What if we took Brigards modified experiment and modified it one step further. You’re told that the life you now know is just an experience machine. You are then given three options. Firstly, you could stay in the machine and forget ever being told it wasn’t real. Second, you could choose to live out a “real” life outside the experience machine that would be different, but of a comparable net pleasure. Lastly, you could upgrade to a new experience machine that would maximize the pleasure you experience throughout life. I’ve asked this question to many friends and they’re somewhat split on the first and third option, but almost no one ever chooses reality. I think this would make a strong case against the inherent value of truth. I’d be interested to hear what you think about it.
You are Dwayne Dibley and find out you are on the SSS Esperanto under influence by a giant squid. Do you stay in the machine or return to Starbug and spend your life with a bum and a hologram with narcisicsm.
I find the Brigard modification problematic. I cannot be persuaded into thinking that I currently live in an experience machine of which 'I' am the architect. If it is true that my 'physical body' is somewhere outside the machine, assuming that that world is not simulated itself, then most definitely I cannot be the architect of a machine which produces maximal pleasure. Therefore, if I am not the architect of this machine, there must be a different reason why I am currently plugged into the EM. I'll leave the possibility open that the person who attempts to persuade me into accepting the belief that I am currently living in a simulation is false, until I have sufficient reason to believe that it is indeed the case. Given that thought experiments more or less have infinite dimensions of freedom, we can grant that that person indeed has the ability to convince me that I'm currently plugged into EM. If that is so, then I have two options. I can continue living in the EM or have myself unplugged. What reasons do I have to continue living? I readily presented one. If I am currently plugged into the EM, it is certain that I did not do it myself with the intention to maximize pleasure. Assuming that I wouldn't have plugged myself into the EM in order to live a worse life, I simply have no idea why I would be plugged into the machine. But the cause for plugging myself into the machine must have been sufficient for me to 'leave' the life I'm living in the world outside the EM. It is therefore logically sound to infer that (i) the life I'm living outside the machine was sufficiently dreadful for me to leave it or (ii) any other possible external force (taken in the most literal sense, this external force can be literally anything that caused me to be plugged into EM other than the cause being an autonomous decision by myself) caused me to be plugged into the EM (I leave open the possibility that I'm living a much more pleasurable, better and so forth live than I am living in the EM). it is possible that I'd be content when I unplug myself, but all things considered, this situation is not that much different from the story of the Ones Who Walked Away From the Omelas, in which the decision to leave the city leaves open an infinite range of potential future lives that one decides to trade against one's current life (the analogy stops because in that story a kid tortured in a dungeon, which could trigger the decision to leave being ethically informed rather than the hedonistic impulse of living an infinitely more blissful life). Thus, if (i) happens to be the case, I should not unplug myself from the EM for reasons that need no explanation; if (ii) is true *and* I am currently satisfied with the life I am living I should not either. What are the reasons for unplugging myself from the EM? One reason might be that the EM in which I currently happen to live is a solipsistic world. I wonder what it would take to persuade me that that is in fact the case. But assuming that I am convinced that solipsism is true in EM I'd be more inclined to unplug myself from the EM -- under a number of conditions.: (i) Solipsism is false outside the EM. If it is true as well outside the EM, I'd see no point in plugging out of the EM, for my acting in the world has no effect on anyone other than myself. In that case maximizing pleasure is, I think, the only reasonable option. Given that I am rather content with my current life (status quo bias), I'm not happy to wager this life for a life of less pleasurable experiences. The fact that I potentially lead a perfect life, i.e., my 'true' life outside the EM being what I'd consider a life in a perfectly optimized EM, does not matter if the probability of the downside is present. In case of the possibility of complete disaster when the current situation is sufficient, it is unwise to make a probabilistic calculation (and in this case you cannot, because you don't have any priors to base your probabilistic calculation on). (ii) I am 'physically', that is to say, phenomenally, the same person outside the EM and others will perceive me as such. If I cannot be granted both (i) and (ii), I'll be happy to stay plugged in.
Aesir Vanir I think that those concerns are really missing the point that the experiment is supposed to be pressuring, but I’ll do my best to address them. Let’s say that you were randomly selected to be a child that was put into the experience machine at a very young age because your species was traveling in space to a new planet and they needed to conserve resources. By putting you in the machine, they were able to give you a “life” to live while simultaneously drastically reducing the resources you’d consume in reality outside the machine. Imagine cryosleep wouldn’t be an option. Your space travels are now over and your species has reached its new planet replete with resources. This being the case, they present you with the three options I described in my initial comment. Thus, the reasons for entering the machine were perfectly consistent with there being a comparable and palatable existence outside of it. For the sake of the thought experiment let’s imagine that you will unequivocally live a life that is substantially similar in terms of pleasure experienced whether you choose the status quo or to exit the machine. The life you live will be different. You’ll live on a whole new planet, surrounded by completely different people, etc but most things that make you happy or sad will be relatively given out in similar doses. For example, you’ll have a similar socioeconomic status, you’ll have relationships of a quality more or less equivalent to one’s you’ve had, you’ll be about as smart and as attractive relatively speaking as you were in the machine etc. The only major difference is that one is “real” in the sense that there is a physical reality your body is interacting with and not just a stimulation that your brain is deceived into thinking is an impression of reality. Further, the people would be real as opposed to non-sentient computer programs that convincingly pass as sentient. Let’s finally imagine that you could, at your discretion, choose to forget that the life you were living wasn’t real. I think that the vast majority of people would either choose the status quo EM or the modified EM that gives them a maximally pleasurable life
@@thewibb5109 Thanks for your reply (I have another response to this video in this comment section concerning solipsism and the validity of the EM as a machine than can in principle maximize pleasure. I have theoretical disagreements with EM being possible _at_ _all_ but I won't go into that too much in this response). The central importance of Nozick's thought experiment is the question of autonomy. I must confess I was confused by your initial post in which you said that your friends choose the first or third option and forego the possibility of re-entering the 'real' world _even_ when their quality of life in both worlds is preserved. Living in the EM means resigning your autonomy, if we define autonomy as the ability to be one's own person, to take directions in life based on your own deliberations, your own desires, your own personal characteristics, and so forth, that are not the product of external forces but of an authentic self. Because I view Nozick's argument against that background, and because I highly value autonomy, I'd choose the second option in your initial post. The reason for this should be obvious: In the EM, my actions (_if_ we can even speak of 'my actions' and resulting happy mental states due to 'my actions' in EM) do not have any tangible effects on anyone if solipsism is true. If solipsism is false in EM, then necessarily happiness cannot be maximized and EM is false, as I explained in my other post in this comment section. Even more so, one could ask what it means for any action to be tangible in EM whether solipsism is true or false, for there is a fundamental asymmetry between the 'real' and 'simulated' world with respect to the question of autonomy and tangibility of one's actions. Intuitively, your actions are 'more real' in the 'real' world and less real in the simulated. What could that difference consist in? One aspect that grounds the intuition, I think, is that your body is 'real' in the former world and not 'real' in the latter. The simulation cannot sustain itself in the absence of the real world, while the 'real' world does not need the simulation for it to continue. All simulated worlds are 'mere' subsets of the 'real' world to which they are connected. Consider a further aspect. When I hit someone in the simulated world because this is pleasurable to me, assuming that person is conscious and has subjective experience of me hitting that person, we can both _in_ _principle_ plug out and have a discussion about what happened. By definition, no 'real' damage was done in the simulated world, though the person I hit certainly 'experienced' it not unlike the experience of being hit in the real world. I think it is useful to use the dream metaphor to clarify the difference between the real and the simulated world. It clears up intuitions about the 'inconsequential' nature of the world in the EM. You can be hit, killed, loved, valued, marry, have children &c. in both worlds. But only in the real world will the consequences of those actions have 'real' consequences. Being killed, for example, is very definitive in the real world, but not so much in the dream world -- you can simply wake up. Having a child in EM doesn't put forth a new being in the world as having a child in the real world does. Moreover, the child cannot unplug from the experience machine, for it is born in it. That raises additional questions with respect to the status of a person in EM who doesn't have the ability to unplug. Luckily, getting killed in the EM isn't about to happen and of course defeats the purpose of the thought experiment (observe that being happy with killing yourself or getting killed cannot be finalized in the EM, but only in the real world), but having children certainly will be an experience of some in EM. My point is that no action in the simulated world has the same ontological status as the same action has in the real world, even if a person's subjective experiences caused by any action are identical in both worlds. Thus, assuming that solipsism is false in the 'real' world outside the EM, as I do while writing this post, for a person who values autonomy and their actions having consequences for people other than themselves, the second option is the rational choice to make. One might object that the first option solves the problematic question of autonomy. If not being autonomous in EM is a detrimental factor to the happiness of the person who values autonomy and the tangibility of their actions, then simply stipulating that we have the subjective experience of being autonomous in EM solves that problem. But the person who values autonomy values the idea that _you_ are the architect of _your_ pleasure and misery and all emotional states in between, and those mental states are not due to an external source imposing those mental states upon you, like the EM does (for it makes sure that you'll always act in accordance with what will make you maximally happy). But the point of Nozick's experiment, as I see it, is not so much the life one lives in any of the two world, but the very _choice_ one makes to plug-in or, in Brigard's modification, to un-plug. The *intention* behind the act of plugging in or unplugging is what matters -- for surely the person who chooses option 1 retains the idea of autonomy in EM *because* he/she is under the impression that life is lived in the 'real' world -- a choice which reveals the preferences of that person to live in the 'real' world.* But the revealed preference of that person to relinquish autonomy by means of auto-induced amnesia contradicts the preference of the person to be autonomous. That is to say, there is a step _prior_ to entering the EM that reveals the person's preferences; the revealed preferences of the person aren't shown by the de facto life he/she lives, which is always _posterior_ to the choice made by the person. Therefore, anyone who values autonomy will chose option 2 by default (and I must say you made that an easy choice by equalizing the person's net pleasure in both worlds, among other benefits such as a continuation of personality &c.); though it is easy to see that anyone who wants pleasure over anything else, whether the source of pleasure is internally generated as a result of the autonomous actions of the person or externally imposed on the person, will rationally choose option 3. (I wonder what reasoning was behind your friend's choice for option 1) I presented this case to my brother and he responded that there really is no distinction between option 1 and 2 _after_ one makes the decision, for all else is equal _except_ the phenomenal world you inhabit. That exception might be sufficiently significant that it leads to a person disregarding option 2 (status quo bias) and choosing 1, though you granted that the person making the choice remains phenomenally *identical*. That was the only objection my brother had to option 2: the discontinuity of one's _personal_ interaction with the world you're planning to leave when unplugging,and thus having to reassess your subjective relation with the new world you'll inhabit when choosing option 2 (for if you'd have a different body and so on, this negates _x_ years of reciprocal interaction with the world in the EM. You're effectively rejecting your Personality/Self when choosing option 2). But if you grant continuity of personality (and even socio-economic status and so forth if I understood you correctly), that makes option 2 all the more attractive -- especially to those who value autonomy and who were already inclined to choose option 2 for that reason. * I think this is an important objection to your claim that you made a case against the inherent value of truth, if we understand the 'real' world to be the 'true' world. Option 1 _is_ in fact a preference for truth: by choosing to remove the awareness that you live in the EM you reveal your preference for living in the 'real' world, though for whatever reason it happens that that person does not wish to unplug. Other than status quo bias I do not see how option 1 can be preferable. Option 2 is clearly preferable if status quo bias is not the reason for choosing option 1, for the act that precedes choosing option 1 already shows a person's being favourable toward living in the real world. So much so that the person explicitly wishes to forget that he/she is _not_ living in a simulated, i.e., a 'fake' world! Option 2 grants that person to _actually_ live in the 'real' world. Thus, I do not see how the three options you present aren't effectively two options, namely 2 and 3. Because option 3 is possible, choosing option 1 cannot be preferable to 3 if one values happiness over truth. For if one were more concerned with being happy than with living in a 'real' world, then everyone would prefer option 3 over 1. Thus, I think you're mistaken in thinking that choosing 1 _and_ 3 is an argument against 2, that is to say, an argument against the inherent value of 'truth' -- this is only the case if it can be argued that 3 is objectively preferable to 2. But I don't think the construction of an EM which maximizes happiness is possible, as I argued in another post in this comment section (not the post you replied to).
The thing is that one can still be entirely motivated by pleasure and pain, and still not opt into the experience machine. Look at how people are characterized as feeling when they are given the thought experiment. People feel disturbed and repulsed by the thought experiment. Disturbance and repulsion are forms of pain. I’d say that people find the idea of not living within reality inherently painful, subsequently making people not want to go into the experience machine.
- I would argue that utilitarians would be committed to stepping into the experience machine - Since hedonic utilitarians take pleasure to be the only thing that matters about experiences, it should be equally good for them to step into a 'pleasure machine' where no experiences are produced, but the underlying cocktail of neurotransmitters that make experiences feel good - say serotonin, dopamine, oxytocin, etc... are instead stimulated. - In fact, it is likely that the pleasure machine could bring about much more pleasure than the experience machine since they can cause the release of the underlying neurotransmitters to a much greater extent than experiences could - But while the pleasure brought about from going from the experience machine to pleasure machine would likely increase massively, it seems much more counterintuitive that what ought to be done is that we should all strap ourselves to pleasure machines. - Would you plug into an experience machine but not a pleasure machine? If so, why not?
I can see a delema that's is probably besides the point. If the pleasure is based on what I have already experienced then the experience machine would be very limited. If it is based off what someone else has experienced then how would it know what would give me pleasure.
You can posit another objection if you frame it in the sense of the people being able to interact with others in the machine. If it is the case that I want to have sex with my entire female class, then the machine makes it happen. But what if that class consist of real people, also plugged into the machine? They might NOT want to have sex with me. In fact it might be the case that they want me out of their life entirely. So whilst the machine is trying to appeal to my egoism, if I have a desire to obviously not revoke other people's consent, and clearly we can say that other people's suffering here wouldn't better the criteria of best pleasure for individuals. I think it highlights the point about reality that we intuitively appeal to. Reality doesn't let us experience our inner most egoistic sense of welfare because such things are incompatible with other people's desires for welfare. So if it is the case that our wellbeing rests on us having REAL social interactions instead of just fake NPC like ones, where we're not actually interacting with anyone real, who can't appreaciate the experiences we're sharing, then the machine can't provide us that aspect of reality that we truly need. i.e. agency in a world with other agents, all seeking their own best possible wellbeing states. It seems if the machine could produce such an experience, then really all it's doing is mirroring the real world and it's limits to what it can provide. Only it takes out all the work involved in doing it. In which case one could argue, well why would we invest time and money building a self sustaining machine that does all this, instead of just making a world where this setup already is the case? There would intrinsically be no difference between the experience machine and the real world, so we're just better off making the real world the best possible experience. I mean an experience machine can't prevent an asteroid wiping out all life on earth (including the machine), but in reality we could build an anti-asteroid laser or something. It just becomes an argument that the real world is the only possible 'best possible world' we could actually create. So I guess that puts me firmly in the hedoism camp. Fetch the lube Doris!
In the world of the experience machine solipsism is either true or false. If solipsism in the experience machine is false, there must be other conscious minds in the machine. It is true that no two people have identical ideas about pleasure and desires. Therefore, if solipsism is false in the EM, the EM cannot function such that it maximizes my pleasure for the same reason I cannot maximize my pleasure in this world. To give a pathetic example: if it were up to me, I'd read books throughout the day and have sex with all women who cause arousal in me, for surely, being human, sex with people to whom you're attracted will be part of the experiences one considers pleasurable and therefore desirable. Because these experiences are desirable they will also be part of one's experience in the EM. For reasons that need no explanation, a life consisting of both activities, be it inside or outside the machine, is unfeasible. If solipsism is false in EM, then my pleasure can never be optimized, for certainly I can experience reading books all day and engage in activities which in which other people don't participate, but my pleasure would be limited nonetheless -- for clearly not all people in the machine, who are conscious, would agree to my wanting to have sex with them. Thus, if EM maximizes pleasure of any agent in EM and solipsism is false in EM, and if solipsism being false in EM implies that no agent can maximize its pleasure because no two agents have identical ideas about what is pleasurable or desirable, then EM is false. That leaves the other possibility of EM being true iff solipsism is true in EM. Now, that raises a few intuitive questions about the meaning of pleasure in the absence of other conscious beings. Can a pleasurable activity that involves other beings be truly pleasurable if those other beings are unconscious, i.e., can pleasure in that context be 'truly' desirable if it cannot be shared with other beings who participate in the activity? To get back to my example: is sex with an attractive woman pleasurable if she participates in the activity with me, but doesn't experience the activity itself? Intuitively, the amount of pleasure derived from that activity is significantly less compared to the situation in which both you and the person reciprocally cause pleasure to arise in each other. Thus, all things being equal, the pleasure I derive from sex with a woman who cannot experience the activity (and therefore cannot experience pleasure) is necessarily lowered, for I gain additional pleasure from the activity due to the fact that the other person is experiencing pleasure as well -- an experience of additional pleasure which is necessarily absent if solipsism is true in EM. Therefore, if solipsism is true in EM, and activities that maximize one's pleasure involve other beings, then, because my pleasure depends on the pleasure that other beings reciprocally experience from their interaction with me, and if pleasure is absent in unconscious beings that participate in activities in which I am involved, EM is necessarily false.
You ask whether the EM content can be 'truly' pleasurable (or desirable), but perhaps the difference between 'truly pleasurable' and merely 'experienced to be pleasurable' is negligible. It is certainly imperceptible, as perceptions wholly belong to experience. The whole point of the EM is for you give up the assurance that whatever you experience truly happens. Keep in mind that your memory of opting into the EM will be erased, so you won't have any foreknowledge of this subtle distinction obtaining, and no way of finding out. The EM might run like a sandbox (think virtual machines) for each person, with no one else plugged into the same machine (since, as you point out, the alternative seems untenable), yet at the same time provide that person the full experience of there being other people to interact with. In other words, you'd effectively be opting into a solipsistic world... but what guarantee do you have that 'real life' isn't solipsistic?
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What if we took Brigards modified experiment and modified it one step further. You’re told that the life you now know is just an experience machine. You are then given three options. Firstly, you could stay in the machine and forget ever being told it wasn’t real. Second, you could choose to live out a “real” life outside the experience machine that would be different, but of a comparable net pleasure. Lastly, you could upgrade to a new experience machine that would maximize the pleasure you experience throughout life. I’ve asked this question to many friends and they’re somewhat split on the first and third option, but almost no one ever chooses reality. I think this would make a strong case against the inherent value of truth. I’d be interested to hear what you think about it.
You are Dwayne Dibley and find out you are on the SSS Esperanto under influence by a giant squid.
Do you stay in the machine or return to Starbug and spend your life with a bum and a hologram with narcisicsm.
I find the Brigard modification problematic. I cannot be persuaded into thinking that I currently live in an experience machine of which 'I' am the architect. If it is true that my 'physical body' is somewhere outside the machine, assuming that that world is not simulated itself, then most definitely I cannot be the architect of a machine which produces maximal pleasure. Therefore, if I am not the architect of this machine, there must be a different reason why I am currently plugged into the EM. I'll leave the possibility open that the person who attempts to persuade me into accepting the belief that I am currently living in a simulation is false, until I have sufficient reason to believe that it is indeed the case. Given that thought experiments more or less have infinite dimensions of freedom, we can grant that that person indeed has the ability to convince me that I'm currently plugged into EM.
If that is so, then I have two options. I can continue living in the EM or have myself unplugged. What reasons do I have to continue living? I readily presented one. If I am currently plugged into the EM, it is certain that I did not do it myself with the intention to maximize pleasure. Assuming that I wouldn't have plugged myself into the EM in order to live a worse life, I simply have no idea why I would be plugged into the machine. But the cause for plugging myself into the machine must have been sufficient for me to 'leave' the life I'm living in the world outside the EM. It is therefore logically sound to infer that (i) the life I'm living outside the machine was sufficiently dreadful for me to leave it or (ii) any other possible external force (taken in the most literal sense, this external force can be literally anything that caused me to be plugged into EM other than the cause being an autonomous decision by myself) caused me to be plugged into the EM (I leave open the possibility that I'm living a much more pleasurable, better and so forth live than I am living in the EM). it is possible that I'd be content when I unplug myself, but all things considered, this situation is not that much different from the story of the Ones Who Walked Away From the Omelas, in which the decision to leave the city leaves open an infinite range of potential future lives that one decides to trade against one's current life (the analogy stops because in that story a kid tortured in a dungeon, which could trigger the decision to leave being ethically informed rather than the hedonistic impulse of living an infinitely more blissful life). Thus, if (i) happens to be the case, I should not unplug myself from the EM for reasons that need no explanation; if (ii) is true *and* I am currently satisfied with the life I am living I should not either.
What are the reasons for unplugging myself from the EM? One reason might be that the EM in which I currently happen to live is a solipsistic world. I wonder what it would take to persuade me that that is in fact the case. But assuming that I am convinced that solipsism is true in EM I'd be more inclined to unplug myself from the EM -- under a number of conditions.:
(i) Solipsism is false outside the EM. If it is true as well outside the EM, I'd see no point in plugging out of the EM, for my acting in the world has no effect on anyone other than myself. In that case maximizing pleasure is, I think, the only reasonable option. Given that I am rather content with my current life (status quo bias), I'm not happy to wager this life for a life of less pleasurable experiences. The fact that I potentially lead a perfect life, i.e., my 'true' life outside the EM being what I'd consider a life in a perfectly optimized EM, does not matter if the probability of the downside is present. In case of the possibility of complete disaster when the current situation is sufficient, it is unwise to make a probabilistic calculation (and in this case you cannot, because you don't have any priors to base your probabilistic calculation on).
(ii) I am 'physically', that is to say, phenomenally, the same person outside the EM
and others will perceive me as such.
If I cannot be granted both (i) and (ii), I'll be happy to stay plugged in.
Aesir Vanir I think that those concerns are really missing the point that the experiment is supposed to be pressuring, but I’ll do my best to address them. Let’s say that you were randomly selected to be a child that was put into the experience machine at a very young age because your species was traveling in space to a new planet and they needed to conserve resources. By putting you in the machine, they were able to give you a “life” to live while simultaneously drastically reducing the resources you’d consume in reality outside the machine. Imagine cryosleep wouldn’t be an option. Your space travels are now over and your species has reached its new planet replete with resources. This being the case, they present you with the three options I described in my initial comment. Thus, the reasons for entering the machine were perfectly consistent with there being a comparable and palatable existence outside of it. For the sake of the thought experiment let’s imagine that you will unequivocally live a life that is substantially similar in terms of pleasure experienced whether you choose the status quo or to exit the machine. The life you live will be different. You’ll live on a whole new planet, surrounded by completely different people, etc but most things that make you happy or sad will be relatively given out in similar doses. For example, you’ll have a similar socioeconomic status, you’ll have relationships of a quality more or less equivalent to one’s you’ve had, you’ll be about as smart and as attractive relatively speaking as you were in the machine etc. The only major difference is that one is “real” in the sense that there is a physical reality your body is interacting with and not just a stimulation that your brain is deceived into thinking is an impression of reality. Further, the people would be real as opposed to non-sentient computer programs that convincingly pass as sentient. Let’s finally imagine that you could, at your discretion, choose to forget that the life you were living wasn’t real. I think that the vast majority of people would either choose the status quo EM or the modified EM that gives them a maximally pleasurable life
@@thewibb5109 Thanks for your reply (I have another response to this video in this comment section concerning solipsism and the validity of the EM as a machine than can in principle maximize pleasure. I have theoretical disagreements with EM being possible _at_ _all_ but I won't go into that too much in this response).
The central importance of Nozick's thought experiment is the question of autonomy. I must confess I was confused by your initial post in which you said that your friends choose the first or third option and forego the possibility of re-entering the 'real' world _even_ when their quality of life in both worlds is preserved. Living in the EM means resigning your autonomy, if we define autonomy as the ability to be one's own person, to take directions in life based on your own deliberations, your own desires, your own personal characteristics, and so forth, that are not the product of external forces but of an authentic self. Because I view Nozick's argument against that background, and because I highly value autonomy, I'd choose the second option in your initial post. The reason for this should be obvious: In the EM, my actions (_if_ we can even speak of 'my actions' and resulting happy mental states due to 'my actions' in EM) do not have any tangible effects on anyone if solipsism is true. If solipsism is false in EM, then necessarily happiness cannot be maximized and EM is false, as I explained in my other post in this comment section. Even more so, one could ask what it means for any action to be tangible in EM whether solipsism is true or false, for there is a fundamental asymmetry between the 'real' and 'simulated' world with respect to the question of autonomy and tangibility of one's actions. Intuitively, your actions are 'more real' in the 'real' world and less real in the simulated. What could that difference consist in? One aspect that grounds the intuition, I think, is that your body is 'real' in the former world and not 'real' in the latter. The simulation cannot sustain itself in the absence of the real world, while the 'real' world does not need the simulation for it to continue. All simulated worlds are 'mere' subsets of the 'real' world to which they are connected.
Consider a further aspect. When I hit someone in the simulated world because this is pleasurable to me, assuming that person is conscious and has subjective experience of me hitting that person, we can both _in_ _principle_ plug out and have a discussion about what happened. By definition, no 'real' damage was done in the simulated world, though the person I hit certainly 'experienced' it not unlike the experience of being hit in the real world. I think it is useful to use the dream metaphor to clarify the difference between the real and the simulated world. It clears up intuitions about the 'inconsequential' nature of the world in the EM. You can be hit, killed, loved, valued, marry, have children &c. in both worlds. But only in the real world will the consequences of those actions have 'real' consequences. Being killed, for example, is very definitive in the real world, but not so much in the dream world -- you can simply wake up. Having a child in EM doesn't put forth a new being in the world as having a child in the real world does. Moreover, the child cannot unplug from the experience machine, for it is born in it. That raises additional questions with respect to the status of a person in EM who doesn't have the ability to unplug. Luckily, getting killed in the EM isn't about to happen and of course defeats the purpose of the thought experiment (observe that being happy with killing yourself or getting killed cannot be finalized in the EM, but only in the real world), but having children certainly will be an experience of some in EM. My point is that no action in the simulated world has the same ontological status as the same action has in the real world, even if a person's subjective experiences caused by any action are identical in both worlds. Thus, assuming that solipsism is false in the 'real' world outside the EM, as I do while writing this post, for a person who values autonomy and their actions having consequences for people other than themselves, the second option is the rational choice to make.
One might object that the first option solves the problematic question of autonomy. If not being autonomous in EM is a detrimental factor to the happiness of the person who values autonomy and the tangibility of their actions, then simply stipulating that we have the subjective experience of being autonomous in EM solves that problem. But the person who values autonomy values the idea that _you_ are the architect of _your_ pleasure and misery and all emotional states in between, and those mental states are not due to an external source imposing those mental states upon you, like the EM does (for it makes sure that you'll always act in accordance with what will make you maximally happy). But the point of Nozick's experiment, as I see it, is not so much the life one lives in any of the two world, but the very _choice_ one makes to plug-in or, in Brigard's modification, to un-plug. The *intention* behind the act of plugging in or unplugging is what matters -- for surely the person who chooses option 1 retains the idea of autonomy in EM *because* he/she is under the impression that life is lived in the 'real' world -- a choice which reveals the preferences of that person to live in the 'real' world.*
But the revealed preference of that person to relinquish autonomy by means of auto-induced amnesia contradicts the preference of the person to be autonomous. That is to say, there is a step _prior_ to entering the EM that reveals the person's preferences; the revealed preferences of the person aren't shown by the de facto life he/she lives, which is always _posterior_ to the choice made by the person. Therefore, anyone who values autonomy will chose option 2 by default (and I must say you made that an easy choice by equalizing the person's net pleasure in both worlds, among other benefits such as a continuation of personality &c.); though it is easy to see that anyone who wants pleasure over anything else, whether the source of pleasure is internally generated as a result of the autonomous actions of the person or externally imposed on the person, will rationally choose option 3. (I wonder what reasoning was behind your friend's choice for option 1)
I presented this case to my brother and he responded that there really is no distinction between option 1 and 2 _after_ one makes the decision, for all else is equal _except_ the phenomenal world you inhabit. That exception might be sufficiently significant that it leads to a person disregarding option 2 (status quo bias) and choosing 1, though you granted that the person making the choice remains phenomenally *identical*. That was the only objection my brother had to option 2: the discontinuity of one's _personal_ interaction with the world you're planning to leave when unplugging,and thus having to reassess your subjective relation with the new world you'll inhabit when choosing option 2 (for if you'd have a different body and so on, this negates _x_ years of reciprocal interaction with the world in the EM. You're effectively rejecting your Personality/Self when choosing option 2). But if you grant continuity of personality (and even socio-economic status and so forth if I understood you correctly), that makes option 2 all the more attractive -- especially to those who value autonomy and who were already inclined to choose option 2 for that reason.
* I think this is an important objection to your claim that you made a case against the inherent value of truth, if we understand the 'real' world to be the 'true' world. Option 1 _is_ in fact a preference for truth: by choosing to remove the awareness that you live in the EM you reveal your preference for living in the 'real' world, though for whatever reason it happens that that person does not wish to unplug. Other than status quo bias I do not see how option 1 can be preferable. Option 2 is clearly preferable if status quo bias is not the reason for choosing option 1, for the act that precedes choosing option 1 already shows a person's being favourable toward living in the real world. So much so that the person explicitly wishes to forget that he/she is _not_ living in a simulated, i.e., a 'fake' world! Option 2 grants that person to _actually_ live in the 'real' world. Thus, I do not see how the three options you present aren't effectively two options, namely 2 and 3. Because option 3 is possible, choosing option 1 cannot be preferable to 3 if one values happiness over truth. For if one were more concerned with being happy than with living in a 'real' world, then everyone would prefer option 3 over 1. Thus, I think you're mistaken in thinking that choosing 1 _and_ 3 is an argument against 2, that is to say, an argument against the inherent value of 'truth' -- this is only the case if it can be argued that 3 is objectively preferable to 2. But I don't think the construction of an EM which maximizes happiness is possible, as I argued in another post in this comment section (not the post you replied to).
The thing is that one can still be entirely motivated by pleasure and pain, and still not opt into the experience machine. Look at how people are characterized as feeling when they are given the thought experiment. People feel disturbed and repulsed by the thought experiment. Disturbance and repulsion are forms of pain.
I’d say that people find the idea of not living within reality inherently painful, subsequently making people not want to go into the experience machine.
- I would argue that utilitarians would be committed to stepping into the experience machine
- Since hedonic utilitarians take pleasure to be the only thing that matters about experiences, it should be equally good for them to step into a 'pleasure machine' where no experiences are produced, but the underlying cocktail of neurotransmitters that make experiences feel good - say serotonin, dopamine, oxytocin, etc... are instead stimulated.
- In fact, it is likely that the pleasure machine could bring about much more pleasure than the experience machine since they can cause the release of the underlying neurotransmitters to a much greater extent than experiences could
- But while the pleasure brought about from going from the experience machine to pleasure machine would likely increase massively, it seems much more counterintuitive that what ought to be done is that we should all strap ourselves to pleasure machines.
- Would you plug into an experience machine but not a pleasure machine? If so, why not?
I can see a delema that's is probably besides the point. If the pleasure is based on what I have already experienced then the experience machine would be very limited. If it is based off what someone else has experienced then how would it know what would give me pleasure.
Can you please do one on authoritarianism and anarchy
Plug me in! Suffering of real world is unbearable, happiness is almost nonexistent and my desires are unsatisfiable.
a pessimist is a person who knows that we live in the best world possible
You can posit another objection if you frame it in the sense of the people being able to interact with others in the machine.
If it is the case that I want to have sex with my entire female class, then the machine makes it happen.
But what if that class consist of real people, also plugged into the machine? They might NOT want to have sex with me. In fact it might be the case that they want me out of their life entirely.
So whilst the machine is trying to appeal to my egoism, if I have a desire to obviously not revoke other people's consent, and clearly we can say that other people's suffering here wouldn't better the criteria of best pleasure for individuals. I think it highlights the point about reality that we intuitively appeal to. Reality doesn't let us experience our inner most egoistic sense of welfare because such things are incompatible with other people's desires for welfare.
So if it is the case that our wellbeing rests on us having REAL social interactions instead of just fake NPC like ones, where we're not actually interacting with anyone real, who can't appreaciate the experiences we're sharing, then the machine can't provide us that aspect of reality that we truly need. i.e. agency in a world with other agents, all
seeking their own best possible wellbeing states.
It seems if the machine could produce such an experience, then really all it's doing is mirroring the real world and it's limits to what it can provide. Only it takes out all the work involved in doing it. In which case one could argue, well why would we invest time and money building a self sustaining machine that does all this, instead of just
making a world where this setup already is the case?
There would intrinsically be no difference between the experience machine and the real world, so we're just better off making the real world the best possible experience.
I mean an experience machine can't prevent an asteroid wiping out all life on earth (including the machine), but in reality we could build an anti-asteroid laser or something. It just becomes an argument that the real world is the only possible 'best possible world' we could actually create.
So I guess that puts me firmly in the hedoism camp. Fetch the lube Doris!
In the world of the experience machine solipsism is either true or false. If solipsism in the experience machine is false, there must be other conscious minds in the machine. It is true that no two people have identical ideas about pleasure and desires. Therefore, if solipsism is false in the EM, the EM cannot function such that it maximizes my pleasure for the same reason I cannot maximize my pleasure in this world. To give a pathetic example: if it were up to me, I'd read books throughout the day and have sex with all women who cause arousal in me, for surely, being human, sex with people to whom you're attracted will be part of the experiences one considers pleasurable and therefore desirable. Because these experiences are desirable they will also be part of one's experience in the EM. For reasons that need no explanation, a life consisting of both activities, be it inside or outside the machine, is unfeasible. If solipsism is false in EM, then my pleasure can never be optimized, for certainly I can experience reading books all day and engage in activities which in which other people don't participate, but my pleasure would be limited nonetheless -- for clearly not all people in the machine, who are conscious, would agree to my wanting to have sex with them.
Thus, if EM maximizes pleasure of any agent in EM and solipsism is false in EM, and if solipsism being false in EM implies that no agent can maximize its pleasure because no two agents have identical ideas about what is pleasurable or desirable, then EM is false.
That leaves the other possibility of EM being true iff solipsism is true in EM. Now, that raises a few intuitive questions about the meaning of pleasure in the absence of other conscious beings. Can a pleasurable activity that involves other beings be truly pleasurable if those other beings are unconscious, i.e., can pleasure in that context be 'truly' desirable if it cannot be shared with other beings who participate in the activity? To get back to my example: is sex with an attractive woman pleasurable if she participates in the activity with me, but doesn't experience the activity itself? Intuitively, the amount of pleasure derived from that activity is significantly less compared to the situation in which both you and the person reciprocally cause pleasure to arise in each other. Thus, all things being equal, the pleasure I derive from sex with a woman who cannot experience the activity (and therefore cannot experience pleasure) is necessarily lowered, for I gain additional pleasure from the activity due to the fact that the other person is experiencing pleasure as well -- an experience of additional pleasure which is necessarily absent if solipsism is true in EM.
Therefore, if solipsism is true in EM, and activities that maximize one's pleasure involve other beings, then, because my pleasure depends on the pleasure that other beings reciprocally experience from their interaction with me, and if pleasure is absent in unconscious beings that participate in activities in which I am involved, EM is necessarily false.
You ask whether the EM content can be 'truly' pleasurable (or desirable), but perhaps the difference between 'truly pleasurable' and merely 'experienced to be pleasurable' is negligible. It is certainly imperceptible, as perceptions wholly belong to experience. The whole point of the EM is for you give up the assurance that whatever you experience truly happens. Keep in mind that your memory of opting into the EM will be erased, so you won't have any foreknowledge of this subtle distinction obtaining, and no way of finding out. The EM might run like a sandbox (think virtual machines) for each person, with no one else plugged into the same machine (since, as you point out, the alternative seems untenable), yet at the same time provide that person the full experience of there being other people to interact with. In other words, you'd effectively be opting into a solipsistic world... but what guarantee do you have that 'real life' isn't solipsistic?
Who’s here from the Destiny debate