And this is why Kant is so important, because we draw back to a priori forms of intuition, starting with space and time. We do not make truth, it is intuitively the same for all because of transcendental deduction. Then you fall to epistemic skepticism if you dismiss particularism. Your own argument is subject to skepticism as it has no foundation. You have no argument for existence without it, and have yet to define it AGAIN! So you have partially refuted yourself in rejecting particularism.
What put the unconscious energy in motion? How did it arrange to finely-tuned. Unmoved, eternal, unconscious energy doesn't make sense. This is Leibniz's point in the contingency argument.
Did you watch this video the whole way through? I directly respond on the reverse OA. Also in (Part 1) I argue the modal perfection argument which shows the negation of maximal greatness is an impossibility. As for the BB/BC, sure it's possible. But as of now there isn't enough evidence to support that theory, so I would have to conclude it's not the most rational inference. Plus, referring to Leibniz's argument from contingency it still lacks explanatory power for contingently existing things.
I'll admit I had some difficulty "getting" some of the philosophical stuff (why aren't we learning this in Sunday school?!?!?!) but I noticed you have much less dislikes even though you boldly said that denying God's existence is less rational than accepting it. Also, is Peter S. Williams trying to say with the Mozart thing that a piece of music, even though it isn't maximally great, can still exist in another world, even one with no Mozart?
So what exactly is he saying, then? I was able to get the gist of the ontological argument and how it proves that God is possible (while not necessarily proving His existence). What exactly did the Mozart piece scenario have to do with it?
Spencer Gage Simply that being lacking necessity in a music piece doesn't mean it is not a GMP for a being. A music piece's joy is not increased by an unrelated property.
The difference is Inwagen argues from logical possibility alone. The OA argues from metaphysical possibility from a posteriori arguments. How do I not make this clear (7:38 −9:06)? Also, as Hume said the only way to prove something a priori is to show that its negation is impossible, which actually happens in the case of the OA. Maydole's modal perfection argument does this, which is presented in my previous video.
I go over the free will defense in "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (Part 1)". Also there is no reason to think a non-sentient world is metaphysically coherent, other than just asserting, unlike a MGB. Furthermore, also in Part 1, I give the modal perfection argument which shows the negation of MG is impossible. So as Hume said, the only way to show something exists a priori is to show the negation is impossible, which the MPA does.
Yes, I've found this to be the case. When I've tried evangelizing with it, I'm dismissed as insane on the sole grounds that it's complicated. I'll agree that your ministry (channel) is extremely important for reaching the layperson. Keep it up.
The statement about the Ontological Argument only showing that belief in God is rational makes sense, but I wonder, if the existence of God can not be proved, is there also an argument that shows that the belief God doesn't exist is rational? I ask, because atheists typically argue against God by poking fun, which seems more emotional than rational.
There really is no rational argument for the non-existence of God. All such arguments when taken to their logical conclusion will ultimately reduce to absurdity. After all, for an argument to be made, one must assume the laws of logic. However, there is no reason to assume the laws of logic in a completely random universe.
Michael Kline That's a non sequitur. How does it follow from the claim _god does not exist_ that _no states of objects are determined by past states_. The universe is random if current events are not determined by past events, it is completely random if all states are not determined by past states. The universe is random because the states of particles are not wholly determined by past states, but it is not completely random not because of god, but because of states that are determined by past states. Examples of these states are confinement, wave function, etc.
There has to be a first cause in any chain of events. If there is no God, then that first cause must be random. Therefore, all events along that chain are also ultimately random as they have no reason for their occurence. The beginning of the universe would be the ultimate random event with everything else stemming from it. Like it or not, without God, the universe is random.
Which I provide, however, I am referring one of of Peter S William's arguments for a pessimistic inference. It is not the main one I rely on. I prefer the modal perfection argument or inferences from a posteriori arguments. I hope that clarifies.
To be a necessary being means to be eternal and unchanging. So a necessary being cannot be destroyed. Which means if a being was omnipotent it could not end the existence of the other necessary being, which would be logically coherent. So the only omnipotent being would have to be the only necessary being. They go hand in hand.
Very well laid out video, I especially appreciated the visual discussion on the fact that God is inherently out of the constraints of time we experience. The subsequent visual was extremely enlightening.
***** You are doing a great job with these videos. Would you be willing, though, for you to reupload this video with without the music being as loud as it is?
We are talking about the basic ontological properties, which all others can be put into. The argument is not suppose to go into a complicated detail as that would be pointless. Only the general basics are there. LOL, yes we do have a stalemate, I just take the logical high ground, since the argument is coherent and not refuted. Again, I don't care. I am interested in what is reasonable, not how one feels. As Anthony Flew says, "We must follow the argument where it leads."
There Is No Other Name On Heaven & Earth That U Can Get Salvation, EXCEPT IN THE NAME OF "JESUS".. "Without Jesus Blood No Man Can Enter Into Heaven.. Because He Is A Heavenly Almighty Who Came Into The Earth With Flesh & Blood, And Shed His Blood 4 Each & Every Human...
***** P1. If God exists and a universe exists then "God exists temporally" is temporally true. P2. If "God exists temporally" is temporally true then "God exists timelessly" is temporally false. P3. If "God exists timelessly" is temporally false then "God exists timelessly" is not eternally true. P4. If "God exists timelessly" is not eternally true then "God exists timelessly" is not timelessly true. P5. It is not the case that "God exists timelessly" is not timelessly true. C. Therefore, it is not the case that "God exists timelessly" is not eternally true. C1. Therefore, it is not the case that "God exists timelessly" is temporally false. C2. Therefore, it is not the case that "God exists temporally" is temporally true. C3. Therefore, it is not the case that God exists and the universe exists. P6. The universe exists. C4. Therefore, God does not exist. Here, "eternally true" should be read as "true in such a way that it is true without beginning and without end". Support: P1 accords to WLC's claims about God being temporal since the universe began. P2 accords with the fact that "God exists temporally" and "God exists timelessly" cannot be true simultaneously. P3. If "God exists timelessly" is temporally false (eg, at the moment) then its truthfulness cannot be without beginning and without end. P4. If its truthfulness is not without beginning and without end then its truthfulness cannot be timeless. P5. "God exists timelessly" can only be timelessly true because it can only be true of God in a reality where there is no universe and no time.
***** But he intervened in the universe. intervention requires information processing in the mind which requires time. If we can't conceive of atemporal thinking coherently then we have no basis for saying that it is epistemically (and therefore metaphysically) possible. So if God can think and intervenes, then he is necessary temporal. Thus the argument is valid. IN fact, God came down as Jesus and became temporal. So please do read the full argument.
Mclinkin94 From a timeless perspective that would all be actualized at once. I am not arguing to think of atemporal thinking . God doesn't need to think, His knowledge is perfect.
No problem, It simply relies on what the argument say. Even if you deny the full conclusion of the other arguments from natural theology you cannot discount the evidence leading to the possibilities of design. To get away from that you need to show a MGB cannot be the final explanation regardless, and that is all the MOA needs.
Yes, I am a molinist in once sense. But if I go out of metaphysics I hold to another view. I am planning a video in a few months that will refute the claim that there is no free will, but I do want to do a video some time in the future arguing for both positions. It has been about 3 years since I read those theodicies. I would have to refresh myself. I remember I thought they were ok but unsatisfying. I prefer the way NT Wright handles it.
+RoyalGiraffe Not to mention that it's the same as saying "It's possible that there's a world where God does not exist if God does not exist." It's a little circular if I may say so. lol
OK, I found it! Nice music, by the way. So, the defence you gave was that we have other reasons: (a) The other arguments to support God (b) The attempts of failure have failed. (i.e. showing God impossible) On the first one, I can refute them, so I'm going to ignore them because I know the flaws in the other arguments. The second point is interesting, however. I am not sure how it could work. Absence of evidence =/= evidence of absence plays a role here. It seems like a cop-out to me. (Cont)
And you can't build a case with just (A). But (A) being foundational then allows (C) to come to life. For example, an investigator cannot use the evidence the suspect's shoe found at the crime scene alone, but if the foundational testimony of an eye witness is used first then two pieces together can build a stronger case.
I'm making a distinction between logical possible worlds and metaphysical possible worlds. As Saul Kripke pointed out, metaphysical possible words are more restrictive and limited. A non-sentient world is not metaphysically possible.
First, I hold to B-theory of time, so I like the contingency cosmological argument put forward by Leibniz. The TAG is not something I listed. The fine tuning argument is not flawed and I have a 3 part video series defending it. Second, theists only need to show God is possible, not proven. One can dispute the arguments all they want, but they do not completely remove the possibility. I go more into this in my video, "What Atheist Confuse"
I knew you assumed the verification principle, which has been debunked for decades. The principle that everything needs empirical verification is an analytical statement & I don't accept it as synthetic truth unless you can empirically demonstrate it exists. Existence is not defined as being empirical, otherwise your own thoughts don't exist. Try again. You can't conceive of a being greater than the Greatest possible being. It's like asking can there be placement higher than 1st place.
Yes the evidence is based on experimentation, and i say in that video we can experiment on the evidence left behind. That is obvious, so what is the best inference from the evidence we can test? Metaphysics studies what is and what exists. For something to be metaphysically possible, there needs to be an a posteriori reason for it to exist, like a piece of evidence possibly inferring to it Probability is all the OA and more. The OA simply points out that entails God exists.
Metaphysics is used to explain reality. It is explaining what is reasonably the case based on the most logical inference from what there is in reality. Since we live in a sentient world, this world is therefore sentient. Therefore, a non sentient world is not accessible from this world, therefore irrelevant logically and metaphysically speaking.
First, see the last section of the video. The argument just shows the most logical conclusion about the actual world is that God exists. 2nd, it is almost becoming too easy to prove there is something outside space-time today. Not only can I rely on philosophy of mind, or the existence of abstract objects, but given the contingency of space-time and that the overwhelming evidence in LQG and String theory is space-time is an emergent description of something else, hence "holographic principle".
Metaphysics basically deals with how we see the world in the big picture. If one beliefs in God, then God is part of their ontology & would be part of their metaphysics. So metaphysics deals with possible interpretations of the actual world. Since a non-sentient world couldn't include us, it really can't be a metaphysical interpretation of the actual world. Yes, everything is possible in logical possible worlds, but not metaphysical, as there are only so many ways to interpret the action world.
The metaphysical inference doesn't need to be an absolute, just show that a MGB is possible. Arguing we may be wrong now is not an argument, because I can just say how do you know you are right that we are wrong currently?
Well, remember the opposite of possibility is impossibility. The opposite of contingency is necessity. Contingency is not opposite to impossibility. Most things are ontologically contingent, but if God was, that would be a contradiction in terms. God is either necessary and possible, or necessary and impossible. But to show something is impossible, there need to be a contradiction in its nature. So one needs to show this.
Well, is there any evidence? I mean, have we a reason to believe that outside our the realm of matter (universe or multiverse) there is a realm like this?
That is simple. See Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (Part 1) for Maydole's modal perfection argument, which shows ~MG is impossible. Then you need an a posteriori argument for a NS world. Otherwise it isn't metaphysically possible. Exactly! Upon examining water it is H2O. Therefore, it requires a posteriori reasoning. A priori (mere logical reasoning) is not enough to firmly say water is H2O. See the video I just posted for you.
I addressed that, by pointing out turning modal operators into meaning something different doesn't change the actual definition of the operators. It was pointless. He then came back by saying, in his own word, I was beneath him, so do I need to spell anything else out for you?
What can be claimed is different than what is true. The question I am still wondering is what is your presupposition to distinguish from actual and possible?
No - 9:09 - 9:58. None of the arguments rely only on themselves. They all work together. The OA is simply the thrust of them all, making the connection from possibility (from the other arguments) to a rational conclusion of existence.
Yes, we are very much affected by quantum physics. I am going to start videos on quantum physics next winter, but for now check out the "Johanan Raatz" channel. Start with his videos, "Your Reality May Be Virtual If…" "For The Atheists" "Strange Computer Code Discovered Concealed In Superstring Equations!" and "The Omega Simulation".
I wil be doing a video soon called, "The case for free will" and will give some science and philosophy arguing we have free will. But for now, maximal autonomy, as Alvin Plantinga says, is if it was possible for us to pick our past and ontology. Free will is simply being about to focus our mind in situations on one choice or another. God knowing who we are doesn't mean He determines negates our ability to focus our mind on one decision or another.
That implies God is bond in time because he knows something "before". God is outside of time and has not past or future. Furthermore, you confuse maximal autonomy with free will, which is a video I have scheduled for May.
Yes, but the in saying ◊G (possibly God exists - Premise 1), it's logically equivalent to ◊□G (possibly necessary God exists) as Dr. Craig points out. The argument works to inform of this connection deductively. This is shown more clearly in Peter S William's version of the argument. P1 - If it is possible God exists, then God exists. This is because God is ontologically necessary. He cannot be contingent and just be in a possible world. He is either impossible or necessary.
Necessity describes how one might exist, as opposed to contingent existence. The problem is possible worlds are logical constructs of the actual world. So what is logical for one possible world has to be logical for another. You can't say one has necessary X, but the other does not.
No, I'm putting forward my philosophical position. Jut calling it an assumption is not a refutation of the fact that out the physical proceeds physical. I can call it what it is. I didn't say the OA proves God exists, I said it shows God is logically coherent. A skeptic can just deny logic and metaphysics, but that is not the same as refuting it.
Based on the ontology of a car, the quality of taste would not make it a better car (ontologically). It would make it a better snack, but not a better car.
I hardly think that is an issue. First, the other arguments only need to show that is merely possible (not proven) that God exists. Plus, in Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (Part 1) I point out that Maydole's modal perfection argument shows the negation of maximal greatness is impossible, which can give a pessimistic inference.
Actually logic simply defines God as necessary. The next question is if God is possible or not. We can answer this in two ways: drawing in inference from the other arguments in natural theology or relying on Maydole's modal perfection argument, which shows ~MG is impossible. Logic does the rest.
Is there an 'a posteriori' argument for such a case other than is being logical possible? If the OA doesn't feel convincing then I will point out it is not a matter of what you feel, but what is logical. All I have to do is show God is simply possible and the OA shows us He exists. The only way out of this is to show God is the opposite - impossible.
Sure, but when it boils down as well, remember there is no metaphysical reason to think non-sentient world is possible. Other than is just makes logical sense. There are many things that make logical sense but lack metaphysical possibility. I hope that helps.
You're correct it wouldn't, especially depending on the view of God and time. It would affect God's timelessness, but not omnipotence. You may not realize, but I put that in there because some atheists on youtube have put that argument up against the logical coherent of God. So I felt a need to address it. Well timelessness is not the only view theists can take. One can be a molinst (Plantinga is) or an open theist (Swinburne). Timelessness can only be understood analogously for temporal beings.
Not according to Page. They arise from fluctuations in the energy. You and I are both laymen in physics though. In philosophy, we when speak of nothing, we mean absence, of energy, matter, time and even space. There is no energy to even begin with in nothing. This is different in physics.
Your questions are setups and miss the OA properties of 'de re'. Dr. Craig addressed this objection as too vague for useful classification. Craig argues the OA can be classified as ontological instead of mereological or higher-order if it attempts to deduce the existence of God come from His definition and paired with other necessary truths (modalities of possibility). Again, this is a bait and switch on your part.
You see, your persistence combined with changing arguments really just shows you do not care about what is true, you care about being right, regardless of how you find a way, LOL! The ends will justify the means. See my video, "(Christianity vs Evolution)?" That story is not literal.
I don't know how many times I am going to have to repeat myself. Possible Worlds are not independent of each other. They are logical constructs of the actual world. So if something is logically necessary in w1 then it makes sense that you cannot construct w2 without that which is necessary. Your biggest error is your confusion over what possible world semantics is
The question is if they are weak patches. I see some errors his in chain mail, like his dualism,acceptance of ex nihilo, and his rejection of quantum research attacking realism as bad spots, but taking a panentheistic view can patch those up. Many times I get atheists arguing as if all theists take Craig's position, but one can easily modify his approach if his chain mail is weak.
So you are basically arguing without God there is no objective logic? Also can you argue when (for example) power is not ontologically beneficial? And I mean "ontologically' beneficial, not ethically or politically?
The problem is recent experiments have proven Einstein was wrong on this. See the article in PhysicsWorld, "Quantum Physics says Goodbye to Reality". try this: search this title: "Why Quantum Physics Ends the Free Will Debate"
Stop trying to order me around or I'll just kick you off my channel. The key word is "my". If you think God is not metaphysical then you have to discount the possibility of His existence from every a posteriori argument in natural theology, which I have seen no philosopher do.
This objection is a misunderstanding of what it means to change. It means the essence cannot change, not the whole structure. This is also why the energy-essence distinction is so important. Since the world was created from the eternal energies of God and do change as they are contingent, but eternal. Being necessary in essence doesn't mean static but a nature that doesn't change.
I don't disagree with anything you just said. Please watch 10:39 to end of this video. The best conclusion we can draw about the actual world is that God exists.
This is why your objection seems so odd other than you being the 1st to present it. Because Kripke's semantics provide a basis for translating modal axioms into sentences of a 2nd-order language where quantification is allowed over one-place predicates (P). Plus, if we restrict ourselves to 1st-order, then the OA reveals an inadequacy in 1st-order logic rather than in the OA itself. Within 1st-order logic questions of existence arise that can't be dealt with in pure quantificational terms.
Yes, exactly! Possible worlds are limited in what they are. They are not anything you can imagine, but are logically restricted to certain laws. You cannot just say something is a possible world. I can imagine things that cannot exist in any possible world.
Logically they are different words though, and for them to be shown to be the same thing, we need empirical verification. This is not even debated. Check out Kripke's book.
Yes, Hume said the only way to prove something a priori is to show the negation is impossible. In Part 1 I present the modal perfection argument, which shows ~MG is impossible.
Possible Metaphysics are possible explanation for the actual world, where as logical possibilities are mere logical things that could exist. Metaphysics deals with how we view the world.
Those are very good questions and there could be several answers. The 1st is the future isn't an equation, it's a bunch of different equations, hence infinite outcomes. The 2nd is debatable among philosophers of religion which is why I picked my words as carefully as I could. For general purposes it could be either but I lean to the thought that God is timeless and can enter into time as He pleases.
This is why I like the contingency cosmological argument because it does that. Expect a video on it by September. Second of all, there is no other definition. A contingent MGB is a contradiction in terms. God is either necessary and possible or necessary and impossible. Besides, so what? What is wrong with deism? The OA just shows a MGB exists. Not a particular one.
But you are still defining things differently as a MWB. God entails all great making properties which includes necessity. The only way out of it is to show that this concept is incoherent. Peter S Williams goes over this in his lecture, linked in the information section. It starts by defining God and then modal logic informs us this means God exists.
Who said I didn't have a reference (9:00). Also the MPA argument shows the ~MG is impossible, so MG has to be possible a priori. Even Hume knew the only way to prove something a priori is to show the negation is impossible & Maydole as done that. What is a truth giver? This is your last warning. Stop using terms without defining. You can't just say 'truth giver' & assume that is an argument. Because I argue I have given many truth givers. Your argument doesn't refute the OA from my perspective.
Not true, again, you are misunderstanding what is happing here. Premise 3 of this simple version doesn't rely on a 'de dicto' modality of necessity but on 'de re' necessity. Again, no one claims the OA argues for necessity in 'de dicto' and tries to say ◊□G ↔ □G. The Argument is ◊G ↔ G, relying on the modality of possibility. PSW's version shows this and is why I pointed it out because it it the most you can reduce the argument and see where possibility and necessity are placed.
I am using basic logic. See my video, "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (Part 1)". I go over why physical things cannot be maximally great. Modal Logic is just a tool, but at its core it is still an ontological argument.
And? That means nothing in terms of the argument as I point that out at the end. You can say God doesn't exist in reality, but that is not the most logical conclusion.
At the end of the day you are within your rational rights to simply deny natural theology. Our point though, is that is not a refutation or offering a better explanation. It might not be obvious to you, but that is simply your opinion and not objectively true. Check out my video, "What Atheists Confuse".
The objection about Goldbach's conjecture misses the point entirely. The point about Goldbach's conjecture is that logical and epistemic possibility do not easily translate to metaphysical possibility. Also, if in order to know that something is true in a possible world we have to know "everything about it to know that it is logically coherent," then we would certainly need to know everything about God in order to know whether the concept of God is logically coherent. So, if this objection works against Goldbachs conjecture it works equally well against the claim that "Possibly, God exists." If we can not know Goldbach's conjecture because the set of all even numbers would be infinite, and we can not have knowledge of infinite sets, then we *certainly* can not determine whether the concept of omniscience or omnipotence makes sense either, because, presumably, God would be a being of infinite power and knowledge.
Then is becomes more of a subjective view of how strong you think the evidence is. If you say the evidence is not strong enough that is a like saying the evidence points to God but I want more, therefore I do not agree. But this statement doesn't change the evidence we do have and what is say about the best inference we can draw.
This all implies God is in some form of time, and knowing ahead of what he will do. God would not have knowledge of what an action could produce, because that means there are future events for Him.
In language, yes. But it's simply a title for properties that are always ontologically beneficial. Inventing words doesn't mean the ontology of properties are subjective.
Sorry for the confusion, by MG, I mean maximal greatness. In "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (Part 1)" I present the modal perfection argument. The MPA shows that the negation of MG is impossible, and as David Hume said this is the only way to prove someone is necessary, by showing the negation is impossible.
Then 8:37- 9:56, you obviously have a confusion over what 'a posteriori' is, as the other argument in natural theology are 'a posteriori' arguments.
Great, I am glad I could help.
God Bless
That seems like a difference of opinion. I find philosophy & theology very enlightening on questions that I have always wondered about.
And this is why Kant is so important, because we draw back to a priori forms of intuition, starting with space and time. We do not make truth, it is intuitively the same for all because of transcendental deduction.
Then you fall to epistemic skepticism if you dismiss particularism. Your own argument is subject to skepticism as it has no foundation. You have no argument for existence without it, and have yet to define it AGAIN! So you have partially refuted yourself in rejecting particularism.
What put the unconscious energy in motion? How did it arrange to finely-tuned. Unmoved, eternal, unconscious energy doesn't make sense. This is Leibniz's point in the contingency argument.
Did you watch this video the whole way through? I directly respond on the reverse OA. Also in (Part 1) I argue the modal perfection argument which shows the negation of maximal greatness is an impossibility.
As for the BB/BC, sure it's possible. But as of now there isn't enough evidence to support that theory, so I would have to conclude it's not the most rational inference. Plus, referring to Leibniz's argument from contingency it still lacks explanatory power for contingently existing things.
I'll admit I had some difficulty "getting" some of the philosophical stuff (why aren't we learning this in Sunday school?!?!?!) but I noticed you have much less dislikes even though you boldly said that denying God's existence is less rational than accepting it.
Also, is Peter S. Williams trying to say with the Mozart thing that a piece of music, even though it isn't maximally great, can still exist in another world, even one with no Mozart?
I don't think so.
So what exactly is he saying, then? I was able to get the gist of the ontological argument and how it proves that God is possible (while not necessarily proving His existence). What exactly did the Mozart piece scenario have to do with it?
Spencer Gage Simply that being lacking necessity in a music piece doesn't mean it is not a GMP for a being. A music piece's joy is not increased by an unrelated property.
Thanks for you intellectual response..
You dealt with my points so eloquently, I feel I am in the presence of greatness.
Back to sleep now.
The difference is Inwagen argues from logical possibility alone. The OA argues from metaphysical possibility from a posteriori arguments. How do I not make this clear (7:38 −9:06)? Also, as Hume said the only way to prove something a priori is to show that its negation is impossible, which actually happens in the case of the OA. Maydole's modal perfection argument does this, which is presented in my previous video.
I go over the free will defense in "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (Part 1)". Also there is no reason to think a non-sentient world is metaphysically coherent, other than just asserting, unlike a MGB. Furthermore, also in Part 1, I give the modal perfection argument which shows the negation of MG is impossible. So as Hume said, the only way to show something exists a priori is to show the negation is impossible, which the MPA does.
outstanding, praise God he gave you the insight to answer these difficult questions.
Yes, I've found this to be the case. When I've tried evangelizing with it, I'm dismissed as insane on the sole grounds that it's complicated. I'll agree that your ministry (channel) is extremely important for reaching the layperson. Keep it up.
The statement about the Ontological Argument only showing that belief in God is rational makes sense, but I wonder, if the existence of God can not be proved, is there also an argument that shows that the belief God doesn't exist is rational? I ask, because atheists typically argue against God by poking fun, which seems more emotional than rational.
There really is no rational argument for the non-existence of God. All such arguments when taken to their logical conclusion will ultimately reduce to absurdity. After all, for an argument to be made, one must assume the laws of logic. However, there is no reason to assume the laws of logic in a completely random universe.
+Michael Kline The universe isn't completely random.
If there's no God, then the universe MUST be completely random.
Michael Kline That's a non sequitur. How does it follow from the claim _god does not exist_ that _no states of objects are determined by past states_. The universe is random if current events are not determined by past events, it is completely random if all states are not determined by past states. The universe is random because the states of particles are not wholly determined by past states, but it is not completely random not because of god, but because of states that are determined by past states. Examples of these states are confinement, wave function, etc.
There has to be a first cause in any chain of events. If there is no God, then that first cause must be random. Therefore, all events along that chain are also ultimately random as they have no reason for their occurence. The beginning of the universe would be the ultimate random event with everything else stemming from it. Like it or not, without God, the universe is random.
Which I provide, however, I am referring one of of Peter S William's arguments for a pessimistic inference. It is not the main one I rely on. I prefer the modal perfection argument or inferences from a posteriori arguments. I hope that clarifies.
To be a necessary being means to be eternal and unchanging. So a necessary being cannot be destroyed. Which means if a being was omnipotent it could not end the existence of the other necessary being, which would be logically coherent. So the only omnipotent being would have to be the only necessary being. They go hand in hand.
Imagine being the guy who waited two years for part two
Very well laid out video, I especially appreciated the visual discussion on the fact that God is inherently out of the constraints of time we experience. The subsequent visual was extremely enlightening.
***** You are doing a great job with these videos. Would you be willing, though, for you to reupload this video with without the music being as loud as it is?
We are talking about the basic ontological properties, which all others can be put into. The argument is not suppose to go into a complicated detail as that would be pointless. Only the general basics are there.
LOL, yes we do have a stalemate, I just take the logical high ground, since the argument is coherent and not refuted. Again, I don't care. I am interested in what is reasonable, not how one feels. As Anthony Flew says, "We must follow the argument where it leads."
No axion is switched. The argument remains the same relying on metaphysical possibility in premise 1. You seem to be implying it begs the question.
Excellent work! These refutations will prove invaluable in debates and discussions.
There Is No Other Name On Heaven & Earth That U Can Get Salvation, EXCEPT IN THE NAME OF "JESUS"..
"Without Jesus Blood No Man Can Enter Into Heaven.. Because He Is A Heavenly Almighty Who Came Into The Earth With Flesh & Blood, And Shed His Blood 4 Each & Every Human...
*****
P1. If God exists and a universe exists then "God exists temporally" is temporally true.
P2. If "God exists temporally" is temporally true then "God exists timelessly" is temporally false.
P3. If "God exists timelessly" is temporally false then "God exists timelessly" is not eternally true.
P4. If "God exists timelessly" is not eternally true then "God exists timelessly" is not timelessly true.
P5. It is not the case that "God exists timelessly" is not timelessly true.
C. Therefore, it is not the case that "God exists timelessly" is not eternally true.
C1. Therefore, it is not the case that "God exists timelessly" is temporally false.
C2. Therefore, it is not the case that "God exists temporally" is temporally true.
C3. Therefore, it is not the case that God exists and the universe exists.
P6. The universe exists.
C4. Therefore, God does not exist.
Here, "eternally true" should be read as "true in such a way that it is true without beginning and without end".
Support:
P1 accords to WLC's claims about God being temporal since the universe began.
P2 accords with the fact that "God exists temporally" and "God exists timelessly" cannot be true simultaneously.
P3. If "God exists timelessly" is temporally false (eg, at the moment) then its truthfulness cannot be without beginning and without end.
P4. If its truthfulness is not without beginning and without end then its truthfulness cannot be timeless.
P5. "God exists timelessly" can only be timelessly true because it can only be true of God in a reality where there is no universe and no time.
I don't even get past P1. The universe existing doesn't force any ontological claims on God. He is the eternal cause of the universe.
***** But he intervened in the universe. intervention requires information processing in the mind which requires time. If we can't conceive of atemporal thinking coherently then we have no basis for saying that it is epistemically (and therefore metaphysically) possible.
So if God can think and intervenes, then he is necessary temporal. Thus the argument is valid.
IN fact, God came down as Jesus and became temporal. So please do read the full argument.
Mclinkin94 From a timeless perspective that would all be actualized at once.
I am not arguing to think of atemporal thinking . God doesn't need to think, His knowledge is perfect.
***** So God does not information process. God does not make decisions. Making decisions require thought or intentions. Intentions require time.
Mclinkin94 The essence of God would be His perfect timeless knowledge. He doesn't need to think. Actions are down through the eternal energies of God.
No problem, It simply relies on what the argument say. Even if you deny the full conclusion of the other arguments from natural theology you cannot discount the evidence leading to the possibilities of design. To get away from that you need to show a MGB cannot be the final explanation regardless, and that is all the MOA needs.
Yes, I am a molinist in once sense. But if I go out of metaphysics I hold to another view.
I am planning a video in a few months that will refute the claim that there is no free will, but I do want to do a video some time in the future arguing for both positions.
It has been about 3 years since I read those theodicies. I would have to refresh myself. I remember I thought they were ok but unsatisfying. I prefer the way NT Wright handles it.
Lol. Is it possible for there to be a non-sentient world? The Cosmological argument would argue otherwise!
+RoyalGiraffe Not to mention that it's the same as saying "It's possible that there's a world where God does not exist if God does not exist." It's a little circular if I may say so. lol
OK, I found it! Nice music, by the way.
So, the defence you gave was that we have other reasons:
(a) The other arguments to support God
(b) The attempts of failure have failed. (i.e. showing God impossible)
On the first one, I can refute them, so I'm going to ignore them because I know the flaws in the other arguments. The second point is interesting, however. I am not sure how it could work. Absence of evidence =/= evidence of absence plays a role here. It seems like a cop-out to me. (Cont)
I think the introspective argument proves ELOHIYM exists
The y there is unnecessary
Yes, and words are used in philosophy, so you should know how they are defined.
And you can't build a case with just (A). But (A) being foundational then allows (C) to come to life. For example, an investigator cannot use the evidence the suspect's shoe found at the crime scene alone, but if the foundational testimony of an eye witness is used first then two pieces together can build a stronger case.
The Ontological Argument is the worst argument for God's existence.
I disagree, in fact i think the only reason it’s perceived as bad is because the argument is hard to communicate.
Wow! This is the greatest amount of nonsense I've ever heard!
You are beyond irrational. Get a brain.
I'm making a distinction between logical possible worlds and metaphysical possible worlds. As Saul Kripke pointed out, metaphysical possible words are more restrictive and limited. A non-sentient world is not metaphysically possible.
First, I hold to B-theory of time, so I like the contingency cosmological argument put forward by Leibniz. The TAG is not something I listed. The fine tuning argument is not flawed and I have a 3 part video series defending it. Second, theists only need to show God is possible, not proven. One can dispute the arguments all they want, but they do not completely remove the possibility. I go more into this in my video, "What Atheist Confuse"
I knew you assumed the verification principle, which has been debunked for decades. The principle that everything needs empirical verification is an analytical statement & I don't accept it as synthetic truth unless you can empirically demonstrate it exists. Existence is not defined as being empirical, otherwise your own thoughts don't exist. Try again.
You can't conceive of a being greater than the Greatest possible being. It's like asking can there be placement higher than 1st place.
Such a concept is contingent, so that is is incorrect. Plus, there is no reason to suggest it's metaphysical.
Yes the evidence is based on experimentation, and i say in that video we can experiment on the evidence left behind. That is obvious, so what is the best inference from the evidence we can test?
Metaphysics studies what is and what exists. For something to be metaphysically possible, there needs to be an a posteriori reason for it to exist, like a piece of evidence possibly inferring to it
Probability is all the OA and more. The OA simply points out that entails God exists.
Metaphysics is used to explain reality. It is explaining what is reasonably the case based on the most logical inference from what there is in reality. Since we live in a sentient world, this world is therefore sentient. Therefore, a non sentient world is not accessible from this world, therefore irrelevant logically and metaphysically speaking.
First, see the last section of the video. The argument just shows the most logical conclusion about the actual world is that God exists. 2nd, it is almost becoming too easy to prove there is something outside space-time today. Not only can I rely on philosophy of mind, or the existence of abstract objects, but given the contingency of space-time and that the overwhelming evidence in LQG and String theory is space-time is an emergent description of something else, hence "holographic principle".
Metaphysics basically deals with how we see the world in the big picture. If one beliefs in God, then God is part of their ontology & would be part of their metaphysics. So metaphysics deals with possible interpretations of the actual world. Since a non-sentient world couldn't include us, it really can't be a metaphysical interpretation of the actual world.
Yes, everything is possible in logical possible worlds, but not metaphysical, as there are only so many ways to interpret the action world.
The metaphysical inference doesn't need to be an absolute, just show that a MGB is possible. Arguing we may be wrong now is not an argument, because I can just say how do you know you are right that we are wrong currently?
Well, remember the opposite of possibility is impossibility. The opposite of contingency is necessity. Contingency is not opposite to impossibility. Most things are ontologically contingent, but if God was, that would be a contradiction in terms. God is either necessary and possible, or necessary and impossible. But to show something is impossible, there need to be a contradiction in its nature. So one needs to show this.
Well, is there any evidence? I mean, have we a reason to believe that outside our the realm of matter (universe or multiverse) there is a realm like this?
That is simple. See Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (Part 1) for Maydole's modal perfection argument, which shows ~MG is impossible.
Then you need an a posteriori argument for a NS world. Otherwise it isn't metaphysically possible.
Exactly! Upon examining water it is H2O. Therefore, it requires a posteriori reasoning. A priori (mere logical reasoning) is not enough to firmly say water is H2O. See the video I just posted for you.
I addressed that, by pointing out turning modal operators into meaning something different doesn't change the actual definition of the operators. It was pointless. He then came back by saying, in his own word, I was beneath him, so do I need to spell anything else out for you?
What can be claimed is different than what is true. The question I am still wondering is what is your presupposition to distinguish from actual and possible?
No - 9:09 - 9:58. None of the arguments rely only on themselves. They all work together. The OA is simply the thrust of them all, making the connection from possibility (from the other arguments) to a rational conclusion of existence.
Yes, we are very much affected by quantum physics. I am going to start videos on quantum physics next winter, but for now check out the "Johanan Raatz" channel. Start with his videos, "Your Reality May Be Virtual If…" "For The Atheists" "Strange Computer Code Discovered Concealed In Superstring Equations!" and "The Omega Simulation".
Then I am confused by your question. God entails all GMPs., which would include necessity.
I wil be doing a video soon called, "The case for free will" and will give some science and philosophy arguing we have free will. But for now, maximal autonomy, as Alvin Plantinga says, is if it was possible for us to pick our past and ontology. Free will is simply being about to focus our mind in situations on one choice or another. God knowing who we are doesn't mean He determines negates our ability to focus our mind on one decision or another.
Then one needs a metaphysical inference for metaphysical possibility, which I have done in the video.
That implies God is bond in time because he knows something "before". God is outside of time and has not past or future. Furthermore, you confuse maximal autonomy with free will, which is a video I have scheduled for May.
Yes, but the in saying ◊G (possibly God exists - Premise 1), it's logically equivalent to ◊□G (possibly necessary God exists) as Dr. Craig points out. The argument works to inform of this connection deductively. This is shown more clearly in Peter S William's version of the argument. P1 - If it is possible God exists, then God exists. This is because God is ontologically necessary. He cannot be contingent and just be in a possible world. He is either impossible or necessary.
Necessity describes how one might exist, as opposed to contingent existence. The problem is possible worlds are logical constructs of the actual world. So what is logical for one possible world has to be logical for another. You can't say one has necessary X, but the other does not.
No, I'm putting forward my philosophical position. Jut calling it an assumption is not a refutation of the fact that out the physical proceeds physical.
I can call it what it is. I didn't say the OA proves God exists, I said it shows God is logically coherent. A skeptic can just deny logic and metaphysics, but that is not the same as refuting it.
That has nothing to do with the OA. The OA works in possible world semantics which are logical examples of the real world.
Based on the ontology of a car, the quality of taste would not make it a better car (ontologically). It would make it a better snack, but not a better car.
I hardly think that is an issue. First, the other arguments only need to show that is merely possible (not proven) that God exists. Plus, in Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (Part 1) I point out that Maydole's modal perfection argument shows the negation of maximal greatness is impossible, which can give a pessimistic inference.
Natural theology starts with the fact that God is logically possible and builds a metaphysical case. It is important to distinguish between these two.
Actually logic simply defines God as necessary. The next question is if God is possible or not. We can answer this in two ways: drawing in inference from the other arguments in natural theology or relying on Maydole's modal perfection argument, which shows ~MG is impossible. Logic does the rest.
Is there an 'a posteriori' argument for such a case other than is being logical possible?
If the OA doesn't feel convincing then I will point out it is not a matter of what you feel, but what is logical. All I have to do is show God is simply possible and the OA shows us He exists. The only way out of this is to show God is the opposite - impossible.
Sure, but when it boils down as well, remember there is no metaphysical reason to think non-sentient world is possible. Other than is just makes logical sense. There are many things that make logical sense but lack metaphysical possibility. I hope that helps.
You're correct it wouldn't, especially depending on the view of God and time. It would affect God's timelessness, but not omnipotence. You may not realize, but I put that in there because some atheists on youtube have put that argument up against the logical coherent of God. So I felt a need to address it.
Well timelessness is not the only view theists can take. One can be a molinst (Plantinga is) or an open theist (Swinburne). Timelessness can only be understood analogously for temporal beings.
Not according to Page. They arise from fluctuations in the energy. You and I are both laymen in physics though. In philosophy, we when speak of nothing, we mean absence, of energy, matter, time and even space. There is no energy to even begin with in nothing. This is different in physics.
Your questions are setups and miss the OA properties of 'de re'. Dr. Craig addressed this objection as too vague for useful classification. Craig argues the OA can be classified as ontological instead of mereological or higher-order if it attempts to deduce the existence of God come from His definition and paired with other necessary truths (modalities of possibility). Again, this is a bait and switch on your part.
Then it should be easy to debunk...
You see, your persistence combined with changing arguments really just shows you do not care about what is true, you care about being right, regardless of how you find a way, LOL! The ends will justify the means.
See my video, "(Christianity vs Evolution)?" That story is not literal.
I don't know how many times I am going to have to repeat myself. Possible Worlds are not independent of each other. They are logical constructs of the actual world. So if something is logically necessary in w1 then it makes sense that you cannot construct w2 without that which is necessary. Your biggest error is your confusion over what possible world semantics is
The question is if they are weak patches. I see some errors his in chain mail, like his dualism,acceptance of ex nihilo, and his rejection of quantum research attacking realism as bad spots, but taking a panentheistic view can patch those up. Many times I get atheists arguing as if all theists take Craig's position, but one can easily modify his approach if his chain mail is weak.
So you are basically arguing without God there is no objective logic?
Also can you argue when (for example) power is not ontologically beneficial? And I mean "ontologically' beneficial, not ethically or politically?
The problem is recent experiments have proven Einstein was wrong on this. See the article in PhysicsWorld, "Quantum Physics says Goodbye to Reality".
try this:
search this title: "Why Quantum Physics Ends the Free Will Debate"
No, necessity is an ontological claim. This is, however, pointed out using the contingency argument.
Stop trying to order me around or I'll just kick you off my channel. The key word is "my". If you think God is not metaphysical then you have to discount the possibility of His existence from every a posteriori argument in natural theology, which I have seen no philosopher do.
This objection is a misunderstanding of what it means to change. It means the essence cannot change, not the whole structure. This is also why the energy-essence distinction is so important. Since the world was created from the eternal energies of God and do change as they are contingent, but eternal. Being necessary in essence doesn't mean static but a nature that doesn't change.
I don't disagree with anything you just said. Please watch 10:39 to end of this video. The best conclusion we can draw about the actual world is that God exists.
This is why your objection seems so odd other than you being the 1st to present it. Because Kripke's semantics provide a basis for translating modal axioms into sentences of a 2nd-order language where quantification is allowed over one-place predicates (P). Plus, if we restrict ourselves to 1st-order, then the OA reveals an inadequacy in 1st-order logic rather than in the OA itself. Within 1st-order logic questions of existence arise that can't be dealt with in pure quantificational terms.
Yes, you got it. A non-sentient world lacks metaphysically possibility, so it only could exist but lacks a metaphysical reason.
Yes, exactly! Possible worlds are limited in what they are. They are not anything you can imagine, but are logically restricted to certain laws. You cannot just say something is a possible world. I can imagine things that cannot exist in any possible world.
Logically they are different words though, and for them to be shown to be the same thing, we need empirical verification. This is not even debated. Check out Kripke's book.
That still doesn't refute their points.
Premise 2 is confusing logical ontology with logical epistemology. You are assuming we decide what is a GMP.
Yes, Hume said the only way to prove something a priori is to show the negation is impossible. In Part 1 I present the modal perfection argument, which shows ~MG is impossible.
Yep! Raatz will do that. Enjoy your trip down the rabbit hole. :)
I'll be making videos on the subject soon.
I'm glad I could be of help, let me know if you have any more questions.
Possible Metaphysics are possible explanation for the actual world, where as logical possibilities are mere logical things that could exist. Metaphysics deals with how we view the world.
Those are very good questions and there could be several answers. The 1st is the future isn't an equation, it's a bunch of different equations, hence infinite outcomes. The 2nd is debatable among philosophers of religion which is why I picked my words as carefully as I could. For general purposes it could be either but I lean to the thought that God is timeless and can enter into time as He pleases.
This is why I like the contingency cosmological argument because it does that. Expect a video on it by September. Second of all, there is no other definition. A contingent MGB is a contradiction in terms. God is either necessary and possible or necessary and impossible.
Besides, so what? What is wrong with deism? The OA just shows a MGB exists. Not a particular one.
But you are still defining things differently as a MWB. God entails all great making properties which includes necessity. The only way out of it is to show that this concept is incoherent. Peter S Williams goes over this in his lecture, linked in the information section. It starts by defining God and then modal logic informs us this means God exists.
Who said I didn't have a reference (9:00). Also the MPA argument shows the ~MG is impossible, so MG has to be possible a priori. Even Hume knew the only way to prove something a priori is to show the negation is impossible & Maydole as done that.
What is a truth giver? This is your last warning. Stop using terms without defining. You can't just say 'truth giver' & assume that is an argument. Because I argue I have given many truth givers. Your argument doesn't refute the OA from my perspective.
Not true, again, you are misunderstanding what is happing here. Premise 3 of this simple version doesn't rely on a 'de dicto' modality of necessity but on 'de re' necessity. Again, no one claims the OA argues for necessity in 'de dicto' and tries to say ◊□G ↔ □G. The Argument is ◊G ↔ G, relying on the modality of possibility. PSW's version shows this and is why I pointed it out because it it the most you can reduce the argument and see where possibility and necessity are placed.
I am using basic logic. See my video, "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (Part 1)". I go over why physical things cannot be maximally great. Modal Logic is just a tool, but at its core it is still an ontological argument.
And? That means nothing in terms of the argument as I point that out at the end. You can say God doesn't exist in reality, but that is not the most logical conclusion.
At the end of the day you are within your rational rights to simply deny natural theology. Our point though, is that is not a refutation or offering a better explanation. It might not be obvious to you, but that is simply your opinion and not objectively true. Check out my video, "What Atheists Confuse".
The objection about Goldbach's conjecture misses the point entirely. The point about Goldbach's conjecture is that logical and epistemic possibility do not easily translate to metaphysical possibility.
Also, if in order to know that something is true in a possible world we have to know "everything about it to know that it is logically coherent," then we would certainly need to know everything about God in order to know whether the concept of God is logically coherent. So, if this objection works against Goldbachs conjecture it works equally well against the claim that "Possibly, God exists." If we can not know Goldbach's conjecture because the set of all even numbers would be infinite, and we can not have knowledge of infinite sets, then we *certainly* can not determine whether the concept of omniscience or omnipotence makes sense either, because, presumably, God would be a being of infinite power and knowledge.
Yes, but it is not about absolute certainty, but the most logical inference.
Then is becomes more of a subjective view of how strong you think the evidence is. If you say the evidence is not strong enough that is a like saying the evidence points to God but I want more, therefore I do not agree. But this statement doesn't change the evidence we do have and what is say about the best inference we can draw.
Modern Cosmology and physics.
This all implies God is in some form of time, and knowing ahead of what he will do. God would not have knowledge of what an action could produce, because that means there are future events for Him.
In language, yes. But it's simply a title for properties that are always ontologically beneficial. Inventing words doesn't mean the ontology of properties are subjective.
Sorry for the confusion, by MG, I mean maximal greatness. In "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (Part 1)" I present the modal perfection argument. The MPA shows that the negation of MG is impossible, and as David Hume said this is the only way to prove someone is necessary, by showing the negation is impossible.