The problem is "square circle" is not coherent in its definition and cannot even be possible. So: P1: If it is possible a square circle exists, then one exists. P2: It is not possible a square circle exists. P3: Therefore, a square circle does not exist.
You should know by now I've dealt with that in "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (part 1)" Defining something as necessary doesn't make it possible.
Now you're committing an equivocation fallacy. While a disagree on the objectively of oughts, "good" being used here is not moral goodness but as you said, "good in the sense of good chess". Some properties are good and some are not. What you value doesn't affect the ontological status of properties.
Because to say it is fact they are subjective is an objective truth claim. Therefore there is objective logic that is true independent of our opinions. Logic is not made, but discovered. What is ontologically beneficial is truly beneficial regardless of what we think.
Then I recommend you read "Modal Logic as Metaphysics". Modal Logic can take things that are coherent and asks whether they are possible and/or necessary. It works just fine with metaphysics. Also, I know the analysis of a MGB doesn't mean it exists, this is why we use modal logic.
Once again there are no problems if you do not change the rules of logic. Confusing 'metaphysics and epistemology' or confusing 'empiricism with deductive reasoning' are two things skeptics never seem to get. Proof means nothing in philosophy, and anyone who argues it does has discredited himself.
And that is the problem. God is defined as necessary (opposite being contingent). So the only way for God not to exist would be if He is impossible. So saying It is possible that God doesn't exist is the same as saying It is possible that God is impossible. You cannot arrive as impossibility from the opposite, possibility, like you can with necessity. Necessity and possibility are not opposites.
Then that was my typo mistake. I meant to say, "I even argue it is logically possible God exists in a logical sense." I do not need to rely on metaphysical possibility. Using that axiom constantly it just causing you to not see your error. The OA works by doing two things: defying God and noting God is possible. By constantly pulling out the axiom you are saying the OA only says it possible God exists. But that is not what the OA does, and therefore, doesn't rely on 1 premise.
That is not what infinite is. First of all, we know the infinite exists, because basically numbers go on. The infinite just doesn't make sense in our finite world, but we cannot deny it exists. So infinite is logical because numbers go on infinitely.
I once had a discussion with someone who said that the Modal Perfection Argument begged the question because "great-making properties are possible" is a direct corollary of "great-making properties entail lesser-making properties." When people say that a deductive argument begs the question for reasons similar to this, they are demonstrating that they don't know what a deductive argument actually is; the whole point of a deductive argument is that the conclusion is a direct corollary of the premises.
Wrong again, the argument is from necessity not existence. Existence is not a property And a necessary unicorn is a logical absurdity. I deal with that claim in "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (part 1)"
That is not even an issue. You are assuming verificationism which is self-defeating to begin with and is nothing more than red herring. The definition is logically coherent and metaphysically possible.
This is why I used Peter S. Williams version in this. Saying God is necessary doesn't prove He is. The 2nd premise can be "It is not possible God exists". I can define several things as necessary but easily show it is not possible they exist. So this doesn't beg the question.
Possible worlds are not imagined worlds. They are logical constructs of the actual world. You're also using neutral making properties, not great making properties, which are inherently good (ontologically) in all circumstances.
P1 yeah, I've heard that before. I have 3 other videos shows this is not the case. The 2nd, 3rd, and 4th link in the information section. P2 I deal with that objection specifically in "Answering objections to the Ontological Argument (part 2)". 4th link. P3 Possible worlds are just logical constructs of the actual world and I am planning a specific video on it.
First, ontology is independent of our mental thoughts. What I think doesn't affect the truth of ontology. I could want to die, but that doesn't make dying ontology beneficial. 2nd, goals are subjective but ontology is not. One may want to be stupid, but that doesn't show stupidity is a GMP. 3rd, if "ontologically beneficial is contingent upon subjective desires", then your intelligence is only subjectively valuable to you an your goals. There is nothing objectively good about it.
That doesn't mean it is true in what is logical. If logic is purely subjective then your own argument is purely subjective and there is nothing inherently good about it. So you have refuted yourself if you say it is all subjective. Power doesn't corrupt, moral imperfection does. These are separate properties. Power is a good thing of itself. We are talking of ontology not ethics.
If you start with an incoherent definition then the argument is not sound to begin with. I can define several things as necessary but that doesn't mean they are possible.
And I responded there. It is not a question of whether it is possible that God is necessary. God is necessary by definition and we ask if He is possible.
And now you admit the problem with the argument. It is logically valid. See my video, "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (part 2)" Logical validity doesn't cut it, unless you can show the negation is impossible (as Hume demonstrated), which actually can be done with God using the modal perfection argument but not with for argument.
@@TheSpacePlaceYT If he's defined as necessary, then saying he's possible is the same as saying he exists. Since he's necessary, there's nothing different because of his existence. What I'm interested in are the contingent facts under my control. Do you have anything related to that?
facepalm*, No because you do not define bachelor until the 2nd premise. See the first link, you are embarrassing yourself now: "In a situation where you dispute the conclusion but are unaware of the identity given in (a), this argument could be offered to inform you, and so in that context it would not be question-begging." You have no clue what you are saying.
And what in considerations is true or false? What I want is neither true nor false. It's just is a want. It is true that I want X, but the "want" is not true. What is truly beneficial is independent of desire. Our desires are not perfect, right all the time, or creates the truth of ontology. This would mean both weakness and strength are beneficial, but that is absurd ontologically speaking. These appear to be red herring my friend. God is a conscious mind. Asking what color He is like . . .
P1 is that God is possible, not that He exists. You are confusing metaphysically possible with logically possible. Kripke demonstrated these are not the same. That argument you gave is valid, but not sound. I made sure the OA was sound. There is a different here.
The MOA boils down to, "if god exists, then god exists". It just uses a lot more words in an effort to hide the obvious ridiculousness of the argument. _Everything Wrong with the Modal Ontological Argument_ ua-cam.com/video/jt2dywK1RZs/v-deo.html
It is metaphysically impossible because the concept of a MGB is metaphysically coherent, drawing a pessimistic inference or an abductive inference. You are attempting to rearrange the OA in order to debunk it, which isn't fooling anyone. The argument starts because one can show a MGB is metaphysically necessary. Then it is easy to argue other things are metaphysically impossible. What metaphysical reason do you have to suggest a MGB is impossible other than your simple logical proposition?
-That has been done, read Saul Kripke "Naming an Necessity". - That show the argument is deductively valid. - And i defend the metaphysical possibility ofGod existence "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (part 2)". - That is fine, that is not the point see "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (part 2)".
The OA doesn't prove God exists in an epistemic sense since it is a metaphysical argument. It shows that to believe God exists is the rational conclusion and completely logical.
We are simply defining infinite differently. Logic is not a set of boundary, despite how people use it. It simply is and what is possible. The only thing outside of logic is nothing.
-I doubt that, because at the most it can only be divided into two premises, which is why I sited William's version. One needs to point out possibility equals necessary existence and the other needs to show that God is possible. -I'm currently looking at Maydole's formulation & no where does He use ◊□. Check out the link in the info section by Dr. Craig. -See my video the 4th link in the info section. I argue for metaphysical possibility, not epistemic. -I also point out why a reverse OA fails.
No, because there is a difference between logical equivalence and synonymous. See the first link in the information section. If it was question begging it would only rely on 1 premise, which it doesn't science you need 1 say God is possible and one to say God is necessary. The reverse is question begging because you only need 1 to say God is impossible.
You are imposing time onto a being, that is by definition timeless. If He exists, then He exists eternally. If He failed to exist one day then He would not be eternal, be bound by time. Therefore, not omnipotent. Therefore, it is logically absurd to say God can fail to exist at a point. That implies time.
Yes, one can show logical possible world where God doesn't exist. Luckily, Peter S Williams responded to van Inwagen on this. See my video, "Answering Objections to the ontological argument (part 2)" It is not uninformative and actually easily rests on metaphysical possibility, which as Kripke pointed out is different.
Fair enough. To prevent a long discussion on ethics, moral perfection is the ontological properties of knowing the right decision to make, as well as not being able to be be twisted by greed or any other vices.
And again, i do not rely on mere logical possibility but metaphysical. I can use several other reasons to support P1, which are listed in "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (part 2)". I can only just draw support from the MPA. Do you own "the nature of necessity"? It doesn't say “it is without a doubt question begging”. This quote is from Jordan Howard Sobel in Logic and Theism. Have you been reading message boards?
The question becomes how are you defining perfection? By perfection do you mean omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect? If you are speaking of simply moral perfection then I don't think it is an issue to say that two being can be morally perfect. There is no logical contradiction in the nature of two things being morally perfect. I hope that helps.
No, what I said was, "when it is understood correctly it is impossible to refute." Just because we understand something that is logically coherent that doesn't prove it. Physicists could logically prove the existence of black holes for years using Einstein's equations, but that didn't stop them from proving from looking for empirical verification. We have to understand the difference between proof and a rational conclusion. The OA can't be refuted logically but that is at far as it goes.
I make the case is favors the Christian God at the end of "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (part 1)". But to be technical natural theology doesn't favor any particular God in the long run. See my video, "What atheists confuse" for more on this.
. . . saying I don't believe quarks exist because I don't know the color they are. God is spaceless so He doesn't have boarders or a physical shape. He is the same and primary substance as our consciousness is. Being a panentheist I argue all that exists in the mind of God and His thoughts (us).
Informing is telling someone information about a concept. Ex: God is necessary by definition. Persuading is convincing someone what is the most rational inference for an argument. Ex: God is best inference to explain the beginning of the universe because of (A) and (B).
You know I'm not a dualist. Raatz and I agree on most things. Why do you think God is going to desire something odd like that? This is hinting towards some sort of euthyphro dilemma with logic. God is identical with His nature and wouldn't be as a contingent being who's desires change from time to time.
And circular reasoning is only a problem is certain circumstances. See the first link in the information section. No, (2:35). The argument does force us to accept God is possible in P2. A MGB could be impossible. I do show God is possible in my video, "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (part 2)".
1:06 is the demonstration of skeptics error of reduction, which confuses 'de dicto' and 'de re'. That skeptical misrepresentation begs the question as I showed in the video, but the actual argument doesn't because it informs and doesn't rely on 1 premise.
And you assume I don't had any 'a posteriori' argument from evidence for metaphysical possibility? See my video, "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (part 2)"
LOL, yes we do, and they only need to show God is possible. And the conclusion is not identical as it relies on as least 2 premises as I demonstrated. Really, where does Plantinga say it is question begging?
Yes, I never disputed that, and I am trying to tell you that doesn't mean the argument begs the question, because your point is only directed at one premise.
If you are going to repeat your same refuted objections in different words I'm going to start getting rid of them. Once again, no, it relies on metaphysical possibility. Stop straw manning the argument to repeat yourself.
This is really good. Sadly, most of your opponents will still misuse the terms "begging the question" and "circular reasoning" as a way of making your arguments seem irrelevant. This has been their strategy for a long time: marginalize Christians so that popular thought considers them to be stupid, illogical, and even dangerous. Keep doing what you are doing, bro: you are helping, even in a small way, to reverse that trend.
Yes, that version is just a very simplified version. I would note that necessity isn't brought in until P3, but if the skeptic is not convinced I can just use Plantinga's original version, or Williams, or Parrish's version.
Insulting it is not refuting it. No, because science is subject to philosophy of science. Science has to assume philosophical questions like the laws of logic, the uniformity of nature & induction, among other things. LOL, you also confuse possible worlds with other universes. They are different things, as possible worlds are just logical constructs of the actual world. They do not exist in a concrete sense. Also just saying the OA doesn't work is just your opinion. It doesn't actually refute it
It has been awhile since I have seen that one, but if I remember correctly he goes after the original one, which is fine, because this version argues from necessity, not existence.
No you are being ad hoc. No, my response was for you notice it relies on two premises, not one, and to read the link in the information section explaining this.
You are turning a molehill into a mountain. The OA just shows if it is possible God exists, then God exists. Thus theists only need to show from natural theology that God is just possible, and I think it can go beyond that.
That is fine, again, the formulation can be remastered. It is not an issue for the underlying logic. We do the same with the principle of sufficient reason. Here you go: jwwartick . com/2010/02/18/the-ontological-argument-therefore-god-exists/
Thank you, The physical universe does not include everything in a philosophical possible world, because a possible world includes abstract ideas and emotions, among other things not included in the study of science. Your objection to premise 3 was actually the same objection I had at first. See my video, "the ontological argument (the introduction)" and "answering objections to the ontological argument" for your other objection. The links are in the information section.
You are making the same mistake as Dr. Wolpert: /watch?v=go6m-KNUmG4 I argue in that video as to why evil is a privation of good. I clearly do not make an unfounded assertion. See "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (part 1)". The argument is informative. So it does something, it informs.
From which version of the OA are you asking from? From Peter S Williams version, the 2nd premise gives us possibility backed up by the fact that God is logically coherent. The first premise is just backed up by the definition of God.
Yes, actually in my next video I'll be dealing with Epistemic vs Metaphysical possibility by dealing with Peter Van Inwagen's objection. TBS is committing a fallacy of equivocation by confusing the conclusion of the OA with a basic concept. The concept of a unicorn or a square circle exists but that doesn't mean they are metaphysically possible or rational to believe in. The OA doesn't prove God exists but it does show the belief in God is far more rational than the belief in atheism.
See, I agree that we cannot prove God's existence, but disagree we cannot know about these things. There is a difference between scientific empirical verification and the deductive reasoning of evidence to the most rational inference. Subjects like metaphysics, history, forensics, and ethics all cannot rely on scientific verification. Instead the conclusions in these subjects rely on evidence and a conclusion drawn from the evidence. Natural theology works the same way.
I would say the most logical position from the argument is there is a non-specific MGB that exists. But yes, it doesn't prove it, like we prove with scientific experimentation.
If there are no inherently great-making properties then your own intelligence is not objectively good and is only subjectively good. Therefore your argument is only intelligent in your own mind. This is the "ontological argument", the key word is "ontological". Properties are good if they benefit a being ontologically.
I did not say natural laws, I said "laws and (the) nature of the actual world", which is not defined as the physical universe. Look up what possible world semantics are.
Again, it that God is necessary by definition. If He wasn't necessary He would not be a MGB. We are not unsure if He is possibly necessary. See the 6th link in the information section.
You are confusing metaphysics with epistemology. In metaphysics things are not so because you think so. There needs to be a reason for impossibility. Possible worlds are not vaguely imagined worlds because we could imagine logically impossible statements. Possible worlds are hypothetical worlds based on the laws and nature of the actual world. They are thought experiments for philosophers.
You still offer no better inference. The OA incapsulated the thrust of the arguments in a global conclusion as Dr. Craig and Dr. Moreland put it. Either way unless there is a better inference natural theology still stands.
A contingent God is a contradiction in terms. So that would make God impossible. You are now changing the rules in other to disregard the argument, which is only going to convince yourself. And detracting also doesn't debunk the argument. So no cigar, it still doesn't beg the question. Do I need to bring Maydole out on you?
There you go again with the word "proved". You cannot force a metaphysical argument to prove. By doing so you do not debunk anything, instead you change the rules of logic so you can discredit God, which doesn't work because you reworked the rules.
Fair enough. However, I am going on the argument of my other two video, "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (part 1) & (part 2)" IN part 1 I argue via the modal perfection argument that ~MG is impossible so MG has to be possible. In part 2 I give reasons why MG is metaphysically possible, even if the MPA failed. So I would argue I have backed up my claim in those videos.
Science deals with the empirical. We cannot observe past the big bang, so anything past that is metaphysical, by definition. Not true, and for example Pau Davies and Richard Conn Henry became deists after studying physics. There is plenty of evidence that infers design. See my series on the Teleological argument, and i am about to get into the new arguments from digital physics. And again, science is just empirical facts. We then take those facts & infer the best explanation in metaphysics.
Did you notice I used PSW's version, which pretty much does that? The main point of the argument is to properly demonstrate how God is logically defined and why it makes sense that it is logically so that He either exists or is impossible. There is no middle ground.
You are confusing de dicto and de re necessity. The argument relies on de re necessity. So something can be de re necessary and not de dicto possible. Metaphyscial possibility is different in that it relies on one a posteriori argument. Your argument has not metaphysical support unlike the OA. See my video, "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (part 2)" for more on that topic. An argument has to be valid and sound. There is nothing supporting your argument so it doesn't work.
Ironically, this will be addressed in my next video, "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (Part 2)", which will be out in about a week. They are perfectly compatible and do not contradict.
You are assuming natural theology acts like links in a chain. When they are actually like links in chain mail, strengthening one another and building one another. I agree with Dr. Craig each individual argument on it's own doesn't show God exists, but natural theology does not operate as such (even though it is usually presumed that way). So I am not sure what your point is. No philosopher would suggest to argue with only the OA or any other individual argument.
Logic is, but it tells us what is good & bad. Your argument is not good then, so why pretend it is making a valid point? You are performing a bait & switch now. I never said logic is good. Logic tells us what is good. On your view your intelligence is nothing, not beneficial or good. It is not a GMP. You refuted your argument if you claim that. ROFL! I'm suppose to be impressed by insults & pride. I could just of said you have wishful thinking & have been indoctrinated by atheist professors.
I covered the reverse OA in my video, "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (Part 2)" It is not metaphysically possible God doesn't exist. I even argue it is not logically possible God exists in a logical sense, as the modal perfection argument shows, "See my video, "Answering Objections to the ontological Argument (part 1).
Okay, let's talk about De Re and De Dicto for a second. In my understanding De Dicto is: Necessarily there exists some x that is a, while De Re is there exists some x such that it is necessarily a. If we fill in "MGB" and "possible" for "x" and "a" we get: De Dicto: Necessarily there exists some MGB that is possible. and De Re: There exists some MGB that is necessarily possible. Is that what you mean or have I misconstrued?
Just ignoring what I said? Again, I show God is possible in my video, "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (part 2)". You obviously don't understand possible worlds. To say God is possible is to say God exists in a possible world. They mean the same thing in possible world semantics. I know the argument doesn't prove God exists I say so in my other video. Also the argument can't be used to show fairies exist. See my video "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (part 1)".
Really? Where did I say that? I merely did a google search and I found it on a message board and saw how it could be easily misconstrued to seem that Plantinga said that. And that is not what P1 says. So it is a straw man.
On that basis, if we are flawed beings and cannot conceive of anything perfect, then our knowledge is nothing but flawed and your arguments are flawed because they are based on flawed knowledge. You are also confusing metaphysical possibility with epistemic possibility. I deal with this in my video, "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (Part 2)."
Yes, the OA is "a logical proof", I did not say " it is logical proof" I was using proof in terms like a mathematical proof, but if it is confusing for some I can modify that to be more clear. If the OA is sound it certainly does rationally demonstrate God exists, but since the argument is metaphysical I am sensitive to saying it has proven God exists relative to epistemic status. My next video will be talking about this more.
And possible worlds are hypothetical worlds that must have the same logic and rules as the actual world so what is logical in them has to be logical in the actual world.
LOL, and you object to conclusion by saying God is not possible, meaning God is logically incoherent and impossible, which is in two premises. Stop fooling yourself.
No, you are simply defining infinite differently than me, and I've already pointed this out. Again, omnipotence doesn't mean one can do al things, it means all powerful. God cannot lie, make a square circle, tell you how many hours are in green, etc. All powerful doesn't mean doing all things.
I know, it can very frustrating. I have in the works an idea for a video called, "What atheists confuse". Which I think will be done late April of May. I am going to point out the difference between empirical verification and deductive reasoning. Thanks for the support and helping respond to people :)
The problem is "square circle" is not coherent in its definition and cannot even be possible. So:
P1: If it is possible a square circle exists, then one exists.
P2: It is not possible a square circle exists.
P3: Therefore, a square circle does not exist.
almost ALL the comments are yours, who were you debating 😂
@@Jodogio this was eleven years ago
You should know by now I've dealt with that in "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (part 1)" Defining something as necessary doesn't make it possible.
Now you're committing an equivocation fallacy. While a disagree on the objectively of oughts, "good" being used here is not moral goodness but as you said, "good in the sense of good chess". Some properties are good and some are not. What you value doesn't affect the ontological status of properties.
Because to say it is fact they are subjective is an objective truth claim. Therefore there is objective logic that is true independent of our opinions. Logic is not made, but discovered. What is ontologically beneficial is truly beneficial regardless of what we think.
Then I recommend you read "Modal Logic as Metaphysics". Modal Logic can take things that are coherent and asks whether they are possible and/or necessary. It works just fine with metaphysics. Also, I know the analysis of a MGB doesn't mean it exists, this is why we use modal logic.
Once again there are no problems if you do not change the rules of logic. Confusing 'metaphysics and epistemology' or confusing 'empiricism with deductive reasoning' are two things skeptics never seem to get. Proof means nothing in philosophy, and anyone who argues it does has discredited himself.
And that is the problem. God is defined as necessary (opposite being contingent). So the only way for God not to exist would be if He is impossible. So saying It is possible that God doesn't exist is the same as saying It is possible that God is impossible. You cannot arrive as impossibility from the opposite, possibility, like you can with necessity. Necessity and possibility are not opposites.
Then that was my typo mistake. I meant to say, "I even argue it is logically possible God exists in a logical sense." I do not need to rely on metaphysical possibility.
Using that axiom constantly it just causing you to not see your error. The OA works by doing two things: defying God and noting God is possible. By constantly pulling out the axiom you are saying the OA only says it possible God exists. But that is not what the OA does, and therefore, doesn't rely on 1 premise.
That is not what infinite is. First of all, we know the infinite exists, because basically numbers go on. The infinite just doesn't make sense in our finite world, but we cannot deny it exists. So infinite is logical because numbers go on infinitely.
I once had a discussion with someone who said that the Modal Perfection Argument begged the question because "great-making properties are possible" is a direct corollary of "great-making properties entail lesser-making properties." When people say that a deductive argument begs the question for reasons similar to this, they are demonstrating that they don't know what a deductive argument actually is; the whole point of a deductive argument is that the conclusion is a direct corollary of the premises.
Wrong again, the argument is from necessity not existence. Existence is not a property And a necessary unicorn is a logical absurdity. I deal with that claim in "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (part 1)"
The OA works in two ways, defining God as necessary and arguing God is possible. Simply defining God doesn't mean He exists.
That is not even an issue. You are assuming verificationism which is self-defeating to begin with and is nothing more than red herring. The definition is logically coherent and metaphysically possible.
This is why I used Peter S. Williams version in this. Saying God is necessary doesn't prove He is. The 2nd premise can be "It is not possible God exists". I can define several things as necessary but easily show it is not possible they exist. So this doesn't beg the question.
Possible worlds are not imagined worlds. They are logical constructs of the actual world.
You're also using neutral making properties, not great making properties, which are inherently good (ontologically) in all circumstances.
P1 yeah, I've heard that before. I have 3 other videos shows this is not the case. The 2nd, 3rd, and 4th link in the information section.
P2 I deal with that objection specifically in "Answering objections to the Ontological Argument (part 2)". 4th link.
P3 Possible worlds are just logical constructs of the actual world and I am planning a specific video on it.
First, ontology is independent of our mental thoughts. What I think doesn't affect the truth of ontology. I could want to die, but that doesn't make dying ontology beneficial. 2nd, goals are subjective but ontology is not. One may want to be stupid, but that doesn't show stupidity is a GMP. 3rd, if "ontologically beneficial is contingent upon subjective desires", then your intelligence is only subjectively valuable to you an your goals. There is nothing objectively good about it.
That doesn't mean it is true in what is logical. If logic is purely subjective then your own argument is purely subjective and there is nothing inherently good about it. So you have refuted yourself if you say it is all subjective.
Power doesn't corrupt, moral imperfection does. These are separate properties. Power is a good thing of itself. We are talking of ontology not ethics.
That is not proving I am wrong, which is not what it is about. It is about the best inference and most reasonable position.
You would be surprised of how many skeptics have argued the Modal OA begs the question therefore it is invalid. I was shocked.
If you start with an incoherent definition then the argument is not sound to begin with. I can define several things as necessary but that doesn't mean they are possible.
And I responded there. It is not a question of whether it is possible that God is necessary. God is necessary by definition and we ask if He is possible.
And now you admit the problem with the argument. It is logically valid. See my video, "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (part 2)" Logical validity doesn't cut it, unless you can show the negation is impossible (as Hume demonstrated), which actually can be done with God using the modal perfection argument but not with for argument.
I deal with the more in "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (part 2). God is not just logically possible, but metaphysically possible.
But not necessary?
@@goldenalt3166 God is defined as necessary, so it means a necessary being (God) is logically possible, therefore he exists.
@@TheSpacePlaceYT If he's defined as necessary, then saying he's possible is the same as saying he exists. Since he's necessary, there's nothing different because of his existence. What I'm interested in are the contingent facts under my control. Do you have anything related to that?
@@goldenalt3166bro what?
@@DeAngeloJohnson-ee9bt That's your comment after one year?
facepalm*, No because you do not define bachelor until the 2nd premise. See the first link, you are embarrassing yourself now:
"In a situation where you dispute the conclusion but are unaware of the identity given in (a), this argument could be offered to inform you, and so in that context it would not be question-begging."
You have no clue what you are saying.
And what in considerations is true or false? What I want is neither true nor false. It's just is a want. It is true that I want X, but the "want" is not true. What is truly beneficial is independent of desire. Our desires are not perfect, right all the time, or creates the truth of ontology. This would mean both weakness and strength are beneficial, but that is absurd ontologically speaking.
These appear to be red herring my friend. God is a conscious mind. Asking what color He is like . . .
P1 is that God is possible, not that He exists. You are confusing metaphysically possible with logically possible. Kripke demonstrated these are not the same.
That argument you gave is valid, but not sound. I made sure the OA was sound. There is a different here.
The MOA boils down to, "if god exists, then god exists". It just uses a lot more words in an effort to hide the obvious ridiculousness of the argument.
_Everything Wrong with the Modal Ontological Argument_
ua-cam.com/video/jt2dywK1RZs/v-deo.html
It is metaphysically impossible because the concept of a MGB is metaphysically coherent, drawing a pessimistic inference or an abductive inference. You are attempting to rearrange the OA in order to debunk it, which isn't fooling anyone. The argument starts because one can show a MGB is metaphysically necessary. Then it is easy to argue other things are metaphysically impossible. What metaphysical reason do you have to suggest a MGB is impossible other than your simple logical proposition?
-That has been done, read Saul Kripke "Naming an Necessity".
- That show the argument is deductively valid.
- And i defend the metaphysical possibility ofGod existence "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (part 2)".
- That is fine, that is not the point see "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (part 2)".
The OA doesn't prove God exists in an epistemic sense since it is a metaphysical argument. It shows that to believe God exists is the rational conclusion and completely logical.
We are simply defining infinite differently. Logic is not a set of boundary, despite how people use it. It simply is and what is possible. The only thing outside of logic is nothing.
-I doubt that, because at the most it can only be divided into two premises, which is why I sited William's version. One needs to point out possibility equals necessary existence and the other needs to show that God is possible.
-I'm currently looking at Maydole's formulation & no where does He use ◊□. Check out the link in the info section by Dr. Craig.
-See my video the 4th link in the info section. I argue for metaphysical possibility, not epistemic.
-I also point out why a reverse OA fails.
It is not suppose to be scientific, but metaphysical by drawing from evidence and reason to reach the most logical inference to what is true.
No, because there is a difference between logical equivalence and synonymous. See the first link in the information section. If it was question begging it would only rely on 1 premise, which it doesn't science you need 1 say God is possible and one to say God is necessary.
The reverse is question begging because you only need 1 to say God is impossible.
You are imposing time onto a being, that is by definition timeless. If He exists, then He exists eternally. If He failed to exist one day then He would not be eternal, be bound by time. Therefore, not omnipotent. Therefore, it is logically absurd to say God can fail to exist at a point. That implies time.
Yes, one can show logical possible world where God doesn't exist. Luckily, Peter S Williams responded to van Inwagen on this. See my video, "Answering Objections to the ontological argument (part 2)" It is not uninformative and actually easily rests on metaphysical possibility, which as Kripke pointed out is different.
Fair enough. To prevent a long discussion on ethics, moral perfection is the ontological properties of knowing the right decision to make, as well as not being able to be be twisted by greed or any other vices.
And again, i do not rely on mere logical possibility but metaphysical. I can use several other reasons to support P1, which are listed in "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (part 2)". I can only just draw support from the MPA.
Do you own "the nature of necessity"? It doesn't say “it is without a doubt question begging”. This quote is from Jordan Howard Sobel in Logic and Theism. Have you been reading message boards?
The question becomes how are you defining perfection? By perfection do you mean omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect? If you are speaking of simply moral perfection then I don't think it is an issue to say that two being can be morally perfect. There is no logical contradiction in the nature of two things being morally perfect. I hope that helps.
No, what I said was, "when it is understood correctly it is impossible to refute." Just because we understand something that is logically coherent that doesn't prove it. Physicists could logically prove the existence of black holes for years using Einstein's equations, but that didn't stop them from proving from looking for empirical verification. We have to understand the difference between proof and a rational conclusion. The OA can't be refuted logically but that is at far as it goes.
I make the case is favors the Christian God at the end of "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (part 1)". But to be technical natural theology doesn't favor any particular God in the long run. See my video, "What atheists confuse" for more on this.
. . . saying I don't believe quarks exist because I don't know the color they are. God is spaceless so He doesn't have boarders or a physical shape. He is the same and primary substance as our consciousness is. Being a panentheist I argue all that exists in the mind of God and His thoughts (us).
Informing is telling someone information about a concept. Ex: God is necessary by definition. Persuading is convincing someone what is the most rational inference for an argument. Ex: God is best inference to explain the beginning of the universe because of (A) and (B).
And P1 doesn't tell us where all are possible or impossible. It is just a definition. You need a second premise for that.
You know I'm not a dualist. Raatz and I agree on most things.
Why do you think God is going to desire something odd like that? This is hinting towards some sort of euthyphro dilemma with logic. God is identical with His nature and wouldn't be as a contingent being who's desires change from time to time.
And circular reasoning is only a problem is certain circumstances. See the first link in the information section.
No, (2:35). The argument does force us to accept God is possible in P2. A MGB could be impossible.
I do show God is possible in my video, "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (part 2)".
1:06 is the demonstration of skeptics error of reduction, which confuses 'de dicto' and 'de re'. That skeptical misrepresentation begs the question as I showed in the video, but the actual argument doesn't because it informs and doesn't rely on 1 premise.
And you assume I don't had any 'a posteriori' argument from evidence for metaphysical possibility? See my video, "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (part 2)"
LOL, yes we do, and they only need to show God is possible. And the conclusion is not identical as it relies on as least 2 premises as I demonstrated.
Really, where does Plantinga say it is question begging?
Yes, I never disputed that, and I am trying to tell you that doesn't mean the argument begs the question, because your point is only directed at one premise.
If you are going to repeat your same refuted objections in different words I'm going to start getting rid of them.
Once again, no, it relies on metaphysical possibility. Stop straw manning the argument to repeat yourself.
I do like how the video's are well made. Good pacing and as easy to understand as something like this could be.
This is really good. Sadly, most of your opponents will still misuse the terms "begging the question" and "circular reasoning" as a way of making your arguments seem irrelevant. This has been their strategy for a long time: marginalize Christians so that popular thought considers them to be stupid, illogical, and even dangerous. Keep doing what you are doing, bro: you are helping, even in a small way, to reverse that trend.
Yes, that version is just a very simplified version. I would note that necessity isn't brought in until P3, but if the skeptic is not convinced I can just use Plantinga's original version, or Williams, or Parrish's version.
Insulting it is not refuting it.
No, because science is subject to philosophy of science. Science has to assume philosophical questions like the laws of logic, the uniformity of nature & induction, among other things.
LOL, you also confuse possible worlds with other universes. They are different things, as possible worlds are just logical constructs of the actual world. They do not exist in a concrete sense.
Also just saying the OA doesn't work is just your opinion. It doesn't actually refute it
Again, your P2 doesn't says God is possible or not, It says "IF". Which changes the meaning. Nice try.
I go over this in "The Ontological Argument (The Introduction)". Possibility does equal existence is something is ontologically necessary.
It has been awhile since I have seen that one, but if I remember correctly he goes after the original one, which is fine, because this version argues from necessity, not existence.
No you are being ad hoc.
No, my response was for you notice it relies on two premises, not one, and to read the link in the information section explaining this.
You are turning a molehill into a mountain. The OA just shows if it is possible God exists, then God exists. Thus theists only need to show from natural theology that God is just possible, and I think it can go beyond that.
That is fine, again, the formulation can be remastered. It is not an issue for the underlying logic. We do the same with the principle of sufficient reason.
Here you go:
jwwartick . com/2010/02/18/the-ontological-argument-therefore-god-exists/
Thank you,
The physical universe does not include everything in a philosophical possible world, because a possible world includes abstract ideas and emotions, among other things not included in the study of science.
Your objection to premise 3 was actually the same objection I had at first. See my video, "the ontological argument (the introduction)" and "answering objections to the ontological argument" for your other objection. The links are in the information section.
You are making the same mistake as Dr. Wolpert: /watch?v=go6m-KNUmG4
I argue in that video as to why evil is a privation of good. I clearly do not make an unfounded assertion. See "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (part 1)".
The argument is informative. So it does something, it informs.
From which version of the OA are you asking from? From Peter S Williams version, the 2nd premise gives us possibility backed up by the fact that God is logically coherent. The first premise is just backed up by the definition of God.
And I answered what makes Him the greatest conceivable being. He is a immaterial being, a conscious mind.
Yes, actually in my next video I'll be dealing with Epistemic vs Metaphysical possibility by dealing with Peter Van Inwagen's objection.
TBS is committing a fallacy of equivocation by confusing the conclusion of the OA with a basic concept. The concept of a unicorn or a square circle exists but that doesn't mean they are metaphysically possible or rational to believe in. The OA doesn't prove God exists but it does show the belief in God is far more rational than the belief in atheism.
See, I agree that we cannot prove God's existence, but disagree we cannot know about these things. There is a difference between scientific empirical verification and the deductive reasoning of evidence to the most rational inference. Subjects like metaphysics, history, forensics, and ethics all cannot rely on scientific verification. Instead the conclusions in these subjects rely on evidence and a conclusion drawn from the evidence. Natural theology works the same way.
I would say the most logical position from the argument is there is a non-specific MGB that exists. But yes, it doesn't prove it, like we prove with scientific experimentation.
If there are no inherently great-making properties then your own intelligence is not objectively good and is only subjectively good. Therefore your argument is only intelligent in your own mind.
This is the "ontological argument", the key word is "ontological". Properties are good if they benefit a being ontologically.
I did not say natural laws, I said "laws and (the) nature of the actual world", which is not defined as the physical universe. Look up what possible world semantics are.
Again, it that God is necessary by definition. If He wasn't necessary He would not be a MGB. We are not unsure if He is possibly necessary. See the 6th link in the information section.
You are confusing metaphysics with epistemology. In metaphysics things are not so because you think so. There needs to be a reason for impossibility. Possible worlds are not vaguely imagined worlds because we could imagine logically impossible statements. Possible worlds are hypothetical worlds based on the laws and nature of the actual world. They are thought experiments for philosophers.
You still offer no better inference. The OA incapsulated the thrust of the arguments in a global conclusion as Dr. Craig and Dr. Moreland put it. Either way unless there is a better inference natural theology still stands.
A contingent God is a contradiction in terms. So that would make God impossible. You are now changing the rules in other to disregard the argument, which is only going to convince yourself. And detracting also doesn't debunk the argument. So no cigar, it still doesn't beg the question. Do I need to bring Maydole out on you?
Thanks for letting me, it encourages me to keep going. God Bless!
There you go again with the word "proved". You cannot force a metaphysical argument to prove. By doing so you do not debunk anything, instead you change the rules of logic so you can discredit God, which doesn't work because you reworked the rules.
Then the ontological argument follows leading to the conclusion.
Fair enough. However, I am going on the argument of my other two video, "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (part 1) & (part 2)" IN part 1 I argue via the modal perfection argument that ~MG is impossible so MG has to be possible. In part 2 I give reasons why MG is metaphysically possible, even if the MPA failed. So I would argue I have backed up my claim in those videos.
No, in no possible world can a being be all power and not exist. That would be logically absurd. I hope that helps.
If God could die, He would not be all powerful. St. Augustine pointed this out years ago.
Science deals with the empirical. We cannot observe past the big bang, so anything past that is metaphysical, by definition.
Not true, and for example Pau Davies and Richard Conn Henry became deists after studying physics. There is plenty of evidence that infers design. See my series on the Teleological argument, and i am about to get into the new arguments from digital physics.
And again, science is just empirical facts. We then take those facts & infer the best explanation in metaphysics.
Did you notice I used PSW's version, which pretty much does that? The main point of the argument is to properly demonstrate how God is logically defined and why it makes sense that it is logically so that He either exists or is impossible. There is no middle ground.
You are confusing de dicto and de re necessity. The argument relies on de re necessity. So something can be de re necessary and not de dicto possible.
Metaphyscial possibility is different in that it relies on one a posteriori argument. Your argument has not metaphysical support unlike the OA. See my video, "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (part 2)" for more on that topic.
An argument has to be valid and sound. There is nothing supporting your argument so it doesn't work.
Ironically, this will be addressed in my next video, "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (Part 2)", which will be out in about a week. They are perfectly compatible and do not contradict.
You are assuming natural theology acts like links in a chain. When they are actually like links in chain mail, strengthening one another and building one another. I agree with Dr. Craig each individual argument on it's own doesn't show God exists, but natural theology does not operate as such (even though it is usually presumed that way). So I am not sure what your point is. No philosopher would suggest to argue with only the OA or any other individual argument.
Logic is, but it tells us what is good & bad. Your argument is not good then, so why pretend it is making a valid point? You are performing a bait & switch now. I never said logic is good. Logic tells us what is good. On your view your intelligence is nothing, not beneficial or good. It is not a GMP. You refuted your argument if you claim that.
ROFL! I'm suppose to be impressed by insults & pride. I could just of said you have wishful thinking & have been indoctrinated by atheist professors.
I covered the reverse OA in my video, "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (Part 2)" It is not metaphysically possible God doesn't exist. I even argue it is not logically possible God exists in a logical sense, as the modal perfection argument shows, "See my video, "Answering Objections to the ontological Argument (part 1).
Arguing from epistemology doesn't effect the metaphysical argument.
Okay, let's talk about De Re and De Dicto for a second. In my understanding De Dicto is: Necessarily there exists some x that is a, while De Re is there exists some x such that it is necessarily a. If we fill in "MGB" and "possible" for "x" and "a" we get: De Dicto: Necessarily there exists some MGB that is possible. and De Re: There exists some MGB that is necessarily possible. Is that what you mean or have I misconstrued?
Just ignoring what I said? Again, I show God is possible in my video, "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (part 2)".
You obviously don't understand possible worlds. To say God is possible is to say God exists in a possible world. They mean the same thing in possible world semantics.
I know the argument doesn't prove God exists I say so in my other video. Also the argument can't be used to show fairies exist. See my video "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (part 1)".
Really? Where did I say that? I merely did a google search and I found it on a message board and saw how it could be easily misconstrued to seem that Plantinga said that.
And that is not what P1 says. So it is a straw man.
Then you need to study cosmology. The singularity is not a thing, but a boundary, as Paul Davies notes.
On that basis, if we are flawed beings and cannot conceive of anything perfect, then our knowledge is nothing but flawed and your arguments are flawed because they are based on flawed knowledge.
You are also confusing metaphysical possibility with epistemic possibility. I deal with this in my video, "Answering Objections to the Ontological Argument (Part 2)."
Well harm is a physical effect. It has nothing to do with morality. See Hume's is/ought problem or open ended question argument.
Yes, the OA is "a logical proof", I did not say " it is logical proof" I was using proof in terms like a mathematical proof, but if it is confusing for some I can modify that to be more clear.
If the OA is sound it certainly does rationally demonstrate God exists, but since the argument is metaphysical I am sensitive to saying it has proven God exists relative to epistemic status. My next video will be talking about this more.
So you aren't sure that the argument is sound?
And possible worlds are hypothetical worlds that must have the same logic and rules as the actual world so what is logical in them has to be logical in the actual world.
LOL, and you object to conclusion by saying God is not possible, meaning God is logically incoherent and impossible, which is in two premises. Stop fooling yourself.
No, you are simply defining infinite differently than me, and I've already pointed this out. Again, omnipotence doesn't mean one can do al things, it means all powerful. God cannot lie, make a square circle, tell you how many hours are in green, etc. All powerful doesn't mean doing all things.
Good for him, where do i say that?
I know, it can very frustrating. I have in the works an idea for a video called, "What atheists confuse". Which I think will be done late April of May. I am going to point out the difference between empirical verification and deductive reasoning. Thanks for the support and helping respond to people :)