Interesting talk ! Met Donald Featherstone at Fort Leavenworth Kansas US Army Command Staff College playing wargames with military staff officers at the Spring Convention in the Officers Club on base. Here in KC Mo. we have a Wargaming Club the HATSOFF group who brought him across as our Guest from reading all his books !! Very nice man, SORRY that he's past !! :-(
GREAT video. I've known the rough details of this wargaming exercise since being a young "wargamer" in the 1970s / 80s, and often wondered about the details while playing the SPI wargame "Seelöwe". Thanks for the production.
The big omission from the game was ULTRA, as the work of Bletchley Park had only just been revealed to the world. I think that they also 'fixed' the game slightly by moving the Royal Navy's destroyers and light cruisers further away from the beachheads than they were in real life. Put those two things together and it becomes very likely the invasion force would have been sunk in the Channel before it ever got to the beaches.
A friend of mine who was at Lancaster Uni. when Paddy Griffith was lecturing there, and was part of his wargaming group, kept in contact witrh him for years thereafter, and assures me that that was the case. There was considerable doubt that, if the actual locations of the RN's anti-invasion forces were reproduced in the wargame, no organised German forces would get through at all. A small window of opportunity was therefore created, to permit a German landing. After which of course the destroyers and light cruisers arrived, and the invasion collapsed.
I took the Allies two and a half years and Thousands of man-years to plan Overlord to get into Europe and even then it was a struggle. Think of the 200 plus LSTs and the invasion being delayed waiting for the last thirty or so. Imagine the Allies using river barges to cross the Channel. Now tell me that on a shoestring with barges the German could have invaded and resupplied their forces with the British navy in the Channel.
The point about the navy is a good one. But here's a hypothesis. The Royal Navy comes to channel to destroy the german invasion. They win BUT take fearsome losses from the Luftwaffe. The UK then goes on the lose the battle of the Atlantic due to such losses.
@@edenbreckhouse 'Fearsome losses?' What leads you to that conclusion? Have you considered the Luftwaffe failure at Dunkirk, their lack of training in anti-shipping techniques, their inability to operate at night, their lack even of a torpedo bomber until 1942, and the fact that, in the whole of WW2, the Luftwaffe sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship larger than as light cruiser? You really expect such a force to cause mayhem for the Royal Navy in a matter of a few days?
Super interesting! I first became aware of D.Featherstone, Paddy Griffith, brigadier Peter Young, and their wargaming books when i was about 12yrs old. Thats what really got me into 'real' wargaming vs the big marx figures and dirt bombs in my parents yard! Im 43 now, and still fascinated with the hobby and these titans of our hobby. Thanks for sharing. Best regards
The Ultra code breaking effort was still top secret (the first books were in the process of being published) in 1974. Also, I don't know how much was known in 1974 about the British flipping German agents? Obviously, very high ranking officers would have a lot of knowledge, but to what extent would the knowledge have been compartmentalized ?(similar to how UAP programs are compartmentalized today).
I was in to table top war gaming in the 70's fond memories, I was fascinated with the German order of battle and the tactics used in blitzkrieg, the club I belonged too use to re-enact Waterloo but the French won every time, luckily real battles aren't decided on a dice throw?
Good talk John! Great to see Paddy getting recognition on a wider public stage for his massive contribution to wargaming. I read the Daily Telegraph Colour Supplement article on the Sealion game at the time (kept it for years) and would, like you, have loved to have taken part. As it was I got to know Paddy later through another star of the Sealion game. And having now seen the hair and beard Andy Callan was sporting at the time I am surprised they managed to get him in through the gates! Andy rescued me from abandoning wargaming after the standard commercial fare failed to live up to expectations. He introduced me to the newly formed Wargames Developments and Paddy. Paddy opened my eyes to a completely different world of wargaming and history, and became a good friend who kept me sane when work was mad, and offered small kindnesses like buying my new born son, his first toy animals - a Pink rabbit and baby rabbit with the note 'Welcome to the wonderful world of Pink Rabbits Conaire'. A softer side of Paddy which may surprise some who encountered him in his guise of incisive academic historian and blue skies wargames thinker. Good stuff John. Hope the books (on the Sealion game and Paddy's life of wargaming) sell well. Guy
There would have been no need to fire an accurate salvo. A half decent bow wave would have sent those barges to the bottom. Send Destroyers through them at a stiff rate of knots and it would have been game over, but then there would have been no game. Regardless, it's nice to see some sort of reasonable explanation and presentation explaining just what a nonsense, be it practical or political, the notion of an invasion of the United Kingdom at that time actually was. Nice work. Thank you.
You are right about destroyers being able to sink river barges with a bow wave. Hence in the game, the German players were cautious about committing these when the Royal Navy appeared. The game was one of Paddy Griffith's triumphs
The major argument against Stukas is Dunkirk. There were destroyers parked off the beach for well over a week. After a maximum effort they managed to sink just four of them. Now imagine Stukas in a swirling melee in the Channel against 50 destroyers charging around and mixed up with German transports. They'd be totally ineffective.
Careful. You will upset the Sealion 'Would Haves.' Those why constantly chant about what the might Lufiwaffe 'would have' done to the poor, helpless, Royal Navy in the Channel, but are never quite able to explain how it was that the Luftwaffe never actually managed to come even remotely close to any of it.
Very interesting regarding the GHQ Reserves and bringing them in via rail. In the actual Home Forces plan for defences, you had the GHQ Reserve formed by VII Corps in the area between Guildford and Dorking. The GHQ Reserves were priamrily organised for mobile movement via road, so deploying VII Corps would have been even quicker than deploying the second GHQ reserve of IV Corps located in Northamptonshire. But still interesting to see how quickly the GHQ Reserves were deployed in the war game. Interesting idea re the bluff. I've seen nothing in the Cabinet War files to suggest that but very interesting that those were potential benefits to keeping the Germans tied up focussing on invasion.
That was a really interesting story of early wargamming. Featherstones,Grants and Phil Dunns sea battles books where my introduction to rules back in the late 70's.
It took the British and Americans years to set themselves up for DDay. They had centuries of naval experience, far larger navies with masses of specially built equipment, several practice runs and fresh, prepared troops operating from permanent bases established precisely to support an invasion of France. The Germans had much less naval experience, much smaller naval forces with only some bodged together landing vessels, no practice exercises or operations, and troops that had just fought the Battle of France, were still replacing losses to men and equipment and sorting out their occupation of their newly captured territories. They were also working from temporary forward bases designed to support either a French strategy or a German invasion of France.
You are right to emphasis the importance of experience and rehearsals. Britain had a lot of failures in training in amphibious operations, and slowly learnt.
The Germans did have a practice. 4% sinking from sailing 1 mile offshore, turning round and coming back. What the losses would have been from 48 to 72 hours at sea, in a convoy in blackout and radio silence, with a tug towi g a powered barge towing an unpowered barge towing a raft of horses, 3 knots against a 6 knot tide I hate to think. Even without waves in river vessels or any Royal Navy response. 50% sinking sounds optimistic!
There may have been only 21 purpose-built RN minesweepers, but by the autumn there were at least two hundred converted trawlers and drifters available on the south coast. Many destroyers were also fitted with minesweeping gear. In any case, even if the Kriegsmarine had somehow managed to lay all eleven planned barriers or Sperren, such barriers were far from impenetrable; the largest one would have consisted of four rows with one mine per 160 m in each row, meaning that a destroyer with a beam of 12 m, or even a cruiser with a beam of 20 m, might well have sailed right through them without noticing. Or to put it another way, sweeping a gap a mile wide through such a barrier would require the removal of only about fifty mines.
There are so many problems with Operation Sealion it is not feasible. To work it needs an early enough point of departure so Germany takes a "Britain first" approach. Then builds naval and air forces to achieve it. What surprises me is that Britain continued to believe and act as if invasion was imminent eg stop lines. That was a huge investment of effort.
Plus ... if the U-Boats were to protect the invasion, it would be interesting to know what happened in the game to explain why they were so ineffective, particularly in countering the RN's night time raids.
@@DH.2016 as I remember the U-boats of 1940, even manned by their best captains, were not very good at engaging warships moving at speed. In the game the RN lost 6 ships to U-boats (4 near harbours where the warships are most vulnerable). Remember that the umpires included those of senior ranks with command experience from WWII and so they all agreed the judgments made by the umpires were correct. They included the roll of chance by using cards
@@HistoryofWargaming Indeed. The ships the Americans sank were almost entirely sunk by naval aircraft, to which the Wehrmacht had no equivalent. The nearest they had was Fliegerkorps X, specialised in coastal operations. Notice that of the RN's WW2 losses of capital ships in the Med , Fliegerkorps X's main stamping ground, all three (Barham, Ark Royal and Eagle) were lost to U-boats. Of course in 1940 Fliegerkorps wasn't as good as it later became; their main contribution to the war effort that year was the sinking of the destroyers Leberecht Maas and Max Schultz in Operation Wikinger.
The royal navy would have not sent in their capital ships to stop the invasion (no need for them the kreigsmarine have very few capital ships left and would not risk them in the shallow channel). submarines struggle to sink the faster lighter destroyers, frigates and corvettes. They also are not very good for troop transport or fire support.
I wrote up the game, including many of the original briefs, etc in Paddy Griffith’s Wargaming Operation Sealion (1940): The Game that Launched Academic Wargaming
If it was a British bluff, it was a very costly one, as a large number of destroyers were held back for the defence of Britain, hence the U-boat "happy time". A total of 50 destroyers and light cruisers were supposed to be available at any one time for anti-invasion duty, though there is some evidence that they were sent into the Atlantic anyway. That is the actual strength of the Naval force that would have met the invaders, and they wouldn't have all arrived at once. The Royal Navy had a very different idea about the ability of aircraft to hit ships, and closed the Channel to British shipping in daylight from July 1940 onwards. There simply wasn't the space to manoeuvre in the channel while being attacked by coastal artillery, aircraft, avoiding mines, submarines, and whatever surface ships/ gun boats/fast boats the Germans had available. That picture from the middle of the Pacific Ocean is deceptive. The Japanese did hit British ships with level bombers but even German level bombers were supposed to have a dive bombing capability.
The RN Pink List for 16/17 September, 1940, which was, in effect, the RN's Order of Battle, had around 70 light cruisers and destroyers within five hours steaming of Dover. On the same list, 8 destroyers only were shown as on escort duty. Aside from the above, there were a further 42 destroyers in UK ports further away, such as Scapa Flow, Rosyth, Londonderry, & the Firth of Clyde. Indeed the RN closed the Channel to convoys in daylight, because small coasters moving at less than ten knots were much more vulnerable than warships. Throughout the war, however, the Germans had many coastal batteries. By the end of August, 1940, there were over 150 batteries, of medium, heavy, and super heavy guns. These began firing at convoys from 12 August, and on 22 August, 1940, 108 shells were fired at CE9. No hits were scored. Indeed, as post war Admiralty records state 'No British or foreign merchant ship was sunk by enemy batteries throughout the war. No foreign merchant ship was damaged. Seven British merchant ships, of an aggregate tonnage of roughly 8,000, were damaged. Oh, and in terms of Channel Convoys, the CW & CE series, there were 531 such convoys between 1940 & 1944, involving 9,097 vessel trips. Losses? 31 to all causes, 24 in convoy, 4 stragglers, and 3 out of convoy. You write of minefields. The Germans had seven hastily converted minelayers. The British had around four hundred fleet & auxiliary minesweepers. Moreover, when were these mines to be laid? At night perhaps? The RN operated nightly destroyer patrols through the Channel from Plymouth & The Nore. What do you consider might have happened when these patrols encountered the minelayers? Or submarines? The Channel was dangerous for the typical WW2 submersible. In late 1939, the Kriegsmarine sent three small coastal boats into it. They, and their crews, are still there, and U-Boat operations ceased in the Channel until after D-Day, when boats sent there in desperation were annihilated by Allied Escort Groups. Luftwaffe? This would be the same Luftwaffe which had failed so badly at Dunkirk, I assume? The same Luftwaffe which hadn't been trained in anti-shipping operations? The same Luftwaffe which didn't, until mid 1942, even have any operational torpedo bombers? The same Luftwaffe which, even after training, managed to sink 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship bigger than a light cruiser, in the whole of the war? Moreover, the Kriegsmarine plan required eleven days simply to ferry across the first wave of assault troops (in towed barges, crossing at little more than walking pace). What happens to these barges at night, when the RN can operate, and the Luftwaffe cannot provide even theoretical protection? German surface ships? Which? The one heavy cruiser, three light cruisers, twelve destroyers and torpedo boats, and thirteen S Boats, which was all the Kriegsmarine had operational in September, 1940?
@@RomanHistoryFan476AD As the RN historically had around seventy light cruisers and destroyers within five hours steaming of the Straits, even landing was problematical, to say the least.
1). In September, 1940, the Germans had less than 5,000 paratroopers, and only just over 220 operational transport aircraft. 2). How could the Germans possibly hope to get past the RN in order to capture a port?
Ports are too easy to sabotage or destroy. Transport planes are too slow and vulnerable. They would rapidly be shot down. Their transport capacity is also too low to make any significant impact. It sounds good but it just doesn't work.
Did the Luftwaffe even have 750 serviceable JU-52s in total, let alone in Northern France, in September 1940. How many of them were going to be towing the DFS-230 gliders?
Good show . . . until the final slide. To illustrate that alternative histories are "utter rubbish", a cover shot of Kenneth Macksey's 1980 book, Invasion, appears. Macksey actually agrees that an attempt in September had little chance of success, which is why he posits a cross-channel attack in mid July 1940, as soon as practicable after Dunkirk. His alternative history begins with an actual German conference on 5 June to discuss the course of the war. Alternate-Hitler rather than waiting for Britain to request terms, impetuously decides to invade. The General Staff complies. It's a great read, highly recommended.
German divisions invading in July 1940 would have faced a weaker British Army, but their campaign would still be unsupported by lines of supply. The landing units would have perhaps 48 hours before they ran out of supplies. The Royal Navy would have cut the cross channel routes in July, August or September. Macksey's book is a good book, but I am not certain of the military basis behind the narrative. Of course, others may disagree!
@@HistoryofWargaming How would the Germans hope to invade in July, when they had, literally, no transports at all, not even a few barges? On 20 June, at a conference with Hitler, Raeder reported that the Kriegsmarine had no landing craft, but hoped to have prepared around 45 seaworthy barges 'within a fortnight.'
@@dovetonsturdee7033 It is often said Wargamers study tactics, generals study logistics. To invade in July 1940, Germany would have started planning much earlier than June. Such preparations would have been detected and presumably the British would have also started to prepare.
@@HistoryofWargaming True enough. Moreover, planning couldn't really have started before June 1940. The collapse of France so completely and so quickly was a huge surprise. Even to many German commanders, I suspect!
I'll never understand the worship of Don Featherstone. Not the man, whom I know nothing about, but his influence on wargames - have people actually read his books? Their historical absurdity is matched only by the impracticality of the rules they suggest.
But they worked for me aged 10 to 15 or so. Simple, accessible and fun, for me the rules worked OK. Then one 'moves on'. Now in my sixties I back enjoying the hobby which has got much more sophisticated over the last 50 years as I hope I have!
Interesting talk ! Met Donald Featherstone at Fort Leavenworth Kansas US Army Command Staff College playing wargames with military staff officers at the Spring Convention in the Officers Club on base. Here in KC Mo. we have a Wargaming Club the HATSOFF group who brought him across as our Guest from reading all his books !! Very nice man, SORRY that he's past !! :-(
GREAT video. I've known the rough details of this wargaming exercise since being a young "wargamer" in the 1970s / 80s, and often wondered about the details while playing the SPI wargame "Seelöwe". Thanks for the production.
The big omission from the game was ULTRA, as the work of Bletchley Park had only just been revealed to the world. I think that they also 'fixed' the game slightly by moving the Royal Navy's destroyers and light cruisers further away from the beachheads than they were in real life. Put those two things together and it becomes very likely the invasion force would have been sunk in the Channel before it ever got to the beaches.
A friend of mine who was at Lancaster Uni. when Paddy Griffith was lecturing there, and was part of his wargaming group, kept in contact witrh him for years thereafter, and assures me that that was the case. There was considerable doubt that, if the actual locations of the RN's anti-invasion forces were reproduced in the wargame, no organised German forces would get through at all.
A small window of opportunity was therefore created, to permit a German landing. After which of course the destroyers and light cruisers arrived, and the invasion collapsed.
I took the Allies two and a half years and Thousands of man-years to plan Overlord to get into Europe and even then it was a struggle. Think of the 200 plus LSTs and the invasion being delayed waiting for the last thirty or so. Imagine the Allies using river barges to cross the Channel. Now tell me that on a shoestring with barges the German could have invaded and resupplied their forces with the British navy in the Channel.
The point about the navy is a good one. But here's a hypothesis. The Royal Navy comes to channel to destroy the german invasion. They win BUT take fearsome losses from the Luftwaffe. The UK then goes on the lose the battle of the Atlantic due to such losses.
@@edenbreckhouse 'Fearsome losses?' What leads you to that conclusion? Have you considered the Luftwaffe failure at Dunkirk, their lack of training in anti-shipping techniques, their inability to operate at night, their lack even of a torpedo bomber until 1942, and the fact that, in the whole of WW2, the Luftwaffe sank 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship larger than as light cruiser?
You really expect such a force to cause mayhem for the Royal Navy in a matter of a few days?
Super interesting! I first became aware of D.Featherstone, Paddy Griffith, brigadier Peter Young, and their wargaming books when i was about 12yrs old. Thats what really got me into 'real' wargaming vs the big marx figures and dirt bombs in my parents yard! Im 43 now, and still fascinated with the hobby and these titans of our hobby. Thanks for sharing. Best regards
it is a fascinating life long hobby!
The Ultra code breaking effort was still top secret (the first books were in the process of being published) in 1974.
Also, I don't know how much was known in 1974 about the British flipping German agents?
Obviously, very high ranking officers would have a lot of knowledge, but to what extent would the knowledge have been compartmentalized ?(similar to how UAP programs are compartmentalized today).
I was in to table top war gaming in the 70's fond memories, I was fascinated with the German order of battle and the tactics used in blitzkrieg, the club I belonged too use to re-enact Waterloo but the French won every time, luckily real battles aren't decided on a dice throw?
Good talk John! Great to see Paddy getting recognition on a wider public stage for his massive contribution to wargaming.
I read the Daily Telegraph Colour Supplement article on the Sealion game at the time (kept it for years) and would, like you, have loved to have taken part. As it was I got to know Paddy later through another star of the Sealion game. And having now seen the hair and beard Andy Callan was sporting at the time I am surprised they managed to get him in through the gates!
Andy rescued me from abandoning wargaming after the standard commercial fare failed to live up to expectations. He introduced me to the newly formed Wargames Developments and Paddy.
Paddy opened my eyes to a completely different world of wargaming and history, and became a good friend who kept me sane when work was mad, and offered small kindnesses like buying my new born son, his first toy animals - a Pink rabbit and baby rabbit with the note 'Welcome to the wonderful world of Pink Rabbits Conaire'. A softer side of Paddy which may surprise some who encountered him in his guise of incisive academic historian and blue skies wargames thinker.
Good stuff John.
Hope the books (on the Sealion game and Paddy's life of wargaming) sell well.
Guy
Paddy had a major influence of developing wargaming beyond the figure, tabletop and board games of the time. So did Andy Callan and others.
@@HistoryofWargaming - Also glad to hear Andy Callan getting a mention. Met him once - a true star of modern wargaming.
Excellent overview of the War game, oh to be a fly on the wall during the game, fascinating,
Just found this via a link. Thank you very much for taking the time to set this out for us!
Glad you enjoyed this fascinating piece of wargaming 'archaeology'.
There would have been no need to fire an accurate salvo. A half decent bow wave would have sent those barges to the bottom. Send Destroyers through them at a stiff rate of knots and it would have been game over, but then there would have been no game. Regardless, it's nice to see some sort of reasonable explanation and presentation explaining just what a nonsense, be it practical or political, the notion of an invasion of the United Kingdom at that time actually was.
Nice work. Thank you.
You are right about destroyers being able to sink river barges with a bow wave. Hence in the game, the German players were cautious about committing these when the Royal Navy appeared. The game was one of Paddy Griffith's triumphs
The major argument against Stukas is Dunkirk. There were destroyers parked off the beach for well over a week. After a maximum effort they managed to sink just four of them. Now imagine Stukas in a swirling melee in the Channel against 50 destroyers charging around and mixed up with German transports. They'd be totally ineffective.
You make a good point using the statistics from Dunkirk.
Careful. You will upset the Sealion 'Would Haves.' Those why constantly chant about what the might Lufiwaffe 'would have' done to the poor, helpless, Royal Navy in the Channel, but are never quite able to explain how it was that the Luftwaffe never actually managed to come even remotely close to any of it.
Very interesting regarding the GHQ Reserves and bringing them in via rail. In the actual Home Forces plan for defences, you had the GHQ Reserve formed by VII Corps in the area between Guildford and Dorking. The GHQ Reserves were priamrily organised for mobile movement via road, so deploying VII Corps would have been even quicker than deploying the second GHQ reserve of IV Corps located in Northamptonshire. But still interesting to see how quickly the GHQ Reserves were deployed in the war game.
Interesting idea re the bluff. I've seen nothing in the Cabinet War files to suggest that but very interesting that those were potential benefits to keeping the Germans tied up focussing on invasion.
That was a really interesting story of early wargamming. Featherstones,Grants and Phil Dunns sea battles books where my introduction to rules back in the late 70's.
It took the British and Americans years to set themselves up for DDay. They had centuries of naval experience, far larger navies with masses of specially built equipment, several practice runs and fresh, prepared troops operating from permanent bases established precisely to support an invasion of France.
The Germans had much less naval experience, much smaller naval forces with only some bodged together landing vessels, no practice exercises or operations, and troops that had just fought the Battle of France, were still replacing losses to men and equipment and sorting out their occupation of their newly captured territories. They were also working from temporary forward bases designed to support either a French strategy or a German invasion of France.
You are right to emphasis the importance of experience and rehearsals. Britain had a lot of failures in training in amphibious operations, and slowly learnt.
@@HistoryofWargaming Practice makes perfect.
The Germans did have a practice. 4% sinking from sailing 1 mile offshore, turning round and coming back.
What the losses would have been from 48 to 72 hours at sea, in a convoy in blackout and radio silence, with a tug towi g a powered barge towing an unpowered barge towing a raft of horses, 3 knots against a 6 knot tide I hate to think. Even without waves in river vessels or any Royal Navy response.
50% sinking sounds optimistic!
There may have been only 21 purpose-built RN minesweepers, but by the autumn there were at least two hundred converted trawlers and drifters available on the south coast. Many destroyers were also fitted with minesweeping gear. In any case, even if the Kriegsmarine had somehow managed to lay all eleven planned barriers or Sperren, such barriers were far from impenetrable; the largest one would have consisted of four rows with one mine per 160 m in each row, meaning that a destroyer with a beam of 12 m, or even a cruiser with a beam of 20 m, might well have sailed right through them without noticing. Or to put it another way, sweeping a gap a mile wide through such a barrier would require the removal of only about fifty mines.
thank you for expanding my response with more detail. You are right, there was additional minesweeping capacity beyond the 21 minesweepers.
Thanks for that John, very interesting.
So funny the general was such a train nerd he could construct the time tables from 34 years before
Informative and interesting, thanks for sharing!
Well done great presentation and shared this to MW
The OS maps for 1945-47 are now available for download from the Scottish National Library. maps.nls.uk/os/one-inch-new-popular/
Wow amazing😱
There are so many problems with Operation Sealion it is not feasible. To work it needs an early enough point of departure so Germany takes a "Britain first" approach. Then builds naval and air forces to achieve it.
What surprises me is that Britain continued to believe and act as if invasion was imminent eg stop lines. That was a huge investment of effort.
I have some of his rulebooks, he's one of the best.
I can't help wondering about the American experience in the Pacific; their aircraft seemed very competent in the matter of sinking capital ships.
Plus ... if the U-Boats were to protect the invasion, it would be interesting to know what happened in the game to explain why they were so ineffective, particularly in countering the RN's night time raids.
@@DH.2016 as I remember the U-boats of 1940, even manned by their best captains, were not very good at engaging warships moving at speed. In the game the RN lost 6 ships to U-boats (4 near harbours where the warships are most vulnerable). Remember that the umpires included those of senior ranks with command experience from WWII and so they all agreed the judgments made by the umpires were correct. They included the roll of chance by using cards
My understanding it takes training to hit moving ships, usually using dive bombers and torpedo bombers. High level bombers were largely ineffective.
@@HistoryofWargaming Indeed. The ships the Americans sank were almost entirely sunk by naval aircraft, to which the Wehrmacht had no equivalent. The nearest they had was Fliegerkorps X, specialised in coastal operations. Notice that of the RN's WW2 losses of capital ships in the Med , Fliegerkorps X's main stamping ground, all three (Barham, Ark Royal and Eagle) were lost to U-boats. Of course in 1940 Fliegerkorps wasn't as good as it later became; their main contribution to the war effort that year was the sinking of the destroyers Leberecht Maas and Max Schultz in Operation Wikinger.
The royal navy would have not sent in their capital ships to stop the invasion (no need for them the kreigsmarine have very few capital ships left and would not risk them in the shallow channel). submarines struggle to sink the faster lighter destroyers, frigates and corvettes. They also are not very good for troop transport or fire support.
Is there a book that recounts that 1973 event?
I wrote up the game, including many of the original briefs, etc in Paddy Griffith’s Wargaming Operation Sealion (1940): The Game that Launched Academic Wargaming
If it was a British bluff, it was a very costly one, as a large number of destroyers were held back for the defence of Britain, hence the U-boat "happy time". A total of 50 destroyers and light cruisers were supposed to be available at any one time for anti-invasion duty, though there is some evidence that they were sent into the Atlantic anyway. That is the actual strength of the Naval force that would have met the invaders, and they wouldn't have all arrived at once. The Royal Navy had a very different idea about the ability of aircraft to hit ships, and closed the Channel to British shipping in daylight from July 1940 onwards. There simply wasn't the space to manoeuvre in the channel while being attacked by coastal artillery, aircraft, avoiding mines, submarines, and whatever surface ships/ gun boats/fast boats the Germans had available. That picture from the middle of the Pacific Ocean is deceptive. The Japanese did hit British ships with level bombers but even German level bombers were supposed to have a dive bombing capability.
The RN Pink List for 16/17 September, 1940, which was, in effect, the RN's Order of Battle, had around 70 light cruisers and destroyers within five hours steaming of Dover. On the same list, 8 destroyers only were shown as on escort duty. Aside from the above, there were a further 42 destroyers in UK ports further away, such as Scapa Flow, Rosyth, Londonderry, & the Firth of Clyde.
Indeed the RN closed the Channel to convoys in daylight, because small coasters moving at less than ten knots were much more vulnerable than warships. Throughout the war, however, the Germans had many coastal batteries. By the end of August, 1940, there were over 150 batteries, of medium, heavy, and super heavy guns. These began firing at convoys from 12 August, and on 22 August, 1940, 108 shells were fired at CE9. No hits were scored. Indeed, as post war Admiralty records state 'No British or foreign merchant ship was sunk by enemy batteries throughout the war. No foreign merchant ship was damaged. Seven British merchant ships, of an aggregate tonnage of roughly 8,000, were damaged.
Oh, and in terms of Channel Convoys, the CW & CE series, there were 531 such convoys between 1940 & 1944, involving 9,097 vessel trips. Losses? 31 to all causes, 24 in convoy, 4 stragglers, and 3 out of convoy.
You write of minefields. The Germans had seven hastily converted minelayers. The British had around four hundred fleet & auxiliary minesweepers. Moreover, when were these mines to be laid? At night perhaps? The RN operated nightly destroyer patrols through the Channel from Plymouth & The Nore. What do you consider might have happened when these patrols encountered the minelayers?
Or submarines? The Channel was dangerous for the typical WW2 submersible. In late 1939, the Kriegsmarine sent three small coastal boats into it. They, and their crews, are still there, and U-Boat operations ceased in the Channel until after D-Day, when boats sent there in desperation were annihilated by Allied Escort Groups.
Luftwaffe? This would be the same Luftwaffe which had failed so badly at Dunkirk, I assume? The same Luftwaffe which hadn't been trained in anti-shipping operations? The same Luftwaffe which didn't, until mid 1942, even have any operational torpedo bombers? The same Luftwaffe which, even after training, managed to sink 31 RN destroyers, and no RN warship bigger than a light cruiser, in the whole of the war? Moreover, the Kriegsmarine plan required eleven days simply to ferry across the first wave of assault troops (in towed barges, crossing at little more than walking pace). What happens to these barges at night, when the RN can operate, and the Luftwaffe cannot provide even theoretical protection?
German surface ships? Which? The one heavy cruiser, three light cruisers, twelve destroyers and torpedo boats, and thirteen S Boats, which was all the Kriegsmarine had operational in September, 1940?
What IS a "loosing battle"?
Operation Sealion a naval invasion that relied on the superior navy not interring and strangling the logistics.
logistics would have been the downfall as long as the British pursued an active defence to force the invasion to consume their ammunition etc...
@@HistoryofWargaming Pretty much the issue is not landing the first wave, It is supplying it afterwards.
@@RomanHistoryFan476AD As the RN historically had around seventy light cruisers and destroyers within five hours steaming of the Straits, even landing was problematical, to say the least.
@@dovetonsturdee7033 True but we got to give the Germans at least one chance first.
The main German objectives should have been to capture 2-3 airfields via paratroopers and at the very least one decent sized port for resupply
1). In September, 1940, the Germans had less than 5,000 paratroopers, and only just over 220 operational transport aircraft.
2). How could the Germans possibly hope to get past the RN in order to capture a port?
Ports are too easy to sabotage or destroy.
Transport planes are too slow and vulnerable. They would rapidly be shot down. Their transport capacity is also too low to make any significant impact.
It sounds good but it just doesn't work.
What happened to the German airborne at Crete in 1941 and the Canadians at Dieppe in 1942 shows how practical an idea this isn't.
Did the Luftwaffe even have 750 serviceable JU-52s in total, let alone in Northern France, in September 1940. How many of them were going to be towing the DFS-230 gliders?
Good show . . . until the final slide. To illustrate that alternative histories are "utter rubbish", a cover shot of Kenneth Macksey's 1980 book, Invasion, appears. Macksey actually agrees that an attempt in September had little chance of success, which is why he posits a cross-channel attack in mid July 1940, as soon as practicable after Dunkirk. His alternative history begins with an actual German conference on 5 June to discuss the course of the war. Alternate-Hitler rather than waiting for Britain to request terms, impetuously decides to invade. The General Staff complies. It's a great read, highly recommended.
German divisions invading in July 1940 would have faced a weaker British Army, but their campaign would still be unsupported by lines of supply. The landing units would have perhaps 48 hours before they ran out of supplies. The Royal Navy would have cut the cross channel routes in July, August or September. Macksey's book is a good book, but I am not certain of the military basis behind the narrative. Of course, others may disagree!
@@HistoryofWargaming How would the Germans hope to invade in July, when they had, literally, no transports at all, not even a few barges? On 20 June, at a conference with Hitler, Raeder reported that the Kriegsmarine had no landing craft, but hoped to have prepared around 45 seaworthy barges 'within a fortnight.'
@@dovetonsturdee7033 It is often said Wargamers study tactics, generals study logistics. To invade in July 1940, Germany would have started planning much earlier than June. Such preparations would have been detected and presumably the British would have also started to prepare.
@@HistoryofWargaming True enough. Moreover, planning couldn't really have started before June 1940. The collapse of France so completely and so quickly was a huge surprise. Even to many German commanders, I suspect!
Its called the English channel for a reason
They didn’t need to destroy the RAF they just needed to keep the RAF occupied
But how does that protect the German barges from the tender mercies of the RN anti-invasion flotillas?
Paddy 100% had ADHD 😂
I'll never understand the worship of Don Featherstone. Not the man, whom I know nothing about, but his influence on wargames - have people actually read his books? Their historical absurdity is matched only by the impracticality of the rules they suggest.
But they worked for me aged 10 to 15 or so. Simple, accessible and fun, for me the rules worked OK. Then one 'moves on'. Now in my sixties I back enjoying the hobby which has got much more sophisticated over the last 50 years as I hope I have!