The indiegogo campaign has ended, yet the book is now released for the general public as well: » The Assault Platoon of the Grenadier-Company November 1944 (StG 44) - sturmzug.com Same with our previous book: » Army Regulation Medium Panzer Company 1941 - www.hdv470-7.com
Hey dude can you do some video in obscure battles that most people have had much to watch or read on the subject, like the cherkassy pocket, courland cauldron. Maybe some videos on specific soldiers that made a difference in the battlefield. Or how the recon battalions acted and changed from 39 to 45... You could do videos on the battlegroups that were hastily scrounged together at the end of the war, you could do divisional histories etc Just a thought, but if you did decide to make These types of videos I will watch every one dude I dunno just sick of every armchair historian doing videos on Stalingrad or kursk barbarossa etc there are 100 videos with so many different views but essentially the same number and people. I hope you could help us put with these types of videos
@@coryobrien8154 why lose a good soldier agains a shepherd with and rusty ak and some lucky shots? but yeah, in a modern context you are not *required* to fight to the death, usually you will have some kind of support. If you are fighting 1:1 against a similary trained enemy its almost a coin toss
Current Patch German AI is OP and has at least 500 divisions by 1941. And infantry along with artillery has been nerfed. You need tanks and lots of AA to counter German Air superiority.
@@robertalaverdov8147 I agree, played as Republican Spain with 40-width infantry with artillery and full support companies. It took quite awhile to beat the Germans and I couldn't just right on Berlin otherwise my manpower would be out in 6 months tops, maybe 3. Then again, since there was so many Germans on my border the soviets had an easier time and didn't get pushed back very far. I never had air superiority and knew I never would. Every time I got a few hundred planes and put them over a region they would be shot down. Didn't have the time to invest in much air technology so fair enough.
There is nothing weird about soviet soldiers sometimes only opening fire when enemy comes close. I think that should be somewhere in the old manuals. Modern Russian manuals say that when defending a squad should open fire from greater distances when the attacking force is strong but let small groups come close and suddenly open fire from spare firing positions (not to give away main positions). That's just a case of biting what you can chew. That's just common sense, it shouldn't be some new modern tactic. It was even used in WW1. One Russian officer who fought wrote in his memoirs about a battle that happened in autumn of 1914. He was ordered to take his company and defend an important bridge acting as a rearguard to cover retreat of their corps. They entrenched, endured massive barrages, repelled numerous German attacks for all day and decided to pull out at night since Germans slowly advanced on their flanks. One platoon stayed to cover the retreat. Germans decided to take seemingly empty positions and moved as disorganized crowd. That platoon stayed let them get close and only then suddenly opened fire forcing panicking Germans to flee and pulling out afterwards. If you think that surprise effect will be enough to destroy or rout the enemy then there is no reason not to ambush the enemy and let them get close before you reveal yourself. And if people knew this tactic in 1914 and use it today then it would be weird if it was forgotten in WW2.
@@Nelson-gs9yv any AT rifle gunner should hold their fire until same distance or ideally until the tank can be flanked at 100m. Long distance shooting of those rifles is a nowadays idioticy invented by CoD WWII and BF V devs, who made sniper rifles out of them. Because they want to sell gamers M82/M107. Irl they wouldn't even have adjustable iron sights because you'll lose too much penetration at distance anyway.
@Roughman Volley sights survived until late 20's in fact. However I'd say they were obsolete after Crimean/American Civil War. And no, not because of machine guns alone. Back then machine gun was more of an artillery piece, remember? It was because of MAGAZINE rifles. Henry, Winchester and Vetterli to be specific.
@Roughman Battle of Little Bighorn is still picked apart today on whether Henry was superior to 1873 cavalry carbine and taken part in the overall outcome as one of decisive factors. If it was that simple, there would have never been such a question asked, not to mention researched. Vetterli was not only adopted, it was MADE to the specifications of Swiss army. And won the competition. Not to mention it's long service and huge geography of usage also raises a fair point.
@Roughman 1)it signifies the afterthought of this discussion. You wanted an example of if those rifles were effective. They were. 2)look up Vetterli magazine since you've just clearly stated that you're oblivious to any connections of the design. And you'll see how Henry and Winchester are connected to it. And the ammo it used. The ammo you complained about previously. Henry's magazine is what brought repeating rifles into the light instead of being revolver jokes. You've also tried to skip on service length and what other armies used Vetterli.
I love how they are instructed to break into "determined battlecry", (@8:30) I could see a Soviet non-com chewing out a soldier, "your battlecry is not determined enough!". As always, the video was top notch!
@@ME-hm7zm I AM STARSHIY SERZHANT KHARTMANENKO, YOUR COMPANY STARSHINA. FROM NOW ON THE FIRST WORDS OUT OF YOUR FILTHY SEWERS WILL BE 'LET ME ADDRESS MYSELF, TOVARISH STARSHIY SERZHANT', AND THE LAST WORDS WILL BE WHATEVER YOU WANT, 'COS IT'S NOT AN AMERICAN MARINE CORPS, SO WE DON'T SAY THE SAME WORDS TWICE.
Finns have a lot of reports on how the Soviet squads *actually* functioned on the field - at least when against the Finns. Issue obvously is that they are all in Finnish, so they have not really been used in research. The most curious thing is that the Finns considered Soviet troops pretty good soldiers, but with limited initiative if the leadership was affected. Hence, a Soviet unit could perform great attacks and combat movements, but casualties among leaders would fast lead to lack of initiative and decisive losses for the units.
The Soviets originally had even battallion commanders leading attacks from the front. They quickly changed this when they they realised losing such high commanders so frequently caused needless disorganisation.
It makes even more sense when considering how many conscripted soldiers were novice and lack both school education and combat experience, which is certainly not uncommon for such a scale of mobilization in such a vast and rather poor country. Those novice might do well under direct instructions from squad commander. But if such an interpreter was incapacitated, the situation might become too complicated for them to comprehend.
@@neobr1ck I've seen examples of manuals issued by the Red Army for instruction. They use fairly simple language and definitely do not seek to blind the reader with science. They include quite a lot of line drawings for illustration.
@@kaczynskis5721 Even if a textbook is simple and reader-friendly, people sometimes still need a teacher. And from the design of the manual we can feel the urge to make it easier to understand, which is also an indication that some soldiers did have problem understanding the instructions.
Man, you know why ''battle cry'' was even mentioned? No, not only because it gave some morale boost... ''URAAA'' was really important thing because of...well... Interesting fact: *if you screaming/opening mouth, you have less chance of becoming deaf/contused* It's just simple physiology. They tried to save soldiers by giving them command to scream.
@@sprzedawcanozywgierozy8247 I mean the historic British battle cry has been either "Victory!" Or "Charge!" For most of history and screaming "Attack!" is also used, though more uncommonly. So the German "Angriff" would technically count if they would yell it as they engaged the foe. Which seems to be how it was applied.
Russians took that "Uraa!" battlecry from mongols in 13th century. "Uragshaa!" in mongolian means "Forward!". When hundreds of horsemans cry "Uragshaa", its sounds like "Uraa!". And dont forget, that Russia was under mongolian control in 1237 - 1480
11:26 While waiting until the enemy is less than 50m away before opening fire does seem rather short, it totally makes sense to me that the soviets wouldn’t open fire at the ranges given in the manual. In battle conditions, 400m with iron sights is quite the optimistic range for even an experienced shooter. It is of course possible to hit something with a iron sighted Mosin/kar98/etc at a 400m shooting range, but even something as “basic” as target aquisition becomes really hard that far away(for example, try finding the guy on anything other than a well groomed football field after he hits the deck). Things like this, combined with the fact that most soldiers(soviet or otherwise) aren’t exactly super amazing marksmen, makes it much smarter for the squad to wait until the enemy at a closer range and not waste precious ammo.
It makes even much more sense if you consider shock effect. Being shot from 400m gives you at lot of possibility to get in a cover. Being shot pointblank - not just leaves much less options, but also create panic, especially for inexperienced soliders.
@@clouster75 Yeah, it works against inexperienced soldiers only. Fear killed a lot of ppl back then. That's why Elite soldiers from both armies (german SS and russian Guards) easily held their ground and deflected waves of regular infantry. (wermacht and red army). They were brainwashed and had no fucking fear for their lifes, like at all: SS gave swore an oath to Hitler (not to Deutschland) and used pills of ''pervitin'' (type of methamphetamine that kills fear). Guards and Shook Troops literally were Stalinists and were ready to *kill and die for Motherland*. Also, they were drinking ''100g'' of vodka before every battle ''for braveness''.
@@lovepeace9727but the guards divisions, weren't political divisions like the ss, they were just élite army divisions, wich were composed of very experienced soldiers, that's what guards unit were, soldiers that had fought really well, the only divisions that were more political were the nkvd units, but in late 1942 they had lost all power in the red army, because stalin trusted more in his generals, as such he didn't need political comisars and divisions to restrain his soldiers, and after that the nkvd units were just like regular army units, and that's it
A bit late but would like to chip in. The engagement at longer ranges isn’t really meant to kill the enemy (though it is good when it happens) but begin the process of fire superiority. Once shot, the attacker will begin to slow down and try to find their target and engage back but in general people are less inclined to stick their heads up when getting shot. Obviously it would escalate with artillery and mortars getting called into each other’s positions but being further away may complicate the certification process (ie did the arty actually kill what it was supposed too)
Hey, dear neighbour to the east, your content consistently provides good quality sources which, generally, is something that could be better on YT. Many fellow UA-camrs could learn a bit or two from you in this regards. The way you handle the sources is something that inspired me to start showing more quotations on screen, which at first seems odd, but it grew on me with time. It also allows for further animations which is kinda nice. Servus, my Austrian friend, keep it coming.
lots of 'rush' memes here in the comments, but this looks like pretty standard, if simplified and adapted small unit tactics. I think a lot of you fail to recognize the record of close in fighting and is morale effect, especially before common issue of self loading rifles and modern logistical supply. considering the Soviet material and personnel situation i think the biggest takeaway from this is that a realistic approach is one that takes note of the standards doctrine of the time and adapts it to a realistic assessment of ones own capabilities as well as an evolving sense of the opponents capabilities and behavior. rifles are often not the chosen weapon of the assault, pretty recent US army doctrine privileged grenades in the assault, though that may have changed.
Not a confirmed source, but assault tactics have changed a lot during the years. The biggest influence in the last 40 years were the wars in Afghanistan, USSR and US/NATO. Grenades were always part of assault squads. However, more modern infantry has much heavier training in close quarter combat compared to inter-war period due to the heavy fighting in cities.
It feels very vauge though. Indeed it fits the situation witth personell, training and so on, but in my opinion so many vauge points, such as "attack and do it passionately", would be better for a generally more experienced/better trained unit. Who have a better all around understanding of the concepts of attack and defence before baptism of fire. of course MHV points this out, but the guide feels so much more vague than he points out. Over simplified just to give the grunts on the ground any kind of aid.
@@oskarnisson8211 first of all, it isn't the whole field manual. Second, field manuals in soviet ussian point of view is a kind of 'beginner's guide', there are instructions which clear the vague points out. Or at least they should)
@@oskarnisson8211 as for better training, soviets didn't have much time for training after the war started, because the situation was dire. You should not think of soviet troops as unexperienced though, as valuable experience was paid in blood of first two years of the war. Life is a the most prominent of teachers. I assume, soviet troops in 44 had more experience than american troops who was drilled for a year or so, but had little actual combat practice.
@@MilitaryHistoryVisualized Hello, if you have actual Russian sources, I may provide some shoddy fast translation (probably). I obviously don't know how big are they though.
This is actually covered in the same Combat Regulations of November 1942, they were just omitted in this video. After squad tactics it goes like this: squad of submachine gunners, squad of machingunners, squad of antitank rifles, single artillery gun. After that it explains actions of bigger units, and ends with instructions to rifle company. And after that there is a second part, which proceeds to even bigger units, and ends with instructions to regiments. Interestingly, there is one chapter which describes how regiment should fight in case of complete surrounding.
@mr_ anheuser Well that's an exageratiom, for sure - But compared to the german manual, it is way more disrespectful to safety. Not that it was necessarily a mistake - they did have a lot of men.
This manual clearly codifies that. 1. Infantrymen carrying ammo for a gun that isn't theirs. 2. The manual states to begin firing at 400 meters, but due to ammo/training constraints, most actual squads begin firing at 50-100 meters. 3. No dedicated anti-tank munitions on a squad level, so everyone is told to zerg rush the tank with grenades, then run past into the infantry to fight them instead. So yes, running headlong without arms or ammo. Also, kind of surprised that the Soviet manual is the one that says 'You must hate your enemies' explicitly.
Yeah, like WWI marked a huge change in how we fought, witnessed firsthand as old strategies failed spectacularly against new technology. Adaptation was hard and fast. Research during the interwar period refined tactics but also still hadn't quite gotten past some faults of the old ways. Especially with the introduction of armour, no one was entirely sure how they should be used. WWII was a trial by fire for these refined tactics but despite how much technology has advanced, the basic function for tactics haven't really. The only really big thing I can think of (I'm in no way a professional or even especially a hobbyist) is the idea and introduction of accuracy through volume of fire. Like as different as modern assault rifles are from WWII battle rifles, how one maneuvers and arranges groups to make the best of your pew pews hasn't changed much.
The Soviets learned so much from that war. They even made copies of the Suomi KP-31 (SMG), called the PPD, then later they made the famous PPSh, the Daddy.
Looking forward to see the American, British and Japanese version. Then, bond them together with a concluding video on some typical outcome of a firefight
You are being bombarded? Advance and kill the enemy You are being fired at? Advance and kill the enemy Tanks are rolling over you? Advance and kill the enemy Your trench is being overrun? Advance and kill the enemy The platoon next to you is being overrun by tanks? Advance and kill the enemy
you think so? A freshly occupied position is harder to defend than an estableshed own position i think. So in my opinion they covered the "worst case" of defending a position. (so in other scenarios there are a few things less to consider or easier)
@@nirfz A valid point. However, it misses my original meaning that the Germans were optimistic in thinking they would only be advancing and not retreating.
@@ctrlaltdebug right after "occupying and holding a position" is the point of "going back" which sounds like retreating to me. Also one could argue (would be easier if we had read the damn thing) that just because "Occupying and holding a position" is the title, that doesn't necessarily mean that they were opstimistic to only having to advance. The holding a position part could also include while on retreat, on the move in general, holding a position while on marching and getting attacked... So holding a position in general. Also you have to take into account that those manuals also had their share of propaganda use. Just take the first line of the Soviet one with the "must hate the enemy" line, same thing here. So it might well be that they wanted to tell their soldiers (just like you say) that they would only advance. But from all i know about german burocracy and rules for everything i have my doubts.
@@ctrlaltdebug It's not a matter of optimism. Tactics that are effective in holding a recently captured position from counter attack, will also be effective in holding your own defensive positions. Thats just how maneuver warfare works. If i were to put it one way is that your assumption that this is optimism, comes from a mindset that is very "last century" where holding a frontage for long periods of time was how wars were fought. However in the modern era, at a squad or even platoon level there is effectively no such thing as a separation between defensive and offensive tactics. In an era of mechanized armies with rapid radio communication with accurate artillery, and air support, holding solid defensive positions are meaningless. The key to such warfare is mobility, which in retreat works exactly the same way as in advance. You must adopt a new position and fight from it. More over such tactics allow a defending force to dampen the blow of an enemy offensive, adapt to it, and cause severe casualties to the attacking force. As opposed to a solid defensive line which is broken then over run due to the static nature of it's defensive positions and then the enemy moves with relative impunity until it encounters the next defensive line. The proof is in the pudding. The Germans kept breaking through defensive lines, and advanced all the way through Russia, and all the way to the English channel. Then when the war turned, these same tactics delayed (significantly better supplied) allied forces for several years as we pushed across the fields France and Belgium, and up through the hills of Italy. Even better evidence is that this is effectively how we all fight today.
Slight correction on "June 1941" squad layout. It looks like 2 mixed together TO&Es from 1939 and July 1941. Grenadier and Assistant grenadier were part of the squad prior and during Winter War. But rifle grenade launcher was phased out quite quickly after that conflict (it was kinda crap) - according June 1940 ("штат 04/100" - "TO&E 04/100") squad had 12 men - leader, machine gunner, assistant machine gunner and 9 riflemen (assistant squad leader wasn't specified by TO&E. By April 1941 ("штат 04/400") squad had 11 men - leader, machine gunner, assistant machine gunner, 2 submachine gunners and 6 riflemen. Both these TO&Es, however, called only for 2 snipers per company. Sniper in rifle squad appeared in rather bizarre "TO&E for rifle regiment of reduced wartime division" (штат № 04/601) which was never really implemented. According to that, rifle platoon was supposed to have 4 rifle squads. 2 squads were supposed to have 1 sniper, other 2 - submachine gunners instead of snipers.
@@IvanIvanov-ho6rz slightly more complicated - 1 squad had lmg and sniper, 1 squad - lmg and smg, 1 squad - sniper but no lmg, 1 squad - smg but no lmg. And it was never implemented due to constant lack of optical sights, so the best shooter in thq squad (or just randomly picked dude, in some cases) was named "sniper", but not given optics
June 1941 At the beginning of the war, most of the regular units of the Red Army were armed with SVT. The composition of squad was 11 men - 1 with DP27 and 8 with SVT rifles, 2 with PPD smg
@@ineednochannelyoutube5384 The Soviets have lost most of their tanks, aircraft and artillery in the first weeks of war so logically infantry was their main weapon, at least for the first two years of war.
The US has "enemies foreign and domestic" as part of the oath but that's as close as we get to the Russian military oath. Which to say, not very close at all. USA's and Germany's infantry tactics are all about adapting to the situation with a emphasis on bullets, not bodies. Doing it by the Russian military book is just a good way to get you killed in combat. There was a reason more Russian's died than any other nation.
@@readhistory2023 Majority of russians who died, were civillians, and a big part of soldiers who perished, died in german concentration camps. If we are going to compare those killed in action, it is actually not very big of a difference, 1.5 soviet died per every Axis soldier on the easter front.
@@readhistory2023 Yes and that reason is that Russians (and other nationalities of the urss) fought quantitatively 80% of german numbers and qualitatively the most elite divisions and when they were fresh. There were little americans to kill until 1944 in europe buddy, when germany was already on its knees.
Alexs220 I am Russian. The “majority of Soviet casualties were civilians” is a myth of the Soviet and Russian propaganda. The official number of the Soviet military casualties, published by the Russian defense ministry (“8 200 000”) is understated. The real figures, estimated on the basis of the personal files of the soldiers (which are incomplete) is something of the order of 14-17 million.
3:25 там вообще все было очень серьезно: Я, гражданин Союза Советских Социалистических Республик, вступая в ряды Рабоче-Крестьянской Красной Армии, принимаю присягу и торжественно клянусь быть честным, храбрым, дисциплинированным, бдительным бойцом, строго хранить военную и государственную тайну, беспрекословно выполнять все воинские уставы и приказы командиров и начальников. Я клянусь добросовестно изучать военное дело, всемерно беречь военное и народное имущество и до последнего дыхания быть преданным своему народу, своей Советской Родине и Рабоче-Крестьянскому Правительству. Я всегда готов по приказу Рабоче-Крестьянского Правительства выступить на защиту моей Родины - Союза Советских Социалистических Республик и, как воин Рабоче-Крестьянской Красной Армии, я клянусь защищать ее мужественно, умело, с достоинством и честью, не щадя своей крови и самой жизни для достижения полной победы над врагами. Если же по злому умыслу я нарушу эту мою торжественную присягу, то пусть меня постигнет суровая кара советского закона, всеобщая ненависть и презрение трудящихся.
3:25 It was actually much more serious than that: "I, a citizen of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, join the ranks of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and give a solemn oath to be an honest, disciplined, and alert soldier; to guard the military and state secrets with utmost care; to follow without any doubt all military codices and the orders given by my commanders and superiors. I pledge to study the military craft with due diligence, to guard the military and civilian property by all means necessary, and to be loyal until my last breath to my people, my soviet Motherland, and my workers' and peasants' government. I will always be ready to execute orders from workers' and peasants' government for protection of the Motherland - the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, and, as a soldier of Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, I pledge to protect Her [Motherland] bravely, skillfully, with dignity and honour, with no regard for my own blood [not family, just blood] and my very life to attain total victory over the enemies. If I break this solemn oath with malicious intent, then I shall be smitten by the soviet law, by overwhelming hatred and disdain of the workers [as in "those who work"]." Probably many mistakes, sorry.
@@ExtermicideN7 thank you, tovarisch! It's worth noting, that unlike Wehrmacht, in Red Army there was no oath to Stalin personally, only to people, Motherland and government in general.
That "Sniper" at squad level seems really weird. Finnish Reserve officer's handbook from 1940 also mentions this "Sniper" at squad level, but it is obvious from equipment numbers, that every soviet infantry squad couldn't have a sniper, at least one equipped with a scoped rifle. It also mentions sniper at platoon level in Finnish organization which is optimistic, to say the least. I wonder does the "sniper" have different meaning in this context. Then again, the foreign organizations used in the book have some flaws, such as still using organization based on MG 08/15 for the german squad.
Foreign Infantry squad organizations from 'Reserve Officer' by P. Huhtala from 1940. Introduction is from march 1939, which explains why there is nothing about the Winter war in the book. The book claims it is based on active regulations and newest domestic and foreign military literature (March 1939) Page 534-> Foreign Squad organizations 1. Germany Squad leader (Rifle) Deputy Squad leader (Rifle) LMG. Gunner (MG 08/15 and pistol) Gunner's assistant (Pistol) Ammo carrier 1 (Sniper rifle) Ammo carrier 2 (Pistol) 7 Riflemen (Rifles) Estimated firepower = 250 shots per minute (sh/min) 2. Russia (There are no Weapons marked for roles from then on) Squad Leader LMG Gunner Gunner's assistant 2 Ammo carriers 4 Riflemen 2 Sniper Rifle (The book describes sniper rifles earlier as Scoped rifles, so I have no idea where it's pulling these from) Estimated firepower 250 sh/min 3. France Squad leader Deputy Sqaud leader LMG gunner Gunner's assistant 3 ammo carriers 4 riflemen Grenadier (or Rifle Grenade shooter as literal translation) Estimated firepower 250 sh/min and 6 Grenades per minute 4. Poland Squad leader Deputy Sqaud leader LMG gunner 3 ammo carriers 13 Riflemen Estimated firepower 330 sh/min 5. Italy Squad leader Deputy squad leader LMG gunner 4 ammo carriers/riflemen 8 riflemen Estimated firepower 290 sh/min I left out the Platoon, Company, Battalion and regiment organizations for each of the countries.
I know the squad level snipers were basically precursors to today's designated marksmen. Training and equipment were inconsistent compared to on paper especially early on so maybe they hoped to have a scoped rifle for every squad. Maybe it was just a normal rifleman with a special role. Perhaps the squad leader knows that specific rifleman has the best accuracy with his rifle compared to the rest to take out important targets such as machine gunnners. He later on says the most accurate riflemen were supposed to be shooting from a max of 600m compared to the normal rifleman's 400m. So maybe the most accurate rifleman would be the sniper.
What about Soviet Squad tactics later in the war involving submachine gunners and assault groups? The Soviets had the highest amount of automatic weapons deployed in the entire war and even outfitted entire companies with SMGs. There must have been different tactics employed.
There's always a difference between the official written way of doing things and how it's actually implemented on the job. This becomes amplified when you have people covering up mistakes, shifting blame and generally avoiding responsibility in a hostile work environment.
Supposed tactics of submachine gunners was written in the document which ordered the creation of such units. They were supposed to ambush enemy by fire during defencive operations, preferably taking positions between rifle battalions and companies. In offence they were supposed to infiltrate enemy positions using terrain features in order to overwhelm enemy by close-ranged fire supporting the assault of the riflemen and later clear trenches together with said riflemen.
High amount of submachine guns was the soviet answer to MG 34/MG 41 domination over DP machine guns of soviet rifle squads and relative poor mobility of Maxim heavy MGs of soviet rifle battalions.
Assault group tactics is the different topic by itself. It was formalized by the 43-44. Basically, assault groups were formed on ad hoc basis from rifles, submachinegunners, engineers and chemical troops (they were in charge of flamethrowers). Assault groups should not be confused with assault engineer units.
In WW2 soviet also used SMG squads to the great extent. Average smg platoon would consist of 2-3 sharpshooters, 2-4 LMGs and up to 30 SMGs. This was proven to be quite effective mostly because PPSH ammo has exeptional ballistic characteristics (for a smg) and effective range of 200 meters. Altrough rudimentary sights rules out any presicion at such distances.
I recall Ian from Forgotten weapons saying that most standard issue bolt actions were useless at 300m, whereas their ideal range, would be about 100m or shorter. It seems like the Soviet soldiers opened fire at ranges they could actually hit a man sized target.
no, they are most effective at 150-300 meters, and most infantry have trouble hitting targets consistent past that, which is why you have marksmen/sniper training. the rifles are accurate well beyond that.
Translation of excerpts from a German order. 412 Infantry Regiment, [227th Infantry Division], KP regiment 12/12/1941 The order on the defense of the area Lipki ... 3. Joining the battle. For an easel machine gun ... at a distance of 2000 m. For a light machine gun: not more than 800 m. For a rifle: concentrated rifle fire from a distance of 500 m, single fire from a distance of 200 m. For a submachine gun: from a distance of 200 m. Signature: Schindler Oberleutenant and company commander Schindler's List (... and on the distance of effective fire) afirsov.livejournal.com/489740.html (in Russian)
@@leeonardodienfield402 Most boltguns are optimistically 4 moa. That is sufficient to not guaruantee a hit on a guman when aiming for CoM from 200m away.
It may be difficult to range when Soviets open fire because of the nature of their trench systems and the fact they often just had time to dig 'Russian holes' (single man deep foxholes covered in camouflage). I have read accounts of German soldiers being surprised by Soviets suddenly emerging from these holes and opening fire at almost point blank range. The Soviet defence I think was much like a field full of moles.
Another myth from the Eastern front. РККА's Field Manual of 1925 year envisaged for the use of "strelkovaya yacheika" (foxholes) only in a maneuvering war, since it is impossible to set the right time for the prepare of the correct position in the form of communication trench (okop -- from this: ic.pics.livejournal.com/paul_atrydes/2932304/40870/40870_original.jpg to this: ic.pics.livejournal.com/paul_atrydes/2932304/41471/41471_original.jpg ). It also provided for the gradual retrofitting of this position from fox holes to "okop" proper communication trenchs, if the unit has time. In 1927 РККА published "Инж-26" (Manual on Military Engineering for the Infantry (1926)) A specific sequence of actions is indicated here: under enemy fire, the rifle squad must (consistently) dig a individual hole for lying shooting, knee shooting, standing shooting, then the foxholes are combined into a connected trench (the same "okop"). Field Manual of 1927 paid even more attention to this by advancing camouflage for infantry "okop" trenches and sapper operations. Field Manual of 1929 -- et cetera. Finally in 1933, in "Инж-33" the concept of a complex trench (transheya -- which translates literally) is introduced: ic.pics.livejournal.com/paul_atrydes/2932304/41627/41627_original.jpg As you probably already guessed, then this system became more and more thoughtful and sophisticated. For example -- "Инж-П-39": ic.pics.livejournal.com/paul_atrydes/2932304/43484/43484_original.jpg So, given that the Soviet infantry was to consistently turn temporarily dug foxholes into same system of trench fortifications, this myth arose because the German units were just lucky to attack the still not entrenched Soviet infantry: ic.pics.livejournal.com/paul_atrydes/2932304/45395/45395_original.jpg -- in the time section of the upper part of the picture.
One of the rather frustration thing about looking at units below regiment level organisation is that few publication details it that far down. Glantz's and others usually stop at rifle division level and it details how many anti-tank guns, howitzers and mortars at what caliber more often. In the grand scheme of things, those are what matters more than how many rifles or SMGs. The organisation and equipment in this video seemingly betrayed the fact that the Soviet Union made millions of SMGs. A couple of possibilities: - A few lines of rifle battalion and regiment organisation showed that they have separate SMG companies. - Tankodesantniki: tank desant/tank rider/mechanised infantry are often referred to as submachine gun companies as well. It seems that the tanks can shoot at thing at long range with its weapons and the accompanying infantry need approximately SMGs to deal with close-in threats. Another variation is very often, in Soviet Order of Battle, a Fortified Region is included but often ignored in subsequent analysis. Fortified Regions are Corps-level formation that has 3 machinegun artillery Regiment plus anti-tank, AA, tank regiments, and other support battalions. These units are low-mobility but high fire power formations in economy-of-force roles. On the offensive, they occupy the same frontage as about 6 Rifle Divisions on the penetration sector. Their role is to guard the flanks and generate a lot of noise and fire without using a lot of manpower (maskirovka: generate phantom formations and hide the real concentration) . Think a typical infantry squad/platoon but with riflemen swapped out for crew-weapons crews and their associated machineguns. (source: "Fortified Regions: What is the OperationalSignificance of the Employment of FortifiedRegions for NATO and the United States?", AD-A234 373, Lieutenant Colonel Dennis K. Hill, SAMS thesis, USA CGSC) The latter adaptation is not uncommon. During the latter half of the Korean war where it was mostly static defensive and limited infiltration/raid battles, each Allied defending infantry formation received more machine guns allotments.
13:35 The German manual looks like a text book - going into theory first - , the Soviet manual like a self-help book - with direct instruction to do your stuff - from the TOC.
Different perspectives I assume. Perhaps, a short-sighted or well confident person might appreciate that the way the Germans did things because its so elaborate, while the Soviet one looks simplistic. However, one must count in several factors in the war, like attrition and limited training. In this case, a simply structured manual is much more recommended as it can be objective-focused and easier to read
GeFlixes the Soviet handbooks were tripartite: The soldiers and NCOs studied the squad/platoon part, the officer corps concentrated on the company/battalion part, while the regiment/division part was mostly classified and only fully available to senior officers
Interestingly, this is probably the same tactics the Chinese used against UN forces in Korea. There are sources saying that machine gun fire is fired as close as possible.
As for the tactic of waiting until very close before opening fire, despite the TO&E and manuals, many Russian units were ENTIRELY equipped with the PPSh-41 & later PPS-43 Sub-Machine Guns. Entire battalions have been noted to have been so equipped. While this may have been mostly relegated to Shock Troops accompanying tanks on the advance, the fact is that often terrain or weapon availability would have dictated far closer initiation ranges than any manual instruction. Further to that, accuracy is almost always improved by being closer to your targets, as is the shock value of sudden close gunfire. SMGs firing pistol cartridges and from an open bolt would always achieve better results at closer ranges, even when not in urban house to house or room clearing operations.
Thank You! 11:32 - My guess, the German soldiers might have the specially prepared ambushes in mind. The company/battallion level manual prescribed (and still prescribes) to create fire ambushes in camouflaged positions during the defense. I don't think it was possible to camouflage the main defensive position.
There was only one instance in Stalingrad that looks like what was depicted in Enemy at the Gates. It was the battle of the 13th Guards Rifle Division around Mamaev Kurgan in September. But those were decisive days. Division of 10 thousand was sent into the city, and immediately ordered to attack German positions on Kurgan. After 48 hours of battle, 90% of division was dead or wounded. Those kind of events weren't a rule, they were a huge exception, and showed a direness of situation. Other than that almost whole battle of Stalingrad was led by small combat teams, often smaller than squads depicted in this video. Which doens't mean it wasn't an extremely bloody battle, it was, just the nature of fighting was different. But i guess it isn't spectacular to show 4-man fire team fighting for a living room for 3 hours.
What about the use of submachine guns? The soviets went literally insane on the use of submachine guns (PPSh's, PPS's, PPD'S), equipping entire companies whit the, using them to devastating effects when storming enemy positions.
You clearly see the scenario based thinking in both armies, for conscripted soldiers, it is hard to reorganise during such a short period, and thus easier to command and organise on platoon rather than squad level. Specific task requirement is easier to be understand and executed, though less freedom is given, it surely keep everyone in place. But for a regular army, you would expect them to be organised on squad level and act according to the principle and rules of tactic manoeuver.
Short range thing was used in a situation when enemy had artillery or aviation support advantage(which was most of the time in a beginning of the war) because if the combat is on such a close distance germans couldnt request airstrike or artillery support for themselves.Moreover i assume not every conscript could reliably get a target at 400m range so it would make sense to strike from point blank rather than risking giving away your position and miss. And take all manuals with a grain of salt because its an army so every book usually goes fubar and people have to adjust accordingly to the situation I am honestly dubious that anyone used that formation part of the guide strictly as in manual.
I found this in the german infantry regulations of 1906 translated to english for some USA general staff. "Especially does the combat require leaders trained to reliance and to self-reliance, and soldiers of initiative, who, from devotion to their Emperor and the Fatherland, manifest a form purpose to conquer even when their leaders have fallen." Maybe this is closer to that Russian mother land thing in that soviet regulation?
It is unbelievable that an infantry squad under any heavy type of artillery fire would do anything other than lie flat on the ground. Anything else would be suicidal. Also the effects of percussion shock on the human body and the the nerves needs to be considered.
Let me make a few comments or corrections to your video. Perhaps the inaccuracies in your video I saw because of the inaccuracy of the translation. So, during the Polish campaign of 1939 and the Winter war, the red army rifle group consisted of 14 people: the group commander, rangefinder observer, machine gunner, assistant machine gunner, grenade thrower, assistant grenade thrower, 8 shooters, weapons: 13 Mosin rifles and 1 light machine gun DP-27. After the Winter war, the grenade thrower and the assistant grenade thrower were removed, since the Diakonov rifle grenade did not have sufficient fragmentation effect. A total of 12 men, 11 Mosin rifles and 1 DP-27 light machine gun. In April 1941, the observer-rangefinder was removed, and 2 shooters changed their weapons from the Mosin rifle to the PPSH-41 submachine gun. In addition, Mosin rifles were changed to SVT-40. Total armament: 1 DP-27, 2 PPSH-41, 8 SVT-40. In July 1941, a light staff was introduced, according to which all shooters armed with PPSH-41 were removed from the rifle platoon, and 2 types of groups appeared - with DP-27 and without DP-27. 2 groups in the platoon have DP-27, and 2 groups are most likely armed with 2 PPSH-41 in the group instead of DP-27. In total, there are 11 people in the group. Vooruzhenie: 1 DP-27, 10 SVT-40 or 1 PPSH-41, 10 SVT-40. But the SVT-40 is refused or replaced with a Mosin rifle. Until the spring of 1942, the number of DP-27s in the platoon increases from 2 to 4 units and two types of groups are canceled. On December 10, 1942, two types of groups were introduced again - "heavy" and "normal" and the number of people was reduced from 11 to 9. Weapon."heavy" groups - 2 DP-27, 1 PPSH-41, 6 Mosin rifles. Armament of the "normal" group - 1 DP-27, 1 PPSH-41, 7 Mosin rifles. However, in reality, the division into 2 groups was only in the battle of Kursk, in further battles the platoon consisted of 4 "normal" groups.
It's not ideal and can't be used as a main source. But here you can find scan and transcript of Army regulations before the WWII (1939). rkka.ru/docs/real/su38/main.htm With some digging you should be able to find copy of the original or it's usage in another material as a reference. Here is a chapter for squad layout. rkka.ru/docs/real/su38/3.htm
My grandpa, Polish resistance soldier of AK - BCh told me once about Soviet infantry tactic that he saw in use. He witnessed Red Army soldiers running straight against machine guns in lines, not scattered and they were always drunk as hell. Also, they were ill equiped, their guns had so destroyed rifling, that bullets from PPSh's bounced over wooden boards just like peas.
Mateusz Grzyb Strange. The one Soviet memoir I’ve read was of a mechanized infantry officer, Evgeni Bessonov. He wrote that his battalion very rarely received the “standard” alcohol rations, causing a few unscrupulous individuals to brew moonshine, which was banned in the Red Army. Attacking in “lines” is not unusual, only that they would attack in a spread out skirmish line. Running straight into machine guns would only be used as a last resort, or in the confined spaces of urban areas. Machine-gun nests would usually be destroyed in a multi-pronged attack with machine-gun/mortar support. Unless the round was fired from over 300m away, it would be physically impossible for a 7.62x25 to be deflected off of wood. Even .22 calibre pistols are deadly at range.
Well the 1941 Soviet squad wasn't exactly 4 weapon systems. The Sniper could detach his scope or simply use the unobstructed iron sights and act as a rifleman
By not opening fire prematurely not only do the Soviets frustrate reconnaissance efforts, but the enemy will probably find themselves among Soviet positions with fire coming from multiple directions when firing does start. This is most disorienting and likely to pin the Germans down.
Campbell is certainly correct - the 5.04.41 order of battle 04/400 infantry division has 11-men squads of SL, 2-men LMG team, 2 SMG and 6 riflemen. Check it out for yourself: niehorster.org/012_ussr/41_organ/div_rifle/rd_inf-co.html Snipers were not included in the squad before 1960's.
I respect Niehorster a lot, but Sharp particularly noted that til July 1941 there was actually a grenadier & assistant in the setup. That is oddly specific.
The reason why a grenadier & assistant were dropped out of the squad in 1940 (per 04/100 order of battle) was that Dyakonov rifle grenade launcher was deemed ineffective in light of the experience of 1938-40 battles.
One thing to remember about the Soviet perspective, and the bluntness of its attitude towards saboteurs, traitors, and cowardice, is the Ostplan. The USSR was fighting against a war of extermination and slavery. There was also a Rightist bloc inside the country that opposed the popular backed center faction, lead by Stalin and pals. The Russian Civil War didn't end in 1917 by any means. Red Army is strongest :')
I have a question I've wanted to ask for a long time man. are you former military? you have such a wealth of knowledge that if you are not, is even more impressive. Good work on these videos and keep it up man!
My grandfather told me about a Soviet charge where the first wave had the guns and consecutive waves picked them up and carried them closer to enemy fire... That's quite a way of wasting human resources... My grandfather also assumed that they knew that they'd be doing a suicide charge (as they were drunk and many died crapping themselves...)
@@fulcrum2951 I swear he told me it. However, there's not much I can do to verify his stories. All I can tell is that he never cared about making himself a hero or making one side look good and the other bad. He had a lot of sh!t on everyone.
Probably covered already, but lots of the carbine versions of the Mosin Nagant did have bayonets. They had a side folding bayonet permanently mounted to the rifle. Sort of like what the Russians did with the SKS after the war.
Point 309 in the German manual looks to me like a veiled reference to the fact that you are likely to have taken casualties in the assault, and quickly need to decide who is the new machine gunner's assistant, and whether your injured NCO should be relieved of his duties or attended to by a rifleman for example. The Soviet manual "therefore taking no losses", seems over-optimistic by comparison. Good video, very keen to see British and US equivalents. I'm pretty sure that early war the Bren gun team was not expected to join the assault directly but provide covering fire, but that in practice it joined the assault, stopping periodically or firing from the sling, but it would be interesting to see what was actually recommended in the manuals.
It seems odd to me that both the Germans and the soviets would put the LMG at the head of the marching column where I (as someone who knows nothing about military history short of what I've learnt from the TV and YT) would have thought they were most vulnerable to sniper fire, grenades, small arms fire and ambushes. Why would the weapon with the longest range and the highest suppression potential be placed in the most vulnerable location - does it reduce the changes of friendly fire in an ambush to have the machine gun foremost in front of friendly troops or is there some other rationale?
Military manuals often place two important roles as close as possible to the front. The first being, the leaders. The reason they are put at the front is that they get very good situational awareness, and others behind the leader can simply follow the leader without him having to explain small details to a pointman. Similarly, machine gunners are placed as close to the front as possible, allowing them to more quickly start suppressing the enemy. People who are right at the front are often the ones that get pinned down or get hit first. But you can get away with creating such manuals because usually things go right for you. You see, most of the time the people at the front of a formation don't get pinned down and don't get hit... Most of the time. So, it comes down to weighing the pros and cons. Different military organizations will give you different answers on what the best placement is for each role.
Also important to keep in in mind is that the LMG was the biggest firepower that the squad had and putting it close to the front also meant that it was under the most direct possible control of the squad leader without making him carry it himself. And as Alexsandr Kramaenko says, it makes it easier for the LMG to go into action quickly if/when contact is made.
German Manual: Do a, then b. Be wary of the possibility of c. Soviet Manuel: Run forward, yell, shoot the enemy and throw bottles at them like true Slavs.
It's my understanding that the Soviets were more focused on the operational level and operated on the assumption that they would be working with less at the tactical level due to language barriers, training issues, etc., and this remained true into the Cold War. The less complexity at low levels, the less that can go wrong down there. I've read a few articles by professional wargamers running Cold War stuff with actual Soviet doctrine and it's pretty much painting by numbers, intended to be applied directly from the manuals. It means less time spent preparing, less variables, and apparently such a sudden and violent advance that the NATO side was left scratching their heads with command paralysis when it hit, because it didn't follow any of their "rules" or assumptions. Sometimes the best way to deal with real people is to give them less things to have "good ideas" about changing, and so the Soviets sunk an enormous amount of time into the study of military history in order to do so. Sometimes simple is best. If you advance across a suspected minefield as if it's not there, you'll lose some men/vehicles to mines, but you'll lose less than if you halted, called the engineers up, and then got plastered by pre-sighted artillery.
Their early squad organisation had room for a sniper but they disappear later, although one rifleman is assumed to be a better shot than the others. Did the snipers become platoon or company assets, rather than squad ones?
Never encountered a pre-war soviet squad TOE with a sniper (well, any TOE before the creation of SVD, actually). Pretty sure it is wrong. The one with two SMG gunners is correct.
considering that Sharp did a book series of around 7 books on TOE including everything from infantry to artillery and armor division, I am not really yet convinced. Not to mention that he goes into a lot of detail on how the squad setup changed.
@@MilitaryHistoryVisualized well, quantity doesn't always mean quality. If there is no number of TOE in the book (kinda like 04\601 for the rifle regiment, for example), I would not trust such source entirely as the autor probably didn't use actual documents. A TOE with a sniper could exist as some special measure (for airbourne rifles for example) but surely wasn't the basic one for a standard rifle unit.
@@MilitaryHistoryVisualized shtat is a correct russian term for TOE, every shtat is assigned a number, like 00/000, with which it is adressed in staff documents. I just use english term in order to make myself clear for foreigners. Btw Soviet\Russian field manuals don't include any basic TOEs\shtats inside them, unlike US ones as far as I can tell. For training purposes there are so called 'training shtats' which are told to cadets by their instructors during lectures, actual shtats are considered secret and are quite fluid, actually.
11:47 I think these 100 meter ranges anecdotally reported would be because the Germans were so good at long range exchanges, they always had better fire control, lenses, training, so to make up for this, just like with the tanks, they would rely on point blank ranges making up for this lack of quality in manpower and equipment.
can you do a video on dutch military ww2 tactics? we tried to stop the germans by flooding large parts of the country. sadly planes where a thing by then. we also used german weapons so i assume we had similar tactics to the invaders.
The structure of the Soviet Manual reflected more than being able to reach barely literate soldiers. They wanted the reader to know the most relevant things first given their crisis. If they lived long enough, they could read through the rest.
@@SgtCandy Well late russian empire had their own literacy program too, soviet one was just mode widespread and available one since it was free and was spreading "forcefully" through countryside. Forcefully not in a sense that they were held at the gunpoint, but in a sense that it was encouraged
During WW2 Soviet soldiers were not illiterate , ALTHOUGH they had little education other then that. So reading things wasnt a problem, understanding them was.
Are you planning to work on an updated US Squad tactics video ? the old one seems really short compared to these newer ones that you've created and I would love to see an updated video. (you should see if you can get Hell Let Loose to sponsor the video for you :-) )
@@englishalan222 That speaks not so much of tactical effectiveness as for adecuate equipment and ferociousness, factors much more important in room by room warfare. Also, the Soviet's excellent city defenses were best at the strategic level: the creation of specific sniper schools, the use of propaganda and effective motivation of civilian population as well as common troops, the creation of weapons like the PPs which are excellent for short range, frantic battles, etc.
@mr_ anheuser The level of training is more complicate. Prior to Barbarossa the German training was better. The Soviets however had trained reserves. Men who already served their mandatory conscription in the past. Germany had not because of the treaty of Versailles. So the first waves of Soviets replacements in winter 1941-1942 started out with a form of training maybe even up to the level prior to the purges and only needed a refresher course. So they could be sent to the front fast. While every German recruit had to be trained from scratch. The Germans did not have the resources to serious expand their training facilities. So once the losses and new demands of the war outstripped the German training capacity the only option was to slacken the standards. And after 1942 the Soviets would have the resources and time to improve training and even pull experienced units out for retraining. So by the time of preparation for the last push for Berlin the Soviets could reorganize and retrain experienced units specific for urban combat, while the training in Germany pretty much reached the level of Red Army memes.
Wait... the Soviets issued a rifle to every rifleman rather than a one per three? Wait... the Soviets actually used machine guns to shoot germans rather their own troops?
I think the implication of the ammunition carrier is as in one appointed to go and conduct the resupply for the entire squad? Might be worth casing over other sources to see if this is how it was employed. Including it in a statement about designating an observer/scout and a messenger (for the squad? Turned over as a platoon messenger?) makes me wonder if it isn't a reference solely to the MG.
The indiegogo campaign has ended, yet the book is now released for the general public as well:
» The Assault Platoon of the Grenadier-Company November 1944 (StG 44) - sturmzug.com
Same with our previous book:
» Army Regulation Medium Panzer Company 1941 - www.hdv470-7.com
Can you please see if you could find one about the italian and french squads too ?
Do one on German sniper training and Soviet sniper training
once again Canada misses out
Hey dude can you do some video in obscure battles that most people have had much to watch or read on the subject, like the cherkassy pocket, courland cauldron. Maybe some videos on specific soldiers that made a difference in the battlefield. Or how the recon battalions acted and changed from 39 to 45... You could do videos on the battlegroups that were hastily scrounged together at the end of the war, you could do divisional histories etc
Just a thought, but if you did decide to make These types of videos I will watch every one dude
I dunno just sick of every armchair historian doing videos on Stalingrad or kursk barbarossa etc there are 100 videos with so many different views but essentially the same number and people.
I hope you could help us put with these types of videos
could you please do the Vietnam river navy and Operation Sea Lords? very interested unconventional part of an unconventional war.
As an infantryman I do appreciate that you took the time to note that we are told to fight to the death at every opportunity lol
Yeah, we are also trained to break contact unless we have 3 to 1 odds. So theres that too. Live to fight another day...
@@coryobrien8154 I imagine this stratagem being quite effective
@@coryobrien8154 why lose a good soldier agains a shepherd with and rusty ak and some lucky shots? but yeah, in a modern context you are not *required* to fight to the death, usually you will have some kind of support. If you are fighting 1:1 against a similary trained enemy its almost a coin toss
Gallows humour is the best.
@@coryobrien8154 not in communist conscripted armies.
Me: has a chemistry assignment due in 2 hours and hasnt done anything.
Also me: hmmm I wonder what were soviet infantry squad tactics during ww2
How did the assignment go?
yeah howd it go
@@joemamaobama6863 and he was never seen again
Yeah how’s it go
So? How did it go?
Step 1: Make 50 40-width Infantry divisions
Step 2: Right click on Berlin
Step 3: *Observe*
Current Patch German AI is OP and has at least 500 divisions by 1941. And infantry along with artillery has been nerfed. You need tanks and lots of AA to counter German Air superiority.
@@robertalaverdov8147 I agree, played as Republican Spain with 40-width infantry with artillery and full support companies. It took quite awhile to beat the Germans and I couldn't just right on Berlin otherwise my manpower would be out in 6 months tops, maybe 3. Then again, since there was so many Germans on my border the soviets had an easier time and didn't get pushed back very far. I never had air superiority and knew I never would. Every time I got a few hundred planes and put them over a region they would be shot down. Didn't have the time to invest in much air technology so fair enough.
Nicholas Skinner hearts of iron 4
RUSH B(ERLIN)
Step 1: Make a lot of divisions.
Step 2: Forts. Lots of forts.
Step 3: AA. Lots of AA.
Step 4: Germans throw themselves against the wall of forts.
There is nothing weird about soviet soldiers sometimes only opening fire when enemy comes close. I think that should be somewhere in the old manuals. Modern Russian manuals say that when defending a squad should open fire from greater distances when the attacking force is strong but let small groups come close and suddenly open fire from spare firing positions (not to give away main positions). That's just a case of biting what you can chew. That's just common sense, it shouldn't be some new modern tactic.
It was even used in WW1. One Russian officer who fought wrote in his memoirs about a battle that happened in autumn of 1914. He was ordered to take his company and defend an important bridge acting as a rearguard to cover retreat of their corps. They entrenched, endured massive barrages, repelled numerous German attacks for all day and decided to pull out at night since Germans slowly advanced on their flanks. One platoon stayed to cover the retreat. Germans decided to take seemingly empty positions and moved as disorganized crowd. That platoon stayed let them get close and only then suddenly opened fire forcing panicking Germans to flee and pulling out afterwards.
If you think that surprise effect will be enough to destroy or rout the enemy then there is no reason not to ambush the enemy and let them get close before you reveal yourself. And if people knew this tactic in 1914 and use it today then it would be weird if it was forgotten in WW2.
Peter the Peter German AT gunners were taught to hold their fire until Allied tanks came within 300 meters or less
@@Nelson-gs9yv any AT rifle gunner should hold their fire until same distance or ideally until the tank can be flanked at 100m. Long distance shooting of those rifles is a nowadays idioticy invented by CoD WWII and BF V devs, who made sniper rifles out of them. Because they want to sell gamers M82/M107. Irl they wouldn't even have adjustable iron sights because you'll lose too much penetration at distance anyway.
@Roughman Volley sights survived until late 20's in fact. However I'd say they were obsolete after Crimean/American Civil War. And no, not because of machine guns alone. Back then machine gun was more of an artillery piece, remember? It was because of MAGAZINE rifles. Henry, Winchester and Vetterli to be specific.
@Roughman Battle of Little Bighorn is still picked apart today on whether Henry was superior to 1873 cavalry carbine and taken part in the overall outcome as one of decisive factors. If it was that simple, there would have never been such a question asked, not to mention researched.
Vetterli was not only adopted, it was MADE to the specifications of Swiss army. And won the competition. Not to mention it's long service and huge geography of usage also raises a fair point.
@Roughman 1)it signifies the afterthought of this discussion. You wanted an example of if those rifles were effective. They were.
2)look up Vetterli magazine since you've just clearly stated that you're oblivious to any connections of the design. And you'll see how Henry and Winchester are connected to it. And the ammo it used. The ammo you complained about previously. Henry's magazine is what brought repeating rifles into the light instead of being revolver jokes. You've also tried to skip on service length and what other armies used Vetterli.
I love how they are instructed to break into "determined battlecry", (@8:30) I could see a Soviet non-com chewing out a soldier, "your battlecry is not determined enough!". As always, the video was top notch!
SHOW ME YOUR WAR FACE
@@buckplug2423 SOVIET HARTMAN D:
*URAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA*
@@ME-hm7zm I AM STARSHIY SERZHANT KHARTMANENKO, YOUR COMPANY STARSHINA. FROM NOW ON THE FIRST WORDS OUT OF YOUR FILTHY SEWERS WILL BE 'LET ME ADDRESS MYSELF, TOVARISH STARSHIY SERZHANT', AND THE LAST WORDS WILL BE WHATEVER YOU WANT, 'COS IT'S NOT AN AMERICAN MARINE CORPS, SO WE DON'T SAY THE SAME WORDS TWICE.
WHAT IS THAT? WHAT THE FUCK IS THAT?!?!?!
Finns have a lot of reports on how the Soviet squads *actually* functioned on the field - at least when against the Finns. Issue obvously is that they are all in Finnish, so they have not really been used in research.
The most curious thing is that the Finns considered Soviet troops pretty good soldiers, but with limited initiative if the leadership was affected. Hence, a Soviet unit could perform great attacks and combat movements, but casualties among leaders would fast lead to lack of initiative and decisive losses for the units.
The Soviets originally had even battallion commanders leading attacks from the front. They quickly changed this when they they realised losing such high commanders so frequently caused needless disorganisation.
Very interesting to hear that! Could you point me towards any sources or is the information still hidden in the military archives?
It makes even more sense when considering how many conscripted soldiers were novice and lack both school education and combat experience, which is certainly not uncommon for such a scale of mobilization in such a vast and rather poor country. Those novice might do well under direct instructions from squad commander. But if such an interpreter was incapacitated, the situation might become too complicated for them to comprehend.
@@neobr1ck I've seen examples of manuals issued by the Red Army for instruction. They use fairly simple language and definitely do not seek to blind the reader with science. They include quite a lot of line drawings for illustration.
@@kaczynskis5721 Even if a textbook is simple and reader-friendly, people sometimes still need a teacher. And from the design of the manual we can feel the urge to make it easier to understand, which is also an indication that some soldiers did have problem understanding the instructions.
Man, you know why ''battle cry'' was even mentioned?
No, not only because it gave some morale boost... ''URAAA'' was really important thing because of...well...
Interesting fact: *if you screaming/opening mouth, you have less chance of becoming deaf/contused*
It's just simple physiology. They tried to save soldiers by giving them command to scream.
@Mumpel Tier I thought that german soldiers were screaming "Ankrief" or something like that...
@@lovepeace9727 "Angriff" which means "Attack", not really a battle cry.
@@sprzedawcanozywgierozy8247 I mean the historic British battle cry has been either "Victory!" Or "Charge!" For most of history and screaming "Attack!" is also used, though more uncommonly. So the German "Angriff" would technically count if they would yell it as they engaged the foe. Which seems to be how it was applied.
While we're on the topic of battle cries, Deus Vult was a pretty good one
Russians took that "Uraa!" battlecry from mongols in 13th century. "Uragshaa!" in mongolian means "Forward!". When hundreds of horsemans cry "Uragshaa", its sounds like "Uraa!". And dont forget, that Russia was under mongolian control in 1237 - 1480
11:26 While waiting until the enemy is less than 50m away before opening fire does seem rather short, it totally makes sense to me that the soviets wouldn’t open fire at the ranges given in the manual. In battle conditions, 400m with iron sights is quite the optimistic range for even an experienced shooter. It is of course possible to hit something with a iron sighted Mosin/kar98/etc at a 400m shooting range, but even something as “basic” as target aquisition becomes really hard that far away(for example, try finding the guy on anything other than a well groomed football field after he hits the deck). Things like this, combined with the fact that most soldiers(soviet or otherwise) aren’t exactly super amazing marksmen, makes it much smarter for the squad to wait until the enemy at a closer range and not waste precious ammo.
It makes even much more sense if you consider shock effect. Being shot from 400m gives you at lot of possibility to get in a cover. Being shot pointblank - not just leaves much less options, but also create panic, especially for inexperienced soliders.
@@clouster75 Yeah, it works against inexperienced soldiers only. Fear killed a lot of ppl back then. That's why Elite soldiers from both armies (german SS and russian Guards) easily held their ground and deflected waves of regular infantry. (wermacht and red army). They were brainwashed and had no fucking fear for their lifes, like at all:
SS gave swore an oath to Hitler (not to Deutschland) and used pills of ''pervitin'' (type of methamphetamine that kills fear).
Guards and Shook Troops literally were Stalinists and were ready to *kill and die for Motherland*. Also, they were drinking ''100g'' of vodka before every battle ''for braveness''.
@@lovepeace9727Never seen so much disinformation in a UA-cam comment
@@lovepeace9727but the guards divisions, weren't political divisions like the ss, they were just élite army divisions, wich were composed of very experienced soldiers, that's what guards unit were, soldiers that had fought really well, the only divisions that were more political were the nkvd units, but in late 1942 they had lost all power in the red army, because stalin trusted more in his generals, as such he didn't need political comisars and divisions to restrain his soldiers, and after that the nkvd units were just like regular army units, and that's it
A bit late but would like to chip in. The engagement at longer ranges isn’t really meant to kill the enemy (though it is good when it happens) but begin the process of fire superiority. Once shot, the attacker will begin to slow down and try to find their target and engage back but in general people are less inclined to stick their heads up when getting shot. Obviously it would escalate with artillery and mortars getting called into each other’s positions but being further away may complicate the certification process (ie did the arty actually kill what it was supposed too)
Hey, dear neighbour to the east, your content consistently provides good quality sources which, generally, is something that could be better on YT. Many fellow UA-camrs could learn a bit or two from you in this regards.
The way you handle the sources is something that inspired me to start showing more quotations on screen, which at first seems odd, but it grew on me with time. It also allows for further animations which is kinda nice.
Servus, my Austrian friend, keep it coming.
Österreich!
lots of 'rush' memes here in the comments, but this looks like pretty standard, if simplified and adapted small unit tactics. I think a lot of you fail to recognize the record of close in fighting and is morale effect, especially before common issue of self loading rifles and modern logistical supply.
considering the Soviet material and personnel situation i think the biggest takeaway from this is that a realistic approach is one that takes note of the standards doctrine of the time and adapts it to a realistic assessment of ones own capabilities as well as an evolving sense of the opponents capabilities and behavior.
rifles are often not the chosen weapon of the assault, pretty recent US army doctrine privileged grenades in the assault, though that may have changed.
Not a confirmed source,
but assault tactics have changed a lot during the years. The biggest influence in the last 40 years were the wars in Afghanistan, USSR and US/NATO. Grenades were always part of assault squads. However, more modern infantry has much heavier training in close quarter combat compared to inter-war period due to the heavy fighting in cities.
Exactly
It feels very vauge though. Indeed it fits the situation witth personell, training and so on, but in my opinion so many vauge points, such as "attack and do it passionately", would be better for a generally more experienced/better trained unit. Who have a better all around understanding of the concepts of attack and defence before baptism of fire. of course MHV points this out, but the guide feels so much more vague than he points out. Over simplified just to give the grunts on the ground any kind of aid.
@@oskarnisson8211 first of all, it isn't the whole field manual. Second, field manuals in soviet
ussian point of view is a kind of 'beginner's guide', there are instructions which clear the vague points out. Or at least they should)
@@oskarnisson8211 as for better training, soviets didn't have much time for training after the war started, because the situation was dire. You should not think of soviet troops as unexperienced though, as valuable experience was paid in blood of first two years of the war. Life is a the most prominent of teachers. I assume, soviet troops in 44 had more experience than american troops who was drilled for a year or so, but had little actual combat practice.
What about late war tactics? The end of the war saw MASSIVE use in soviet submachine guns with almost entire sqauds being armed with them
send me the manuals or other good sources in English or German, thank you.
@@MilitaryHistoryVisualized maybe you could talk with Dr. Toppel about Soviet squad tactics? At least he can read the original sources in Russian.
@@MilitaryHistoryVisualized Hello, if you have actual Russian sources, I may provide some shoddy fast translation (probably). I obviously don't know how big are they though.
@@MilitaryHistoryVisualized DM me if you want translation from Russian sources
This is actually covered in the same Combat Regulations of November 1942, they were just omitted in this video. After squad tactics it goes like this: squad of submachine gunners, squad of machingunners, squad of antitank rifles, single artillery gun. After that it explains actions of bigger units, and ends with instructions to rifle company. And after that there is a second part, which proceeds to even bigger units, and ends with instructions to regiments. Interestingly, there is one chapter which describes how regiment should fight in case of complete surrounding.
You mean the typical russian tactic wasnt to headlong charge without arms or ammo??!!
COMMIE STARVE, SOLDIER RUN HEAD FIRST INTO BADDY.
What do you mean by saying that 'Enemy at the gates' is not historically acurate?
Well that's actually pretty much what the manual described...
Only with "a determined battle cry" in addition.
@mr_ anheuser
Well that's an exageratiom, for sure -
But compared to the german manual, it is way more disrespectful to safety.
Not that it was necessarily a mistake - they did have a lot of men.
This manual clearly codifies that.
1. Infantrymen carrying ammo for a gun that isn't theirs.
2. The manual states to begin firing at 400 meters, but due to ammo/training constraints, most actual squads begin firing at 50-100 meters.
3. No dedicated anti-tank munitions on a squad level, so everyone is told to zerg rush the tank with grenades, then run past into the infantry to fight them instead.
So yes, running headlong without arms or ammo. Also, kind of surprised that the Soviet manual is the one that says 'You must hate your enemies' explicitly.
As someone in infantry training it’s amazing how similarly we still operate compared to ww2
Yeah, like WWI marked a huge change in how we fought, witnessed firsthand as old strategies failed spectacularly against new technology. Adaptation was hard and fast. Research during the interwar period refined tactics but also still hadn't quite gotten past some faults of the old ways. Especially with the introduction of armour, no one was entirely sure how they should be used.
WWII was a trial by fire for these refined tactics but despite how much technology has advanced, the basic function for tactics haven't really. The only really big thing I can think of (I'm in no way a professional or even especially a hobbyist) is the idea and introduction of accuracy through volume of fire.
Like as different as modern assault rifles are from WWII battle rifles, how one maneuvers and arranges groups to make the best of your pew pews hasn't changed much.
Squad tactics was pretty much perfected in WW2, there hasn't been a major change ever since.
Germans: Where did Ivans learned to mask their positions so good?!
Finns: [confused pikachu face]
The winter war, was the most extrem training program any armed force in our history went through
@@jamesmortimer4016 u r from Finland?
@@Pvt.Conscriptovich no
@@jamesmortimer4016 ah my bad, just read ur message incorrect and thought u r from Finland.
The Soviets learned so much from that war. They even made copies of the Suomi KP-31 (SMG), called the PPD, then later they made the famous PPSh, the Daddy.
Looking forward to see the American, British and Japanese version. Then, bond them together with a concluding video on some typical outcome of a firefight
Is easy. Allied bombing run kills everybody.
@mr_ anheuser They certainly were US infantry tactic.
@mr_ anheuser And the problem with that is....? If you got it USE it.
@mr_ anheuser Who would you say were the greatest then? Imperial German armed forces?
@mr_ anheuser the romans didn't have enemies posted in bunkers firing supersonic projectiles at them from 500 meters away.
Germans: "this is how, why, when, and who you should do this to."
Russians: "kill the enemy."
You are being bombarded? Advance and kill the enemy
You are being fired at? Advance and kill the enemy
Tanks are rolling over you? Advance and kill the enemy
Your trench is being overrun? Advance and kill the enemy
The platoon next to you is being overrun by tanks? Advance and kill the enemy
@@ChaplainDMK some of you may die, but hopefully the enemy dies more
“You don’t need to tell me twice”
-AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA!
this is the warface now show me your warface !
- УРААААААААААААААААААА!
УРАААААААААААААААААААААААААА!
BS! you don't convince me now show you your REAL warface!
УРААААААААААААААААААААААА!
Show me your russian face - УРААААААА!
@@ФедяКрюков-в6ь za stalina!!!!! За Сталина!!!!!!
@@Kriegter I've imagined Hartman's platoon jogging and singing 'Katyusha'
@@ФедяКрюков-в6ь *hartman
The German manual seems rather optimistic, as if you'd only be defending occupied enemy positions.
you think so? A freshly occupied position is harder to defend than an estableshed own position i think. So in my opinion they covered the "worst case" of defending a position. (so in other scenarios there are a few things less to consider or easier)
@@nirfz A valid point. However, it misses my original meaning that the Germans were optimistic in thinking they would only be advancing and not retreating.
@@ctrlaltdebug right after "occupying and holding a position" is the point of "going back" which sounds like retreating to me.
Also one could argue (would be easier if we had read the damn thing) that just because "Occupying and holding a position" is the title, that doesn't necessarily mean that they were opstimistic to only having to advance. The holding a position part could also include while on retreat, on the move in general, holding a position while on marching and getting attacked... So holding a position in general. Also you have to take into account that those manuals also had their share of propaganda use. Just take the first line of the Soviet one with the "must hate the enemy" line, same thing here. So it might well be that they wanted to tell their soldiers (just like you say) that they would only advance. But from all i know about german burocracy and rules for everything i have my doubts.
@@ctrlaltdebug It's not a matter of optimism. Tactics that are effective in holding a recently captured position from counter attack, will also be effective in holding your own defensive positions. Thats just how maneuver warfare works. If i were to put it one way is that your assumption that this is optimism, comes from a mindset that is very "last century" where holding a frontage for long periods of time was how wars were fought.
However in the modern era, at a squad or even platoon level there is effectively no such thing as a separation between defensive and offensive tactics. In an era of mechanized armies with rapid radio communication with accurate artillery, and air support, holding solid defensive positions are meaningless. The key to such warfare is mobility, which in retreat works exactly the same way as in advance. You must adopt a new position and fight from it.
More over such tactics allow a defending force to dampen the blow of an enemy offensive, adapt to it, and cause severe casualties to the attacking force. As opposed to a solid defensive line which is broken then over run due to the static nature of it's defensive positions and then the enemy moves with relative impunity until it encounters the next defensive line. The proof is in the pudding. The Germans kept breaking through defensive lines, and advanced all the way through Russia, and all the way to the English channel. Then when the war turned, these same tactics delayed (significantly better supplied) allied forces for several years as we pushed across the fields France and Belgium, and up through the hills of Italy. Even better evidence is that this is effectively how we all fight today.
Slight correction on "June 1941" squad layout. It looks like 2 mixed together TO&Es from 1939 and July 1941.
Grenadier and Assistant grenadier were part of the squad prior and during Winter War. But rifle grenade launcher was phased out quite quickly after that conflict (it was kinda crap) - according June 1940 ("штат 04/100" - "TO&E 04/100") squad had 12 men - leader, machine gunner, assistant machine gunner and 9 riflemen (assistant squad leader wasn't specified by TO&E. By April 1941 ("штат 04/400") squad had 11 men - leader, machine gunner, assistant machine gunner, 2 submachine gunners and 6 riflemen. Both these TO&Es, however, called only for 2 snipers per company.
Sniper in rifle squad appeared in rather bizarre "TO&E for rifle regiment of reduced wartime division" (штат № 04/601) which was never really implemented. According to that, rifle platoon was supposed to have 4 rifle squads. 2 squads were supposed to have 1 sniper, other 2 - submachine gunners instead of snipers.
But why do you think that 04/601 was never implemented?! 2 squads had lmg, 2 squads - 2 smgs instead of lmg, not snipers.
@@IvanIvanov-ho6rz slightly more complicated - 1 squad had lmg and sniper, 1 squad - lmg and smg, 1 squad - sniper but no lmg, 1 squad - smg but no lmg.
And it was never implemented due to constant lack of optical sights, so the best shooter in thq squad (or just randomly picked dude, in some cases) was named "sniper", but not given optics
@@Temeluchas Yes, you are right, my mistake. 2 lmgs per platoon, very few.
June 1941 At the beginning of the war, most of the regular units of the Red Army were armed with SVT. The composition of squad was 11 men - 1 with DP27 and 8 with SVT rifles, 2 with PPD smg
I find it so difficult to believe that Soviets used real tactics in WW2
German Propaganda: Still works since 1939
It didnt help that the soviets did use infantry as the breakthrough arm doctrinally.
They had one: full frontal attack
@@renel8964 Way to prove him correct.
@@ineednochannelyoutube5384 look at any war they ever fought, that was always their go to.
@@ineednochannelyoutube5384
The Soviets have lost most of their tanks, aircraft and artillery in the first weeks of war so logically infantry was their main weapon, at least for the first two years of war.
3:27 I didnt know that a pledge to die if neccesary is something unusual in western armies. It was removed from russian pledge only in 1998.
The US has "enemies foreign and domestic" as part of the oath but that's as close as we get to the Russian military oath. Which to say, not very close at all. USA's and Germany's infantry tactics are all about adapting to the situation with a emphasis on bullets, not bodies. Doing it by the Russian military book is just a good way to get you killed in combat. There was a reason more Russian's died than any other nation.
@@readhistory2023 Majority of russians who died, were civillians, and a big part of soldiers who perished, died in german concentration camps. If we are going to compare those killed in action, it is actually not very big of a difference, 1.5 soviet died per every Axis soldier on the easter front.
@@readhistory2023 Yes and that reason is that Russians (and other nationalities of the urss) fought quantitatively 80% of german numbers and qualitatively the most elite divisions and when they were fresh. There were little americans to kill until 1944 in europe buddy, when germany was already on its knees.
Alexs220 I am Russian. The “majority of Soviet casualties were civilians” is a myth of the Soviet and Russian propaganda. The official number of the Soviet military casualties, published by the Russian defense ministry (“8 200 000”) is understated. The real figures, estimated on the basis of the personal files of the soldiers (which are incomplete) is something of the order of 14-17 million.
Seth Heristal You are just repeating the myths reproduced by the Russian official “historiography”.
Subtitles: krautfunding
Me: *I see what you did there*
11:37 The camouflage icon is iconic......^^
Iconic
3:25 там вообще все было очень серьезно:
Я, гражданин Союза Советских Социалистических Республик, вступая в ряды Рабоче-Крестьянской Красной Армии, принимаю присягу и торжественно клянусь быть честным, храбрым, дисциплинированным, бдительным бойцом, строго хранить военную и государственную тайну, беспрекословно выполнять все воинские уставы и приказы командиров и начальников.
Я клянусь добросовестно изучать военное дело, всемерно беречь военное и народное имущество и до последнего дыхания быть преданным своему народу, своей Советской Родине и Рабоче-Крестьянскому Правительству.
Я всегда готов по приказу Рабоче-Крестьянского Правительства выступить на защиту моей Родины - Союза Советских Социалистических Республик и, как воин Рабоче-Крестьянской Красной Армии, я клянусь защищать ее мужественно, умело, с достоинством и честью, не щадя своей крови и самой жизни для достижения полной победы над врагами.
Если же по злому умыслу я нарушу эту мою торжественную присягу, то пусть меня постигнет суровая кара советского закона, всеобщая ненависть и презрение трудящихся.
3:25 It was actually much more serious than that:
"I, a citizen of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, join the ranks of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and give a solemn oath to be an honest, disciplined, and alert soldier; to guard the military and state secrets with utmost care; to follow without any doubt all military codices and the orders given by my commanders and superiors.
I pledge to study the military craft with due diligence, to guard the military and civilian property by all means necessary, and to be loyal until my last breath to my people, my soviet Motherland, and my workers' and peasants' government.
I will always be ready to execute orders from workers' and peasants' government for protection of the Motherland - the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, and, as a soldier of Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, I pledge to protect Her [Motherland] bravely, skillfully, with dignity and honour, with no regard for my own blood [not family, just blood] and my very life to attain total victory over the enemies.
If I break this solemn oath with malicious intent, then I shall be smitten by the soviet law, by overwhelming hatred and disdain of the workers [as in "those who work"]."
Probably many mistakes, sorry.
@@ExtermicideN7 thank you, tovarisch! It's worth noting, that unlike Wehrmacht, in Red Army there was no oath to Stalin personally, only to people, Motherland and government in general.
@@ExtermicideN7 I did not find any mistakes. It is very well translated.
Dek3son
Finally! Glad to see some love for the Soviets and their organizations and tactics. Hope there is a lot more content to come
That "Sniper" at squad level seems really weird. Finnish Reserve officer's handbook from 1940 also mentions this "Sniper" at squad level, but it is obvious from equipment numbers, that every soviet infantry squad couldn't have a sniper, at least one equipped with a scoped rifle. It also mentions sniper at platoon level in Finnish organization which is optimistic, to say the least. I wonder does the "sniper" have different meaning in this context. Then again, the foreign organizations used in the book have some flaws, such as still using organization based on MG 08/15 for the german squad.
Foreign Infantry squad organizations from 'Reserve Officer' by P. Huhtala from 1940. Introduction is from march 1939, which explains why there is nothing about the Winter war in the book. The book claims it is based on active regulations and newest domestic and foreign military literature (March 1939)
Page 534->
Foreign Squad organizations
1. Germany
Squad leader (Rifle)
Deputy Squad leader (Rifle)
LMG. Gunner (MG 08/15 and pistol)
Gunner's assistant (Pistol)
Ammo carrier 1 (Sniper rifle)
Ammo carrier 2 (Pistol)
7 Riflemen (Rifles)
Estimated firepower = 250 shots per minute (sh/min)
2. Russia
(There are no Weapons marked for roles from then on)
Squad Leader
LMG Gunner
Gunner's assistant
2 Ammo carriers
4 Riflemen
2 Sniper Rifle (The book describes sniper rifles earlier as Scoped rifles, so I have no idea where it's pulling these from)
Estimated firepower 250 sh/min
3. France
Squad leader
Deputy Sqaud leader
LMG gunner
Gunner's assistant
3 ammo carriers
4 riflemen
Grenadier (or Rifle Grenade shooter as literal translation)
Estimated firepower 250 sh/min and 6 Grenades per minute
4. Poland
Squad leader
Deputy Sqaud leader
LMG gunner
3 ammo carriers
13 Riflemen
Estimated firepower 330 sh/min
5. Italy
Squad leader
Deputy squad leader
LMG gunner
4 ammo carriers/riflemen
8 riflemen
Estimated firepower 290 sh/min
I left out the Platoon, Company, Battalion and regiment organizations for each of the countries.
I know the squad level snipers were basically precursors to today's designated marksmen. Training and equipment were inconsistent compared to on paper especially early on so maybe they hoped to have a scoped rifle for every squad.
Maybe it was just a normal rifleman with a special role. Perhaps the squad leader knows that specific rifleman has the best accuracy with his rifle compared to the rest to take out important targets such as machine gunnners. He later on says the most accurate riflemen were supposed to be shooting from a max of 600m compared to the normal rifleman's 400m. So maybe the most accurate rifleman would be the sniper.
Dedicated marksman is a better translation. Many countries had them.
mosin nagant blyat
What about Soviet Squad tactics later in the war involving submachine gunners and assault groups?
The Soviets had the highest amount of automatic weapons deployed in the entire war and even outfitted entire companies with SMGs. There must have been different tactics employed.
There's always a difference between the official written way of doing things and how it's actually implemented on the job.
This becomes amplified when you have people covering up mistakes, shifting blame and generally avoiding responsibility in a hostile work environment.
@@Hebdomad7 Not relevant to what I said
Supposed tactics of submachine gunners was written in the document which ordered the creation of such units. They were supposed to ambush enemy by fire during defencive operations, preferably taking positions between rifle battalions and companies. In offence they were supposed to infiltrate enemy positions using terrain features in order to overwhelm enemy by close-ranged fire supporting the assault of the riflemen and later clear trenches together with said riflemen.
High amount of submachine guns was the soviet answer to MG 34/MG 41 domination over DP machine guns of soviet rifle squads and relative poor mobility of Maxim heavy MGs of soviet rifle battalions.
Assault group tactics is the different topic by itself. It was formalized by the 43-44. Basically, assault groups were formed on ad hoc basis from rifles, submachinegunners, engineers and chemical troops (they were in charge of flamethrowers). Assault groups should not be confused with assault engineer units.
In WW2 soviet also used SMG squads to the great extent. Average smg platoon would consist of 2-3 sharpshooters, 2-4 LMGs and up to 30 SMGs. This was proven to be quite effective mostly because PPSH ammo has exeptional ballistic characteristics (for a smg) and effective range of 200 meters. Altrough rudimentary sights rules out any presicion at such distances.
Yeah, 7.62x25 is like underpowered early intermediate.
After your German Squad Tactics video fixed my depression nearly 2 years ago, this is what I've been waiting for.
I recall Ian from Forgotten weapons saying that most standard issue bolt actions were useless at 300m, whereas their ideal range, would be about 100m or shorter. It seems like the Soviet soldiers opened fire at ranges they could actually hit a man sized target.
no, they are most effective at 150-300 meters, and most infantry have trouble hitting targets consistent past that, which is why you have marksmen/sniper training. the rifles are accurate well beyond that.
Translation of excerpts from a German order.
412 Infantry Regiment, [227th Infantry Division],
KP regiment 12/12/1941
The order on the defense of the area Lipki
...
3. Joining the battle.
For an easel machine gun ... at a distance of 2000 m.
For a light machine gun: not more than 800 m.
For a rifle: concentrated rifle fire from a distance of 500 m, single fire from a distance of 200 m.
For a submachine gun: from a distance of 200 m.
Signature: Schindler
Oberleutenant and company commander
Schindler's List (... and on the distance of effective fire)
afirsov.livejournal.com/489740.html
(in Russian)
@@АвтономныйСтранник very cool thanks man
blyat
ic.pics.livejournal.com/afirsov/14754672/736969/736969_original.jpg
@@leeonardodienfield402 Most boltguns are optimistically 4 moa. That is sufficient to not guaruantee a hit on a guman when aiming for CoM from 200m away.
It may be difficult to range when Soviets open fire because of the nature of their trench systems and the fact they often just had time to dig 'Russian holes' (single man deep foxholes covered in camouflage). I have read accounts of German soldiers being surprised by Soviets suddenly emerging from these holes and opening fire at almost point blank range. The Soviet defence I think was much like a field full of moles.
Another myth from the Eastern front. РККА's Field Manual of 1925 year envisaged for the use of "strelkovaya yacheika" (foxholes) only in a maneuvering war, since it is impossible to set the right time for the prepare of the correct position in the form of communication trench (okop -- from this: ic.pics.livejournal.com/paul_atrydes/2932304/40870/40870_original.jpg to this: ic.pics.livejournal.com/paul_atrydes/2932304/41471/41471_original.jpg ). It also provided for the gradual retrofitting of this position from fox holes to "okop" proper communication trenchs, if the unit has time.
In 1927 РККА published "Инж-26" (Manual on Military Engineering for the Infantry (1926)) A specific sequence of actions is indicated here: under enemy fire, the rifle squad must (consistently) dig a individual hole for lying shooting, knee shooting, standing shooting, then the foxholes are combined into a connected trench (the same "okop"). Field Manual of 1927 paid even more attention to this by advancing camouflage for infantry "okop" trenches and sapper operations. Field Manual of 1929 -- et cetera.
Finally in 1933, in "Инж-33" the concept of a complex trench (transheya -- which translates literally) is introduced: ic.pics.livejournal.com/paul_atrydes/2932304/41627/41627_original.jpg As you probably already guessed, then this system became more and more thoughtful and sophisticated. For example -- "Инж-П-39": ic.pics.livejournal.com/paul_atrydes/2932304/43484/43484_original.jpg
So, given that the Soviet infantry was to consistently turn temporarily dug foxholes into same system of trench fortifications, this myth arose because the German units were just lucky to attack the still not entrenched Soviet infantry: ic.pics.livejournal.com/paul_atrydes/2932304/45395/45395_original.jpg -- in the time section of the upper part of the picture.
@@Ailasher
Fantastic comment! Thank you for dispelling some of the BS that surrounds Soviet tactics/doctrine in WW2 :)
One of the rather frustration thing about looking at units below regiment level organisation is that few publication details it that far down. Glantz's and others usually stop at rifle division level and it details how many anti-tank guns, howitzers and mortars at what caliber more often. In the grand scheme of things, those are what matters more than how many rifles or SMGs. The organisation and equipment in this video seemingly betrayed the fact that the Soviet Union made millions of SMGs.
A couple of possibilities:
- A few lines of rifle battalion and regiment organisation showed that they have separate SMG companies.
- Tankodesantniki: tank desant/tank rider/mechanised infantry are often referred to as submachine gun companies as well. It seems that the tanks can shoot at thing at long range with its weapons and the accompanying infantry need approximately SMGs to deal with close-in threats.
Another variation is very often, in Soviet Order of Battle, a Fortified Region is included but often ignored in subsequent analysis. Fortified Regions are Corps-level formation that has 3 machinegun artillery Regiment plus anti-tank, AA, tank regiments, and other support battalions. These units are low-mobility but high fire power formations in economy-of-force roles. On the offensive, they occupy the same frontage as about 6 Rifle Divisions on the penetration sector. Their role is to guard the flanks and generate a lot of noise and fire without using a lot of manpower (maskirovka: generate phantom formations and hide the real concentration) . Think a typical infantry squad/platoon but with riflemen swapped out for crew-weapons crews and their associated machineguns. (source: "Fortified Regions: What is the OperationalSignificance of the Employment of FortifiedRegions for NATO and the United States?", AD-A234 373, Lieutenant Colonel Dennis K. Hill, SAMS thesis, USA CGSC)
The latter adaptation is not uncommon. During the latter half of the Korean war where it was mostly static defensive and limited infiltration/raid battles, each Allied defending infantry formation received more machine guns allotments.
I love your small group tactics the most ! Absolutely amazing !
Its great.
"Which earned it it's nickname..."
me; Yes yes say it please!
"Record player"
:(
Dinner Plate - 28
@@JdeMonster Dropbeat Panel - 28
Or my favorite Disco Player - 28
13:35 The German manual looks like a text book - going into theory first - , the Soviet manual like a self-help book - with direct instruction to do your stuff - from the TOC.
Different perspectives I assume. Perhaps, a short-sighted or well confident person might appreciate that the way the Germans did things because its so elaborate, while the Soviet one looks simplistic. However, one must count in several factors in the war, like attrition and limited training. In this case, a simply structured manual is much more recommended as it can be objective-focused and easier to read
How dare you call us simple. You simply just have the enemy smell American for it to die.
@@nottoday3817 Yes, I also assume that the different doctrines regarding the officer corps are behind the different handbook styles.
GeFlixes the Soviet handbooks were tripartite: The soldiers and NCOs studied the squad/platoon part, the officer corps concentrated on the company/battalion part, while the regiment/division part was mostly classified and only fully available to senior officers
@@jurisprudens But aren't most high ranking officers been purged and there been a excessive amount of officers than soldiers.
I've also heard the DP-28 called the "Dinner Plate-28"
one of the few military youtubers that sources their work
Thank you for citing your sources. I appreciate that.
Interestingly, this is probably the same tactics the Chinese used against UN forces in Korea.
There are sources saying that machine gun fire is fired as close as possible.
As for the tactic of waiting until very close before opening fire, despite the TO&E and manuals, many Russian units were ENTIRELY equipped with the PPSh-41 & later PPS-43 Sub-Machine Guns. Entire battalions have been noted to have been so equipped.
While this may have been mostly relegated to Shock Troops accompanying tanks on the advance, the fact is that often terrain or weapon availability would have dictated far closer initiation ranges than any manual instruction. Further to that, accuracy is almost always improved by being closer to your targets, as is the shock value of sudden close gunfire.
SMGs firing pistol cartridges and from an open bolt would always achieve better results at closer ranges, even when not in urban house to house or room clearing operations.
13: 26 lol [wall of text]
Also the [sic] after “taking no losses on the assault”🙃
I'd love to see further reviews on the other major powers to see how everyone compared.
Excellent work good sire.
I am way too excited for this. Been wanting this since I saw your German squad video.
"Time to take a look at " BEST INTRO EVER ♥
Danke!
Danke für die Unterstützung! / Thanks for the support!
Thank You!
11:32 - My guess, the German soldiers might have the specially prepared ambushes in mind. The company/battallion level manual prescribed (and still prescribes) to create fire ambushes in camouflaged positions during the defense. I don't think it was possible to camouflage the main defensive position.
In Panfilov's 28 men they create a false position as bait
I'm sorry kid, but when have you sold your brain?
It is possible to camouflage a lot, giving your enemy false confidence. The Russians are masters of camouflage.
There was only one instance in Stalingrad that looks like what was depicted in Enemy at the Gates. It was the battle of the 13th Guards Rifle Division around Mamaev Kurgan in September. But those were decisive days. Division of 10 thousand was sent into the city, and immediately ordered to attack German positions on Kurgan. After 48 hours of battle, 90% of division was dead or wounded.
Those kind of events weren't a rule, they were a huge exception, and showed a direness of situation. Other than that almost whole battle of Stalingrad was led by small combat teams, often smaller than squads depicted in this video. Which doens't mean it wasn't an extremely bloody battle, it was, just the nature of fighting was different. But i guess it isn't spectacular to show 4-man fire team fighting for a living room for 3 hours.
What about the use of submachine guns? The soviets went literally insane on the use of submachine guns (PPSh's, PPS's, PPD'S), equipping entire companies whit the, using them to devastating effects when storming enemy positions.
You clearly see the scenario based thinking in both armies, for conscripted soldiers, it is hard to reorganise during such a short period, and thus easier to command and organise on platoon rather than squad level. Specific task requirement is easier to be understand and executed, though less freedom is given, it surely keep everyone in place. But for a regular army, you would expect them to be organised on squad level and act according to the principle and rules of tactic manoeuver.
Short range thing was used in a situation when enemy had artillery or aviation support advantage(which was most of the time in a beginning of the war) because if the combat is on such a close distance germans couldnt request airstrike or artillery support for themselves.Moreover i assume not every conscript could reliably get a target at 400m range so it would make sense to strike from point blank rather than risking giving away your position and miss. And take all manuals with a grain of salt because its an army so every book usually goes fubar and people have to adjust accordingly to the situation I am honestly dubious that anyone used that formation part of the guide strictly as in manual.
I found this in the german infantry regulations of 1906 translated to english for some USA general staff.
"Especially does the combat require leaders trained to reliance and to self-reliance, and soldiers of initiative, who, from devotion to their Emperor and the Fatherland, manifest a form purpose to conquer even when their leaders have fallen."
Maybe this is closer to that Russian mother land thing in that soviet regulation?
6:00 should be required watching for ro2 players
It is unbelievable that an infantry squad under any heavy type of artillery fire would do anything other than lie flat on the ground. Anything else would be suicidal. Also the effects of percussion shock on the human body and the the nerves needs to be considered.
Let me make a few comments or corrections to your video. Perhaps the inaccuracies in your video I saw because of the inaccuracy of the translation. So, during the Polish campaign of 1939 and the Winter war, the red army rifle group consisted of 14 people: the group commander, rangefinder observer, machine gunner, assistant machine gunner, grenade thrower, assistant grenade thrower, 8 shooters, weapons: 13 Mosin rifles and 1 light machine gun DP-27. After the Winter war, the grenade thrower and the assistant grenade thrower were removed, since the Diakonov rifle grenade did not have sufficient fragmentation effect. A total of 12 men, 11 Mosin rifles and 1 DP-27 light machine gun. In April 1941, the observer-rangefinder was removed, and 2 shooters changed their weapons from the Mosin rifle to the PPSH-41 submachine gun. In addition, Mosin rifles were changed to SVT-40. Total armament: 1 DP-27, 2 PPSH-41, 8 SVT-40. In July 1941, a light staff was introduced, according to which all shooters armed with PPSH-41 were removed from the rifle platoon, and 2 types of groups appeared - with DP-27 and without DP-27. 2 groups in the platoon have DP-27, and 2 groups are most likely armed with 2 PPSH-41 in the group instead of DP-27. In total, there are 11 people in the group. Vooruzhenie: 1 DP-27, 10 SVT-40 or 1 PPSH-41, 10 SVT-40. But the SVT-40 is refused or replaced with a Mosin rifle. Until the spring of 1942, the number of DP-27s in the platoon increases from 2 to 4 units and two types of groups are canceled. On December 10, 1942, two types of groups were introduced again - "heavy" and "normal" and the number of people was reduced from 11 to 9. Weapon."heavy" groups - 2 DP-27, 1 PPSH-41, 6 Mosin rifles. Armament of the "normal" group - 1 DP-27, 1 PPSH-41, 7 Mosin rifles. However, in reality, the division into 2 groups was only in the battle of Kursk, in further battles the platoon consisted of 4 "normal" groups.
Great video as always!
It's not ideal and can't be used as a main source. But here you can find scan and transcript of Army regulations before the WWII (1939).
rkka.ru/docs/real/su38/main.htm
With some digging you should be able to find copy of the original or it's usage in another material as a reference.
Here is a chapter for squad layout.
rkka.ru/docs/real/su38/3.htm
My grandpa, Polish resistance soldier of AK - BCh told me once about Soviet infantry tactic that he saw in use. He witnessed Red Army soldiers running straight against machine guns in lines, not scattered and they were always drunk as hell. Also, they were ill equiped, their guns had so destroyed rifling, that bullets from PPSh's bounced over wooden boards just like peas.
Mateusz Grzyb Strange. The one Soviet memoir I’ve read was of a mechanized infantry officer, Evgeni Bessonov. He wrote that his battalion very rarely received the “standard” alcohol rations, causing a few unscrupulous individuals to brew moonshine, which was banned in the Red Army. Attacking in “lines” is not unusual, only that they would attack in a spread out skirmish line.
Running straight into machine guns would only be used as a last resort, or in the confined spaces of urban areas. Machine-gun nests would usually be destroyed in a multi-pronged attack with machine-gun/mortar support.
Unless the round was fired from over 300m away, it would be physically impossible for a 7.62x25 to be deflected off of wood. Even .22 calibre pistols are deadly at range.
What else you would expect to hear from bitter veteran?
yep, those drunken soviet soldiers, rushing in a straight line
*Red orchestra 2 flashbacks intensified*
everybody vote bridges!!!
@@hi-tech_soldier2558 Barashka
@@hi-tech_soldier2558 the useless t34 and sniper cant kill anyone lol
Well the 1941 Soviet squad wasn't exactly 4 weapon systems. The Sniper could detach his scope or simply use the unobstructed iron sights and act as a rifleman
And risk breaking the scope that the Soviet state gave him? They may be sent to the gulag if the political officer found out! (Jokes, mostly)
Can you do the British army next please
Please do the American WWII squad infantry tactics next! Thank you for the awesome videos!
By not opening fire prematurely not only do the Soviets frustrate reconnaissance efforts, but the enemy will probably find themselves among Soviet positions with fire coming from multiple directions when firing does start. This is most disorienting and likely to pin the Germans down.
0:33 the subtitles say "krautfunding"... Or so it meant to be?
Campbell is certainly correct - the 5.04.41 order of battle 04/400 infantry division has 11-men squads of SL, 2-men LMG team, 2 SMG and 6 riflemen. Check it out for yourself: niehorster.org/012_ussr/41_organ/div_rifle/rd_inf-co.html
Snipers were not included in the squad before 1960's.
I respect Niehorster a lot, but Sharp particularly noted that til July 1941 there was actually a grenadier & assistant in the setup. That is oddly specific.
A grenadier and assistant were part of 15-men squad as per 04/20 order of battle of 1939 vintage.
The reason why a grenadier & assistant were dropped out of the squad in 1940 (per 04/100 order of battle) was that Dyakonov rifle grenade launcher was deemed ineffective in light of the experience of 1938-40 battles.
That was my understanding for the snipers. There was a 'team' included in the Company HQ. A team might have been two snipers.
3:07 That is the MN-1938 Carbine.
no, it is not: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mosin%E2%80%93Nagant#/media/File:Mosin_Nagant_series_of_rifles.jpg
@@MilitaryHistoryVisualized I mean when you mentioned the Carbine version, not the rifle shown.
One thing to remember about the Soviet perspective, and the bluntness of its attitude towards saboteurs, traitors, and cowardice, is the Ostplan. The USSR was fighting against a war of extermination and slavery.
There was also a Rightist bloc inside the country that opposed the popular backed center faction, lead by Stalin and pals. The Russian Civil War didn't end in 1917 by any means.
Red Army is strongest :')
Against their own country you mean right?
Stalin was a genocidal maniac, ugh you commie apologists make me sick
@@DavidPerez-mr3cs you nazi
I have a question I've wanted to ask for a long time man. are you former military? you have such a wealth of knowledge that if you are not, is even more impressive. Good work on these videos and keep it up man!
What the book doesn't tell you is that the most common squad tactic of Russians is to rush B.
My grandfather told me about a Soviet charge where the first wave had the guns and consecutive waves picked them up and carried them closer to enemy fire...
That's quite a way of wasting human resources... My grandfather also assumed that they knew that they'd be doing a suicide charge (as they were drunk and many died crapping themselves...)
Anytime someone says "my grandfather" or someone related about the past, I'll be very suspicious
@@fulcrum2951 I swear he told me it. However, there's not much I can do to verify his stories. All I can tell is that he never cared about making himself a hero or making one side look good and the other bad. He had a lot of sh!t on everyone.
@@edi9892 you grandfather is probably an idiot
Because your grandfather’s friends very effectively reduced the Soviet civilian population. The Red Army had to rush
I thought the video title said Soviet SQUAT TACTIC
*Red Army battlecry FILLS with you DETERMINATION, TOVARISCH!*
Probably covered already, but lots of the carbine versions of the Mosin Nagant did have bayonets. They had a side folding bayonet permanently mounted to the rifle. Sort of like what the Russians did with the SKS after the war.
Dimitri: MG42 nest komrade commisar.
Commisar: You know what to do dimitri.
Dimitri: Yes komrade commisar we will rush the mg42.
"Lets Headbutt the germans like the americans in D-Day" -Said no soviet ever
Point 309 in the German manual looks to me like a veiled reference to the fact that you are likely to have taken casualties in the assault, and quickly need to decide who is the new machine gunner's assistant, and whether your injured NCO should be relieved of his duties or attended to by a rifleman for example. The Soviet manual "therefore taking no losses", seems over-optimistic by comparison.
Good video, very keen to see British and US equivalents. I'm pretty sure that early war the Bren gun team was not expected to join the assault directly but provide covering fire, but that in practice it joined the assault, stopping periodically or firing from the sling, but it would be interesting to see what was actually recommended in the manuals.
It seems odd to me that both the Germans and the soviets would put the LMG at the head of the marching column where I (as someone who knows nothing about military history short of what I've learnt from the TV and YT) would have thought they were most vulnerable to sniper fire, grenades, small arms fire and ambushes. Why would the weapon with the longest range and the highest suppression potential be placed in the most vulnerable location - does it reduce the changes of friendly fire in an ambush to have the machine gun foremost in front of friendly troops or is there some other rationale?
you don't march when you expect enemy fire / engagements. And the squad rarely acted alone.
Military manuals often place two important roles as close as possible to the front. The first being, the leaders. The reason they are put at the front is that they get very good situational awareness, and others behind the leader can simply follow the leader without him having to explain small details to a pointman. Similarly, machine gunners are placed as close to the front as possible, allowing them to more quickly start suppressing the enemy. People who are right at the front are often the ones that get pinned down or get hit first. But you can get away with creating such manuals because usually things go right for you. You see, most of the time the people at the front of a formation don't get pinned down and don't get hit... Most of the time. So, it comes down to weighing the pros and cons. Different military organizations will give you different answers on what the best placement is for each role.
Also important to keep in in mind is that the LMG was the biggest firepower that the squad had and putting it close to the front also meant that it was under the most direct possible control of the squad leader without making him carry it himself. And as Alexsandr Kramaenko says, it makes it easier for the LMG to go into action quickly if/when contact is made.
German Manual: Do a, then b. Be wary of the possibility of c.
Soviet Manuel: Run forward, yell, shoot the enemy and throw bottles at them like true Slavs.
The soviet doctrine seems more apt for a turn based tactical game for a micromanager than for an actual squad leader who had to deal with real people.
It's my understanding that the Soviets were more focused on the operational level and operated on the assumption that they would be working with less at the tactical level due to language barriers, training issues, etc., and this remained true into the Cold War. The less complexity at low levels, the less that can go wrong down there. I've read a few articles by professional wargamers running Cold War stuff with actual Soviet doctrine and it's pretty much painting by numbers, intended to be applied directly from the manuals. It means less time spent preparing, less variables, and apparently such a sudden and violent advance that the NATO side was left scratching their heads with command paralysis when it hit, because it didn't follow any of their "rules" or assumptions. Sometimes the best way to deal with real people is to give them less things to have "good ideas" about changing, and so the Soviets sunk an enormous amount of time into the study of military history in order to do so.
Sometimes simple is best. If you advance across a suspected minefield as if it's not there, you'll lose some men/vehicles to mines, but you'll lose less than if you halted, called the engineers up, and then got plastered by pre-sighted artillery.
@@rossmum Thank you. Very eye opening.
Will there be a video about squad tactics from other nations too? Or did you do this one because you stumbled upon the information?
What about those units that were armed entirely with submachine guns?
might happen at one point
3:10 record player? My friends and I just called is the pizza mag gun
Pretty sure the Russians had encountered more record players than pizzas but don't quote me on that
@@davidreeding9176 There were a lot of Italians on the Eastern front so its anyone's guess
-The squad takes their Shovels and hatchets.
-The squad applies the hatchets and shovels to the nemies heads.
-The squad goes home
sounds like a good early medieval squad warfare tactic
Their early squad organisation had room for a sniper but they disappear later, although one rifleman is assumed to be a better shot than the others. Did the snipers become platoon or company assets, rather than squad ones?
Never encountered a pre-war soviet squad TOE with a sniper (well, any TOE before the creation of SVD, actually). Pretty sure it is wrong. The one with two SMG gunners is correct.
considering that Sharp did a book series of around 7 books on TOE including everything from infantry to artillery and armor division, I am not really yet convinced. Not to mention that he goes into a lot of detail on how the squad setup changed.
@@MilitaryHistoryVisualized well, quantity doesn't always mean quality. If there is no number of TOE in the book (kinda like 04\601 for the rifle regiment, for example), I would not trust such source entirely as the autor probably didn't use actual documents. A TOE with a sniper could exist as some special measure (for airbourne rifles for example) but surely wasn't the basic one for a standard rifle unit.
he regularly refers to shats. And then again he translated the manual.
so it would be kinda odd that he would then go for a different source.
@@MilitaryHistoryVisualized shtat is a correct russian term for TOE, every shtat is assigned a number, like 00/000, with which it is adressed in staff documents. I just use english term in order to make myself clear for foreigners.
Btw Soviet\Russian field manuals don't include any basic TOEs\shtats inside them, unlike US ones as far as I can tell. For training purposes there are so called 'training shtats' which are told to cadets by their instructors during lectures, actual shtats are considered secret and are quite fluid, actually.
11:47 I think these 100 meter ranges anecdotally reported would be because the Germans were so good at long range exchanges, they always had better fire control, lenses, training, so to make up for this, just like with the tanks, they would rely on point blank ranges making up for this lack of quality in manpower and equipment.
can you do a video on dutch military ww2 tactics?
we tried to stop the germans by flooding large parts of the country. sadly planes where a thing by then.
we also used german weapons so i assume we had similar tactics to the invaders.
Ask wasterling
The structure of the Soviet Manual reflected more than being able to reach barely literate soldiers. They wanted the reader to know the most relevant things first given their crisis. If they lived long enough, they could read through the rest.
Soviet illiteracy is a myth, they had implenented free mass education in the villages and had over 90% literacy rate
@@Dimovuha222 my apologies then, I thought they still had strides to make at that time from the ignorance the Tsars kept them in.
@@SgtCandy Well late russian empire had their own literacy program too, soviet one was just mode widespread and available one since it was free and was spreading "forcefully" through countryside. Forcefully not in a sense that they were held at the gunpoint, but in a sense that it was encouraged
@@SgtCandy Russia and other soviet republics still have the one of the highest literacy rates in the world, with 99,8-99,9 population being literate
During WW2 Soviet soldiers were not illiterate , ALTHOUGH they had little education other then that. So reading things wasnt a problem, understanding them was.
Alexa, play the National Anthem of the USSR!
Alexa: *DA!*
*no enthernet connection*
“Push comrade we have more men than they have bullet
Are you planning to work on an updated US Squad tactics video ? the old one seems really short compared to these newer ones that you've created and I would love to see an updated video. (you should see if you can get Hell Let Loose to sponsor the video for you :-) )
I respect all sides and all soldiers that served in WW2 and I love studying about every side the best generation!!
Basically its the same as Call of Duty; the Russians have their own load outs from a set of 5 to choose from depending on the situation
Would love to see a video on British WW2 Squad Tactics soon!
The Germans were masters of tactics, but faltered at an strategical level. The opposite can be said about the Soviets.
Yet the Soviets would prove better than the Germans at street house-to-house fighting
@@englishalan222 That speaks not so much of tactical effectiveness as for adecuate equipment and ferociousness, factors much more important in room by room warfare. Also, the Soviet's excellent city defenses were best at the strategic level: the creation of specific sniper schools, the use of propaganda and effective motivation of civilian population as well as common troops, the creation of weapons like the PPs which are excellent for short range, frantic battles, etc.
@mr_ anheuser The level of training is more complicate. Prior to Barbarossa the German training was better. The Soviets however had trained reserves. Men who already served their mandatory conscription in the past. Germany had not because of the treaty of Versailles. So the first waves of Soviets replacements in winter 1941-1942 started out with a form of training maybe even up to the level prior to the purges and only needed a refresher course. So they could be sent to the front fast. While every German recruit had to be trained from scratch. The Germans did not have the resources to serious expand their training facilities. So once the losses and new demands of the war outstripped the German training capacity the only option was to slacken the standards. And after 1942 the Soviets would have the resources and time to improve training and even pull experienced units out for retraining. So by the time of preparation for the last push for Berlin the Soviets could reorganize and retrain experienced units specific for urban combat, while the training in Germany pretty much reached the level of Red Army memes.
HA!
I thought he said
"Be sure to check out our Kraut funding campaign"
*Knock knock*
Who's there?
Gestapo
Gestapo w-?
*slap*
Vee vill ask ze qvestions!
6:53
Under artirallery fire?
Just run through it comrade
lmao
Wait...the Soviets had squad tactics that weren't "Run at the enemy until we eventually get there"?
Wait... the Soviets issued a rifle to every rifleman rather than a one per three?
Wait... the Soviets actually used machine guns to shoot germans rather their own troops?
@@ФедяКрюков-в6ь Wait, the Soviets had strats other than Zerg Rush?
I think the implication of the ammunition carrier is as in one appointed to go and conduct the resupply for the entire squad?
Might be worth casing over other sources to see if this is how it was employed.
Including it in a statement about designating an observer/scout and a messenger (for the squad? Turned over as a platoon messenger?) makes me wonder if it isn't a reference solely to the MG.
"Similar, but more refined" - how many areas can you say that when comparing 1930s-40s era Germany and Soviet forces?
"Enemy is over there, figure it out!"