I worked with an old guy who had been in XXX Corps and I mentioned watching 'A Bridge Too Far' and his response was 'I'll tell you something son. Did you know we arrived at Nijmegen Bridge only about 2 hours behind schedule? They don't mention THAT in the film!'
when XXX Corps scout cars arrived at GRAVE at 0820 on day three XXX Corps was still 25 miles/40km (Grave to Heumen to Arnhem) from Arnhem on current maps, well over 1/3 the distance from Joes Bridge to Arnhem with 11 hours to sunset having averaged just over 2 miles/3lm per hour up to that point. on day four Frosts' men ran out of food, ammo and water.
@@OldWolflad " The Guards Armoured Division were making progress towards Arnhem - they crossed the newly constructed Son Bailey bridge and reached Grave that morning, but the advance of XXX Corps lacked momentum." page 10 Netherlands 17-25 September 1944 - GOV UK
My brother-in-law's father landed with the Border Regiment at Arnhem and had a proper boy's own adventure. He was a medical officer RAMC, who attended the wounded for many days until captured and then helped the Germans in their hospital, befriending one of the German officers and gaining his trust and therefore had freedom of movement around the hospital. He took the first opportunity to escape where he was picked up by Dutch resistance that took him to an SAS patrol and he got back across the Rhine. He went on to find the Malaysian Army Medical Corps. A true hero.
My grandfather was a member of 'Recce' squadron. D troop, 12 section. They were in the lead of the advance up the Utrechtseweg on the 18th. I believe there is some footage of this on youtube which was taken by some civilians, I think one was a local dentist. My grandfather was wounded at a skirmish at a building that was known as 'der vergarde' at the time. He may have witnessed a minor war crime in progress by the Germans at the time, funnily enough. He was moved back to the Schoonord area and then moved to the school on Paasberg and was eventually captured on the 24th or 25th. He was then taken to Stalag 11b as a pow. After the war he actually ended up working back at Tarrant Rushton airfield (where he flew from by Horsa) as part of 'Flight refueling' being the transport manager I believe.
This episode partly answered one of my questions. My Uncle was in the Border Regiment and 1st Airlanding Brigade from December ‘44. I could understand the reluctance to launch any more glider borne operations but wondered why this highly trained unit wasn’t deployed in another way. I’m obviously glad my Uncle survived the war but imagine he and his mates must have been frustrated not to be used until the Relief of Norway.
Using three routes to get into Arnhem did make sense given the narrowness of the roads and the number of objectives that would need to be secured as quickly as possible. The biggest problem for 1st Para Brigade was that Lathbury held them on the drop zone for almost an hour before allowing 2 and 3 Para to set off (and an additional half hour for 1 Para) because he wanted to ensure that all three battalions were at least 95% assembled, rather than allowing them to set off straight away, with stragglers gathered into a scratch formation to follow behind. "Chapeau!" to the Military Police detachment which did set off immediately and reached and took their objective near the Arnhem road bridge about 3 hours before the lead elements of 2 Para arrived. If C Coy, 2 Para had similarly rushed off immediately, it's possible that they could have captured the rail bridge before it could be blown up; instead, for some reason they weren't even at the front of the 2 Para column. Re. the "recce jeeps either not arriving or being stuck in gliders" rumour that took hold, I suspect that what happened was that when A Troop (assigned to Div HQ duties) arrived on foot and were asked where their jeeps were just reported about their own and someone on the staff assumed they meant the whole squadron. Freddie Gough, when told about the coup-de-main role his squadron were assigned did protest and, when that failed, requested that some of the Tetrarch tanks from 6th Airborne be added to his force. As for the ambush by Krafft's troops, I suspect that their experience in Italy of losing almost all of B Troop to an ambush kicked in, combined with their reservations about the task, causing a temporary paralysis in their thinking; as far as I have been able to ascertain, they never even considered trying to find a route around to the north to outflank Krafft's line (the operational maps do show the tracks through the plantations/woods). As for why so many of their gliders landed badly, making it difficult (or impossible in the case of the HQ troop glider which "landed" 30 foot up in a tree) to get the jeeps out, I believe that many of the gliders were actually overweight. The kit to be carried in each chalk was weighed in May ahead of Overlord (1st Airborne were on warning in case they needed to be deployed as reinforcements) and all of the vehicles and guns were left at the airfields. Every few days (and before each operation scheduled, then cancelled), drivers and DRs would go along to turn over the engines; when they did that, they usually took along some extras (ammunition, fuel, water, food). This would have particularly affected the weight of the recce troop gliders which had two jeeps each.
My grandfather was with the 5th east Yorkshire's as an infantry as a lance corporal. He was halted at Bemmel on "the island" before this he was with the 10th Durham's from July and fought through France and Belgium. He was never injured and made it through the war. Never spoke about it, I only found out what he had done when he died and I looked through all the stuff he saved from the war.
@@johndawes9337 john burns you simple shit try another o your many aliases,saying the same polluted drivel repeatedly - How about this johnny monty's own words *Monty admissions of guilt - after the war of course* "Montgomery Memoirs page 276 " "The next day, Bedell Smith came to see me the next day to say that Eisenhower had decided to act as I recommended. The Saar Thrust to be stopped. Three US Division (12 US AG) were to be grounded and their transports used to supply extra maintenance to 21 Army Group. The bulk of the 12 AG logistic support was to be given to 1 US Army on my right and I was to be allowed to deal directly with General Hodges. *As a result of these promises I reviewed my Plans with Dempsey and then fixed D-Day for the Arnhem Operation for Sunday 17th September."* *The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, p.303 Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "And here I must admit a bad mistake on my part -I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp so that we could get free use of the port."* *(Montgomery’s memoirs, p297)* *A Magnificent Disaster, by David Bennett, p. 198* Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. *"We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively."* Oh others blame him to so the truth that you're allergic to is still out there - are you Lucien Treub??? *Alan Brooke placing the blame on Bernard* *"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke* entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. *I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place* *Admiral Ramsay brought this out as well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....."The mistake lay with Monty for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply. Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knock out blow."* *From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary* *Eisenhower's Armies ,by Dr Niall Barr ,page 415* After the failure of Market-Garden, Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer, noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary, followed by an advance on the Rhine, the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. *"IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem"* *How about Air Marshall Tedder???* *With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599"* *Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal* *How Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith* *Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany,1944-45* The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area. With their Recon Battalions intact. *Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airily aside"* *Monty's Chief of Staff* *Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45* Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray. That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road, Monty ignored him. Montgomery’s own staff was opposed to the plan, as was his own chief of staff. *How about IKE's Private Papers?* *The Eisenhower Papers, volume IV, by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies.*
I think I do know why 4 Para did not land on the same DZ as 1 Para: They needed space to land the glider complement of the 2nd lift, which constituted another 350 gliders. The point is that a field that has been used as a landing zone for gliders cannot be used again, for gliders or parachutes, as all the gliders are in the way. After the first drop, LZ S and LZ Z are full of gliders which make them unsuitable for further landings. DZ X (where 1 Para landed on day 1) is re-used as a glider landing zone on day 2, but that means it cannot be used as a drop zone for 4 Para at the same time. Hence the need for another large open field to land 4 Para. I don't think there's any alternative for Ginkel Heath available to them. What I don't understand is why they did not land 1 Airlanding Bde on Ginkel Heath on day 1, rather than on LZ S. That way the Bde only has to defend DZ X and LZ S for the second lift, which is significantly closer to Arnhem than using Ginkel Heath on day 2.
Green on mucker lots of memories from a oldswet my self an ex'service AB ALL THE WAY BROTHER FROM A EX'PARA from 2PARA. I had 4'uncle's who was in this rade an only 2came out of arnhem we will remember them!!
Why did Brereton propose and authorise 5am departures in darkness and double lifts of all 3.5 involved airborne divisions on D-Day in his own Operation Linnet Two into an American sector thirteen days earlier? Identical distances too. British 1st Airborne were given the order to capture one bridge intact, not more than one.
This was Monty's idea not Brereton monty knew damn well that they had to use two drops(at least).Also he knew about the Two SS Divisions refitting in Arnhem - MONTY GARDEN
@@bigwoody4704 operation number 16 was montgomerys and Brownings concept no doubt but Brereton and Williams fundamentally changed it. Two drops were possible. Brereton had proposed Operation Linnet Two thirteen days earlier where two large drops in a day were to be undertaken to insert 30,000 plus airborne troops in a single day, with flights taking off in darkness at 5am. Distances in this operation to Liege and Maastricht were identical to Arnhem - around 190 miles. It begs the question, what changed?
@@OldWolflad no they did not and the British were dropping berets and all sorts of stupid crap thinking it would be a parade drill try reading this guys book - an official RAF Historian for 30 yrs. The Gerries were already preparing for an invasion ahead of time,this the allies knew as Dempsey himself noted it. *Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.138 Brereton was not in a position to exploit strategic intelligence and he would also have known that Montgomery had access to ULTRA and had never the less decided that Market Garden should proceed. First Allied Airborne depended very heavily on Mongomery's 21st Army Group for their supply of intelligence. 1st Parachute Brigade summary by Capt. W.A. Taylor that appeared on September 13th which pointed out that "the whole Market area was being feverishly prepared for defense" - a statement entirely in accord with Dempsey's diary notes of September 9th & 10th* *Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.160 By September 1944 Air Force Planners were unable to see a happy outcome. Moreover, it was documented that because Arnhem lay so far in land they did not expect to attain outright tactical surprise. The previous Comet Operation air warning stated "Surprise is extremely unlikely and the enemy will undoubtedly have knowledge of the approach of Troop Carrier formations by radar alert or visual reconnaissance"* *Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p131 Montgomery altered his assessments from his obvious desire that the offensive should proceed as planned. He persuaded himself that any threat from the Germans was off set by the large number of Airborne troops. Despite warnings from the head of intelligence and Bedell-Smith suggested that the operation be revised or halted Monty dismissed the objections out of hand*
@@OldWolfladI am not convinced that LINNET 2 was ever a serious proposal by Brereton(though I do not have any contemporary sources to support this hypothesis ). The unplanned proposal was valid for one day only (4th September) and came at the same time that Brereton had written to Eisenhower, on 1st September (the day before the cancellation on LINNET when COMET originated), stating that ‘from the bases now occupied in the United Kingdom, the Allied Airborne Army can only operate as far as a a line Amsterdam - Utrecht - Eindhoven - Liége’ (WO 219/2186). I think that the LINNET 2 idea was to reinforce the First Allied Airborne Army’s proposal to move to locations on mainland Europe in order to be able to support a wider range of objectives. Notably, the objectives for both COMET and MARKET lay beyond that line. So what had changed, there is a significant reduction in available daylight between the beginning of September and the weather normally deteriorates rapidly over this period - I live next to one of 1st Airborne’s departure airfields for their parachute elements and yesterday cycled around the other two (as well as the Polish Brigade’s base areas around Stamford), the difference in weather in the last two weeks is noticeable. The RAF, in particular, had extensive experience operating in the departure areas so would have been well aware of the constraints that weather would have on air operations. It is noticeable that the development of MARKET GARDEN’s scheme of manoeuvre in 21st Army Group, did not involve any specialist air planners which probably could have corrected the flawed assumptions that the lift plan for LINNET could be used for MARKET. But, let’s just say that it would have been possible for two lifts per day and superimpose that onto the reality of the contemporary situation. There would have still only been one drop on day 1 (17th September) as it needed to follow the suppression of German air defences undertaken by Bomber Command, the US 8th and 9th Air Forces, and the 2nd Tactical Air Force. Then on 18th September the departure airfields in Lincolnshire were fogged in until late morning (hence why 4th Parachute Brigade’s arrival was delayed), so there would still have only been time for one lift. It would appear, then, that the Air Plan was written on what was likely to be able to be delivered rather than one the was improbable.
@@mikeainsworth4504 Interesting views Mike. Appreciate your thoughts. If you listen to James Daley on WW2TV regards cancelled ops, Maastricht had actually been prominent in Brereton's thoughts since 25th August, and yes whilst it was proposed quickly following Linnets redundancy, Eisenhower did approve it. But yes I am aware that Brereton wrote to Eisenhower about distance-limitations around the same time, but Maastricht -Liege is more or less the same distance as Arnhem from UK airbases, and just 19 miles beyond that imaginary line drawn line from Amsterdam to Liege. I also found it interesting that Linnet Two would have involved inserting airborne forces that were not in the 21st Army Group area but within the US sector. Was he prepared to commit forces for an operation into a US sector but not a British one? Furthermore, in Linnet, operations were to commence in darkness at 5am, subject to weather. The 50 minutes difference in the amount of daylight therefore doesn't wash for me. The RAF certainly felt that two drops were possible, certainly in the British sector. I spoke at length to a retired RAF officer at IWM years ago, who told me that most officers were livid. Even a small scale return flight using fixed-wing Dakota's only could have delivered an additional 2-3,000 airborne troops per sector. Gavin felt that Brereton was intransigent too.
Arnhem Appreciation John Peate Peter Smolcic Market Garden was not a defeat. It took 100km of German held ground. The Germans retreated and lost Eindhoven and Nijmegen. The allies later used Nijmegen to attack into Germany. Only Arnhem was a defeat but technically this was an all air operation. Planned by the air forces. Montgomery had no jurisdiction to order First Allied Airborne Army and RAF to accept his suggestions and they didn’t. Montgomery argued for double missions flown on day one, for closer drops to Arnhem and for coup de mains on the bridges. The air commanders refused all of this. Consequently, Arnhem was not Montgomery’s battle to lose technically speaking. Deep down he may have felt the same way. It was planned mainly by the Air Force commanders, Brereton and Williams of the USAAF, though I’m not letting Hollinghurst of the RAF off here. His decision not to fly closer to Arnhem doomed 1st Airborne. It was Bereton and Williams who: decided that there would be drops spread over three days, defeating the object of para jumps by losing all surprise, which is their major asset. rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-day on the Pegasus Bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet. chose the drop and and landing zones so far from the Bridges. Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to take on the flak positions and attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports, thereby allowing them to bring in reinforcements with impunity. Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of “possible flak.“ From Operation Market Garden: The Campaign for the Low Countries, Autumn 1944: MARKET was an air force plan. It followed the Army’s request but not the commander’s intent. (P45) Williams proved intransigent to British recommendations before, especially when 38 Group had been left out of LINNET and COMET planning by FAAA and IX TCC, making it an American planned show with a British Airborne Corps. (P46) MARKET received virtually no assistance in ground attacks on the front or by extensive interdiction along the front due to the strategic bomber missions flown simultaneously. (P55) - Operation Market Garden: The Campaign for the Low Countries, Autumn 1944: Seventy Years On Hollinghurst and the RAF pleaded for double drops on each day even offering to pilot US planes but were ignored by Williams. what is clear is that ****Williams refused to hear any British proposals from the RAF or Army concerning solutions that would have aided 1 Airborne Division. (P46) - Operation Market Garden: The Campaign for the Low Countries, Autumn 1944: Seventy Years On From THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE 1944-1945. Rick Atkinson. “General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in Dragoon the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision.” Montgomery had the idea for Taylor’s 101st Airborne to be dropped on both sides of Son but Taylor protested and got his way, as Montgomery had no jurisdiction to order him. The 101st Airborne failed to capture the Son bridge due to that. On the failure of the US 101st Airborne to capture the Som bridge intact: “Montgomery’s proposal was for the US 101st Airborne to be strung out like a kite string over a 30 mile stretch. Major General Maxwell Taylor, the commander of US 101st Airborne, protested against such an extreme dispersion of his division. Brereton took the matter up with Montgomery,who agreed to let the matter be settled by direct discussion Taylor and General Miles Dempsey, the commander of British Second Army. They met at Montgomery’s headquarters on September 12th.” -Market Garden Then and Now by Karel Margry These kind of decisions ended up being crucial flaws and it was Brereton who enforced them, *not* Montgomery. The air commanders made the wrong choices throughout the planning. Beyond the initial broad outline, Monty didn’t plan the operation and nor did he have any jurisdiction over the air forces. He can consult and discuss but he cannot give them orders. Monty’s aides tried to persuade Brereton to double missions on the 17th but Brereton refused and as I just pointed out, Monty even went back on his idea for the 101st to be strung out over a long distance when a Taylor argued against it. Monty did not wish to step on the toes of the airborne commanders. He respected their views and he let them plan it. Also neither Montgomery nor Browning could dissuade the RAF from deciding to drop 1st Airborne so far way from the Arnhem bridge, which led to the vast majority of 1st Airborne not even reaching it. The orders of advice Marshall Hollinghurst could not be changed. Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst are mainly the ones whose decisions screwed the operation and prevented it from being a 100% success. The failure of the Americans to take the Son Bridge and the Nijmegen Bridge doomed the British 1st Airborne Division. A fact never mentioned in detail. If the British Division had been landed next to the Arnhem Bridge it would have been held for far longer. The Nijmegen Bridge should have been taken immediately but was not, check the facts. Gavin spent all his time trying to hold his landing zone and did not deploy a battalion to the bridge until a day later. Recce forces had got there but were driven off. A bit of detail reading needs to be done by certain people. The Grave Bridge was taken immediately as an American Company commander noticed on the plan that his C47s were passing near the bridge after dropping the division so he asked his pilots to delay dropping his company until they were near the bridge otherwise he was going to be dropped nearly 4 miles away. I was lucky to do a painting commission for Col John Waddy so I was with him on the last Arnhem Ride of the battlefield with the British Army.
I worked with an old guy who had been in XXX Corps and I mentioned watching 'A Bridge Too Far' and his response was 'I'll tell you something son. Did you know we arrived at Nijmegen Bridge only about 2 hours behind schedule? They don't mention THAT in the film!'
In 43 hours to be precise. No one seems to know what the exact schedule was
when XXX Corps scout cars arrived at GRAVE at 0820 on day three XXX Corps was still 25 miles/40km (Grave to Heumen to Arnhem) from Arnhem on current maps, well over 1/3 the distance from Joes Bridge to Arnhem with 11 hours to sunset having averaged just over 2 miles/3lm per hour up to that point.
on day four Frosts' men ran out of food, ammo and water.
@@nickdanger3802 30 Corps were at Nijmegen in 43 hours, on 19th September, just ten miles from Arnhem. Frost was fine at that point.
@@OldWolflad map showing point of contact XXX Corps and 82nd on 19th
i.pinimg.com/736x/84/53/5b/84535ba36b2a1520fd13adf949e57046.jpg
@@OldWolflad " The Guards Armoured Division were making progress towards Arnhem - they crossed the newly constructed Son Bailey bridge and reached Grave that morning, but the advance of XXX Corps lacked momentum."
page 10
Netherlands 17-25 September 1944 - GOV UK
My brother-in-law's father landed with the Border Regiment at Arnhem and had a proper boy's own adventure. He was a medical officer RAMC, who attended the wounded for many days until captured and then helped the Germans in their hospital, befriending one of the German officers and gaining his trust and therefore had freedom of movement around the hospital. He took the first opportunity to escape where he was picked up by Dutch resistance that took him to an SAS patrol and he got back across the Rhine. He went on to find the Malaysian Army Medical Corps. A true hero.
There is an exposition about the Sint Elizabeth’s Gasthuis about this in the Airborne Museum @ Hartenstein. Quite interesting how some have escaped.
This is fab. Really thought-provoking.
Thank you James and Al.
Aww chaps, awesome stuff... Slightly a shame Bombadier Milligan wasn't involved to then include it in his war memoirs.
My grandfather was a member of 'Recce' squadron.
D troop, 12 section. They were in the lead of the advance up the Utrechtseweg on the 18th.
I believe there is some footage of this on youtube which was taken by some civilians, I think one was a local dentist.
My grandfather was wounded at a skirmish at a building that was known as 'der vergarde' at the time.
He may have witnessed a minor war crime in progress by the Germans at the time, funnily enough.
He was moved back to the Schoonord area and then moved to the school on Paasberg and was eventually captured on the 24th or 25th.
He was then taken to Stalag 11b as a pow.
After the war he actually ended up working back at Tarrant Rushton airfield (where he flew from by Horsa) as part of 'Flight refueling' being the transport manager I believe.
This episode partly answered one of my questions. My Uncle was in the Border Regiment and 1st Airlanding Brigade from December ‘44. I could understand the reluctance to launch any more glider borne operations but wondered why this highly trained unit wasn’t deployed in another way. I’m obviously glad my Uncle survived the war but imagine he and his mates must have been frustrated not to be used until the Relief of Norway.
Learned a lot from this presentation…very interesting thanks guys.
Al has a new book to plug
Ooh, ta for the tip! I enjoyed the last one, so will go grab a copy!
Using three routes to get into Arnhem did make sense given the narrowness of the roads and the number of objectives that would need to be secured as quickly as possible.
The biggest problem for 1st Para Brigade was that Lathbury held them on the drop zone for almost an hour before allowing 2 and 3 Para to set off (and an additional half hour for 1 Para) because he wanted to ensure that all three battalions were at least 95% assembled, rather than allowing them to set off straight away, with stragglers gathered into a scratch formation to follow behind.
"Chapeau!" to the Military Police detachment which did set off immediately and reached and took their objective near the Arnhem road bridge about 3 hours before the lead elements of 2 Para arrived. If C Coy, 2 Para had similarly rushed off immediately, it's possible that they could have captured the rail bridge before it could be blown up; instead, for some reason they weren't even at the front of the 2 Para column.
Re. the "recce jeeps either not arriving or being stuck in gliders" rumour that took hold, I suspect that what happened was that when A Troop (assigned to Div HQ duties) arrived on foot and were asked where their jeeps were just reported about their own and someone on the staff assumed they meant the whole squadron.
Freddie Gough, when told about the coup-de-main role his squadron were assigned did protest and, when that failed, requested that some of the Tetrarch tanks from 6th Airborne be added to his force. As for the ambush by Krafft's troops, I suspect that their experience in Italy of losing almost all of B Troop to an ambush kicked in, combined with their reservations about the task, causing a temporary paralysis in their thinking; as far as I have been able to ascertain, they never even considered trying to find a route around to the north to outflank Krafft's line (the operational maps do show the tracks through the plantations/woods).
As for why so many of their gliders landed badly, making it difficult (or impossible in the case of the HQ troop glider which "landed" 30 foot up in a tree) to get the jeeps out, I believe that many of the gliders were actually overweight. The kit to be carried in each chalk was weighed in May ahead of Overlord (1st Airborne were on warning in case they needed to be deployed as reinforcements) and all of the vehicles and guns were left at the airfields. Every few days (and before each operation scheduled, then cancelled), drivers and DRs would go along to turn over the engines; when they did that, they usually took along some extras (ammunition, fuel, water, food). This would have particularly affected the weight of the recce troop gliders which had two jeeps each.
Thank you for a great series! And thank you for debunking the ‘yeah, but they could have landed closer to Arnhem bridge’ argument!
My grandfather was with the 5th east Yorkshire's as an infantry as a lance corporal. He was halted at Bemmel on "the island" before this he was with the 10th Durham's from July and fought through France and Belgium. He was never injured and made it through the war. Never spoke about it, I only found out what he had done when he died and I looked through all the stuff he saved from the war.
Hey guys! Will you be at Duxford next weekend for the Battle of Britain air show??
an hour on Market Garden without mentioning Montgomery once
good as he had very lil to do with MG
@@johndawes9337 I was expecting them to spell that out on the pod
@@cybertronian2005 about time someone did..CR has a lot to answer for with his book/movie.
OF course British
@@johndawes9337 john burns you simple shit try another o your many aliases,saying the same polluted drivel repeatedly - How about this johnny monty's own words
*Monty admissions of guilt - after the war of course*
"Montgomery Memoirs page 276 "
"The next day, Bedell Smith came to see me the next day to say that Eisenhower had decided to act as I recommended. The Saar Thrust to be stopped. Three US Division (12 US AG) were to be grounded and their transports used to supply extra maintenance to 21 Army Group. The bulk of the 12 AG logistic support was to be given to 1 US Army on my right and I was to be allowed to deal directly with General Hodges. *As a result of these promises I reviewed my Plans with Dempsey and then fixed D-Day for the Arnhem Operation for Sunday 17th September."*
*The Guns at Last Light, by Rick Atkinson, p.303 Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war, conceding "And here I must admit a bad mistake on my part -I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp so that we could get free use of the port."*
*(Montgomery’s memoirs, p297)*
*A Magnificent Disaster, by David Bennett, p. 198* Montgomery attributes the lack of full success to the fact that the II SS Panzer Corps was refitting in the area. *"We knew it was there.....we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight effectively."*
Oh others blame him to so the truth that you're allergic to is still out there - are you Lucien Treub???
*Alan Brooke placing the blame on Bernard*
*"Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the diary of Field Marshal Lord Alan Brooke* entry for 5 October 1944:Page 219" During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. *I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place*
*Admiral Ramsay brought this out as well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely....."The mistake lay with Monty for not having made the capture of Antwerp the immediate objective at highest priority & I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed Montgomery. Our large forces were now grounded for lack of supply. Had we got Antwerp instead of the corridor we should be in a far better position for launching a knock out blow."*
*From a PHD at King's College who also notes Ramsay/Brooke warned Monty about the Scheldt Estuary*
*Eisenhower's Armies ,by Dr Niall Barr ,page 415* After the failure of Market-Garden, Eisenhower held a conference on 5 October 1944 that not only provided a post mortem on the operation but in which he reiterated his strategy for the campaign. Alan Brooke was present as an observer, noted that IKE's strategy continued to focus on the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary, followed by an advance on the Rhine, the capture of the Ruhr and a subsequent advance on Berlin. *"IKE nobly took all the blame on himself as he had approved Monty's suggestion to operate on Arnhem"*
*How about Air Marshall Tedder???*
*With Prejudice, by Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Deputy Supreme Commander AEF, Page 599"* *Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal*
*How Allied HQ Chief of Staff Bedell-Smith*
*Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany,1944-45* The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10th Panzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area. With their Recon Battalions intact. *Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airily aside"*
*Monty's Chief of Staff*
*Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45* Freddie de Guingand Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray. That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road, Monty ignored him. Montgomery’s own staff was opposed to the plan, as was his own chief of staff.
*How about IKE's Private Papers?*
*The Eisenhower Papers, volume IV, by Edward Chandler By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished . *It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies.*
I think I do know why 4 Para did not land on the same DZ as 1 Para: They needed space to land the glider complement of the 2nd lift, which constituted another 350 gliders.
The point is that a field that has been used as a landing zone for gliders cannot be used again, for gliders or parachutes, as all the gliders are in the way.
After the first drop, LZ S and LZ Z are full of gliders which make them unsuitable for further landings. DZ X (where 1 Para landed on day 1) is re-used as a glider landing zone on day 2, but that means it cannot be used as a drop zone for 4 Para at the same time. Hence the need for another large open field to land 4 Para. I don't think there's any alternative for Ginkel Heath available to them.
What I don't understand is why they did not land 1 Airlanding Bde on Ginkel Heath on day 1, rather than on LZ S. That way the Bde only has to defend DZ X and LZ S for the second lift, which is significantly closer to Arnhem than using Ginkel Heath on day 2.
Just listened to the WW2TV episode on the role of 8 & 12 Corps in Market Garden. Is this something you will cover?
Green on mucker lots of memories from a oldswet my self an ex'service AB ALL THE WAY BROTHER FROM A EX'PARA from 2PARA. I had 4'uncle's who was in this rade an only 2came out of arnhem we will remember them!!
Why did Brereton propose and authorise 5am departures in darkness and double lifts of all 3.5 involved airborne divisions on D-Day in his own Operation Linnet Two into an American sector thirteen days earlier? Identical distances too.
British 1st Airborne were given the order to capture one bridge intact, not more than one.
This was Monty's idea not Brereton monty knew damn well that they had to use two drops(at least).Also he knew about the Two SS Divisions refitting in Arnhem - MONTY GARDEN
@@bigwoody4704 operation number 16 was montgomerys and Brownings concept no doubt but Brereton and Williams fundamentally changed it.
Two drops were possible. Brereton had proposed Operation Linnet Two thirteen days earlier where two large drops in a day were to be undertaken to insert 30,000 plus airborne troops in a single day, with flights taking off in darkness at 5am. Distances in this operation to Liege and Maastricht were identical to Arnhem - around 190 miles.
It begs the question, what changed?
@@OldWolflad no they did not and the British were dropping berets and all sorts of stupid crap thinking it would be a parade drill try reading this guys book - an official RAF Historian for 30 yrs. The Gerries were already preparing for an invasion ahead of time,this the allies knew as Dempsey himself noted it.
*Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.138 Brereton was not in a position to exploit strategic intelligence and he would also have known that Montgomery had access to ULTRA and had never the less decided that Market Garden should proceed. First Allied Airborne depended very heavily on Mongomery's 21st Army Group for their supply of intelligence. 1st Parachute Brigade summary by Capt. W.A. Taylor that appeared on September 13th which pointed out that "the whole Market area was being feverishly prepared for defense" - a statement entirely in accord with Dempsey's diary notes of September 9th & 10th*
*Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p.160 By September 1944 Air Force Planners were unable to see a happy outcome. Moreover, it was documented that because Arnhem lay so far in land they did not expect to attain outright tactical surprise. The previous Comet Operation air warning stated "Surprise is extremely unlikely and the enemy will undoubtedly have knowledge of the approach of Troop Carrier formations by radar alert or visual reconnaissance"*
*Sabastian Ritchie's Arnhem Myth and Reality,p131 Montgomery altered his assessments from his obvious desire that the offensive should proceed as planned. He persuaded himself that any threat from the Germans was off set by the large number of Airborne troops. Despite warnings from the head of intelligence and Bedell-Smith suggested that the operation be revised or halted Monty dismissed the objections out of hand*
@@OldWolfladI am not convinced that LINNET 2 was ever a serious proposal by Brereton(though I do not have any contemporary sources to support this hypothesis ). The unplanned proposal was valid for one day only (4th September) and came at the same time that Brereton had written to Eisenhower, on 1st September (the day before the cancellation on LINNET when COMET originated), stating that ‘from the bases now occupied in the United Kingdom, the Allied Airborne Army can only operate as far as a a line Amsterdam - Utrecht - Eindhoven - Liége’ (WO 219/2186). I think that the LINNET 2 idea was to reinforce the First Allied Airborne Army’s proposal to move to locations on mainland Europe in order to be able to support a wider range of objectives.
Notably, the objectives for both COMET and MARKET lay beyond that line.
So what had changed, there is a significant reduction in available daylight between the beginning of September and the weather normally deteriorates rapidly over this period - I live next to one of 1st Airborne’s departure airfields for their parachute elements and yesterday cycled around the other two (as well as the Polish Brigade’s base areas around Stamford), the difference in weather in the last two weeks is noticeable. The RAF, in particular, had extensive experience operating in the departure areas so would have been well aware of the constraints that weather would have on air operations.
It is noticeable that the development of MARKET GARDEN’s scheme of manoeuvre in 21st Army Group, did not involve any specialist air planners which probably could have corrected the flawed assumptions that the lift plan for LINNET could be used for MARKET.
But, let’s just say that it would have been possible for two lifts per day and superimpose that onto the reality of the contemporary situation. There would have still only been one drop on day 1 (17th September) as it needed to follow the suppression of German air defences undertaken by Bomber Command, the US 8th and 9th Air Forces, and the 2nd Tactical Air Force. Then on 18th September the departure airfields in Lincolnshire were fogged in until late morning (hence why 4th Parachute Brigade’s arrival was delayed), so there would still have only been time for one lift. It would appear, then, that the Air Plan was written on what was likely to be able to be delivered rather than one the was improbable.
@@mikeainsworth4504 Interesting views Mike. Appreciate your thoughts.
If you listen to James Daley on WW2TV regards cancelled ops, Maastricht had actually been prominent in Brereton's thoughts since 25th August, and yes whilst it was proposed quickly following Linnets redundancy, Eisenhower did approve it.
But yes I am aware that Brereton wrote to Eisenhower about distance-limitations around the same time, but Maastricht -Liege is more or less the same distance as Arnhem from UK airbases, and just 19 miles beyond that imaginary line drawn line from Amsterdam to Liege. I also found it interesting that Linnet Two would have involved inserting airborne forces that were not in the 21st Army Group area but within the US sector. Was he prepared to commit forces for an operation into a US sector but not a British one?
Furthermore, in Linnet, operations were to commence in darkness at 5am, subject to weather. The 50 minutes difference in the amount of daylight therefore doesn't wash for me. The RAF certainly felt that two drops were possible, certainly in the British sector. I spoke at length to a retired RAF officer at IWM years ago, who told me that most officers were livid. Even a small scale return flight using fixed-wing Dakota's only could have delivered an additional 2-3,000 airborne troops per sector. Gavin felt that Brereton was intransigent too.
51.00 arrive at road bridge at 1930 hours
Arnhem Appreciation John Peate
Peter Smolcic
Market Garden was not a defeat. It took 100km of German held ground. The Germans retreated and lost Eindhoven and Nijmegen. The allies later used Nijmegen to attack into Germany.
Only Arnhem was a defeat but technically this was an all air operation. Planned by the air forces.
Montgomery had no jurisdiction to order First Allied Airborne Army and RAF to accept his suggestions and they didn’t. Montgomery argued for double missions flown on day one, for closer drops to Arnhem and for coup de mains on the bridges. The air commanders refused all of this. Consequently, Arnhem was not Montgomery’s battle to lose technically speaking. Deep down he may have felt the same way.
It was planned mainly by the Air Force commanders, Brereton and Williams of the USAAF, though I’m not letting Hollinghurst of the RAF off here. His decision not to fly closer to Arnhem doomed 1st Airborne.
It was Bereton and Williams who:
decided that there would be drops spread over three days, defeating the object of para jumps by losing all surprise, which is their major asset.
rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-day on the Pegasus Bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet.
chose the drop and and landing zones so far from the Bridges.
Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to take on the flak positions and attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports, thereby allowing them to bring in reinforcements with impunity.
Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of “possible flak.“
From Operation Market Garden: The Campaign for the Low Countries, Autumn 1944:
MARKET was an air force plan. It followed the Army’s request but not the commander’s intent. (P45)
Williams proved intransigent to British recommendations before, especially when 38 Group had been left out of LINNET and COMET planning by FAAA and IX TCC, making it an American planned show with a British Airborne Corps. (P46)
MARKET received virtually no assistance in ground attacks on the front or by extensive interdiction along the front due to the strategic bomber missions flown simultaneously. (P55)
- Operation Market Garden: The Campaign for the Low Countries, Autumn 1944: Seventy Years On
Hollinghurst and the RAF pleaded for double drops on each day even offering to pilot US planes but were ignored by Williams.
what is clear is that ****Williams refused to hear any British proposals from the RAF or Army concerning solutions that would have aided 1 Airborne Division. (P46)
- Operation Market Garden: The Campaign for the Low Countries, Autumn 1944: Seventy Years On
From THE WAR IN WESTERN EUROPE 1944-1945. Rick Atkinson.
“General Brereton’s troop carrier commanders had insisted that only a single mission fly on Sunday; a second sortie would ostensibly exhaust air and ground crews and leave insufficient time to service and reload the planes (although double missions over the same distance had been flown from Italy in Dragoon the previous month). Pleas by airborne commanders and by an emissary from Montgomery to Brereton’s headquarters failed to reverse the decision.”
Montgomery had the idea for Taylor’s 101st Airborne to be dropped on both sides of Son but Taylor protested and got his way, as Montgomery had no jurisdiction to order him. The 101st Airborne failed to capture the Son bridge due to that.
On the failure of the US 101st Airborne to capture the Som bridge intact:
“Montgomery’s proposal was for the US 101st Airborne to be strung out like a kite string over a 30 mile stretch. Major General Maxwell Taylor, the commander of US 101st Airborne, protested against such an extreme dispersion of his division. Brereton took the matter up with Montgomery,who agreed to let the matter be settled by direct discussion Taylor and General Miles Dempsey, the commander of British Second Army. They met at Montgomery’s headquarters on September 12th.”
-Market Garden Then and Now by Karel Margry
These kind of decisions ended up being crucial flaws and it was Brereton who enforced them, *not* Montgomery. The air commanders made the wrong choices throughout the planning.
Beyond the initial broad outline, Monty didn’t plan the operation and nor did he have any jurisdiction over the air forces. He can consult and discuss but he cannot give them orders. Monty’s aides tried to persuade Brereton to double missions on the 17th but Brereton refused and as I just pointed out, Monty even went back on his idea for the 101st to be strung out over a long distance when a Taylor argued against it. Monty did not wish to step on the toes of the airborne commanders. He respected their views and he let them plan it. Also neither Montgomery nor Browning could dissuade the RAF from deciding to drop 1st Airborne so far way from the Arnhem bridge, which led to the vast majority of 1st Airborne not even reaching it. The orders of advice Marshall Hollinghurst could not be changed. Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst are mainly the ones whose decisions screwed the operation and prevented it from being a 100% success.
The failure of the Americans to take the Son Bridge and the Nijmegen Bridge doomed the British 1st Airborne Division. A fact never mentioned in detail. If the British Division had been landed next to the Arnhem Bridge it would have been held for far longer. The Nijmegen Bridge should have been taken immediately but was not, check the facts. Gavin spent all his time trying to hold his landing zone and did not deploy a battalion to the bridge until a day later. Recce forces had got there but were driven off. A bit of detail reading needs to be done by certain people. The Grave Bridge was taken immediately as an American Company commander noticed on the plan that his C47s were passing near the bridge after dropping the division so he asked his pilots to delay dropping his company until they were near the bridge otherwise he was going to be dropped nearly 4 miles away. I was lucky to do a painting commission for Col John Waddy so I was with him on the last Arnhem Ride of the battlefield with the British Army.
Well I wont be reading the book Al, so read the appreciation below