Mover, as a former B-1 IP/OGV EP stationed at Ellsworth, I can fill in some details. 1 - The SOF Callsign is FOXTROT. It looks like the FOX-3 name is a combination of FOXTROT and TOP-3 (Ops Sup). When I was there, when only one squadron was flying (Ellsworth as two operational flying squadrons), a single sortie (e.g., OCF, divert RTB), the SOF was not required, but the Top 3 had to have the SOF truck to assume SOF duties. The SOF could only be in the tower or the SOF truck. My guess is manning issues have allowed this combination of duties to occur more liberally than previously allowed. 2 - No HUD in the B-1 3 - While the B-1 had the ability to fly a coupled approach, there is/was a WARNING in the Dash 1 that stated "Do not engage ILS automatic approach mode due to oscillations below 500 feet AGL that may result in ground impact." Furthermore, there is another WARNING that states before entering the traffic pattern "Failure to ensure Auto Throttle disengagement can result in loss of throttle control and an unsafe landing condition." Every approach is hand flown. 4 - Per the Dash 1, pilots are told to use the AOA indicator and indexer to maintain an on-speed 7 degrees AOA indication throughout the approach. This represents the optimum approach AOA. Turbulence, gusty wind, or wind shear conditions may induce variations in AOA or airspeed and may cause excessive sink rates to develop on final approach. In this case, the pilot should increase final approach and touchdown airspeed by a maximum of 10 knots in such cases to improve aircraft handling characteristics. The aircraft should be landed at higher airspeeds. The -1 also warns: Maintain AOA throughout the approach and landing. Do not allow an excessive sink rate to develop since recovery may not be possible. 5 - The B-1 has recently received a glass cockpit mod, but previously, the checklist had you bug an altitude in the radar altimeter and once you flew below that altitude the Min Decision Height Caution light would come on and your steering cross would flash. That could be different now, but I could probably assume there is something on there display to alert them they are below the index altitude. Also, I think the checklist used to direct you set approach minimums on your altimeter. 6 - WITHHOLD deals with weapons employment. Anyone on the crew can call WITHHOLD due to things like exceeding heading tolerances, timing tolerances, threats, Safe Escape, Safe Separation etc. ABORT is in the context of a takeoff / rejected takeoff. 7 - The 28BW used to have a section in it on Cold Weather Altimeter Corrections. (I also used to teach this during my IRC classes.) Not sure what happened to this knowledge. I don't want to point fingers as no one is infallible and we all screw up, it really is just the magnitude and time that it happens. These guys got painted into a corner both self-induced and by outside influences. I would almost guarantee that if they knew about the NOTAM, applied it correctly, and diverted to Tinker, they would have landed safely. But, yes, a poor instrument approach was flown. Finally, I knew the Board President when he was a Lt / Capt at Ellsworth. Stand-up guy when we were stationed together and I think he presented the facts and opinions well and highlighted some big deficiencies.
You forgot to add that it was cancelled by a military veteran because cruise missiles replaced it and IT couldn't replace the B-52. An Actor brought it back.
@@joelkaplan8172i recommend Mentour for info on commercial landings, among other things airline pilots do. A stabilized approach is achieved very early and must be maintained all the way to landing. Very rare that it is not and from what i’ve seen flight data is transmitted back to the company and deviations are supposed to be caught in a review there. I am a glider pilot not an airline pilot but ive spent many hours listening to content providers on this. Any part 121 pilots out there to expand on this? Joe, are you a nervous flyer? Lots of us in the back are even if only from time to time
I've got a crazy B-1B crash story. I was director of a small Kentucky county (Crittenden County) emergency medical services, and the counties primary first out paramedic. We received a 911 dispatch for a possible aircraft accident about 7 miles from the city out in the county. I was driving the ambulance to the scene. I had responded to 5-7 various aircraft incidents over my, at the time, 20+ years. I reassured my partner it was probably another small experimental single occupant light craft. About a half mile from the scene I saw a large amount of smoke and a tall oak tree on fire with flames reaching to the top of the tree. I thought to myself maybe this aircraft was somewhat larger lol. On arrival, I noted it was on the farm of the lead singer of the current weekend band I was in. Eddie was at work but another local farmer arrived to the scene at the same time as the ambulance. We requested fire and rescue to respond. The debris field was enormous. The farmer offered to drive my partner and myself through the initial impact mud into the debris field with his 4x4. I grabbed medic bags, and pitched them in the truck. About 100 yards in we were clear of the mud. We got off the truck. I told them to look for aircraft seats as that historically had been where I located crash victims. Started trudging through this incredible mass of parts. I saw some papers blowing in the wind with "SECRET" then saw an intact helmet bag with tour patches and unit emblems. Got on the radio and advised dispatch supect aircraft was military and to call Fort Campbell, our nearest military base. A few more yards in, and there are the enormous landing gear but still no seats or chutes. The whole scene was so surreal, smells, fires, smoking parts etc., still no seats or victims. The very last parts we found were the hugh engines, finally stopped, when they encountered the woods at the end of the debris field. The jet engines were still smoking emitting an acrid smell. I advised dispatch no victim contact and we were at the end of the debris. Dispatch advised me that Fort Campbell is notified, but it's not their aircraft. Dispatch then gave us a new 911 call to a location about 15-20 miles from this scene. "injured man hanging from parachute in tree". We cleared the crash site and responded to last dispatch. The fire department was arriving. I thanked the farmer for the assist, and headed to new dispatch coordinates Long story short a second ambulance was dispatched to assist us. We eneded up locating and transporting the four crew members of the B-1 to our small county hospital. Found out they were flying out of their Texas base. Injuries were minor or non existent for three of the crew. The wizzo had a manageable head injury. From the scuttlebutt that got back to me: 1.This B1 had undergone recent updates to the electronics. 2. A sudden fire was noted in the main cabin probably related to the recent updates. (Never herard exact cause). The pilot, that noted the fire, apparently punches out the whole crew when ejection is required. 3. The pilot told the crew of imminent ejection intent. 4. The wizzo did not have enough time to don and/or secure his helmet before being ejected from the aircraft. He was the airman that ended up hanging by his chute from the tree with a head injury. Apparently military aircraft accident word travels fast. On our arrival to Crittenden County Hospital we noted Blackhawks. One landing on our hospital pad. Others landing on the parking lots and grassy areas. We were being invaded by the US ARMY from Fort Campbell! One cigar chomping Colonel appeared to be in charge. Well folks, we were having a Dustoff Medevac operation right before our eyes. We gladly turned our 4 patients over to the mighty colonel his, Blackhawks, and his medics! With their hotloads onto the aircraft, we barely had time to give patient reports on our airmen. Our assumption was that the military powers that be, had worked out a plan to take care of their own and bypass our little county hospital. I was amazed Fort Campbell and the Texas airbase formed and implemented a plan between the time Fort Campbell was notified, and their arrival at the county hosp. I guess loosing a nuclear weapon capable aircraft has extra urgency eh? BTW, we were told later, the B-1 was unarmed. Yeah, we didn't observe any ordinance on our journey through the crash site. Not sure how our lil facemask and rubber gloves would've saved us from a nuclear holocaust anyway. Lol
Way before your story, I lived on a farm in Michigan, and a fighter plane crashed in a field right across the road. Not more than a quarter mile away. The pilot had radioed that he was going down "somewhere" before GPS. The pilot was able to walk away, and go to the farmhouse. The farmer got on the phone, and by golly, they had a set of trucks there within about 4+hours (from somewhere unknown), and they loaded the plane up, and disappeared. I was totally impressed with the speed of this operation. The farmer was paid back for damage to his "empty" field, no crops there, just plowed, so the pilot hit the best target available in that area. Only replowed a rut into the field, for a couple hundred yards.
I am currently assigned to one of the pilot training wings…. this attitude is being bred into our new pilots from the ground up. Disregard of regulations and guidance is commonplace. The current syllabus is not being executed as written… syllabus deviations are routine…without documentation. Syllabus events are routinely pencil whipped….with tacit approval of leadership. Crew rest is a recommendation only. I could go on and on… Students leave here thinking that this is a normal way of executing the mission….do whatever it takes to get the X.
Van Creveld had a great point in his book Command in War: He points out that you can push men and horses to astounding limits; as Patton said, men can eat their belts. There isn't any amount of cajoling, threats, or begging that will alter how a machine performs. You can't talk your way out of a stall, and too many people believe that rules are meant to be broken and never understand what a hard limit is until they're in freefall.
This culture is being bred into new pilots as they go through pilot training… these new students do not know the difference and will take this culture with them as they flow downstream to their gaining units.
It seems these poor leadership issues have permeated all levels of all branches. The DoD is screaming “We’re incompetent because we’ve driven out all the competent service members and can’t attract high quality personnel anymore”.
@@greysheeum It is hard for me to imagine. When I got out of the Marine Corps in 1996 a bad leader was an anomaly. Personal responsibility was also huge. Maybe it was coming from a single-seat fighter community, but others getting blamed for your bad airmanship and lack of attention to detail seems unbelievably to be.
@@brianrmc1963 The point is that bad traits and habits are learned. They’re being taught somewhere. It’s usually up the line from the point of failure. CO, OPS, IP, PC. If bad is taught early, it’s usually taught often.
Former USAF guy now 121 guy - excellent breakdown. You are 1,000% correct about the sad state of NOTAM code. That accident is textbook complacency combined with queep getting in the way of flying training. Outstanding video.
@@Space_Parrot "A term used by the Air Force to describe unnecessary or redundant training and other duties. In 2016, the Air Force began working to cut out "queep" by studying training courses and removing or streamlining some of them." It's a reference to but made distinct from creep as in design/scope creep.
@@EtherFoxI'm working in industry which has become addicted to module training and cuz it's so easy to deploy these training modules, they make many of them and so our people are burdened every month with having to do required modules and a lot of them are written by smart people. But some of the people I work with are dumb people. God bless them, they do. The manual labor, but they have a very hard time with jargon and word. Dense slides, and the cleverly written tests. Some of these guys have been in prison for years and don't know how to use a computer.
As a former weather puke, I agree that the fact that the weather sensor on runway 13 was down for 2 months should have been elevated and corrected within the weather and OSS channels. While the NOTAM correctly identified the visibility sensor outage and limitations, that sensor should have been replaced at an active northern tier base with known poor flying weather in the winter. However I think the wind shear element is a red herring. A change from 340/11 to 190/05 is an indication of light and variable winds, typical during a winter fog condition. Note that the report said the wind data came from the onboard tactical display, so wasn't this information was available to the crew in real time? I also question how a change from a quartering tailwind to a crosswind condition, at these low wind speeds, is responsible for a 12 kt increase in airspeed in 25 seconds. Bottom line is that if the aircrews had known about the NOTAM visibility restrictions, they would have diverted to Tinker. A hard lesson but everyone lived to tell the tale.
NWS weather geek here- and like Mover says, opinions are mine: We often see DoD sensors down with a long delay getting fixed. Several DoD radars have poor maintenance, and mainly due to how the electronic maintenance programs are run and the lack of dedicated trained techs. So I am not shocked on the sensor out for two months. Also, we see partly the result of going 100% to automated observations. When I was an observer, if tower asked me to be on the ball because someone was trying get in or out under IFR, I did. Missing the basics will bite you in the ass, on occasion.
@@WxWaterFire10 years ago, nav aid school was almost a year long. Now it’s maybe 6 weeks, and you “learn the rest at your base”. AETC decimated training and quality.
@@WALTERBROADDUS typical bureaucratic red tape.. file a report, wait 2 weeks for that person to file a report and wait 2 more weeks for the next person to file a report. then multiple meetings about the cost to repair it. then file that report to schedule the maintenance.. 6 months later it's still not fixed. welcome to how the government operates. i deal with it ever friggin day at my job.. took us 3 years to get an additional forklift order request approved that we won't get until 2027. so their solution... spend 3k dollars a week on a rental until 2027.... yay for government common sense..
@@desertengineer1100%. At a base at my last office, the techs were nice folks, but none went to the WSR88D school the NWS runs. The OJT don't work on everything
I was on hot pit on that day and launched out 129, scary thing sitting out there in the fog and seeing 129 go by on the runway then hearing 3 distinct explosions. Glad to finally see this investigation concluded.
I'm curious was there anything you and the rest of the ground crew had to do after the mishap? Quarantined for debrief and drug test or anything of that sort?
@@John-tx1wk I didn’t cause I didn’t personally work on the aircraft that day, although I know some folk that did, we went and safed 129 at the end of the runway while 85 was burning could just barely see the orange pluming over the fog
I witnessed the B1 taking off at on Rwy 31 at 1630 into a fog back. They were below mins to takeoff. I was at the departure end of rwy 13 at the time. The visibility when they landed was about 100 feet. I am a retired Navy pilot with 700 hours in prowlers and 2200 hours in C9Bs. CAP worked with 28th BW to provide photos via drone and aircraft of the mishap area
I grew up in Rapid City. When I heard him say the visibility at the start of the vid, that was all I really needed to hear. This landing should never have been attempted. I don't know why people don't respect the weather more. Burn some fuel, head for Oklahoma. Those guys go to London for lunch sometimes.
Flight Training in USAF has been consistently subpar at the Aircraft Specialization level. Rocky is correct, syllabus deviations continue to be routine and have been for ~2 decades. I remember repeatedly being told by an instructor to do X which was explicitly prohibited by CJCS regulations. As an O-5, he had rank and told me to do it or he'd mark it as an unsatisfactory flight. I did X as there was only a VERY minor actual risk at the time. 5 flights later I did the same thing under his tutelage and he wrote me up. That's not training. That's just flexing and being cruel. The students escalated it, but he retired before anything could be done about it. Every student in the schoolhouse knew he was trouble and avoided him. We came up with our own checklist just to comply with his demands instead of focusing on learning.
That's called an officer with a lack of integrity and a command not holding people accountable to height and weight standards. I'm surprised ole Porky could climb the crew ladder to get into the cockpit.
I was asked in a promotional interview what I felt the biggest problem in law enforcement. I said easy, it is complacency. That applies to everything. 99% of things that go wrong can easily be traced back to complacency. Every member of the board raised their eyebrows like a light went on. Fight complacency with high expectations and discipline, inspections, adherence to standards, and promote self responsibility and ensure your subordinates are properly trained you are taking big steps in fighting complacency which prevents mishaps.
When I was flying, day after day, I had to remind myself every now and then that I had to look at things with fresh eyes and try to envision what the consequences of each action or lack of action would be. It's something you have to prod yourself to do on a regular basis.
WOW, scathing is right C.W. this report was after heads for sure. I appreciate how you go through this report and explain to us the verbage of what things mean and especially your opinion of what mistakes were probably made, just so many things lined up for such mishap to happen. Thank you again.
I was stationed at Ellsworth in the early 90s when a B-1 crew botched a disengagement from a tanker and ripped a huge gash in the tanker fuselage with the tail of the B-1. Luckily, both damaged aircraft were able to safely land.
The entire NOTAM system in general needs an overhaul, any 121 pilot will tell you when a briefing pack contains literally 70-100 pages and 90% of them are inconsequential NOTAMS that really just aren’t relevant to the flight it’s a problem. When you have 80 lines of “Non standard signage on TWY W4” mixed in with actual critical items such as ILS or ALS INOP it is not unheard of to miss things even WHEN you’re looking for them. I personally like color coding and symbology which reflects the type and pertinence of a particular NOTAM. Some AOC’s implement this in your EFB software but many don’t and it’s still just the dead see scrolls in black and white text
I issue certain NOTAMs and hate how complicated I have to make them sometimes. I've had times when a condition "requires" a NOTAM but I know it's not helpful or other occasions where doing it the "correct" way may result in three NOTAM but an "incorrect" way may result in one, much more comprehensible NOTAM. Then I have to make a call between the CYA FAA specified way or the actually useful course of action. It is ridiculous how opaque and inefficient NOTAMs are.
In the Army, I’ve scrubbed missions. I was a Crew Chief/Door Gunner. We were just out burning gas, and weather was coming in. I spoke out that I was uncomfortable because clouds were dropping and we would run the risk of having to fly IFR. Pilots immediately aborted the operations. There were no questions asked. We had a fantastic “all go or no go” safety policy.
I am a high time USAF pilot and participant in accident investigations to include serving on boards. I commend you for plowing through this lengthy findings document. I would only add two things. First your concerns about the Col. being mad could also be interpreted to be the General is mad. Accident Boards can be very political and sometimes don't report all the facts and distort events. Some reports that I have seen downplay equipment failures to blame crew members who are more easily replaced only to have to admit later that mx or design errors are present on succeeding accidents. Look at the Boeing fiascos. Second, the report clearly shows the upgrading Mission pilot had a weak record which would make it mandatory for the Instructor (the pilot in command) to make the approach because of the clearly marginal weather conditions regardless of the actual situation being worse. Why the accident board did not ground the pilot in command is strange. In cases like this one has to check and see if the IP was married to the General's daughter. At the rate these squadrons are deteriorating we won't have to worry about the B-1 being around much longer. I really don't think that the current pilots have any ability to fly on instruments or keep themselves out of trouble. (the IP should have been taking the aircraft around after the first negative deviation in airspeed) Been there, done that. If Gen Lemay was here he would have immediately grounded the first crew who busted minimums and they would be sent to Shemya Island in the Aleutians as an example for the rest of the Wing. After all they are sup-post to be trusted with nuclear weapons and there is zero confidence in these crews, their leaders or their training or selection.
@@Johnwashere-dt2ovit’s a fact. The Bone fleet has been denuclearized for a while now. All the necessary hardware- including wiring-was removed and destroyed.
I worry that they weren't flying enough. I was a C-5 pilot/examiner for years. Pilot monitoring must cross check VVI coming down final. I always told right seater to tell me immediately if my VVI exceeded 500-700 feet per minute from DA to touchdown. Lack of airmanship was the principle cause. Classic duck under going for the lights combined with poor airspeed control.
You should have been in SAC when they had 2 copilot crews in the KC-135's & you only got to touch the controls every 3rd or 4th flight. Still logging USELESS AC time but...experience time in a Jumpseat? I became more proficient in the Boom Pod than in the right seat. On the brighter side, American, Delta, Braniff I, II, III, America West, Alaska, & Southwest only looked at total time & Type Ratings. So, after 30+ years of flying I have >20,000+ flight time (more of that over an ocean asleep than most folks have driving to work) [maybe a slight exaggeration😊] & retired with Captain ratings ending with a B -767/757, Cat II engine out, Cat III qualifications. Not bad for a 9 year old who's dream was to just fly any Cessna 150!!! 🫡
Definitely some changes since I was there. Say SOF in the Ellsworth tower. Your take on briefings is spot on even in the bomber world. Shame but the AIB lead is a good guy and I have flown with him in the past so, so trust his review of the incident.
While this is a major loss it also isn’t. The B-1 is being phased out and less than half are still in service with only a few reserves kept on hand. If my count is right there’s now 44 airworthy out of the 100 B-1b airframes.
More common than you think regarding weight. It's been a minute but when I was on staff, there was an extensive study done regarding ejection seat weight limits and the picture wasn't pretty. That's not to say there was a large amount of overweight aircrew, there wasn't. However, there was a larger amount than expected. To my knowledge, no one was grounded across the CAF due to their weight...
When I was stationed at Hahn AB in the 80's I was a fire team leader and we saw an F-16 burst into flames from right behind the cockpit to the tail! It became transparent you could see the framework! The pilot cut the engine ejected, he was full AB braking when it ignited. The SOF was in a truck and met the pilot seconds after he landed on his feet and the SOF was slapping him on the back saying you did the right thing! I was with Security Police. In the cold war days.. I enjoy your reports, I subbed thank you sir.
Was stationed at Hahn too. That pilot was picked up as he was trying to walk back to his crashed/burning jet. The jet's TP Twenty Mike Mike was cooking off. Weather conditions were scary similar for that Hahn crash - low ceiling, freezing fog, etc. Luckily everyone in both events survived.
Good explanation of the report. Sounds like there needs to be some changes of leadership and retraining of the squadron. That swiss cheese model had a huge tunnel instead of holes! Glad they survived!
Ellsworth used to be a good base, they fell into a negative feedback loop with the leadership there unfortunately. All the good people left and all the bad people stayed, those bad people in turn eventually made any new people find ways out too. They didn't give a shit about all the experience and knowledge that was lost and there was a lot of corruption. My leadership there didn't even care to know when my last day was despite there being nobody to replace me. On a personal level I'm glad they were so terrible to work with that they pushed me out of a job I loved in hindsight, worked out way better for me in the long run. I'm also relieved nobody was hurt but I know a lot of people from there are not surprised about the incident or the report.
That's exactly what I thought. This wasn't swiss cheese, this was a fishing net with more holes than solids! Every one of the crew was flaunting regulations, the base was flaunting regulations, and common sense was nowhere to be found. Add in an inexperienced pilot who has trouble landing in weather and I'm pleasantly surprised that the outcome wasn't much worse!
There are 2 variants to the Swiss-cheese model that I normally acknowledge. One of them is the melty-cheese model, where the safety systems cause the failure (the cheese melts, dripping into the fondu pot of doom) The other is the munchy-cheese model, where an adequate safety system exists, but people degrade it by eating the cheese (removing, disabling, or removing safety-measures). This feels different...like a 'moldy cheese model' might be needed (the cheese is forgotten, turning into a ball of mold where disaster is inevitable)
Thank God they fixed the ejection seat systems. I know I wasn't in the cockpit, but damn yall, how many times have we seen airspeed decay on an approach which results in a crash. Quit the scan and this crap happens
I was thinking the same thing. I was in AFROTC at UIdaho when the firings happened. Our Det Commander discussed it with us- I fully expect some heads to roll
Book: "Warnings Unheeded" Covers that crash and the Authors account of an active shooter incident he responded to as First responder as part of base security.
Been waiting for this for years. Finally a couple years ago we got “CND/visual” NOTAMs. I was appalled when I was trained in issuing them. They have so many exceptions and limitations that I would rather deactivate that capability. There isn’t enough explanation to anyone reading the NOTAMs how the visual NOTAMs work and they can very easily provide confusing info.
Where to being.... I am a 63 years old airline captain. I fly mostly international routes. My normal crew is mainly three first officers, but occasionally, I get a captain or two depending on the availability of crew members, but as I said, mainly the crew consists of three first officers, and myself for a total of four pilots in my crew. We follow the stabilized approach concept al the way until touchdown. Any crew member could call for a missed approach at any time, and immediately, it will be executed without questions, we just do it and ask questions later. To be a military pilot or even a private E-1, it is expected that you will conform to military standards such as weight and discipline. The check airman (instructor pilot in this story) was shamefully fat. He was complacent, and it is obvious to me that this pilot lacked the abilities to be a check airman/instructor pilot. The upgrading pilot was trying to become a captain of a B1-B bomber when it is obvious to any of us who routinely fly for a living that this pilot had no business being there. By the report, you know that she/he shouldn't have been there trying to upgrade to any position of command. By his or her actions, this pilot shouldn't be allowed to become a captain on a B-58 Baron, much less in a B1-B Lancer. The other two support crew members were in this situation as useless as a freezer in the middle of the South Pole. We civilians, airline pilots, do not have the option to "punch out" or eject as this pilots did. We have to fly the aircraft all the way until it stops and you walk away or die trying. All four crew members should get fired from their jobs as it is obvious they are just there to collect a paycheck and nothing else. Their superior officers should get fired as well for their lack of supervision and for having a unit of below standard crew members who were irresponsible and unprofessional. Lastly, I served in the US Army with the infantry. Our units were highly motivated, fit, and ready for anything destiny had for us. As usual, good job reporting.
Sad part is I doubt that the Air Force is the only branch with these issues. I mean look at all the mechanical failures we've seen lately in every branch, it's like corners are being cut on maintenance like they're an airline.
Dude, they allowed a 260 lb commissioned officer to still be serving. Like I know the jokes about the chair force, but shit, THOSE are the standards for commissioned? Its a wonder why the enlisted can't stand most y'all. Combat ready my ass. It's just damn scary that this lack of discipline is all throughout our military.
The guy's been flying a bomber for 18 years and has 2000 hours? What the hell? Where's he been flying to, the corner 7-11? The lack of hours and training is very concerning.
I was a flt eng on the Herk for 6 years and got over 2000 hours. I'm betting a big part of the difference is the 130 has a reliability rating in the high 90s vs mid 20s for Bone.
As a civilian pilot, it’s always interesting to see military procedures and how bad airmanship doesn’t really care about your feelings. It would be interesting to glean some insight as to the pilots training history, checkride failures etc…..
As a former SARM, I was a little proud to see us mentioned. I always find these videos informational, and as a SARM I can easily identify what went wrong. 21 years of SARM, I always expressed to my troops why we have to be on top of our job so things like this wouldn't happen.
CW, for us uneducated want to be flyers (aviators), you have explained this that even I can understand it, even as a former jumper yes I know and heard all the jokes it’s good hear the the crew go out safety. The air force has lost someone (you) with a great deal of knowledge and experience I miss the “Make them tell me no” videos, as you are a mentor to the next up and coming generation of aviators. My military days are now have long pasted however I still look skywards when I visit Lakenheath (LN) with work and still brings a very warm feeling when I visit. Keep up the great work.
It seems to be getting worse though. Maritime infrastructure is showing similar "laziness" is the only way I can describe it. I'm not sure what is happening or what the cause of it is. I hate to use the trope but "wokeness"?
@@_droid No it's far bigger than that. America is being set up by treasonous elements in Washington to lose the next big war. Why? Because those traitorous elements hate your freedom, they hate the rights the constitution gives you and they want to destroy it all. And what's the only somewhat feasible way to remove the constitution? That's right, losing a war badly enough. Hence the encouraged laziness, incompetence and lack of standards.
@@_droid Nah. You can be "w-o-k-e" but still have standards of quality in training. A woman, black person, a gay person, etc. all can achieve the same level of quality safety standards and quality of flying as anyone else. History has taught us that dozens of times. The issue is the training standards, not the diverse makeup of the force. US armed forces have always been pretty diverse. That isn't the issue.
As a 30 year commercial pilot, I've never encountered "wind shear" in fog, nor have I ever heard of it or been trained for it. I call BS. Honestly, I'd like to know more about the flight crews knowledge, experience and abilities; however, we know we'll never obtain that.
I hope you realize how misleading your statement is. Wind shear is a serious thing and it cannot be ruled out because there is fog and putting wind shear in quotes is really somewhat snarky. Having said that, the low experience present would raise the question if they would recognize wind shear indications if they encountered it.
@@xenia5101 It's almost never foggy when the wind is blowing, sir. Exceptions can be low visibility due to smoke while windy. or blowing snow. There are other exceptions, but spend some time getting less offended by people you disagree with on google forums and be open to differing perspectives. I train for wind shear annually, and experience it occasionally to some degree. I take it very seriously, and your inference otherwise is wrong...
@@stacyw8269 I still take issue, not offense, with your statement and find your expertise on weather science is overstated based on your remarks. Speaking of respect, where does B/S fall? If you can supply any clarity from your annual training making an absolute statement on fog excluding wind shear we would all learn something but I doubt if you can do that since wind shear training is normally based on practicing recognition and escape in the simulator. Perhaps a better lesson would be to have you fly a few approaches in Alaska in the winter, especially the airfields in the Aleutian Chain. Any Reeve Aleutian veterans out there like to comment?
@@xenia5101 I don't kindly take criticism from private pilots with little experience George. I've done plenty of operations in Alaska including Kenai from time to time. Have shot many approaches throughout Alaska in fact. Kenai is easy, Kodiak is not... Neither is Juneau or lots of others where I've contended with lots of ice and weather that changes by the minute. Why don't you try barking up a tree where your qualifications give you more license than aviation 101 private pilot speak. I mean, at least get an IFR rating before talking like an authority. I've forgotten more on this topic than you'll EVER know.
Thank you for your review of this report. I hope that it opens eyes. Procedures are written in blood. Disregard of these causes more blood. Don't be a nerd, but follow the rules, they are (usually) there for a reason. I take these things into my civilian life and attempt to transpose the learnings for the people I am responsible for. My people understand that adherence to procedure hones their skills as professionals. Being a "pro" makes people feel good about their jobs. Not encouraging your people to be pros, is a disservice to them.
I was an instructor navigator on EC-135 aircraft out of the 28th BMW at Ellsworth in the early 1970's. My first lesson to any new navigator assigned to the aircraft was that on the approach or in the traffic pattern, his ONLY job was to keep the two idiots in the front seats from killing the rest of the crew. Fortunately, I took my own advice. I'm still here, though we did have a couple of close calls over the years. The reason you have a crew on a crew aircraft is that one person can't do it all. If the crew works together, mistakes are caught and problems are prevented.
My first time watching your channel - not military nor a pilot. Even so, you were informative, interesting and understandable. I had almost no trouble following along... especially since you defined most of the acronym jargon. Thanks for doing such thorough work!
I wanted to just say in general, not specifically directed at this video, thank you CW Lemoine for sharing your experience with the rest of the world. Hearing and understanding the view point of someone with your experiences on specific topics, and in general, is invaluable history!
Well boys, I had three engines out, had more holes in us than a horse trader's mule, the radio was gone and we were leaking fuel and if we was flying any lower why we'd need sleigh bells.
This happened at Ellsworth in the 80s. B1 landed short of runway 31. This is why McDonalds and the gas stations are no longer on the approach end of 31. They were made to move. After, they put a mobile PAR in place and all approaches had a PAR backup requirement for several years.
The pilot on that crash was a classmate of mine from The USAF Academy. I remember it well. As I recall, they were shooting a TACAN Approach to RW 31. Is that correct?
I worked at Ellsworth from 2001-2007 and they didn't move the McDonalds till after 2002 so after 21 years it was still there. Hard to order in the drive thru when a B1 was landing/taking off
@@brockkellem9724 It took a while for sure. I visited in 2008 and the approach end was completely different. That is also when they put the stoplight on the perimeter road (I hear it is now a gate). The switch for the stoplight was in the tower.
In the past the Mentour Pilot channel has commented at length concerning civilian NOTAMs being a clogged mess. Are the NOTAMs used by the military created by the same people or using the same model? Since there seems to be a parallel.
I was thinking of LeMay, too. 🙂. I don’t know enough about him to judge if that’s good or bad. They had more accidents then, but they had a lot more aircraft and flew a lot more, too. And lesser technology. Dropped a few nukes by accident, too, didn’t they? Luckily, it seems none of them went off.
Problems like this have always existed in parts of the system. People feel like it "gets worse" about practically everything. But a lot of that is just the improvement in transparency and the honesty of reporting.
Thanks for the knowledgeable explanation. Glad everyone survived. Unrelated suggestion: How about having your gaming buddy "Raymond" as a guest on The Mover & Gonky Show? I think he's also a pilot? He's funny, and I think he would have some hilarious comments on the aviation news of the week!
I’m a 121 guy who is former military but not a rated aviator. Your spot on that in the end the reason this crash happens is a mind boggling lack of basic flying skills. This is Instrument flying 101 and the MP and crew utterly failed to do their jobs. I find it especially noteworthy that you have an IP flying with a pilot with a history of exactly the deficiencies that led to this crash who appears to be acting as an IP and therefor should be monitoring the approach closely. Especially since they are fully expecting an approach to near or at minimums. Despite those factors the IP apparently isn’t paying attention. The report is scathing but I think reading through the text he justifies why the findings are so scathing. My impression is that as they interviewed people they found a culture that wasn’t just lax but willfully non compliant with stuff they didn’t feel like following. I think that culture is a big part of why the OSO/DSO were not monitoring and cross checking as they should have been and why the IP was so obviously deficient as well. Proper monitoring and cross checking would absolutely have prevented this accident and therefore I would tend to agree that the organizational culture stands shoulder to shoulder with the poor flying skills as a cause.
I think while you are right the final layer is the pilot. The fact is that in real terms you have a dozen or more failures that permitted the pilot to be in the position to make that failure. The fact that they chose to continue to approach unstabilized, in below minimum and still disregarded comms discipline shows they had been allowed to be so lax for so long: to them this was not unique it was the norm
Thank you Mover for calling a spade a spade. At the end of the day, we had 4 airman ejecting and a wrecked airplane because the pilot flying failed to do the stick n rudder thing. It really is that simple.
I couldn't agree more with your statement that bad leadership will destroy a squadron. I too have seen it firsthand. A few weeks befre we deployed for a 6+-month WestPac tour in 1992, a new commanding officer was assigned to the squadron. Over the period of 6 months, the morale, combat efficiency, and effectiveness of a Marine Attack Squadron was destroyed. I used the analogy that our new CO was handed a loaded weapon and in just a few months he proceeded to render it completely inoperable.
its often said it takes many mistakes for something like this to happen. But in reality, i think there are always 2 or 3 mistakes being made and we are only 1 mistake away from finding out.
Thank you for doing these Reviews. As a layman, I use your debriefs to understand failure in critical environments. The AIB and its content are always illustrative and detailed (read: clear and concise feedback). At 44:54 you state, "I'm going to disagree to an extent." Subsequently, you go on to state the pilot, basically, failed to fly the airplane. That, in my opinion, is accurate. However, prior to your statement, I wrote to myself: "Men are lax in holding other men to a standard. There is a systemic lack of accountability here, which points to a failure in leadership." In this instance, again, in my opinion, the leaders in the organization allowed the 'holes' in the swiss cheese model to get too big. The AIB was written for the NEXT leader of the organization. I think it's on point. Again, thanks for doing these videos. Now, I got to get back to work.
I went to HS in Ekalaka MT during the 90's. They used to fly over all the time. When the B1 crashed in the late 90's it actually crashed on my friends parents land. They watched it happen while working in the pasture. They said it was terrible, not sure how true it was. But there was an attempt to eject and the fireball enveloped them all. I memory serves me correctly the 2nd in command of Ellsworth was onboard at the time.
Yes, Col. Anthony Beat was 2nd in command and was a very likeable guy. Sorry, but there was no attempt to eject, I was at the breifing and had friends that went out to pick up the pieces.
I was an enlisted man at Ellsworth in the early 1960,s. General Lemay was in charge of SAC at the time. He ran ORI,s Operational Rediness Inspections to keep Wing commanders sharp and ready for battle. My wife and I visited Ellsworth early November last year. While driving around the base I was struck by the number of big deer grazing in small groups near the runway area. Budget constraints by EPA and Washington may have reduced the Wing commanders priorities for training and required air crew hours. Beautiful base though.
Given the checklist culture in aviation - why are callouts not automatic just like checklists? Can't believe none of the 4 crew members spoke up about them - given they can be life saving under those conditions.
Mover, have you considered uploading your content to any other platforms? Sorry for asking if you already do. I will be distancing myself from Google/UA-cam as much as possible and moving towards platforms that don't censor search results because it is an election year.
I left the Air Force in the late 70’s and can’t imagine how so many significant errors occurred on one flight. My last duty station was MacDill in Tampa,Fl which was a training base at the time. I saw a lot of crazy things watching newbie’s learning how to fly F-4’s but that was expected.Frontline experienced crews should be by the numbers, (especially in minimum weather conditions.) I’m sure somebody’s wing’s were clipped!
Mover, I do not believe the B-1 has an autopilot capable of landing. I was qualified as a 32672 Integrated Avionics Tech, primarily for the F-111 but the B-1 was part of our shred-out (along with F-15 and your beloved, not mine (🙂) Viper). Although we were about 8 years apart, The B-1A was a lessons learned design from the Vark with the variable wings systems, and our AP's were similar. IIRC, we had Heading holds, Alt. holds and Vel. holds with a combination set of modes. Not having ANY crew call-outs in the cockpit (and he had THREE sets of eyes!) was as bad as the 200 hour MP getting WAY behind the airplane. The IP's not paying attention to the CRM procedures may also be a facet of not managing his personal fitness, as well. As a retired Aircraft Production Superintendent, and a lover of both swing wing aircraft, it is a shame they lost that airframe with only about 40 or so left.
When we had fighters our SOF sat in a truck off the side of the runway. Was called Watchdog. Maybe it's cause we where a gaurd unit and it wasn't our tower.
Were you a dedicated safety officer in either branch at one/some point? Or perhaps rotated through it? Is it even a rotation billet? You seem to have a very firm grasp of this material that suggests you, at one time, were a squadron safety officer. I could be wrong, of course.
In the UK, which is remarkably compact compared to the US, I have long complained that our charts (which are predominantly electronic now) are so cluttered with overlays, notams, avoids etc that they are almost unusable, the important information being almost totally obscured by rubbish.
I agree, sure there were a lot of contributing factors but at the end of the day they had four sets of eyes in the cockpit and forgot to fly the plane. I know they were heavy with the extra fuel and I don't know how long the runway was, but I would rather float down the runway and maybe have to do a go around rather than belly flop the damn thing short of the runway.
So, the initial A/C they were going to fly had a FCGM problem. So they stepped to the spare which immediately broke and needed the SCDU R2'd. Plus the MOSO's altimeter didn't read right and the MSDO's comm panel didn't work. B1s doing B1 things. Nice to see they haven't improved in reliability in 20+ years... 4 years at Dyess and never once saw one land code 1. I think crashing that jet just saved the taxpayer a bunch of money.
So my question is, is this a career ender for the left seat? Grew up around Marine aviation. Saw a pilot run a TA-4 out of fuel 2 miles from El Toro. Dad said he will be flying a desk from now on!
Fascinating. 'Never been to Ellsworth, but I do remember a lot of evening and overnight shifts from the tower cab & RAPCON perspective. I see some of my past experiences through this mishap report.& analysis. This accident might not of happened if PAR was still available...but I know, the USAF can't have PAR systems nowadays (too expensive & labor intensive) and then you add more chance of controller error (thinking of three F-16, Kunsan & Osan Air Base mishaps on or near the runways back in the 90's). 'More to say and questions to ponder, but my aviation support experiences are far away in an obsolete past, so I'll just shake my head & hope for the best upon my young, active duty brothers & sisters...fm
Where do you find these AIB reports? We lost a pilot in the Adriatic when I was in Aviano about 12 years ago. I retired before the report came out and I've always wanted to know what they determined actually happened.
I am surprised the MIP had only 2 flights in the last 60 days and the MP only 6. To be send up in that weather with those minimums (even at take off) seems ridiculous and extremely dangerous. How proficient can one be with those numbers?
After seeing the performance of the Secret Service on 13 July, i wondered if incompetence might be endemic in other parts of the executive branch, including the military...
I didn't know that the military accident reports refer to the accident airplane as the "MA" (for Mishap Aircraft) the crew as "MC" (for Mishap Crew) and the pilot as "MP" (for Mishap Pilot). Always learning something new.
Just because he was 260 doesn't mean he was fat.... he could be an absolute jacked mofo.... regardless tho the ejection seat doesn't care if it's 260 of fat or 260 of muscle... over weight is over weight.
I've seen two guys at/over seat limits. One was fat, the other was a large bit very fit dude. (After he was grounded, leadership was like, this is dumb, but more cardio and less lifting, dude...)
I grew up near Ellsworth AFB when there were much more tragic mishaps, classmates whose dads were gone just like that. I'm just thankful they all made it out with their lives, which is much more important than an airplane.
Anyone taking into account the height of the aircraft?? 100ft overcast. They need to add the height of the cockpit to the minimums. I don't know how high the B1 cockpit is from the ground but if it was 100ft the pilot would still be in the cloud. They need to measure minimums from the cockpit height not the ground....
Referring to 121, Southwest recently had 3 similar incidents. At least 2 of these involved a good stabilized visual approach to a highway short of the airport, but aligned with the runway.
A very good informative video. Thank you very much. What is missing in this report IMO, is a clear identification of the underlaying causual bad precondition. The reason people get like this, is because something is wearing them out. That one thing that caused this mishap is so omnipresent, it should be identified. I don't think it's a somebody. You don't get that many slices of Swiss cheese to line up by accident.
I still can’t believe that the Air Force is allowing anyone to remain on duty, much less active flight status, at 260lbs. My maximum allowable weight for my height was 184lbs when I was in the USAF and I’m of average height for a male. I was an F-16 crew chief so I’m pretty familiar with the ACES II ejection seat and its maximum weight limit of 211lbs. This is not an arbitrary number. It’s there for a reason. I’m sorry that the IP was injured but 260lbs is inexcusable and obviously the reason for his injuries. You can’t cheat physics. They would have placed me on the wing commander’s fitness program (aka Fatboy program) long before I could ever have thought about getting that heavy. I have witnessed airmen both losing rank and being denied reenlistment for being overweight and not maintaining physical fitness standards. Is this no longer being practiced? I don’t know if this is the result of an overall decline in standards across the Air Force due to recruitment and retention shortfalls, or simply poor discipline and leadership within the wing at Ellsworth but the current fitness standards are completely unacceptable in this case. Times have apparently changed in the USAF during the last 15 years and not for the better it would seem.
The CO of my last ship was either 25 or 35% BF. I can't remember because there was also a Chief (E7) who had the alternate number. This was in the early 2000's.
@@skayt35 SAC was famously sharp and former SAC alumni I worked with thought the more casual TAC culture might not suit that mission. Curtis LeMay is famous for good reasons.
I read this when it came out. The board president didn’t pull any punches. I plan to brief it at our unit’s next safety meeting. The cultural stuff was the most interesting part. I think as you read it is also pretty clear those units are very undermanned and overburdened by queep, but of course that’s not explicitly pointed to as a causal factor. Heads are definitely gonna roll from this one.
Even Mav, although USN, would have diverted. But Mav and Sully can teach us that people today do not "know" the aircraft they are flying. That "knowledge" saved souls on Sully's flight.
Mover, as a former B-1 IP/OGV EP stationed at Ellsworth, I can fill in some details.
1 - The SOF Callsign is FOXTROT. It looks like the FOX-3 name is a combination of FOXTROT and TOP-3 (Ops Sup). When I was there, when only one squadron was flying (Ellsworth as two operational flying squadrons), a single sortie (e.g., OCF, divert RTB), the SOF was not required, but the Top 3 had to have the SOF truck to assume SOF duties. The SOF could only be in the tower or the SOF truck. My guess is manning issues have allowed this combination of duties to occur more liberally than previously allowed.
2 - No HUD in the B-1
3 - While the B-1 had the ability to fly a coupled approach, there is/was a WARNING in the Dash 1 that stated "Do not engage ILS automatic approach mode due to oscillations below 500 feet AGL that may result in ground impact." Furthermore, there is another WARNING that states before entering the traffic pattern "Failure to ensure Auto Throttle disengagement can result in loss of throttle control and an unsafe landing condition." Every approach is hand flown.
4 - Per the Dash 1, pilots are told to use the AOA indicator and indexer to maintain an on-speed 7 degrees AOA indication throughout the approach. This represents the optimum approach AOA. Turbulence, gusty wind, or wind shear conditions may induce variations in AOA or airspeed and may cause excessive sink rates to develop on final approach. In this case, the pilot should increase final approach and touchdown airspeed by a maximum of 10 knots in such cases to improve aircraft handling characteristics. The aircraft should be landed at higher airspeeds. The -1 also warns: Maintain AOA throughout the approach and landing. Do not allow an excessive sink rate to develop since recovery may not be possible.
5 - The B-1 has recently received a glass cockpit mod, but previously, the checklist had you bug an altitude in the radar altimeter and once you flew below that altitude the Min Decision Height Caution light would come on and your steering cross would flash. That could be different now, but I could probably assume there is something on there display to alert them they are below the index altitude. Also, I think the checklist used to direct you set approach minimums on your altimeter.
6 - WITHHOLD deals with weapons employment. Anyone on the crew can call WITHHOLD due to things like exceeding heading tolerances, timing tolerances, threats, Safe Escape, Safe Separation etc. ABORT is in the context of a takeoff / rejected takeoff.
7 - The 28BW used to have a section in it on Cold Weather Altimeter Corrections. (I also used to teach this during my IRC classes.) Not sure what happened to this knowledge.
I don't want to point fingers as no one is infallible and we all screw up, it really is just the magnitude and time that it happens. These guys got painted into a corner both self-induced and by outside influences. I would almost guarantee that if they knew about the NOTAM, applied it correctly, and diverted to Tinker, they would have landed safely. But, yes, a poor instrument approach was flown. Finally, I knew the Board President when he was a Lt / Capt at Ellsworth. Stand-up guy when we were stationed together and I think he presented the facts and opinions well and highlighted some big deficiencies.
You forgot to add that it was cancelled by a military veteran because cruise missiles replaced it and IT couldn't replace the B-52. An Actor brought it back.
Are commercial passenger ils landings as cumbersome and dangerous as this appears to be?
#3- What the actual F... ? Boeing.......
Thank you. Very interesting. Dad was Bombradier Navigator on B-47s retiring as Lt Col in 1964.
@@joelkaplan8172i recommend Mentour for info on commercial landings, among other things airline pilots do. A stabilized approach is achieved very early and must be maintained all the way to landing. Very rare that it is not and from what i’ve seen flight data is transmitted back to the company and deviations are supposed to be caught in a review there. I am a glider pilot not an airline pilot but ive spent many hours listening to content providers on this. Any part 121 pilots out there to expand on this? Joe, are you a nervous flyer? Lots of us in the back are even if only from time to time
I've got a crazy B-1B crash story. I was director of a small Kentucky county (Crittenden County) emergency medical services, and the counties primary first out paramedic. We received a 911 dispatch for a possible aircraft accident about 7 miles from the city out in the county. I was driving the ambulance to the scene. I had responded to 5-7 various aircraft incidents over my, at the time, 20+ years. I reassured my partner it was probably another small experimental single occupant light craft. About a half mile from the scene I saw a large amount of smoke and a tall oak tree on fire with flames reaching to the top of the tree. I thought to myself maybe this aircraft was somewhat larger lol. On arrival, I noted it was on the farm of the lead singer of the current weekend band I was in. Eddie was at work but another local farmer arrived to the scene at the same time as the ambulance. We requested fire and rescue to respond. The debris field was enormous. The farmer offered to drive my partner and myself through the initial impact mud into the debris field with his 4x4. I grabbed medic bags, and pitched them in the truck. About 100 yards in we were clear of the mud. We got off the truck. I told them to look for aircraft seats as that historically had been where I located crash victims. Started trudging through this incredible mass of parts. I saw some papers blowing in the wind with "SECRET" then saw an intact helmet bag with tour patches and unit emblems. Got on the radio and advised dispatch supect aircraft was military and to call Fort Campbell, our nearest military base. A few more yards in, and there are the enormous landing gear but still no seats or chutes. The whole scene was so surreal, smells, fires, smoking parts etc., still no seats or victims. The very last parts we found were the hugh engines, finally stopped, when they encountered the woods at the end of the debris field. The jet engines were still smoking emitting an acrid smell. I advised dispatch no victim contact and we were at the end of the debris. Dispatch advised me that Fort Campbell is notified, but it's not their aircraft. Dispatch then gave us a new 911 call to a location about 15-20 miles from this scene. "injured man hanging from parachute in tree". We cleared the crash site and responded to last dispatch. The fire department was arriving. I thanked the farmer for the assist, and headed to new dispatch coordinates Long story short a second ambulance was dispatched to assist us. We eneded up locating and transporting the four crew members of the B-1 to our small county hospital. Found out they were flying out of their Texas base. Injuries were minor or non existent for three of the crew. The wizzo had a manageable head injury. From the scuttlebutt that got back to me: 1.This B1 had undergone recent updates to the electronics. 2. A sudden fire was noted in the main cabin probably related to the recent updates. (Never herard exact cause). The pilot, that noted the fire, apparently punches out the whole crew when ejection is required. 3. The pilot told the crew of imminent ejection intent. 4. The wizzo did not have enough time to don and/or secure his helmet before being ejected from the aircraft. He was the airman that ended up hanging by his chute from the tree with a head injury. Apparently military aircraft accident word travels fast. On our arrival to Crittenden County Hospital we noted Blackhawks. One landing on our hospital pad. Others landing on the parking lots and grassy areas. We were being invaded by the US ARMY from Fort Campbell! One cigar chomping Colonel appeared to be in charge. Well folks, we were having a Dustoff Medevac operation right before our eyes. We gladly turned our 4 patients over to the mighty colonel his, Blackhawks, and his medics! With their hotloads onto the aircraft, we barely had time to give patient reports on our airmen. Our assumption was that the military powers that be, had worked out a plan to take care of their own and bypass our little county hospital. I was amazed Fort Campbell and the Texas airbase formed and implemented a plan between the time Fort Campbell was notified, and their arrival at the county hosp. I guess loosing a nuclear weapon capable aircraft has extra urgency eh? BTW, we were told later, the B-1 was unarmed. Yeah, we didn't observe any ordinance on our journey through the crash site. Not sure how our lil facemask and rubber gloves would've saved us from a nuclear holocaust anyway. Lol
Did they take the aliens to the base 😮
Way before your story, I lived on a farm in Michigan, and a fighter plane crashed in a field right across the road. Not more than a quarter mile away. The pilot had radioed that he was going down "somewhere" before GPS. The pilot was able to walk away, and go to the farmhouse. The farmer got on the phone, and by golly, they had a set of trucks there within about 4+hours (from somewhere unknown), and they loaded the plane up, and disappeared. I was totally impressed with the speed of this operation. The farmer was paid back for damage to his "empty" field, no crops there, just plowed, so the pilot hit the best target available in that area. Only replowed a rut into the field, for a couple hundred yards.
Great first hand account, thank you!
I am currently assigned to one of the pilot training wings…. this attitude is being bred into our new pilots from the ground up. Disregard of regulations and guidance is commonplace. The current syllabus is not being executed as written… syllabus deviations are routine…without documentation. Syllabus events are routinely pencil whipped….with tacit approval of leadership. Crew rest is a recommendation only. I could go on and on…
Students leave here thinking that this is a normal way of executing the mission….do whatever it takes to get the X.
This will bite eventually, and at the cost of lives. I love aviation, its dangerous by nature. The kind of aviation you describe is downright stupid.
Hold the line as best as you can.
Normalisation of Deviance!!!!!
@@colincampbell817 Exactly!
Van Creveld had a great point in his book Command in War: He points out that you can push men and horses to astounding limits; as Patton said, men can eat their belts. There isn't any amount of cajoling, threats, or begging that will alter how a machine performs. You can't talk your way out of a stall, and too many people believe that rules are meant to be broken and never understand what a hard limit is until they're in freefall.
I think you nailed it: Poor basic airmanship, further worsened by degraded leadership.
This culture is being bred into new pilots as they go through pilot training… these new students do not know the difference and will take this culture with them as they flow downstream to their gaining units.
It seems these poor leadership issues have permeated all levels of all branches. The DoD is screaming “We’re incompetent because we’ve driven out all the competent service members and can’t attract high quality personnel anymore”.
@@greysheeum It is hard for me to imagine. When I got out of the Marine Corps in 1996 a bad leader was an anomaly. Personal responsibility was also huge. Maybe it was coming from a single-seat fighter community, but others getting blamed for your bad airmanship and lack of attention to detail seems unbelievably to be.
@@brianrmc1963 The point is that bad traits and habits are learned. They’re being taught somewhere. It’s usually up the line from the point of failure. CO, OPS, IP, PC. If bad is taught early, it’s usually taught often.
You would think the Czar 52 accident at Fairchild would have taught them something, but the leadership now were not even in when it happened.
Former USAF guy now 121 guy - excellent breakdown. You are 1,000% correct about the sad state of NOTAM code. That accident is textbook complacency combined with queep getting in the way of flying training. Outstanding video.
Queep?
@@Space_Parrot "A term used by the Air Force to describe unnecessary or redundant training and other duties. In 2016, the Air Force began working to cut out "queep" by studying training courses and removing or streamlining some of them."
It's a reference to but made distinct from creep as in design/scope creep.
@@Space_Parrot it's Air Force slang for "bureaucratic nonsense"/"unnecessary busy work"/"non-essential paperwork drills"
@@EtherFoxI'm working in industry which has become addicted to module training and cuz it's so easy to deploy these training modules, they make many of them and so our people are burdened every month with having to do required modules and a lot of them are written by smart people. But some of the people I work with are dumb people. God bless them, they do. The manual labor, but they have a very hard time with jargon and word. Dense slides, and the cleverly written tests. Some of these guys have been in prison for years and don't know how to use a computer.
As a former weather puke, I agree that the fact that the weather sensor on runway 13 was down for 2 months should have been elevated and corrected within the weather and OSS channels. While the NOTAM correctly identified the visibility sensor outage and limitations, that sensor should have been replaced at an active northern tier base with known poor flying weather in the winter. However I think the wind shear element is a red herring. A change from 340/11 to 190/05 is an indication of light and variable winds, typical during a winter fog condition. Note that the report said the wind data came from the onboard tactical display, so wasn't this information was available to the crew in real time? I also question how a change from a quartering tailwind to a crosswind condition, at these low wind speeds, is responsible for a 12 kt increase in airspeed in 25 seconds. Bottom line is that if the aircrews had known about the NOTAM visibility restrictions, they would have diverted to Tinker. A hard lesson but everyone lived to tell the tale.
@@demmertp 2 Months to repair? 👩🔧 any particular reason given?
NWS weather geek here- and like Mover says, opinions are mine:
We often see DoD sensors down with a long delay getting fixed. Several DoD radars have poor maintenance, and mainly due to how the electronic maintenance programs are run and the lack of dedicated trained techs. So I am not shocked on the sensor out for two months.
Also, we see partly the result of going 100% to automated observations. When I was an observer, if tower asked me to be on the ball because someone was trying get in or out under IFR, I did. Missing the basics will bite you in the ass, on occasion.
@@WxWaterFire10 years ago, nav aid school was almost a year long. Now it’s maybe 6 weeks, and you “learn the rest at your base”. AETC decimated training and quality.
@@WALTERBROADDUS typical bureaucratic red tape.. file a report, wait 2 weeks for that person to file a report and wait 2 more weeks for the next person to file a report. then multiple meetings about the cost to repair it. then file that report to schedule the maintenance.. 6 months later it's still not fixed. welcome to how the government operates. i deal with it ever friggin day at my job.. took us 3 years to get an additional forklift order request approved that we won't get until 2027. so their solution... spend 3k dollars a week on a rental until 2027.... yay for government common sense..
@@desertengineer1100%. At a base at my last office, the techs were nice folks, but none went to the WSR88D school the NWS runs. The OJT don't work on everything
I was on hot pit on that day and launched out 129, scary thing sitting out there in the fog and seeing 129 go by on the runway then hearing 3 distinct explosions. Glad to finally see this investigation concluded.
I'm curious was there anything you and the rest of the ground crew had to do after the mishap? Quarantined for debrief and drug test or anything of that sort?
My Dad and I were leaving our place heading east about 4 miles from the base and saw the fireball in the sky. It was crazy with the glow.
@@John-tx1wk I didn’t cause I didn’t personally work on the aircraft that day, although I know some folk that did, we went and safed 129 at the end of the runway while 85 was burning could just barely see the orange pluming over the fog
@@John-tx1wk In the report they indicate two maintenance personnel tested positive on the tox screen. Not causal, but OMG!
@@812MSS Add one mistake to the total.
I witnessed the B1 taking off at on Rwy 31 at 1630 into a fog back. They were below mins to takeoff. I was at the departure end of rwy 13 at the time. The visibility when they landed was about 100 feet. I am a retired Navy pilot with 700 hours in prowlers and 2200 hours in C9Bs. CAP worked with 28th BW to provide photos via drone and aircraft of the mishap area
I grew up in Rapid City. When I heard him say the visibility at the start of the vid, that was all I really needed to hear. This landing should never have been attempted. I don't know why people don't respect the weather more. Burn some fuel, head for Oklahoma. Those guys go to London for lunch sometimes.
Flight Training in USAF has been consistently subpar at the Aircraft Specialization level. Rocky is correct, syllabus deviations continue to be routine and have been for ~2 decades.
I remember repeatedly being told by an instructor to do X which was explicitly prohibited by CJCS regulations. As an O-5, he had rank and told me to do it or he'd mark it as an unsatisfactory flight. I did X as there was only a VERY minor actual risk at the time. 5 flights later I did the same thing under his tutelage and he wrote me up. That's not training. That's just flexing and being cruel. The students escalated it, but he retired before anything could be done about it.
Every student in the schoolhouse knew he was trouble and avoided him. We came up with our own checklist just to comply with his demands instead of focusing on learning.
Weight limit for ejection seat is 245lbs. MIP's weight at last medical check was 245. At hospital, after crash, MIP's weight was 260lbs.
Pencil Whipping. And bad/lazy leadership.
That's called an officer with a lack of integrity and a command not holding people accountable to height and weight standards. I'm surprised ole Porky could climb the crew ladder to get into the cockpit.
15 lbs of bandages
So you're telling me there's a chance I could be a B-1 pilot....
@@IT_GOON Love the humor, You're such an inappropriate mongrel just like me!!!
I was asked in a promotional interview what I felt the biggest problem in law enforcement. I said easy, it is complacency. That applies to everything. 99% of things that go wrong can easily be traced back to complacency. Every member of the board raised their eyebrows like a light went on. Fight complacency with high expectations and discipline, inspections, adherence to standards, and promote self responsibility and ensure your subordinates are properly trained you are taking big steps in fighting complacency which prevents mishaps.
Were you been promoted?
good
Absolutely!
When I was flying, day after day, I had to remind myself every now and then that I had to look at things with fresh eyes and try to envision what the consequences of each action or lack of action would be. It's something you have to prod yourself to do on a regular basis.
AIB reviews with mover is something I enjoy over his usual regular content. These are great segments!
WOW, scathing is right C.W. this report was after heads for sure. I appreciate how you go through this report and explain to us the verbage of what things mean and especially your opinion of what mistakes were probably made, just so many things lined up for such mishap to happen. Thank you again.
It is better to have figurative heads rolling than actual heads rolling.
I was stationed at Ellsworth in the early 90s when a B-1 crew botched a disengagement from a tanker and ripped a huge gash in the tanker fuselage with the tail of the B-1. Luckily, both damaged aircraft were able to safely land.
I was there when the aircraft taxied in front of the PRIDE hangar and then watched the KC-135 come in.
Lack of discipline, professionalism and basic airmanship. A clusterfuck of immense proportions!
I think it can be classified as a syndrome. Maybe the "nothing will happen" syndrome.
@@flagmichaelorrr the focus from the top is on making sure the proper political message training is being done and not operational readiness
The entire NOTAM system in general needs an overhaul, any 121 pilot will tell you when a briefing pack contains literally 70-100 pages and 90% of them are inconsequential NOTAMS that really just aren’t relevant to the flight it’s a problem. When you have 80 lines of “Non standard signage on TWY W4” mixed in with actual critical items such as ILS or ALS INOP it is not unheard of to miss things even WHEN you’re looking for them. I personally like color coding and symbology which reflects the type and pertinence of a particular NOTAM. Some AOC’s implement this in your EFB software but many don’t and it’s still just the dead see scrolls in black and white text
I issue certain NOTAMs and hate how complicated I have to make them sometimes. I've had times when a condition "requires" a NOTAM but I know it's not helpful or other occasions where doing it the "correct" way may result in three NOTAM but an "incorrect" way may result in one, much more comprehensible NOTAM. Then I have to make a call between the CYA FAA specified way or the actually useful course of action. It is ridiculous how opaque and inefficient NOTAMs are.
In the Army, I’ve scrubbed missions. I was a Crew Chief/Door Gunner. We were just out burning gas, and weather was coming in. I spoke out that I was uncomfortable because clouds were dropping and we would run the risk of having to fly IFR. Pilots immediately aborted the operations. There were no questions asked. We had a fantastic “all go or no go” safety policy.
I am a high time USAF pilot and participant in accident investigations to include serving on boards. I commend you for plowing through this lengthy findings document. I would only add two things. First your concerns about the Col. being mad could also be interpreted to be the General is mad. Accident Boards can be very political and sometimes don't report all the facts and distort events. Some reports that I have seen downplay equipment failures to blame crew members who are more easily replaced only to have to admit later that mx or design errors are present on succeeding accidents. Look at the Boeing fiascos.
Second, the report clearly shows the upgrading Mission pilot had a weak record which would make it mandatory for the Instructor (the pilot in command) to make the approach because of the clearly marginal weather conditions regardless of the actual situation being worse. Why the accident board did not ground the pilot in command is strange. In cases like this one has to check and see if the IP was married to the General's daughter.
At the rate these squadrons are deteriorating we won't have to worry about the B-1 being around much longer. I really don't think that the current pilots have any ability to fly on instruments or keep themselves out of trouble. (the IP should have been taking the aircraft around after the first negative deviation in airspeed) Been there, done that.
If Gen Lemay was here he would have immediately grounded the first crew who busted minimums and they would be sent to Shemya Island in the Aleutians as an example for the rest of the Wing. After all they are sup-post to be trusted with nuclear weapons and there is zero confidence in these crews, their leaders or their training or selection.
Agree with all of the above except I don't believe the B-1B is nuclear-weapon rated anymore... just conventional...
@@jamescraig4479believe or a fact?
@@Johnwashere-dt2ovit’s a fact. The Bone fleet has been denuclearized for a while now. All the necessary hardware- including wiring-was removed and destroyed.
@@cruisinguy6024 thank you
@@Johnwashere-dt2ov Fact!
I worry that they weren't flying enough. I was a C-5 pilot/examiner for years. Pilot monitoring must cross check VVI coming down final. I always told right seater to tell me immediately if my VVI exceeded 500-700 feet per minute from DA to touchdown. Lack of airmanship was the principle cause. Classic duck under going for the lights combined with poor airspeed control.
You should have been in SAC when they had 2 copilot crews in the KC-135's & you only got to touch the controls every 3rd or 4th flight. Still logging USELESS AC time but...experience time in a Jumpseat? I became more proficient in the Boom Pod than in the right seat. On the brighter side, American, Delta, Braniff I, II, III, America West, Alaska, & Southwest only looked at total time & Type Ratings. So, after 30+ years of flying I have >20,000+ flight time (more of that over an ocean asleep than most folks have driving to work) [maybe a slight exaggeration😊] & retired with Captain ratings ending with a
B -767/757, Cat II engine out, Cat III qualifications. Not bad for a 9 year old who's dream was to just fly any Cessna 150!!! 🫡
Definitely some changes since I was there. Say SOF in the Ellsworth tower. Your take on briefings is spot on even in the bomber world. Shame but the AIB lead is a good guy and I have flown with him in the past so, so trust his review of the incident.
just brutal. $450m aircraft. And exceeded the weight for ejection seat. Good read out CW
While this is a major loss it also isn’t. The B-1 is being phased out and less than half are still in service with only a few reserves kept on hand. If my count is right there’s now 44 airworthy out of the 100 B-1b airframes.
More common than you think regarding weight. It's been a minute but when I was on staff, there was an extensive study done regarding ejection seat weight limits and the picture wasn't pretty. That's not to say there was a large amount of overweight aircrew, there wasn't. However, there was a larger amount than expected. To my knowledge, no one was grounded across the CAF due to their weight...
When I was stationed at Hahn AB in the 80's I was a fire team leader and we saw an F-16 burst into flames from right behind the cockpit to the tail! It became transparent you could see the framework! The pilot cut the engine ejected, he was full AB braking when it ignited. The SOF was in a truck and met the pilot seconds after he landed on his feet and the SOF was slapping him on the back saying you did the right thing! I was with Security Police. In the cold war days.. I enjoy your reports, I subbed thank you sir.
Was stationed at Hahn too. That pilot was picked up as he was trying to walk back to his crashed/burning jet. The jet's TP Twenty Mike Mike was cooking off. Weather conditions were scary similar for that Hahn crash - low ceiling, freezing fog, etc. Luckily everyone in both events survived.
Good explanation of the report. Sounds like there needs to be some changes of leadership and retraining of the squadron. That swiss cheese model had a huge tunnel instead of holes! Glad they survived!
Ellsworth used to be a good base, they fell into a negative feedback loop with the leadership there unfortunately. All the good people left and all the bad people stayed, those bad people in turn eventually made any new people find ways out too. They didn't give a shit about all the experience and knowledge that was lost and there was a lot of corruption. My leadership there didn't even care to know when my last day was despite there being nobody to replace me.
On a personal level I'm glad they were so terrible to work with that they pushed me out of a job I loved in hindsight, worked out way better for me in the long run. I'm also relieved nobody was hurt but I know a lot of people from there are not surprised about the incident or the report.
That's exactly what I thought. This wasn't swiss cheese, this was a fishing net with more holes than solids! Every one of the crew was flaunting regulations, the base was flaunting regulations, and common sense was nowhere to be found. Add in an inexperienced pilot who has trouble landing in weather and I'm pleasantly surprised that the outcome wasn't much worse!
There are 2 variants to the Swiss-cheese model that I normally acknowledge.
One of them is the melty-cheese model, where the safety systems cause the failure (the cheese melts, dripping into the fondu pot of doom)
The other is the munchy-cheese model, where an adequate safety system exists, but people degrade it by eating the cheese (removing, disabling, or removing safety-measures).
This feels different...like a 'moldy cheese model' might be needed (the cheese is forgotten, turning into a ball of mold where disaster is inevitable)
@@Relkond That's about right.
Probably much more than just the squadron. Frankly, I think it goes all the way to the top. Leadership seems to have the wrong priorities.
Thank God they fixed the ejection seat systems. I know I wasn't in the cockpit, but damn yall, how many times have we seen airspeed decay on an approach which results in a crash. Quit the scan and this crap happens
Things like this are one reason Squadron commanders get relieved and it's always brought to the same reason: loss of confidence in ability to lead
I think the last AIB I read that was this harsh was the Fairchild B-52.
I was thinking the same thing. I was in AFROTC at UIdaho when the firings happened. Our Det Commander discussed it with us- I fully expect some heads to roll
You need to read the AIB for the C17 mishap up in Alaska. Just as bad as the B52.
Book: "Warnings Unheeded" Covers that crash and the Authors account of an active shooter incident he responded to as First responder as part of base security.
@@wacojones8062 That SP (now SF) was rather badass
Changing how NOTAM is presented should be the low hanging fruit to fix in the airforce, navy, and the FAA
Been waiting for this for years. Finally a couple years ago we got “CND/visual” NOTAMs. I was appalled when I was trained in issuing them. They have so many exceptions and limitations that I would rather deactivate that capability. There isn’t enough explanation to anyone reading the NOTAMs how the visual NOTAMs work and they can very easily provide confusing info.
This incident had significance to me because i spent my early childhood years at Ellsworth AFB when dad was a B-52 munitions technician. 81-85.
Scathing indeed! I totally feel the anger too. The report reads just like the sassy first drafts I write when I’m really pissed off.
Where to being....
I am a 63 years old airline captain. I fly mostly international routes. My normal crew is mainly three first officers, but occasionally, I get a captain or two depending on the availability of crew members, but as I said, mainly the crew consists of three first officers, and myself for a total of four pilots in my crew.
We follow the stabilized approach concept al the way until touchdown. Any crew member could call for a missed approach at any time, and immediately, it will be executed without questions, we just do it and ask questions later.
To be a military pilot or even a private E-1, it is expected that you will conform to military standards such as weight and discipline.
The check airman (instructor pilot in this story) was shamefully fat. He was complacent, and it is obvious to me that this pilot lacked the abilities to be a check airman/instructor pilot. The upgrading pilot was trying to become a captain of a B1-B bomber when it is obvious to any of us who routinely fly for a living that this pilot had no business being there. By the report, you know that she/he shouldn't have been there trying to upgrade to any position of command. By his or her actions, this pilot shouldn't be allowed to become a captain on a B-58 Baron, much less in a B1-B Lancer.
The other two support crew members were in this situation as useless as a freezer in the middle of the South Pole.
We civilians, airline pilots, do not have the option to "punch out" or eject as this pilots did. We have to fly the aircraft all the way until it stops and you walk away or die trying.
All four crew members should get fired from their jobs as it is obvious they are just there to collect a paycheck and nothing else. Their superior officers should get fired as well for their lack of supervision and for having a unit of below standard crew members who were irresponsible and unprofessional.
Lastly, I served in the US Army with the infantry. Our units were highly motivated, fit, and ready for anything destiny had for us.
As usual, good job reporting.
Sad part is I doubt that the Air Force is the only branch with these issues. I mean look at all the mechanical failures we've seen lately in every branch, it's like corners are being cut on maintenance like they're an airline.
Dude, they allowed a 260 lb commissioned officer to still be serving. Like I know the jokes about the chair force, but shit, THOSE are the standards for commissioned? Its a wonder why the enlisted can't stand most y'all. Combat ready my ass. It's just damn scary that this lack of discipline is all throughout our military.
The guy's been flying a bomber for 18 years and has 2000 hours? What the hell? Where's he been flying to, the corner 7-11? The lack of hours and training is very concerning.
I was a flt eng on the Herk for 6 years and got over 2000 hours. I'm betting a big part of the difference is the 130 has a reliability rating in the high 90s vs mid 20s for Bone.
Probably flying a desk 29 days, and a plane 1 in order to keep flight pay.
@@crazypetec-130fe7 KC-130 Nav. Sounds about right.
Military vs civilian flying yields vastly different experience levels over time. The military simply do not fly every day unless there's a war on.
@@wntu4 Agreed, but, 2000 hrs in 18 yrs isn't nearly enough.
As a civilian pilot, it’s always interesting to see military procedures and how bad airmanship doesn’t really care about your feelings. It would be interesting to glean some insight as to the pilots training history, checkride failures etc…..
As a former SARM, I was a little proud to see us mentioned. I always find these videos informational, and as a SARM I can easily identify what went wrong. 21 years of SARM, I always expressed to my troops why we have to be on top of our job so things like this wouldn't happen.
CW, for us uneducated want to be flyers (aviators), you have explained this that even I can understand it, even as a former jumper yes I know and heard all the jokes it’s good hear the the crew go out safety. The air force has lost someone (you) with a great deal of knowledge and experience I miss the “Make them tell me no” videos, as you are a mentor to the next up and coming generation of aviators. My military days are now have long pasted however I still look skywards when I visit Lakenheath (LN) with work and still brings a very warm feeling when I visit. Keep up the great work.
My military days are longer-past-ed then yours, since I got out in 1967.😁
Lack of discipline and repeated bad behavior seems to be a common occurrence in a lot of these mishaps
For all of time, yeah. Humans are the #1 cause of mishaps.
It seems to be getting worse though. Maritime infrastructure is showing similar "laziness" is the only way I can describe it. I'm not sure what is happening or what the cause of it is. I hate to use the trope but "wokeness"?
@@_droid No it's far bigger than that. America is being set up by treasonous elements in Washington to lose the next big war. Why? Because those traitorous elements hate your freedom, they hate the rights the constitution gives you and they want to destroy it all. And what's the only somewhat feasible way to remove the constitution? That's right, losing a war badly enough. Hence the encouraged laziness, incompetence and lack of standards.
@@_droid Nah. You can be "w-o-k-e" but still have standards of quality in training. A woman, black person, a gay person, etc. all can achieve the same level of quality safety standards and quality of flying as anyone else. History has taught us that dozens of times. The issue is the training standards, not the diverse makeup of the force. US armed forces have always been pretty diverse. That isn't the issue.
Crew was seriously behind the plane before takeoff and stayed that way to impact.
As a 30 year commercial pilot, I've never encountered "wind shear" in fog, nor have I ever heard of it or been trained for it. I call BS. Honestly, I'd like to know more about the flight crews knowledge, experience and abilities; however, we know we'll never obtain that.
In cold conditions convergence lines can cause this effects.
I hope you realize how misleading your statement is. Wind shear is a serious thing and it cannot be ruled out because there is fog and putting wind shear in quotes is really somewhat snarky. Having said that, the low experience present would raise the question if they would recognize wind shear indications if they encountered it.
@@xenia5101 It's almost never foggy when the wind is blowing, sir. Exceptions can be low visibility due to smoke while windy. or blowing snow. There are other exceptions, but spend some time getting less offended by people you disagree with on google forums and be open to differing perspectives. I train for wind shear annually, and experience it occasionally to some degree. I take it very seriously, and your inference otherwise is wrong...
@@stacyw8269 I still take issue, not offense, with your statement and find your expertise on weather science is overstated based on your remarks. Speaking of respect, where does B/S fall?
If you can supply any clarity from your annual training making an absolute statement on fog excluding wind shear we would all learn something but I doubt if you can do that since wind shear training is normally based on practicing recognition and escape in the simulator. Perhaps a better lesson would be to have you fly a few approaches in Alaska in the winter, especially the airfields in the Aleutian Chain.
Any Reeve Aleutian veterans out there like to comment?
@@xenia5101 I don't kindly take criticism from private pilots with little experience George. I've done plenty of operations in Alaska including Kenai from time to time. Have shot many approaches throughout Alaska in fact. Kenai is easy, Kodiak is not... Neither is Juneau or lots of others where I've contended with lots of ice and weather that changes by the minute. Why don't you try barking up a tree where your qualifications give you more license than aviation 101 private pilot speak. I mean, at least get an IFR rating before talking like an authority. I've forgotten more on this topic than you'll EVER know.
When I read how heavy the one dude was I said under my breath _"chonky"_
Thank you for your review of this report. I hope that it opens eyes. Procedures are written in blood. Disregard of these causes more blood.
Don't be a nerd, but follow the rules, they are (usually) there for a reason.
I take these things into my civilian life and attempt to transpose the learnings for the people I am responsible for.
My people understand that adherence to procedure hones their skills as professionals.
Being a "pro" makes people feel good about their jobs. Not encouraging your people to be pros, is a disservice to them.
I was an instructor navigator on EC-135 aircraft out of the 28th BMW at Ellsworth in the early 1970's. My first lesson to any new navigator assigned to the aircraft was that on the approach or in the traffic pattern, his ONLY job was to keep the two idiots in the front seats from killing the rest of the crew. Fortunately, I took my own advice. I'm still here, though we did have a couple of close calls over the years. The reason you have a crew on a crew aircraft is that one person can't do it all. If the crew works together, mistakes are caught and problems are prevented.
My first time watching your channel - not military nor a pilot. Even so, you were informative, interesting and understandable. I had almost no trouble following along... especially since you defined most of the acronym jargon. Thanks for doing such thorough work!
A frightfully expensive, irreplaceable destroyed by complacency and incompetence, our adversaries are taking note.
I wanted to just say in general, not specifically directed at this video, thank you CW Lemoine for sharing your experience with the rest of the world. Hearing and understanding the view point of someone with your experiences on specific topics, and in general, is invaluable history!
Was Maj. Kong trying to reach the weather ship at Tango Delta? They should have told him about the wind shear.....
Well boys, I had three engines out, had more holes in us than a horse trader's mule, the radio was gone and we were leaking fuel and if we was flying any lower why we'd need sleigh bells.
This happened at Ellsworth in the 80s. B1 landed short of runway 31. This is why McDonalds and the gas stations are no longer on the approach end of 31. They were made to move. After, they put a mobile PAR in place and all approaches had a PAR backup requirement for several years.
The pilot on that crash was a classmate of mine from The USAF Academy. I remember it well. As I recall, they were shooting a TACAN Approach to RW 31. Is that correct?
I worked at Ellsworth from 2001-2007 and they didn't move the McDonalds till after 2002 so after 21 years it was still there. Hard to order in the drive thru when a B1 was landing/taking off
@@brockkellem9724 It took a while for sure. I visited in 2008 and the approach end was completely different. That is also when they put the stoplight on the perimeter road (I hear it is now a gate). The switch for the stoplight was in the tower.
@@johnscherer5380 I believe so, yes. Been a couple days :)
Ahhh...the old "McVasis"....
In the past the Mentour Pilot channel has commented at length concerning civilian NOTAMs being a clogged mess. Are the NOTAMs used by the military created by the same people or using the same model? Since there seems to be a parallel.
I believe OPS GROUP's mission is to translate NOTAMs into a more understandable and useful form.
I enjoy everything on your channel, but these detailed breakdowns are definitely my favorite
Curtis LeMay is spinning in his grave at 5,000 rpm....😮
Curtis Lemay was a dangerous psycho who desobeyed his hierarchy more times than not. He got canned for a reason
and at low altitude!
Way more accidents in the 1960s than now, SAC was pushed to the limit in the 60s.
I was thinking of LeMay, too. 🙂. I don’t know enough about him to judge if that’s good or bad. They had more accidents then, but they had a lot more aircraft and flew a lot more, too. And lesser technology. Dropped a few nukes by accident, too, didn’t they? Luckily, it seems none of them went off.
As an AF enlisted retiree, I'm well aware that the USAF has been going downhill for a very long time.
Problems like this have always existed in parts of the system. People feel like it "gets worse" about practically everything.
But a lot of that is just the improvement in transparency and the honesty of reporting.
The system doesn't change. You just get promoted higher into it with age and experience so you notice it more.
go woke, go broke 🤷🏻♂️
@T33K3SS3LCH3N Yeah, like the two-tiered Ranger school once women were permitted to enter. Mate, your grasp on this is end about face.
Thanks for the knowledgeable explanation. Glad everyone survived. Unrelated suggestion: How about having your gaming buddy "Raymond" as a guest on The Mover & Gonky Show? I think he's also a pilot? He's funny, and I think he would have some hilarious comments on the aviation news of the week!
I’m a 121 guy who is former military but not a rated aviator.
Your spot on that in the end the reason this crash happens is a mind boggling lack of basic flying skills. This is Instrument flying 101 and the MP and crew utterly failed to do their jobs. I find it especially noteworthy that you have an IP flying with a pilot with a history of exactly the deficiencies that led to this crash who appears to be acting as an IP and therefor should be monitoring the approach closely. Especially since they are fully expecting an approach to near or at minimums. Despite those factors the IP apparently isn’t paying attention.
The report is scathing but I think reading through the text he justifies why the findings are so scathing. My impression is that as they interviewed people they found a culture that wasn’t just lax but willfully non compliant with stuff they didn’t feel like following. I think that culture is a big part of why the OSO/DSO were not monitoring and cross checking as they should have been and why the IP was so obviously deficient as well. Proper monitoring and cross checking would absolutely have prevented this accident and therefore I would tend to agree that the organizational culture stands shoulder to shoulder with the poor flying skills as a cause.
I think while you are right the final layer is the pilot. The fact is that in real terms you have a dozen or more failures that permitted the pilot to be in the position to make that failure.
The fact that they chose to continue to approach unstabilized, in below minimum and still disregarded comms discipline shows they had been allowed to be so lax for so long: to them this was not unique it was the norm
Thank you Mover for calling a spade a spade. At the end of the day, we had 4 airman ejecting and a wrecked airplane because the pilot flying failed to do the stick n rudder thing. It really is that simple.
Sounds like some people got re-assigned to flying a dishwasher.
I couldn't agree more with your statement that bad leadership will destroy a squadron. I too have seen it firsthand. A few weeks befre we deployed for a 6+-month WestPac tour in 1992, a new commanding officer was assigned to the squadron. Over the period of 6 months, the morale, combat efficiency, and effectiveness of a Marine Attack Squadron was destroyed. I used the analogy that our new CO was handed a loaded weapon and in just a few months he proceeded to render it completely inoperable.
its often said it takes many mistakes for something like this to happen. But in reality, i think there are always 2 or 3 mistakes being made and we are only 1 mistake away from finding out.
Swiss cheese model
Thank you for doing these Reviews. As a layman, I use your debriefs to understand failure in critical environments. The AIB and its content are always illustrative and detailed (read: clear and concise feedback). At 44:54 you state, "I'm going to disagree to an extent." Subsequently, you go on to state the pilot, basically, failed to fly the airplane. That, in my opinion, is accurate. However, prior to your statement, I wrote to myself: "Men are lax in holding other men to a standard. There is a systemic lack of accountability here, which points to a failure in leadership." In this instance, again, in my opinion, the leaders in the organization allowed the 'holes' in the swiss cheese model to get too big. The AIB was written for the NEXT leader of the organization. I think it's on point. Again, thanks for doing these videos. Now, I got to get back to work.
The movie Twelve O'clock High should be required watching for all who take command.
I went to HS in Ekalaka MT during the 90's. They used to fly over all the time. When the B1 crashed in the late 90's it actually crashed on my friends parents land. They watched it happen while working in the pasture. They said it was terrible, not sure how true it was. But there was an attempt to eject and the fireball enveloped them all. I memory serves me correctly the 2nd in command of Ellsworth was onboard at the time.
Yes, Col. Anthony Beat was 2nd in command and was a very likeable guy. Sorry, but there was no attempt to eject, I was at the breifing and had friends that went out to pick up the pieces.
"Put the thing on the thing." LOL, excellent review Mover. I learned a lot.
I'm just glad I don't have to go through this crap every time I crash in War Thunder.
Don't give Gaijin ideas though.
@@FirstDagger "Your account has been suspended pending crash investigation results."
After every GB, boot up "tank mechanic simulator" and fix your broken tank.
I was an enlisted man at Ellsworth in the early 1960,s. General Lemay was in charge of SAC at the time. He ran ORI,s Operational Rediness Inspections to keep Wing commanders sharp and ready for battle. My wife and I visited Ellsworth early November last year. While driving around the base I was struck by the number of big deer grazing in small groups near the runway area. Budget constraints by EPA and Washington may have reduced the Wing commanders priorities for training and required air crew hours. Beautiful base though.
Given the checklist culture in aviation - why are callouts not automatic just like checklists? Can't believe none of the 4 crew members spoke up about them - given they can be life saving under those conditions.
Former Army guy here. This really hits home for me how much smarter Air Force people are. This stuff sounds really hard.
Mover, have you considered uploading your content to any other platforms? Sorry for asking if you already do. I will be distancing myself from Google/UA-cam as much as possible and moving towards platforms that don't censor search results because it is an election year.
I left the Air Force in the late 70’s and can’t imagine how so many significant errors occurred on one flight. My last duty station was MacDill in Tampa,Fl which was a training base at the time. I saw a lot of crazy things watching newbie’s learning how to fly F-4’s but that was expected.Frontline experienced crews should be by the numbers, (especially in minimum weather conditions.) I’m sure somebody’s wing’s were clipped!
Mover, I do not believe the B-1 has an autopilot capable of landing. I was qualified as a 32672 Integrated Avionics Tech, primarily for the F-111 but the B-1 was part of our shred-out (along with F-15 and your beloved, not mine (🙂) Viper). Although we were about 8 years apart, The B-1A was a lessons learned design from the Vark with the variable wings systems, and our AP's were similar. IIRC, we had Heading holds, Alt. holds and Vel. holds with a combination set of modes. Not having ANY crew call-outs in the cockpit (and he had THREE sets of eyes!) was as bad as the 200 hour MP getting WAY behind the airplane. The IP's not paying attention to the CRM procedures may also be a facet of not managing his personal fitness, as well. As a retired Aircraft Production Superintendent, and a lover of both swing wing aircraft, it is a shame they lost that airframe with only about 40 or so left.
I'll bear these points in mind next time I fly my trust B-1B on the weekend.
Look up the report from the crash that killed Ron Brown back in the ‘90s.
My Wing CC was the board President for that one. It sounds very similar.
The NOTAM system is still based on the old strictures of the teletype system. Modern high bandwidth systems could allow plain language reports.
Because half of the FAA still uses teletype....
When we had fighters our SOF sat in a truck off the side of the runway. Was called Watchdog. Maybe it's cause we where a gaurd unit and it wasn't our tower.
What a loss of an expensive aircraft
What a STUPID loss of an expensive aircraft!
Were you a dedicated safety officer in either branch at one/some point? Or perhaps rotated through it? Is it even a rotation billet? You seem to have a very firm grasp of this material that suggests you, at one time, were a squadron safety officer. I could be wrong, of course.
I was a Safety Department Head in the Navy.
Can you do a video sometime discussing that role @@CWLemoine
Mentour Pilot agrees with your opinion regarding NOTAMS. He more or less claims that the clutter in civilian airport NOTAMS cause mishaps.
In the UK, which is remarkably compact compared to the US, I have long complained that our charts (which are predominantly electronic now) are so cluttered with overlays, notams, avoids etc that they are almost unusable, the important information being almost totally obscured by rubbish.
I agree, sure there were a lot of contributing factors but at the end of the day they had four sets of eyes in the cockpit and forgot to fly the plane.
I know they were heavy with the extra fuel and I don't know how long the runway was, but I would rather float down the runway and maybe have to do a go around rather than belly flop the damn thing short of the runway.
Thanks Mover. This was definitely a shot across the bow. I'm sure there are changes coming 💀
Curtis LeMay would have blown a gasket from the vaunted SAC era.
“Scathing” is so the right word for this. I was stunned at some of what I read over the weekend on this.
So, the initial A/C they were going to fly had a FCGM problem. So they stepped to the spare which immediately broke and needed the SCDU R2'd. Plus the MOSO's altimeter didn't read right and the MSDO's comm panel didn't work. B1s doing B1 things. Nice to see they haven't improved in reliability in 20+ years... 4 years at Dyess and never once saw one land code 1. I think crashing that jet just saved the taxpayer a bunch of money.
and the xyz didnt activate the lmnop
"What are you sinking about?" Best damn commercial ever. I still link it around.
Just wow. Sht happens but,...dang! That was an expensive flip.
So my question is, is this a career ender for the left seat? Grew up around Marine aviation. Saw a pilot run a TA-4 out of fuel 2 miles from El Toro. Dad said he will be flying a desk from now on!
I almost yelled out "fly the damn airplane!!!"
Fascinating. 'Never been to Ellsworth, but I do remember a lot of evening and overnight shifts from the tower cab & RAPCON perspective. I see some of my past experiences through this mishap report.& analysis. This accident might not of happened if PAR was still available...but I know, the USAF can't have PAR systems nowadays (too expensive & labor intensive) and then you add more chance of controller error (thinking of three F-16, Kunsan & Osan Air Base mishaps on or near the runways back in the 90's). 'More to say and questions to ponder, but my aviation support experiences are far away in an obsolete past, so I'll just shake my head & hope for the best upon my young, active duty brothers & sisters...fm
Where do you find these AIB reports? We lost a pilot in the Adriatic when I was in Aviano about 12 years ago. I retired before the report came out and I've always wanted to know what they determined actually happened.
Thank you mover!!! For us not in the military, it is a real view of the rules of a counter intuitive world.
I am surprised the MIP had only 2 flights in the last 60 days and the MP only 6. To be send up in that weather with those minimums (even at take off) seems ridiculous and extremely dangerous. How proficient can one be with those numbers?
I completely agree. No way I would have flown with that guy on that day.
After seeing the performance of the Secret Service on 13 July, i wondered if incompetence might be endemic in other parts of the executive branch, including the military...
" you don't want to be the fatty ".
I didn't know that the military accident reports refer to the accident airplane as the "MA" (for Mishap Aircraft) the crew as "MC" (for Mishap Crew) and the pilot as "MP" (for Mishap Pilot). Always learning something new.
If my man was at 260 lbs, he had lost discipline a long time before this mishap occurred.
Just because he was 260 doesn't mean he was fat.... he could be an absolute jacked mofo.... regardless tho the ejection seat doesn't care if it's 260 of fat or 260 of muscle... over weight is over weight.
Isn’t it time we talked about the ‘elephant’ in the room…..?
I've seen two guys at/over seat limits. One was fat, the other was a large bit very fit dude. (After he was grounded, leadership was like, this is dumb, but more cardio and less lifting, dude...)
@@EDCandLace This doesn't negate my point. Either way, he lost discipline long before the incident.
@@USAFraimius dude could be jacked af, and it doesn't change that being overweight impacts the effectiveness of the seat.
I grew up near Ellsworth AFB when there were much more tragic mishaps, classmates whose dads were gone just like that. I'm just thankful they all made it out with their lives, which is much more important than an airplane.
Anyone taking into account the height of the aircraft?? 100ft overcast. They need to add the height of the cockpit to the minimums. I don't know how high the B1 cockpit is from the ground but if it was 100ft the pilot would still be in the cloud. They need to measure minimums from the cockpit height not the ground....
Plus flying nose high so the pilot was way above the lowest part of his a/c.
Plus he was slow, so nose even higher, can’t help
It doesn’t matter. If you cannot see the required item(s) at minimum altitude you go around. It’s really quite simple, in concept at least……
Referring to 121, Southwest recently had 3 similar incidents. At least 2 of these involved a good stabilized visual approach to a highway short of the airport, but aligned with the runway.
Don't they do a BFT annually? How's a 160Ib guy passing ?
A very good informative video. Thank you very much. What is missing in this report IMO, is a clear identification of the underlaying causual bad precondition. The reason people get like this, is because something is wearing them out. That one thing that caused this mishap is so omnipresent, it should be identified. I don't think it's a somebody. You don't get that many slices of Swiss cheese to line up by accident.
I still can’t believe that the Air Force is allowing anyone to remain on duty, much less active flight status, at 260lbs. My maximum allowable weight for my height was 184lbs when I was in the USAF and I’m of average height for a male. I was an F-16 crew chief so I’m pretty familiar with the ACES II ejection seat and its maximum weight limit of 211lbs. This is not an arbitrary number. It’s there for a reason. I’m sorry that the IP was injured but 260lbs is inexcusable and obviously the reason for his injuries. You can’t cheat physics. They would have placed me on the wing commander’s fitness program (aka Fatboy program) long before I could ever have thought about getting that heavy. I have witnessed airmen both losing rank and being denied reenlistment for being overweight and not maintaining physical fitness standards. Is this no longer being practiced? I don’t know if this is the result of an overall decline in standards across the Air Force due to recruitment and retention shortfalls, or simply poor discipline and leadership within the wing at Ellsworth but the current fitness standards are completely unacceptable in this case. Times have apparently changed in the USAF during the last 15 years and not for the better it would seem.
keeping on weight standards was always a priority when I was in the AF. And not just for pilots. Even desk jockeys had to be under.
Fighters vs. bombers? I could imagine that being sharp might not get the same attention at some bomber squadrons.
The CO of my last ship was either 25 or 35% BF.
I can't remember because there was also a Chief (E7) who had the alternate number.
This was in the early 2000's.
@@skayt35 SAC was famously sharp and former SAC alumni I worked with thought the more casual TAC culture might not suit that mission. Curtis LeMay is famous for good reasons.
The retention issue is making it so a lot of rules get thoroughly bent.
I read this when it came out. The board president didn’t pull any punches. I plan to brief it at our unit’s next safety meeting.
The cultural stuff was the most interesting part. I think as you read it is also pretty clear those units are very undermanned and overburdened by queep, but of course that’s not explicitly pointed to as a causal factor.
Heads are definitely gonna roll from this one.
Even Mav, although USN, would have diverted.
But Mav and Sully can teach us that people today do not "know" the aircraft they are flying. That "knowledge" saved souls on Sully's flight.
Wow, Mover. Quite the report! Thank you for taking the time to break it down for us.