Correct about Pliev's 3rd Cavalry, but don't agree about Malinovsky's 2nd Guards on the Myshkova on19th December: at this date only a few advanced elements had reached the line, nothing to do with the almighty army which was fully there only 4 days after. But anyway, these are but details, the bottom line is: YES they lacked the means for a proper breakout, BUT should they have tried an unprepared one, would less than 10% of the entire army have succeeded in escaping? Certainly more than that. Even if a little more than that this would have been enough to justify it, as opposed to stay in the cauldron. So again, not necessarily a coordinated retreat, but just an uncoordinated one still would have been a better solution than nothing. Of course it's hard to imagine an Army commander issuing such an order as "leave everything and just run for it!" and yet whatever crazy, this was the least crazy solution. And thumbs up for the space marine voice over 😂
it appears you have not watched TIK's final arguments. those 10% of survivors could not have stoped the folow up breaktroughs and would have become -x00%, there was barely a frontline holding against the outer ring, imagine that ring reinforced with 7 armys of soviets that have tasted copious amount of blood, and defensive lines infected by a couple thousand of mesengers from literal hell.
I'm not sure if a breakout from Stalingrad could have been possible at any point, and I tend to agree with TIK that a breakout would have been difficult to agree on, plan and execute, potentially impossible even. I would argue that any argument for a breakout, even during Winter Storm would have required hindsight... And even so, in hindsight, this series is asking the wrong question. The only way to mount a breakout in hindsight in my opinion is not to argue what is best for the 6th army, but in hindsight which decision gives the best possible chance of winning the war. This is because the primary decision-makers of this scenario don't care about 6th army, they care about winning the war, so we need to make a decision with hindsight from this mindset. 1) To argue Winter Storm could have been a breakout window without the benefit of hindsight seems incorrect to me, because the best option is for Manstein to relieve 6th army, and if you wait for the offensive to fail before breaking out, then you don't end up having enough time to reach the friendly lines. To my understanding, the offensive stalled on the 17th, and breakout was requested by Manstein on the 18th (Italian 8th & Group Hollit have already been routed at this point - little saturn)... And Winter Storm retreats on the 26th? So you're looking at an 8-day window (this is also hindsight) to organize the troops and break out against an enemy that just stopped a much better-equipped force... It doesn't make sense to me even in hindsight. Even the argument about the airlift, "they already knew it wasn't working"... Did they know that it was never going to work? Up to this point, to my knowledge, many factors had impacted the airlift: Starting aircraft count, weather, pilot shortage. What degree of confidence would they have had at the time that these issues would persist (or that they would lose the airfields). Hindsight in this case isn't necessarily a predictor of the future, especially on a very limited sample size of less than a month. 2) The question we need to be asking is "which option gives Germany the better chance of winning the war". As a strategist, if there's a 1% chance or a 0.1% chance, or a 0.01% chance of the army in Stalingrad being relieved, either via breakout or via airlift, I'm taking it because at this point, withdrawing from Stalingrad drastically decreases already dim (non-existent) odds of winning the war. The entire argument of whether or not to break out in hindsight can't be made based on what gives the 6th army the best chance of survival, because the German leadership cared about winning, they didn't care about lives. "But hindsight means we know that they lost", this brings me to point 3 which is people don't look at hindsight correctly. 3) Hindsight is often used to say "well, they should have done X because Y didn't work". This logic is flawed because you don't know the probability of success of any given operation. You can make guesses as to what the odds are, but you don't know... Was the 6th army's fate a bad hand played well, a good hand played poorly? Maybe it was a bad hand that was also poorly played. Think about it in the context of a game, you have a choice between rolling a d6 or a d8, high roll wins... You roll the d8 and roll a 1... Does it make any sense for me to then say without knowing your choice, in hindsight, you should have rolled the d6 because it could roll a 6... No! But why? In hindsight, we know you failed. War isn't so simple as a dice roll, we don't know what the probability of success is on any given operation. When you make a change in hindsight, in order to understand whether or not this change makes sense, you have to evaluate the probability of success of the proposed change vs the original operation without the assumption that the original operation would play out exactly as it did historically. There's a ton of evidence that supports that if A then B mostly doesn't apply when planning real-world situations like this. Sports are a great example because it's about repeating the same actions in the same conditions, hindsight doesn't do much for you unless backed by a statistical base of information because every action or plan has a probability of success... There's no if A then B therefore I should do C. It would be naive to think that the exact same orders, under the exact same conditions would yield the exact same result in the event of a do-over.
I think it boils down to what would be left of the Army. Lacking arms and equipment they'd be stranded in the open fields in the middle of winter and a whole new force would need to rush in to from a new line. Simply put 6th Army was already dead before it was encircled. However, if the airlift and relief operation both worked, the new line wouldn't beas demanding, and more of the army and equipment would survive. Do you take a 15% chance to save some of the army, or a 20% chance to save the entire war, thus Germany itself?
@@Pangora2 The probabilities don't have to be so favorable, a 1% chance of saving the war is better than a 50% chance of saving some of the 6th army. The issue with Germany in WW2 was that it wasn't possible for them to end the war through negotiations. Like, even if we assume hindsight is 20:20 and both options are losing... Does saving 6th army destabilize the front, accelerating a drive on Berlin? This question is critical, because once again if the answer is yes, you cannot do it... Because in hindsight, Germany received very favorable treatment at the hands of the Western allies (unjustly so), so this is also something we have to consider. In hindsight, the better question might be whether or not the Germans should have attempted Winter Storm at all, or whether Winter Storm caused the accelerated downfall of the Eastern front, would those divisions not have been able to contain Little Saturn? Part of the problem with the whole discussion revolving around a breakout is that it revolves around the morality of saving 6th army, but we need to pay more attention to the strategic side of things (WW2 was anything but a war of upholding high moral standards). Which decisions have a chance at winning the war? Once the answer is none of them, we have to ask which decisions slow a drive on Germany as much as possible.
@@EywaSC agreed. Id take the shot of the airlift over giving up the oil and losing the war, were my goal to win. Saving a few thousand starving men looks good for that weeks headline, but ultimately still lost the war. It's like an old video game where some minor thing you did in the first few minutes determines the ending. The more I study the war, theore certain I am that the victory in France was a poison pill that got Germany destroyed.
Thanks TIKhistory I enjoyed the video. But there is this burning question that I just can't but out: "Why did the Soviets decide to close the pocket?" Yes, I know that they anticipated a German counterattack from outside so decided to close the pocket because they thought there was only about 80,000 soldiers in the pocket. However, many documentaries and series that talk about this period talk about "how easily the Soviets could have left the Germans to starve to death in Stalingrad" but decided to end the pocket. Which is why I ask the question, "Why did the Soviets decide to close the pocket?" Think about it: if the Soviets believed that there were only 80,000 Germans in the pocket and thought they could not do anything significant because they believed that they had a much larger force, then why not use just a fraction of that supposedly superior number of soldiers to form a defensive line and use the rest to attack the Germans from outside the pocket. In my opinion, if this strategy had taken place - whether or not General Paulus or the OKH decided to break out or counter-attack the pocket - this would have ultimately resulted in the annihilation of the German and Romanian divisions at the outset, thereby giving the Russians a ten-week head start on wheeling down to the Sea of Azov to trap the other German Armies balked in the Caucasus.
@@vegitoblue5000 I think this ultimately comes down to the fact that they needed the pocket closed to free up those forces. Yes they ended up having to dedicate more troops to the encirclement to close it but I think because of the pressure that was applied, it made the issue of supplies far greater for the German army in the pocket. Yes they could have maybe set fewer troops to the encirclement and let them starve to death. BUT if you leave a large enough army and don't pressure them enough and use up their supplies quicker, that's longer you're going to have to ultimately wait. That also gives the Germans more to in the pocket to poke holes in the lighter Russian line and move forward with a breakout.
Yputube needs to bring the video response function back. Used to have this all the time. Long form civil debates over a month or so. Gave the audiance a chance to read the reference material and form their own oppinion before the next response. But civil discourse doesnt generate clicks. Anger and outrage does a lot more for their bottom line.
Many years ago I had the fortune of speaking with an old woman who survived the Battle for Stalingrad as a child. She and two other orphans were taken in by an elderly couple who lived in the middle of a half destroyed apartment building. At night they burned bits of furniture and books whose leather jackets had been stripped by starving Russians. Occasionally they had bread that was mostly saw dust. But there primary source of food was very tough "pork", which obtained and was cooked in the middle of the night... Granted that the German Army had is easier than Soviet Civilians, they too had turned to cannibalism after eating the horses. The Germans had cut holes in the bottom of the fuel tanks on all vehicles to remove the very last drops of fuel. Every discarded weapon found was checked and rechecked for ammo. Every dead soldier was missing his boots and coat, unless they were too damaged or messy to make worth taking. And many were missing whole limbs, and had other signs of being butchered... Yeah, right the Germans could have tried a break out. That way they would have just died that day, rather than dying every day in Stalin's Gulags...
The Germans used to send them to the river to collect water with the promise of chocolate and sweets, the Russians shot them as traitors to the soviet union.. 😢
As an historian, I am loving the debate with Anton Joly through these incredible videos. As a librarian, I am loving that your bookshelves are looking more organized and less cluttered. Keep up the awesome work.
Of course TIK likes 40K, and of course he's a son of Dorn. In all seriousness, polite discourse shows something lasting and of real quality. It's hopefully the destiny of good media, like a good history book, a good history channel entertains, informs and is willing to discuss and interact with a few other sources and viewpoints.
@@vladdrakul7851 Your comments about our Primarch are noted and you will know why we are called the Crimson Fists when we insert the Fist of Dorn up your arse.
An argument I haven't heard here. Is that the reason that 6th Army didn't break out of Stalingrad was because. Cities like Stalingrad are hard to take and easy to defend. Therefore I think the Germans saw Stalingrad as a way of anchoring the line. They also had cut off the Volga river so, supplies could not move freely up and down it.
Many thanks to the Chapter Master for his Honoured contribution, Ave Imperator, Gloriam in Excelsis Terra! good to see proper debate and discussion again ^w^
Some awesome academic debate going on here. Hell, is it even academic? Maybe we’re just so used to people foaming at the mouth when they’re put into a debate that we’re shocked when people respect each other for a change. Civil is the word I’m looking for. Anyways- love your stuff TIK, always puts me in a good mood. Keep doing you!
9:50 This is ignoring the fact that at the same time the Red Army would have attacked all around the perimeter to try and break the now-depleted defense lines. This might have meant that if the breakout failed, 6th Army might not have had a defensible position to retreat to.
Great video. There are many factors here as to why 6th Army stayed in place. All coming together around the same time and thus "Ālea iacta est". I've read all the same books TIK has read on the subject. One critical factor people seem to forget or just are unaware of is the state of 6th Army in late Nov. It's extremely exhausted and for the most part very diminished in combat strength compared to what it was in the early summer. It had already started to go into winter prep mode which means the majority of the horse transport was sent further west to better depots. So most heavy weapons that aren't motorized are now static. There is only one railway that leads to the Stalingrad area so the amount of supplies the army needed was never really satisfied thus there was not much extra of anything on hand. There are always some formations that have squirreled away more fuel, ammo, and food than they report but not in the quantities that can sustain those formations for very long. End results is once the army was surrounded it was in a very tough situation for any sort of organized break out. These type of maneuvers are extremely difficult to execute even for units with decent logistic situations to start. It really was the events that led to the surrounding of 6th army that IMO could have been prevented. Terrible intel and an overconfidence that they could continue to beat off the Soviet attempts to drive on the flanks of 6th Army. Weakening the flanks of German formations to keep the offensives in the city going. Don't even want to get into the poor misjudgments of not pushing out certain Soviet bridgeheads in the German allies sectors of the front when this option was still available.
I'll check out Anton's video later. Right now, I'm interested in your side of things. Because I'm biased and like your content. Shocker! I like your stuff. Certainly found this whole subject interesting.
As a complete amateur but as someone fascinated by this area of the war I'd just like to say how much I'm enjoying this reasoned, well-argued and respectful debate. Bravo to both parties. I look forward to a continuation.
I really appreciate the back and forth, you are both great. This is what historical analysis should be - a respectful conversation. However, I'm totally with you Tik. I would add that all of this is hindsight with a view from the top. Imagine, instead, that your nerves are shattered, your stomach is empty, and your toes are freezing off. Is that corridor to the south a good place to strike? You have no idea. The only thing that might propel you forward is sheer desperation. Should they have tried? Probably. But that they didn't tells us, I think, that they were focused on survival first. And that's not something we can judge from the warm comfort of our chairs 80 years on.
This channel is great, such interesting and well-thought out analysis with cross-pollination by other historians. 40km (about 25 miles) is a long distance on foot even with a full belly and no heavy pack. Now imagine trudging cold and hungry in ice and snow with shells interdicting the line of retreat causing constant disruption as soldiers go prone to survive clouds of shrapnel zinging overhead. After the shells, you pick up the dead (maybe), help the wounded (maybe), abandon vehicles as they break down or run out of fuel, and all manner of hardship trying to disengage from a massive Soviet army seething with revenge. Like wolves seeing a wounded animal trying to limp away, the Soviet army would rush in with a howls of glee nipping at their heels the whole way. I agree that staying put was the correct course of action. The German army was "between Scylla and Charybdis".
This is the process of historical investigation. Respectful and thoughtful debate. You gentlemen are rare objects in this age. Long may you both run. Cheers.
I was not expecting the 40k part. Was listening to this in the background while I worked and I chuckled. Very good content and a interesting break there!
2 роки тому+3
Tik I agree that the only option for Paulus to breakout was to wait for Manstein to launch Winter Storm and to receive enough fuel and ammunition by the airlift but since the mínimum conditions to attempt a breakout never happened the sacrifice to stay put made sense in order to save Army Group A and avoid the whole German front from collapsing. Thanks for another awesome video. Cheers from Peru!
It's great to see a healthy debate between people who treat each other with mutual respect! I don't know enough about this subject to start with any assumptions about what is correct, but the back and forth addressing of points helps me learn and understand far more than simply reading a paragraph in a history textbook.
I come back to this debate 2wice a year i wish it happened much more often Tik you have taught me so much more about history and to always to my best to think criticality also with a clear mind thank you
I can't profess to know these subjects down to the minute detail, but I certainly know enough to respect the willingness to debate sensibly, events that happened over 80 years ago.
I think a breakout in late November was ruined by Seydlitz's botched retreat. That caused a lot of issues which force Paulus to focus on recovering the situation instead of re-organizing for a break-out. Forces which might have consolidated their positions in good order were forced to fight defensive actions and shift around to solidify the pocket, both not ending up in the best locations and having to expend combat strength fighting defensive actions only made necessary because of the retreat.
It wasn't as if there was no fuel in the Stalingrad pocket; the tanks trapped within continued defensive operations into December, which they could not have done if there were not some fuel stockpiles available. A breakout somewhere in the 26th-28th range (assuming no Seydlitz mistake fouling up planning) could have had access to enough fuel at least for the breakout attack, and likely would have been able to get some tanks and artillery though by prioritizing some units and vehicles. This is evidenced by the fact that it appears that Paulus was planning an early breakout until Seydlitz's error screwed up his plans, which he would not have done had he not believed he had the fuel to carry out such a plan.
It's intresting how few tanks that they had available, upto this point in the series it has been noteworthy how they were able to recover and repair tanks to keep the numbers up. But now that is no longer possible. Presumably because spares are hard to get now or they had lost much of the repair equipment behind the lines when they got over run.
I think 6th Army was essentially immobilized back when they sent most of their horses west. Their fate was "baked in the cake" from before Uranus even started.
If the encirclement had happened in the summer months the Germans might have tried harder to break out but in the winter conditions, I'm sure the Germans knew any break out would have turned into a rout.
Oh Emperor. You can't get away from Warhammer even if you wanted to. Warhammer it great. And a Chapter Master weighing in. You can't argue. Especially with a Fist.
I totally agree with your assessment. Even in late November if Paulus had attempted a breakout he would have been: Undermanned Short of food&water Short of ammunition Short of fuel Short of transport Had to leave all the disabled soldiers behind Had to fight in a column being attacked on all sides Had to abandon all non essential equipment Been reduced to fighting in the open air in sub zero weather with no hope of shelter Under these circumstances his column most likely would have disappeared under the weight of the massive attacks by the 7 armies chasing his army. Once that happened, the entire southern German front would have been cut off and destroyed before it could retreat from the Caucuses
Brilliant discussion. I'm glad to see that both channels met at this point of the battle. And even more that discussions that take place on books were brought to UA-cam. Keep the great work!
I loved the arrival of Pedro Kantor 18 mins within this video. The voice chance court me completely off guard and I laughed so hard. Excellent video TIK.
Before the encirclement - 6th Army was unable to to mass enough "strength" (fuel, ammunition, combat soldiers, and food) to complete conquering Stalingrad. I cannot see any chance for a breakout - at any time - given the large Red Army assets deployed for the encirclement. Perhaps trying to breakout early on would have been preferable to the suffering endured by the 6th Army until the surrender, but that decision is the old "do you want your eyes gouged out with a blunt or sharp stick?" question. And of course those on the spopt at that time had ZERO hindsight to guide them. Outstanding discussion by ALL the great Historians involved!
As always, thanks tik for the awesome video. By the way, can you please make a video explaining Salazar's Portugal before and during the war? I would like to learn about his ideology and policies, as well as his actions in relation to world changing events and how was he able to hold on in power for 40 years. Yours sincerely, Assaf Doron from Israel.
We followed a politic of neutrality (allowing both sides to stay on our ports including in our colonies, selling & buying from both sides, etc.). At the late stages of the war we allowed the americans to set up an air base in the Azores islands. When Hitler died we declared a 3 day (if I'm correct) mourning period. Greetings from Lisbon
@@gdal3 Thanks for the new info. I want to learn about the Portuguese policy towards the Holocaust and the German reaction to it, as well as the policies of the Iberian peninsula remaining out of war. Beyond that Salazar made his mark over Economics and his ideology, sometimes referred to as fascist, had a religious conservative base, which objects fascist-socialist principles.
@@אסףדורון we accepted Jewish (and other) refugees coming from Europe. There are many books written about it. There are museums dedicated to it (particularly one in Vilar Formoso right next to the railway station where many first arrived in Portugal). Most of them then went to America, Brazil and other places, very few stayed (after the war ended that is). We treated them well given their temporary status. Locals almost always gave them housing and food for the first days until they sorted their affairs out. The German government didn't mind it as their policy was to simply get the "undesirables" out of their territory + occupied territory and, after 1940, to put them to work to make up for the loss of German manpower now in the military. That's why most refugees came pre-1941.
@@gdal3Thanks very much for taking your time to explain. You got any book recommendations on the topic (Portugal Estado Nuevo) for english speaking audience?
@@אסףדורון I guess that's where "clerical fascism" comes into play, but I'm not even sure if that's a real ideology or a label used to describe religious national conservative parties.
Great video, great debate! and a warm thank you for allowing us to discuss such an interesting issue. I only disagree on the timing. I believe that the breakout or a strong move should have been done by Paulus on November, 20. As you indicated in the previous videos, Paulus was fully aware of the risk of encirclement way before Uranus. He even asked the permission to retreat. Therefore, he should have acted immediately, the 20th at the latest. Great Generals do that: Rommel did, Robert E. Lee did. Paulus was not at that level and 300,000 soldiers payed that badly
Great installment! I believe they had to try to breakout out at some point maybe even during winter storm in mid December , even it turned into a “hells gate” scenario , the Germans were experiencing such a man power shortage after 18 months in the east, they could not let all those experienced combat vets die. I believe somewhere I read in the initial weeks on the encirclement they mainly shipping in fuel and ammo to the pocket, because everyone was thing “breakout” After hitler didn’t get the Caucasus, he admitted I must “liquidate “ this war No way Germany is win the war in the east at this point,, but if they wanted to have any chance of stalemate on the eastern front, they could not lose all those experienced troops,, and of course not launch operation citadel in the summer of 1943
None of this would have mattered. When the Wehrmacht launched Barbarossa, it was it was going to fail. They could have taken Staligrad, but they would not have the logistics to hold it.
When a man has been starved, it's not like you overfeed him for the similar number of days and he's back in service. The longer the starvation the more brutal the environment the longer recovery until it reaches the point where you simply have a bunch of broken men.
What I will always struggle with is why the II SS Pz Corps was tasked with case Anton in Southern France: an infantry corps could have done the job, while the Pz corps could have tipped the balance in favour of Manstein’s relief force as they were only just denied at the 11th hour of breaking through at Verkhne-Kumskiy. Although an additional mobile reserve may have been needed to stop little Saturn as well. What I want to know is: 1. Was Manstein given every available means to achieve his mission? 2. If not what was needed to ensure at least the best chance of success? I’ve read other sectors of the front refused to release any divisions-so they would have had to have been taken from France, Norway, the Low Countries or even hastily forming an RLA/Rona force to add to the order of battle. I’ve yet to see an overview of what was actually available for the relief operation vs what Manstein received.
This ladies and gentlemen, is how two "disagreeing" parties conduct an "argument". Both sides hearing each other out, and both responding to each other's points - unlike in the rest of the world where one side demonizes the other in order to overcome their "adversaries".
Thanks TIKhistory I enjoyed the video. But there is this burning question that I just can't but out: "Why did the Soviets decide to close the pocket?" Yes, I know that they anticipated a German counterattack from outside so decided to close the pocket because they thought there was only about 80,000 soldiers in the pocket. However, many documentaries and series that talk about this period talk about "how easily the Soviets could have left the Germans to starve to death in Stalingrad" but decided to end the pocket. Which is why I ask the question, "Why did the Soviets decide to close the pocket?" Think about it: if the Soviets believed that there were only 80,000 Germans in the pocket and thought they could not do anything significant because they believed that they had a much larger force, then why not use just a fraction of that supposedly superior number of soldiers to form a defensive line and use the rest to attack the Germans from outside the pocket. In my opinion, if this strategy had taken place - whether or not General Paulus or the OKH decided to break out or counter-attack the pocket - this would have ultimately resulted in the annihilation of the German and Romanian divisions at the outset, thereby giving the Russians a ten-week head start on wheeling down to the Sea of Azov to trap the other German Armies balked in the Caucasus.
This is explainable. Falsely believing only 80-90,000 men were in the pocket, the Soviets decided to try and destroy it with the majority of their troops (like they did with Group Lascar). After a few days, they realized that there were a lot more Germans trapped in there than originally believed, and that they couldn't destroy it at that time. They then needed to keep their divisions around the pocket to keep it contained. So the reason they didn't send more troops to the outer-encirclement line was because they wanted to destroy the pocket first before doing so. But then realized that they had to keep their troops around the pocket because more troops were in it than they believed. That's also why Operation Saturn was downgraded to Operation Little Saturn because 2nd Guards Army ended up being moved east to the Stalingrad area due to the Soviets not have nearly enough troops to both hold the pocket at stop Manstein's counterattack.
@@TheImperatorKnight Thank you, I very much appreciate your reply. I think what I am trying to ask is: if the Soviets did do the strategy I have mentioned before *from the outset* , would it have resulted in the slow annihilation of the German and Romanian divisions, whilst using most of the 7 Soviet armies to rapidly move against the Germans outside the pocket, pushing them down to the Sea of Azov to trap the other German Armies balked in the Caucasus 10 weeks earlier?
@@vegitoblue5000 Thank you for your scenario. I think the main issue is the Soviets wouldn't want a large group of cohesive Axis forces in their rear, incl the Axis supply dumps, repair facilities & airfields). Other German pockets had survived until then. Around Moscow & Leningrad in 1941, the Soviets had pushed deep into the German lines, winning a victory, but at the end suffering very high losses, & nearly ruining the victory. Other Soviet offensives had also failed like this, & their logistic support was limited. The Soviets would want to avoid this. Soviet recon was bad for forces at close range, they didn't have much idea on the forces around Stalingrad. Whilst they may have estimates of total Axis forces around Stalingrad down to the Caucasus/sea of Azoz, where they actually were is another matter. If the Soviets expected 80-90,000 troops around Stalingrad, then they were 'missing' around 180,000, which would have been a huge counter attack force. Once they realised 260,000 odd were in the Stalingrad pocket, it was too late to try & head to the sea of Azoz, & their main task was to contain them, to complete the victory they had already won. Time & weather were on their side. Stalin was listening to his generals, who would have reined in Stalin's grander plans (which had caused the big losses near Moscow & Leningrad). With poor logistics, & worsening winter weather, reaching the sea of Azov is impossible for the Soviets, they barely contained the Stalingrad pocket & weak Axis relief forces.
I like this discussion, but it is a never ending one. The next question is what would have happened if the 6th Army's break out was succesfull. The exhausted troops of the 6th Army couldn't really help defending the new frontlines and the Soviet troops, which surrounded the pocket could have taken part in an offensive against this new frontline. Maybe it would have collapsed too and things could have been even worse than it was now. The thing is we will never know what the best option was, even with hindsight.
I dunno... most historians make a big deal out of November 21-23 where 6th Army was basically without command due to moving to winter quarters for the command staff. You guys barely mention it. It WAS a big deal.
Love the whole series! A point if i may. Generals in the field, do not disobey the orders of their government, as a rule. It is an act of rebellion, which is likely to get them shot by their own officers. Relieved of command and arrested, certainly. There was one who did it ,historically, and pulled it off. That one had a ton of gold to bribe people with , a train of slaves and war captives and had just conquered a country. He was not coming home defeated in need of resupply. His name was Ioulious (never Julius , the romans did not have J in their alphabet)Gaius Marius, named after his famous ancestor who reformed the legions of the Roman republic, He had semi divine ancestry, political allies, and a victorious army fed and full of plunder at this back. Paulus had a starving army, was defeated , was dependent on air dropped supplies, and had no way of reaching his country, even if he had the guts to take the 6th and proclaim himself .. chancellor, or Kaiser ,or whatever. At this point , the only way the 6th could have survived was by treason. Paulus declaring himself Kaiser, reaching out to the soviets for support in his bid for the throne, making Stalin believe him, making the western allies believe him, getting a complete refit out of Stalin, then marching his army south out of soviet territory , into Germany. Killing Hitler,declaring himself Emperor, and starting peace talks with the allies. You think this could have happened .....On a scale of ..One to One million, what were his chances of pulling this off, without some nazi fanatic murdering his along the way? Without the rest of the German armies attacking him?
Not a subject expert as you guys are on Stalingrad, I do agree with you...they in essence demobilized, also just a few weeks prior they were fighting and taking huge losses for just a few blocks, their combat power was spent. Great content guys 👍
I have been saying for months; they should have detached 1/3rd of 6th army right away, to Kalach. Sure, the rest of the army would have been left behind, and a much smaller pocket would have formed (minus the "nose of Marinowka" I guess, but that would have been 100k FEWER men to supply by air! And, a rescue force made up of 6th Army men outside the pocket at Kalach. IMHO, a much better position for recovery.... but that would have required a better General than von Paulus.
Great vid TIK! I think that playing the hindsight card falls flat because there is no reason to limit it to the breakout decision. You could equally extend it to the decision to attack Stalingrad, to not giving the Romanian divisions adequate AT capability , or not make the Caucasus oil fields the overriding objective in 1941, or choosing to invade the USSR at all, or Goering's inability to stockpile sufficient oil in the late 30's, etc. Why should hindsight apply to this decision and to no others?
TIK, speaking of the Korsun Cherkassy encirclement of 44, maybe now is the ideal time to continue where you left off with that event? It will make a great example of comparing and contrasting between the two encirclements and their proceeding outcomes.
Absolutely, however I currently don't have time to continue research, scripting and editing another Korsun (or Battlestorm) video while continuing with Stalingrad, the regular Monday videos, and training up the new editor/animator. So unfortunately we may have to wait until after Stalingrad is over before I finish with Korsun.
What an amazing explanation regarding the German situation in Russia. Why didn't the Germans sprint towards the Caucasus before operation Barbarossa and organized logistics in the East as an exploration force?
I also thought about this. But someone told me Germany didn’t wanna risk the Russians just rushing the borders from the east while they off to the Caucausus
A wonderful introducing & A Great video always shares by TIK...before months I disclosur that break out was possible when Romanian reconnecting noticed..Soviets troops assembled in flanks before 6th Army's utterly surrounded
@TIK Agree largely with your point of view. The 6th Army would never have broken out entirely, at least without the advantage of hindsight. Technically, a part of the same (the Panzer and Mot. forces on the Western cauldron) could have had some luck, but it could have gone either way. In any case, the rest of the pocket would have collapsed much faster, may be by mid December instead of end of January 43. This means only a part of the motorised troops break out (best case), dooming 250000 men in the pocket and the First Panzer Army (another 200000 men) in the Caucasus. However, I have a few questions. Perhaps you will cover them in the future videos of your Stalingrad series 1. The pocket had 7 airfields. Though most were small, why did the Germans not expand them when they had the time? Lack of Engineering Supplies cannot be the reason, since the dying army was able to put Gumrak and Stalingradsky into operation (briefly and poorly) in the last days of the battle. 2. Why was Gumrak put into operation at such a later date? I know it had the 6 Army HQ and the Field Hospital, but at this point of time Paulus knew their only salvation was the air bridge. Why did the AOK 6 refuse preparing Gumrak till Pitomnik was directly threatened? 3. Why were only the seriously wounded being flown out of the pocket? Only in the very end, when Hitler decreed the reforming of the 6 Army with the core of old survivors were the specialists and others of distinction flown out. A regular evacuation of various dislocated rear service personnel from the beginning along with the wounded was apparently never attempted. General Hube was evacuated in Late January in a Ju 52 where he was the only passenger. Is this just bad staff work? Flying superfluous personnel would have allowed a bit more supplies for each man. 4. There were roughly 8-10000 surviving German/Hiwi/etc remnants who continued to fight after the surrender of the Northern Pocket, probably upto March 1943, if Soviet sources are to be believed. If the troops were already famished and died due to diseases in their thousands in captivity, how could these men have soldiered on in hostile territory without ammunition, food and fuel for another month?
So, sit and wait for better times. Hope is in mind until the last moment. So, Paulus was not so bad general after all. So, youtubers can have civil debate if they try to do so. So, this video is educational. Thanx.
Debates about the German position and command decisions at Stalingrad will probably last at least as long as American debates about the Confederate position and command decisions at Gettysburg.
In my opinion, the best-case scenario for the 6th army was - "a few mobile armored and motorized battalions escape, footsloggers are lost". And while in 1944 german commanders did accept such outcomes on many occasions, in late 1942 the decision to abandon the bulk of the trapped forces and save something was simply unthinkable. Let's not forget that prior to this point in the war the germans managed to rescue all their encircled forces (Demyansk and Kholm are just the most famous examples). Stalingrad and Velikie Luki were the first cases where encirclement actually led to the destruction of the trapped force. Even though in Velikie Luki panzers from the relief force managed to get to the garrison. So Paulus, in an alternative reality where he did order a breakout, would still be a coward in the narrative. For abandoning most of his army and a perfectly defendable position that tied out a lot of soviet forces. Since "it should've been obvious that they could easily stay put and await relief" =)
What was the weather like on Dec. 23? Walking through the open countryside with no shelter in the winter is hard enough without people shooting at you while you’re half-starved. Even if the way was open and without opposition, unless the weather was relatively mild without much wind, they still might not have survived. Walking even 10% of the way would have probably been a deadly peril if the winter winds were stiff enough.
I don't think it was possible, even if the Soviet Army wasn't in the way. A disorganized retreat would have meant the soldiers wouldn't have had any logistical support. Exhausted, starving, and possibly injured troops hiking 40km exposed to the harsh elements while trying to carry enough food and (liquid) water to last them days? A large portion of them wouldn't survive the first night.
Let's be honest here. Only successful saving for 6th army would have been if Manstein had at least 3 times more troops ( not only for breaking in, but also to make a new Frontline for connecting with Stalingrad). Nothing else would have saved 6th army. For me, more important question is. Whay Manstein counterattack was so week
After watching most of these videos, it seems like the better arguments are posited by the party who looks at the logistics in a more granular degree. Simply looking at a map and rough troop numbers is rather deceiving, so looking at what the individual units had, and how many they had to do it with, and more importantly when thet could have done it, makes a better case than a less detailed argument.
Just a note about the 2nd Guards Army. The discussion is they hadn't arrived yet, though TIK says it was taking up positions. What I hear is if the 6th Army made a break out attempt with a stretched out infantry line miles long behind the spearhead, that would mean the 2nd Guards would have arrived on the Axis flank and I suggest sliced the Axis into tiny groups, out in the tundra and winter. So I doubt the break out would have succeeded.
I agree. The Russians would have been thinking, how can we put more units in between Manstien and Paulus and how can we increase the pressure on Paulus in general, and in the light of our entire 1000 kilometer threatre front? I would suggest the Russians saw their opportunities and limitations and were very interested in it working out in their favor.
Interesting conclusion in the end of how the 6th army ended up by failing to break out being a sort of rear guard action that saved the over extended armies south of the city and allowed them to pump out some oil from the fields they did take. Considering how in another video i saw recently the situation south of the city had one motorized unit covering something like 100 plus miles and luckily the soviets had no significant forces in the area to exploit this.
I would love to see some analysis on how many men could have been saved from the pocket if every supply plane coming in was going home loaded with as many men as could reasonably be removed without jeopardising the integrity of the front (ideally every plane leaving full, but i feel that's unrealistic)... Sure it would have required constant retreat to shorten the lines, but it would also constantly reduce the amount of supplies required to support the pocket. Even if the men were leaving totally unequipped, all their ammo/supplies could be shared among those that remained. Obviously at some point the pocket would no longer sustain itself and the remaining men/supplies would be lost... but historically they all were anyway
I've wondered this for years. I think a JU52 could transport just 4 injured soldiers on stretchers out of an official capacity of 17, I'm sure that figure could be raised to 20 per plane given the 'Stalingrad diet' they were all on. Specialist soldiers (eg tank crews) should be saved, decorated soldiers also, walking wounded only. After December 23rd doctors & officers could have been flown out. This is being very cold hearted & the Germans probably did the best they could have flying out approx 35,000.
It's been a while since I've read this book. The memoirs of various soldiers do talk about those waiting to be taken out of Stalingrad. "Survivors of Stalingrad, eyewitness accounts from the 6th army 1942-43" by Reinhold Busch. What isn't often mentioned is those flying out of Stalingrad were also subject to Soviet AA and Soviet fighters. JU52's and HE-111's were used to airlift officers and wounded out of the airfields.
Every returning plane was (over)loaded with wounded soldiers like my grand uncle going back to Germany for treatment. GU lost his left forearm, and ended the war commanding an artillery battery going into British captivity.
Correct about Pliev's 3rd Cavalry, but don't agree about Malinovsky's 2nd Guards on the Myshkova on19th December: at this date only a few advanced elements had reached the line, nothing to do with the almighty army which was fully there only 4 days after.
But anyway, these are but details, the bottom line is: YES they lacked the means for a proper breakout, BUT should they have tried an unprepared one, would less than 10% of the entire army have succeeded in escaping? Certainly more than that. Even if a little more than that this would have been enough to justify it, as opposed to stay in the cauldron. So again, not necessarily a coordinated retreat, but just an uncoordinated one still would have been a better solution than nothing. Of course it's hard to imagine an Army commander issuing such an order as "leave everything and just run for it!" and yet whatever crazy, this was the least crazy solution.
And thumbs up for the space marine voice over 😂
it appears you have not watched TIK's final arguments. those 10% of survivors could not have stoped the folow up breaktroughs and would have become -x00%, there was barely a frontline holding against the outer ring, imagine that ring reinforced with 7 armys of soviets that have tasted copious amount of blood, and defensive lines infected by a couple thousand of mesengers from literal hell.
I'm not sure if a breakout from Stalingrad could have been possible at any point, and I tend to agree with TIK that a breakout would have been difficult to agree on, plan and execute, potentially impossible even. I would argue that any argument for a breakout, even during Winter Storm would have required hindsight... And even so, in hindsight, this series is asking the wrong question. The only way to mount a breakout in hindsight in my opinion is not to argue what is best for the 6th army, but in hindsight which decision gives the best possible chance of winning the war. This is because the primary decision-makers of this scenario don't care about 6th army, they care about winning the war, so we need to make a decision with hindsight from this mindset.
1) To argue Winter Storm could have been a breakout window without the benefit of hindsight seems incorrect to me, because the best option is for Manstein to relieve 6th army, and if you wait for the offensive to fail before breaking out, then you don't end up having enough time to reach the friendly lines. To my understanding, the offensive stalled on the 17th, and breakout was requested by Manstein on the 18th (Italian 8th & Group Hollit have already been routed at this point - little saturn)... And Winter Storm retreats on the 26th? So you're looking at an 8-day window (this is also hindsight) to organize the troops and break out against an enemy that just stopped a much better-equipped force... It doesn't make sense to me even in hindsight.
Even the argument about the airlift, "they already knew it wasn't working"... Did they know that it was never going to work? Up to this point, to my knowledge, many factors had impacted the airlift: Starting aircraft count, weather, pilot shortage. What degree of confidence would they have had at the time that these issues would persist (or that they would lose the airfields). Hindsight in this case isn't necessarily a predictor of the future, especially on a very limited sample size of less than a month.
2) The question we need to be asking is "which option gives Germany the better chance of winning the war". As a strategist, if there's a 1% chance or a 0.1% chance, or a 0.01% chance of the army in Stalingrad being relieved, either via breakout or via airlift, I'm taking it because at this point, withdrawing from Stalingrad drastically decreases already dim (non-existent) odds of winning the war. The entire argument of whether or not to break out in hindsight can't be made based on what gives the 6th army the best chance of survival, because the German leadership cared about winning, they didn't care about lives. "But hindsight means we know that they lost", this brings me to point 3 which is people don't look at hindsight correctly.
3) Hindsight is often used to say "well, they should have done X because Y didn't work". This logic is flawed because you don't know the probability of success of any given operation. You can make guesses as to what the odds are, but you don't know... Was the 6th army's fate a bad hand played well, a good hand played poorly? Maybe it was a bad hand that was also poorly played. Think about it in the context of a game, you have a choice between rolling a d6 or a d8, high roll wins... You roll the d8 and roll a 1... Does it make any sense for me to then say without knowing your choice, in hindsight, you should have rolled the d6 because it could roll a 6... No! But why? In hindsight, we know you failed. War isn't so simple as a dice roll, we don't know what the probability of success is on any given operation.
When you make a change in hindsight, in order to understand whether or not this change makes sense, you have to evaluate the probability of success of the proposed change vs the original operation without the assumption that the original operation would play out exactly as it did historically. There's a ton of evidence that supports that if A then B mostly doesn't apply when planning real-world situations like this. Sports are a great example because it's about repeating the same actions in the same conditions, hindsight doesn't do much for you unless backed by a statistical base of information because every action or plan has a probability of success... There's no if A then B therefore I should do C. It would be naive to think that the exact same orders, under the exact same conditions would yield the exact same result in the event of a do-over.
I think it boils down to what would be left of the Army. Lacking arms and equipment they'd be stranded in the open fields in the middle of winter and a whole new force would need to rush in to from a new line. Simply put 6th Army was already dead before it was encircled. However, if the airlift and relief operation both worked, the new line wouldn't beas demanding, and more of the army and equipment would survive. Do you take a 15% chance to save some of the army, or a 20% chance to save the entire war, thus Germany itself?
@@Pangora2 The probabilities don't have to be so favorable, a 1% chance of saving the war is better than a 50% chance of saving some of the 6th army. The issue with Germany in WW2 was that it wasn't possible for them to end the war through negotiations. Like, even if we assume hindsight is 20:20 and both options are losing... Does saving 6th army destabilize the front, accelerating a drive on Berlin? This question is critical, because once again if the answer is yes, you cannot do it... Because in hindsight, Germany received very favorable treatment at the hands of the Western allies (unjustly so), so this is also something we have to consider.
In hindsight, the better question might be whether or not the Germans should have attempted Winter Storm at all, or whether Winter Storm caused the accelerated downfall of the Eastern front, would those divisions not have been able to contain Little Saturn?
Part of the problem with the whole discussion revolving around a breakout is that it revolves around the morality of saving 6th army, but we need to pay more attention to the strategic side of things (WW2 was anything but a war of upholding high moral standards). Which decisions have a chance at winning the war? Once the answer is none of them, we have to ask which decisions slow a drive on Germany as much as possible.
@@EywaSC agreed. Id take the shot of the airlift over giving up the oil and losing the war, were my goal to win. Saving a few thousand starving men looks good for that weeks headline, but ultimately still lost the war. It's like an old video game where some minor thing you did in the first few minutes determines the ending. The more I study the war, theore certain I am that the victory in France was a poison pill that got Germany destroyed.
This is just the best. 2 amazing History UA-camrs interacting with no drama or anything just a respectful debate. Wish there was more of this. 😊
I also wish there were more of this sort of thing!
Thanks TIKhistory I enjoyed the video. But there is this burning question that I just can't but out: "Why did the Soviets decide to close the pocket?" Yes, I know that they anticipated a German counterattack from outside so decided to close the pocket because they thought there was only about 80,000 soldiers in the pocket.
However, many documentaries and series that talk about this period talk about "how easily the Soviets could have left the Germans to starve to death in Stalingrad" but decided to end the pocket. Which is why I ask the question, "Why did the Soviets decide to close the pocket?"
Think about it: if the Soviets believed that there were only 80,000 Germans in the pocket and thought they could not do anything significant because they believed that they had a much larger force, then why not use just a fraction of that supposedly superior number of soldiers to form a defensive line and use the rest to attack the Germans from outside the pocket.
In my opinion, if this strategy had taken place - whether or not General Paulus or the OKH decided to break out or counter-attack the pocket - this would have ultimately resulted in the annihilation of the German and Romanian divisions at the outset, thereby giving the Russians a ten-week head start on wheeling down to the Sea of Azov to trap the other German Armies balked in the Caucasus.
@@TheImperatorKnight You keep showing everyone why you are so respected in the community. Keep it up brother 👊🏻
@@vegitoblue5000 I think this ultimately comes down to the fact that they needed the pocket closed to free up those forces. Yes they ended up having to dedicate more troops to the encirclement to close it but I think because of the pressure that was applied, it made the issue of supplies far greater for the German army in the pocket. Yes they could have maybe set fewer troops to the encirclement and let them starve to death. BUT if you leave a large enough army and don't pressure them enough and use up their supplies quicker, that's longer you're going to have to ultimately wait. That also gives the Germans more to in the pocket to poke holes in the lighter Russian line and move forward with a breakout.
Yputube needs to bring the video response function back. Used to have this all the time.
Long form civil debates over a month or so. Gave the audiance a chance to read the reference material and form their own oppinion before the next response. But civil discourse doesnt generate clicks. Anger and outrage does a lot more for their bottom line.
I loved the part with chaptermaster Pedro Kantor. It implies space marines riding horses, which is quite hillarious.
The whole Space Marine voice thing was utterly hillarious.
Same here, it was a surprise bomb by TIK, but a welcome one.
Funnily enough, there were models made of Chaos Space Marines riding horses (poor horses!)
If there is no contingency plan in the Codex for this situation, it can't be done. QED
@@strategicgamingwithaacorns2874 Yeah, more of that is needed . :D
THE PLANET BROKE BEFORE GUARD DID.
I love this cultured academic discussion full of love of truth rather than resentment of eachother
As it should be!
Exactly!
Even the fanatical xenophobic Space Marine is behaving well!
@@konstantinriumin2657 Do not queston the honor of xenophobic Space Marines!That is not a quest you want to take guy!
Sadly, that is how normal people used to debate with each other. Before calling the other guy fascist became the norm.
I love how you two are basically having a civil debate through your videos.
Many years ago I had the fortune of speaking with an old woman who survived the Battle for Stalingrad as a child. She and two other orphans were taken in by an elderly couple who lived in the middle of a half destroyed apartment building. At night they burned bits of furniture and books whose leather jackets had been stripped by starving Russians. Occasionally they had bread that was mostly saw dust. But there primary source of food was very tough "pork", which obtained and was cooked in the middle of the night...
Granted that the German Army had is easier than Soviet Civilians, they too had turned to cannibalism after eating the horses. The Germans had cut holes in the bottom of the fuel tanks on all vehicles to remove the very last drops of fuel. Every discarded weapon found was checked and rechecked for ammo. Every dead soldier was missing his boots and coat, unless they were too damaged or messy to make worth taking. And many were missing whole limbs, and had other signs of being butchered...
Yeah, right the Germans could have tried a break out. That way they would have just died that day, rather than dying every day in Stalin's Gulags...
The Germans used to send them to the river to collect water with the promise of chocolate and sweets, the Russians shot them as traitors to the soviet union.. 😢
Most died from being starved by German command. They would have needed rest in hospitals & training up just to make it to the gulags
Thank you, TIKhistory.
First! Hope you enjoy the video!
As an historian, I am loving the debate with Anton Joly through these incredible videos. As a librarian, I am loving that your bookshelves are looking more organized and less cluttered. Keep up the awesome work.
This video is a great example of how to debate with one another with respect.
I love your discourse with Anton Joly. Keep up the amazing work.
Of course TIK likes 40K, and of course he's a son of Dorn.
In all seriousness, polite discourse shows something lasting and of real quality. It's hopefully the destiny of good media, like a good history book, a good history channel entertains, informs and is willing to discuss and interact with a few other sources and viewpoints.
40k is a part of the TIK shared universe
@@vladdrakul7851 Your comments about our Primarch are noted and you will know why we are called the Crimson Fists when we insert the Fist of Dorn up your arse.
Whenever you quote "Madman Hitler" use the Warhammer voice from now on please. LOVED IT!
I'm really enjoying the back and forth.
Hindsight is the hardest tool to put down as a historian.
Maybe a joint video would be interesting to react directly to each other
An argument I haven't heard here. Is that the reason that 6th Army didn't break out of Stalingrad was because. Cities like Stalingrad are hard to take and easy to defend. Therefore I think the Germans saw Stalingrad as a way of anchoring the line. They also had cut off the Volga river so, supplies could not move freely up and down it.
Many thanks to the Chapter Master for his Honoured contribution, Ave Imperator, Gloriam in Excelsis Terra!
good to see proper debate and discussion again ^w^
In this day and age it's refreshing to see a calm and respectful debate/discussion with acknowledgements on both sides
Some awesome academic debate going on here. Hell, is it even academic? Maybe we’re just so used to people foaming at the mouth when they’re put into a debate that we’re shocked when people respect each other for a change. Civil is the word I’m looking for. Anyways- love your stuff TIK, always puts me in a good mood. Keep doing you!
9:50 This is ignoring the fact that at the same time the Red Army would have attacked all around the perimeter to try and break the now-depleted defense lines. This might have meant that if the breakout failed, 6th Army might not have had a defensible position to retreat to.
Agree, he could end up in worse position. In open, to say.
Great video. There are many factors here as to why 6th Army stayed in place. All coming together around the same time and thus "Ālea iacta est". I've read all the same books TIK has read on the subject. One critical factor people seem to forget or just are unaware of is the state of 6th Army in late Nov. It's extremely exhausted and for the most part very diminished in combat strength compared to what it was in the early summer. It had already started to go into winter prep mode which means the majority of the horse transport was sent further west to better depots. So most heavy weapons that aren't motorized are now static. There is only one railway that leads to the Stalingrad area so the amount of supplies the army needed was never really satisfied thus there was not much extra of anything on hand. There are always some formations that have squirreled away more fuel, ammo, and food than they report but not in the quantities that can sustain those formations for very long. End results is once the army was surrounded it was in a very tough situation for any sort of organized break out. These type of maneuvers are extremely difficult to execute even for units with decent logistic situations to start. It really was the events that led to the surrounding of 6th army that IMO could have been prevented. Terrible intel and an overconfidence that they could continue to beat off the Soviet attempts to drive on the flanks of 6th Army. Weakening the flanks of German formations to keep the offensives in the city going. Don't even want to get into the poor misjudgments of not pushing out certain Soviet bridgeheads in the German allies sectors of the front when this option was still available.
I'll check out Anton's video later. Right now, I'm interested in your side of things. Because I'm biased and like your content. Shocker! I like your stuff.
Certainly found this whole subject interesting.
As a complete amateur but as someone fascinated by this area of the war I'd just like to say how much I'm enjoying this reasoned, well-argued and respectful debate. Bravo to both parties. I look forward to a continuation.
I really appreciate the back and forth, you are both great. This is what historical analysis should be - a respectful conversation. However, I'm totally with you Tik. I would add that all of this is hindsight with a view from the top. Imagine, instead, that your nerves are shattered, your stomach is empty, and your toes are freezing off. Is that corridor to the south a good place to strike? You have no idea. The only thing that might propel you forward is sheer desperation. Should they have tried? Probably. But that they didn't tells us, I think, that they were focused on survival first. And that's not something we can judge from the warm comfort of our chairs 80 years on.
This channel is great, such interesting and well-thought out analysis with cross-pollination by other historians.
40km (about 25 miles) is a long distance on foot even with a full belly and no heavy pack. Now imagine trudging cold and hungry in ice and snow with shells interdicting the line of retreat causing constant disruption as soldiers go prone to survive clouds of shrapnel zinging overhead.
After the shells, you pick up the dead (maybe), help the wounded (maybe), abandon vehicles as they break down or run out of fuel, and all manner of hardship trying to disengage from a massive Soviet army seething with revenge. Like wolves seeing a wounded animal trying to limp away, the Soviet army would rush in with a howls of glee nipping at their heels the whole way.
I agree that staying put was the correct course of action. The German army was "between Scylla and Charybdis".
thanks for all the effort and work you put in your videos. by far my favorite UA-cam channel.
This is the process of historical investigation. Respectful and thoughtful debate. You gentlemen are rare objects in this age. Long may you both run. Cheers.
Driving to work, and you made my day with this video. The space marine voice over was perfect btw.
I was not expecting the 40k part. Was listening to this in the background while I worked and I chuckled. Very good content and a interesting break there!
Tik I agree that the only option for Paulus to breakout was to wait for Manstein to launch Winter Storm and to receive enough fuel and ammunition by the airlift but since the mínimum conditions to attempt a breakout never happened the sacrifice to stay put made sense in order to save Army Group A and avoid the whole German front from collapsing. Thanks for another awesome video. Cheers from Peru!
It's great to see a healthy debate between people who treat each other with mutual respect! I don't know enough about this subject to start with any assumptions about what is correct, but the back and forth addressing of points helps me learn and understand far more than simply reading a paragraph in a history textbook.
I come back to this debate 2wice a year i wish it happened much more often Tik you have taught me so much more about history and to always to my best to think criticality also with a clear mind thank you
This is honestly a brilliant debate, thank you both.
I can't profess to know these subjects down to the minute detail, but I certainly know enough to respect the willingness to debate sensibly, events that happened over 80 years ago.
I think a breakout in late November was ruined by Seydlitz's botched retreat. That caused a lot of issues which force Paulus to focus on recovering the situation instead of re-organizing for a break-out. Forces which might have consolidated their positions in good order were forced to fight defensive actions and shift around to solidify the pocket, both not ending up in the best locations and having to expend combat strength fighting defensive actions only made necessary because of the retreat.
It wasn't as if there was no fuel in the Stalingrad pocket; the tanks trapped within continued defensive operations into December, which they could not have done if there were not some fuel stockpiles available. A breakout somewhere in the 26th-28th range (assuming no Seydlitz mistake fouling up planning) could have had access to enough fuel at least for the breakout attack, and likely would have been able to get some tanks and artillery though by prioritizing some units and vehicles.
This is evidenced by the fact that it appears that Paulus was planning an early breakout until Seydlitz's error screwed up his plans, which he would not have done had he not believed he had the fuel to carry out such a plan.
It's intresting how few tanks that they had available, upto this point in the series it has been noteworthy how they were able to recover and repair tanks to keep the numbers up. But now that is no longer possible. Presumably because spares are hard to get now or they had lost much of the repair equipment behind the lines when they got over run.
I think 6th Army was essentially immobilized back when they sent most of their horses west. Their fate was "baked in the cake" from before Uranus even started.
If the encirclement had happened in the summer months the Germans might have tried harder to break out but in the winter conditions, I'm sure the Germans knew any break out would have turned into a rout.
Oh Emperor. You can't get away from Warhammer even if you wanted to. Warhammer it great. And a Chapter Master weighing in. You can't argue. Especially with a Fist.
I totally agree with your assessment. Even in late November if Paulus had attempted a breakout he would have been:
Undermanned
Short of food&water
Short of ammunition
Short of fuel
Short of transport
Had to leave all the disabled soldiers behind
Had to fight in a column being attacked on all sides
Had to abandon all non essential equipment
Been reduced to fighting in the open air in sub zero weather with no hope of shelter
Under these circumstances his column most likely would have disappeared under the weight of the massive attacks by the 7 armies chasing his army.
Once that happened, the entire southern German front would have been cut off and destroyed before it could retreat from the Caucuses
The 80th anniversary coming up. Thank u Lewis. Cheers.
Brilliant discussion. I'm glad to see that both channels met at this point of the battle. And even more that discussions that take place on books were brought to UA-cam. Keep the great work!
Simply put ;
6th Army (whole) - Perished
4th Panzer Army (partially) - Perished
1st Panzer Army - Rescued
I loved the arrival of Pedro Kantor 18 mins within this video.
The voice chance court me completely off guard and I laughed so hard.
Excellent video TIK.
Before the encirclement - 6th Army was unable to to mass enough "strength" (fuel, ammunition, combat soldiers, and food) to complete conquering Stalingrad. I cannot see any chance for a breakout - at any time - given the large Red Army assets deployed for the encirclement. Perhaps trying to breakout early on would have been preferable to the suffering endured by the 6th Army until the surrender, but that decision is the old "do you want your eyes gouged out with a blunt or sharp stick?" question. And of course those on the spopt at that time had ZERO hindsight to guide them. Outstanding discussion by ALL the great Historians involved!
As always, thanks tik for the awesome video. By the way, can you please make a video explaining Salazar's Portugal before and during the war? I would like to learn about his ideology and policies, as well as his actions in relation to world changing events and how was he able to hold on in power for 40 years.
Yours sincerely, Assaf Doron from Israel.
We followed a politic of neutrality (allowing both sides to stay on our ports including in our colonies, selling & buying from both sides, etc.). At the late stages of the war we allowed the americans to set up an air base in the Azores islands. When Hitler died we declared a 3 day (if I'm correct) mourning period. Greetings from Lisbon
@@gdal3 Thanks for the new info. I want to learn about the Portuguese policy towards the Holocaust and the German reaction to it, as well as the policies of the Iberian peninsula remaining out of war. Beyond that Salazar made his mark over Economics and his ideology, sometimes referred to as fascist, had a religious conservative base, which objects fascist-socialist principles.
@@אסףדורון we accepted Jewish (and other) refugees coming from Europe. There are many books written about it. There are museums dedicated to it (particularly one in Vilar Formoso right next to the railway station where many first arrived in Portugal). Most of them then went to America, Brazil and other places, very few stayed (after the war ended that is). We treated them well given their temporary status. Locals almost always gave them housing and food for the first days until they sorted their affairs out. The German government didn't mind it as their policy was to simply get the "undesirables" out of their territory + occupied territory and, after 1940, to put them to work to make up for the loss of German manpower now in the military. That's why most refugees came pre-1941.
@@gdal3Thanks very much for taking your time to explain. You got any book recommendations on the topic (Portugal Estado Nuevo) for english speaking audience?
@@אסףדורון I guess that's where "clerical fascism" comes into play, but I'm not even sure if that's a real ideology or a label used to describe religious national conservative parties.
I like how respectful this debate is. I'm listening to both sides and it feels like watching good chess match (I mean it in a good way)
The bit with the Crimson fists chapter master caught me off guard, touché TIK nicely done
Great debate, love it. Thanks to both channels.
Ngl wasn't expecting the chapter master skit and I love it
I really enjoy all of your battle storm series
I am more of a Guard fan myself, but that’s obvious because we’re all history buffs here, and it’s the default history buff army. Love the video BTW.
Great debate. Loving these series of vids from the 2 channels.
Great video, great debate! and a warm thank you for allowing us to discuss such an interesting issue. I only disagree on the timing. I believe that the breakout or a strong move should have been done by Paulus on November, 20. As you indicated in the previous videos, Paulus was fully aware of the risk of encirclement way before Uranus. He even asked the permission to retreat. Therefore, he should have acted immediately, the 20th at the latest. Great Generals do that: Rommel did, Robert E. Lee did. Paulus was not at that level and 300,000 soldiers payed that badly
Thanks, this debate is just great!
Great installment! I believe they had to try to breakout out at some point maybe even during winter storm in mid December , even it turned into a “hells gate” scenario , the Germans were experiencing such a man power shortage after 18 months in the east, they could not let all those experienced combat vets die. I believe somewhere I read in the initial weeks on the encirclement they mainly shipping in fuel and ammo to the pocket, because everyone was thing “breakout”
After hitler didn’t get the Caucasus, he admitted I must “liquidate “ this war
No way Germany is win the war in the east at this point,, but if they wanted to have any chance of stalemate on the eastern front, they could not lose all those experienced troops,, and of course not launch operation citadel in the summer of 1943
None of this would have mattered. When the Wehrmacht launched Barbarossa, it was it was going to fail. They could have taken Staligrad, but they would not have the logistics to hold it.
When a man has been starved, it's not like you overfeed him for the similar number of days and he's back in service. The longer the starvation the more brutal the environment the longer recovery until it reaches the point where you simply have a bunch of broken men.
Another excellent video, TIK. Thanks. Cheers.
What I will always struggle with is why the II SS Pz Corps was tasked with case Anton in Southern France: an infantry corps could have done the job, while the Pz corps could have tipped the balance in favour of Manstein’s relief force as they were only just denied at the 11th hour of breaking through at Verkhne-Kumskiy.
Although an additional mobile reserve may have been needed to stop little Saturn as well.
What I want to know is:
1. Was Manstein given every available means to achieve his mission?
2. If not what was needed to ensure at least the best chance of success?
I’ve read other sectors of the front refused to release any divisions-so they would have had to have been taken from France, Norway, the Low Countries or even hastily forming an RLA/Rona force to add to the order of battle.
I’ve yet to see an overview of what was actually available for the relief operation vs what Manstein received.
This ladies and gentlemen, is how two "disagreeing" parties conduct an "argument". Both sides hearing each other out, and both responding to each other's points - unlike in the rest of the world where one side demonizes the other in order to overcome their "adversaries".
amazing detail as always, but I did near choke on my drink laughuing at the 40k referance and the quote read in a Space Marine voice.
Thanks TIKhistory I enjoyed the video. But there is this burning question that I just can't but out: "Why did the Soviets decide to close the pocket?" Yes, I know that they anticipated a German counterattack from outside so decided to close the pocket because they thought there was only about 80,000 soldiers in the pocket.
However, many documentaries and series that talk about this period talk about "how easily the Soviets could have left the Germans to starve to death in Stalingrad" but decided to end the pocket. Which is why I ask the question, "Why did the Soviets decide to close the pocket?"
Think about it: if the Soviets believed that there were only 80,000 Germans in the pocket and thought they could not do anything significant because they believed that they had a much larger force, then why not use just a fraction of that supposedly superior number of soldiers to form a defensive line and use the rest to attack the Germans from outside the pocket.
In my opinion, if this strategy had taken place - whether or not General Paulus or the OKH decided to break out or counter-attack the pocket - this would have ultimately resulted in the annihilation of the German and Romanian divisions at the outset, thereby giving the Russians a ten-week head start on wheeling down to the Sea of Azov to trap the other German Armies balked in the Caucasus.
This is explainable. Falsely believing only 80-90,000 men were in the pocket, the Soviets decided to try and destroy it with the majority of their troops (like they did with Group Lascar). After a few days, they realized that there were a lot more Germans trapped in there than originally believed, and that they couldn't destroy it at that time. They then needed to keep their divisions around the pocket to keep it contained.
So the reason they didn't send more troops to the outer-encirclement line was because they wanted to destroy the pocket first before doing so. But then realized that they had to keep their troops around the pocket because more troops were in it than they believed. That's also why Operation Saturn was downgraded to Operation Little Saturn because 2nd Guards Army ended up being moved east to the Stalingrad area due to the Soviets not have nearly enough troops to both hold the pocket at stop Manstein's counterattack.
@@TheImperatorKnight Thank you, I very much appreciate your reply. I think what I am trying to ask is: if the Soviets did do the strategy I have mentioned before *from the outset* , would it have resulted in the slow annihilation of the German and Romanian divisions, whilst using most of the 7 Soviet armies to rapidly move against the Germans outside the pocket, pushing them down to the Sea of Azov to trap the other German Armies balked in the Caucasus 10 weeks earlier?
@@vegitoblue5000 Thank you for your scenario. I think the main issue is the Soviets wouldn't want a large group of cohesive Axis forces in their rear, incl the Axis supply dumps, repair facilities & airfields). Other German pockets had survived until then. Around Moscow & Leningrad in 1941, the Soviets had pushed deep into the German lines, winning a victory, but at the end suffering very high losses, & nearly ruining the victory. Other Soviet offensives had also failed like this, & their logistic support was limited. The Soviets would want to avoid this.
Soviet recon was bad for forces at close range, they didn't have much idea on the forces around Stalingrad. Whilst they may have estimates of total Axis forces around Stalingrad down to the Caucasus/sea of Azoz, where they actually were is another matter. If the Soviets expected 80-90,000 troops around Stalingrad, then they were 'missing' around 180,000, which would have been a huge counter attack force. Once they realised 260,000 odd were in the Stalingrad pocket, it was too late to try & head to the sea of Azoz, & their main task was to contain them, to complete the victory they had already won. Time & weather were on their side.
Stalin was listening to his generals, who would have reined in Stalin's grander plans (which had caused the big losses near Moscow & Leningrad). With poor logistics, & worsening winter weather, reaching the sea of Azov is impossible for the Soviets, they barely contained the Stalingrad pocket & weak Axis relief forces.
I like this discussion, but it is a never ending one.
The next question is what would have happened if the 6th Army's break out was succesfull.
The exhausted troops of the 6th Army couldn't really help defending the new frontlines and the Soviet troops, which surrounded the pocket could have taken part in an offensive against this new frontline. Maybe it would have collapsed too and things could have been even worse than it was now.
The thing is we will never know what the best option was, even with hindsight.
My goodness that voice over 😂😂😂
Glorious, you've done it yet again
Message from Pedro Cantor was great! :)
I dunno... most historians make a big deal out of November 21-23 where 6th Army was basically without command due to moving to winter quarters for the command staff. You guys barely mention it. It WAS a big deal.
Love the whole series! A point if i may.
Generals in the field, do not disobey the orders of their government, as a rule. It is an act of rebellion, which is likely to get them shot by their own officers. Relieved of command and arrested, certainly.
There was one who did it ,historically, and pulled it off. That one had a ton of gold to bribe people with , a train of slaves and war captives and had just conquered a country. He was not coming home defeated in need of resupply.
His name was Ioulious (never Julius , the romans did not have J in their alphabet)Gaius Marius, named after his famous ancestor who reformed the legions of the Roman republic, He had semi divine ancestry, political allies, and a victorious army fed and full of plunder at this back.
Paulus had a starving army, was defeated , was dependent on air dropped supplies, and had no way of reaching his country, even if he had the guts to take the 6th and proclaim himself .. chancellor, or Kaiser ,or whatever.
At this point , the only way the 6th could have survived was by treason.
Paulus declaring himself Kaiser, reaching out to the soviets for support in his bid for the throne, making Stalin believe him, making the western allies believe him, getting a complete refit out of Stalin, then marching his army south out of soviet territory , into Germany. Killing Hitler,declaring himself Emperor, and starting peace talks with the allies.
You think this could have happened .....On a scale of ..One to One million, what were his chances of pulling this off, without some nazi fanatic murdering his along the way? Without the rest of the German armies attacking him?
Dude, take it easy on the dope. I think you’re doing a little too much.
Not a subject expert as you guys are on Stalingrad, I do agree with you...they in essence demobilized, also just a few weeks prior they were fighting and taking huge losses for just a few blocks, their combat power was spent. Great content guys 👍
Lost it at the Chaptermaster Pedro narration, best laugh I've had today so far!
"Thank you, TIKhistory" -Ages Flow
Is an understatement to me but fitting nonetheless. Love your channel and its interesting content.
Love your shared series!
Glad to have inspired you, TIK. Even in the 42nd Millennium Rememberancer G'lanz is still required reading.
The space marine voice you used killed me man. That shit was hilarious
Ahhh that Pedro Kantor gag gave me a chuckle
I have been saying for months; they should have detached 1/3rd of 6th army right away, to Kalach.
Sure, the rest of the army would have been left behind, and a much smaller pocket would have formed (minus the "nose of Marinowka" I guess, but that would have been 100k FEWER men to supply by air!
And, a rescue force made up of 6th Army men outside the pocket at Kalach. IMHO, a much better position for recovery.... but that would have required a better General than von Paulus.
It was great to hear Pedro Kantor's voice again. #rememberthefarm #rynn'sworldwillriseagain
Great vid TIK!
I think that playing the hindsight card falls flat because there is no reason to limit it to the breakout decision. You could equally extend it to the decision to attack Stalingrad, to not giving the Romanian divisions adequate AT capability , or not make the Caucasus oil fields the overriding objective in 1941, or choosing to invade the USSR at all, or Goering's inability to stockpile sufficient oil in the late 30's, etc.
Why should hindsight apply to this decision and to no others?
TIK, speaking of the Korsun Cherkassy encirclement of 44, maybe now is the ideal time to continue where you left off with that event?
It will make a great example of comparing and contrasting between the two encirclements and their proceeding outcomes.
Absolutely, however I currently don't have time to continue research, scripting and editing another Korsun (or Battlestorm) video while continuing with Stalingrad, the regular Monday videos, and training up the new editor/animator. So unfortunately we may have to wait until after Stalingrad is over before I finish with Korsun.
This is how ppl must conduct debates
I agree. There's too much screaming and drama these days
the voice over quote from Pedro Kantor actually had me laughing so hard.
The excellent map at minute 1.5 makes a great starting point for a war game scenario - working on the logistical will be challenging for the designer
What an amazing explanation regarding the German situation in Russia. Why didn't the Germans sprint towards the Caucasus before operation Barbarossa and organized logistics in the East as an exploration force?
I also thought about this. But someone told me Germany didn’t wanna risk the Russians just rushing the borders from the east while they off to the Caucausus
A wonderful introducing & A Great video always shares by TIK...before months I disclosur that break out was possible when Romanian reconnecting noticed..Soviets troops assembled in flanks before 6th Army's utterly surrounded
@TIK Agree largely with your point of view. The 6th Army would never have broken out entirely, at least without the advantage of hindsight. Technically, a part of the same (the Panzer and Mot. forces on the Western cauldron) could have had some luck, but it could have gone either way. In any case, the rest of the pocket would have collapsed much faster, may be by mid December instead of end of January 43. This means only a part of the motorised troops break out (best case), dooming 250000 men in the pocket and the First Panzer Army (another 200000 men) in the Caucasus.
However, I have a few questions. Perhaps you will cover them in the future videos of your Stalingrad series
1. The pocket had 7 airfields. Though most were small, why did the Germans not expand them when they had the time?
Lack of Engineering Supplies cannot be the reason, since the dying army was able to put Gumrak and Stalingradsky into operation (briefly and poorly) in the last days of the battle.
2. Why was Gumrak put into operation at such a later date? I know it had the 6 Army HQ and the Field Hospital, but at this point of time Paulus knew their only salvation was the air bridge. Why did the AOK 6 refuse preparing Gumrak till Pitomnik was directly threatened?
3. Why were only the seriously wounded being flown out of the pocket? Only in the very end, when Hitler decreed the reforming of the 6 Army with the core of old survivors were the specialists and others of distinction flown out. A regular evacuation of various dislocated rear service personnel from the beginning along with the wounded was apparently never attempted. General Hube was evacuated in Late January in a Ju 52 where he was the only passenger. Is this just bad staff work? Flying superfluous personnel would have allowed a bit more supplies for each man.
4. There were roughly 8-10000 surviving German/Hiwi/etc remnants who continued to fight after the surrender of the Northern Pocket, probably upto March 1943, if Soviet sources are to be believed. If the troops were already famished and died due to diseases in their thousands in captivity, how could these men have soldiered on in hostile territory without ammunition, food and fuel for another month?
So, sit and wait for better times. Hope is in mind until the last moment.
So, Paulus was not so bad general after all.
So, youtubers can have civil debate if they try to do so.
So, this video is educational. Thanx.
Debates about the German position and command decisions at Stalingrad will probably last at least as long as American debates about the Confederate position and command decisions at Gettysburg.
In my opinion, the best-case scenario for the 6th army was - "a few mobile armored and motorized battalions escape, footsloggers are lost". And while in 1944 german commanders did accept such outcomes on many occasions, in late 1942 the decision to abandon the bulk of the trapped forces and save something was simply unthinkable. Let's not forget that prior to this point in the war the germans managed to rescue all their encircled forces (Demyansk and Kholm are just the most famous examples). Stalingrad and Velikie Luki were the first cases where encirclement actually led to the destruction of the trapped force. Even though in Velikie Luki panzers from the relief force managed to get to the garrison.
So Paulus, in an alternative reality where he did order a breakout, would still be a coward in the narrative. For abandoning most of his army and a perfectly defendable position that tied out a lot of soviet forces. Since "it should've been obvious that they could easily stay put and await relief" =)
I was thinking along them lines after his video!
Did Paulus himself never talked about Stalingrad and his point of view? I mean, he lived until 1957.
What was the weather like on Dec. 23?
Walking through the open countryside with no shelter in the winter is hard enough without people shooting at you while you’re half-starved.
Even if the way was open and without opposition, unless the weather was relatively mild without much wind, they still might not have survived. Walking even 10% of the way would have probably been a deadly peril if the winter winds were stiff enough.
I don't think it was possible, even if the Soviet Army wasn't in the way. A disorganized retreat would have meant the soldiers wouldn't have had any logistical support. Exhausted, starving, and possibly injured troops hiking 40km exposed to the harsh elements while trying to carry enough food and (liquid) water to last them days? A large portion of them wouldn't survive the first night.
the cameo by Chapter Master Pedro Kantor hade me rolling
Let's be honest here. Only successful saving for 6th army would have been if Manstein had at least 3 times more troops ( not only for breaking in, but also to make a new Frontline for connecting with Stalingrad). Nothing else would have saved 6th army.
For me, more important question is. Whay Manstein counterattack was so week
After watching most of these videos, it seems like the better arguments are posited by the party who looks at the logistics in a more granular degree. Simply looking at a map and rough troop numbers is rather deceiving, so looking at what the individual units had, and how many they had to do it with, and more importantly when thet could have done it, makes a better case than a less detailed argument.
Thank you for the new video, TIK!
Thank you. Great explanations.
Just a note about the 2nd Guards Army. The discussion is they hadn't arrived yet, though TIK says it was taking up positions. What I hear is if the 6th Army made a break out attempt with a stretched out infantry line miles long behind the spearhead, that would mean the 2nd Guards would have arrived on the Axis flank and I suggest sliced the Axis into tiny groups, out in the tundra and winter. So I doubt the break out would have succeeded.
I agree. The Russians would have been thinking, how can we put more units in between Manstien and Paulus and how can we increase the pressure on Paulus in general, and in the light of our entire 1000 kilometer threatre front? I would suggest the Russians saw their opportunities and limitations and were very interested in it working out in their favor.
Interesting conclusion in the end of how the 6th army ended up by failing to break out being a sort of rear guard action that saved the over extended armies south of the city and allowed them to pump out some oil from the fields they did take. Considering how in another video i saw recently the situation south of the city had one motorized unit covering something like 100 plus miles and luckily the soviets had no significant forces in the area to exploit this.
Love the War40k fun you had there 😁
The videos rock Tik! Keep up the great work man.
I would love to see some analysis on how many men could have been saved from the pocket if every supply plane coming in was going home loaded with as many men as could reasonably be removed without jeopardising the integrity of the front (ideally every plane leaving full, but i feel that's unrealistic)...
Sure it would have required constant retreat to shorten the lines, but it would also constantly reduce the amount of supplies required to support the pocket. Even if the men were leaving totally unequipped, all their ammo/supplies could be shared among those that remained.
Obviously at some point the pocket would no longer sustain itself and the remaining men/supplies would be lost... but historically they all were anyway
I've wondered this for years. I think a JU52 could transport just 4 injured soldiers on stretchers out of an official capacity of 17, I'm sure that figure could be raised to 20 per plane given the 'Stalingrad diet' they were all on. Specialist soldiers (eg tank crews) should be saved, decorated soldiers also, walking wounded only. After December 23rd doctors & officers could have been flown out. This is being very cold hearted & the Germans probably did the best they could have flying out approx 35,000.
It's been a while since I've read this book. The memoirs of various soldiers do talk about those waiting to be taken out of Stalingrad. "Survivors of Stalingrad, eyewitness accounts from the 6th army 1942-43" by Reinhold Busch. What isn't often mentioned is those flying out of Stalingrad were also subject to Soviet AA and Soviet fighters. JU52's and HE-111's were used to airlift officers and wounded out of the airfields.
Every returning plane was (over)loaded with wounded soldiers like my grand uncle going back to Germany for treatment. GU lost his left forearm, and ended the war commanding an artillery battery going into British captivity.
(Slow clapping) Ok the space marine voice reading that comment just earned my Like for this video. Well done TIK for knowing your audience…
Ok, it’s nice to hear Anton Joly’s opinion, but what does The Spymaster think about this?
The Spymaster believes that not being able to break out was part of Paulus' key British Agent Training .
@@johnseppethe2nd2 I thought Paulus was just saving troops for his planned invasion of Tasmania, you know, to get there before the Israelis did.