I independently came to the same conclusion as Puccetti. I think he may be right. It's a simple way of accounting for fission and fusion cases and it accounts for the nature of the two hemispheres and the role of the corpus callosum. Although it is a bizarre and somewhat frightening idea that I have another consciousness occupying my skull.
Another objection to this position could be drugs: some drugs are simple and dont alter psychology that much (say caffine), but others may completely "change a person", for an extreme case maybe Angel Dust? In those cases are they actually a different person? I dont see how the causality argument can be made in those cases since its not a series of psychological reactions leading to this new mental state (they didnt realize anything they injected something). Or to make it more clear we could say they were drugged in thier sleep.
In the beginning, there is no need to talk about teleportation (the of great distance and the instantaneity are irelevant here), and one could get the substance of the argument about identity just by talking about a form of perfect cloning, although such a thing might not be possible. The reason why people tend to talk about teleportation is that in a non practical way, modern physics proposes a way to teleport somebody. However, it is strictly impossible for the person to be kept in one piece during the process, so the argument of the copy can't be made to discredit the idea of a transfer or even conservation of identity. In my humble opinion, as well as two elementary entities can be distinct without being intresically different, I would percieve a copy of myself as a distinct self - with a distinct conscience, but this is another topic - shortly after it were created; then I assume we would go on to live different lives, since the alternative would be creepy.
I don't see how you can think that teleportation is suicide and still find locke's idea of psychological continuity persuasive. surely the teleported 'double' share not just some, but all of the psychological traits of the original, and therefore is the 'same' person. That would be my intuition at least. as to the problem arising from keeping the original, then I would simply say that at the precise moment of teleportation/replication, there are two identical instances of the person, but that at everybfuture moment they continually diverge and become different people.
I don't see how it's just semantics. When you step into the teleportation machine, either your stream of consciousness will continue, or it will permanently cease. That doesn't seem like mere semantics to me.
Of course but it depends on your own personal conception of personal identity. Some would say destroying your body is suicide, some not. Whether you want to draw the line at destroying your body or whatever is entirely arbitrary. how would you judge which answer is correct or not? What criteria would it have to fit? The commonly agreed definition of personal idenitty i.e there is something unique that can be described as "you" is too vague when it comes to providing answers to paradoxes like this and so people fill the gaps to compensate for the vagueness. There its no correct answer on how one should fill it's the gaps. I suppose this whole personal identity thing it's analogous to sorites paradox
I think I see your worry at 3:15. If they made a copy of me while I was alive, I would not be the copy; If I am not the copy in that case, then I am not the copy in any case -- even if I were destroyed in the process; If I am not the copy in any case, then I wouldn't survive teleportation. I used to have this worry as well, but now I think it is confused. The reason is that it does not follow, from the fact that person A is not identical to person B when they both exist at the same time, that person A could not be identical to person B if they existed at different times. Consider: you are identical to you-from-a-few-seconds-ago but if you-from-a-few-seconds-ago existed right now, then you would not be identical to that person. So, the fact that you are not identical to your copy when you exist together does not entail that you could not be identical to your copy if you existed at different times.
The whole concept of personal identity is quite confused. We say that you're the same person as you were when you were younger, but the identity exists only in words since in reality you are quite different from your younger self. You wouldn't want your so-called identical younger self to step into your place, because that would mean wiping out memories, skills, relationships, and all sorts of personal growth. Any theory of personal identity should recognize that personal identity is a misleading term since it doesn't refer to an actual identity. In contrast, your teleportation copy really would be identical in everything except position, so we really could swap between the two copies without consequence. So ironically the teleportation copy really is identical to you, while your younger self is not identical to you except in the sense of "personal identity".
Once we make the distinction between qualitative and numerical identity, aren't these worries laid to rest? Of course I am not qualitatively identical to my younger self, but I am still numerically identical to him. And in the case of the copy, though I am qualitatively identical to him I am not numerically identical to him. The "identity" in "personal identity" is supposed to be numerical and not qualitative. Otherwise, as you say, the whole thing is confused.
Nick Alvarez "The identity in 'personal identity' is supposed to be numerical and not qualitative." Even that seems like a confusion since it makes no sense to have numerical identity without qualitative identity. One thing cannot have different properties when compared to itself. "In the case of the copy, though I am qualitatively identical to him I am not numerically identical to him." In a very real way you _are_ numerically identical to your copy. Even though there are two bodies, they share the same personality, the same memories, the same goals, and so it is fair to say that there is only one person who happens to exist in both bodies. It is like a single story that has been printed into multiple books.
A thing can have different qualities when compared to itself if it has those different qualities at different times. I don't think there is any sense in which I am numerically identical to my copy. If we counted bodies or persons we would count two and not one. Moreover, you should think this too, since you just said that "it makes no sense to have numerical identity without qualitative identity". Me and my copy do not have all the same qualities.
Nick Alvarez "Me and my copy do not have all the same qualities." Which qualities do you mean? If we're just talking about position then that's really just a quality of your body, and we agree that the bodies of the two copies aren't identical. Even so, position isn't a property of your personality and so both copies are identical in terms of personality.
For anyone interested, Shelley Kagan has an excellent series of lectures on YT titled 'death' which also examine the question of personal identity.
yo man, all your videos are awesome! they help me alot! just wanted you to know I appreciate what you do!
Thanks so much for making these videos! I swear you’re singlehandedly getting me through university! Absolutely great content
I independently came to the same conclusion as Puccetti. I think he may be right. It's a simple way of accounting for fission and fusion cases and it accounts for the nature of the two hemispheres and the role of the corpus callosum. Although it is a bizarre and somewhat frightening idea that I have another consciousness occupying my skull.
Another objection to this position could be drugs: some drugs are simple and dont alter psychology that much (say caffine), but others may completely "change a person", for an extreme case maybe Angel Dust? In those cases are they actually a different person? I dont see how the causality argument can be made in those cases since its not a series of psychological reactions leading to this new mental state (they didnt realize anything they injected something). Or to make it more clear we could say they were drugged in thier sleep.
In the beginning, there is no need to talk about teleportation (the of great distance and the instantaneity are irelevant here), and one could get the substance of the argument about identity just by talking about a form of perfect cloning, although such a thing might not be possible. The reason why people tend to talk about teleportation is that in a non practical way, modern physics proposes a way to teleport somebody. However, it is strictly impossible for the person to be kept in one piece during the process, so the argument of the copy can't be made to discredit the idea of a transfer or even conservation of identity.
In my humble opinion, as well as two elementary entities can be distinct without being intresically different, I would percieve a copy of myself as a distinct self - with a distinct conscience, but this is another topic - shortly after it were created; then I assume we would go on to live different lives, since the alternative would be creepy.
18:16 that's a lot of damage
I don't see how you can think that teleportation is suicide and still find locke's idea of psychological continuity persuasive. surely the teleported 'double' share not just some, but all of the psychological traits of the original, and therefore is the 'same' person. That would be my intuition at least.
as to the problem arising from keeping the original, then I would simply say that at the precise moment of teleportation/replication, there are two identical instances of the person, but that at everybfuture moment they continually diverge and become different people.
12:20 Moore
has this expermient with teacup been conducted? if so how these patients responded to the fact that they say one thing but wrote another
It has been conducted, and many other experiments like it. They are surprised and cannot explain why they did.
thats scary.
I have a job at a german factory,
The whole teleportation debate is just a semantics debate, there is no right answer.
I don't see how it's just semantics. When you step into the teleportation machine, either your stream of consciousness will continue, or it will permanently cease. That doesn't seem like mere semantics to me.
Of course but it depends on your own personal conception of personal identity. Some would say destroying your body is suicide, some not. Whether you want to draw the line at destroying your body or whatever is entirely arbitrary.
how would you judge which answer is correct or not? What criteria would it have to fit?
The commonly agreed definition of personal idenitty i.e there is something unique that can be described as "you" is too vague when it comes to providing answers to paradoxes like this and so people fill the gaps to compensate for the vagueness. There its no correct answer on how one should fill it's the gaps. I suppose this whole personal identity thing it's analogous to sorites paradox
I think I see your worry at 3:15. If they made a copy of me while I was alive, I would not be the copy; If I am not the copy in that case, then I am not the copy in any case -- even if I were destroyed in the process; If I am not the copy in any case, then I wouldn't survive teleportation.
I used to have this worry as well, but now I think it is confused. The reason is that it does not follow, from the fact that person A is not identical to person B when they both exist at the same time, that person A could not be identical to person B if they existed at different times. Consider: you are identical to you-from-a-few-seconds-ago but if you-from-a-few-seconds-ago existed right now, then you would not be identical to that person. So, the fact that you are not identical to your copy when you exist together does not entail that you could not be identical to your copy if you existed at different times.
The whole concept of personal identity is quite confused. We say that you're the same person as you were when you were younger, but the identity exists only in words since in reality you are quite different from your younger self. You wouldn't want your so-called identical younger self to step into your place, because that would mean wiping out memories, skills, relationships, and all sorts of personal growth.
Any theory of personal identity should recognize that personal identity is a misleading term since it doesn't refer to an actual identity.
In contrast, your teleportation copy really would be identical in everything except position, so we really could swap between the two copies without consequence. So ironically the teleportation copy really is identical to you, while your younger self is not identical to you except in the sense of "personal identity".
Once we make the distinction between qualitative and numerical identity, aren't these worries laid to rest? Of course I am not qualitatively identical to my younger self, but I am still numerically identical to him. And in the case of the copy, though I am qualitatively identical to him I am not numerically identical to him. The "identity" in "personal identity" is supposed to be numerical and not qualitative. Otherwise, as you say, the whole thing is confused.
Nick Alvarez "The identity in 'personal identity' is supposed to be numerical and not qualitative."
Even that seems like a confusion since it makes no sense to have numerical identity without qualitative identity. One thing cannot have different properties when compared to itself.
"In the case of the copy, though I am qualitatively identical to him I am not numerically identical to him."
In a very real way you _are_ numerically identical to your copy. Even though there are two bodies, they share the same personality, the same memories, the same goals, and so it is fair to say that there is only one person who happens to exist in both bodies. It is like a single story that has been printed into multiple books.
A thing can have different qualities when compared to itself if it has those different qualities at different times.
I don't think there is any sense in which I am numerically identical to my copy. If we counted bodies or persons we would count two and not one. Moreover, you should think this too, since you just said that "it makes no sense to have numerical identity without qualitative identity". Me and my copy do not have all the same qualities.
Nick Alvarez "Me and my copy do not have all the same qualities."
Which qualities do you mean? If we're just talking about position then that's really just a quality of your body, and we agree that the bodies of the two copies aren't identical. Even so, position isn't a property of your personality and so both copies are identical in terms of personality.
You should do a collaboration with Crash Course Philosophy.