Sorry about the bad audio quality. This was my first video posted and is definitely far from perfect, but I'll always try to keep improving and I promise the audio improves in future videos. Regardless, I never thought my first video would get this much attention, so thank you all for the crazy amount of support
It's finally viewed as the smartest move so everyone does it. you win alot less games if they replace you, and if you lose the game and it looks like its your fault then you risk getting the boot. It was all about risk aversion. Which is why the NFL is a copy cat league, partly.
@@MovieMakingMan I quit and play poker full time now haha. That experience helped me realize people are just going to do what they are comfortable with despite hard evidence there are better ways. Thought why fight it? Just play a game where you can make the most of it,
@@alexleach4002 That’s quite the career change. You must be a great player to do it professionally. Do you tend to play the same group of people a lot of the time?
There is one scenario that further increases the odds. If you convert on the first attempt, you have the option to kick two field goals should your next drive stall short of the goal line - which increases your odds of tying the game.
@@SonnyBubbayour odds of converting whatever 4th down and trying to score a touchdown are probably better than getting a third possession if it's late game. But that's just my gut LOL
The NFL making the extra point longer a few years ago is what prompted the popularization of this strategy. Missed extra points, while still not the norm, are much more common than they used to be, thus making the "kick twice" strategy much less of a sure bet than it was before.
Plus the changes in the OT rules after the Bills/Chiefs 2022 Divisional Round Game. Now that both teams are guaranteed 1 possession in OT, the limiting factor is how good is your defense? If it's dogshit, go for two and avoid the eventual OT loss if both possessions result in a TD.
Yeah, bringing the conversion rate from the mid 90's down to the high 80's for XP kicks made going for two a much more attractive proposition from an analytic standpoint, just as the league intended.
@@D2theLEO .94 * .94 *.5 gives you .4418 chance of making both kicks and winning in OT, which means strategy 3 beats it if you make more than .33 of your 2 pointers
I forgot where but the average nfl play goes for something like 2.5ish yards per play Edit I might be wrong but the worst offense team by total yards in 2023 was the Carolina Panthers at 4510 yards or 265.29 yards per game. NFL team usually play 60ish plays on offense per game and that using that and the Panthers data for 2023 equals 4.42 yards per snap. Of course anything might happen on any particular play and some say it's easier to play defense at the goal line. So 49 percent seems logical to me
@@Michael-sb8jf The average play went for 5.3 yards last season. This has been measured since 1932 and the lowest it ever got was 3.6 y/p in 1935. It has literally never been close to 2.5ish yards per play. It hasn't even dipped below 5 y/p in 30 years.
@@DoubleTTB22you can’t just lump all plays together like that though. Down, distance, game clock, and obviously field position are all significant factors that go into the yards gained on a play and how difficult it was to get them.
Not really @@alexleach4002 John urschel (ex NFL lineman now full time mathematician) does a good short demonstration of this fact. It's really just some simple algebra and solving quadratic formulas
I've seen a *lot* of discussion of this tactic over the years and I find it rare that someone writing a piece like this actually describes an aspect that helps explain why this strategy works. To be clear, the probabilities described in the video are correct, but intuitively, it can be difficult to get past "if the deuce is a coin flip and worth about 1 point as a result, how are you actually gaining an advantage by going for 2 the first time?" The answer is that this strategy changes the chances of different outcomes compared to the "kick twice" strategy. Let's assume that the kick is 100% and the deuce is 50% just to make the math easier. Long story short, if you "kick twice," you are going to score 14 points 100% of the time. If you "kick first, deuce second," you are going to score 13 points 50% of the time and 15 points 50% of the time. If you use the video's strategy "deuce first, decide second", you're going to score 15 points 50% of the time, 14 points 25% of the time, and *12* points 25% of the time. The key is that "14 points 25% of the time, 12 points 25% of the time" part. That's the difference between "kick first, deuce second" and "deuce first, react second." You run the risk of scoring only *12* points, which neither of the other strategies risks. But big deal!!! Scoring 12 and scoring 13 are functionally equivalent in this situation. So "deuce first, decide second" converts some of the losses from "kick first, deuce second" into *ties*, giving you a chance to win in overtime. Essentially, what you risk is "we'll sometimes score only 12 points from the two touchdowns"...but 12 points is the same as scoring 13 in this scenario because you lose the game either way. But what you *gain* is "we'll score 15 points (to win) or 14 points (to tie)" more frequently, and *that's* how this strategy increases your chances of winning. It's "win a few more games" in exchange for "a few of the games that we *do* lose will be lost by a greater margin, but we will lose fewer such games."
So in essense, deuce works at its best after a kick, as the chances of an undesirable result is 50/50, whereas deuce and deuce risks 50/25/25... and its potential gain outweighs the potential loss. 50/50 > 50/25/25
@@krazzed3243 ? This isnt a troll though? This is based on my understanding, you can feel free to correct me on this. Unlike with a divorce, my reasoning can be fixed if you were communicative instead of reactionary.
@kyperactive sorry I kind of immediately assumed it was a troll cause we're on the internet and too many people these days troll for reactions. Let's go through the issue: given this 50/50 for extra points then deuce you have a 50% chance to win and 50% chance to lose. The other strategy (strategy 3: 50, 25, 25) the 50% is still a straight win like the kick first strategy. The middle 25% is a tie which goes to OT. Supposing both teams are equally likely to win overtime this means you win half of that 25% of the time where you tied at end of regulation. This means you win 12.5% of the time there. You still lose 25% of the time (didn't make either 2 point conversion) but the other 12.5 + 25% only amounts to you losing 37.5% of the time and winning 62.5% of the time which is better than the kick first strategy. So deuce first strategy with option to kick second if first made or do a second deuce attempt if first failed strictly dominates kick first. So 50/25/25 > 50/50
This doesn't even compare to the inability of the NBA to recognize the value of the 3 point line. It's genuinely concerning how long that one took to figure out, especially considering just how much money was on the line.
For a league so _heavily_ focused on stats (even including a bunch of useless ones), it's odd that for 20 years they were ignoring best play dictated by high school math.
The problem was always owners being too risk averse, and not giving any leeway to the coach when it didn't work. It doesn't matter that what you're doing is correct if the guy cutting your check gets scared of blowback from fans and won't hesitate to make you the scapegoat when it goes wrong, which it does about 25% of the time.
I’m pretty sure I saw somewhere that it was agreed upon by both coaches ahead of the game that they would avoid a tie because the game was so big, so that’s why he went for 2 I’m pretty sure
@@NashRespectyeah, I came here to say the same. No overtime back then in college football (which is the only variant of football that had 2-point conversions at the time)
I think the simplest way to explain this is in terms of coin flips. Assuming that extra points are guaranteed and both OT and 2-point conversions are around 50/50, it comes down to, would you rather have: Heads: Win Tails: Lose OR Heads: Win Tails: Flip another coin - Heads: OT, Tails: Lose
This is a good way of explaining it, I think I would take it a step further - Heads: Win Tails: Lose OR Heads: Win Tails: Flip two more coins. If both are heads, win. If either are tails, lose.
If what you say is true and 2-point converts are successful 49% of the time while 1-point converts are successful 94% of the time, then it also follows that 2-point converts should be used in almost all situations all game long, barring specific point differentials late in the game.
This is where the dispersion might start playing effect: there are might not to be enough opportunities for the 2-point attempts to be viable In the provided scenario it works because we have a very specific scenario: scoring exactly 2 touchdowns before the end of the game and 14 point deficit.
7-ish years ago they had precisely this in mind when they moved the 1-pt conversion back from the 2yd line. They moved it far enough back that the probability of it succeeding was about 2x the probability of 2-pt conversions succeeding.
The statisticians have been saying that coaches should be going for 2 more often. And also going for it on 4th and short more often as well. Different analysts have different recommendations. Pretty much all of them advocate being more aggressive but some actually do advocate going for it all the time barring specific point differentials as you say. Especially below the NFL level where defenses are much more easily exploited.
Yes, you are correct. However, it's still pretty much a wash in most situations, and it's fair to argue that you create a lot of game tape for your opponents to study if you're going for 2 all of the time. It also increases the variance in your outcomes, which is generally *good* if you're a bad team (you're more likely to steal a win here and there than you are to blow a game using this strategy because you're already losing most of your games to begin with) and *bad* if you're a good team (the exact opposite of the scenario I just described.)
A coach may have his reasons for not doing this. In the 1980s, Tom Landry took a lot of heat in one game for not trying for a game-winning field goal when that seemed the obvious play. After losing the game and misspeaking about the decision in a press conference, some people were calling for his job, saying he was clearly washed up. But in fact, the kicker had been sketchy throughout the game, so even though the field goal attempt seemed obvious, Landry simply didn't trust his kicker to get the job done. Analytics is a tool, not an answer for every situation.
The only problem I can see here is that using historical 2 point conversion data will be biased as teams only went for the 2 point conversions when they really felt they could get it due to their match ups. So the 49% is high but if everyone start to just go for 2 point conversions now that number of 49% will surely decrease.
Last year teams run 209 plays from the opponent 2 yards line. They scored 88 TDs. That's gives us a 42% success rate. And this isn't even a favorabke example because within those 209 plays there were FG taken, knees taken, and plays that were at the 2 but weren't goal to go so the team just played to get a first down and then tried to score from inside the 2.
@@christoduplessis8177 It's higher than the ~39% success rate that should be the cutoff for this strategy being superior than just kicking the XP, so if anything is demonstrative that going for 2 should be the way to go, even if just by a slim margin.
Extra points are one thing but it drives me crazy when people start pretending like 4th downs are simple math. There are so many variables in 4th downs
It’s math. People don’t like to hear it, but sports is math. There’s a reason why it’s something like 1% of players on sports betting sites win the majority of the money. It’s because those are the guys using math to smoke the people playing on intuition
It's math. I have only punted once in 3 years, and that because we were inside our own 20 with a 4th and 31 because of multiple penalties and fumble and a big sack.
I was just thinking about this. I also think teams should go for two if they are the first team to score with a touchdown. If they fail, the losing team is still 2 field goals away. If they succeed, the other team is now in a much riskier spot.
It sounds good on paper, but the XP that early is better. Because if you whiff on the 2 you get beat on one TD if it hits for 7. Then a FG on the rebound means an FG returned kills you instead of OT.
It's better to take the one. In college you might do this if you are an underdog, but at the pro level, especially in playoff games, the XP is the better play.
I mean the teams that are not going for it might have a lower than 38% conversion rate since that’s just the league average. So statistically might be right approach to not go for it for them specifically
Good stuff. My only critique would be on the way you explained the maths behind the different strategies. None of it is wrong, btw, but I think a visual representation (decision tree, flowchart, etc.) is more effective when breaking down probabilities to a general audience that might not be familiar with this stuff. Anyways- Sports stats nerds like us seem to be entering into a golden age so I’m always stoked to see new content around it! Subbed.
These analytics are missing a bunch of other analytics that would affect the decision to go for 2. Situational football matters and the old school style is still applicable along with analytics. Momentum and each teams probability of scoring touchdowns in OT matter. If you score two TDs in a row and hold them to none, it becomes more than just go for 2. Did the other team make big mistakes leading to the TDs or did you figure out the scheme. This is why 40% are still “leaving it on the table”
Over a decade ago, I argued exactly this with my uncle for almost an hour before finally convincing him. I give him credit for genuinely trying to understand, but it's amazing how people's intuition and "risk avoidance" blinds them to a strategy that (excepting extreme lack of confidence in your team to convert a 2) is just superior.
Great vid! Just curious about the 1967 paper - the 2 pt conversion was implemented in 1994 in the NFL so I’m wondering what the basis for that paper even was?
Not sure if it got mentioned or not in the video, but teams have actually known this for a long time now. Coaches were just never brave enough to do it because if it failed they would likely lose their jobs.
Do you have the stats for the games where coaches opted to go for it/not go for it given these narrow parameters?? I'd love to know the breakdown on if it's better in theory or in practice.
‘60% is much higher than the 0% in it was….’ This guy maths :) Good topic and video. As others said, good to sort audio out. And then improve graphics a bit for retention. Good stuff.
since this is predicated on the other team not scoring, i think another thing to keep in mind with that is the mental difference of a 6 point lead vs a 7 point lead. if you get the 2 point conversion, it puts more pressure on the opposing team to get atleast a field goal when they have the ball, vs a 7 (or 8) point lead allows them to be conservative and try to maximize time they chew off the clock. good video though!
Are you using the probability of 2pt conversions overall or probability of 2pt conversions when under X min in 4th quarter? Wondering the stats as teams get closer and closer to the end of game.
I don’t know if you’re using a scarlet or a volt audio interface, but you have to change your recording set up to mono. The recording is looking for audio information from the right side, but there is no input so you can just connect them both together.
There’s also kind of a psychological advantage to go for 2 if you’re down by 14. To WIN THE GAME in regulation (paging Herm Edwards), you’re going to have to make a two point conversion at some point. If you kick the extra point on the first TD, now you’ve got a much more daunting decision to make after the second TD. Kick the PAT and take your chances in overtime, OR you can try to go for two and win it, but it’s an awfully hollow feeling if you don’t make it and lose (open to a TON of second guessing by fans, media, and maybe even your own players). But if you go for two after the first TD and make it, now it’s an easy call after the second one to send the kicker out there to win the game (or possibly be the goat if he misses the kick and you end up losing in OT). If you miss that first two pointer, you’ll still have a chance to get it after the second TD and force OT (and if you lose after that, not nearly as many people will be going back to the first TD to rake you over the coals for going for two there)
The numbers for 2-pt conversion success rate only go up if you couple it with burgeoning 4th down philosophies; if coaches opt for offensive plays on 4th down rather than punting, then you only need to average 2.5 yards per play to make the requisite 10 yards for a first down. The NFL 2-pt attempt starts from the 2-yard line, so if one's entire offense is geared around getting 2.5 yards then you have basically your entire playbook at your disposal for the goalline attempt as opposed to historically niche schemes reserved specifically for the 2-pt attempt.
I see what you mean. Run-heavy teams like the Marshawn Lynch Seahawks or the Derrick Henry Titans are likely more capable of getting 2.5 years than a team like the Dolphins, who prefer chunk plays and stretching the field over the classic "3 yards and a cloud of dust". I would say that even if a team isn't geared toward analytics and just runs the ball a lot, they're probably still quite good at getting 2.5 yards.
I think this is counteracted by the fact that defense doesn't have to protect against big plays and can focus on just preventing the 2 yards. The odds are probably worse.
@@BigBo-Peep Exactly. NFL defenses, for one play at their own two-yard line, are much more effective than anywhere else or any other time on the field. The field of play is much smaller and the task of making a stop is simplified. This is a common example of not considering the changing dynamics and current game situation when making blanket statements about the outcome.
If every team adopted this strategy the number of successful conversions would definitely trend downward. Teams that go for 2 now are more confident, probably because they're better in the redzone already, and the more teams do it the more defenses will adapt to them, there will be a lot more film to analyze. I'd like to see how the probability changes if every team defaulted to doing it.
that's a good point, and i would imagine that two point conversions would be practiced a lot more than they already are. something to note though is that the lower bound on a team's 2 pt conversion rate is ~27% (27% of plays at the opponent's 2 yd line result in a touchdown in any situation, and this includes 1-3rd down plays where the team isn't doing their all to score)
What’s the *observed* winrate of the teams who attempted this strategy? I trust that the math is correct, but obviously it oversimplifies a lot of variables (like the opposing team behaving differently after a 2pt attempt). It would mean a lot if the observed numbers confirm the suggested strategy’s being superior.
I'm glad to see someone finally explain the reasoning behind why teams have been doing this. I think avoiding overtime if possible is another reason to do this considering how broken the NFL overtime rules are. I'd rather lose on my terms going for two point conversions than lose because of an overtime coin toss
The issue with analytics is all the confounders... confounding variables... how good and balanced is your offense, and also how much momentum does your offense have? Have you recently been able to effectively both run and pass against this opponent, on this drive or otherwise? Who is your quarterback and how good is he scrambling and using his legs? Any relevant injuries on either side? Also, how much time is left on the clock and how many timeouts do you have to use on defense? An offense will, traditionally, be more conservative with the ball up 7 (or especially 8) than up 4, 5, or 6... (and also more conservative with the ball up 3 than up only 1 or 2). While aggressive teams now often go for a win-or-lose 2 point conversion at the end of games being down 7 and scoring the TD, there's still value in going for 1 at that point, particularly if you have reasonable confidence in your defense and kicker. If you're a team that struggles in short yardage offense like the Chicago Bears you're probably still better off going for one.
Does the ability, % wise, of the team’s ability to score on short yardage figure into this computation? I have seen a lot of teams that could march up and down the field all day, but get inside the TEN and it was three failures and a FG attempt.
I've thought this way for quite a while, but one assumption that I think needs to be challenged before the argument is water-tight is whether or not teams truly do have a 50% change of winning in overtime. Intuitively, let's say team A scores 14 points in the first quarter, and then their offense is completely flat the rest of the game. Team B starts off not having any competency on offense, but picks up steam in the fourth quarter and scores 14 quickly to tie up the game. Which team are you putting your money on to win in OT? Let's introduce a variable a representing overtime win probability into the equations. The team following strategy 1 has a win probability of a, while the team following strategy 3 has a win probability of making 2pt + a(making 2pt) - a(making 2pt)^2. With this new variable, any team that is >66% confident of winning in overtime (and also is certain of making both extra points) should now prefer strategy 1, assuming the league average for 2 point conversion percentage. So maybe this is an interesting statistic to track this upcoming NFL season - when teams do make the rare, late-game 14 point comeback, what are their chances of winning in overtime?
Avoiding overtime is also best for your team next week. The end of a close game is the likeliest time you’ll suffer an injury, so the decision can be best for both teams. This used to be frequently brought up with the old college football overtime rules, where alternating touchdowns would go on so long that eventually teams would go for 2 fearing injuries and a loss due to physical exhaustion.
Nice video. I hope everyone followed the math. Of course there are secondary factors involved, like how you're moving the ball in that game, against that team. And as more teams go for two, more teams will practice longer against it, perhaps changing the probabilities.
Same thing with Blackjack. Many people rather stand on a 16 against a dealer up card of 10 out of fear of going over 21 even though that it the best call in that situation. People fear messing up through an action more than messing up through inaction or less action. People will fail by not trying rather than trying and failing, especially when there are those that will criticize you for trying and failing rather than playing it "safe".
I've been ranting about teams not doing this for decades. Another related issue is when teams trail by 15 or 22; they tend to save the 2-point try for the last moment. Down 15, the only thing this does is delay the moment when they find out whether they need a third score or not (which may not matter, if you know you don't have time for a third score, but if you do, the sooner you know you need it, the better your chances). But down 22, if you fail the first time you can still potentially make it up by making the next two; if you wait, there's no recovery. One trend I've been seeing that I *don't* like is going for 2 after scoring while up 1. Sure, if you make it, you've put the game beyond one score. But 1) the success rate tends to be just below 50%, which means you're slightly better off trying to stop their 2-point conversion than trying to make your own, and 2) whether the opponent is down 7 or down 9, now they know what they have to do and can play accordingly. If they're down 8, they don't know whether they will need another score after the touchdown; they will usually assume not, and therefore be in a worse position if they find out they need the second score with only a few seconds left than if they found out with several minutes to spare. Or they may try to leave time in case they do need a second score, and now you get a chance to answer after they tie it.
This has been driving me insane for years, and I was pumped to not only finally see it become the more common decision this last year, but actually see it result in a win (GB over NO). I believe the reason why it took so long to finally be used is the fact that it is hard to see success stories on so few samples - that is not because it is a bad strategy, but because the odds of winning when you are in this situation are pretty low to begin with. It's a strategy that probably increases win probability from like 22% to 23%. That said, when the Bills converted against my Bengals last year, I was terrified. The Bengals had outplayed them all game, and the idea that the Bills could steal one was terrifying. This could have been another success story, but luckily for me the Bengals moved the chains.
@@thekingbarrelmaker7642 It will eventually. Hopefully it just happens after the strategy is more well known and accepted or the outrage will get some coach fired for making a good decision
Another thing i noticed is that teams who need a field goal and a touchdown to win opt to go for the td first over the field goal. And a lot of times theyll waste too much time trying to go for the td. I think, as soon as youre in field goal range in the 4th quarter. You use all your downs to either throw tds or throw it away. Then kick it, if you havent gotten a td yet, even if its at the 6 minute mark of the 4th quarter. I can see teams having a lot better probability if they prioritize the fg in that circumstance.
The issue with getting the FG first is that the other team can still make it a two possession game by getting a FG themselves. By getting a TD, it nullifies the other team getting a FG since the game would still be a one possession game, which puts a ton of pressure on the opposing team to get a TD.
Some Coaches use the logic of “playing in a way I can defend in a job interview this off season” and that can end up holding them back from optimal play. It’s the risk reward calls like this and 4th downs that make football so fun to enjoy.
I watch mostly college football so there may be some of that in my reasoning but I think there's also an aspect of knowing the type of players you have. In the NFL where everyone is a professional, this might not be an issue unless you have a bad team, but it could still matter. You may have a group of players that can totally understand this, and miss the first 2-point and not really be bothered, and that may change in the same group of guys game to game. They'll start the next drive where they left off and continue to fight. Another group of players might see that they are now pretty much still 2 scores down and potentially 3 scores down if they miss because going for a 2-point is just getting a touchdown again but you only have one play. Basically, when a coach is making an in game decision he can't JUST take analytics into account. You have a group of men who may or may not have confidence in that type of strategy, so that's where you may see some coaches opt for keeping it more of a status quo type of game.
The backing up of the extra point changed things. When there was zero chance of missing the extra point kicking it through made sense. When you bring in a 5-10% chance of missing one of the two XPs I think going for 2 down 8 is the way to go. But another thing to take into account is how good the 2pt plays you have dialed up are.
Hey man. I loved the video. Great use of statistics and simplifying them for the sake easy understanding. This video made me think of why teams have a difficult time scoring at the 2 yard line on 2-point conversions. It seems like it'd be easier because of how close they are to the end-zone and how often a team typically makes 2 yard gains. Is it because of how much less space the defense has to cover? How much more difficult is it to gain yards at each yard line closer to the end-zone? If you are looking for video ideas, I think that might be worth while.
The reason why people are using the 2 point conversion more is because the extra point was moved to the 30 yard line. So the odds of getting a two-point conversion are better than an extra point as extra points have a better chance of being missed now. Especially if the defense gets a penalty that then puts the ball at the one yard line if you go for a two point conversion.
Side note for fantasy football, this could impact kickers and teams going for two. Which teams are more so likely to go for two and which teams are more so likely to still use a kicker for the extra point. Probably too small to ever account for anything but could be something that plays into min maxing scoring opportunities in fantasy football.
Also worth considering is, a few years ago the extra point kick was moved back, which reduces the chance of converting a 1-point extra point. Not a huge difference, but not negligible either.
If you’re down by 14 in any circumstance, it seems like a good strategy. If there’s more time on the clock, two field goal drives ties it. If not converting 1 of 2-point conversion attempts, still produces the 14 points
I was just about to say that my team stinks too bad for this to work, then it was stated that your team has to be 39% successful at 2 pointers for the strategy to be positive. Bravo
Now let's just say, hypothetically, you're trailing in the Super Bowl 28-3 midway through the third quarter, and you score a TD to make it 28-9 but your kicker misses the extra point. Shortly after, in the beginning of the fourth quarter, you kick a field goal to cut it to 28-12 and need two TD's with two successful two point conversions to tie. What are your chances of winning the Super Bowl? Let's assume you have an elite QB and an elite HC who have both already won multiple championships together.
Some teams are better at making conversions, and some teams are better at defending against it. So, depending on your team and who you are playing against, it can make sense NOT to go for it.
it still can be matchup based maybe the guy on the other sideline might be more aggressive with a 6 point lead compared to a 7 point lead. with new OT rules in playoffs gives an extra layer of thought as well
My biggest issue used to be the ignoring or analytics but like most things in life, people swing to the complete opposite side and now feel you have to trust the book with every scenario. I've always felt math can't tell you certain things that are happening on the field, so math alone shouldn't be used to tell me if I'm going or not.
My favorite place for a 2pt conversion. Down by 7 near the end of the first half and you get the ball to start the half. (0-7) You get a TD and 2PT to end the half (8-7) You score in the second half and get the 2pt. (16-7) Now even if the other team scores and gets the 2pt, (you've both scored 2 TDS) they are still down one score
When you added the chart showing increased usage of the strategy, I was hoping you were going to provide success rate for this strategy vs 7+7 strategy.
I want a similar analysis on a related but slightly different scenario: what to do when you're down _15_ instead of 14. For years conventional wisdom has been kick the PAT to "make it a one score game". That's always driven me nuts because it's only a 1 score game if you assume you make the 2 point conversion later, and if you're assuming you're gonna make it. It doesn't matter when you do it. But if you _miss_, it's better to miss early so you have more time to react. When down 15, I think you should always go for 2 after the first TD. I want to see the math to know if I'm right
god yeah i hate that, if you miss the first 2pt you know what youre in for and have time go game plan. otherwise youre just banking on the percent chance to get the 2pt the second time around. idk why its normal to do the pat first!
Personally I say just go for 2 in pretty much every situation. The only time I wouldn't is if I'm up 8 before the PAT, since the much more likely 1 point try also makes it a 2-score game.
This is where aspects outside maths come into effect, honestly. If you chop down 15 points deficit down to 2 points with no time left and 2pts conversion left to try, your squad might be hyped whereas the opponent will be very nervous, possibly changing the odds in your favour as opposed to doing it the mathematically better way. Whereas if your opponent is clutch in key moments, you go for the 2pts conversion early.
I don't like this. Kick the PAT, but still call plays with the urgency of you being down two scores. If u don't get the ball back quickly, your still have some time to salvage something down 8 instead of down 9 where the game is lost
Me and my brother were talking about this the other day, but with the amount of amazing players that go undrafted or super later in the draft, you'd think that at some point some front office would say "maybe we aren't analyzing these players correctly." Despite it working in baseball, it seems like the idea that analytics can help a team win or players succeed is still seen as nerdy/unnecessary by a lot of people in football front offices.
I think it’s important to dig a bit further into the observed 49% 2 point conversion success rate over the past 2 years. Given the short yardage involved, there could easily be situations where certain offensive/defensive line matchups result in a 70% conversion rate, and other matchups result in a 30% conversion rate. The bottom 20% of offensive lines and/or the top 20% of defensive lines could easily result in conversion rates well below the 38% threshold needed to make this strategy viable.
Heres the thing, these analytics are based off teams not going for two. If every team were to go for two, im sure the analytics would reverse and say go for 1.
The problem with this strategy is thst it doesn't exist in a vacuum. Of the players on the field don't believe in the strategy, missing the 2p conversion on the first touchdown can affect the team's confidence and ability to successfully score the second touchdown. Now that it's more acceptable, I'd imagine it would continue to be done and for players to buy in.
This is fascinating. The optimal strategy sitting in plain daylight for decades and only now is it obvious. Another intangible worth considering in the favor of strategy 3 is the reduced lack of pressure to complete the two point conversion after the first scored touchdown. You’re a long shot to win the game as it is and the defense is likely to play looser to avoid a stupid penalty. Speaking of penalties, I think refs are more likely to call something like a pass interference when a team is down two scores. They’d be more hesitant to make a consequential call like that when a two point conversion can actually win the game.
Very nice explanation. What's underappreciated is, if the team does Strategy 1 and loses, it's "bad luck". If they do Strategy 3 and lose, it's because "the coach is an idiot". It's like penalty kicks in soccer. Even if the analytics show that the most effective move is to kick it straight at the middle of the goal because the goalie is almost always going to guess left or right, few people do this because you look like an idiot if the goalie doesn't move.
There's a (very succeful) HS in Arkansas that won't punt, kick a FG and will always go for two. Their idea is that they put more pressure on the opponents and they can make training more efficient as they don't have to bother with special teams. BTW they also never return punts (again minimal gains for specific training) and always onside kick (makes sense statistically, it doesn't require much training for kicking team but lots for the receiving one)
@@iec7587 he crunched the numbers and it made sense definitely for HS where there is less time to practice and its easier to score and make big plays. Also, punters are quite bad at that level. He moved on to a horrible college but things didn't work out and now he's back in AR. The team changed coach but kept the philosophy and they've been regularly putting up big numbers every week
And all that probability goes out the door because of a bonehead play. i.e taunting, false start, or bad officiating. But the gist of the video is spot on.
One thing I’m surprised not covered here: if a team converts after first TD, the gap drops to 6 points. That means that if they get the ball at 4th down at say 35 yard line with 2:30 to go, they can kick a field goal and fight for another FG with seconds left on the clock versus the bigger risk of not making the 4th down. This would take the game to overtime, but it’s better than being forced to score a TD in the 2nd possession.
I highly doubt this makes much of a difference at all Down 6 vs down 7 coaches should be trying as hard as possible to score just a field goal assuming time is running out which puts there win probability close to 100% as it’s a 2 score game. Although I guess we’re talking about coaches making sub optimal decisions so maybe it could be considered if you know the other coach likes to be conservative and attempts to run time vs scoring
I’m a little confused as to the terminology of the strategy. It’s a strategy for when you’re down by 14, but a lot of the examples shown at the beginning are of teams down by 8. Going for two when down by 8 should be basic tactics. Are these situations where they went for two on the first touchdown and failed, forcing them to go for 2 again? I think it would have been better to show them lining up to go for 2 when they’re down by 14, not when they’re down by 8.
I’ve known this for years. And have talked about it. No one listened. Glad to see NFL coaches coming around to this obvious idea. Here’s another thought … From an analytics standpoint, there is an argument to be made that teams should ALWAYS go for two. If the NFL average of success when going for two is .49, then, over the course of 100 TD, expected production is 98 points. Otoh, if the conversion rate of a point after attempt is .94, then only 94 points are produced. As we can plainly see, from this standpoint alone, teams should go for two, even in the first quarter, ahead by only six. Or regardless of the score, in fact. It’s the same idea as three point FG attempts in basketball. If a team can shoot 35% from behind the arc, they score 105 points in 100 attempts, which is more than the 100 produced by shooting 50% attempting 100 2-pointers. The difference, of course, is that analytics only applies when odds assert themselves. And odds only assert themselves over a large sample size. In basketball, a team will make dozens of attempts a game, and hundreds over the course of a season, thus making the (lower percentage, but higher reward) 3-point attempt a viable strategy even in the first quarter. Particularly if you have good long range shooters and employ strategies for said shooters to get good looks. In football, otoh, a team, depending on the quality of their offense, would expect to score only 30-80 TDs in an entire season. The numbers will vary from team to team, but, certainly scoring 100 TDs in a season is not very likely. When we reduce that to a single game, a team may typically score only 3-5 TDs a game (if they’re good) or even only a single TD (or zero, but then the point is entirely moot) As such, relying on analytics in the first quarter of a game is dicey. Particularly if you are a defense minded team. But what if a team were to up their odds? What if, through practice, execution, and strategy, a team were increase their 2 pt conversion rate to 55%? That would produce 110 points. Comparing this to the 94, then this strategy is particularly worthwhile. However, if a specific offense were to accomplish this, then employ this strategy, opposing defenses, upon reading the scouting report, would specifically prepare for such offenses, likely bringing the conversion rate back down. Thus defeating the purpose of designing an offense for such a strategy. What to do? What to do? One option, currently obsolete, is the surprise two point attempt. If the XP attempt was spotted at the two yard line, as it was some years ago, then teams could run trick plays. If trick plays worked over 50% of the time, and were used judiciously, this would be a viable strategy. Additionally, it would keep opposing defenses/special teams “on their toes”. This would be an advantage, presumably. Under current rules, with XP spot is 15 yard line, this is not a possibility. This could be remedied by spotting the XP attempt at the 12, and declaring the ten yard line the goal line for purposes of the two point attempt. But, we all know the NFL will never do this. Which is a damn shame, because the surprise two pointer is, or rather, was, one of the most exciting plays in football. But the NFL, in it’s infinite wisdom, keeps making new rules that only serve to make the game less exciting. The new kickoff, and thus, the elimination of the surprise onside kick, being the latest such atrocity. But I digress … Under current rules, use of such a strategy becomes contextual and situational. A powerful offense that scores a lot of TDs (larger sample size) and has an exceptional short yardage game (higher success rate) might consider employing this tactic. Certainly such an offense that scores a TD on their opening drive might find it advantageous to attempt to seize an 8-0 lead right away, knowing that there would be ample time, and likely future opportunity, to try again later in the game in case of failure. The advantage of success, of course, would be to apply additional pressure on their opponent. Aggressive coaches might decide that a 55% chance of doing so would be worth the risk. But what about mid game? 2nd & 3rd quarter? Again, situational. Down by 11 near the end of the first half, a sucessful 2 minute drill results in a deficit of five. Go for two to draw to within a field goal? Down by four in the 3rd, get six to go up by two? Is it worth the risk to take a four point lead and stay ahead if your opponent scores a fourth quarter field goal? The possibilities are endless. Certainly the father you are behind, the more risk you can take to get back in the game. Down by 21 in the 2nd quarter. Get six, be down 15, and try and cut it to 13, knowing that you have to score twice more (at least) anyway. And if you cut it to 13, and they get a FG, you are still within 16, and thus a two possession game. Go for two more aggressively throughout the game? Risky, but food for thought.
Hack Hunter, Extremely long comment. If you find this interesting. Feel free to run with it by making a video on the subject. If you do, I’d appreciate a shout out.
To me this is at a minimum like going for an offsides kick: If you're in a situation where offsides is even in the conversation (which is often the case when down by 8+ with
For people knitpicking that the 49% average is situational (team dependent) note that if we assume a 94% extra point completion rate, the threshold for the 2 pt conversion is only 34%. If 49% is average, only trash teams are below 34%. But if you are a trash team, can you really assume 50% chance of winning OT? If you only assume a 40% win rate in OT, the threshold drops to 28%. I can only see strategy 1 being better in the case of a game between teams with a excellent defense and bad offense and the team that is behind is also better at long ball than short ball. Then perhaps they have a chance in OT but are far below average at 2 pt conversion. Seems like a scenario worth considering, but the vast majority of the time strategy 3 is considerably better.
If I can be a contrarian for a moment, I have a bit of a problem with the assumption of a 50% chance of winning in overtime, since it implies a coin-flip chance. Sure, teams overall are .500 in OT, but since 2017 (when the new OT rules took hold) only 18 of 104 regular-season games ended with an opening drive TD. There is an opportunity to deploy strategy in overtime on both sides of the ball.
That video, your video, is amazing! With all due respect, I see one slight flaw in the video. "The 40% wins left on the table." If the coach thinks that his team's odds of making the 2-point conversion are less than 38 %, then kicking the extra points is correct. I have an undergraduate degree in Mathematics. When it comes to Applied Mathematics and Statistics, I would rather have a root cannel. Strangely enough, one of our five daughters is a Fellow of the American Society Actuaries. No lie, a full Fellow! I need to lay down, my brain is starting to hurt. Thank you for your thoroughness. May you and yours stay well and prosper.
It also depends very much on what the offensive team is very good at doing and what the defensive team is very good at doing. Those variables throw a twist into every situation, and history doesn't matter when every year, every team is different.
exactly!!! too many variables need to be analyzed.... and they need to be specific to each team. unfortunately each team changes far too frequently.... you could analyze by head coaches but only the good ones last long enough to build data from. this would bias the data. if mike tomlin is my coach? i am going for 2 when the analytics call for it. if it is dan quinn? i am kicking the extra point.
I will say that the NFL only instituted the two point conversion in 1994. In addition, the existence of overtime in the NFL only occurred in 1974, and ties before that were both more common and didn't count towards tiebreakers and things like that. I understand it did take some time, but its more like the change towards shooting more 3 pointers than the change towards 3 outcomes hitters in the MLB. The MLB rules didn't change, people just needed to do math. NFL and NBA did have changes that changed their calculus.
The difference is that the extra point is basically a free point, a gimme, a lay up, hardly any effort needed. A 2 pt conversion takes effort, even possibly one of the best offensive play calls in the playbook. Also, missing on a 2 pt conversion gives the defense a bit of a momentum shift.
My issue with this is it doesn’t take into account time left in the game, who you are playing against, and other factors. I firmly believe that coaches would call the game differently if they’re tied or down by one. Being down by 1 forces you to go for broke and at least kick a field goal. You got 4 downs and you have to be aggressive. A good offense will typically have the ability to get in field goal range and possibly win the game. If a team is tied they’re not as inclined to play aggressively and risk a turnover. I love the analysis, but I think it’s way too cut and dry when football is never cut and dry
Sorry about the bad audio quality. This was my first video posted and is definitely far from perfect, but I'll always try to keep improving and I promise the audio improves in future videos. Regardless, I never thought my first video would get this much attention, so thank you all for the crazy amount of support
Video was good enough to watch even with the awful audio. Keep up the good work
my left ear really loved this video good work
Thought it was my headphones
world's most panned audio frfr
UA-cam could and probably should add "mix to mono" as an option next to "stable volume".
The video’s audio went wide left.
@@mal2ksc and an option to change the sync on the audio while they're at it
Coaches leave wins on the table because they will get fired by people who reason with their gut instead of using probability.
Yes, and the fans are even worse.
Never forget to account for the stupid.
@@lucasmembrane4763 Don't forget talking heads on these sports networks.
This was the reason Phil Galfond suggested for why coaches are weary of going for the 2 point conversion in his video on the topic.
It's finally viewed as the smartest move so everyone does it. you win alot less games if they replace you, and if you lose the game and it looks like its your fault then you risk getting the boot. It was all about risk aversion. Which is why the NFL is a copy cat league, partly.
I tried many times to explain this as a HS coach to the other staff and it just fell on deaf ears. One of the reasons I am no longer coaching.
Probably even better for many HS teams, where PAT kicks are less consistent than high levels.
I hope you were able to pick up the pieces after you were fired. What type coach were you?
What field did you end up in? All the best.
@@MovieMakingMan I quit and play poker full time now haha. That experience helped me realize people are just going to do what they are comfortable with despite hard evidence there are better ways. Thought why fight it? Just play a game where you can make the most of it,
@@alexleach4002 That’s quite the career change. You must be a great player to do it professionally. Do you tend to play the same group of people a lot of the time?
@@alexleach4002 going from that to playing poker professionally is funny as fuck
There is one scenario that further increases the odds. If you convert on the first attempt, you have the option to kick two field goals should your next drive stall short of the goal line - which increases your odds of tying the game.
Came to comment this
Another Szenario would be to make a one point safety at the first conversion try!
If you’re already late in the game when you’re down 14, you can’t build a strategy around getting a third possession.
@@SonnyBubba The strategy is based on scoring two touchdowns, but 3-possession is an extra possibility that only exists in this scenario.
@@SonnyBubbayour odds of converting whatever 4th down and trying to score a touchdown are probably better than getting a third possession if it's late game. But that's just my gut LOL
The NFL making the extra point longer a few years ago is what prompted the popularization of this strategy. Missed extra points, while still not the norm, are much more common than they used to be, thus making the "kick twice" strategy much less of a sure bet than it was before.
the effect is multiplied if ur kicker is going thru a slump. NFL Kickers are capable of missing back to back xtra points if they are feeling bad.
Plus the changes in the OT rules after the Bills/Chiefs 2022 Divisional Round Game. Now that both teams are guaranteed 1 possession in OT, the limiting factor is how good is your defense? If it's dogshit, go for two and avoid the eventual OT loss if both possessions result in a TD.
Yeah, bringing the conversion rate from the mid 90's down to the high 80's for XP kicks made going for two a much more attractive proposition from an analytic standpoint, just as the league intended.
Agreed. I'd like to know what that breakeven point is based on the true XP success rate of 94%, but I'm too lazy to calculate it.
@@D2theLEO .94 * .94 *.5 gives you .4418 chance of making both kicks and winning in OT, which means strategy 3 beats it if you make more than .33 of your 2 pointers
Wait. 2 point conversions have a 49% chance of succeeding? Thats way better than I thought.
I forgot where but the average nfl play goes for something like 2.5ish yards per play
Edit
I might be wrong but the worst offense team by total yards in 2023 was the Carolina Panthers at 4510 yards or 265.29 yards per game. NFL team usually play 60ish plays on offense per game and that using that and the Panthers data for 2023 equals 4.42 yards per snap.
Of course anything might happen on any particular play and some say it's easier to play defense at the goal line. So 49 percent seems logical to me
@@Michael-sb8jf The average play went for 5.3 yards last season. This has been measured since 1932 and the lowest it ever got was 3.6 y/p in 1935. It has literally never been close to 2.5ish yards per play. It hasn't even dipped below 5 y/p in 30 years.
@@Michael-sb8jfIs that applicable at the 2 yard mark?
@@DoubleTTB22you can’t just lump all plays together like that though. Down, distance, game clock, and obviously field position are all significant factors that go into the yards gained on a play and how difficult it was to get them.
@@osrsfl618 He (DoubleTT) replied to him (Michael) just about average play.
For those wondering the exact value of 0.382 is (3-√5)/2
little golden ratio in there
Not really @@alexleach4002
John urschel (ex NFL lineman now full time mathematician) does a good short demonstration of this fact. It's really just some simple algebra and solving quadratic formulas
duh
@@alexleach4002 Where is the golden ratio there?
@@johncharles2357 that number is 2-phi. Or phi^-2. or you can think of it as the b part of a line segment a+b where a is to b as a+b is to a.
I've seen a *lot* of discussion of this tactic over the years and I find it rare that someone writing a piece like this actually describes an aspect that helps explain why this strategy works. To be clear, the probabilities described in the video are correct, but intuitively, it can be difficult to get past "if the deuce is a coin flip and worth about 1 point as a result, how are you actually gaining an advantage by going for 2 the first time?"
The answer is that this strategy changes the chances of different outcomes compared to the "kick twice" strategy. Let's assume that the kick is 100% and the deuce is 50% just to make the math easier. Long story short, if you "kick twice," you are going to score 14 points 100% of the time. If you "kick first, deuce second," you are going to score 13 points 50% of the time and 15 points 50% of the time. If you use the video's strategy "deuce first, decide second", you're going to score 15 points 50% of the time, 14 points 25% of the time, and *12* points 25% of the time.
The key is that "14 points 25% of the time, 12 points 25% of the time" part. That's the difference between "kick first, deuce second" and "deuce first, react second." You run the risk of scoring only *12* points, which neither of the other strategies risks. But big deal!!! Scoring 12 and scoring 13 are functionally equivalent in this situation. So "deuce first, decide second" converts some of the losses from "kick first, deuce second" into *ties*, giving you a chance to win in overtime.
Essentially, what you risk is "we'll sometimes score only 12 points from the two touchdowns"...but 12 points is the same as scoring 13 in this scenario because you lose the game either way. But what you *gain* is "we'll score 15 points (to win) or 14 points (to tie)" more frequently, and *that's* how this strategy increases your chances of winning. It's "win a few more games" in exchange for "a few of the games that we *do* lose will be lost by a greater margin, but we will lose fewer such games."
thanks for the clear explanation
So in essense, deuce works at its best after a kick, as the chances of an undesirable result is 50/50, whereas deuce and deuce risks 50/25/25... and its potential gain outweighs the potential loss.
50/50 > 50/25/25
@@kyperactivewhat kind of troll is this? That is literally not at all what the entire video or this comment said
@@krazzed3243 ?
This isnt a troll though?
This is based on my understanding, you can feel free to correct me on this. Unlike with a divorce, my reasoning can be fixed if you were communicative instead of reactionary.
@kyperactive sorry I kind of immediately assumed it was a troll cause we're on the internet and too many people these days troll for reactions.
Let's go through the issue: given this 50/50 for extra points then deuce you have a 50% chance to win and 50% chance to lose. The other strategy (strategy 3: 50, 25, 25) the 50% is still a straight win like the kick first strategy. The middle 25% is a tie which goes to OT. Supposing both teams are equally likely to win overtime this means you win half of that 25% of the time where you tied at end of regulation. This means you win 12.5% of the time there. You still lose 25% of the time (didn't make either 2 point conversion) but the other 12.5 + 25% only amounts to you losing 37.5% of the time and winning 62.5% of the time which is better than the kick first strategy.
So deuce first strategy with option to kick second if first made or do a second deuce attempt if first failed strictly dominates kick first. So 50/25/25 > 50/50
This one barely counts as analytics and almost qualifies as basic math, which makes it even more disappointing that it took so long to be accepted.
This doesn't even compare to the inability of the NBA to recognize the value of the 3 point line. It's genuinely concerning how long that one took to figure out, especially considering just how much money was on the line.
Au contraire, mon ami. The presenter has shown how the focused use of even basic probability rules can result in profound insights.
For a league so _heavily_ focused on stats (even including a bunch of useless ones), it's odd that for 20 years they were ignoring best play dictated by high school math.
In 1969 Texas went for two down 14-6 in the 4th quarter to Arkansas. So I guess coaches have known rarely using this for a long time.
There was no OT at the time, so not quite the same. But still similar. (just that the odds of OT are "odds of tie")
The problem was always owners being too risk averse, and not giving any leeway to the coach when it didn't work. It doesn't matter that what you're doing is correct if the guy cutting your check gets scared of blowback from fans and won't hesitate to make you the scapegoat when it goes wrong, which it does about 25% of the time.
Game of the Century!
I’m pretty sure I saw somewhere that it was agreed upon by both coaches ahead of the game that they would avoid a tie because the game was so big, so that’s why he went for 2 I’m pretty sure
@@NashRespectyeah, I came here to say the same. No overtime back then in college football (which is the only variant of football that had 2-point conversions at the time)
I think the simplest way to explain this is in terms of coin flips. Assuming that extra points are guaranteed and both OT and 2-point conversions are around 50/50, it comes down to, would you rather have:
Heads: Win
Tails: Lose
OR
Heads: Win
Tails: Flip another coin - Heads: OT, Tails: Lose
This is a good way of explaining it, I think I would take it a step further -
Heads: Win
Tails: Lose
OR
Heads: Win
Tails: Flip two more coins. If both are heads, win. If either are tails, lose.
If what you say is true and 2-point converts are successful 49% of the time while 1-point converts are successful 94% of the time, then it also follows that 2-point converts should be used in almost all situations all game long, barring specific point differentials late in the game.
This is where the dispersion might start playing effect: there are might not to be enough opportunities for the 2-point attempts to be viable
In the provided scenario it works because we have a very specific scenario: scoring exactly 2 touchdowns before the end of the game and 14 point deficit.
Not necessarily as the 7th point will often be more important to obtain than the right point (as 2 field goals reaches 6 points)
7-ish years ago they had precisely this in mind when they moved the 1-pt conversion back from the 2yd line. They moved it far enough back that the probability of it succeeding was about 2x the probability of 2-pt conversions succeeding.
The statisticians have been saying that coaches should be going for 2 more often. And also going for it on 4th and short more often as well. Different analysts have different recommendations. Pretty much all of them advocate being more aggressive but some actually do advocate going for it all the time barring specific point differentials as you say. Especially below the NFL level where defenses are much more easily exploited.
Yes, you are correct. However, it's still pretty much a wash in most situations, and it's fair to argue that you create a lot of game tape for your opponents to study if you're going for 2 all of the time.
It also increases the variance in your outcomes, which is generally *good* if you're a bad team (you're more likely to steal a win here and there than you are to blow a game using this strategy because you're already losing most of your games to begin with) and *bad* if you're a good team (the exact opposite of the scenario I just described.)
A coach may have his reasons for not doing this. In the 1980s, Tom Landry took a lot of heat in one game for not trying for a game-winning field goal when that seemed the obvious play. After losing the game and misspeaking about the decision in a press conference, some people were calling for his job, saying he was clearly washed up. But in fact, the kicker had been sketchy throughout the game, so even though the field goal attempt seemed obvious, Landry simply didn't trust his kicker to get the job done.
Analytics is a tool, not an answer for every situation.
Analytics can decide if you should trust the kicker in that situation
The only problem I can see here is that using historical 2 point conversion data will be biased as teams only went for the 2 point conversions when they really felt they could get it due to their match ups. So the 49% is high but if everyone start to just go for 2 point conversions now that number of 49% will surely decrease.
Last year teams run 209 plays from the opponent 2 yards line. They scored 88 TDs. That's gives us a 42% success rate.
And this isn't even a favorabke example because within those 209 plays there were FG taken, knees taken, and plays that were at the 2 but weren't goal to go so the team just played to get a first down and then tried to score from inside the 2.
@@ХорхеГарсия-э5е that leaves us definitely neither here nor there 😂
@@christoduplessis8177
It's higher than the ~39% success rate that should be the cutoff for this strategy being superior than just kicking the XP, so if anything is demonstrative that going for 2 should be the way to go, even if just by a slim margin.
@@ХорхеГарсия-э5е just for interest sake, how did you get the 39%? Real question...
That one highschool coach who coached like it was madden (always go for it on 4th down, always onside kick, always go for 2) screaming i told you so
He coaches at the D1 level now
Extra points are one thing but it drives me crazy when people start pretending like 4th downs are simple math. There are so many variables in 4th downs
It’s math. People don’t like to hear it, but sports is math. There’s a reason why it’s something like 1% of players on sports betting sites win the majority of the money. It’s because those are the guys using math to smoke the people playing on intuition
It's math. I have only punted once in 3 years, and that because we were inside our own 20 with a 4th and 31 because of multiple penalties and fumble and a big sack.
@@panzermk8 its math but it doesnt take into account every variable. you still have to apply it properly.
@@panzermk8 LMAO
I was just thinking about this. I also think teams should go for two if they are the first team to score with a touchdown. If they fail, the losing team is still 2 field goals away. If they succeed, the other team is now in a much riskier spot.
Agreed
It sounds good on paper, but the XP that early is better. Because if you whiff on the 2 you get beat on one TD if it hits for 7. Then a FG on the rebound means an FG returned kills you instead of OT.
It's better to take the one. In college you might do this if you are an underdog, but at the pro level, especially in playoff games, the XP is the better play.
And, yes, it's obviously a better move if it works.
@@jessyfretz5800 do you play madden?
You seem to be ignoring the XP being moved back to the 15. That move is what incentivized the change.
Yes, that’s very important too. I wonder what the XP percentage was back when it was from the 3 yard line.
Doesn't even seem like it's fancy analytics, it's just basic math and risk management.
I mean the teams that are not going for it might have a lower than 38% conversion rate since that’s just the league average. So statistically might be right approach to not go for it for them specifically
Good stuff. My only critique would be on the way you explained the maths behind the different strategies.
None of it is wrong, btw, but I think a visual representation (decision tree, flowchart, etc.) is more effective when breaking down probabilities to a general audience that might not be familiar with this stuff.
Anyways- Sports stats nerds like us seem to be entering into a golden age so I’m always stoked to see new content around it! Subbed.
These analytics are missing a bunch of other analytics that would affect the decision to go for 2. Situational football matters and the old school style is still applicable along with analytics. Momentum and each teams probability of scoring touchdowns in OT matter. If you score two TDs in a row and hold them to none, it becomes more than just go for 2. Did the other team make big mistakes leading to the TDs or did you figure out the scheme. This is why 40% are still “leaving it on the table”
Over a decade ago, I argued exactly this with my uncle for almost an hour before finally convincing him. I give him credit for genuinely trying to understand, but it's amazing how people's intuition and "risk avoidance" blinds them to a strategy that (excepting extreme lack of confidence in your team to convert a 2) is just superior.
Great vid! Just curious about the 1967 paper - the 2 pt conversion was implemented in 1994 in the NFL so I’m wondering what the basis for that paper even was?
Not sure if it got mentioned or not in the video, but teams have actually known this for a long time now. Coaches were just never brave enough to do it because if it failed they would likely lose their jobs.
He specifically mentions how long teams have known this
Love the video. This also applies when down 4 after scoring a late TD too, right?
Do you have the stats for the games where coaches opted to go for it/not go for it given these narrow parameters?? I'd love to know the breakdown on if it's better in theory or in practice.
‘60% is much higher than the 0% in it was….’
This guy maths :)
Good topic and video. As others said, good to sort audio out. And then improve graphics a bit for retention. Good stuff.
since this is predicated on the other team not scoring, i think another thing to keep in mind with that is the mental difference of a 6 point lead vs a 7 point lead. if you get the 2 point conversion, it puts more pressure on the opposing team to get atleast a field goal when they have the ball, vs a 7 (or 8) point lead allows them to be conservative and try to maximize time they chew off the clock. good video though!
Are you using the probability of 2pt conversions overall or probability of 2pt conversions when under X min in 4th quarter? Wondering the stats as teams get closer and closer to the end of game.
Nice video, I'd be interested in seeing how the actual win probability lines up with the actual results.
I don’t know if you’re using a scarlet or a volt audio interface, but you have to change your recording set up to mono. The recording is looking for audio information from the right side, but there is no input so you can just connect them both together.
I was thinking this exactly during the game this weekend. Announcers had no clue
There’s also kind of a psychological advantage to go for 2 if you’re down by 14. To WIN THE GAME in regulation (paging Herm Edwards), you’re going to have to make a two point conversion at some point. If you kick the extra point on the first TD, now you’ve got a much more daunting decision to make after the second TD. Kick the PAT and take your chances in overtime, OR you can try to go for two and win it, but it’s an awfully hollow feeling if you don’t make it and lose (open to a TON of second guessing by fans, media, and maybe even your own players). But if you go for two after the first TD and make it, now it’s an easy call after the second one to send the kicker out there to win the game (or possibly be the goat if he misses the kick and you end up losing in OT). If you miss that first two pointer, you’ll still have a chance to get it after the second TD and force OT (and if you lose after that, not nearly as many people will be going back to the first TD to rake you over the coals for going for two there)
In defense of coaches of old, the probability of making a two point try was thought to be 0.33, which is lower than the threshold of 0.38.
not sure how far back you're talking about but the odds of an extra point back then was probably much lower also.
@@Sashinator0 It is fun to watch videos from back when kickers were straight on style. Far more missed extra points, fewer long field goals.
I'm not saying you're wrong, but the probability could have been calculated. You don't need to guess that it's 33%-you can just crunch the numbers.
The numbers for 2-pt conversion success rate only go up if you couple it with burgeoning 4th down philosophies; if coaches opt for offensive plays on 4th down rather than punting, then you only need to average 2.5 yards per play to make the requisite 10 yards for a first down. The NFL 2-pt attempt starts from the 2-yard line, so if one's entire offense is geared around getting 2.5 yards then you have basically your entire playbook at your disposal for the goalline attempt as opposed to historically niche schemes reserved specifically for the 2-pt attempt.
I see what you mean. Run-heavy teams like the Marshawn Lynch Seahawks or the Derrick Henry Titans are likely more capable of getting 2.5 years than a team like the Dolphins, who prefer chunk plays and stretching the field over the classic "3 yards and a cloud of dust".
I would say that even if a team isn't geared toward analytics and just runs the ball a lot, they're probably still quite good at getting 2.5 yards.
I think this is counteracted by the fact that defense doesn't have to protect against big plays and can focus on just preventing the 2 yards. The odds are probably worse.
@@BigBo-Peep Exactly. NFL defenses, for one play at their own two-yard line, are much more effective than anywhere else or any other time on the field. The field of play is much smaller and the task of making a stop is simplified. This is a common example of not considering the changing dynamics and current game situation when making blanket statements about the outcome.
If every team adopted this strategy the number of successful conversions would definitely trend downward. Teams that go for 2 now are more confident, probably because they're better in the redzone already, and the more teams do it the more defenses will adapt to them, there will be a lot more film to analyze. I'd like to see how the probability changes if every team defaulted to doing it.
that's a good point, and i would imagine that two point conversions would be practiced a lot more than they already are. something to note though is that the lower bound on a team's 2 pt conversion rate is ~27% (27% of plays at the opponent's 2 yd line result in a touchdown in any situation, and this includes 1-3rd down plays where the team isn't doing their all to score)
Will two point conversions become harder as defensive special teams unit see them more and prepare for them more closely?
My left ear didn't enjoy this
You had your earbuds in backward then
@@sorin_markov :(
Does this mean your right ear really enjoyed this?
What’s the *observed* winrate of the teams who attempted this strategy?
I trust that the math is correct, but obviously it oversimplifies a lot of variables (like the opposing team behaving differently after a 2pt attempt).
It would mean a lot if the observed numbers confirm the suggested strategy’s being superior.
I'm glad to see someone finally explain the reasoning behind why teams have been doing this. I think avoiding overtime if possible is another reason to do this considering how broken the NFL overtime rules are. I'd rather lose on my terms going for two point conversions than lose because of an overtime coin toss
Quick question; why did you do some of the text in manim (like the animation at 3:37), but then do the plot at 4:46 in Desmos?
The issue with analytics is all the confounders... confounding variables... how good and balanced is your offense, and also how much momentum does your offense have? Have you recently been able to effectively both run and pass against this opponent, on this drive or otherwise? Who is your quarterback and how good is he scrambling and using his legs? Any relevant injuries on either side? Also, how much time is left on the clock and how many timeouts do you have to use on defense? An offense will, traditionally, be more conservative with the ball up 7 (or especially 8) than up 4, 5, or 6... (and also more conservative with the ball up 3 than up only 1 or 2). While aggressive teams now often go for a win-or-lose 2 point conversion at the end of games being down 7 and scoring the TD, there's still value in going for 1 at that point, particularly if you have reasonable confidence in your defense and kicker. If you're a team that struggles in short yardage offense like the Chicago Bears you're probably still better off going for one.
Great video man! I always love to see a team go for two at the right time, just makes so much sense in so many cases.
Does the ability, % wise, of the team’s ability to score on short yardage figure into this computation? I have seen a lot of teams that could march up and down the field all day, but get inside the TEN and it was three failures and a FG attempt.
Interesting video. I’m wondering of the teams who deployed option 3 in 2023 how many went on to actually win the game?
Manim & Desmos used on a sports video? This is a math/P.E. teacher's dream come true!
Dont go for 2!
Yours truly,
An Iowa fan
I've thought this way for quite a while, but one assumption that I think needs to be challenged before the argument is water-tight is whether or not teams truly do have a 50% change of winning in overtime. Intuitively, let's say team A scores 14 points in the first quarter, and then their offense is completely flat the rest of the game. Team B starts off not having any competency on offense, but picks up steam in the fourth quarter and scores 14 quickly to tie up the game. Which team are you putting your money on to win in OT?
Let's introduce a variable a representing overtime win probability into the equations. The team following strategy 1 has a win probability of a, while the team following strategy 3 has a win probability of making 2pt + a(making 2pt) - a(making 2pt)^2. With this new variable, any team that is >66% confident of winning in overtime (and also is certain of making both extra points) should now prefer strategy 1, assuming the league average for 2 point conversion percentage.
So maybe this is an interesting statistic to track this upcoming NFL season - when teams do make the rare, late-game 14 point comeback, what are their chances of winning in overtime?
Maybe do a search in the literature to see if momentum is real lol.
I'm not sure, but I assume it's just pop psychology.
Avoiding overtime is also best for your team next week. The end of a close game is the likeliest time you’ll suffer an injury, so the decision can be best for both teams. This used to be frequently brought up with the old college football overtime rules, where alternating touchdowns would go on so long that eventually teams would go for 2 fearing injuries and a loss due to physical exhaustion.
Nice video. I hope everyone followed the math. Of course there are secondary factors involved, like how you're moving the ball in that game, against that team. And as more teams go for two, more teams will practice longer against it, perhaps changing the probabilities.
Same thing with Blackjack. Many people rather stand on a 16 against a dealer up card of 10 out of fear of going over 21 even though that it the best call in that situation. People fear messing up through an action more than messing up through inaction or less action. People will fail by not trying rather than trying and failing, especially when there are those that will criticize you for trying and failing rather than playing it "safe".
I've been ranting about teams not doing this for decades. Another related issue is when teams trail by 15 or 22; they tend to save the 2-point try for the last moment. Down 15, the only thing this does is delay the moment when they find out whether they need a third score or not (which may not matter, if you know you don't have time for a third score, but if you do, the sooner you know you need it, the better your chances). But down 22, if you fail the first time you can still potentially make it up by making the next two; if you wait, there's no recovery.
One trend I've been seeing that I *don't* like is going for 2 after scoring while up 1. Sure, if you make it, you've put the game beyond one score. But 1) the success rate tends to be just below 50%, which means you're slightly better off trying to stop their 2-point conversion than trying to make your own, and 2) whether the opponent is down 7 or down 9, now they know what they have to do and can play accordingly. If they're down 8, they don't know whether they will need another score after the touchdown; they will usually assume not, and therefore be in a worse position if they find out they need the second score with only a few seconds left than if they found out with several minutes to spare. Or they may try to leave time in case they do need a second score, and now you get a chance to answer after they tie it.
This has been driving me insane for years, and I was pumped to not only finally see it become the more common decision this last year, but actually see it result in a win (GB over NO). I believe the reason why it took so long to finally be used is the fact that it is hard to see success stories on so few samples - that is not because it is a bad strategy, but because the odds of winning when you are in this situation are pretty low to begin with. It's a strategy that probably increases win probability from like 22% to 23%.
That said, when the Bills converted against my Bengals last year, I was terrified. The Bengals had outplayed them all game, and the idea that the Bills could steal one was terrifying. This could have been another success story, but luckily for me the Bengals moved the chains.
It also happened in Titans-Dolphins last year. But there has not yet been an occurrence where the strategy directly resulted in a regulation loss.
@@thekingbarrelmaker7642 It will eventually. Hopefully it just happens after the strategy is more well known and accepted or the outrage will get some coach fired for making a good decision
Another thing i noticed is that teams who need a field goal and a touchdown to win opt to go for the td first over the field goal. And a lot of times theyll waste too much time trying to go for the td.
I think, as soon as youre in field goal range in the 4th quarter. You use all your downs to either throw tds or throw it away. Then kick it, if you havent gotten a td yet, even if its at the 6 minute mark of the 4th quarter.
I can see teams having a lot better probability if they prioritize the fg in that circumstance.
The issue with getting the FG first is that the other team can still make it a two possession game by getting a FG themselves.
By getting a TD, it nullifies the other team getting a FG since the game would still be a one possession game, which puts a ton of pressure on the opposing team to get a TD.
Some Coaches use the logic of “playing in a way I can defend in a job interview this off season” and that can end up holding them back from optimal play.
It’s the risk reward calls like this and 4th downs that make football so fun to enjoy.
I watch mostly college football so there may be some of that in my reasoning but I think there's also an aspect of knowing the type of players you have. In the NFL where everyone is a professional, this might not be an issue unless you have a bad team, but it could still matter. You may have a group of players that can totally understand this, and miss the first 2-point and not really be bothered, and that may change in the same group of guys game to game. They'll start the next drive where they left off and continue to fight. Another group of players might see that they are now pretty much still 2 scores down and potentially 3 scores down if they miss because going for a 2-point is just getting a touchdown again but you only have one play. Basically, when a coach is making an in game decision he can't JUST take analytics into account. You have a group of men who may or may not have confidence in that type of strategy, so that's where you may see some coaches opt for keeping it more of a status quo type of game.
The backing up of the extra point changed things. When there was zero chance of missing the extra point kicking it through made sense. When you bring in a 5-10% chance of missing one of the two XPs I think going for 2 down 8 is the way to go. But another thing to take into account is how good the 2pt plays you have dialed up are.
It’s not zero though. Don’t forget John Carney and the Saints
@@monkeyboyjonathan42 it's close to zero. Missing 1/200 is far different than missing 15/200
I like to explain this as playing to win rather than playing to not lose. Cool to see the whole breakdown of the situation!
Hey man. I loved the video. Great use of statistics and simplifying them for the sake easy understanding. This video made me think of why teams have a difficult time scoring at the 2 yard line on 2-point conversions. It seems like it'd be easier because of how close they are to the end-zone and how often a team typically makes 2 yard gains. Is it because of how much less space the defense has to cover? How much more difficult is it to gain yards at each yard line closer to the end-zone? If you are looking for video ideas, I think that might be worth while.
The reason why people are using the 2 point conversion more is because the extra point was moved to the 30 yard line. So the odds of getting a two-point conversion are better than an extra point as extra points have a better chance of being missed now. Especially if the defense gets a penalty that then puts the ball at the one yard line if you go for a two point conversion.
Side note for fantasy football, this could impact kickers and teams going for two. Which teams are more so likely to go for two and which teams are more so likely to still use a kicker for the extra point. Probably too small to ever account for anything but could be something that plays into min maxing scoring opportunities in fantasy football.
Also worth considering is, a few years ago the extra point kick was moved back, which reduces the chance of converting a 1-point extra point. Not a huge difference, but not negligible either.
If you’re down by 14 in any circumstance, it seems like a good strategy. If there’s more time on the clock, two field goal drives ties it. If not converting 1 of 2-point conversion attempts, still produces the 14 points
I finally have something to contribute to conversation once fall hits lol
I was just about to say that my team stinks too bad for this to work, then it was stated that your team has to be 39% successful at 2 pointers for the strategy to be positive. Bravo
Now let's just say, hypothetically, you're trailing in the Super Bowl 28-3 midway through the third quarter, and you score a TD to make it 28-9 but your kicker misses the extra point. Shortly after, in the beginning of the fourth quarter, you kick a field goal to cut it to 28-12 and need two TD's with two successful two point conversions to tie. What are your chances of winning the Super Bowl? Let's assume you have an elite QB and an elite HC who have both already won multiple championships together.
Some teams are better at making conversions, and some teams are better at defending against it. So, depending on your team and who you are playing against, it can make sense NOT to go for it.
Except probably no team is as good or bad as the 38% threshold required.
it still can be matchup based maybe the guy on the other sideline might be more aggressive with a 6 point lead compared to a 7 point lead. with new OT rules in playoffs gives an extra layer of thought as well
My biggest issue used to be the ignoring or analytics but like most things in life, people swing to the complete opposite side and now feel you have to trust the book with every scenario. I've always felt math can't tell you certain things that are happening on the field, so math alone shouldn't be used to tell me if I'm going or not.
You can also kick to field goals if you make 2 with strategy three.
Hopefully fans will start to understand this decision.
I hate the talk after an unsuccessful conversion like it was a bad decision or sth.
My favorite place for a 2pt conversion.
Down by 7 near the end of the first half and you get the ball to start the half. (0-7) You get a TD and 2PT to end the half (8-7)
You score in the second half and get the 2pt. (16-7)
Now even if the other team scores and gets the 2pt, (you've both scored 2 TDS) they are still down one score
When you added the chart showing increased usage of the strategy, I was hoping you were going to provide success rate for this strategy vs 7+7 strategy.
I want a similar analysis on a related but slightly different scenario: what to do when you're down _15_ instead of 14.
For years conventional wisdom has been kick the PAT to "make it a one score game". That's always driven me nuts because it's only a 1 score game if you assume you make the 2 point conversion later, and if you're assuming you're gonna make it. It doesn't matter when you do it. But if you _miss_, it's better to miss early so you have more time to react.
When down 15, I think you should always go for 2 after the first TD. I want to see the math to know if I'm right
Go for 2 in the first quarter and you will be down 13 instead of 14.
god yeah i hate that, if you miss the first 2pt you know what youre in for and have time go game plan. otherwise youre just banking on the percent chance to get the 2pt the second time around. idk why its normal to do the pat first!
Personally I say just go for 2 in pretty much every situation. The only time I wouldn't is if I'm up 8 before the PAT, since the much more likely 1 point try also makes it a 2-score game.
This is where aspects outside maths come into effect, honestly.
If you chop down 15 points deficit down to 2 points with no time left and 2pts conversion left to try, your squad might be hyped whereas the opponent will be very nervous, possibly changing the odds in your favour as opposed to doing it the mathematically better way. Whereas if your opponent is clutch in key moments, you go for the 2pts conversion early.
I don't like this. Kick the PAT, but still call plays with the urgency of you being down two scores. If u don't get the ball back quickly, your still have some time to salvage something down 8 instead of down 9 where the game is lost
Me and my brother were talking about this the other day, but with the amount of amazing players that go undrafted or super later in the draft, you'd think that at some point some front office would say "maybe we aren't analyzing these players correctly."
Despite it working in baseball, it seems like the idea that analytics can help a team win or players succeed is still seen as nerdy/unnecessary by a lot of people in football front offices.
I think it’s important to dig a bit further into the observed 49% 2 point conversion success rate over the past 2 years. Given the short yardage involved, there could easily be situations where certain offensive/defensive line matchups result in a 70% conversion rate, and other matchups result in a 30% conversion rate.
The bottom 20% of offensive lines and/or the top 20% of defensive lines could easily result in conversion rates well below the 38% threshold needed to make this strategy viable.
Heres the thing, these analytics are based off teams not going for two. If every team were to go for two, im sure the analytics would reverse and say go for 1.
Only if the 2 point conversion success rate drops below 38%
The problem with this strategy is thst it doesn't exist in a vacuum. Of the players on the field don't believe in the strategy, missing the 2p conversion on the first touchdown can affect the team's confidence and ability to successfully score the second touchdown.
Now that it's more acceptable, I'd imagine it would continue to be done and for players to buy in.
This is fascinating. The optimal strategy sitting in plain daylight for decades and only now is it obvious. Another intangible worth considering in the favor of strategy 3 is the reduced lack of pressure to complete the two point conversion after the first scored touchdown. You’re a long shot to win the game as it is and the defense is likely to play looser to avoid a stupid penalty. Speaking of penalties, I think refs are more likely to call something like a pass interference when a team is down two scores. They’d be more hesitant to make a consequential call like that when a two point conversion can actually win the game.
Very nice explanation. What's underappreciated is, if the team does Strategy 1 and loses, it's "bad luck". If they do Strategy 3 and lose, it's because "the coach is an idiot". It's like penalty kicks in soccer. Even if the analytics show that the most effective move is to kick it straight at the middle of the goal because the goalie is almost always going to guess left or right, few people do this because you look like an idiot if the goalie doesn't move.
There's a (very succeful) HS in Arkansas that won't punt, kick a FG and will always go for two. Their idea is that they put more pressure on the opponents and they can make training more efficient as they don't have to bother with special teams.
BTW they also never return punts (again minimal gains for specific training) and always onside kick (makes sense statistically, it doesn't require much training for kicking team but lots for the receiving one)
I first saw this on HBO Real Sports. If I remember correctly he is a math guy.
@@iec7587 he crunched the numbers and it made sense definitely for HS where there is less time to practice and its easier to score and make big plays. Also, punters are quite bad at that level. He moved on to a horrible college but things didn't work out and now he's back in AR. The team changed coach but kept the philosophy and they've been regularly putting up big numbers every week
And all that probability goes out the door because of a bonehead play. i.e taunting, false start, or bad officiating.
But the gist of the video is spot on.
One thing I’m surprised not covered here: if a team converts after first TD, the gap drops to 6 points. That means that if they get the ball at 4th down at say 35 yard line with 2:30 to go, they can kick a field goal and fight for another FG with seconds left on the clock versus the bigger risk of not making the 4th down. This would take the game to overtime, but it’s better than being forced to score a TD in the 2nd possession.
What needs to also be considered is that by converting the first two pointer the other team becomes more motivated to score on their drive
Not at all the other team is just gonna run the clock out if they get into scoring range the game will be out of time anyway
The other team wins with any score no matter what. They will always be highly incentivized to score again.
I highly doubt this makes much of a difference at all
Down 6 vs down 7 coaches should be trying as hard as possible to score just a field goal assuming time is running out which puts there win probability close to 100% as it’s a 2 score game.
Although I guess we’re talking about coaches making sub optimal decisions so maybe it could be considered if you know the other coach likes to be conservative and attempts to run time vs scoring
I’m a little confused as to the terminology of the strategy. It’s a strategy for when you’re down by 14, but a lot of the examples shown at the beginning are of teams down by 8. Going for two when down by 8 should be basic tactics. Are these situations where they went for two on the first touchdown and failed, forcing them to go for 2 again? I think it would have been better to show them lining up to go for 2 when they’re down by 14, not when they’re down by 8.
I’ve known this for years. And have talked about it. No one listened. Glad to see NFL coaches coming around to this obvious idea. Here’s another thought …
From an analytics standpoint, there is an argument to be made that teams should ALWAYS go for two. If the NFL average of success when going for two is .49, then, over the course of 100 TD, expected production is 98 points.
Otoh, if the conversion rate of a point after attempt is .94, then only 94 points are produced. As we can plainly see, from this standpoint alone, teams should go for two, even in the first quarter, ahead by only six. Or regardless of the score, in fact.
It’s the same idea as three point FG attempts in basketball. If a team can shoot 35% from behind the arc, they score 105 points in 100 attempts, which is more than the 100 produced by shooting 50% attempting 100 2-pointers.
The difference, of course, is that analytics only applies when odds assert themselves. And odds only assert themselves over a large sample size. In basketball, a team will make dozens of attempts a game, and hundreds over the course of a season, thus making the (lower percentage, but higher reward) 3-point attempt a viable strategy even in the first quarter. Particularly if you have good long range shooters and employ strategies for said shooters to get good looks.
In football, otoh, a team, depending on the quality of their offense, would expect to score only 30-80 TDs in an entire season. The numbers will vary from team to team, but, certainly scoring 100 TDs in a season is not very likely.
When we reduce that to a single game, a team may typically score only 3-5 TDs a game (if they’re good) or even only a single TD (or zero, but then the point is entirely moot)
As such, relying on analytics in the first quarter of a game is dicey. Particularly if you are a defense minded team.
But what if a team were to up their odds? What if, through practice, execution, and strategy, a team were increase their 2 pt conversion rate to 55%? That would produce 110 points. Comparing this to the 94, then this strategy is particularly worthwhile.
However, if a specific offense were to accomplish this, then employ this strategy, opposing defenses, upon reading the scouting report, would specifically prepare for such offenses, likely bringing the conversion rate back down. Thus defeating the purpose of designing an offense for such a strategy.
What to do? What to do?
One option, currently obsolete, is the surprise two point attempt. If the XP attempt was spotted at the two yard line, as it was some years ago, then teams could run trick plays. If trick plays worked over 50% of the time, and were used judiciously, this would be a viable strategy. Additionally, it would keep opposing defenses/special teams “on their toes”. This would be an advantage, presumably.
Under current rules, with XP spot is 15 yard line, this is not a possibility. This could be remedied by spotting the XP attempt at the 12, and declaring the ten yard line the goal line for purposes of the two point attempt. But, we all know the NFL will never do this.
Which is a damn shame, because the surprise two pointer is, or rather, was, one of the most exciting plays in football. But the NFL, in it’s infinite wisdom, keeps making new rules that only serve to make the game less exciting.
The new kickoff, and thus, the elimination of the surprise onside kick, being the latest such atrocity. But I digress …
Under current rules, use of such a strategy becomes contextual and situational. A powerful offense that scores a lot of TDs (larger sample size) and has an exceptional short yardage game (higher success rate) might consider employing this tactic.
Certainly such an offense that scores a TD on their opening drive might find it advantageous to attempt to seize an 8-0 lead right away, knowing that there would be ample time, and likely future opportunity, to try again later in the game in case of failure.
The advantage of success, of course, would be to apply additional pressure on their opponent. Aggressive coaches might decide that a 55% chance of doing so would be worth the risk.
But what about mid game? 2nd & 3rd quarter? Again, situational. Down by 11 near the end of the first half, a sucessful 2 minute drill results in a deficit of five. Go for two to draw to within a field goal?
Down by four in the 3rd, get six to go up by two? Is it worth the risk to take a four point lead and stay ahead if your opponent scores a fourth quarter field goal? The possibilities are endless.
Certainly the father you are behind, the more risk you can take to get back in the game. Down by 21 in the 2nd quarter. Get six, be down 15, and try and cut it to 13, knowing that you have to score twice more (at least) anyway. And if you cut it to 13, and they get a FG, you are still within 16, and thus a two possession game.
Go for two more aggressively throughout the game? Risky, but food for thought.
Hack Hunter,
Extremely long comment. If you find this interesting. Feel free to run with it by making a video on the subject.
If you do, I’d appreciate a shout out.
To me this is at a minimum like going for an offsides kick: If you're in a situation where offsides is even in the conversation (which is often the case when down by 8+ with
For people knitpicking that the 49% average is situational (team dependent) note that if we assume a 94% extra point completion rate, the threshold for the 2 pt conversion is only 34%. If 49% is average, only trash teams are below 34%. But if you are a trash team, can you really assume 50% chance of winning OT?
If you only assume a 40% win rate in OT, the threshold drops to 28%.
I can only see strategy 1 being better in the case of a game between teams with a excellent defense and bad offense and the team that is behind is also better at long ball than short ball. Then perhaps they have a chance in OT but are far below average at 2 pt conversion. Seems like a scenario worth considering, but the vast majority of the time strategy 3 is considerably better.
I remember a college team (Gators I think) stopped going for first down and just tried to score with big passes. It never caught on.
that might work in college since defense is garbage there, will never work in NFL thou.
If I can be a contrarian for a moment, I have a bit of a problem with the assumption of a 50% chance of winning in overtime, since it implies a coin-flip chance. Sure, teams overall are .500 in OT, but since 2017 (when the new OT rules took hold) only 18 of 104 regular-season games ended with an opening drive TD. There is an opportunity to deploy strategy in overtime on both sides of the ball.
Video on going for 2 uses only one headphone 😂good video
Well maybe the coach doesn't think they can make the point thst tome or higher chance to win in OT
That video, your video, is amazing! With all due respect, I see one slight flaw in the video. "The 40% wins left on the table." If the coach thinks that his team's odds of making the 2-point conversion are less than 38 %, then kicking the extra points is correct.
I have an undergraduate degree in Mathematics. When it comes to Applied Mathematics and Statistics, I would rather have a root cannel. Strangely enough, one of our five daughters is a Fellow of the American Society Actuaries. No lie, a full Fellow!
I need to lay down, my brain is starting to hurt.
Thank you for your thoroughness. May you and yours stay well and prosper.
It also depends very much on what the offensive team is very good at doing and what the defensive team is very good at doing. Those variables throw a twist into every situation, and history doesn't matter when every year, every team is different.
exactly!!! too many variables need to be analyzed.... and they need to be specific to each team. unfortunately each team changes far too frequently.... you could analyze by head coaches but only the good ones last long enough to build data from. this would bias the data. if mike tomlin is my coach? i am going for 2 when the analytics call for it. if it is dan quinn? i am kicking the extra point.
Welcome to analytics where real life doesn't count. Just theoretical B.S.
Really cool video. Thanks for walking us through the math
I will say that the NFL only instituted the two point conversion in 1994. In addition, the existence of overtime in the NFL only occurred in 1974, and ties before that were both more common and didn't count towards tiebreakers and things like that. I understand it did take some time, but its more like the change towards shooting more 3 pointers than the change towards 3 outcomes hitters in the MLB. The MLB rules didn't change, people just needed to do math. NFL and NBA did have changes that changed their calculus.
The difference is that the extra point is basically a free point, a gimme, a lay up, hardly any effort needed. A 2 pt conversion takes effort, even possibly one of the best offensive play calls in the playbook. Also, missing on a 2 pt conversion gives the defense a bit of a momentum shift.
My issue with this is it doesn’t take into account time left in the game, who you are playing against, and other factors. I firmly believe that coaches would call the game differently if they’re tied or down by one. Being down by 1 forces you to go for broke and at least kick a field goal. You got 4 downs and you have to be aggressive. A good offense will typically have the ability to get in field goal range and possibly win the game. If a team is tied they’re not as inclined to play aggressively and risk a turnover. I love the analysis, but I think it’s way too cut and dry when football is never cut and dry