MARKET GARDEN in the Netherlands or blocking US 1st Army at Aachen. The Germans had mobilised the Reserve Army (operation 'Valkyrie') in the first week of September to man the Westwall and the non-existent defence lines along rivers and canals in the Netherlands with training and replacement units. This obviously impacted the Reserve Army's ability to train replacements for the Field Army, which had the effect that many front line units involved in the Ardennes counter-offensive were still not up to full strength. If the Allies had crossed the Rhine in the Netherland and then the planned US 1st Army crossing between Bonn and Cologne, then the next phase pincer on the Ruhr could only have been met with what was left over.
Biggest allies problem is logistics. Without Antwerp in operation they can't support the troops going into the Ruhr. So taken Arnhem they have to stop to first take Zeeland to control the waterway into Antwerp. To do that they will need most of the material brought all the way from France on trucks.
@@ducthman4737 - that was the plan after MARKET GARDEN. The pincer envelopment of the Ruhr could not take place until US 1st Army had also established a Rhine crossing, and at the time of MARKET GARDEN they were still being blocked west of Aachen. The Canadians would meanwhile be clearing the Scheldt estuary to allow Antwerp to be opened.
@@danwilliams4051 clearly you fall into the ”what if” game. Play it out to its natural conclusion and you go all the way back to the march into the Rheinland in 1936, but hey go for it if you think it makes you a great WWIi historian.
I'm thinking biteing of more than you can chew. Like Uther historians i think operation market Garden was a bad idea. Could do with a documentary about monti casino.
There's no denying that the British have an extraordinary ability to narrate military events in a way that is both skilful and compelling. But it's also undeniable that they present their defeats and failures as if they were victories. At the risk of being misunderstood and misinterpreted: what about the heroism, the competence of the opponent? Is there no place for it?
They mentioned the quality of the Germans and their ability to react quickly plenty of times. They also mention the failures on the allied side plenty of times. The bottom line is that the Germans retreated, losing nearly 100km of ground including major Dutch towns Eindhoven and Nijmegen. The British 2nd Army got across the Waal River, closer to Germany.
I know that generals only get to their positions by being bullish and arrogant, but they really needed to stow their egos at times. Monty and Patton were the worst offenders, but there were other like Clark in Italy. None of them could see their own deficiencies, and were willing to thrown men into the meat grinder without a thought to the loss of life.
Monty was certainly arrogant but you cant accuse him of feeding his men into the meat grinder. He knew even from 1942 that the British were running out of manpower and his decisions and tactics reflected this
Actually Montgomery admitted his own mistakes in Market Garden and didn't pass the buck onto anyone, when he could have. Montgomery even backed down when Taylor didnt like Montgomery's suggestion for the 101st drop zones. The most arrogant was Eisenhower. Not content with being Supreme Commander he also wanted Montgomery's job of C-in-C of all allied ground forces and then Trumans job of President of the USA. Eisenhower never once accepted his broad front strategy was a failure and never admitted responsibility for the Ardennes retreat and unnecessary casualties there.
To be honest, ya'll and the others did very well during market garden. We dropped the ball, though at the moment I can't remember the name of the bridge/ town.
If you have speakers pointing things out on a map -- SHOW THE MAP! We don't want to see the pointers, but what they're pointing at. And rather the maps than just talking heads.
@@fazole It’s myth that any petrol was taken from Patton for Montgomery. Patton was already at a standstill before planning for Market Garden even started. Patton finally began receiving adequate supplies on September 4, (two weeks before MG) after a week’s excruciating pause” - Harry Yeide Market Garden only had priority in extra supply transport laid on. It didn’t take away any actual supplies from any US army. Nor did Market Garden stop all operations on the western front. Patton’s 3rd Army was still trying to take Metz and US 1st Army began its Hurtgen Forest campaign on September 19th, 2 days after Market Garden began. Did you know that the twin pronged US 1st Army attack in the Hurtgen Forest and Aachen in October 1944 used FOUR TIMES as many men and supplies as the ground element of Market Garden, which wasn’t even a full 2nd British Army attack? “ It was commonly believed at Third Army H.Q. that Montgomery's advance through Belgium was largely maintained by supplies diverted from Patton. (See Butcher, op. cit., p. 667.) This is not true. The amount delivered by the ' air-lift ' was sufficient to maintain only one division. No road transport was diverted to aid Montgomery until September 16th. On the other hand, three British transport companies, lent to the Americans on August 6th " for eight days," were not returned until September 4th.' “ - CHESTER WILMOT THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE. 1954 P 589ty John Peate.
@@fazoleAh the old myth. Market Garden used British allocated fuel. Nothing was diverted from Patton. Patton had already been failing to take Metz (began September 6th) before Market Garden was even green lit. The whole front should have been shut down for a week to help Market Garden. It wasn't. Patton was allowed to continue in the Lorraine and Hodges started going into the Hurtgen Forest (September 19th).
And how do you do Market Garden without the holdups? 20.000 vehicles, 100km, partly very narrow roads with many bottle necks, vehicles will have issues and block the road, the enemy has a role and weather as well. The loss of Son bridge and damage at Veghel bridge needing rebuilds are things you can expect to happen in at least 1-2 places. I think the hold ups are inevitable, therefore the plan is irresponsible because it's so unlikely to go swiftly.
@@patrickschellen737 Nijmegen was not taken on the first day, which was possible. They spent too much time worrying about the groosbeak heights, and not taking the bridge which was the whole idea of the drop there. 30 core had to wait to have this bridge taken, which took manpower and time.
I really enjoy this recurring panel. Chris Copson and Chris Parry play off each other very well, and you moderate very smoothly James.
Criminally undersubbed channel so far. I've been really enjoying these shows. Keep it coming James 👍
Thanks for the reminder to subscribe. Sorted.
Agree, a hidden gem of youtube. The tank museum channel has some good numbers now. Let's get this one going too!
I don't understand the constant references to Patton. He was an Army commander, not an Army Group commander like Montgomery, their roles and responsibilities were completely different. Bradley was Montgomery's American equivalent.
Very interesting video to watch. Just a month ago I visited the battlefields of Arnhem and Oosterbeek.
Keep in mind that the bridge that is there today is not the bridge from 1944.
You completely ignore the impact of the failure to take Nijmegen Bridge on the outcome of OMG. 30 Corps reached Nijmegen on 19th September, pretty much on schedule, having made up most of the time lost at Son when the bridge there was blown. The failure to take Nijmegen Bridge on Day one, when it was virtually unguarded, meant that by the time the bridge was taken, after heavy fighting, on the evening of the 20th, it was too late to relieve 2nd Para Bn at Arnhem Bridge.
No they didn’t, they addressed that and afterwards hypothesised if that didn’t happen.
when lead elements of 30 Corps arrived at Grave at 0820 on day three they were still 25 miles/40km from Arnhem, over 1/3 the distance from Joes Bridge to Arnhem.
on day 4 Frosts' men ran out of food, ammo and water.
Market-Garden reminds me of Yamamoto’s plan for Midway. Overly complex and synchronized actions. For it to go as plan requires that your enemy do as you expect them to do. When the enemy doesn’t act as predicted the timetable and the plan goes sideways
Did you know Yamamoto was the name year's ago of Tokyo don't know if I've spelt Tokyo correctly Also the name off ww2 Japanese Battle ship ⚓
@@matthewfisher-sp5fq … your thinking of the IJN ship Yamato. I don’t know if Admiral Yamamoto had ship named after him
You need margins, especially in your timings. Market Garden had none.
@@matthewfisher-sp5fq - I'm only aware that Tokyo was formerly known as Edo at the time of the 1603 Tokugawa shogunate, the basis of James Clavell's classic 1975 novel Shōgun.
It still nearly suceeded and was the fastest allied advance against German opposition in the entire September 1944 to February 1945 period.
If not for the overly cautious decisions by Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst it likely would have suceeded.
I’ve read lots about this battle & never really looked into what they would have done if 30 Corps had got to Arnhem.
Having watched this I think Chris Parry is right & that a much greater disaster would have occurred! Thanks all.
According to TIK's channel, the plan was to drive a 2nd army corp parallel or behind 30 corps in order to secure the Netherlands and surround the Ruhr area.
@fazole
No move on the Ruhr could have occurred until the US 1st Army got beyond Aachen and to the Rhine. British 2nd Army could never have taken the Ruhr by itself. As we know, the US 1st Army wasn't able to get much further than Aachen and got bogged down in the Hurtgen Forest. So there would have been a bridgehead over the Rhine that couldn't be utilised for a move on the Ruhr. The immediate next phase if Arnhem was captured was to be a move north to the coast to cut off the western Netherlands. Then there would have to be a wait to move into Germany until the US 1st Army got to the Rhine, which it never did until March 1945.
James Hanson has the most expressive left eyebrow in broadcasting. Which I very much enjoy.
I think you mean "right eyebrow" but yes I agree 😂
Best episode yet, possibly because it's such a familiar story. However, I never thought about the possible implications of the operation succeeding.
Please keep these videos coming, quickly becoming my favorite channel on UA-cam. Channel will have a huge subscriber base in no time.
This is a great discussion of Market Garden. It probably could have mentioned why the drop zones were so far away. They could have dropped a battalion of paratroopers south of the river without heavy equipment but airborne divisions were largely glider-borne and it was the closest location that could accommodate that many gliders. It would have also been worth talking about if they had focused on opening the Scheldt as the British Chiefs of Staff wanted. A single airborne division landed north of the Scheldt and a short push northwest from Arnhem might have cut off the entire 15th Army in Normandy.
I do not understand why they did use more air support. In the falsie pocket they used `cab ranks` where fighter bombers where on call to targets called out by i think RAF controllers. you prob. know already lol.
Oh on another note if you have not read try `SAS The Italian Job`
General Brereton rejected Montgomery's alternative to Market Garden. Montgomery toyed with the idea of a paratroop drop at Walcheren Island to clear the Scheldt. Brereton said no. He insisted the terrain was not suitable and the Flak too intense.
From September 1st, Eisenhower took Montgomery's job of C-in-C of all ground forces, as well as still remaining Supreme Commander. Eisenhower gave no priority to concentrating on the Scheldt. Eisenhower told Montgomery the second week in September his initial objectives were to attain the Ruhr and Saar and then Antwerp should be ready to supply the advance to Berlin.
@@anthonyhowrard526 Allied airfields were much closer to hand in Normandy.
A small correction and apologies if it’s already been mentioned in a previous comment. The pontoon bridge at Arnhem was not blown up as was stated. A section of the bridge had been removed (as it was designed to be to allow shipping through) thereby preventing the British forces using it to cross to the south side of the river. It was the railway bridge just outside of Oosterbeek that was blown up by the Germans, just as C Company from 2nd Parachute Battalion were making their crossing.
Love your channel James! A fresh approach to over argued battles. I especially enjoy the use of REAL maps, with "generals" poring over them. So much better than computer graphics! Good job my friend - hope your channel grows exponentially. You leave one with the feeling of a real briefing room. Hint: Imagine shoud you partner up with a modeller or two - and start building sandboxes for the critical little battles within the bigger operations...
Thank you for this episode. It is a fun and interesting series of events that are highlighted. Too bad the number of viewers is so limited. This deserves better.
Great video ty. Very well reasoned and fairly rationalised.
I've been in Arnheim, its amazing how small the area is. The combat area around Arnheim can be covered in an afternoon walk.
@34:45 Little correction if I may. The former HQ of Walter Model is not the same place as the current location of the Airborne museum. Model was located at hotel de Tafelberg. Just a couple of hundred meters away.
The headquarters staff were in the Hartenstein, where the museum is located, and Model himself was in the smaller Tafelberg. Elements of the headquarters and signals staff took over most, if not all, of the hotels in the Oosterbeek area.
I think you’ll find that the man stood next to Margaret Thatcher is Francesco Cossiga the Italian Premier & not Lord Carrington.
Agreed, silly error.
On the first day 'elements' of a US Para Battalion (1st/508th PIR) did somewhat belatedly move into Nijmegen hours after landing but got stopped in the town. A single patrol finally reached the bridge just before 10 pm and disarmed the 17 'sailors' who were guarding it just as the SS recce battalion arrived obliging them to retreat (this was the motorised unit that gets shot up the next morning on Arnhem bridge). There was lots of mistakes made in this operation (but show me an operation where no mistakes are made!) but the failure to even try to capture Nijmegen bridge on the first day doomed it. I mean its why they were there to capture the bridge. The leading elements of the Guards Armoured arrive on the morning of the 19th and if they had been able to drive straight across the bridge then its only the 10 odd kms to Arnhem. John Frosts forces finally surrender on the evening of the 21st.
before 740 men BLOCKED the last intact bridge in Arnhem area (rail bridge 4 miles/6km from LZ Z destroyed 4 hours after 1st AB landed) the 82nd had captured the 500m bridge north of Grave, the last intact bridge over the Maas Waal canal and the Heights for Brownings' useless HQ brought in by 38 of 1st AB's gliders (capacity 1,000 infantrymen)
when lead elements of 30 Corps arrived at Grave at 0820 on day three they were still 25 miles/40km from Arnhem, over 1/3 the distance from Joes Bridge to Arnhem.
@@nickdanger3802 When did 30 corps arrive at Nijmegen is the important question. And the important fact is the Bridge (and the town) was already supposed to be in allied hands on the first day. And the reason it wasn't is because Colonel Lindquist’s 508th regiment made no move to do so until 1800 hrs on the 17th and made an anaemic attempt to capture the bridge with just 2 companies of the 1/508. Had it been elements of 30 corps could have crossed it on the 19th. Instead they had to fight their way through the town and wait for boats to be brought forwards which delayed the capture to the late afternoon of the 20th. By this time it had become too late for the British Paras at Arnhem. All of the other Paratrooper Brigades tasked with capturing Bridges made rapid and heroic attempts on the first day. Except the 508th who dithered and made a limp wristed and far too late attempt to capture Nijmegen. Plenty of errors in the operation to go around but failure to capture the Bridge at Nijmegen on day 1 was the one that doomed the op.
@@cryhavoc999 how many bridges captured (that means both ends) by 1st AB ?
@@nickdanger3802 .5 more than 508th - and not sure why that matters? And that was not through lack of trying unlike the 508th.
If market garden succeeded Monty would still be telling us how great he is.
Hardly. He passed away in 1976.
i doubt it, but i bet Ike would claim it as a great win seeing it was he who was in charge of MG
History already records how Montgomery was the most successful and most capable Western Allied ground commander of WW2. That's just a fact.
Great video idea, we all like the "what if" questions about history's big moments. But rarely see them discussed so thoroughly and with real detail from qualified experts on the matter.
Great video, as has become customary!
Fascinating and well thought out discussion. Thank you all.
This channel needs more exposure!
Marching one armored column single file over one road on top of an elevated lane for 55 of the 70 miles was a disaster waiting to happen. One big choke pointand in fact a shooting gallery
@@bigwoody4704 exactlly, so many people underestimate this
@@patrickschellen737 John Keegan for the most part a great British historian stated that the so called leaders and great Allied minds failed across the board.There were at least 600 more flights than D-Day 3 months earlier. That was maybe 30 miles across the channel and another 20 miles inland.
These flights took off from airfields at least 50 miles west of london and the distance to Arnhem was 300 miles - one way.That's a lot of time 80 yrs ago in prop driven cargo planes. Not only that there was over 2hrs less daylight plus fog and mist from the cool night air every morning. And the whole sale bombing of the Reich had started and was going almost 24/7. Bomber Harris and Hap Arnold weren't letting go of any more of there valuable flight crews/mechanics for Montgomery's operations that would hinder theirs.
British Planners had canceled similar operations Linnet and Comet for very good reasons. Monty getting his grubby little mitts on two US Air Borne Divisions changes not of the difficulties - Monty Garden
The Germans had been slaughtered badly at the Falaise Gap and were in headlong route into Holland. I can see that the allies wanted to strike while the iron was hot. They were over confident and Urqhart, not having much airborne experience, was probably not the best man for the job for the Arnhem landing. A para drop should have been attempted on the town, despite risk and on the southern end of bridge from the beginning in order to sieze it in the classic coupe d' main tactic. An experienced airborne general would have insisted on this. The The resting SS reserve units near the LZs was just bad luck.
@@fazole Urqhart demanded it as did boy browning but transport command refused for night drops more than one drop a day double tow gliders and coup de main attacks on the bridge and ridgeway sided with the american commander of transport command
The Allies greatly underestimated the German Speed of reaction on all Levels - Not only Generals. The German Officer Corps was trained to always seek the initiative. Even Captains were putting together small Kampfgruppen near Arnheim an were Counter attacking - a mindset Allied Officers with the exception of maybe the Paras and the Rangers- were Never trained to have.
German Officers were often wondering, why allied troops were waiting for support or New orders instead of exploiting Chances brought by a quick breakthrough.
With this Training in the Sense of „Auftragstaktik“ and „Schwerpunkt“ the Allies May have had a better chance.
In the setup for market Garden it is hard to See and chance of winning Arnheim
They could have suceeded with double missions on day one, closer drops to the Arnhem bridge, the 82nd taking the Nijmegen bridge early and Brereton not preventing tactical ground attack air support.
ja ja, jermans so wunderbar i agree but you missed Fingerspitzengefühl from your meme list of cool sounding terms.
The 5 Tiger I's didn't belong to the 9.SS.Pz.Division, they were from the recently formed Pz.Kompanie. Hummel and they were Heer troops not Waffen SS.
Yes lots of inaccuracies here. Kompanie Hummel was 200km away in Bielefeld, Germany when the paratroops were dropping on the 17th. It was then put on trains and sent to the Netherlands, arriving on the 19th. Interestingly, Kompanie Mielke, with Panzer IIIs and IVs, was also in Bielefeld when the paras were dropping. This was the first German tank unit to attack Frosts men at the Arnhem bridge.
Just goes to show the overall lack of German armour in the Netherlands if they had to call on units 200 km away in Germany.
Also the famous pictures of Stug IIIs alongside Waffen SS panzergrenadiers in Arnhem weren't SS Stugs. They were Heer, from Sturmgeschutz Brigade 280, which also arrived from Germany on the 19th. This unit was heading for the Aachen area before being diverted to the Netherlands.
Yeah. This was very well done both men had a good grasp of the situation.
One thing I was surprised to see not mentioned - as the alternative plan - to clear the Scheldt Estuary so that Antwerp could be used as a port.
Antwerp was a very good port and the allies had captured it - in tact. The Germans had units sacrificed in holding out to the Channel Ports as long as they could - to keep the Allies from using them - and - to blow up these ports before they surrendered so that they would have to have extensive repairs done - as at Cherbourg - before they could be used.
The trouble was - Antwerp was at then end of the Scheldt Estuary and the German15th Army controlled the North Bank of it.
If you contrast the Market air drops to the D-Day drops - those had months of planing and coordination. They had to take place during a fixed period of time so the tides, the moon and the other considerations were taken into account.
Market - Garden was thrown together in a week in order to try and take advantage of the Germans weakness - but - they just didn't manage to do it.
.
When reading known history, back then, it was still expected that the Western Allies, not the Soviets, would reach Berlin 1st. The Soviets had not yet taken Belgrade.
Meanwhile, it gradually became clear that the US was becoming the senior partner in the Western Alliance. A successful Market Garden would have reasserted UK status in the Alliance.
Clearing the Scheldt estuary was not an "alternative" plan. It was scheduled to be done after MARKET GARDEN, which needed to be executed as soon as possible to take advantageof the Germans disarray. They were scrambling to establish defence lines along tha major rivers and canals, while the defences and troops around the Scheldt estuary had been part of Hitler's Atlantic Wall since 1943.
Montgomery originlly requested an airborne operation - INFATUATE - on Walcheren to assist the Canadians in this on 4 September at the same time he was planning the first Arnhem operation - COMET. The Walcheren operation was refused by Brereton and the plan was resurrected in November with amphibious landings instead of airborne. MARKET GARDEN was not thrown together in a week but was developed from earlier Arnhem operation COMET and a three division air plan for LINNET I and II, all recycled from earlier plans being developed since the NOrmandy invasion and in some cases before.
The reason MARKET failed was because the 508th PIR did not send a battalion to seize the undefended Nijmegen bridge immediately after landing as the 82nd Airborne divisional commander had instructed. The plan, compromised as it was by the air planners, wasn't followed on the ground by an officer who was not a good field commander and had not performed well in Normandy.
@@davemac1197
Browning was overall AB commander and he never ordered an immediate siezure of the Nijmegen bridge. It is speculation, but quite possible that Ultra intercepts deduced the German Ardennes attack planned for Nov. originally, but placed it as staging from the the Dutch border and this is why so much effort was put into defending and probing the Reichswald zone instead of immediately siezing the Nijmegen bridge. Also the 82nd's objectives were spread far apart. They had to hold from Nijmegen, the Groesbeek heights all the way down to Veghel bridge; a huge area to cover with limited motor transport. When Ryan wrote A Bridge Too Far, Ultra had not been declassified either.
@@fazole Ryan was very selective about what he chose to put into his book. He had far, far more information at his fingertips that didn't suit his narrative and others such as Bergstrom and Neillands have made full use of it to dispel many of the myths that Ryan's book had created (and the thoroughly entertaining, but borderline fictitious "A Bridge Too Far", which is pretty clearly as much "knowledge" about Market Garden as many of the commentators on these pages seem to have!)
Amazingly interesting as always
Thanks
I'm glad he mentioned the Poles.
Thank you. Great video
There are many books about the Allies and their problems, few from the German side. The exception is It Never Snows in September by Robert J Kershaw.
The thing that stood out for me was the Germans improvisation. All the times I have wargamed this, the Allies I have won.
I read the book too. A must read to gain a more accurate perspective on the battle.
A German post battle report concludes that the biggest mistake made by the allies were too dispersed drops and over a number of days. That was the fault of Brereton and Williams of the USAAF and Hollinghurst of the RAF.
@@lyndoncmp5751 Hollinghurst was overuled by the USAAF as they commanded allied transport command he said he could have done coup de main he said 2 or even 3 flights per day was possible he said his men could do double tows the americans said no to every one of them
@@wargey3431 Yes I've read that Brereton rejected requests from the RAF to fly double missions for Arnhem etc, but also I've read that it was Hollinghurst who gave the final say so for the drop and landing zones around Arnhem. And also that Urquhart didn't protest strongly enough against them.
@@lyndoncmp5751 I think it was more beresford blocked it and Hollinghurst and Urqhart pushed back but he refused to acquiesce so they had to ok the final plan
The lack of use of the 2nd tactical airforce really didn’t help we know how scared German armour was of typhoons
None of the paras could hold a bridge as it took to long for the column to advance the y weren't dropping with that much artillary the Gerries still had 88s in the area
For the delays being outlined, GADs HC were in the out skirts of Nijmegen before lunch on the 19th 42 hours after the start. Grenadier Group has crossed the Grave Bridge by mid morning 19th before being stopped by Boy Browning, I assume for O’Gp as 82nd hasn’t taken the Nijmegen bridge. If the Nijmegen had been taken on 17th, guarded only by a Platoon-, or even the morning of 18th, GAD would have been across the Waal 7 miles from Arnhem at D+48, with the full combat power of the Grenadier Group.
The area the 82nd had to secure was too large, from Veghel to Nijmegen to the German border. And doing it with just Jeeps!
There was even a three hour delay on the 19th when the 82nd admin were preparing the battle through Nijmegen towards the bridge. Gavin got frustrated by this delay.
Numbers of Allied troops much greater than 85,000. Have you totally forgotten about 8 and 12 Corps?
Excellent thought provoking video. What happens if the para drop on Arnhem is delayed but the other two bridges are captured first, 30 Corps advance and then the drop on Arnhem takes place?
In that scenario the Germans would have sent forces across the Arnhem bridge towards Nijmegen (as they did after Frosts men were defeated) and would have blocked any allied advance to Arnhem. A later paratroop drop into Arnhem would have been impossible, especially as more German forces would have been in the Arnhem area by then.
@@lyndoncmp5751 which is also the reason why Market Garden needed to be done before the clearing of the Scheldt, as if the order of operations had been reversed, the Germans would simply have destroyed all of the bridges across all of the waterways, effectively boxing 21AG into a corner and making EVERY waterway an amphibious crossing, with the only difference being the scope.
The same goes for the troops being dropped on the other bridges - drop in amongst the enemy (which is what paratroops are supposed to do) on the far sides of the bridges, diminish the enemy defence, and work backward to take them. Instead they are not only fighting to cross water obstacles but simultaneously fighting to overwhelm the enemy entrenched.
The Germans ability to form cohesive and effective Kampfgruppen from the remnants of shattered divisions and regiments was amazing, especially in the defense. When many of these same units went on the offensive on the same ground later on, they were far less successful. Granted, allied airpower and artillery had a say in that.
Yes British 2nd Army stopped a German counter attack that tried to retake Nijmegen in early October.
the americans are always said to be the superior fire masters if anything it was actually the british the work the artillery did in NWE was amazing at Arnhem 30 corps guns were nothing short of spectacular they were hitting german positions without hitting their own with almost no fire control orders if it wasnt for the arrival of those guns none of 6th airborne would have got out
3mins, 20secs. No, it as not Montgomery or Patton. It was was Montgomery or Bradley.
I agree. It's novice stuff that they talk about Montgomery or Patton, as if Patton was the American's Army Group commander. Bradley was, and they don't even mention Hodges US 1st Army in between, which was given priority for nearly 3 months with its Hurtgen Forest, Aachen and Lorraine campaigns end September to end December.
Dissapointed , was expecting a full episode about why the bulge would be succesfull if Arnhem would have been won.
instead the majority is the story about the battle of arnhem, lost as historic.
While pretty well presented, but it is not the thing the title is proclaiming, unfortunately :(
I'm not sure they mentioned it, but II SS PzKorps were specifically trained for Paratrooper insertion. This would be specifically the 9th SS and 10th SS. But nonetheless a very detailed list of events they covered. Another great movie to watch instead of A Bridge too Far is "Theirs is the Glory"
What if Patton had lead the armoured assault and not Monty/30Corp?
The results would be the same. At the end of the day neither Patton or 30 Corps would be going anywhere until the Nijmegen Waal bridge was cleared for the advance to Arnhem.
Another great episode. Thank you very much, gentlemen. This series is so fascinating. Maybe Jutland, Yorktown, Saratoga or, heaven help us, .Carthage defeats Rome?
It was a huge gamble; maybe Patton and Middleton could have pulled it off, but Monty and Horrocks had never showed and never would show any evidence they were capable of a balls-to-the-wall thrust like was needed.
Market Garden made more of an advance in single day than Patton did in whole month of September 1944.
@@sumivescent & the next two following months'as well....... I can never understand the obsession with Patton that so many have. As a commander, he was adequate, at best.
Swap 101st and 1st airborne around. So the division that drops in 3 waves is closest to reinforcement. And order 30 corps to advance at dawn rather then 1430.
What was the reason to wait so late for 30 corps to get started. I am not sure I have ever seen it explained. The film portrayed the delay as foolish arrogance with Michael Cain as Vandeleur saying "It wouldn't do to arrive early, nicely on time is better".
@@fazole I think it was because 16 other airborne drops had been cancelled before so 30 corps wanted to wait till the airplanes flew over so they knew for certain thay the drops would take place before committing to the attack.
I was also thinking that maybe if 30 corps had attacked earlier it would of removed the element of surprise for the airborne troops. So the drops had to happen first then 30 corps advances. Like with d day. But because the airborne wanted to drop in day light the advance of 30 corps was pushed back.
So in that regard a night time drop might of been better meaning that 30 corps could of started at dawn. Meaning they would have more time to advance so they could of got to Eindhoven on day 1 rather then day 2. However a nighttime drop of course means the airborne wouldn't of been as coordinated..
Apologies for changing the subject, but under the heading of “future topics,” I’d like to ask an unrelated question.
We’ve all heard about the Doolittle raid on Tokyo in 1942, with most reports noting that it was actually a much needed publicity stunt/morale boost, doing relatively minor material damage.
What would have happened if Doolittle’s raiders had targeted the Imperial Palace, killing Hirohito in the process?
It's a good question about if Carrington had died. He negotiated a settlement between Greece and Turkey in 1987 (?) when there was a flare up in the Aegean and the Lancaster House agreement re Zimbabwe Rhodesia. Would there have been another negotiator capable of doing so? (Probably yes, tbh)
Bad plan? I thought it was chosen because Monty. Was so meticulous (citing El Alamein).
it was not planned by Monty. Ike got Brereton and Williams to make the plan..not a bad plan if only Gavin had taken the Waal bridge on landing.
@@johndawes9337
Did Browning order Gavin to take the Waal bridge immediately? No, he wanted the LZs heavily defended and the Reichswald probed. Then, the 82nd's AO was huge, from Veghel to Nijmegen to the German border. And doing it with limited Jeep transport...
@@fazoleBrowning authorised Gavin to move on the bridge immediately if the situation was doable, and in fact Gavin TWICE ordered Lindquist to do so. Browning never prevented the 82nd from taking the bridge on day one if they could do it.
@@lyndoncmp5751 browning emphasised quite heavily the heights at groosbeek and devoted 36 gliders to landing his HQ in nijmegen
@@wargey3431Emphasising and prioritising the heights is not the same as ignoring the bridge though and not allowing Gavin to strike for the bridge on day one. Gavin was emphatic that he had authorisation to strike for the bridge ASAP if the situation in the 508th's sector permitted it. Browning did not prevent Gavin from striking for the bridge immediately if the 508th's sector was quiet enough, which it was.
The problem was a mix up in communication between Gavin and Lindquist (likely Lindquist at fault there) and then Lindquist dilly dallying around for another 2 hours after Gavin repeated his order to strike for the bridge.
The 508th was ready and had secured it's drop zone by 3.30pm. It didn't move on the bridge for another 5 hours.
If the Germans had some how won the bulge it would have done little. The Germans had few reserves , the eastern front was
collapsing and the allies still had plenty reinforcements and the French army was growing weekly to help in manpower
with plenty of equipment coming in and the allies were still climbing up the Italian peninsular.
41:06 I am not convinced. If Gavin had taken the Niemagen bridge ,the armor could have gotten to Arnham w/in 3 day. The Brits in arnham held out for 7.
@@bbbabrock 4 days at least, not 3, it wasn't just open roads between Nijmegen and Arnhem. And first part of convoy only reached Nijmegen on D+2 afternoon, had the bridge been taken they likely spend the night in Nijmegen. You battle your way forward on D+3, incur casualties (both men and machine) and use lots of supplies along the way. And reaching outskirts Arnhem isn't the same as linking up. So after that what do you have left to fight with and to supply Airborne? And that's when the major cutting of supply lines comes in.
@@patrickschellen737 D+4 Frost still holds the northern side german armour is still almost all on the north bank apart from the recon battalion with mainly scout cars they would have quite easily in all likelihood reached john frosts position with the entire corps
@@wargey3431 yes, but you don't account for the running out of stuff like ammunition and not being able to get supplies. Weapons don't just magically appear out of thin air
Note: It is generally known, I believe, that the airborne operations proposed prior to Market Garden were cancelled because the objectives were overtaken by the allied advance, not because they were not deemed feasible.
( Why are the gentlemen calling Nijmegen "Nijmwegen"?)
9th SS Panzer and 10th SS Panzer had barely 3000 soldiers and no significant armour. Where does James get his figures of 7000 each??
The Hamilcars were used to bring in the 17pdr AT guns, and their tow vehicles. Urquhart elected to go in "heavy" on that first lift at the expense of additional troops. 1st AB were not "lightly armed paras" at all. They had their 17pdr and 6pdr AT guns, the 75mm howitzers, the 20mm Polsten AAA guns, the 3" mortar teams, the Vickers teams and their usual compliment of PIATs, all brought in on that first drop. In fact, this included the 6pdrs that were part of the 1st Polish Independent Bde, even though the Poles, themselves, were not being put down on the ground until later.
I like the show and the what if at the end. What doesn't work is the oblique angle closeups if the maps..too hard to follow...using real maps is great but also other websites use graphics which simplify and make more understandable...perhaps simplifued maps would help
Monty was a logistics guy. Excellent planner and organizer, terrible with actual battles.
so why did he win so many?
@@johndawes9337 tbh mostly because he always stacked the deck to win and he was great at inspiring troops, the troops mostly loved him.
@@yannichudziak9942 name a successful general in the M/ETO who did not stack up the deck to win?
@@johndawes9337 he didn't he was on the side of two super powers - he had 4 yrs to cross the channel before the GI crossed an ocean
YUP
'Nimevegen'? 🤔
Leave the maps on screen for longer!
Some peeps might actually want to orientate themselves and understand the key terrain of the battle!
The maps are much more useful than wide shots of your three mugs against a studio graphic!
This could have been three separate shows. I know, I'm greedy.
I really enjoy this channel thank you! But please remove the logo in the top right corner. Show it for 20 seconds and let it go, it’s distracting imho. Keep up the good work 🙏🏻
All battleplans, in all wars, in all of history - have one thing in common: The moment contact is made with the enemy - the battleplan doesn't work anymore. That's why you need good leadership at platoon level. Wars are not won by generals in planning rooms, but by leaders of small groups of men - tired, crawling through mud, under fire..
Not even the best small groups can fix a bad plan, though.
MG had no OVERALL field commander. The AB commander was Browning and the 30 Corps commander was Horrocks. Monty was nowhere to be seen or even heard. No overall leadership when things went off the rails, indicating Monty was more concerned about recriminatiions if it failed, so he CYA'd.
There was evidence before they landed of an ss armoured unit in the area, they knew their radios didn’t work but it was unreported, they didn’t have enough transport aircraft for the mission yet the plan wasn’t rejected, it was a self inflicted failure. And the Germans were aware of how important those bridges were, why was success believed?✌️❤️🇬🇧
The plan was upgraded from COMET to MARKET because they were aware of the SS units in the Arnhem area, and they didn't know how badly the radios would be affected by the terrain. The self-inflicted failure was by the USAAF air planners reducing the airlifts to one per day and ruling out the dawn glider coup de main assaults on the three big bridges. Also by Gavin ruling out a parachute coup de main drop on the Nijmegen bridge, and by Colonel Lindquist on the ground when he failed to follow Gavin's instruction to send his 1st Battalion 508th PIR to the Nijmegen bridge immediately after landing.
@davemac1197
On top of that, Brereton wanting the skies clear for his planned 3 days of drops (which ballooned into a week or so), preventing the use of tactical air support. More caution from Brereton.
@@lyndoncmp5751 - my understanding was that while the airborne transports were in the air, the 2nd TAF in Belgium were grounded to deconflict the traffic, which was also the reason for GARDEN starting 90 minutes after MARKET, partly because Horrocks wanted to be sure the airlift was not cancelled before committing to the advance, but also because he had no tactical air support until the transports were on their way home.
The real problem was that Brereton's 1st AAA failed to inform 2nd TAF when the airlifts were delayed by weather in England, but the skies over Belgium and the Netherlands were still clear - so the 2nd TAF were grounded according to the planned schedule, when they could have been flying. Part of the problem may be Brereton's own absence, since he had decided to travel up the corridor by car to visit his divisions, with Matthew Ridgway just a few miles behind him doing the same thing. Ridgway had no role in MARKET GARDEN as Browning's HQ was the Corps HQ on the ground, but his staff in England were managing the resupply flights and ensuring there were enough red berets and... things... being supplied.
come on! lets get the subscribers up, share this channel. I want it to stay
Market Garden was actually the fastest allied advance against German opposition in the entire September 1944 to February 1945 period. Nearly 100km of German held ground taken, and kept, in just 3 days.
If not for the overly cautious decisions by Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst, the operation likely would have suceeded.
Armies generally do not make great sweeping advances in winter. MG took some land, at great tactical and strategic costs, to acquire mostly valueless boggy land. Too much invested- little of worth achieved.
@@finallyfriday. While the ultimate goal of breaching the Rhine and turning the west wall failed, By the 25th September, 5 major water crossings had been achieved (including the Waal and Maas rivers) and a 65 mile salient/bridgehead had been driven into Southern Holland.
This bridgehead formed a constant threat of a renewed allied thrust into Southern Holland and the plains of Northern Germany, which was realised the following February. The strongest German forces in the area (II SS Panzer Corps, and Student's Fallschirmjaeger army) were split and their ability to conduct offensive operations never recovered. Neutralisation of the bridge at Arnhem after the battle debilitated German offensive operations in Southern Holland as well as creating a springboard into Germany.
General Frederick 'Boy' Browning who commanded the 1st Airborne Corp for Market Garden has been criticised for using desperately needed transport planes to bring in his HQ to be dropped with 82nd Airborne. Planes that could of been used by the British to bring in more men at Arnhem.
...could HAVE been.....
@@EvoraGT430 Seriously?! You're the grammar police?!
@@ukmediawarrior
"could've" is fine too😊
Not much of a win..The Sheldt Estuary was still in German hands, Antwerp still had to be cleared..without Antwerp and it's supplies, the Bulge battle was moot. Germany needed the Fuel there.
Whatever happened to consolidation of forces and comprehensive logistics? Did the allied commanders learn nothing from the problems that Hitler had in Russia?
A better idea would have been to leave Arnheim, and try for the ports in and around Antwerp. This might have partially alleviated the Dutch starvation that winter and given a deep water port several hours steaming closer to the front and not wasted so much fuel transporting fuel, ammo, food, fresh troops to the front.
The biggest allies problem is logistics. Without Antwerp in operation they can't support the troops going into the Ruhr. So taken Arnhem they have to stop to first take Zeeland to control the waterway into Antwerp. To do that they will need most of the material brought all the way from France on trucks.
The corridor to Arnhem is also too narrow and vulnerable, so they have to widen that first. That operation did not start until mid October also because of logistics.
That was Eisenhower in a nutshell. Eisenhowers broad front strategy was a dispersal of forces across a 500 km front, which was far harder to supply, and it severely weakened the allied striking power. As a result the Germans were able to resist this for months.
Montgomery's idea was a more concentrated northern thrust with all armies sticking together in the powerful punch aimed first at the Ruhr then across the north German plain to Berlin. This was strategically and logistically more sound. What benefit was there in trying to get across the Vosges Mountains in the Alsace? Zero strategic benefits there. Eisenhower simply wanted all American armies to share in the victory and didnt want the victory to be British/Canadian heavy in the north.
@@ducthman4737The plan was to attain the Ruhr first and THEN build up supplies from Antwerp for the advance across Germany. Eisenhower said this to Montgomery on the 7th September. Eisenhower was now C-in-C of all allied ground forces from 1st September, as well as Supreme Commander.
Eisenhower gave zero priority in early September to stopping the chase to Germany and to open Antwerp instead.
@@PeteOttonIt would still have taken a month or so to clear the Scheldt and open Antwerp. Clearing the mines alone took ages.
We could argue if that happened and British 2nd Army advanced across southern Netherlands in late October/November in worse weather it might have been far more difficult and the Germans would have been stronger, so there could have been far more casualties. Also the Dutch might have still done what they did and tried to help the allies so the same thing likely would have occurred from the Germans.
If market garden had succeeded then the threat to the corridor would have been very obvious and therefore presumably very heavily defended against. I think a lot of the US forces to the South would have been moved North if 30th corps had broken out of the Arnhem bridgehead.
The US 1st Army was planned to break out of their own bridgehead at the same time in a pincer double envelopment of the Ruhr. The British bridgehead would not be Arnhem itself, it was planned to be on the river Ijssel, the final distributary of the Rhine delta in the Netherlands before the German border and the bridgeheads were to be at Deventer, Zutphen, Doesburg, and Westervoort east of Arnhem.
The US 1st Army already started going into the Hurtgen Forest as Market Garden was happening. They should have used the opportunity to strike at Aachen itself while the panzer units were being diverted to the Netherlands.
Easy enough to transpose the 7 in the 107th Panzer Brigade and come up with "710" (there never was a 710th Pz Brigade)
The German forces, particularly armoured, diverted to Market Garden in September, with more sent there for the German counter attack in early October SHOULD have helped the Americans take Aachen and move beyond it. That never happened and the Americans got themselves bogged down in the Hurtgen Forest instead of taking the opportunity to get beyond Aachen against weakened German forces that momentarily lacked much armour in the Aachen region, as much of it was sent to the Netherlands .
Easier said than done. Hurtgen forest and Aachen were extremely heavily defended and in highly defensible terrain.
@@flashgordon6670 Hurtgen Forest didn't need to be done at all. All it did was waste lives and time and ensured that there were insufficient transports for the following drops for Market Garden.
If you are going to talk about history at least take the time to get the details right. Just a couple of examples. The pontoon bridge at Arnhem was not blown up, in fact the Germans had dismantled the central element which was designed to allow river traffic. The missing element was anchored outside the area controlled by the British. Another howler. There was no 710th Panzer Brigade at Son. It was the 107th Panzer Brigade commanded by Oberst Freiherr von Maltzahn. There are other mistakes. You need to do better!!!
even the bit about the "two options, Monty's or Patton's" is incorrect. The one that Montgomery REALLY wanted was to have Bradley's 1st US Army and his own Second Army to go side by side through Aachen (or similar). Pushing Patton through the Saar was never an efficient way of getting into Germany, which is why it was never done in the end. Eisenhower's insistence on the flawed broad front curtailed everyone's ability to get anything done.
A plank of the week certificate should be posted to the winner and nominees every week, just so the candidates know we’re watching them closely 😂
We have wrapped this in rosy self-perpetuating myths for 80 years. It was a ghastly disaster, we got thoroughly thrashed and beaten, we inconvenienced the enemy trying to cross a bridge for two days. Our Commanders offered little exceptional in terms if their performance. We forgot to make sure our radios worked.
And we blamed it all on the Poles and the RAF when it went to rat poo, and gave Boy Browning one of the least well deserved Knighthoods in history. Our nostalgia has prevented a deep and incisive analysis for almost a century.
well, you've managed to tick several "myth" boxes in one short comment......
@@sean640307 Part fostered by a veteran of the operation during the 1980s and early 90s not good enough for you?
Old mates coughing every episode,it’s a bit disconcerting,he should see a doctor maybe…
Operational casualty figures ??
I don’t accept this for one moment. If Market Garden had been successful then the Allied forces would have pushed straight into the Ruhr. The German Bulge forces would have been drawn northward to protect the fatherland from the invaders and therefore no advance through the Ardennes in December.
The "German Bulge forces" in December were engaged in September fighting MARKET GARDEN in the Netherlands or blocking US 1st Army at Aachen. The Germans had mobilised the Reserve Army (operation 'Valkyrie') in the first week of September to man the Westwall and the non-existent defence lines along rivers and canals in the Netherlands with training and replacement units. This obviously impacted the Reserve Army's ability to train replacements for the Field Army, which had the effect that many front line units involved in the Ardennes counter-offensive were still not up to full strength. If the Allies had crossed the Rhine in the Netherland and then the planned US 1st Army crossing between Bonn and Cologne, then the next phase pincer on the Ruhr could only have been met with what was left over.
Biggest allies problem is logistics. Without Antwerp in operation they can't support the troops going into the Ruhr. So taken Arnhem they have to stop to first take Zeeland to control the waterway into Antwerp. To do that they will need most of the material brought all the way from France on trucks.
@@ducthman4737 - that was the plan after MARKET GARDEN. The pincer envelopment of the Ruhr could not take place until US 1st Army had also established a Rhine crossing, and at the time of MARKET GARDEN they were still being blocked west of Aachen. The Canadians would meanwhile be clearing the Scheldt estuary to allow Antwerp to be opened.
@Ross-e9o Clearly you were not paying attention to this video...
@@danwilliams4051 clearly you fall into the ”what if” game. Play it out to its natural conclusion and you go all the way back to the march into the Rheinland in 1936, but hey go for it if you think it makes you a great WWIi historian.
I'm thinking biteing of more than you can chew. Like Uther historians i think operation market Garden was a bad idea. Could do with a documentary about monti casino.
That doesn’t look like Peter Carrington to me.
There's no denying that the British have an extraordinary ability to narrate military events in a way that is both skilful and compelling.
But it's also undeniable that they present their defeats and failures as if they were victories. At the risk of being misunderstood and misinterpreted: what about the heroism, the competence of the opponent? Is there no place for it?
They mentioned the quality of the Germans and their ability to react quickly plenty of times. They also mention the failures on the allied side plenty of times.
The bottom line is that the Germans retreated, losing nearly 100km of ground including major Dutch towns Eindhoven and Nijmegen. The British 2nd Army got across the Waal River, closer to Germany.
THe Dieppe raid is succesful. What happens to Overlord. Changed to Pas de Calais? Cherbourg? And then what?
I know that generals only get to their positions by being bullish and arrogant, but they really needed to stow their egos at times. Monty and Patton were the worst offenders, but there were other like Clark in Italy. None of them could see their own deficiencies, and were willing to thrown men into the meat grinder without a thought to the loss of life.
Macarthur too and even some of the bomber commanders in the RAF all had egos
Clark is in a category of his own, he failed in his duties to serve his own political ambitions….
Monty was certainly arrogant but you cant accuse him of feeding his men into the meat grinder. He knew even from 1942 that the British were running out of manpower and his decisions and tactics reflected this
Actually Montgomery admitted his own mistakes in Market Garden and didn't pass the buck onto anyone, when he could have.
Montgomery even backed down when Taylor didnt like Montgomery's suggestion for the 101st drop zones.
The most arrogant was Eisenhower. Not content with being Supreme Commander he also wanted Montgomery's job of C-in-C of all allied ground forces and then Trumans job of President of the USA. Eisenhower never once accepted his broad front strategy was a failure and never admitted responsibility for the Ardennes retreat and unnecessary casualties there.
American & British para's.....mentioned in the first two min's...obviously the Polish para's didn't make a drop and save the Brit's then.
To be honest, ya'll and the others did very well during market garden.
We dropped the ball, though at the moment I can't remember the name of the bridge/ town.
Its Nijmegen bridge. Something they don't seem to talk about. That bridge was not taken on the first day, which was the whole plan for each drop.
If you have speakers pointing things out on a map -- SHOW THE MAP!
We don't want to see the pointers, but what they're pointing at. And rather the maps than just talking heads.
Please preface comments to make clear whether you're basing your opinions on Hollywood or on Reality lol
Can the director please stop directing and show where the guest is pointing?
what if they could drop paratroopers as the infantry 30th corps needed in times
They should have gone for Patton!! He would have been in Berlin before christmas. But politics decided otherwise
hahaha Patton could not even get passed Metz.
@@johndawes9337
His fuel was diverted to Market Garden.
@@fazole It’s myth that any petrol was taken from Patton for Montgomery. Patton was already at a standstill before planning for Market Garden even started.
Patton finally began receiving adequate supplies on September 4, (two weeks before MG) after a week’s excruciating pause”
- Harry Yeide
Market Garden only had priority in extra supply transport laid on. It didn’t take away any actual supplies from any US army. Nor did Market Garden stop all operations on the western front. Patton’s 3rd Army was still trying to take Metz and US 1st Army began its Hurtgen Forest campaign on September 19th, 2 days after Market Garden began.
Did you know that the twin pronged US 1st Army attack in the Hurtgen Forest and Aachen in October 1944 used FOUR TIMES as many men and supplies as the ground element of Market Garden, which wasn’t even a full 2nd British Army attack?
“ It was commonly believed at Third Army H.Q. that Montgomery's advance through Belgium was largely maintained by supplies diverted from Patton. (See Butcher, op. cit., p. 667.) This is not true. The amount delivered by the ' air-lift ' was sufficient to maintain only one division. No road transport was diverted to aid Montgomery until September 16th. On the other hand, three British transport companies, lent to the Americans on August 6th " for eight days," were not returned until September 4th.' “
- CHESTER WILMOT
THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE. 1954
P 589ty John Peate.
@@fazoleAh the old myth. Market Garden used British allocated fuel. Nothing was diverted from Patton.
Patton had already been failing to take Metz (began September 6th) before Market Garden was even green lit.
The whole front should have been shut down for a week to help Market Garden. It wasn't. Patton was allowed to continue in the Lorraine and Hodges started going into the Hurtgen Forest (September 19th).
@@johndawes9337Patton took 3 months to move 10 miles to Metz.
Market garden could of worked if not for the hold ups ,why does nobody ever mention this
And how do you do Market Garden without the holdups? 20.000 vehicles, 100km, partly very narrow roads with many bottle necks, vehicles will have issues and block the road, the enemy has a role and weather as well. The loss of Son bridge and damage at Veghel bridge needing rebuilds are things you can expect to happen in at least 1-2 places. I think the hold ups are inevitable, therefore the plan is irresponsible because it's so unlikely to go swiftly.
@@patrickschellen737 Nijmegen was not taken on the first day, which was possible. They spent too much time worrying about the groosbeak heights, and not taking the bridge which was the whole idea of the drop there. 30 core had to wait to have this bridge taken, which took manpower and time.
@@patrickschellen737 truth - accurate post
And also remember what happened when the skies cleared………. so no, modern day revisionists can make videos, but facts are stubborn things……