Imagine if we had like a whole community of free thinking (but not "too free thinking") historians presenting alternative theories and fighting it out. Right now most history channels on UA-cam present themselves as ultimate truth as if we already know everything even when the evidence is limited. TIK is pretty much alone in his genre. I'd like to see more people doing some actual digging. That would also help to keep TIK in check, because he'd be getting valuable feedback from nondisabled people.
That's actually what I'm hoping for! Sadly, many subscribe to the German (Leopold von Ranke) philosophy of history where you "just present the facts" and there is no debate. That's why you get the "ultimate truth" outlook. Unfortunately, history theory shows us that 'history lies in the heart of the debate'. Without the debate you can't figure out the truth because the "facts" are all over the place and don't necessarily lead us to the correct interpretations. That's why debate is necessary, so we can figure out the truth through argument and counter-argument (testing the thesis like you would do in science). I've been over this concept in my history theory video ua-cam.com/video/PvpJEc-NxVc/v-deo.html Plus you must bear in mind that many UA-camrs are playing it safe as a result of the current political culture and UA-cam's terms of service. They'll discuss tanks, weapons and training - stuff where the debate is limited to "what's your favourite tank", which isn't controversial. I totally understand why they do this, but it does mean that the audience is not seeing the potential benefits of a serious academic debate over a more important topic (like this video, or the Hitler's Socialism debate). They also present themselves as a-political or non-political, which I know for a fact is untrue. They hide their political beliefs, deceiving people into thinking they're impartial and therefore trustworthy. I know why they're doing this (partly Ranke, partly so as not to rock the boat), but in their quest to be trustworthy, all they've done is hidden their cards up their sleeves, which actually makes them untrustworthy if you think about it. People may not agree with my stance on certain topics, but at least they know what that stance is. For all you know, one of these other UA-camrs could be a secret [insert-whatever-bad-person-you-like-here]. Of course, it's more difficult to get into these debates, and people aren't mature enough to stop themselves from getting emotional and insulting each other. But in theory, everybody would benefit from a serious and academic debate on more 'controversial' topics. And for this reason, I think a debate would be good for the community here on UA-cam, and would be entertaining for everyone. Plus, I want someone who's actually mature (unlike my current critics) who can take an opposing stance to my work, so that I can see if my arguments hold up to scrutiny, or if I need to clarify certain points, or do more research on certain things to back up my points. It's not easy to do that without someone with an opposing view.
@@TheImperatorKnight Senpai has noticed me. uwu I think the reason simply is that the standard narrative is "good". Good as in you have to actually work your ass off to come up with a better one. The barrier to entry is insanely high. While I can sometimes point to where the logic doesn't add up within the information you have provided, actually gathering sources and coming up with my own theories and operating outside the information contained within your videos would be very very hard. I'd need to put in like a thousand hours of reading before I'm even capable of disagreeing with you about anything nontrivial.
@@TheImperatorKnight I have a question, just a simple one, is this video going to be part of Stalingrad addendum videos? Because I would like to see them in a playlist for full context.
@@junfour That's absolutely a factor. I work a lot of hours to put these videos together. I worked about 80 hours the week prior to releasing Episode 38 of Stalingrad in order to get it edited in time, and that was after a week of doing research, preparing the scripts and recording it. Not everyone's got the will to do that. Same with the other subjects. It's exhausting, and I can certainly see why people are unwilling to commit to a serious amount of reading on these topics. The simple topics are far easier and get more views anyway. People seem to prefer them
My grandfather was a commander of Soviet artillery regiment in 1941. He survived the retreat of SW Front from the border with 4/5 of his division lost. He survived Kiev encirclement in September, where only about 30k managed to break out, out of 500k. He survived Second Battle of Kharkiv, where barely anyone from Soviet 6th army made it through. So that is where I got this special interest in how these breakout attempts work. To simplify it extremely - rivers. Unorganized retreat was not an option for Paulus's forces. "Half of manpower reaching friendly lines" is a wishful thinking. "Swarming the enemy with waves of fleeing troops" is a fantasy. When you travel across countries in a peacetime you barely notice small rivers. Why would you - there are good roads and bridges across. Armies during offensives or planned movement don't have that much problem with small rivers either - they are prepared with all sorts of equipment and specialists to handle that. This is not the case with an army on unorganized retreat. The first river in your way presents you with two choices: 1. keep your vehicles and equipment and go stand in huge traffic jams (which are being bombed) to one or two available bridges or 2. leave all your transport and all equipment past your rifles and rations and ford the river using makeshift means of crossing. After the first crossing units are mostly disorganized, nobody waits for stragglers, forward elements move on. Some makeshift units might continue to function to a degree, but they have no transport, no artillery, and no food or ammunition reserves past what people carry on themselves. Communication or command structure is gone already at that point. The second river is reached by completely separate groups of people - tired, hungry, disoriented. Even the idea of an army is gone by that point. There is no means to create even a resemblance of a crossing or rafts. People usually don't have personal weapons or any food after the second crossing, and they are clothed in whatever they have chosen to swam across. The third river is crossed by lucky few. Starving, exhausted, alone or in small groups, incapable of any sort of fighting. Paulus' troops had to cross 4 to 5 rivers to reach the area of Kotelnikovo. Rossoshka, Karpovka, Donskaya Tsaritsa, Myshkova and Aksay. Despite the usual depiction of the fighting at Stalingrad as extremely cold, at the end of November rivers were not frozen solid. At least not enough to cross with any equipment. My grandfather was among those lucky and resilient enough to cross three rivers in the rear of Soviet SW Front to reach friendly lines. But that was in September. Imagine how it would go in late November.
Thank you very much for sharing that precious memories! I completely agree with you. I'm not a military man but I'm sure moving units around (and across rivers) is extremely difficult. Even more, doing that in contact with the enemy. Even more, without a guaranteed source of supplies. Therefore, I believe attempting a breakout (of any kind) would have been suicidal, besides fantasy & wishful thinking. It was already too late to do anything else rather than regrouping, digging in and waiting for help.
Not to mention crossing SEVERAL rivers (wet) in Winter conditions would have been a death sentence for all but a fortunate few. Even dry exposure with no fuel and little food to just the cold conditions would have killed most.
“When we consider history, we know the end before we consider the beginning. So, we can never see the beginning as it actually was.” ---Cicely Veronica Wedgwood (1910-1997)
there is no "correct" answer to this debate. From a purely military perspective, the decision to attempt a breakout or not is so complex that any decision made was likely "wrong" at the time. Having spent 30 years in the Army, I know how hard such a breakout move actually would have been. Stripping the defense against the Soviet units in contact may have worked for a short period, but it is incredibly hard to predict how it the operation would have gone.
This is one of the best answers and in my opinion best standpoints so far. I tend to think (or believe) that a break-out would have been the best option in theory. But what's next ? There was literally no frontline and 6th army already was is a desperate state. A breakout and simultaneous retreat under fire is one of the most complicated military operations for any formation even at full strength. Even if they achieved that, they would have been sitting in the steppes in winter and their units were still totally depleted. There is no answer at all to question.
Whether or not Paulus made the "right" decision, he made a logical decision based on the information he had at the time. I do think we can conclude this no matter what. It's important, because it means that we can't say he was negligent or incompetent, which would be the only real purpose of this exercise.
Paulus doesn't have the fuel to move his army. At best he abandons all his guns, armour, and equipment and then scrambles into a disorganized Russian position and maybe a few thousand men escape through the fighting and winter river crossings that would ensue. All that would do in practice is free up the Russians to put pressure and waste all the potential of Paulus' forces.
@@lokenontherange Agreed entirely. Under the circumstances and conditions described by TIK. Paulus could not move any of his heavy equipment and very little of his armor. What this meant in practice has already been seen earlier in the war. When armies lost all their heavy equipment, as happened several times in Poland and France, the army was in effect destroyed and incapable of further serious resistance. Such was also the case with Soviet armies during Barbarossa. Once surrounded with their heavy equipment lost, the army was destroyed irrespective of how many of the men escaped before the end. The alternative was to continue to hold out, if assured of air supply. Paulus was given such assurance, and given the example of the Demyansk pocket earlier in 1942 he had no particular reason to anticipate that the air resupply would fail. What was certain was that his army would be destroyed if he ordered an retreat from Stalingrad. So he really had no intelligent choice except to wait for relief. Finally, any such breakout attempt would be to try to organize a breakthrough attack on the march WITH THE ARMY IN FULL RETREAT. There is nothing in history more difficult than this. In general it's never achieved unless you are commanded by Julius Caesar escaping the deathtrap at Dyrrachium. The examples of armies reorganizing themselves for an attack while actually on a retreat simply never happens. With no tanks, no artillery, Paulus had no chance.
Consider for a moment if the breakout HAD occurred and ultimately was a spectacular failure/massive rout which turned the tide of the war for the Soviets. With hindsight we would be then criticising Paulus for not staying put and holding his nerve to allow the ‘master’ (Manstein) break him out. We would argue that the Luftwaffe themselves were quite confident that the air lift could work and argued past successes in Demyansk. We would then argue that the 6th Army was only bogged down due to insufficient reinforcements to Army group B and with the reserves that would be mobilised within a few weeks, Manstein wouldn’t have much trouble breaking through… Especially when the 6th Army would have enough strength (as supplied by air) to attack southwards to meet him.
@@a.rodimtsev9446 yes I agree, the 6th Army was finished in one way or the other. The soviets executed the perfect plan so well, I struggle to think of a better strategic outcome. Maybe you could at least argue that with the 6th army staying organised it tied down huge amounts of Soviet forces. If the 6th army panicked and fled in chaos in the first few days, I wonder if the soviets would have been able to organise a push on Rostov much sooner.
Army Group B had determined that only 1/10 of 6th Army could be resupplied by air. Holding ground in Stalingrad was the death blow. No sane commander would accept the entombment of 200k men without a fight. All of Army Group B wanted to break out and they were denied.
Glad we can have a serious discussion about this, and I trust it interests many people here :) I'll definitely release an answer in the coming weeks, because there are many things to say and the structure of this response video has already formed in my mind as I watched yours. For the moment I'll only say this: in my opinion hindsight is point #1 to consider, not #7. Everything depends on this. And YET, even without hindsight, I'll argue that: 1. A breakout would not have been a 100% logical decision during Uranus, BUT it could have succeeded with much better chances than you put it (I'll develop, but my main argument is that at this time there was just a very theoretical screen by Soviet troops around 6th Army, and those red units that took position here and there were at the end of their resources, had absolutely not formed any solid defense even locally, and so on, so that it was not a credible blocking issue). But again, I agree this was not a decision to make without hindsight. 2. A breakout during Wintergewitter was way more logical to consider because by this time the precarious situation of 6th Army on the long-term was becoming very clear. It was definitely something to consider (and was very much considered by 6th Army's Command) even though it was more difficult than before, due to Soviet units having time to entrench around the cauldron. But here again, I believe people generally underestimate the benefits of a breakout, even a chaotic and disastrous one, AS OPPOSED to the "benefits" of staying in the cauldron. As for the interviews, I agree of course that it was easier to speak like this 30 years after. But I'm sure by the time of Wintergewitter many officers genuinely thought like this. So it's a very, very different thing to discuss options during Uranus than during Winter Storm...
Already looking forward to your video Anton! I get the impression that the discussion ultimately boils down to how solidified the Soviet defences were around the 23rd/24th whether a breakout with mainly infantry would have been possible. Tik has shown in what a terrible situation the German 6th army was but it would be interesting to know more about the state of the Soviet forces. Even if Paulus made a perfectly logical decision based on the information he had, it might have still be the wrong decision if he incorrectly assessed the Soviet strength. Then, even without hindsight of the fate of the 6th army, you could argue Paulus made a wrong decision - though he cannot be blamed for having 'bounded rationality' as Herbert Simon would call it.
@@derozebrigade The state of Soviet forces was not so good by the end of Uranus. So had Paulus decided a breakout at this time, it would have at least partly succeeded. But in no scenario (at any time) was there a possibility to save the heavy weapons. They would have been left behind in any case.
I think there's a point that TIK has not considered, even though it strengthens his position even further: Had Paulus simply ordered his men to pick up their rifles and start walking, what was to prevent all the Soviet forces on the north side of the pocket to start a general advance south? If Rokossovsky's forces had been able to advance south over positions abandoned by the Germans, the pocket would have collapsed even before it was formed. Consequently, I think that an uncoordinated withdrawal was not an option. Of Course, Paulus could have ordered his most exposed forces to withdraw first, while the rest of his forces held their positions and then gone for a "staggered" withdrawal - but wasn't that, more or less, what he tried? To some extent, isn't this what Luigi suggested. Free up forces to create unit capable of operation against the southwestern Pocket frontline. However, I this would take time and events would (and did) overtake such attempts. Or perhaps Luigis suggestion was simply to have each division split their forces up in two groups. One left behond for a suicide mission and the other to fight it's way out as independant Kampfgruppen? I seriously doubt this would work, as TIK has already shown that it was the combat units of the German divisions that had taken the heaviest casulaties, and now those depleted units were suddently to double their workload? I do disagree with TIK that Paulus must have believed that the airbridge "could" (realistically) have worked at this time. I have argued that the Germans basically failed to supply the 6th Army while they held the rail lines open, so hoping for an airbridge to succeed where the rail system had failed, must have been more of a prayer than a realistic hope. But I do agree that that prayer must have seemed the best option open to the Germans at this particular point in history. Also, an airlift doesn't either "work" or "not work", it will automatically work to some degree. Paulus may well have hoped to recieve a significant portion of the needed supplies by air, leaving his forces able to defend until a counterattack by superior German forces from the west (Der Manstein Kommt).
The retreating 6th army would be attacked from the north and might be destroyed in a few days, which would give the Soviet armies a great opportunity to exploit this huge gap in the frontlines! I don't think most soldiers had any chance to break out anyways. Tthe few who did would be overrun by the Soviet armies a few days later and who knows which armies could have been cut off after this. Nothing could have stopped them till they run out of fuel.
@slaine's axe Yes and maybe even a bigger defeat than it was now. What 6th army did was buying time, which gave forces to the south the time to retreat.
Had Manstien pulled off a rescue of Paulus be would be the most popular of the German Eastern Front Generals. I'd be ever caught a whiff of the situation, I would bet he was trying to come up with something. As was the German High Command.
Really in my opinion the only possible route to Save Paulus' Army, would've been a large counteroffensive being pulled from the North or South diverting Soviet Attention and as such allowing forces to attempt a simultaneous breakout (with Paulus' forces attacking toward Manstein and Manstein attacking towards the encircled troops). That in my opinion is probably the only route towards Victory the Germans could've achieved (besides a Masterstroke Tactical movement that they could've replicated from earlier in the War). And since the Luftwaffe couldn't even supply the earlier (I believe it was Maikop?) Pocket that was far smaller than Stalingrad's Pocket, there wasn't even a prayer of hope of supplying Stalingrad simply by Air.
It also ignores that there is a military function to the pocket. It's occupying significant numbers of Russian troops that would elsewise be a problem. Paulus and his superiors have to take a broader view as much as they also have to think about maintaining the army.
Hard to imagine hundreds of thousands of men on foot break g out. The Soviets had tank armies and cavalry divisions closing the trap. Its hard to imagine many surviving.
"With the benefit of hindsight ..." Following this line of logic, I wonder how much the experience at Stalingrad influenced those at Falaise pocket which was an unorganized retreat, with most escaping the near encirclement without the heavy equipment.
Falaise was a disaster made worse by the Mortain Offensive..Also 500 Panzers that were list were lost over the Normandy Campaign! The Germans only did the paperwork after the "Void"! (A similar thing happened after Kursk!)
@@neil03152. Oh really? Patton? He was good at dashing across open country with little opposition. Pursuit and exploitation was his game. Closing the Falaise pocket wasn't so easy and it's not something to blame on Monty.
A key difference between this proposed breakout that 6th Army could have hypothetically conducted and the breakout at the Korsun pocket was the presence of German support. In 1944 the Germans breaking out where breaking out to existing German lines. In the case of a 6th Army breakout in 1942 there is no line for the Germans to break out to. Without a line of German troops to fall back to the German retreat would have been a rout across the steppes. Some have argued the creation of the pocket tied down Russian forces inhibiting future operations that could have endangered other German Armies including a Russian advance to Rostov.
Indeed by having a prolonged siege and the time taken to crush the pocket did tie up large Soviet forces..If the pocket has disintegrated it would have freed up loads of extra troops!
@@jamesbeeching4341 I don't believe it would be easy to disengage either. The withdrawal under pressure is difficult in the best of circumstances. I am going to look up the reinforcement schedule and possibly add some comments to this debate.
@@darklysm8345 How? Only if the Axis had enough ships for this in the Black Sea, which I doubt they had. They could hardly supply the smaller Army Group North in the baltics, so how on earth do you think they could do this with a much larger force? And which divisions could have closed the gap in the Axis frontlines in the south? Yes, that was where they needed Army Group A!
A breakout seemingly on the brink of victory might well have looked like madness, or else an ignominious, shambolic retreat. Whereas what happened was painted as a heroic defence (and it was). In purely military terms, though, the decision is less clear; such an operation would need to be carefully prepared, and by the time that's done, the encirclement would be complete anyway. I think Paulus did his best under impossible circumstances - he had his head in the crocodile's jaws for weeks.
Thanks to Pavel K. for sharing those precious family memories! I completely agree with him & TIK. I'm not a military man but I'm sure moving units around (and across rivers) is extremely difficult. Even more, doing that in contact with the enemy. Even more, without a guaranteed source of supplies. Therefore, I also believe that attempting a breakout (of any kind) would have been suicidal, besides fantasy & wishful thinking. It was already too late to do anything else rather than regrouping, digging in and waiting for help.
Brother Just wanted to say THANKYOU for all your videos After 48 years of studying WW2 and warfare in general watching you and listening to you has been a pleasure I look at the books on your shelves and realize I'm not the only to delve so deep Hope all is well with you in this life Please keep them coming As a recent pensioner i have the time now to absorb them all Nothing but respect from NY
It's what known as "living in hope". Even when your senses awaken you to the reality of the situation, there is always the belief that a solution will appear out of nowhere.
Yes TIK, many of us did see it. To be fair, I'm not sure how many of us would have seen it if you hadn't done some collaborating with Anton long ago, but you succeeded in boosting his viewership tremendously, and I salute you for that excellent decision. (I think he had about 2500 subscribers when the algorithm first recognized my tastes and recommended his videos to me.)
Have only watched the first few minutes, but I do think that ordering an uncoordinated breakout without the benefit of hindsight would have been widely seen as a panic reaction, and I do not think German officers were prone to do such things. Just my 2 cents. Hope you're doing well :)
And what of the chance of getting the Vital oil region with the fractured 6th Army in '43? Without the oil they still lose. Holding onto the flank anchor (stalingrad) and praying they could relieve it from outside I think is a reason choice.
If Paulus had attempted a breakout, it would have failed. Historians today would be writing books blaming Paulus for attempting the breakout instead of waiting for more German units to work on a coordinated breakout (inside and outside the pocket). Even to the point of insisting that the Luftwaffe could have temporarily supplied the troops while battle plans were arranged.
Thank you, TIK I,m very pleased for answering the idea that comes to my mind watching your videos about Paulus break out. It was just a possibility like "try to think different and and wait what can come across"... I enjoy watching your superb work, specially the Stalingrad series...
I still think you ought to do a supplementary video on other options for the relief of 6th Army ( withdrawing armour from AG A, giving Manstein II SS Pz Corps, and also what ought to have been done to avoid the encirclement in the first place ( retaining 11th Army, GD, etc, sticking to the original plan etc).
Paulus, being a staff officer, could never have conceived of ordering a breakout without explicit orders from the High Command. Nor would the Russians, who were closely engaged with the Germans inside Stalingrad, permitted it to have happened undisrupted. One of the German division commanders, I believe in the northern part of the pocket, did order a breakout on his own authority in the first days of the Russian offensive. The Russians detected it and mauled the division as it left its fortifications, inflicting 1,000 casualties. The survivors, having burned their provisions, had to set up shop on a new front devoid of bunkers or provisions. An ad-hoc breakout may have annihilated the German and Romanian divisions at the outset, thereby giving the Russians a ten-week head start on wheeling down to the Sea of Azov to trap the other German Armies balked in the Caucasus.
I've been hearing this for years but the one thing I've never heard is, "What would you do to prevent the Soviets inside the city from overwhelming your rearguard and attacking you from rear"?. I was just looking at a video about Napoleon's retreat from Moscow and it was ugly! The rear guards were cut off several times and either destroyed or abandoned and by sheer will made it back to the main body? The Germans never completely shut down the Volga to Soviet resupply or reinforcement.
The basic problem with the break-out is that there had been no preparation for a retreat. The results would have been a rout, with most, if not all of the troops killed or captured on the steppe. Once the Red Army initiated the attack, there was no solid German front line to retreat to. Virtually all of the German forces were concentrated in the pocket (which was why the attack was so inviting to the Soviets). There were no stockpiles of supplies that the 6th Army could have fallen back on while retreating. The would have rapidly run out of fuel, ammunition, food and water. I believe they had already gotten rid of many horses because they could not supply them with fodder. There are a couple of other factors as well. The 6th army pocket at Stalingrad required large Soviet formations to hold it in place and reduce it. If the 6th Army and the other Axis forces had just tried to reach German lines in an "every man for himself" retreat, all of these Red Army units would hav been free to attack them on the steppe, where the Germans would have had very little to defend themselves with. The other factor is Army Group A, which was in the Caucasus. The bridge at Kalach, which was where the two Red Army spearheads met, is about 400 kms from Rostov. If the 6th Army tried to break out, and was rapidly destroyed, or at least rendered hors de combat, then the Soviets could have attempted to use all of their forces to reach Rostov, and cut off Army Group A. It has been acknowledged in some recent historical studies of this battle that one of the reasons, if not the main one, that the ^th Army was told too fight on as long as they did was to tie up Red Army resources so that Army Group A could retreat back through Rostov., and the Kuban.
This is not true. Soviet attacks intensified in July and Weichs and Paulus wargamed a breakout in addition to a counterstroke. That’s how Weichs came up with the resupply requirements before the encirclement. They sensed a massive Soviet attacks on the flanks for months.
@@dennisrevarga9875 Hitler would never have sanctioned any talk of retreat. Paulus was not going to act against Hitler's wishes. German intelligence on Soviet intentions was poor, and they ignored the reports of the Italians and Rumanians of what was going on on the Russian side of the Don. If the German high command sensed a massive Soviet attack on their flanks, they certainly did nothing to prepare for it.
@@dennisrevarga9875 Source? Kriegspiel doesn't get you any physical means or. as dbassman27 just wrote, mean any preperation or involvement of a higher command. Patton seems to have done similar things before the Ardennes; it didn't mean he could do anything before the Germans attacked, or that he actually took it seriously when they did. Plans are all very well; but implementation is another matter and what higher headquarters will do another thing again. Paulus wasn't commanding in a vacuum
For too much Hindsight involved in the breakout option so I will try a realtime assessment. How far do we think we need to travel on foot? How many calories does that require compared to sitting tight with planned resupply by air? Do we know how fast and what direction the Soviets are moving? Is our destination distance likely increase as the Soviets push the frontline back? If we leave our prepared positions will we be more exposed to Soviet air attack? How fast will we be able to cover the expected distance on foot? Do we have enough warm clothing for a march in exposed conditions? How much rifle ammo 4can we carry? I'm sure there are plenty more questions but for me some of the questions are unanswerable due to not knowing where the Soviets would reach and when. There is also the question that hindsight can't help with - what different action will the Soviets take if they become aware we are fleeing? Interesting debate in a wargame scenario but i see no way breakout would seem the least worst option to Paulus even if he had all the facts when he needed them.
I do think that in a time before Germany had experienced any mayor defeat against Soviet, to give the order: give upp all terrain we have fought for, abandon all our objectives, abandon everything you can't carry (food, water and light weapons), and start walking west - somewhere between shot and sent home to recover from "sudden mental illness" would be that officers faith... You don't flee from a foe that you see as inferior.
Yeah, German intelligence knew a winter attack would come (just like the year before) but didn’t believe it would come so far away on the flanks and in an overwhelming and coordinated fashion, they believed the Soviets had beaten themselves up in the area for months and wouldn’t have the capacity for offensives on multiple fronts (or that the attack would come closer to Stalingrad itself). The same issue repeated itself with Little Saturn which was the nail in the coffin for rescuing 6th Army. Really Germany didn’t respect Soviet offensive tactics until after this whole debacle and even then expected summer to return their fortunes.
TIK, I appreciate your honest approach. You are absolutely right. In this type of debate, either you win (which means you provide someone else a clearer perspective on History) or you learn something new, which is certainly not a loss ! Keep up with the good work !
There's also the question of what would have happened after this breakout/route. With no/little heavy equipment and the soviet armies not occupied reducing the pocket, what would have stopped the red armies from the next big operation and pressing their advantage? Maybe logistics only. It seems a disorganized breakout would have taken the 6th army out of the fight while costing the soviets very little. Atleast in the pocket they could fight and keep the soviet armies tied up.
Good point. It seems undisputable that the Sixth Army would have been wrecked in any breakout attempt, resulting in the complete denuding of German forces in the Don bend, with possibly catastrophic consequences for Axis positions in the western Caucasus and higher up the Don river. All a breakout attempt may have achieved is to let the Sixth Army be cut to pieces on the march in open territory instead of having to be reduced by a two month long siege.
and in theory if they could supply and save 6th Army where it was, a drive on Grozny in '43 would be possible. If 6th Army survived with no heavy equipment on a mad run back to Rostov, what of the prospect of getting the oil NEEDED to fight on?
I am wondering if it would have been logistically possible to break out. It's easy for people to sit in their nice chairs in their warm homes and talk about breaking out, but the weather certainly wasn't on the Germans side. The distances are quite far when walking in snow and cold. Where would they get their food and ammunition? They can't just keep walking for 48 hours or more non-stop. The Russians were far better suited and prepared for the weather than the Germans, so I have the suspicion that had a beak out occurred, the Russians would have rounded up everyone, because the Germans would have been too weak physically and mentally to provide any resistance to the Russians.
In a prepared movement of troops, routes are decided, maps and compasses are distributed, traffic directing units in place, etc., etc. If troop just start walking some routes may become clogged, units may become disorientated and lost, blue on blue events may happen. I can see the unplanned retreat becoming a rout. Given what he knew at the time, and thinking that 6th army could be resupplied by air, IMO Paulus made the right choice staying put.
@@johneden9573 It may be possible, but I don't think they had enough food to supply the calories needed to walk through the snow at -20C temperatures for 48 hours. The Russians soldiers had the logistics to get the food to the soldiers. I doubt Paulus did.
TIK, completely agree with your assessment. In hindsight anything is possible, but viewing things in context of the time period, an early and disorganised breakout would never have been considered. In my opinion, the true scale of the encirclement would not have been known until it was far too late, with most involved likely thinking that this was an unexpected setback that would be rectified in due course, and after a careful and considered situational review. The thought of the then “invincible” German army retreating in disarray at the first signs of trouble, would have been utterly inconceivable at all levels of the German army hierarchy.
"Was the War already over?" Is the question of this encirclement. Not that the encirclement was the 'turning point' but that the turning point already happened. The strategic picture hasn't been brought up, which I think was shocking. They already didn't/barely held any oil in the Caucasus area. The whole point of Stalingrad was to guard that flank. If they gave up Stalingrad to save (some of) the army but lost the oil as a result, the war was OVER. It could no longer be won via offensive operations, just various parrying actions until The West and Russia got tired. However if the 6th Army could hold what they had and every attempt was made to rescue them, the position could (maybe) be restored. Giving up Stalingrad meant giving up at least part of the 6th Army, either in smaller pockets, the equipment, or men lost in the open during Winter. Its a "Withdraw and lose slowly" or "Stand and have a chance at going forward". A lot of 'insane' Axis decisions are all based on the timetable that the longer time went on, the weaker they'd get. So from my perspective is that "Early Withdraw" is to admit the War is Over. If they were to get the rest of the oil, they would need a new summer drive in '43. Germany instead pointed those forces to break 6th Army out - and it couldn't do that. If the Russian encirclement was a fluke, the relief effort would work and Grozny would be within reach of the Planning Room.
If he believed they could get airlift of supplies then to stay would have worked for as long as they held the airfields, a retreat without heavy equipment would have been a difficult task it's a tough decision to make, yes half the men my have got out, hindsight is a wonderful thing, Thank you Tik superb as always.
It is great that you show courtesy here and seek the truth through reasoned argument. This is something so lacking in much of modern discourse. Good work TIK.
I’ve been watching both your channels it’s truly amazing how You both complement each other on this Stalingrad series, But yet willing to have a healthy debate And disagree on some points, I find it fascinating and a great addition tho ur series.
Hi TIK, two questions (i watched some ´ ish videos of you) 1) What did Paulus do all day, what was exactly his job-routine? 2) Was the -eventual- purpose of 6th army to bind as many soviet armies at the Wolga as possible to gain time?
1. Manage an army. There's a lot to it from ordering small advances or withdrawals, rotating units, managing the lives of his direct inferiors, trying to get his superiors to help him out, and coordinating with other branches of thr military. 2. In practice they held something like five times their numbers in position and provided time for units around them to withdraw. Most of this was not intended, but it was what the German command drove them to hold out in order to achieve when it became obvious that Paulus wasn't going anywhere and couldn't be relieved.
@@lokenontherange I would sat that on (2) once it was clear they were lost to the NAZI whatever they got from them was a bonus. Later on in the Eastern Front, it became usual for Hitler to promise the surrounded men relief just to keep them fighting. Often the German officers in defiance of orders retreated not believing these lies.
It would seem that the best argument in favor of a breakout is that (thanks to hindsight) we know only about 10% of the troops in the pocket survived (including those evacuated during the siege) to return home.
Great stuff....heading over to watch Anton's vid - yes, out of order...but looking forward to it. Making up a batch of popcorn and getting a soda to watch this debate.
At the same time, consider the orders regarding Paulus’ situation. The consensus was that even with a siege, the 6th Army still held up sizable amounts of Red Army formations that could have been freed up earlier which could have been used to withstand Manstein’s breakthrough or used elsewhere near the front. It’s a catch 22
Personally I was of the opinion at Anton Joly's video that in their original pocket 6th army occupied established defensive positions on at least the north and the east, whereas with a breakout out in the steppe they would have no established defensive lines to fall back on. And those established positions were strong enough to withstand Rokossovski's mopping up operation, which was why he attacked from the west, where 6th Army had no established defensive lines. As for the best way to settle this debate, LIVESTREAM!!!! Duel it out on a livestream and let the viewers decide via poll at the end.
I don't like the idea of livestreams. I much prefer to script my videos, which allows me to take my time to really think through what I'm trying to say. It also stops the emotional "you're wrong! No you are!" outbursts and insults which are prevalent in today's society. I also think that Anton would struggle to do this because he gets Brad to narrate his videos due to his strong French accent. I'm also against the idea of this being democratic. Just because people believe that the moon is made of cheese doesn't make it so. If everyone agrees with me because I've got a bigger audience and they just decided to dismiss Anton's work, then that's not fair if he's made the better argument. And people who see the results of the poll will then be influenced by that. I therefore think it should be down to the individual to come to their own understanding and decision, regardless what anyone else thinks.
@@TheImperatorKnight Fair enough. I do think you do yourself short though. A fair honest debate doesn't hurt anyone. I do believe you should be on livestreams. I can only dream of seeing you together with a Jordan Peterson discussing the socialist origins of national socialism and fascism. And I miss Anton Joly's wonderful French accent. He does himself short too. And while the vote idea was not to be taken that seriously, if people were to vote for you because you have the larger channel (and fans), I like to think we could rise above that.
Honestly I don't think there's much of a good debate here. TIK is right and Paulus made the best call. If we're debating this even with the benefit of hindsight it's clear that the breakout attempt would not have gone very well. Personally. I think it's a lot more interesting of a question to ask how could Stalingrad gone differently if other things had happened instead. Such as Von Boch not being removed and given freedom to go to Kalach right away. Or if the Germans had sent more reinforcements. Or if Army Group A went to the southern Volga first before then going to the caucuses (or perhaps distributing more of B's force to Paulus at the start).
Excellent episode. Much food for thought. This reminds of when I Craig's book EATG in 1970's. Craig dispelled and exploded many myths by all sides. TIK is doing yeoman's job in same way. Good job!!! 👍😀 Keep it going.
Not seeing Anton's video, but will check it out after this one. This should be a very interesting video today. Will post a reply comment to this one after watching this video & Anton's.
Disclaimer: I'm no Military Professor, Expert, Ex-Solder or Officer. Just a person with a interest & passion for things Military, War and History. So theses are just my opinions and observations on this topic. FYI, this is not well constructed or ordered to the videos in question. Apologies for annoying anyone. These points and thoughts came to me at the time as I jotted them down. 1: Hindsight seems to play a large role in the debate about whether or not Paulus should have pulled out when he had the chance or not. The question or questions I raise to this is, "what did Paulus actually know?" He needs to know what state his forces are in, conditions and their locations, as well as the enemies own positions & strengths as well. There's also that military bit as well, that a retreating army is an easy target, so who's going to cover the withdraw? A: And then there is the strategic significance of Stalingrad itself. The Blockading of the Oil Shipments up the Volga. 2: If an immediate breakout attempt was made, it would have to basically be made with just infantry. Using small arms and any light equipment a man or team of men could carry & use. A: Infantry taking on a combined arms force of tanks, artillery and the infantry equipped (most likely) to deal with the worsening environmental conditions, is a slaughter waiting to happen. And that's before we get to the open steppe nature of the terrain, and bottle neck chock points effecting unit movements. B: What are the conditions of the German Soldiers themselves also? From what I remember of the series. (It has been a very long series) They've basically been on starvation rations (to be generous) for several months now. And must be battle weary & fatigued. Not great conditions to be in for a offensive breakout operation. And what about their munitions? Going in with just 15 rounds per-rifleman, up against fully equipped Soviets with ammunition and ordinance. Yeah. 3: The Time it would have taken Paulus to have Reacted, given the orders to move his units for a breakout and get his forces in position, would have taken too long. And by the time the German soldiers get there, they'd have to go straight into combat with the Soviets. Rushing soldiers headlong into battle without much of their equipment is asking for disaster. (If they went in & dumped their heavier stuff in a headlong rush.) 4: In the past, when out numbered and maneuvered by an foe or enemy force, military units would withdraw & retreat to a position of strength. This would result a in a siege and sieges, take time. Time the enemy has to spend on routing out or besiege the military forces contained. Otherwise, depending on the situation here, time period and other such factors. Either in a military force to their rear that can attack them from a position of strength. Or having to spend time to dig them out of their defences and defeat them in their stronghold. And strongholds have generally been located in strategically vital or significant places. The Volga is still blocked as far as I know, and the ice is going to be a problem sure. But it still needs to be relieved & opened up again soon. 5: The weather at the time effecting military operations. I've never been in a blizzard, I'll say that straight up. But moving massed numbers of men, units, in such conditions is not easy and time consuming. The Russian's have been doing it themselves, and it has affected their movements and units as well. There's also the need for shelter as well as protective clothing for the weather conditions for the units. They'll need to stop during the night and rest. And there's no fire wood on the steppe. 6: I'm increasingly reminded of Napoleon's Retreat from Moscow. The worsening weather, the supply situation, the fierce Battle of the River, and the long retreat back to Poland. That was just with Infantry armed with Muskets, Saber & Lancer Horses, and solid round shot Cannons. Still didn't end very well despite all the heroics of the soldiers of Napoleon's army. 7: To give a quote from Star Wars, "Good Soldiers follow Orders." Now lets say that again with German Officers. And finally. Someone who believes in his Leader. There's no real way one is going to get him to move or do anything without the need authorisation to do so. A: Then that leads into, what does the High Command know and what was its intentions? There's also the whole Time & Reaction thing playing in again. A piece of new information from the rear or the front taking its time to work its way up to the top that then effects the High Command's plans & intentions. 8: Splitting 6th Army in Two: This is a very interesting and quite a novel idea. In theory it sounds good, and the Germans would have the expertise & leadership to break their army down into battlegroup components to facilitate local breakout attempts in the Soviet lines. And leaving the wounded soldiers behind to man prepared static positions with the heavy equipment to back them up. Is a very good use of limited manpower & resources. The only real issue with this good idea, is getting this organised with the appropriate units and men. Then also admitting you'd be leaving some of your boys behind to be besieged. No ones really want to be left behind and abandoned. And then again, splitting the limited existing supplies of 6th Army, between two forces. Need ammo and fuel for the break out forces. But you need ammo & food for the guys holding the defensive positions. Yeah. Really could have done a better job of all of this and should have. But I said I would reply to my first comment, and so I will. Sorry for the absolute mess.
With hindsight maybe the best option would be for Paulus to stay put and then gradually shrink the pocket. This would free troops to be flown out whenever supply planes managed to land. Flying men out would also decrease the need for supplies. I think this would have saved way more men in better shape than an attempted retreat while still keeping soviet forces busy.
Luigi's idea would have required consistent and reliable communications between all parties involved in order to coordinate the operation. I'm skeptical this would have been possible.
worth to consider that human emotions, panic and shock also played a part. In such a bad situation all kinds of ideals are floating in the head and it is difficult to pick apart which are actual logical correct options and which are just panic thinking. We deal in these situations differently. Only after a few days you can put together your ideas and have a thought out, sane decision arguably during this unknowness and panic phase, being indecisive is the best option, until a complete evaluation is done
Thank you for your colossal efforts to make educational videos for Battle of Stalingrad. In order to assess the situation after November 23, 1942 in the Stalingrad area and the possible breakout operation, three or four additional things should be considered. I am not talking about whether the 6th army has enough strength to perform a retreat operation. 1. Most importantly, where does 6th army ( 4th Panzer army) retreat and make a defensive line after a breakout? 2. How many Soviet forces ( number of divisions) are tied down in the Stalingrad pocket during late Nov to Dec, 1942? 3. Nobody mentioned Operation Mars, which started a week later. How does Army group B connects with Army group Center? 4. Assuming the 6th army successfully abandons the Don bend area, and the west of Don river area belongs to the Soviet army, then now general staff have to worry about the fate of the 1st Panzer army, which was extended to the Caucus region. 5. Eight months ago, Heer Ost stabilized the Demyansk and Holm pockets and did not collapse the northern front. German general staff or high ranking generals fully aware that Demyansk and Stalingrad are totally different situations. However, they did not have the luxury to choose the breakout, then offensive or defensive plan ( in this case, I am not talking about military short term tactics but long term military strategy ). Simply put, German general staff chose ( or gambled) the 'MIRACLE' military operation and it did not work. Once again, in my wildest guess, German general staff in Nov/Dec of 1942 chose to save the 1st Panzer in the south and 4th, 2nd army in the north for the sacrifice of the 6th army.
Some writer said decades ago, I believe in regards to some action in North Africa, memory being what it is, to paraphrase, 'To judge someone's actions we must first know what knowledge they based their actions on. It matters not what we know today, only what that person knew then.'
Not to mention that the enemy gets a vote as well. If they want to delay or tie down forces, they can choose to do so. So it's not as simple as walking away.
Agreed: Paulus was up Rasoshka creek without a Pa...nzer Corps... :) His (remaining) armour was already overcommitted, overstrained, undersupplied and severely lacking in fuel at the very end of its overstretched supply tether - a Volga river away from Asia. Instead of any reserve armour, he had a black hole empty gap behind his entire front. With large Soviet tank corps closing in behind him on both wings. He just didn't know the outcome for certain... yet. :) In the circumstances I suppose he did pretty well to form a stable pocket. He wasn't getting out of there though. With the benefit of hindsight... ;)
The weather would have played a major part as areas outside roads were covered in ravines and deep crevices. We often hear Paulus say he only had enough fuel for 100 tanks for 30 km. Why not reduce that to 50 tanks for 60 km? An small armoured spearhead is better than none.
even if 100 tanks could have gone only 30km, then the breakout would have succeeded, the Soviets did not have a in-depth defensive structure and the ones fighting against von Manstein Winter Storm would have been trapped between 2 fires
Thanks for producing this video, TIK. Having watched your earlier episode, and having seen Anton Joly's, the latter left me squirming in my seat as I watched it. Anton has produced fabulous research books on Stalingrad, yet his video had too many inconsistencies in in, errors, and way too much unsupportable supposition. As Spock would say, "It is not logical."
Paulus did have the benefit of hindsight. He knew that a winter retreat through Russia had destroyed the largest army in the world in 1812. Surely that had to weigh heavily in his thinking?
Point 2 assumes that Paulus left no rearguards in his original line, that the Soviets detected the withdrawal, that they were prepared to follow up immediately, etc. etc. The two and a half corps already over the Don made it back to the encirclement without incapacitating losses and were still sufficiently co-ordinated to hold the front for the next six weeks or more. There is also the question as to whether there was really a continuous Soviet line on 25 November.
Always appreciate these healthy debates between content creators. Have you ever considered doing an overview of Operation Silver Fox/Arctic Fox? There's hardly any content on it or attention drawn to it in general (maybe that's partly because it was a pretty quiet front?) and what I do see seems very inconsistent.
Given the dismal state of German supplies, their men were basically starving already, is it realistic to expect the entire Army to have been able to walk dozens of miles in the dead of winter.
Exactly, for them it is was either give up the entire army now in a rush of panic or try to save it. We all know now that it was impossible but they didnt.
The biggest problem that I see with this series is that - - unlike TIK's earlier videos about Fall Blau, which asserted that catastrophic errors were made by Hitler (eg, changing plan Blau, dividing Army Groups A/B), and that the entire campaign was a disaster - - that admission is completely missing in the Stalingrad series. In this series, Hitler "could do no wrong."
If Paulus didn't have the forces to sweep Chuikov's ragged forces out of the ruins of the factories, where was he supposed to get the (mobile!) forces to sweep through fresh armored forces surrounding him? He was already in major supply and shortage squeeze with overstretched and overloaded lines of communication.
Fuel fuel fuel . . . TIK's already covered it working from other vectors. Mobile means fuel stocks, dumps along the way, and reserves. Paulus had none. As far as splitting them goes, I would suggest that splitting them is confining the wounded to certain death. Someone like Napoleon might do it, but he was a verdammt Frenchie; a man without honor or loyalty. I'm not leaving the wounded and rear echelon boys behind. If I do . . . heads (including mine) will roll.
Thank you for your erudite, well thought out, and insightful presentations. Could you look at the strategic role Italy played in WW2, specifically with regard to the strategies of Germany, the United States and Great Britain?
I came to the conclusion that the German high command honestly believed that they could break the encirclement ring from the outside. And, if that had happened, it would have been a disaster for the deeply penetrated Russian units. And then the idea of keeping the 6th Army in place would have turned out to be a fantastic idea. But it did not go that way ... C'est la guerre!
Pretty damn good arguments. I can't really see even with hindsight how this withdrawal, had it succeeded would have been THAT good for Paulus. He'd take sizeable losses AND lose all the heavy equipment.
A very interesting video presentation here, TIK (and, indirectly, Anton). Keep up with your thought-provoking video presentations! :) I think the key operative phrase is "with the benefit of the hindsight". Anyway, my takes: 1. Given what was available to Paulus, both operational situation and available units under his command, right in the wake of the Soviet onslaught, it would have been quite normal for Paulus to experience "operational paralysis". 2. "Operational paralysis": The events surrounding the 6th Army were churning up at a much faster rate than intel updates trickling up to Paulus. Furthermore, he did not have units that were healthy enough to attempt either a counterattack or a breakout. Meanwhile, his top-most superiors (i.e., Hitler and the OKH) showed very little indication of panic apart from promising resupply through airlift. 3. Ordering a breakout operation might not have been practical in the early stage of Operation Uranus due to Paulus and his staff having to delve into so many issues all at once: (a) Getting the northwestern portion of the 6th Army to pull out; (b) taking a stock of on-hand supply situation; (c) making sure to maintain continuous command and communications as best as Paulus can despite the Soviet onslaught; (d) coordinating the 6th Army's actions with the armies outside the Stalingrad Pocket; (e) getting a better handle on reading the actions of Soviet units. 4. In the early stage of Operation Uranus, Paulus could have viewed ordering a breakout as just damn too risky, based on the way the northwestern portion of the 6th Army retreated into what was to become the Stalingrad Pocket with many difficulties. 5. There is also the psychology of make-believe: That is, when facing growing uncertainties and premonitions of things no longer going well, people tend to comfort themselves by make-believe. In case of Paulus, the best possible outcome would have been to firmly defend the Stalingrad Pocket while counting on the promised resupply through airlift and a relief force in the near future. So, Paulus might have been thinking along the line of "I'll do my part of the job within my means, while wait for my bosses to figure out how to best turn this situation around for the time being." 6. In my opinion, the fact that the 6th Army was hollowed out by the time of Operation Uranus was the single biggest constraint faced by Paulus. Had the 6th Army still possessed a decent number of moderately healthy (i.e., good enough for limited offensive operations) panzer and motorized divisions with a bit of ammo and fuel reserves on hand, he might have responded more aggressively--i.e., deploying these panzer and motorized divisions to bite the flanks of the Soviet twin pincers. But in reality, the panzer and motorized divisions under Paulus' command were shadows of their former selves and were placed rather inconveniently in the wake of the Soviet onslaught. To order a breakout under this predicament? That would require an extremely daring general harboring "better to die in the blaze of glory" mentality.
I love the idea of the debate, whatever the result will be, it won't be worse than before the debate itself. Additionally I don't think that Paulus without a hindsight could made a different decision
Interesting point on the corps on the Don, but consider this: we've seen, earlier in this campaign as well as elsewhere, units breaking out of encirclements as they were forming. Supposing Strecker had put his focus not on holding in the north, and the south, and stopping the Soviet breakthrough, all at the same time - but instead he'd fought a rearguard action in the north and attacked not with "what he could spare", but with the bulk of his forces, to the southwest, i.e. straight in the back of the Russians cutting him off. Think v. Wietersheim north of Stalingrad and the Kotluban counter-offensive. I'd give them a pretty good chance of at least a Korsun-style rescue.
It is a bit like Predator One. "Request for evacuation denied, maintain a defensive perimeter and await further instructions!." The problem that remains is that there were 550 trucks and an extra 400 trucks captured west of the Don before the encirclement was complete after the Romanian fuel dump was captured intact. Whether these were captured Soviet trucks from the earlier battles at the Don Bend remains unclear. There seems to be too many German units embedded within the urban areas of the city itself to do anything at a faster pace.
In the 90s there was a documentary aired on the ORF. It also featured a former staff officer of Paulus. He said that they considered a break out and figured that one third would make it. Paulus hesitation and unwillingness to go against Hitlers orders sealed their fate though. Perhaps you can contact the ORF and request this documentary.
In a Kesselschlact situation. The commander of the encircled forces needs a detailed plan. The pocket must be like a slowly collapsing bag and the ideal breakout route will most likely take a good fight to open that route. The units on the far side of the kessel will have to retreat in good order to phase lines and the plan should include deception measures so that the enemy only see a reorganisation of the pocket. As soon as the enemy know for sure that a breakout is happening. Speed is of the essence because the enemy will react very quickly. Stemmerman did as well as he could at Korsun. He managed to keep order but regardless of good planning. The enemy reacted as soon as it was clear that a breakout was happening. Hube with 1 Panzerarmee at Kamentz Podolsk managed to keep his kessel on the move and was wise to take a longer more circuitous route in order to avoid strong enemy forces.
The only time when Paulus could have realistically considered a breakout was when Manstein was coming to the rescue (Winter Storm) in December. And this could only have worked if Manstein had been given a stronger army to breakthrough. Manstein got to within 50kms of the 6th Army, if he could get a bit closer ~30kms, 6th Army's tanks might just have enough fuel to meet him.
TIK, been follow this mammoth production of yours since it started and as posted somewhere back in episode 5 its fantastic and has given me (and continues to do so) an insight and detail into the battle which I had not known or appreciated. Regarding the comments from Anton Joly post which I have now just watched, I think he’s being very supportive of your work (and so he should be) and my take on it was that he and others were saying that with hindsight 6th Army / Paulus should have retreated come what may, and you know, with hindsight knowing that only 5K got back home alive, a mad dash/scramble/route would have been the best thing, it would have been carnage but maybe more might have got out. But I agree with you, at the time, in a blizzard, short of petrol, troops already exhausted, a chaotic scene unfolding by the hour, nobody would have made a decision to breakout certainly not on the 22nd or 23rd/24th. After that, well I need to know more so will wait for the next instalments. From Crackers, a big fan !!
Col. Herbert Salle interviewed in that video was an interesting sort. From Salle speaking French he probably was of French Huguenot Ancestry (La Salle) that settled in Brandenburg. Herbert joined up into the NSDAP founding, got out, then rejoined, probably ready to get out again. Really it seemed he had serious reservations about the whole AH regime and the future of confidence in where things were heading. Salle settled into the Pioneer Corps in the early part of the war. Breakout probably was not on the list of priorities as Paulus may have known about AH and wanting to stay in Stalingrad proper no matter what. Salle stated AH wanted to build concrete fortifications (as winter quarters) at Stalingrad. Salle stated AH had “ a downright criminal ignorance of the local situation ” the nearest gravel deposit was on the Sea of Azov and cement would have had to be brought in from Germany to the Volga by many rail cars. Plus concrete work before or during in the freezing winter is downright difficult next to impossible. Salle was flown out of the pocket in January 1943 probably due to his NSDAP allegiances, but ran afoul of the administration afterwards and the rest of the war.
I think this is a great response video. Anton’s points were good, but the practicality of getting the German units to the jump off point for a breakout is an excellent point that I had never thought of before. I have long wondered why Paulus didn’t attempt the breakout, but you showed that from his perspective it was a potentially suicidal attempt at best while the chance of being relieved was at least a decent possibility. It is easy to think of the German army as being in a neat circle without any natural barriers to overcome, but you are forced to make a much different assessment when you know that most of your army will be wiped out if you gave the order to retreat. Also, even a decent sized army brought out of the pocket with no heavy weapons and no tanks might still be wiped out by the same forces that were encircling it in the first place. Paulus had no guarantee that his retreating troops wouldn’t be overrun by tanks after they got to the German lines since they would have no anti tank capability post breakout. He would also be forced to abandon his wounded in the city to their fate which wouldn’t have sat well with any one. I do have a question for you though TIK. Were any of the units in the 6th Army present at the siege of Leningrad the winter before? If so, it would be interesting to know if they suffered the same fate as the citizens of that city that they had forced into starvation and death the year before. I thought some of the units from Army Group North had been transferred to Army Group South at the beginning of Fall Blau but I could be mistaken on that point. I’d be interested to hear your thoughts. Thanks for the great work!
The best time to have launched the breakout was while they were still supplied enough to achieve their aims …. hence why they did not try a breakout earlier
To me it is unimaginable that any commander that is not facing an immediate annihilation and or capture of his forces would authorise an "uncoordinated" retreat, because you are surrendering all control of both your forces and the situation and with it any influence on the outcome.
Just sawca short video about the Cherkasy pocket and the German breakout towards relief forces. It made me thinknof this video. All the difficulties you enumerate here.
One thing to consider. In any organisation especially arm forces political manouvering within the general staff takes the first place. Desire to climb the ladder always outweighs any other conciderstion. And if you look at it this way many decisions become clear. On all sides
Imagine if we had like a whole community of free thinking (but not "too free thinking") historians presenting alternative theories and fighting it out. Right now most history channels on UA-cam present themselves as ultimate truth as if we already know everything even when the evidence is limited. TIK is pretty much alone in his genre. I'd like to see more people doing some actual digging. That would also help to keep TIK in check, because he'd be getting valuable feedback from nondisabled people.
That's actually what I'm hoping for! Sadly, many subscribe to the German (Leopold von Ranke) philosophy of history where you "just present the facts" and there is no debate. That's why you get the "ultimate truth" outlook. Unfortunately, history theory shows us that 'history lies in the heart of the debate'. Without the debate you can't figure out the truth because the "facts" are all over the place and don't necessarily lead us to the correct interpretations. That's why debate is necessary, so we can figure out the truth through argument and counter-argument (testing the thesis like you would do in science). I've been over this concept in my history theory video ua-cam.com/video/PvpJEc-NxVc/v-deo.html
Plus you must bear in mind that many UA-camrs are playing it safe as a result of the current political culture and UA-cam's terms of service. They'll discuss tanks, weapons and training - stuff where the debate is limited to "what's your favourite tank", which isn't controversial. I totally understand why they do this, but it does mean that the audience is not seeing the potential benefits of a serious academic debate over a more important topic (like this video, or the Hitler's Socialism debate).
They also present themselves as a-political or non-political, which I know for a fact is untrue. They hide their political beliefs, deceiving people into thinking they're impartial and therefore trustworthy. I know why they're doing this (partly Ranke, partly so as not to rock the boat), but in their quest to be trustworthy, all they've done is hidden their cards up their sleeves, which actually makes them untrustworthy if you think about it. People may not agree with my stance on certain topics, but at least they know what that stance is. For all you know, one of these other UA-camrs could be a secret [insert-whatever-bad-person-you-like-here].
Of course, it's more difficult to get into these debates, and people aren't mature enough to stop themselves from getting emotional and insulting each other. But in theory, everybody would benefit from a serious and academic debate on more 'controversial' topics. And for this reason, I think a debate would be good for the community here on UA-cam, and would be entertaining for everyone.
Plus, I want someone who's actually mature (unlike my current critics) who can take an opposing stance to my work, so that I can see if my arguments hold up to scrutiny, or if I need to clarify certain points, or do more research on certain things to back up my points. It's not easy to do that without someone with an opposing view.
You know what, I think I should pin this comment because maybe other UA-camr's might see it
@@TheImperatorKnight Senpai has noticed me. uwu
I think the reason simply is that the standard narrative is "good". Good as in you have to actually work your ass off to come up with a better one. The barrier to entry is insanely high. While I can sometimes point to where the logic doesn't add up within the information you have provided, actually gathering sources and coming up with my own theories and operating outside the information contained within your videos would be very very hard. I'd need to put in like a thousand hours of reading before I'm even capable of disagreeing with you about anything nontrivial.
@@TheImperatorKnight I have a question, just a simple one, is this video going to be part of Stalingrad addendum videos? Because I would like to see them in a playlist for full context.
@@junfour That's absolutely a factor. I work a lot of hours to put these videos together. I worked about 80 hours the week prior to releasing Episode 38 of Stalingrad in order to get it edited in time, and that was after a week of doing research, preparing the scripts and recording it. Not everyone's got the will to do that. Same with the other subjects. It's exhausting, and I can certainly see why people are unwilling to commit to a serious amount of reading on these topics. The simple topics are far easier and get more views anyway. People seem to prefer them
My grandfather was a commander of Soviet artillery regiment in 1941. He survived the retreat of SW Front from the border with 4/5 of his division lost. He survived Kiev encirclement in September, where only about 30k managed to break out, out of 500k. He survived Second Battle of Kharkiv, where barely anyone from Soviet 6th army made it through. So that is where I got this special interest in how these breakout attempts work. To simplify it extremely - rivers.
Unorganized retreat was not an option for Paulus's forces. "Half of manpower reaching friendly lines" is a wishful thinking. "Swarming the enemy with waves of fleeing troops" is a fantasy.
When you travel across countries in a peacetime you barely notice small rivers. Why would you - there are good roads and bridges across. Armies during offensives or planned movement don't have that much problem with small rivers either - they are prepared with all sorts of equipment and specialists to handle that. This is not the case with an army on unorganized retreat. The first river in your way presents you with two choices: 1. keep your vehicles and equipment and go stand in huge traffic jams (which are being bombed) to one or two available bridges or 2. leave all your transport and all equipment past your rifles and rations and ford the river using makeshift means of crossing. After the first crossing units are mostly disorganized, nobody waits for stragglers, forward elements move on. Some makeshift units might continue to function to a degree, but they have no transport, no artillery, and no food or ammunition reserves past what people carry on themselves. Communication or command structure is gone already at that point. The second river is reached by completely separate groups of people - tired, hungry, disoriented. Even the idea of an army is gone by that point. There is no means to create even a resemblance of a crossing or rafts. People usually don't have personal weapons or any food after the second crossing, and they are clothed in whatever they have chosen to swam across. The third river is crossed by lucky few. Starving, exhausted, alone or in small groups, incapable of any sort of fighting.
Paulus' troops had to cross 4 to 5 rivers to reach the area of Kotelnikovo. Rossoshka, Karpovka, Donskaya Tsaritsa, Myshkova and Aksay. Despite the usual depiction of the fighting at Stalingrad as extremely cold, at the end of November rivers were not frozen solid. At least not enough to cross with any equipment. My grandfather was among those lucky and resilient enough to cross three rivers in the rear of Soviet SW Front to reach friendly lines. But that was in September. Imagine how it would go in late November.
Thank you very much for sharing that precious memories! I completely agree with you. I'm not a military man but I'm sure moving units around (and across rivers) is extremely difficult. Even more, doing that in contact with the enemy. Even more, without a guaranteed source of supplies. Therefore, I believe attempting a breakout (of any kind) would have been suicidal, besides fantasy & wishful thinking. It was already too late to do anything else rather than regrouping, digging in and waiting for help.
Thank you very much, very helpful!
That checks out with what I know about the Korsun pocket. The breakout was doing okay, till the troops had to cross a river.
Fantastic post and I fully agree. You have excellent understanding of the realities of war.
Not to mention crossing SEVERAL rivers (wet) in Winter conditions would have been a death sentence for all but a fortunate few. Even dry exposure with no fuel and little food to just the cold conditions would have killed most.
“When we consider history, we know the end before we consider the beginning. So, we can never see the beginning as it actually was.” ---Cicely Veronica Wedgwood (1910-1997)
This should be on a T-shirt or a tile
@TIK, when is your merchandise shop opening?
@@bobbowie5334 I would wipe my ass immediately
History should be treated as if it isn't inevitable (John Lukacs paraphrase).
there is no "correct" answer to this debate. From a purely military perspective, the decision to attempt a breakout or not is so complex that any decision made was likely "wrong" at the time. Having spent 30 years in the Army, I know how hard such a breakout move actually would have been. Stripping the defense against the Soviet units in contact may have worked for a short period, but it is incredibly hard to predict how it the operation would have gone.
Yes, well said.
I see this as a friendly discussion about an hypothesis.
And then we would be here all smug talking about how he should have stayed hahaha
an uncoordinated breakout could have resulted in Saturn operation success, 6th army would has been no longer a capable unit combat
This is one of the best answers and in my opinion best standpoints so far. I tend to think (or believe) that a break-out would have been the best option in theory.
But what's next ? There was literally no frontline and 6th army already was is a desperate state. A breakout and simultaneous retreat under fire is one of the most complicated military operations for any formation even at full strength. Even if they achieved that, they would have been sitting in the steppes in winter and their units were still totally depleted.
There is no answer at all to question.
I agree. Had the breakout failed, they would have folded even more quickly, and perhaps Army Group A might have been trapped in the Caucasus
Whether or not Paulus made the "right" decision, he made a logical decision based on the information he had at the time. I do think we can conclude this no matter what. It's important, because it means that we can't say he was negligent or incompetent, which would be the only real purpose of this exercise.
Paulus doesn't have the fuel to move his army. At best he abandons all his guns, armour, and equipment and then scrambles into a disorganized Russian position and maybe a few thousand men escape through the fighting and winter river crossings that would ensue. All that would do in practice is free up the Russians to put pressure and waste all the potential of Paulus' forces.
@@lokenontherange Agreed entirely. Under the circumstances and conditions described by TIK. Paulus could not move any of his heavy equipment and very little of his armor. What this meant in practice has already been seen earlier in the war. When armies lost all their heavy equipment, as happened several times in Poland and France, the army was in effect destroyed and incapable of further serious resistance. Such was also the case with Soviet armies during Barbarossa. Once surrounded with their heavy equipment lost, the army was destroyed irrespective of how many of the men escaped before the end.
The alternative was to continue to hold out, if assured of air supply. Paulus was given such assurance, and given the example of the Demyansk pocket earlier in 1942 he had no particular reason to anticipate that the air resupply would fail. What was certain was that his army would be destroyed if he ordered an retreat from Stalingrad. So he really had no intelligent choice except to wait for relief.
Finally, any such breakout attempt would be to try to organize a breakthrough attack on the march WITH THE ARMY IN FULL RETREAT. There is nothing in history more difficult than this. In general it's never achieved unless you are commanded by Julius Caesar escaping the deathtrap at Dyrrachium. The examples of armies reorganizing themselves for an attack while actually on a retreat simply never happens. With no tanks, no artillery, Paulus had no chance.
Consider for a moment if the breakout HAD occurred and ultimately was a spectacular failure/massive rout which turned the tide of the war for the Soviets. With hindsight we would be then criticising Paulus for not staying put and holding his nerve to allow the ‘master’ (Manstein) break him out. We would argue that the Luftwaffe themselves were quite confident that the air lift could work and argued past successes in Demyansk. We would then argue that the 6th Army was only bogged down due to insufficient reinforcements to Army group B and with the reserves that would be mobilised within a few weeks, Manstein wouldn’t have much trouble breaking through… Especially when the 6th Army would have enough strength (as supplied by air) to attack southwards to meet him.
Grass is always greener on the other side and whatnot.
Paulus was (luckily) in a lose-lose situation. Sometimes you can't win no matter what.
@@a.rodimtsev9446 yes I agree, the 6th Army was finished in one way or the other. The soviets executed the perfect plan so well, I struggle to think of a better strategic outcome. Maybe you could at least argue that with the 6th army staying organised it tied down huge amounts of Soviet forces. If the 6th army panicked and fled in chaos in the first few days, I wonder if the soviets would have been able to organise a push on Rostov much sooner.
Army Group B had determined that only 1/10 of 6th Army could be resupplied by air. Holding ground in Stalingrad was the death blow. No sane commander would accept the entombment of 200k men without a fight. All of Army Group B wanted to break out and they were denied.
Glad we can have a serious discussion about this, and I trust it interests many people here :)
I'll definitely release an answer in the coming weeks, because there are many things to say and the structure of this response video has already formed in my mind as I watched yours. For the moment I'll only say this: in my opinion hindsight is point #1 to consider, not #7. Everything depends on this. And YET, even without hindsight, I'll argue that:
1.
A breakout would not have been a 100% logical decision during Uranus, BUT it could have succeeded with much better chances than you put it (I'll develop, but my main argument is that at this time there was just a very theoretical screen by Soviet troops around 6th Army, and those red units that took position here and there were at the end of their resources, had absolutely not formed any solid defense even locally, and so on, so that it was not a credible blocking issue). But again, I agree this was not a decision to make without hindsight.
2.
A breakout during Wintergewitter was way more logical to consider because by this time the precarious situation of 6th Army on the long-term was becoming very clear. It was definitely something to consider (and was very much considered by 6th Army's Command) even though it was more difficult than before, due to Soviet units having time to entrench around the cauldron. But here again, I believe people generally underestimate the benefits of a breakout, even a chaotic and disastrous one, AS OPPOSED to the "benefits" of staying in the cauldron.
As for the interviews, I agree of course that it was easier to speak like this 30 years after. But I'm sure by the time of Wintergewitter many officers genuinely thought like this. So it's a very, very different thing to discuss options during Uranus than during Winter Storm...
Already looking forward to your video Anton! I get the impression that the discussion ultimately boils down to how solidified the Soviet defences were around the 23rd/24th whether a breakout with mainly infantry would have been possible. Tik has shown in what a terrible situation the German 6th army was but it would be interesting to know more about the state of the Soviet forces. Even if Paulus made a perfectly logical decision based on the information he had, it might have still be the wrong decision if he incorrectly assessed the Soviet strength. Then, even without hindsight of the fate of the 6th army, you could argue Paulus made a wrong decision - though he cannot be blamed for having 'bounded rationality' as Herbert Simon would call it.
@@derozebrigade The state of Soviet forces was not so good by the end of Uranus. So had Paulus decided a breakout at this time, it would have at least partly succeeded. But in no scenario (at any time) was there a possibility to save the heavy weapons. They would have been left behind in any case.
I think there's a point that TIK has not considered, even though it strengthens his position even further: Had Paulus simply ordered his men to pick up their rifles and start walking, what was to prevent all the Soviet forces on the north side of the pocket to start a general advance south? If Rokossovsky's forces had been able to advance south over positions abandoned by the Germans, the pocket would have collapsed even before it was formed. Consequently, I think that an uncoordinated withdrawal was not an option.
Of Course, Paulus could have ordered his most exposed forces to withdraw first, while the rest of his forces held their positions and then gone for a "staggered" withdrawal - but wasn't that, more or less, what he tried? To some extent, isn't this what Luigi suggested. Free up forces to create unit capable of operation against the southwestern Pocket frontline. However, I this would take time and events would (and did) overtake such attempts.
Or perhaps Luigis suggestion was simply to have each division split their forces up in two groups. One left behond for a suicide mission and the other to fight it's way out as independant Kampfgruppen? I seriously doubt this would work, as TIK has already shown that it was the combat units of the German divisions that had taken the heaviest casulaties, and now those depleted units were suddently to double their workload?
I do disagree with TIK that Paulus must have believed that the airbridge "could" (realistically) have worked at this time. I have argued that the Germans basically failed to supply the 6th Army while they held the rail lines open, so hoping for an airbridge to succeed where the rail system had failed, must have been more of a prayer than a realistic hope. But I do agree that that prayer must have seemed the best option open to the Germans at this particular point in history. Also, an airlift doesn't either "work" or "not work", it will automatically work to some degree. Paulus may well have hoped to recieve a significant portion of the needed supplies by air, leaving his forces able to defend until a counterattack by superior German forces from the west (Der Manstein Kommt).
The retreating 6th army would be attacked from the north and might be destroyed in a few days, which would give the Soviet armies a great opportunity to exploit this huge gap in the frontlines!
I don't think most soldiers had any chance to break out anyways. Tthe few who did would be overrun by the Soviet armies a few days later and who knows which armies could have been cut off after this. Nothing could have stopped them till they run out of fuel.
@slaine's axe Yes and maybe even a bigger defeat than it was now. What 6th army did was buying time, which gave forces to the south the time to retreat.
Had Manstien pulled off a rescue of Paulus be would be the most popular of the German Eastern Front Generals. I'd be ever caught a whiff of the situation, I would bet he was trying to come up with something. As was the German High Command.
Really in my opinion the only possible route to Save Paulus' Army, would've been a large counteroffensive being pulled from the North or South diverting Soviet Attention and as such allowing forces to attempt a simultaneous breakout (with Paulus' forces attacking toward Manstein and Manstein attacking towards the encircled troops). That in my opinion is probably the only route towards Victory the Germans could've achieved (besides a Masterstroke Tactical movement that they could've replicated from earlier in the War). And since the Luftwaffe couldn't even supply the earlier (I believe it was Maikop?) Pocket that was far smaller than Stalingrad's Pocket, there wasn't even a prayer of hope of supplying Stalingrad simply by Air.
It also ignores that there is a military function to the pocket. It's occupying significant numbers of Russian troops that would elsewise be a problem. Paulus and his superiors have to take a broader view as much as they also have to think about maintaining the army.
Thank you, Tic. You're rational discussions are very calming in these days of idiocracy.❤️ You're appreciated.
This is amazing. Historians who disagree but respect each other. This is how it should be
Hard to imagine hundreds of thousands of men on foot break g out.
The Soviets had tank armies and cavalry divisions closing the trap.
Its hard to imagine many surviving.
"With the benefit of hindsight ..." Following this line of logic, I wonder how much the experience at Stalingrad influenced those at Falaise pocket which was an unorganized retreat, with most escaping the near encirclement without the heavy equipment.
Falaise was a disaster made worse by the Mortain Offensive..Also 500 Panzers that were list were lost over the Normandy Campaign! The Germans only did the paperwork after the "Void"! (A similar thing happened after Kursk!)
And Falaise should have been worse for the Germans than it was. The Allies probably could have closed the pocket completely.
@@randallkelley3600 yes flaming Monty again let 'em out in my opinion. Patton would have gone hell for leather in closing the gap,
@@neil03152. Oh really? Patton?
He was good at dashing across open country with little opposition. Pursuit and exploitation was his game.
Closing the Falaise pocket wasn't so easy and it's not something to blame on Monty.
A key difference between this proposed breakout that 6th Army could have hypothetically conducted and the breakout at the Korsun pocket was the presence of German support. In 1944 the Germans breaking out where breaking out to existing German lines. In the case of a 6th Army breakout in 1942 there is no line for the Germans to break out to. Without a line of German troops to fall back to the German retreat would have been a rout across the steppes. Some have argued the creation of the pocket tied down Russian forces inhibiting future operations that could have endangered other German Armies including a Russian advance to Rostov.
Correct, Army group A could be cut off. We don't know if this was really possible, but it couldn't be ignored by the Germans.
Indeed by having a prolonged siege and the time taken to crush the pocket did tie up large Soviet forces..If the pocket has disintegrated it would have freed up loads of extra troops!
@@jamesbeeching4341 I don't believe it would be easy to disengage either. The withdrawal under pressure is difficult in the best of circumstances. I am going to look up the reinforcement schedule and possibly add some comments to this debate.
@@hjalmar4565 bullshit. Army Group A could be supplied and retreated to the Chrimea
@@darklysm8345 How? Only if the Axis had enough ships for this in the Black Sea, which I doubt they had. They could hardly supply the smaller Army Group North in the baltics, so how on earth do you think they could do this with a much larger force?
And which divisions could have closed the gap in the Axis frontlines in the south?
Yes, that was where they needed Army Group A!
A breakout seemingly on the brink of victory might well have looked like madness, or else an ignominious, shambolic retreat. Whereas what happened was painted as a heroic defence (and it was). In purely military terms, though, the decision is less clear; such an operation would need to be carefully prepared, and by the time that's done, the encirclement would be complete anyway.
I think Paulus did his best under impossible circumstances - he had his head in the crocodile's jaws for weeks.
Thanks to Pavel K. for sharing those precious family memories! I completely agree with him & TIK. I'm not a military man but I'm sure moving units around (and across rivers) is extremely difficult. Even more, doing that in contact with the enemy. Even more, without a guaranteed source of supplies. Therefore, I also believe that attempting a breakout (of any kind) would have been suicidal, besides fantasy & wishful thinking. It was already too late to do anything else rather than regrouping, digging in and waiting for help.
Brother
Just wanted to say THANKYOU for all your videos
After 48 years of studying WW2 and warfare in general watching you and listening to you has been a pleasure
I look at the books on your shelves and realize I'm not the only to delve so deep
Hope all is well with you in this life
Please keep them coming
As a recent pensioner i have the time now to absorb them all
Nothing but respect from NY
It's what known as "living in hope". Even when your senses awaken you to the reality of the situation, there is always the belief that a solution will appear out of nowhere.
Yes TIK, many of us did see it. To be fair, I'm not sure how many of us would have seen it if you hadn't done some collaborating with Anton long ago, but you succeeded in boosting his viewership tremendously, and I salute you for that excellent decision. (I think he had about 2500 subscribers when the algorithm first recognized my tastes and recommended his videos to me.)
Have only watched the first few minutes, but I do think that ordering an uncoordinated breakout without the benefit of hindsight would have been widely seen as a panic reaction, and I do not think German officers were prone to do such things. Just my 2 cents.
Hope you're doing well :)
+ fact, that already German troops were almost not able to move at all, even retreat with equipment.
But abandoning stuff would be see as 100% coward.
And what of the chance of getting the Vital oil region with the fractured 6th Army in '43? Without the oil they still lose. Holding onto the flank anchor (stalingrad) and praying they could relieve it from outside I think is a reason choice.
I think your average German private would have viewed it as a panic reaction. The retreat would have been utter chaos.
If Paulus had attempted a breakout, it would have failed. Historians today would be writing books blaming Paulus for attempting the breakout instead of waiting for more German units to work on a coordinated breakout (inside and outside the pocket). Even to the point of insisting that the Luftwaffe could have temporarily supplied the troops while battle plans were arranged.
Thank you, TIK I,m very pleased for answering the idea that comes to my mind watching your videos about Paulus break out. It was just a possibility like "try to think different and and wait what can come across"... I enjoy watching your superb work, specially the Stalingrad series...
I still think you ought to do a supplementary video on other options for the relief of 6th Army ( withdrawing armour from AG A, giving Manstein II SS Pz Corps, and also what ought to have been done to avoid the encirclement in the first place ( retaining 11th Army, GD, etc, sticking to the original plan etc).
Paulus, being a staff officer, could never have conceived of ordering a breakout without explicit orders from the High Command. Nor would the Russians, who were closely engaged with the Germans inside Stalingrad, permitted it to have happened undisrupted. One of the German division commanders, I believe in the northern part of the pocket, did order a breakout on his own authority in the first days of the Russian offensive. The Russians detected it and mauled the division as it left its fortifications, inflicting 1,000 casualties. The survivors, having burned their provisions, had to set up shop on a new front devoid of bunkers or provisions. An ad-hoc breakout may have annihilated the German and Romanian divisions at the outset, thereby giving the Russians a ten-week head start on wheeling down to the Sea of Azov to trap the other German Armies balked in the Caucasus.
Bullshit
I've been hearing this for years but the one thing I've never heard is, "What would you do to prevent the Soviets inside the city from overwhelming your rearguard and attacking you from rear"?. I was just looking at a video about Napoleon's retreat from Moscow and it was ugly! The rear guards were cut off several times and either destroyed or abandoned and by sheer will made it back to the main body? The Germans never completely shut down the Volga to Soviet resupply or reinforcement.
The basic problem with the break-out is that there had been no preparation for a retreat. The results would have been a rout, with most, if not all of the troops killed or captured on the steppe. Once the Red Army initiated the attack, there was no solid German front line to retreat to. Virtually all of the German forces were concentrated in the pocket (which was why the attack was so inviting to the Soviets). There were no stockpiles of supplies that the 6th Army could have fallen back on while retreating. The would have rapidly run out of fuel, ammunition, food and water. I believe they had already gotten rid of many horses because they could not supply them with fodder. There are a couple of other factors as well. The 6th army pocket at Stalingrad required large Soviet formations to hold it in place and reduce it. If the 6th Army and the other Axis forces had just tried to reach German lines in an "every man for himself" retreat, all of these Red Army units would hav been free to attack them on the steppe, where the Germans would have had very little to defend themselves with. The other factor is Army Group A, which was in the Caucasus. The bridge at Kalach, which was where the two Red Army spearheads met, is about 400 kms from Rostov. If the 6th Army tried to break out, and was rapidly destroyed, or at least rendered hors de combat, then the Soviets could have attempted to use all of their forces to reach Rostov, and cut off Army Group A. It has been acknowledged in some recent historical studies of this battle that one of the reasons, if not the main one, that the ^th Army was told too fight on as long as they did was to tie up Red Army resources so that Army Group A could retreat back through Rostov., and the Kuban.
Great points indeed!
This is in effect that hindsight proposal to split the 6th Army into two corps writ large.
This is not true. Soviet attacks intensified in July and Weichs and Paulus wargamed a breakout in addition to a counterstroke. That’s how Weichs came up with the resupply requirements before the encirclement. They sensed a massive Soviet attacks on the flanks for months.
@@dennisrevarga9875 Hitler would never have sanctioned any talk of retreat. Paulus was not going to act against Hitler's wishes. German intelligence on Soviet intentions was poor, and they ignored the reports of the Italians and Rumanians of what was going on on the Russian side of the Don. If the German high command sensed a massive Soviet attack on their flanks, they certainly did nothing to prepare for it.
@@dennisrevarga9875 Source? Kriegspiel doesn't get you any physical means or. as dbassman27 just wrote, mean any preperation or involvement of a higher command. Patton seems to have done similar things before the Ardennes; it didn't mean he could do anything before the Germans attacked, or that he actually took it seriously when they did. Plans are all very well; but implementation is another matter and what higher headquarters will do another thing again. Paulus wasn't commanding in a vacuum
For too much Hindsight involved in the breakout option so I will try a realtime assessment.
How far do we think we need to travel on foot?
How many calories does that require compared to sitting tight with planned resupply by air?
Do we know how fast and what direction the Soviets are moving?
Is our destination distance likely increase as the Soviets push the frontline back?
If we leave our prepared positions will we be more exposed to Soviet air attack?
How fast will we be able to cover the expected distance on foot?
Do we have enough warm clothing for a march in exposed conditions?
How much rifle ammo 4can we carry?
I'm sure there are plenty more questions but for me some of the questions are unanswerable due to not knowing where the Soviets would reach and when.
There is also the question that hindsight can't help with - what different action will the Soviets take if they become aware we are fleeing?
Interesting debate in a wargame scenario but i see no way breakout would seem the least worst option to Paulus even if he had all the facts when he needed them.
I tend to think it would have been impossible for Paulus to withdraw in good order, yes-the Falaise Pocket is a good example here.
I do think that in a time before Germany had experienced any mayor defeat against Soviet, to give the order: give upp all terrain we have fought for, abandon all our objectives, abandon everything you can't carry (food, water and light weapons), and start walking west - somewhere between shot and sent home to recover from "sudden mental illness" would be that officers faith... You don't flee from a foe that you see as inferior.
Yeah, German intelligence knew a winter attack would come (just like the year before) but didn’t believe it would come so far away on the flanks and in an overwhelming and coordinated fashion, they believed the Soviets had beaten themselves up in the area for months and wouldn’t have the capacity for offensives on multiple fronts (or that the attack would come closer to Stalingrad itself). The same issue repeated itself with Little Saturn which was the nail in the coffin for rescuing 6th Army. Really Germany didn’t respect Soviet offensive tactics until after this whole debacle and even then expected summer to return their fortunes.
TIK, I appreciate your honest approach. You are absolutely right. In this type of debate, either you win (which means you provide someone else a clearer perspective on History) or you learn something new, which is certainly not a loss ! Keep up with the good work !
There's also the question of what would have happened after this breakout/route. With no/little heavy equipment and the soviet armies not occupied reducing the pocket, what would have stopped the red armies from the next big operation and pressing their advantage? Maybe logistics only. It seems a disorganized breakout would have taken the 6th army out of the fight while costing the soviets very little. Atleast in the pocket they could fight and keep the soviet armies tied up.
Good point. It seems undisputable that the Sixth Army would have been wrecked in any breakout attempt, resulting in the complete denuding of German forces in the Don bend, with possibly catastrophic consequences for Axis positions in the western Caucasus and higher up the Don river. All a breakout attempt may have achieved is to let the Sixth Army be cut to pieces on the march in open territory instead of having to be reduced by a two month long siege.
and in theory if they could supply and save 6th Army where it was, a drive on Grozny in '43 would be possible. If 6th Army survived with no heavy equipment on a mad run back to Rostov, what of the prospect of getting the oil NEEDED to fight on?
Always nice to see debates like these
I am wondering if it would have been logistically possible to break out. It's easy for people to sit in their nice chairs in their warm homes and talk about breaking out, but the weather certainly wasn't on the Germans side. The distances are quite far when walking in snow and cold. Where would they get their food and ammunition? They can't just keep walking for 48 hours or more non-stop. The Russians were far better suited and prepared for the weather than the Germans, so I have the suspicion that had a beak out occurred, the Russians would have rounded up everyone, because the Germans would have been too weak physically and mentally to provide any resistance to the Russians.
Yes, it could make things worse for the Germans. There was a realistic threat for Army group A to be cut off if 6th Army had collapsed in a few days.
In a prepared movement of troops, routes are decided, maps and compasses are distributed, traffic directing units in place, etc., etc. If troop just start walking some routes may become clogged, units may become disorientated and lost, blue on blue events may happen. I can see the unplanned retreat becoming a rout. Given what he knew at the time, and thinking that 6th army could be resupplied by air, IMO Paulus made the right choice staying put.
48 h4 road March? Can do
Ditto 48 hrs route March in winter.
@@johneden9573 It may be possible, but I don't think they had enough food to supply the calories needed to walk through the snow at -20C temperatures for 48 hours. The Russians soldiers had the logistics to get the food to the soldiers. I doubt Paulus did.
TIK, completely agree with your assessment.
In hindsight anything is possible, but viewing things in context of the time period, an early and disorganised breakout would never have been considered. In my opinion, the true scale of the encirclement would not have been known until it was far too late, with most involved likely thinking that this was an unexpected setback that would be rectified in due course, and after a careful and considered situational review. The thought of the then “invincible” German army retreating in disarray at the first signs of trouble, would have been utterly inconceivable at all levels of the German army hierarchy.
"Was the War already over?" Is the question of this encirclement. Not that the encirclement was the 'turning point' but that the turning point already happened.
The strategic picture hasn't been brought up, which I think was shocking. They already didn't/barely held any oil in the Caucasus area. The whole point of Stalingrad was to guard that flank. If they gave up Stalingrad to save (some of) the army but lost the oil as a result, the war was OVER. It could no longer be won via offensive operations, just various parrying actions until The West and Russia got tired. However if the 6th Army could hold what they had and every attempt was made to rescue them, the position could (maybe) be restored. Giving up Stalingrad meant giving up at least part of the 6th Army, either in smaller pockets, the equipment, or men lost in the open during Winter.
Its a "Withdraw and lose slowly" or "Stand and have a chance at going forward". A lot of 'insane' Axis decisions are all based on the timetable that the longer time went on, the weaker they'd get.
So from my perspective is that "Early Withdraw" is to admit the War is Over. If they were to get the rest of the oil, they would need a new summer drive in '43. Germany instead pointed those forces to break 6th Army out - and it couldn't do that. If the Russian encirclement was a fluke, the relief effort would work and Grozny would be within reach of the Planning Room.
Again TIK I just wanted to say thanks again for your efforts and work here. It just keeps me coming back. Am a long time subscriber.
If he believed they could get airlift of supplies then to stay would have worked for as long as they held the airfields, a retreat without heavy equipment would have been a difficult task it's a tough decision to make, yes half the men my have got out, hindsight is a wonderful thing, Thank you Tik superb as always.
It is great that you show courtesy here and seek the truth through reasoned argument. This is something so lacking in much of modern discourse. Good work TIK.
I’ve been watching both your channels it’s truly amazing how You both complement each other on this Stalingrad series, But yet willing to have a healthy debate And disagree on some points, I find it fascinating and a great addition tho ur series.
Hi TIK, two questions (i watched some ´ ish videos of you)
1) What did Paulus do all day, what was exactly his job-routine?
2) Was the -eventual- purpose of 6th army to bind as many soviet armies at the Wolga as possible to gain time?
I am not sure when Hitler came up with (2) but it was clearly Hitler's aim soon after this.
1. Manage an army. There's a lot to it from ordering small advances or withdrawals, rotating units, managing the lives of his direct inferiors, trying to get his superiors to help him out, and coordinating with other branches of thr military.
2. In practice they held something like five times their numbers in position and provided time for units around them to withdraw. Most of this was not intended, but it was what the German command drove them to hold out in order to achieve when it became obvious that Paulus wasn't going anywhere and couldn't be relieved.
@@lokenontherange I would sat that on (2) once it was clear they were lost to the NAZI whatever they got from them was a bonus. Later on in the Eastern Front, it became usual for Hitler to promise the surrounded men relief just to keep them fighting. Often the German officers in defiance of orders retreated not believing these lies.
Hello TIK. Just want to say I'm really excited to see some actual debate on history! Looking forward to the rest!
It would seem that the best argument in favor of a breakout is that (thanks to hindsight) we know only about 10% of the troops in the pocket survived (including those evacuated during the siege) to return home.
I comletely agree with you. The lack of supplies and the bad weather would have lead to a catastrophy....
Great stuff....heading over to watch Anton's vid - yes, out of order...but looking forward to it. Making up a batch of popcorn and getting a soda to watch this debate.
You raised some very good points and can be argued forever by all sides.
TIK you really are doing something special here. Thanks!
Anton does great work I'm like a kid waiting for Christmas waiting for his next video
At the same time, consider the orders regarding Paulus’ situation. The consensus was that even with a siege, the 6th Army still held up sizable amounts of Red Army formations that could have been freed up earlier which could have been used to withstand Manstein’s breakthrough or used elsewhere near the front. It’s a catch 22
Personally I was of the opinion at Anton Joly's video that in their original pocket 6th army occupied established defensive positions on at least the north and the east, whereas with a breakout out in the steppe they would have no established defensive lines to fall back on. And those established positions were strong enough to withstand Rokossovski's mopping up operation, which was why he attacked from the west, where 6th Army had no established defensive lines.
As for the best way to settle this debate, LIVESTREAM!!!! Duel it out on a livestream and let the viewers decide via poll at the end.
I don't like the idea of livestreams. I much prefer to script my videos, which allows me to take my time to really think through what I'm trying to say. It also stops the emotional "you're wrong! No you are!" outbursts and insults which are prevalent in today's society. I also think that Anton would struggle to do this because he gets Brad to narrate his videos due to his strong French accent.
I'm also against the idea of this being democratic. Just because people believe that the moon is made of cheese doesn't make it so. If everyone agrees with me because I've got a bigger audience and they just decided to dismiss Anton's work, then that's not fair if he's made the better argument. And people who see the results of the poll will then be influenced by that. I therefore think it should be down to the individual to come to their own understanding and decision, regardless what anyone else thinks.
@@TheImperatorKnight Fair enough. I do think you do yourself short though. A fair honest debate doesn't hurt anyone. I do believe you should be on livestreams. I can only dream of seeing you together with a Jordan Peterson discussing the socialist origins of national socialism and fascism. And I miss Anton Joly's wonderful French accent. He does himself short too. And while the vote idea was not to be taken that seriously, if people were to vote for you because you have the larger channel (and fans), I like to think we could rise above that.
Honestly I don't think there's much of a good debate here. TIK is right and Paulus made the best call. If we're debating this even with the benefit of hindsight it's clear that the breakout attempt would not have gone very well.
Personally. I think it's a lot more interesting of a question to ask how could Stalingrad gone differently if other things had happened instead. Such as Von Boch not being removed and given freedom to go to Kalach right away. Or if the Germans had sent more reinforcements. Or if Army Group A went to the southern Volga first before then going to the caucuses (or perhaps distributing more of B's force to Paulus at the start).
Good job reorganizing the book shelf behind you.
Great discussion here on the breakout potential etc.
Excellent episode. Much food for thought. This reminds of when I Craig's book EATG in 1970's. Craig dispelled and exploded many myths by all sides.
TIK is doing yeoman's job in same way. Good job!!! 👍😀 Keep it going.
Not seeing Anton's video, but will check it out after this one.
This should be a very interesting video today.
Will post a reply comment to this one after watching this video & Anton's.
Disclaimer: I'm no Military Professor, Expert, Ex-Solder or Officer. Just a person with a interest & passion for things Military, War and History.
So theses are just my opinions and observations on this topic.
FYI, this is not well constructed or ordered to the videos in question. Apologies for annoying anyone. These points and thoughts came to me at the time as I jotted them down.
1: Hindsight seems to play a large role in the debate about whether or not Paulus should have pulled out when he had the chance or not. The question or questions I raise to this is, "what did Paulus actually know?" He needs to know what state his forces are in, conditions and their locations, as well as the enemies own positions & strengths as well. There's also that military bit as well, that a retreating army is an easy target, so who's going to cover the withdraw?
A: And then there is the strategic significance of Stalingrad itself. The Blockading of the Oil Shipments up the Volga.
2: If an immediate breakout attempt was made, it would have to basically be made with just infantry. Using small arms and any light equipment a man or team of men could carry & use.
A: Infantry taking on a combined arms force of tanks, artillery and the infantry equipped (most likely) to deal with the worsening environmental conditions, is a slaughter waiting to happen. And that's before we get to the open steppe nature of the terrain, and bottle neck chock points effecting unit movements.
B: What are the conditions of the German Soldiers themselves also? From what I remember of the series. (It has been a very long series) They've basically been on starvation rations (to be generous) for several months now. And must be battle weary & fatigued. Not great conditions to be in for a offensive breakout operation. And what about their munitions? Going in with just 15 rounds per-rifleman, up against fully equipped Soviets with ammunition and ordinance. Yeah.
3: The Time it would have taken Paulus to have Reacted, given the orders to move his units for a breakout and get his forces in position, would have taken too long. And by the time the German soldiers get there, they'd have to go straight into combat with the Soviets. Rushing soldiers headlong into battle without much of their equipment is asking for disaster. (If they went in & dumped their heavier stuff in a headlong rush.)
4: In the past, when out numbered and maneuvered by an foe or enemy force, military units would withdraw & retreat to a position of strength. This would result a in a siege and sieges, take time. Time the enemy has to spend on routing out or besiege the military forces contained. Otherwise, depending on the situation here, time period and other such factors. Either in a military force to their rear that can attack them from a position of strength. Or having to spend time to dig them out of their defences and defeat them in their stronghold. And strongholds have generally been located in strategically vital or significant places. The Volga is still blocked as far as I know, and the ice is going to be a problem sure. But it still needs to be relieved & opened up again soon.
5: The weather at the time effecting military operations. I've never been in a blizzard, I'll say that straight up. But moving massed numbers of men, units, in such conditions is not easy and time consuming. The Russian's have been doing it themselves, and it has affected their movements and units as well. There's also the need for shelter as well as protective clothing for the weather conditions for the units. They'll need to stop during the night and rest. And there's no fire wood on the steppe.
6: I'm increasingly reminded of Napoleon's Retreat from Moscow. The worsening weather, the supply situation, the fierce Battle of the River, and the long retreat back to Poland. That was just with Infantry armed with Muskets, Saber & Lancer Horses, and solid round shot Cannons. Still didn't end very well despite all the heroics of the soldiers of Napoleon's army.
7: To give a quote from Star Wars, "Good Soldiers follow Orders." Now lets say that again with German Officers. And finally. Someone who believes in his Leader. There's no real way one is going to get him to move or do anything without the need authorisation to do so.
A: Then that leads into, what does the High Command know and what was its intentions? There's also the whole Time & Reaction thing playing in again. A piece of new information from the rear or the front taking its time to work its way up to the top that then effects the High Command's plans & intentions.
8: Splitting 6th Army in Two: This is a very interesting and quite a novel idea. In theory it sounds good, and the Germans would have the expertise & leadership to break their army down into battlegroup components to facilitate local breakout attempts in the Soviet lines. And leaving the wounded soldiers behind to man prepared static positions with the heavy equipment to back them up. Is a very good use of limited manpower & resources.
The only real issue with this good idea, is getting this organised with the appropriate units and men. Then also admitting you'd be leaving some of your boys behind to be besieged. No ones really want to be left behind and abandoned. And then again, splitting the limited existing supplies of 6th Army, between two forces. Need ammo and fuel for the break out forces. But you need ammo & food for the guys holding the defensive positions.
Yeah. Really could have done a better job of all of this and should have. But I said I would reply to my first comment, and so I will. Sorry for the absolute mess.
This civil discussion is refreshing to see.
With hindsight maybe the best option would be for Paulus to stay put and then gradually shrink the pocket. This would free troops to be flown out whenever supply planes managed to land. Flying men out would also decrease the need for supplies. I think this would have saved way more men in better shape than an attempted retreat while still keeping soviet forces busy.
Luigi's idea would have required consistent and reliable communications between all parties involved in order to coordinate the operation. I'm skeptical this would have been possible.
Thank you. This courteous debate style is nice.
worth to consider that human emotions, panic and shock also played a part. In such a bad situation all kinds of ideals are floating in the head and it is difficult to pick apart which are actual logical correct options and which are just panic thinking. We deal in these situations differently. Only after a few days you can put together your ideas and have a thought out, sane decision
arguably during this unknowness and panic phase, being indecisive is the best option, until a complete evaluation is done
A breakout North/Northwest might have worked, it was lightly held in comparison to the south where there was a concentration of Soviet forces.
Don't you just love History,... the debate ...when its well-done..
I have the impression that many commentators do not understand that war is not a computer game.
Thank you for your colossal efforts to make educational videos for Battle of Stalingrad.
In order to assess the situation after November 23, 1942 in the Stalingrad area and the possible breakout operation, three or four additional things should be considered. I am not talking about whether the 6th army has enough strength to perform a retreat operation.
1. Most importantly, where does 6th army ( 4th Panzer army) retreat and make a defensive line after a breakout?
2. How many Soviet forces ( number of divisions) are tied down in the Stalingrad pocket during late Nov to Dec, 1942?
3. Nobody mentioned Operation Mars, which started a week later. How does Army group B connects with Army group Center?
4. Assuming the 6th army successfully abandons the Don bend area, and the west of Don river area belongs to the Soviet army, then now general staff have to worry about the fate of the 1st Panzer army, which was extended to the Caucus region.
5. Eight months ago, Heer Ost stabilized the Demyansk and Holm pockets and did not collapse the northern front. German general staff or high ranking generals fully aware that Demyansk and Stalingrad are totally different situations. However, they did not have the luxury to choose the breakout, then offensive or defensive plan ( in this case, I am not talking about military short term tactics but long term military strategy ). Simply put, German general staff chose ( or gambled) the 'MIRACLE' military operation and it did not work.
Once again, in my wildest guess, German general staff in Nov/Dec of 1942 chose to save the 1st Panzer in the south and 4th, 2nd army in the north for the sacrifice of the 6th army.
Small Film Companies should do a "What If" of these points.... I would watch! Great as usual TIK
Some writer said decades ago, I believe in regards to some action in North Africa, memory being what it is, to paraphrase, 'To judge someone's actions we must first know what knowledge they based their actions on. It matters not what we know today, only what that person knew then.'
Great Video. It's very easy to throw out some advice and not be responsible for your actions.
Not to mention that the enemy gets a vote as well. If they want to delay or tie down forces, they can choose to do so. So it's not as simple as walking away.
If we are going to use hindsight, then they should have had reserves available to prevent the encirclement to begin with
Agreed: Paulus was up Rasoshka creek without a Pa...nzer Corps... :)
His (remaining) armour was already overcommitted, overstrained, undersupplied and severely lacking in fuel at the very end of its overstretched supply tether - a Volga river away from Asia. Instead of any reserve armour, he had a black hole empty gap behind his entire front. With large Soviet tank corps closing in behind him on both wings. He just didn't know the outcome for certain... yet. :)
In the circumstances I suppose he did pretty well to form a stable pocket. He wasn't getting out of there though. With the benefit of hindsight... ;)
The weather would have played a major part as areas outside roads were covered in ravines and deep crevices.
We often hear Paulus say he only had enough fuel for 100 tanks for 30 km.
Why not reduce that to 50 tanks for 60 km?
An small armoured spearhead is better than none.
even if 100 tanks could have gone only 30km, then the breakout would have succeeded, the Soviets did not have a in-depth defensive structure and the ones fighting against von Manstein Winter Storm would have been trapped between 2 fires
Thanks for producing this video, TIK. Having watched your earlier episode, and having seen Anton Joly's, the latter left me squirming in my seat as I watched it. Anton has produced fabulous research books on Stalingrad, yet his video had too many inconsistencies in in, errors, and way too much unsupportable supposition. As Spock would say, "It is not logical."
Paulus did have the benefit of hindsight. He knew that a winter retreat through Russia had destroyed the largest army in the world in 1812. Surely that had to weigh heavily in his thinking?
Thank you again TIK!
Point 2 assumes that Paulus left no rearguards in his original line, that the Soviets detected the withdrawal, that they were prepared to follow up immediately, etc. etc. The two and a half corps already over the Don made it back to the encirclement without incapacitating losses and were still sufficiently co-ordinated to hold the front for the next six weeks or more. There is also the question as to whether there was really a continuous Soviet line on 25 November.
Always appreciate these healthy debates between content creators. Have you ever considered doing an overview of Operation Silver Fox/Arctic Fox? There's hardly any content on it or attention drawn to it in general (maybe that's partly because it was a pretty quiet front?) and what I do see seems very inconsistent.
Given the dismal state of German supplies, their men were basically starving already, is it realistic to expect the entire Army to have been able to walk dozens of miles in the dead of winter.
Exactly, for them it is was either give up the entire army now in a rush of panic or try to save it. We all know now that it was impossible but they didnt.
The biggest problem that I see with this series is that - - unlike TIK's earlier videos about Fall Blau, which asserted that catastrophic errors were made by Hitler (eg, changing plan Blau, dividing Army Groups A/B), and that the entire campaign was a disaster - - that admission is completely missing in the Stalingrad series. In this series, Hitler "could do no wrong."
If Paulus didn't have the forces to sweep Chuikov's ragged forces out of the ruins of the factories, where was he supposed to get the (mobile!) forces to sweep through fresh armored forces surrounding him? He was already in major supply and shortage squeeze with overstretched and overloaded lines of communication.
Fuel fuel fuel . . . TIK's already covered it working from other vectors. Mobile means fuel stocks, dumps along the way, and reserves. Paulus had none.
As far as splitting them goes, I would suggest that splitting them is confining the wounded to certain death. Someone like Napoleon might do it, but he was a verdammt Frenchie; a man without honor or loyalty. I'm not leaving the wounded and rear echelon boys behind. If I do . . . heads (including mine) will roll.
Thank you for your erudite, well thought out, and insightful presentations. Could you look at the strategic role Italy played in WW2, specifically with regard to the strategies of Germany, the United States and Great Britain?
I came to the conclusion that the German high command honestly believed that they could break the encirclement ring from the outside. And, if that had happened, it would have been a disaster for the deeply penetrated Russian units. And then the idea of keeping the 6th Army in place would have turned out to be a fantastic idea. But it did not go that way ... C'est la guerre!
Pretty damn good arguments. I can't really see even with hindsight how this withdrawal, had it succeeded would have been THAT good for Paulus. He'd take sizeable losses AND lose all the heavy equipment.
A very interesting video presentation here, TIK (and, indirectly, Anton). Keep up with your thought-provoking video presentations! :)
I think the key operative phrase is "with the benefit of the hindsight". Anyway, my takes:
1. Given what was available to Paulus, both operational situation and available units under his command, right in the wake of the Soviet onslaught, it would have been quite normal for Paulus to experience "operational paralysis".
2. "Operational paralysis": The events surrounding the 6th Army were churning up at a much faster rate than intel updates trickling up to Paulus. Furthermore, he did not have units that were healthy enough to attempt either a counterattack or a breakout. Meanwhile, his top-most superiors (i.e., Hitler and the OKH) showed very little indication of panic apart from promising resupply through airlift.
3. Ordering a breakout operation might not have been practical in the early stage of Operation Uranus due to Paulus and his staff having to delve into so many issues all at once: (a) Getting the northwestern portion of the 6th Army to pull out; (b) taking a stock of on-hand supply situation; (c) making sure to maintain continuous command and communications as best as Paulus can despite the Soviet onslaught; (d) coordinating the 6th Army's actions with the armies outside the Stalingrad Pocket; (e) getting a better handle on reading the actions of Soviet units.
4. In the early stage of Operation Uranus, Paulus could have viewed ordering a breakout as just damn too risky, based on the way the northwestern portion of the 6th Army retreated into what was to become the Stalingrad Pocket with many difficulties.
5. There is also the psychology of make-believe: That is, when facing growing uncertainties and premonitions of things no longer going well, people tend to comfort themselves by make-believe. In case of Paulus, the best possible outcome would have been to firmly defend the Stalingrad Pocket while counting on the promised resupply through airlift and a relief force in the near future. So, Paulus might have been thinking along the line of "I'll do my part of the job within my means, while wait for my bosses to figure out how to best turn this situation around for the time being."
6. In my opinion, the fact that the 6th Army was hollowed out by the time of Operation Uranus was the single biggest constraint faced by Paulus. Had the 6th Army still possessed a decent number of moderately healthy (i.e., good enough for limited offensive operations) panzer and motorized divisions with a bit of ammo and fuel reserves on hand, he might have responded more aggressively--i.e., deploying these panzer and motorized divisions to bite the flanks of the Soviet twin pincers. But in reality, the panzer and motorized divisions under Paulus' command were shadows of their former selves and were placed rather inconveniently in the wake of the Soviet onslaught. To order a breakout under this predicament? That would require an extremely daring general harboring "better to die in the blaze of glory" mentality.
This is great true discussion and analysis
I love the idea of the debate, whatever the result will be, it won't be worse than before the debate itself.
Additionally I don't think that Paulus without a hindsight could made a different decision
Interesting point on the corps on the Don, but consider this: we've seen, earlier in this campaign as well as elsewhere, units breaking out of encirclements as they were forming. Supposing Strecker had put his focus not on holding in the north, and the south, and stopping the Soviet breakthrough, all at the same time - but instead he'd fought a rearguard action in the north and attacked not with "what he could spare", but with the bulk of his forces, to the southwest, i.e. straight in the back of the Russians cutting him off. Think v. Wietersheim north of Stalingrad and the Kotluban counter-offensive. I'd give them a pretty good chance of at least a Korsun-style rescue.
I compare the distances in TIK's maps to those of the Midwest along the Mississippi River to understand how large these areas are.
It's astounding.
Forget the Past: It cannot be changed.
Forget the Future: It cannot be predicted.
Forget the Present: I didn't get you one.
I'm sure Paulus thought the army could reopen a corridor so that they could make an organized withdrawal.
It is a bit like Predator One. "Request for evacuation denied, maintain a defensive perimeter and await further instructions!." The problem that remains is that there were 550 trucks and an extra 400 trucks captured west of the Don before the encirclement was complete after the Romanian fuel dump was captured intact. Whether these were captured Soviet trucks from the earlier battles at the Don Bend remains unclear. There seems to be too many German units embedded within the urban areas of the city itself to do anything at a faster pace.
In the 90s there was a documentary aired on the ORF. It also featured a former staff officer of Paulus. He said that they considered a break out and figured that one third would make it. Paulus hesitation and unwillingness to go against Hitlers orders sealed their fate though. Perhaps you can contact the ORF and request this documentary.
In a Kesselschlact situation. The commander of the encircled forces needs a detailed plan. The pocket must be like a slowly collapsing bag and the ideal breakout route will most likely take a good fight to open that route. The units on the far side of the kessel will have to retreat in good order to phase lines and the plan should include deception measures so that the enemy only see a reorganisation of the pocket.
As soon as the enemy know for sure that a breakout is happening. Speed is of the essence because the enemy will react very quickly.
Stemmerman did as well as he could at Korsun. He managed to keep order but regardless of good planning. The enemy reacted as soon as it was clear that a breakout was happening.
Hube with 1 Panzerarmee at Kamentz Podolsk managed to keep his kessel on the move and was wise to take a longer more circuitous route in order to avoid strong enemy forces.
The only time when Paulus could have realistically considered a breakout was when Manstein was coming to the rescue (Winter Storm) in December. And this could only have worked if Manstein had been given a stronger army to breakthrough. Manstein got to within 50kms of the 6th Army, if he could get a bit closer ~30kms, 6th Army's tanks might just have enough fuel to meet him.
Yes.
TIK, been follow this mammoth production of yours since it started and as posted somewhere back in episode 5 its fantastic and has given me (and continues to do so) an insight and detail into the battle which I had not known or appreciated.
Regarding the comments from Anton Joly post which I have now just watched, I think he’s being very supportive of your work (and so he should be) and my take on it was that he and others were saying that with hindsight 6th Army / Paulus should have retreated come what may, and you know, with hindsight knowing that only 5K got back home alive, a mad dash/scramble/route would have been the best thing, it would have been carnage but maybe more might have got out.
But I agree with you, at the time, in a blizzard, short of petrol, troops already exhausted, a chaotic scene unfolding by the hour, nobody would have made a decision to breakout certainly not on the 22nd or 23rd/24th. After that, well I need to know more so will wait for the next instalments.
From Crackers, a big fan !!
Col. Herbert Salle interviewed in that video was an interesting sort. From Salle speaking French he probably was of French Huguenot Ancestry (La Salle) that settled in Brandenburg. Herbert joined up into the NSDAP founding, got out, then rejoined, probably ready to get out again. Really it seemed he had serious reservations about the whole AH regime and the future of confidence in where things were heading. Salle settled into the Pioneer Corps in the early part of the war.
Breakout probably was not on the list of priorities as Paulus may have known about AH and wanting to stay in Stalingrad proper no matter what.
Salle stated AH wanted to build concrete fortifications (as winter quarters) at Stalingrad. Salle stated AH had “ a downright criminal ignorance of the local situation ” the nearest gravel deposit was on the Sea of Azov and cement would have had to be brought in from Germany to the Volga by many rail cars. Plus concrete work before or during in the freezing winter is downright difficult next to impossible. Salle was flown out of the pocket in January 1943 probably due to his NSDAP allegiances, but ran afoul of the administration afterwards and the rest of the war.
I think this is a great response video. Anton’s points were good, but the practicality of getting the German units to the jump off point for a breakout is an excellent point that I had never thought of before. I have long wondered why Paulus didn’t attempt the breakout, but you showed that from his perspective it was a potentially suicidal attempt at best while the chance of being relieved was at least a decent possibility. It is easy to think of the German army as being in a neat circle without any natural barriers to overcome, but you are forced to make a much different assessment when you know that most of your army will be wiped out if you gave the order to retreat. Also, even a decent sized army brought out of the pocket with no heavy weapons and no tanks might still be wiped out by the same forces that were encircling it in the first place. Paulus had no guarantee that his retreating troops wouldn’t be overrun by tanks after they got to the German lines since they would have no anti tank capability post breakout. He would also be forced to abandon his wounded in the city to their fate which wouldn’t have sat well with any one. I do have a question for you though TIK. Were any of the units in the 6th Army present at the siege of Leningrad the winter before? If so, it would be interesting to know if they suffered the same fate as the citizens of that city that they had forced into starvation and death the year before. I thought some of the units from Army Group North had been transferred to Army Group South at the beginning of Fall Blau but I could be mistaken on that point. I’d be interested to hear your thoughts. Thanks for the great work!
The best time to have launched the breakout was while they were still supplied enough to achieve their aims …. hence why they did not try a breakout earlier
To me it is unimaginable that any commander that is not facing an immediate annihilation and or capture of his forces would authorise an "uncoordinated" retreat, because you are surrendering all control of both your forces and the situation and with it any influence on the outcome.
Awesome! Thank you.
Just sawca short video about the Cherkasy pocket and the German breakout towards relief forces.
It made me thinknof this video. All the difficulties you enumerate here.
Im looking forward to a good back and forth, hate argument but like a nice debate weather theres consensus or not.
One thing to consider. In any organisation especially arm forces political manouvering within the general staff takes the first place. Desire to climb the ladder always outweighs any other conciderstion. And if you look at it this way many decisions become clear. On all sides