Note: We did originally feature the ‘stopping for tea’ scene from the film ‘A Bridge Too Far’, however, copyright issues meant we had to remove it, otherwise UA-cam wouldn’t allow the video to be published.
a problem with a lot of the well-known historical books is that they are not so much historical as journalistic. And that the authors to what journalists do most often: Repeat other journalists... And not what historians do: Look for original sources. Then you get what we have here: A whole slew of -otherwise well written- books that repeat each other and thus spread the inaccuracies at a faster pace than proper historians can correct them. That's why I'm so happy with channels like this one: They have wide reach and are dedicated to spreading the real histories.
Cornelius Ryan (author of A Bridge Too Far, 1974) was a newspaper journalist who wanted to tell the story through a series of personal accounts rather than as a historical account.
I beg to differ. I read Cornelius Ryan book. It clearly stated that it's British tanks that broke through the heavily defended German defensive barricade in the Southern side of the bridge, after Gen. Gavin's 82nd Airborne failure to secure the bridge but opted to capture the high ground. He wrote after after the Niijmagen bridge was secured 5 British rush into Arnhem but well secured German anti-tank defenses. 4 of the tanks immediately lit up since they're well exposed and unable to maneuver since the road is up a high dike. The last tank reverse back and call for Air-support to deal with the German artillery. The Air support didn't came because of fog. The british with the help of Dutch resistance went around West of the bridge where a small farming support road is passable. They reach the river West of Arnhem and met with the Polish Airborne that was still trying to cross the bridge 8n order to reinforce the British Airborne on the other side of River West of Arnhem, that are slowly being encircled by the Germans. The British XXX armour decided to act as artillery and linen their tanks by river bank and tried to bombard the German forces, in order to give the British Airborne some time. A lot of these things were not in the movie for some unknown reason. The British armor tried again to reach the bridge, now supported by Polish Airborne, by going by the road hugging the river and heading east towards the bridge. However, to was heavily defended by German anti-tank guns and large German panzers. I don't remember about the drinking tea thing. The only mention of British halting was after first disastrous first charge to Arnhem and them waiting for airsupprt that only came a day later and didn't even dent the Heavy German defense. By that time British moved on to the side road. All those are from the Movie which heavily diviate a lot from the book. (I.e. The umbrella guy in real life didn't. The guy that catched the airdrop packed with Beret didn't die too but only cried laughing for risking his life. General Browning was portrayed to be arrogant snob that dismisses any negative intelligence report. In real life he's a affable and rather caring person, well liked by staff, and in book showed he was deeply troubled by intelligence report of bigger German presence in Arnhem that he continually asks for more Airborne troops and gliders to fly them there. Actor Dirk Bogarde who plays General Browning on film, ironically was junior staff officer of General Browning during the war, and knew the man well. He was appalled at false portrayal of General Browning when he read the script and vainly asks the Director Richard Attenborough to lessen the negative aspects given to the Character) So many things are wrong. Best watch the British Movie/Documentary "Their is the Glory." A film made right after WWII about the Battle for Arnhem bridge. Most of the cast are the actual soldiers who were actually there during the battle. Far more accurate.
@@inisipisTV - Gavin did not 'opt' to capture the high ground - the 508th was to secure the high ground as their initial objective, but Gavin expected the 1st Battalion to go directly to the bridge as quickly as possible. Colonel Lindquist was not a good field officer and did not interpret his orders correctly, thinking he had to clear the drop zone and secure his other objectives before committing a large force to the bridge. By the time Gavin found out the battalion was not moving, it was too late and the Germans were moving SS units into the city and reinforcing the bridges. The German blocking line north of Nijmegen was at Ressen on a line constructed between the 'hedgehog' positions in the villages of Oosterhout-Ressen-Bemmel. It was nowhere near Arnhem and still south of Elst - the town about halfway between Nijmegen and Arnhem on the main road and rail line. The air support at this time did not work because of a failure of primary and spare RAF control radio sets - the planes were frustratingly overhead waiting for instructions, not grounded by fog. The Polish Brigade landing at Driel to the west of Arnhem made no attempts to reach the highway bridge. That was not their mission or the reason for landing there - it was to reinforce the British Airborne Divisional perimeter at Oosterbeek using the Driel-Heveadorp ferry, which had been scuttled by the Dutch ferryman shortly before the Poles arrived, fearing it would be captured by the Germans. The film did not include many of these details and the book does not go into the failure of Lindquist to follow Gavin's instruction. Browning dismissed the aerial photograph showing tanks near Arnhem on 12 September because he believed it showed obsolete panzer tanks that ruled out a 1944 panzer division, and this was finally verified when the photo was found in a Dutch archive in 2015 and the training unit the tanks belonged to identified and located near the 101st Airborne's drop zone on 17 September. Browning also wanted the airborne troops landed closer to their objectives and at a faster rate, but the double airlift on D-Day and the glider assaults on the main bridges were deleted by the USAAF air planners, and Gavin also discarded a suggestion to drop a battalion directly onto the northern approaches to the Nijmegen bridges. This is not in Cornelius Ryan's book, nor is the evolution of the MARKET plan from Browning's original operation COMET and his proposed operation SIXTEEN outline replacement upgrade. Dirk Bogarde served in the RAF attached to Dempsey's 2nd Army staff identifying bombing targets from (ironically) aerial photographs, and he did know the key players like Browning and Montgomery. He played Browning's character as well as he could, but could not mitigate the script, which deeply upset Browning's widow as being grossly unfair to her husband.
Exactly, since WW2 writers have copied the American Hollywood version of events which hid American lies, politics and the horrendous casualty figures US troops suffered. The reality was the Americans Commanders did not shine.
Writers like Anthony Beevor help to perpetuate this sort of divisive stuff. In his book about D-Day, he claims that the Americans and Canadians 'looked askance' at British soldiers brewing up on the beaches, rather than pushing on inland. Really? Didn't the Americans have enough problems on their own beaches to take notice of what the British were doing? There is also wartime camera footage of Canadian soldiers on their landing beach, with a caption saying 'French-speaking Canadian soldiers chat to local people on the beach, as they brew-up'. My father was with the Guards Armoured Division and felt deeply offended by these allegations, in view of the bitter fighting and heavy casualties they suffered, and vehemently denied that any such delay happened.
My dad said the movie was not historically accurate. His uncle was there in the 504. He said the general in charge didn't take the bridge according to schedule because he was afraid of an attack from the Germans on his flank. Then they took one bridge but not the main one. He said the British lost some tanks doing that and were stuck on the other side divided by Germans infiltrating between them. They would not have held the bridgehead without the tanks that got through. British tanks had tea makers built into the tank. It would be hard to take them out and set them up outside. There was still fighting going on in town behind them holding up reinforcements. There was no way to go forward till they got through. That took another day.
British tanks didn't have BVs (boiling vessels) until very late in the war, when the Centurion was introduced. But any significant stop allows a brew to go on - British soldiers have this down to a fine art and have done so for a very long time. (I speak from personal experience...)
before 1st AB got 740 men to the north end of the last intact bridge in Arnhem area, the 82nd had captured the bridge north of Grave (longest road bridge in Europe at that time), the last intact bridge over the Maas Waal canal and the Heights for Brownings' useless HQ brought in by 38 of 1st AB's gliders (capacity 1,000 infantrymen)
@@nickdanger3802 'before 1st AB got 740 men to the north end of the last intact bridge in Arnhem area, the 82nd had captured the bridge north of Grave (longest road bridge in Europe at that time), the last intact bridge over the Maas Waal canal and the Heights for Brownings' useless HQ brought in by 38 of 1st AB's gliders (capacity 1,000 infantrymen)' Your words And US General Brereton's FAAA landed those US troops a hell of a lot closer to those targets than they did for British troops at Anhem. And what was the strength of the opposition at Grave, the Maas Waal canal, and at the Groesbeek heights?.. Shall we check? The Groesbeek Heights were a target for US forces regardless of whether Browning's HQ brought was to be landed there. Oh, and those gliders for Browning's HQ were taken for the aircraft allocation for 1st Airborne, not the aircraft allocation for US forces. Do try to get at least one thing right.
@@thevillaaston7811they did in late 1945, with the introduction of Centurion and every British tank since then has had a boiling vessel. They were such a good idea that now every US Army tank and infantry fighting vehicle has one as well.
5 British tanks had already rushed forward to the German positions resulting in 4 getting knocked out because they had to stay on the road where they were silhouetted against the sky and made easy targets, THAT'S why the rest were told to stay where they were until air support could deal with the German defenses. The enemy always gets a vote in whether or not your plan will work, knowing that Montgomery never should have tried such a bombastic plan with so many moving pieces any one of which going wrong would scuttle the whole thing, the weak link was expecting the armor units to keep their schedule, every time they met enemy resistance they were stuck because when they got off the road they were in swampy soil where tanks bog down making it easy for the Germans to slow their advance. There was simply too many things that could go wrong, and did, WW2 was the first time airborne troops were used in combat, commanders didn't understand their limitations, plus you'd think after D-Day they'd have understood that relying on air drops to go the way you want just isn't going to happen. Everyone got in too much of a hurry to "end the war by Christmas" and it wound up biting them in their rear ends. Eisenhower didn't like Market Garden and should have fought harder to stop it, so that much is on him, Montgomery should have known that the armor units couldn't have kept a schedule like that, so that's on him, and EVERYONE should have known better than to have "go-ittis" and try ending the war by Christmas, it's the same thing that caused so many disasters in history like the Challenger tragedy in January of 86, the engineers that worked for the company that built the solid rocket motors for the Challenger repeadly warned NASA about trying to launch in temperatures that cold, but NASA had go-ittis and we all saw how that worked out.
@@dukecraig2402 " Montgomery should have known that amor units couldn't have kept a schedule like that. so that's on him". XXX corp arrived at Nijmegen slightly ahead of schedule, despite the bridge at son being blown up the 101st face, the fact the operation failed wasn't due to enemy action so much as the incompetence of the 82nd not taking the bridge on arrival when all they faced was a couple of dozen "belly ache' troops guarding it. All this "they stopped for tea" BS was the 82nd trying to shift the blame to XXX corp.
@garryreeve824 All this tea nonsense is only from a movie, not real life. And you really need to learn about who had what orders at Nijmegen and what they were really instructed to do instead of all this belly aching that comes from nonsense videos about what the 82nd Airborne did there.
@@dukecraig2402 Oh I've read pretty much everything I can find regarding Market Garden, yes I'm that old, my father was with British 1st airborne (one of the lucky ones who got out). Gavin ,in his auto biography, says before they jumped he gave Lindquist a direct order to take and hold the road bridge upon landing. "All this tea nonsense" isn't only from a movie, it is in a number of books on Market Garden, including Ryan's A Bridge Too Far. Montgomerys plan was a feasible plan, where it fell down was the way it was implemented such as dropping 1st airborne so far from their objective, not making a second drop on the first day, the shit show of setting up their radios wrong, 'Boy' Browning using vital air transport just so he could drop on Gavin's position. Please feel free to enlighten me with some sources on your nonsense.
From John Frost's book;"A Drop Too Many" *"We had been given to understand that the key Nijmegen Bridge had been captured by the Guards Armoured Division, and the saga of the river crossing by the U.S. 82nd Airborne in daylight against most formidable opposition was left untold"* (51 killed 136 wounded) When speaking of Patton's 3rd Army, Frost said "All ranks of this Army, when they saw our red berets, would say: *'Arnhem. Aye. We'd have gotten through. Yes, sir. We'd have gotten through. I could not help believing that they would have. There was nothing slow or ponderous about them and they didn't stop for tea or the night for that matter."* *Arnhem.Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945. By Lloyd Clark, page 333.Tom Hoare,* who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes: *'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’* *Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings, p.50 Jack Reynolds and his unit, the South Staffords,* were locked into the long, messy, bloody battle. There was no continuous front, no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. *That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed.* *Armageddon:The Battle for Germany, by Max Hastings* - Bob Peatling was keeping a diary, to relieve the dreadful boredom. “I am getting fed up with hearing German voices,” he wrote. "There is no noise of any firing whatever. I can’t make it out. Field-Marshal *Montgomery has dropped a clanger at Arnhem* *Maj. Freddie Hennessy* the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, *and we only have to miss one to be in trouble.”*
I have for long wondered if the bluster of many of the US forces involved was merely a cover for the unforgiveable fact that the 82nd had not taken the bridge at both ends the moment they landed. It was the reason they were dropped into Nijmegen and had the first companies landed taken the bridge they would have found it defended by a couple of dozen Germans only. They did everything except take the bridge including charging around the hills and forest looking for a thousand non-existent German tanks!. XXX Corps arrived in Nijmegen within the parameters set expecting to be able to cross the bridge unopposed and in great numbers as was the plan. The failure of the US airborne to take and hold that bridge was incompetence or maybe worse (but that would be getting into the realms of conspiracy theorism and I really do not wish to indulge in that no matter how strong the evidence to support that concern may be) There has always been the stench of something fishy about Gavin and his actions and why there was no immediate enquiry with the culprit(s) being put under the strongest of scrutiny from a mlitary court. Had a British or Polish unit been reponsible for that level of incompetence and it was US forces being slaughtered as a result of it, how different might the allied reaction to the dereliction of duty have been - instantly! Would the British or Polish commander have been cashiered or left to continue his command with no detriment to himself?
Most of the fault lies with Colonel Lindquist of the 508th, who was charged with taking the bridge with his 1st Battalion as soon as possible. LIndquist only sent a reinforeced platoon recon patrol to the bridge and most of them got lost, separated from the three leading scouts fom the battalion S-2 (Intel) Section, who reached the brudge, took seven prisoners at the southern end and waited about an hour until dark for reinforcements that never arrived before deciding to withdraw. They could hear "heavy equipment" arriving at the other end as they were leaving, so these were the first elements of SS panzer troops arriving in the city. Gavin was quite open about Lindquist, and perhaps his own mistakes, in his 1967 interview with Cornelius Ryan for A Bridge Too Far: _Gavin and Lindquist had been together in Sicily[?] and Normandy and neither Gavin nor Ridgway, the old commander of the 82nd, trusted him in a fight._ _He did not have a “killer instinct.” In Gavin’s words, “He wouldn’t go for the juggler [jugular].” As an administrative officer he was excellent; his troopers were sharp and snappy and, according to Gavin, “Made great palace guards after the war.”_ _Gavin confirms he ordered Lindquist to commit a battalion to the capture of the Nijmegen bridge before the jump. He also confirms he told Lindquist not to go to the bridge by way of the town but to approach it along some mud flats to the east._ _When Gavin learned that Lindquist’s troops were pinned down within a few hundred yards of the bridge on the night of the 17th, he asked him if he had sent them into town by way of the flats. Lindquist said that he had not; that a member of the Dutch underground had come along and offered to lead the men in through the city and that he “thought this would be all right.”_ _It’s interesting to note that Gavin was without an assistant division commander throughout the war. Ridgway refused to promote Lindquist to brigadier and, since Lindquist was senior colonel in the division, was reluctant to jump Tucker, Billingslea or Eckman over him._ _The British wanted him, he said, to drop a battalion on the northern end of the bridge and take it by coup de main. Gavin toyed with the idea and then discarded it because of his experience in Sicily. There, his units had been scattered and he found himself commanding four or five men on the first day. For days afterward, the division was completely disorganized._ _Instead, and in effect, Gavin decided to operated [sic] out of what he described as a "power center"; broadly, a strong, centralized circle of power from which he could move in strength upon his objectives. That power center was located, for the most part, in the Groesbeek heights area._ (box 101, folder 10: James Maurice Gavin, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University) So Gavin was at fault for assigning his least aggressive and experienced regiment to the critical Nijmegen mission, but it seems that he thought giving Lindquist an instruction to send a battalion directly to the bridge and showing him on a map the exact route he wanted the 1st Battalion to take would be enough. He was clearly very angry when he found out thishad not been done: _Captain Chet Graham, the regimental liaison officer with division headquarters, decided to obtain a status of the progress toward the capture of the Nijmegen highway bridge. "I went to the 508th regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, 'As soon as the DZ is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.' So I went through Indian country to the division CP and relayed Lindquist's message to Gavin. I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his Jeep, he told me, 'come with me - let's get him moving.' On arriving at the 508th regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, 'I told you to move with speed.' "_ _At about 8:00 P.M., Colonel Lindquist ordered Lieutenant Colonel Warren, the commander of the 1st Battalion, to seize the Nijmegen highway bridge. It was an order that Warren wasn’t expecting. “This was the first time the battalion was told it was to secure this bridge. By the time the battalion minus [Company C, one section of 81mm mortars, and one section of machine guns] was assembled from its rather wide defensive positions, it was well after dark.”_ (Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke 2012) Also in the Cornelius Ryan Collection is the answer to the mystery of the tanks in the Reichswald. Gavin sent Ryan some papers by Dutch researcher TA Boeree, who had tracked the route of the Hohenstufen Division's withdrawal from Belgium and into the Netherlands, crossing the Maas at Maastricht on 4 September, concentrating near Sittard, and then on 8 September ordered north to Arnhem and the Veluwe region for refitting. Its route went through Nijmegen and apparently made a stop in the Reichswald. When Gavin was assigned Nijmegen for MARKET he went over to the 1st Airborne HQ to see their intel and plans, because they were to drop there for COMET and he saw the reports. Gavin only now realised in his 1966 covering letter to Ryan the armour was the Hohenstaufen in transit. It's in box 101, folder 09, page 48 for the cover letter.
I read something about Montgomery a year or so ago that has stuck with me. After the war he told an interviewer that at this point the British government told him they could supply replacement soldiers for three months. After that, they would have to start breaking up existing regiments and parceling the men out. Americans will criticize Monty for being a set piece chess player while Patton was a high risk poker player. But Britain had be doing it since 1939. I give Monty the benefit of the doubt.
Patton was a US media creation. He was average at best, achieving zero of note. Market Garden was an FAAA operation, led by USAAF General Brereton, using elements of Dempsey's Second Army as the ground element.
Thing is, Patton made cautious decisions in the Lorraine, to the detriment of his own army. A post war official US Army history of the Lorraine criticised Patton for his caution and fighting with his army dispersed instead of concentrated. German general Hermann Balck also said the cautious and hesitating American 3rd Army command helped his situation a great deal and he was able to resist for a long time.
@@lyndoncmp5751 Like the time he attacked a POW camp ( Not sanctioned ) to rescue his son in law ? 300 men went 35 returned. All tanks and equipment lost. Yes very cautious indeed.
I like the comment from actual soldiers in Band of Brothers about "blood & guts" Patton. It was their blood & guts he sacrificed..not his own. As for Monty..one look at US made Battle of the Bulge sums up US WW2 historical accuracy. For a true account from US & even German officers involved..one should read Charles Whiting's Battle of the Bulge Britains Untold Story. This true account shows how Monty took charge and stopped the German advance with US, British and Canadian forces. The US top command were so embarrassed..as they had been in the rear having Xmas lunch with their mistresses..that they threatened to resign. This forced Churchill to wind Monty back in. The lies the US told about Monty in WW2 is a travesty....alongside this "taking tea" B/S to cover up US failure.
@@watkinsrory Yes there is that, but I was talking about his cautious Lorraine campaign September to December 1944. Over 3 months, 52,000 battle casualties (and another 40,000 non battle casualties) and barely 50 miles of ground taken. Probably the most costly allied failure of autumn 1944.
A contributing factor to the growth of this myth was the World At War TV series which in 1974 provided an opportunity for the likes of Gavin and Stephen Ambrose to put forward their views of Operation Market Garden. Given the 1st Airborne's communication problems, its very hard to believe the 82nd Airborne staff knew exactly what the situation was in Arnhem itself and its particularly unlikely any information about British paratroopers 'hanging on by their fingernails' had made its way down to company level. Despite their post war claims, the primary concern of Reuben Tucker - and certainly a 504th captain - at the time would quite rightly have been the problems facing their own men. My father vividly remembered being stuck outside Nijmegen with the Guards Armoured when German troops cut the road ahead and behind them, preventing ammunition and reinforcements getting through to the city and making it impossible to supply an advance to Arnhem. He certainly had no knowledge at all of what was happening to the 1st Airborne.
Exactly. My uncle served in the Grenadier Guards in a Sherman tank. He did not speak so much about the war but one sense I got was that he only really knew what was going on in his own tank and maybe the others in his troop. Beyond that, it was simply a case of doing his job, not letting his mates down and trying to stay alive. The idea that junior commanders such as Captain Peter Carrington would have the strategic appreciation to order unsupported piecemeal advances with zero logistics support towards distant objectives to “save” another division seems totally fanciful. It’s the sort of plot right out of those 1970s war films where nobody ever runs out of ammunition or fuel and never needs to be resupplied or ever requires their tanks to be repaired.
Another myth allowed to be perpetuated by olivier on the world of war series is the closing of the malaise gap. The yank spokesmans critucal comment was allowed to be immortalised without redress. Montgomerys american opposite general Bradley said himself the problem was the problem friendly fire Incidents. He sent american troops off into relative open countryside in the direction of Paris which could have helped close the gap. I'm not saying it's another general clark type move on rome😊.
Thank you for this. My grandparents lived in Lent almost next to the church. My grandfather always told about this battle and maintained that the first allied soldiers he saw were British tankers and not American paratroopers which I always thought was strange as I always had thought the 504st of the 82nd airborne were the first ones there. His house was completely destroyed in the fighting after market garden and my mom was born in the garden shed in the beginning of 1946.
A Dutch historian has recently published a book claiming that it wasn’t the British fault Market Garden failed but was due to the Americans at Nijmegen. Their failure to capture the bridge on day one and their pre-occupation with securing the nearby drop sites led the Germans to reinforce the defences. It then took the famous boat crossing of the river to secure the bridge. The Arnhem bridge was a fiasco but they could have got away with more troops and maybe, just maybe, have secured the bridge.
even with their river crossing, the 504PIR from 82nd AB never did capture the road bridge at Nijmegen. They DID capture the rail bridge, but the road bridge was captured by the tanks for the Grenadier Guards, led by Sgt Robinson.
@@TomThumb-d1r I think he was an excellent Commander in general, but he just fecked up here, or communication with his 508th PIR Colonel Lindquist failed. No doubt, the 82nd and 101st AB Divisions (just like their British counterparts) were superb fighting units.
Best analytical book on MG is by Swedish author Christer Bergstrom - the second volume - and it holds no punches as to where the primary responsibility for its failure should lie.
I worked with a XXX Corps veteran in the early 1980s. I asked him if he had seen 'A Bridge Too Far'. He was furious about the film as he said that they turned up at the bridge expecting it to be open for them to advance and found the 82nd hadn't done this. As he put it 'they were the ones sitting around doing nothing - but they were drinking coffee not tea!'
@@nickdanger3802 ...and do you know *why* (according to Cornelius Ryan) Joe Vandeleur had time to drink champagne in the first place? Because it was Day 3/4 of the Operation, and Guards Armoured was stuck waiting around on the southern side of the Waal while Corps command was busy formulating a plan to make good Gavin's failure to take the bridge on Day 1!
@@skibbideeskitch9894 according to Beevor he also had a swim while he waited for hours for a tac air mission he had called. any tac air missions called on Nijmegen ?
The British tanks completed the crossing at 1830 hours not 1900 hours, its in divisional 82nd US and several official British war office records. The first attempt was made at 1813 hours, and the second attempt at 1820 hours. There is some confusion as to which time zone various people were quoting (they were an hour apart), but the 82nd Divisional post-battle records actually includes a sketch that shows the British tanks completed the crossing at 1830 hours, and the first US troops at the bridge were just a handful at 1915 hours. The US troops then arrived in some larger force there at 1938 hours. US 82nd Division Captain Kappell (who was responsible for writing the post battle report), stated that at 1830 hours ........"at this time British tanks were already on the north shore". Carrington claimed that crossing the bridge under the risk of detonation was the longest three minutes of his life' so at full speed at 30mph they did not hang around on it. Otherwise, it is an excellent analysis, much of which I have been researching over some years, looking at the same documents you examine. So congratulations on an otherwise excellent piece of work. You will still get the usual detractors trying to lay blame at 30 Corps though (I can actually name two of the most likely detractors), a refusal to accept that any blame lays elsewhere despite the presentation of facts. I think the US commanders were subsequently trying to make up for their inaction since arriving on 17th September, and failing to take the Nijmegen road-bridge that same day. The Grenadier Guards and US 505th PIR actually did most of the work, clearing the Germans out of the town and taking the crucial southern end of the bridge. The 504th PIR were absolutely heroic but they were on their last legs and running out of ammunition on the northern shore, but despite what Burriss subsequently claimed, they were nearly a mile away from the main bridge. His arrival actually coincided with the second troop of tanks forty-five minutes later, when things were much quieter, as Burris himself acknowledges. The 4 British tanks that actually took the bridge were fired upon all the way across, under heavy fire with two tanks taken out. A totally different scenario to what Burriss described. Maybe he did believe he was the first to arrive, but actually I very much doubt it. Sadly, I think it was simply part of a concerted campaign to shove the blame onto 30 Corps. But they have been found out! Furthermore, on the evening of the 20th, most of 30 Corps were either back along the line resecuring route 69 in 101st Division's sector or in the case of the Coldstream and Welsh Guards helping out the American 82nd on their rear Nijmegen perimeter. And for anyone (like Burriss) trying to say there was just a single heavy gun between Nijmegen and Arnhem that night, guess what, this is another myth, as you rightly highlight. Within 2-3 miles were situated up to 24 heavy guns that night, though several may have been taken out that morning in RAF raids, though the vast majority were still active. Most of these were not 88 mm guns but captured French 75mm guns which had a very similar profile to the famous German gun. It is increasingly becoming perfectly clear that there has been a lot of embellishment on behalf of certain US troops - 30 Corps were actually at Nijmegen in 42 hours and well under two days, from the time of 1400 hours on the 17th September that 1st Allied Airborne Army Commander permitted ground forces to move - mud sticks etc but it is disgusting.
Thank you for putting the record straight, even in a Play Station-3 war game they actually laugh at how slow the British was at reaching tha Falais gap, what they failed to say was the British & Canadians took on 10-devitions of the cream off the Germans panzer deviation, sorry about my spelling, & the Americans had to face just 1
It would not even be an issue if the American commanders had obeyed orders and gone straight for the bridge instead of wasting time securing their eastern flank against a non-existent threat. Unfortunately a repeat of Freyburg's mistake on Crete.
Most excellent presentation of reality. Burriss even claimed there was "whole Corps of tanks" there that just sat and did nothing. Only 5 tanks got across that night, and 2 of those were damaged. The rest of the Corps tanks were split up and dispersed over 20 miles supporting the 82nd Airborne here there and everywhere.
@@rhannay39 how many bridges captured (that means both ends) by 1st AB ? "securing their eastern flank against a non-existent threat" British AO, British intel
Many years ago i was visiting my grand parents house with my father in Great Wakering , Essex. ( probably mid 70s ) As we walked up to the house a large bear of a man on a bike called out to my father. I was then introduced to ( Sgt ) Peter Robinson a lovely old guy. Later on my father explained about his escapades in Nijmegen etc which i googled years later. As a young boy this was so exciting. Peter and my grand father were very good friends and he recalled an incident that happened after the war . My father , grand father and Peter were going fishing up towards Wakering Creek . They were in an old car with my grand father driving. As they got towards the creek there was a German Prisoner of War camp nearby. As the war had ended they were allowed to work on the land. However Peter spotted two of the Germans walking arm in arm with some local girls. My father remembered that Peter went absolutely mad at this having seen his friends and comrades killed in action and tried to get out of the moving car to attack the Germans with his bare hands. My grand father who realized that Peter would seriously hurt the Germans ( or worse ), accelerated and had to physically fight him off from trying to stop the car .Luckily for them he managed to get away.
The vid omits that no US troops were on the bridge when taken by the tanks. Once the two leading tanks of Pacey and Robinson got past the bridge obstacles at the northern end, Pacey stopped expecting to see American troops. The War Office report states: _“At this point, Pacey stopped, he was not sure where to go as no Americans were seen, so Sergeant Robinson passed him and led on. Much to their surprise, they could not see any Americans so having passed through the concrete chicane they pushed on._
@@lyndoncmp5751 Correct. The second wave of tanks 45 mins later at 1915hr, inc Carington's lone tank, met the just arrived 82nd men at the riverbank, about 15 of them. One was killed by a German sniper in the bridge girders. At 1938hr the 82nd men arrived in greater force at the riverbank. The tanks went over in three waves. 1st was four tanks (two hit), 45 minutes later the 2nd wave, which was one tank, 3rd wave soon after was three. The last three are questionable as they could have been armoured cars.
Right!? And just how did the British tanks clear the bridge head on the Nijmegen end of the bridge ? They didn't it was the 82nd that the bridge so they could cross.
@@grayharker6271There were Germans on the north end of the bridge when the tanks crossed and engaged them. That's how the tanks got battle damage. The 82nd didn't clear the end of the bridge. The 82nd was a kilometre to the north at the railway viaduct in Lent.
@@lyndoncmp5751 Two of the four tanks running over the bridge were hit because the 82nd never cleared the north end of the bridge. No 82nd men were on the bridge when the tanks went over. They even stopped to look around for 82nd men, seeing none.
U.S. 82nd Division records state that the first troop of British tanks, four of them, crossed the Waal road bridge at *1830 hours.* Two tanks were hit with the crews taken POW bar one, Sgt Knight. The tanks charged across at full speed approaching 30 mph firing against German guns all the way, with a few hundred high in the girders. Gunner Leslie Johnson in the lead tank said: _“They were falling like nine-pins. The incoming fire was so heavy that I swear to this day that Jesus Christ rode on the front of our tank. The Germans were so close that I didn’t bother to look through my sights. We could feel the tracks going over them as we shot them down, and there was blood and gore all over the tank.”_ Once the two leading tanks of Pacey and Robinson got past the bridge obstacles at the northern end, Pacey stopped. The War Office report states: _“At this point, Pacey stopped, he was not sure where to go as no Americans were seen, so Sergeant Robinson passed him and led on. Much to their surprise, they could not see any Americans so having passed through the concrete chicane they pushed on. Having crossed the road bridge, the four tanks moved down the northern embankment, where they destroyed another anti tank gun. Robinson and Pacey found themselves in a running battle against more guns, and against German infantry who poured out of the church in Lent, and then 1,500 yards further down the road from the bridge, where the main road goes under the railway line, contact was at last made with some Americans, both were very happy to see each other."_ The 82nd men at Lent reached Lent following the railway embankment from the riverbank using it for cover. The first American troops that arrived at the bridge approaches/waterside after moving along the riverbank from their river landing point with Burriss’ company of about sixteen men, was at *1915* hours. *45 minutes.* after the first tanks had already crossed. This was not the main bridge span, just the raised approach road over land. Official U.S. records confirm that 82nd troops from the 504th arrived at the northern road bridge approaches at *1938 hours.* This would be the time they arrived in any real strength to consolidate, *one hour 8 mins* after the first tank crossed. The records state at *1938 hours:* _“All seemed quiet at this point, with the enemy disorganised and in great confusion, suffering heavy losses. Prior to the physical occupation of the northern end of the bridge by 504th PIR, eight British light tanks had [already] crossed. Two of these were destroyed just north of the bridge”._ The second troop of tanks crossed at least half an hour after the first. Burris was there under the approach road when the second troop rolled over, thinking they were the first tanks over. Lord Carington's tank was one of them. Eight rolled over the bridge, with two hit, being there to consolidate the bridgehead and ensure the Germans did not take the bridge back. Horrock of XXX Corps in his plan had the 43 Wessex infantry to seize the ground from Nijmegen bridge to Arnhem, destroying anti-tank weapons. It was not tank country. The tanks were to follow behind the infantry. The tanks would have been sitting ducks if they went first. The 43rd Wessex were to do the river crossing in two columns. There was a contingency planned if the bridge was blown. The Wessex were to use dedicated assault boats, which they had in Nijmegen, and DUKW amphibious craft. But to save face as they failed to seize the bridge, Gavin of the 82nd pestered Horrocks for his men to do the crossing, Horrocks agreed. It appears that the 82nd did not know of the DUKW amphibious craft using collapsible bridge engineers boats to cross the Waal. Or the Wessex did not want to give them fearing the valuable craft would be lost with an 82nd river assault failure - that needs more research. Not one 82nd man was on the bridge when the first troop of four tanks crossed at *1830,* or at *1915* when the second troop of four went over. Official XXX Corps records from the War Office highlight that the successful tank attack on the road bridge was at *1830 hours.* Thirty-four machine guns, an 88mm gun, and two 20mm cannons were found to be on the road bridge itself, and at least six anti-tank guns and a few 88mm guns were situated around the northern end. All this nonsense of drinking tea by the British tankers disinterested in the battle seems to have started as an American diversion, after inquiries by the Official US historian Charles MacDonald into why the Nijmegen bridges were not taken on the first day.
Charles MacDonald very casually discards it as even being an issue, saying that there was "no incentive for urgency over taking the Nijmegen Bridge as XXX Corps were yet in Eindhoven" - when XXX Corps were already at the Zon. The official history and subsequent memoirs have been vehicles to try and repair a few reputations and shift blame to others.
@@johnburns4017 in the US Official History. The additional quote from Macdonald's is "According to this theory, General Gavin had another full day to tackle the Germans at Nijmegen" - pretty sure same source, although it might be Time for Trumpets as I'm reading off my own notes for that one. Did strike me as a pretty casual dismissal.
This is a very informative video. I live just a few hundred meters from the bridge. The story from the Americans crossing the river is well know in town, since a new bridge has been build where they crossed the river. And every night a veteran follows the light that turn on one after the other to honor the fallen Americans during the crossing. The story of the tanks pressing on to the north of Lent while the Germans were still in Lent and Nijmegen. Is also very impressive. We in Nijmegen should do more to honor those also. Glad to know how it went, will tell kids and friends about. When this situations arises.
So the Americans lied again! I saw a TV documentary on the crossing of the Waal at Nijmegen and it featured one of the American commanders who crossed the river at this point in flimsy boats. The Americans certainly suffered greatly in getting across the river and lost a lot of troops. One can only admire the courage and the sheer grit of the American soldiers. But the American commander in that TV programme certainly blamed Carrington - and even named him - for failing to take out the anti-tank gun at Lent. Btw: he said that there was only one a/t gun, not two as in this video. So I doubt his word. This is the second time that I have read of a cocky Yank supposedly putting his gun against the head of a supposedly cowardly member of the British armed forces. The first was in one of the books by Stephen Ambrose. He wrote that an American officer put his revolver against the head of a Royal Navy sailor who was the coxswain on a landing craft taking American troops into Omaha beach. Under pressure from British historians and journalists, Ambrose later admitted that he made this story up. This is disgusting behaviour. British people have never had a problem with ordinary American soldiers. But there is a problem with some of their commanders and historians.
'British people have never had a problem with ordinary American soldiers. But there is a problem with some of their commanders and historians.' And also, there is a problem with their film makers.
According to Robinson it was an assault gun covering the underpass where the main highway crosses under the embanked rail line at the north end of Lent. The 10.SS-Panzer-Division had just four StuG IIIG assault guns concentrated in the 7.Kompanie of II./SS-Panzer-Regiment 10. When the division was initially raised as a panzergrenadier-division in 1943 and Hitler ordered the 9 and 10 divisions to be converted to panzer-divisions, the StuG Abteilung was reorganised into 7 and 8.Kompanien of the new Panzer-Regiment and the remainder of the II.Abteilung equipped with Panzer IV. The 16 Panzer IV in the 5.Kompanie could not be ferried over the river at Pannerden, they were too heavy, but the four StuGs arrived in Nijmegen and split two to each bridgehead in the city, road and rail. In the October returns the division still reported 3 StuGs on strength, so either a reported loss by the Grenadier Guards in the rail bridgehead (at the Hezelpoort rail underpass) on 19 September, or the loss outside the Lent church mentioned in this video must be incorrect. Lent has two churches, like many Dutch communities, Catholic and Protestant, and I haven't heard of a StuG knocked out here before. The remaining 3 StuGs were successfully withdrawn to the Lent side of the river, probably two in the direction of Bemmel to the east, and one we know was at the Lent underpass blocking Robinson and later withdrawn to the blocking line at the Stationsstraat crossroads between Oosterhout and Ressen, where the Irish Guards were stopped the next day. The 504th troopers from 'G' Company at the Lent underpass that met Robinson's two tanks were unable to stalk the assault gun as they were out of bazooka rounds, added to the fact it was now well after dark, the priority was to consolidate the bridgehead and prepare for a possible immediate counter-attack, which was the German doctrine.
Great analysis and detail to counter rumour and stories. It is crazy to criticise the British for not pushing forward with half a troop of tanks unsupported while still in close combat in Nijmegen.
Hollywood wrote this version of history. British XXX Corps arrived at Nijmegen on time, but the Americans failed to take the Nijmegen bridge, the British had to take it for them. Gavin screwed up, he failed to take the bridge at Nijmegen, seeing it as a secondary matter to protecting his Eastern flank from a phantom German tank army! Read Robin Neillands book The Battle for the Rhine 1944: Arnhem and the Ardennes, the Campaign in Europe. This history book is not the Hollywood film version of Arnhem but a well researched book. Gavin's poor choices, warts and all, different chains of command back to Washington, lack of strategic vision by Eisenhower, duplicity of Ike's subordinate commanders and the huge level of American corruption in supplying its Armies in Europe all contributed to this American led failure.
Pure Bull Shit. None of the Airborne Divisions accomplished all their objectives without XXX Corps help. There were to many of them and the Germans got a say in things. The 82nd Eventually accomplished all their objectives - with XXX Corps help. 1st Airborne accomplished NONE of theirs partly because - as the farthest away - XXX Corps couldn't get to them. Most importantly 1st Aiborne failed to accomplish taking both ends of the Arnhem Highway Bridge. That mean that the Germans could have blown it up any time they wanted. If XXX Corps were about to take the South End of the Arnhem Highway Bridge - the Germans would have blown it up. Are you to stupid to see that? .
The more you learn about Market Garden the more you realize how much of a disaster General Gavin was for whole operation. First, he fails to secure the bridge at Nijmegen on day one. Then, he fails to engage German reinforcements moving into Nijmegen over the bridges over the next two days, allowing them to dig in and fortify their positions. This meant XXX Corps had to clear Nijmegen itself before capturing the main road bridge themselves. They essentially had to do Gavin's job for him. The Americans then have the gall to blame the British.
before 740 men had even arrived at the last intact bridge in Arnhem area, 82nd had captured the bridge north of Grave (longest road bridge in Europe at the time), the last intact bridge over the Maas Waal canal and the Heights for Brownings' useless HQ brought in by 38 of 1st AB's gliders (capacity 1,000 infantrymen)
In Gavin’s defence he simply had too many objectives for the force he had available on the first day. At Nijmegen itself Gavin was given the dilemma of either capturing the bridge immediately and leaving the Grossbeek Heights poorly defended thus leaving his landing fields vulnerable to flanking attacks. As it was he secured the landing fields first allowing the Germans to reinforce the bridge. Difficult to say if he made the right or wrong decision, the result of the choice made is clear, but given that German strength was much greater than planners anticipated it is possible that if the alternative was chosen the units around Nijmegen could have found themselves in a similar situation to the Brits in Arnhem - cut off from re-supply and forced into urban fighting against superior forces.
@@robertshiell887 Which is why he was absolutely the wrong person for the job. The whole purpose of the operation was to capture the bridges so that XXX Corps could get the Arnhem quickly. Regardless of the flanks, the bridges were to be put first above everything else. He failed the most basic task.
@@nickdanger3802 1st AB capturing the north end of their bridge while facing the heaviest German counter attacks with the heaviest armour. Gavin didn't even capture one side of the Waal bridge when it was only guarded by a dozen infantry. He then let the enemy hold the rail bridge and move reinforcements over both bridges with no resistance over two days.
As with any good plan, after its implementation the enemy has a major say in whether it gets changed, the fact of major German forces where there were expected to be resting units was a change the plan didnt need but got anyway
Yes the bridge was a second thought of Gavin and should have been taken immediately. It is interesting to read the facts but the yanks blame the British.
FYI XXX Corps crossed the 1st Bridge w/c is Son after 36 Hrs second main Bridge was Grave w/c 82nd AA captured intact on day one Sept 17. Interesting to note as well that XXX Corps did not advance till "2pm of Sept 17".
@@elmersalonga6424 30 Corps could not advance earlier in the day, as they had to wait until First Allied Airborne were overhead. There had already been 15 airborne operations cancelled, and until those transports and gliders were overhead, Horrocks could not be certain that this was not going to end the same way. Also, if Horrocks had got moving earlier, it would have potentially given the game away and led to the probability that the bridges would have been destroyed. This is also one of the major reasons why Market Garden had to happen before the clearing of the Scheldt was complete, as the Germans would simply have blown up every bridge over every waterway making every river and canal an amphibious crossing. Almost all of the time lost in building the Bailey Bridge over the Son was made up for between Son and Grave, as 30 Corps covered that distance in about two hours, only to be informed that the bridge at Nijmegen was still in German hands.
@@sean640307 Yes I know about the 1st Airbornes cancelled Op SHAEF was being pressured by Gen Arnold at the behest of CoS Marshal because he wanted to see the "Strategic Use of an Airborne Army". Its not really Op MG but OP Market plus Garden. The thing with XXX Corps being on time is now being a tricky bit, of course elements of the Guards Armor reaching the "objective/Bridges as fast as they can was a priority will they have enough Force to punch thru Arnhem? The thing with OP MG there is a lot of materials on Airborne Action but not a lot with XXX Corps. The Narrow Route Rd dubbed as Hell Highway,Club Route was a concern at the inception of the Plan...And looking at the German Counter-Attacks at XXX Corps Route of advance at the start Valkenswaard,Sint Oedenrode and Eerde, it now hard to see that the XXX Corps was reaching the objective on time! And just because Elements of the Guards Armor was reaching the Bridges on time it doesn't meant that they have the Force to Punch thru Arnhem. Case in point only 3 Tanks has crossed Nijmegen because the "Main Force was tied up at Hells Highway.
Yes absolutely, and I think yes. I do think much of the rancour comes from guilt or embarrassment and the natural response is a cover up - MARKET GARDENGATE anyone? Apart from the USAAF air commanders compromsing the operation by scheduling all flights in daylight and deleting Browning's proposed double airlifts on D-Day and the glider coup de main assaults on the main bridges, Gavin compromised his own divisional plan by discarding a British request to drop a battalion on the northern end of the Nijmegen bridge to seize it by coup de main, because of his experience in Sicily he told Cornelius Ryan. He then compounded it by assigning his least aggressive and experienced regiment - the 508th PIR - to the critical Nijmegen mission, instructing Colonel Lindquist to send his 1st Battalion directly to the bridge after landing on D-Day. Lindquist was not a good field commander (he was a gifted administrator) and had not performed well in Normandy on the 508th's first operation, and he simply did not understand the urgency of moving the battalion as soon as it hit the ground, thinking he had to clear the drop zone and secure his other objectives first. Lindquist did send a reinforced platoon recon patrol to check on the condition of the bridge, despite already getting a first hand report from Dutch resistance leader Geert van Hees at the initial objective on the Groesbeek ridge that the Germans had deserted Nijmegen and left only 18 men guarding the bridge, but apart from three scouts from the 1st Battalion S-2 (Intel) Section, the patrol got lost and couldn't find the way to the bridge. The delay allowed the 10.SS-panzer-Division to send units into the city and reinforce its bridges. Despite the default XXX Corps plan for a scenario in which the Nijmegen bridges were still intact, but strongly held by the enemy, being an assault crossing of the Waal to the west by 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division with either one brigade (operation BESSIE) or two brigades up (operation BASIL), Gavin twice intervened to insist on using his own troops to make the crossing and asked for boats to be supplied. Although 43rd Division was put on a warning order for BASIL on 19 September, Gavin's plan was accepted the second time of asking and there was a debacle in supplying the boats because it was assumed they would have to be brought up the corridor from supplies in Belgium. Nobody had thought to ask the Royal Engineers in Guards Armoured Division for their boats - they actually had 34 already at Nijmegen. It's most likely these were the 26 finally used, after an artillery shell hit one of the trucks in Nijmegen, losing 8 boats. Sources: Notes on meeting with J.M. Gavin, Boston, January 20, 1967 (box 101 folder 10: James Maurice Gavin, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University) Bridging The Club Route - Guards Armoured Division’s Engineers During Operation Market Garden, John Sliz (2015, 2016) September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, John C McManus (2012) Put Us Down In Hell - The Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke (2012)
Yes and yes, lol, but it is a game of musical chairs as to who is to blame. General Gavin stated he was ordered to take the Maas-Waal canal bridge, the Grave bridge as well as securing the Groesbeek Heights to the east of Nijmegen to prevent a German counter attack from the Reichswald forest, to prevent German artillery spotters working from the heights and to keep the landing zones clear for follow up drops. Only then was he to proceed to the Nijmegen bridge and secure it. He states that Browning agreed with these orders. However since then there has been a blame game. Browning states Gavin worked off his own initiative and didn't send men to Nijmegen until is was to late. Gavin also stated he gave Lt.Col Linquist of the 508th a verbal order to send men to the Nijmegen bridge straight after dropping, but Linquist says as far as he understood his orders he was to secure the bridges he had been tasked with first, and only then send men north to Nijmegen. Supposedly the 508th were still sitting around having taken their assigned bridges at 1800 when Gavin asked if they had secured the Nijmegen bridge yet, which they had not even marched on.
@@ukmediawarrior - Browning wanted all the key bridges taken as quickly as possible on D-Day and this included the Nijmegen highway bridge. He first had the three main bridges at Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave planned to be taken by glider coup de main assaults in Operation COMET. After that operation was cancelled, the proposed replacement operation SIXTEEN expanded on the same plan by adding the US divisions at Nijmegen-Grave (82nd) and to secure the corridor between Valkenswaard and Uden (101st). Brereton and Williams removed the double airlift and the dawn glider assaults by deciding to conduct all flights in daylight for MARKET. Then, Gavin told Cornelius Ryan: 'The British wanted him, he said, to drop a battalion on the northern end of the bridge and take it by coup de main. Gavin toyed with the idea and then discarded it because of his experience in Sicily. There, his units had been scattered and he found himself commanding four or five men on the first day. For days afterward, the division was completely disorganized. Instead, and in effect, Gavin decided to operated [sic] out of what he described as a "power center"; broadly, a strong, centralized circle of power from which he could move in strength upon his objectives. That power center was located, for the most part, in the Groesbeek heights area.' (box 101, folder 10: James Maurice Gavin, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University) The Maas-Waal canal bridges would be attacked on D-Day by the 504th and 505th at Heumen and Malden. The 508th was to take the Groesbeek ridge, less D Company to clear the drop zone and 1st Battalion to take the Nijmegen bridge. Lindquist was given the instruction to take the Nijmegen bridge two days before take-off, not after landing. Gavin stated this in a letter to US Historical Officer Captain Westover in a 17 July 1945 letter: "About 48 hours prior to take-off, when the entire plan appeared to be shaping up well, I personally directed Colonel Lindquist, commanding the 508th Parachute Infantry, to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen bridge without delay after landing, but to keep a very close watch on it in the event he needed it to protect himself against the Reichswald. So I personally directed him to commit his first battalion to this task. He was cautioned to send the battalion via the flat ground east of the city." He re-iterated this again in his 20 January 1967 interview with Cornelius Ryan: 'Gavin confirms he ordered Lindquist to commit a battalion to the capture of the Nijmegen bridge before the jump. He also confirms he told Lindquist not to go to the bridge by way of the town but to approach it along some mud flats to the east.' (box 101, folder 10: James Maurice Gavin, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University) This has been further confirmed by eye-witness accounts in two books published in 2012: As Gavin finished his briefing, the British General [Browning] cautioned him: “Although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen bridges, it is essential that you capture the Groesbeek ridge and hold it.” General Gavin did have some appreciation of this. At an earlier meeting with his regimental commanders, he [Gavin] had told Colonel Roy Lindquist of the 508th Parachute Infantry that even though his primary mission was to hold the high ground at Berg en Dal near Groesbeek, he was also to send his 1st Battalion into Nijmegen to take the key road bridge. Gavin told Lindquist to push for the bridge via "the flatland to the east of the city and approach it over the farms without going through the built-up area." Gavin considered this so important that he stood with Lindquist over a map and showed him this route of advance. At the same time, Colonel Lindquist had trouble reconciling Gavin's priorities for the two ambitious objectives of holding Berg en Dal and grabbing the bridge. He believed that Gavin wanted him to push for the bridge only when he had secured the critical glider landing zones and other high ground. According to Lindquist, his impression was that "we must first accomplish our main mission before sending any sizeable force to the bridge." Actually, General Gavin wanted the 508th to do both at the same time, but somehow this did not sink into the 508th's leadership. "If General Gavin wanted Col Lindquist to send a battalion for the bridge immediately after the drop, he certainly did not make that clear to him," Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Shanley, the executive officer of the 508th, later wrote. Perhaps this was a miscommunication on Gavin's part, probably not. Lieutenant Colonel Norton, the G-3, was present for the conversation (Shanley was not) and recorded Gavin's clear instructions to Lindquist: "Seize the high ground in the vicinity of Berg en Dal as his primary mission and ... attempt to seize the Nijmegen bridge with a small force, not to exceed a battalion." (September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, John C McManus 2012) Captain Chet Graham was assigned as the regimental liaison officer with division headquarters. "I sat in on a high level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important. He was also told to stay out of the city and to avoid city streets. He told Lindquist to use the west farm area to get to the bridge as quickly as possible as the bridge was the key to the division's contribution to the success of the operation." (Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke 2012) It was only later in the day when Gavin started receiving reports on initial progress that he found out the battalion was not moving on the bridge: Captain Chet Graham, the regimental liaison officer with division headquarters, decided to obtain a status of the progress toward the capture of the Nijmegen highway bridge. "I went to the 508th regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, 'As soon as the DZ is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.' So I went through Indian country to the division CP and relayed Lindquist's message to Gavin. I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his Jeep, he told me, 'come with me - let's get him moving.' On arriving at the 508th regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, 'I told you to move with speed.' " At about 8:00 P.M., Colonel Lindquist ordered Lieutenant Colonel Warren, the commander of the 1st Battalion, to seize the Nijmegen highway bridge. It was an order that Warren wasn’t expecting. “This was the first time the battalion was told it was to secure this bridge. By the time the battalion minus [Company C, one section of 81mm mortars, and one section of machine guns] was assembled from its rather wide defensive positions, it was well after dark.” “A Dutch Underground worker [Geert van Hees] who had contacted regimental headquarters had stated that the highway bridge over the Waal River was defended by a noncommissioned officer and seventeen men. This Dutch patriot also volunteered to guide the battalion into town.” (Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke 2012)
I've been saying this for years. I'm glad to see many young Brits are finally seeing this nonsense for the utter shite that it is. Unfortunately most Americans still believe it and it's a shame. It's a shame that they feel it necessary to make up derogatory things about British servicemen to stroke their ego's instead of just letting the brave actions of American servicemen speak for themselves.
I am not an American but rather an Australian and the British had trouble with showing initiative especially in units like the Guards. Australians, Canadians, New Zealanders even Americans who didn't have the same spit and polish training did much better at using individual initiative which was what the Germans were taught right down to squad level. The Poms had some very good soldiers like John Frost but too many others were always waiting for orders before they moved
@@tonyolivari2480 This is just not true, there was plenty of initiative demonstrated by the British when the 11th Armoured Division captured Brussels and Antwerp, after a rapid advance of 260 miles in 6 days. For the record that’s faster than George Patton moved.
@@tonyolivari2480 funny you should say that. As during the course of WW2 the "poms" worked hard to develop units made of of Soldiers who acted off their own initiative such as the Commandos and the SAS. And the officers behind the development of those units had a tendency to come from spit and polish regiments. David Stirling (SAS founder) Scots Guards Jock Lewes (developed the SAS) Welsh Guards Robert Laycock (established the Commandos) Royal Horse Guards Simon Fraser (led the Commandos at D-day) Scots Guards Even today the Guards have their own platoon in the Parachute Regiment and G squadron SAS tend to recruit from Guards regiments. Being a tightly disciplined unit does not render men incapable of independent thought.
As soon as you said they were the Guards Armoured Division I knew they were not part time militia but a renown honourable troop. I think the Colonel has his wires crossed with another meeting or was beefing up his cowardice
Just so people know, the U.S. Army installed thirty-two mobile, trailer-mounted coffee-roasting and grinding units attached to field bakeries in July 1944, each operated by six specially-trained men. These units produced 90,000 lbs of coffee a day, every day. I guess they never stopped for coffee and doughnuts though (:-.
We have all seen the great Movie a Bridge to Far and remember this part. I'm a Vietnam Combat Veteran and I know how stories get started that could possibly be true but nobody takes the time to investigate if it is. I throughout my life have studied WW2 history and I always thought this incident went against all I have known about the bravery of the British Soldier or Sailor. Thank you for correcting this story.
Hi from Germany! There were military sinulations before September about the way from Elst to Arnheim. The conclusion of this "game" was, that it's impossible and nothing but a "road to suicide" for the British tanks. Unfortunately Montgomery ignored the conclusion of the simulation.
@@Cadfael007 in fact , Montgomery did not have a hell of a lot of input to Market Garden. The main movers and shakers of this operation were Brereton and Browning . The first pretty incompetent, the second pretty arrogant.
First off people should know better than to take history lessons from movies, that's a good way of getting yourself in a bind in life. That said, people seem to misinterpret that scene in the movie, it's like their brains shut down right after Robert Redford delivers his line, it's NEVER implied that the British were stopping FOR THE SAKE OF HAVING TEA, only that since they're stopped they're having it, I don't know how things work in other armies but the one I was in no matter what the reason is for stopping you eat, sleep (catnaps), piss, and do all the other things you can to take advantage of being stopped and having the opportunity to do it, given the British well known love for having tea why in the world wouldn't they if they were stopped? Of course they would, they like tea, why wouldn't they have some when they were stopped? The American GI's were probably drinking Coca-Cola or moonshine or whatever their favorite beverage was growing up. If everyone would follow the movie beyond what Robert Redford's character says the British tank commander clearly says that they can't go on without support, which is what really happened after something like 5 British tanks rushed forward with all but one getting knocked out. To me movies about historical events aren't history lessons, but I do use them to spark an interest in something that if I'm intrigued enough I find credible sources to do the research on it.
@@dukecraig2402 Thank you! I've never served in any capacity, but the novels I've read bear out exactly what you said, to whit, in the forces you never know when you will have the opportunity to eat and/or sleep again so you take any opportunity that presents itself. Nice to hear from an actual vet that the fiction gets that right! :)
Monty demanded and got this debacle ignoring how easy it was to defend one road elevated for 55 of the 70 miles. Field Marshall Walter Model against monty would be like Ghengis Khan against Tinkerbell - the tainted waif never showed up. To make matters worse general Kurt Student was there too and had landed in that area 4 yrs earlier, yup, MONTY GARDEN
According to General Horrocks, after the four Shermans stormed the bridge, no other tanks were available to cross the bridge because they were all heavily engaged in fierce fighting in Niijmegen, and so it would have been suicide for a few tanks on their own, at night, to have tried to reach Arnhem, even if the road was undefended, because there were no forces available because they were all tied down in Niijmegen. Thank you for putting the record straight.
The Guards tanks were indeed split up and dispersed over 20 miles supporting the 82nd Airborne here there and everywhere. Even at the time the 504th PIR were crossing the river in boats the Germans opened up a counter attack at Mook and the Coldstream Guards tanks were requested to help out by Bill Eckman of the 505th PIR which was in danger of being overrun there at Mook.
not the only reason, tanks had used up most ammo in support of river crossing and no arrangements had been made for resupply or for British infantry to support an advance
@@nickdanger3802The Guards Armoured Division had to deviate from their mission, which was to drive up the road to Arnhem. The various Guards tank groups (Grenadier Guards, Coldstream Guards, Irish Guards and Welsh Guards) had to be split up and dispersed over 20 miles supporting the 82nd Airborne here there and everywhere. Due to Brereton's stubbornness in insisting on 3 day drops the 82nd were short of reinforcements as they didn't arrive because of the weather and so the Guards tanks had to be used in that role all over the landing sector after the 82nd requested their assistance to help combat German counter attacks. This took up precious ammo and fuel. This was not foreseen to happen. The Guards tanks were not supposed to be parcelled out all over the place. Nijmegen was supposed to be taken and cleared by the 82nd before they got there.
The 82nd fluffed their lines in Nijmegen for various reasons, but I suspect a lot the dodgy 'recollections' are down to them wanting to hide the fact that XXX corps had to take the town and bridge that were their day 1 objectives, and the reason they couldn't advance to arnhem was the force that should have been available to do that was busy. The germans in Nijmegen when the Guards arrived were not in Nijmegen 3 days earlier when 82nd airborne arrived, and if the 82nd had done what Frost did at arnhem, this story would have been dramatically different.
A Bridge Too Far is one of my favourite movies, but it did contain numerous inaccuracies. I didn't realize the 'stopping for tea' was one of them. There was the soldier who dies retrieving a supply cannister containing berets... he actually survived and was understandably annoyed about risking his life for a cannister of berets. The officer with the umbrella dying... the real officer survived.(there's a youtube video about him.) Essentially, the movie seemed to place the blame on the British.... the Americans, of course, did everything right. The movie shows a line of Shermans sitting idly... not two. Also, the movie only depicts the assault on one bridge... I wasn't aware there were two until now.
Financed by Americans and with eyes on making a lot of money in the most lucrative market, the USA. The real 'villain' of Market Garden, Brereton, was not even mentioned anywhere in the film. Nor his equally cautious fellow USAAF general Paul Williams. Both were conveniently omitted from the film.
The "active" Americans and "slow" British meme is a continuation of the American revolutionary war mythology. The opposite is invariably the case. Taking the wrong bridge and then being saved by Guards' Armed wouldn't maintain their favourite mythology of independent vitality.
@@nickdanger3802- Not really, he proposed the plan to Eisenhower and Eisenhower agreed to the plan and totally support it. Even Patton was impressed by it too that he got on board with it, since if the operation did succeed it would totally knock out German war production and cut off all supply to most Germany, ending the war much sooner . It's a joint British American operation. Most of the Planning was done by General Browning but was alarmed at such an ambitious operation and hearing reports of bigger German presence. He and Monty asks for more Aircraft and Gliders so they can fly and drop all the Airborne troops in their target in one day in order to take the Germans by suprise. Unfortunately they can only came up with only 1/3 of what they asks and the delivery of troops will be staggered and in the course of 3 days. Plus, the troops barely received any real Air-support during the battle. Even in Arnhem the Germans were hardly bombed by Air-support.
@@inisipisTVThe lack of tactical ground attack air support in Market Garden was because of Brereton. He wanted to skies cleared for his 3 days of drops which ballooned into a week due to the weather. That's on Brereton.
The story about the Brits 'stopping for tea' was reinforced by the 1977 movie,' A bridge too far'. This has only strengthened and unfortunately increased the acceptance of this story.
Though the Brit stopping for tea isn't exactly a myth because the British soldier was heavily unionised but in this case its complete bollocks it like at the famous battle in Normandy Villars Bucage turn out the force that stopped to drink tea was actually a rear Gaurd advance force had already pushed thorough and took their objects LazerPig has a very good video on this called The Myth of Wittman.
15:23 Odd to talk about "British caution" in the 3rd most daring large scale operation of WW2. 2nd being Dunkrik again a British operation. The 1st being D-day organised mostly by Britain.
Um no such bullshit The British had 4 full years to cross their channel after getting driven into it. Admiral Ramsay with many US officers from the pacific that were landing every day in the Pacific, planned the landings.Monty planned CAEN and we know how that worked out.The USA filled ships filled stem to stern with tanks,trucks,artillery,men,material,food,fuel and crossed the freakin' ocean
The Dutch one I read does so as well. It goes even one step further: before 1939 the Dutch military already knew how easily defensible the road from Nijmegen to Arnhem was. Some artillery was enough to halt an entire colonne of tanks. This was one of several huge flaws in the plan.
@@neilhooper8759 Sadly they think that 'it was in the movie so it must be true' A Bridge Too Far was made for an American audience, and one of the 'big stars' Robert Redford wanted a heroic scene to himself. The individual he portrayed (lampooned?) Julian Cook, objected to his performance, and apparently made his objections totally clear to those responsible for the movie. The 'drinking tea' scene was imaginative, but entirely made up.
@@marknieuweboer8099 True. That said, had XXX Corps been able to press on to the Arnhem-Nijmegen "Island" on the morning of 19 September, they would've had two significant factors mitigating in their favour: 1) Ample air support (weather conditions were good on that day) 2) Frost's men still controlling the northern end of the Arnhem road bridge - preventing the Germans from flooding the "Island" with reinforcements. Of course, after the delay in taking Nijmegen, neither of these factors were in place.
@@marknieuweboer8099 I have studied Market Garden for years and have well over 20 books on the subject. A few mention this so-called Dutch military exam, but in all I have and in all I have read, not once have I ever come across this "exam". You'd think that someone, somewhere would have it, but it just doesn't exist. I think it's a myth. Even if it DID exist, at the time that it was "a thing", the Dutch military never had anything like the arsenal that 30 Corps was bringing to the battle. 43rd Wessex, alone, was greater in firepower than the entire Dutch army had been, and that's before we start looking at the RHA, the Guards armoured, 30 Corps' own engineers, etc.
Has any research been done on the Bonner Fellers (Cairo, American military attache) despatches and the likely significant damage to the Allied cause during the North African campaign?
@@nickdanger3802 Nah. 621 didn't accomplish a tenth of the damage Fellers inflicted on the Allied war effort in Africa. Even Rommel himself personally praised Fellers.
On the 21st of September the Irish Guards Group tried to fight their way through to Arnhem but they were shot to pieces by german anti tank guns, so the idea that three tanks could have reached Arnhem on the 20th is simply not true as this video clearly proofs.
the difference was that had the bridge been in US hands when 30 Corps arrived initially, then they would have been able to roll right on through to Arnhem, brushing aside the meagre German units that were between Nijmegen and Frost's men at Arnhem. On the night of the 20th, though, there was no possible way that four tanks (one damaged, and with mixed US/British personnel) were going to be able to go on through the night to Arnhem without infantry and air and/or artillery support.
@@sean640307 when lead elements of 30 Corps arrived at Grave at 0820 on day three they were still 25 miles/40km from Arnhem having averaged just over 2 miles/3km per hour on day four Frosts' men ran out of food, ammo and water
@@nickdanger3802 they would still have reached Frost's men before those German reinforcements arrived. The distance between Son and Grave was covered in a little over two hours so trying to factor in what happened before and averaging it out is disingenuous and mischievous. It's also fair to suggest that as 30 Corps got closer, they would have had become more energised, as that is human nature.
@@coling3957 Yes. The alternative for non-commissioned officers and lower ranks is the Military Medal. The Distinguished Conduct Medal was a decoration established in 1854 by Queen Victoria for gallantry in the field by other ranks of the British Army. It is the oldest British award for gallantry and was a second level military decoration, ranking below the Victoria Cross, until it was discontinued in 1993 when it was replaced by the Conspicuous Gallantry Cross.
The sad truth is that Thirty Corps was smeared as too slow because of the falsehood of Gavin who claimed that Thirty Corps was 36 hours late on reaching the bridge, which is clearly nonsense as the operation had only started 42 hours before Thirty Corps reached the Nijmegen bridge, a distance of 50 miles. The fatal delay for this operation was at Nijmegen, not in the advance before then.
British XXX Corps arrived at Nijmegen on time, but the Americans failed to take the Nijmegen bridge, the British had to take it for them. Gavin screwed up, he failed to take the bridge at Nijmegen, seeing it as a secondary matter to protecting his Eastern flank from a phantom German tank army! Read Robin Neillands book The Battle for the Rhine 1944: Arnhem and the Ardennes, the Campaign in Europe. This history book is not the Hollywood film version of Arnhem but a well researched book. Gavin's poor choices, warts and all, different chains of command back to Washington, lack of strategic vision by Eisenhower, duplicity of Ike's subordinate commanders and the huge level of American corruption in supplying its Armies in Europe all contributed to this American led failure.
And if you believe all that rubbish. You're a tart that would believe American Paratroopers were kissing brits like shared here. Americans, especially Paratroopers Despised that stuff.
100% British armour arrived on the afternoon of the 19th, and no bridge was captured. The hole point of the opposition was the bridges. But Boy Browning has to take some of the blame
@@user-mc4sq3fk5d Nope. Browning ordered Gavin to take the bridge. Gavin landed first and decided to prioritize the heights. It's time to stop accepting Gavin's own account and post-war lies as fact. He was the main reason why Market Garden failed.
Thank you for finally putting this issue to rest. My father was with the 43rd Div., XXX Corps and got as far as Elst when they did advance, probably the next day.
It was the same as Ambrose's account of Omaha. Royal Navy personnel that crewed the landing craft some were accused of cowardice for being reluctant to go in and had to be threatened with shooting to get them to go in. The veterans of the US 'Bedfordshires' agreed with the RN vets that they had no record of any such incidents occurring. The RN and US vets approached Ambrose to correct this slur, he ignored them.
Very interesting and well done. Well at least one American historian does not fault the British tanks for not attempting to head on to Arnhem. In "September Hope," John McManus recounts the basics of the incident, including the part about a US paratrooper threatening a British tank commander. But he makes an even stronger case than that made here that advance to Arnhem would have been unlikely to succeed. He doesn't go into detail, as is helpfully done here, about specific German units and strength, but emphasizes that the elevated (dike?) road was horrendous for unsupported armor, making them easy targets, and that in fact there was plenty of German power between Lent and Arnhem. He also adds the larger context that at this point the Allies were in no position to supply a strong force for a run to Arnhem. The thin one-road umbilical that was the spectacular fatal flaw of Market Garden was under attack at several points, Allied road traffic was backed up in several places, etc. He also notes that the US paratrooper frustration with the situation was almost certainly a direct result of the losses endured in the heroic assault across the Waal, which even the British overall commander of Market Garden witnessed and described as incredible. Heat of battle. Plus of course those paratroopers didn't/couldn't know the larger picture that made a run to Arnhem at that time out of the question.
Having read over 30 books concerning Market Garden from every angle…I still realise how good the film was at misleading so many people… thank you for this story
And still people use movies as history lessons? That's mistake #1. The movie script was written off Cornelius Ryan's book which was not a researched historical account, it was taken from first hand accounts of people who were there, as we all know people who were involved in anything in life don't have the full picture. Also I don't know why people think from watching that movie that the British stopped FOR tea, it's only implied that they're drinking tea BECAUSE THEY HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DRINK TEA, ie they were stopped, so take advantage of the time to do whatever. I don't know about any other armies but the one I was in whenever things stop you take advantage of it to take catnaps, eat, drink, take a squirt, whatever, I never took it that the British stopped for the sake of having tea only that they were because they were stopped, if people would pay attention PAST where Robert Redford's character delivers his line the British tank commander clearly states why they can't go forward, and it isn't because they can't be bothered while they're drinking tea. The very fact that people get so upset over a movie is just mind boggling, here's a suggestion, instead of being so lazy that people who want to learn about historical events learn it from a movie maybe they should try putting a little effort into it and try learning it from credible sources.
You better return those coloring books and ask for your money back. Ryan easily talked to more veterans of the battle than anyone before dying of cancer in 1974. The book has plenty of pictures with him talking to German,American & British officers. This carnival barker is no different than TIK telling you bent freaks that monty was great this is a british cheering section not a history lesson. Before the GIs and Russians got involved monty was run off the continent
@@thevillaaston7811 I should perhaps have mentioned, also, that Carrington maintained that no such conversation ever occurred. Still less that a John Wayne wannabee put a pistol to his head.
@@dovetonsturdee7033 Yep, I read his book, 'Reflect on Times Past'. I was wanting to read what he had to say about MARKET GARDEN, and the Falklands War.
Thanks for putting the record straight. It appears a lot of the false accusations arose from the failure to take the final objective ( Arnhem ) and people were eager to point the finger of blame regardless of their remarks being true or false. Puzzles me why Operation Market Garden is largely seen as a failure when the Allies punched a large hole in enemy lines opening up a new front. Admittedly Arnhem was the key but it was a big territorial gain nonetheless. Arnhem wasn't the whole battle.
Market Garden was actually the fastest allied advance against German opposition in the entire September 1944 to February 1945 period. Nearly 100km of German held ground taken in just 3 days. Compare that to the months of getting nowhere in the Hurtgen Forest and Lorraine.
Yeah - it's funny how Market Garden is always portrayed as a massive failure, stupid Monty etc... whereas the disaster of the Ardennes offensive by the Nazis against the Americans is always portrayed as a heroic American effort. In fact, the first two weeks were an almighty cock-up by the Yanks.
@@28pbtkh23 _The British 2nd Tactical Air Force similarly took control of the IX and XXIX Tactical Air Commands from Vandenberg’s Ninth Air Force [in the Bulge]._ _The First Army’s hasty defense had been one of hole-plugging, last stands, and counterattacks to buy time. Although successful, these tactics had created organizational havoc within Hodges’ forces as divisional units had been committed piecemeal and badly jumbled._ _Ridgway wanted St. Vith’s defenders to stay east of the Salm, but Montgomery ruled otherwise. The 7th Armored Division, its ammunition and fuel in short supply and perhaps two-thirds of its tanks destroyed, and the battered elements of the 9th Armored, 106th, and 28th Divisions could not hold the extended perimeter in the rolling and wooded terrain. Meanwhile, Dietrich’s second wave of tanks entered the fray. The II SS Panzer Corps immediately threatened the Salm River line north and west of St. Vith, as did the LVIII Panzer Corps circling to the south, adding the 2d SS Panzer Division to its drive. Ordering the St. Vith defenders to withdraw through the 82d Airborne Division line to prevent another Schnee Eifel disaster, Montgomery signaled them that “they come back with all honor.”_ - Ardennes-Alsace by Roger Cirillo. US Army Center of MIlitary History “I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St.Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St.Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.” “I'm sure you remember how First Army HQ fled from Spa leaving food cooking on the stoves, officers' Xmas presents from home on their beds and, worst of all, top secret maps still on the walls... First Army HQ never contacted us with their new location and I had to send an officer to find them. He did and they knew nothing about us...(Montgomery) was at First Army HQ when my officer arrived. A liaison officer from Montgomery arrived at my HQ within 24 hrs. His report to Montgomery is what saved us...” - Hasbrouck of 7th Armor - “Generals of the Bulge” by Jerry D. Morelock, page 298.
@@lyndoncmp5751 lyndon try your other alias accounts - it was a disaster 34,400 go in 17,000 don't come out - in just 9 days - keep bullshitting yourself. Alan Brooke had stated many times that Monty was out selling himself to others- adrift in twaddle & nonsense Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success."
Its to keep the conversation on the British and not the 82nd who did not even attack the bridge on the first day. The Germans had minimal troops guarding the bridge. Also Guards armoured reached the bridge on time. It was the 82's failure to take the bridge that doomed 1st airborne. TIK history has a programme on this.
LZ Z, 4 miles/6km from rail bridge, destroyed 4 hours after 1st AB landed when 30 Corps arrived at Grave at 0820 on day 3 they were still 25 miles/40km from Arnhem, Grave to Heumen (last intact bridge over Maas Waal canal) to Arnhem, over 1/3 the distance from Joes Bridge to Arnhem
@@nickdanger3802 You don't appear to have noticed the effect of the failure to capture the Son bridge? Wasn't it mentioned in your cut & paste, or did you simply choose to ignore it, perhaps?
_At nightfall on D plus 3, the British had at Nijmegen only the Guards Armoured Division. Because inclement weather continued to deny arrival of the 82nd Airborne Division's glider infantry, the Guards Armoured's Coldstream Guards Group still was needed as a reserve for the airborne division. This left but two armored groups to go across the Waal. Even these did not make it until the next day (D plus 4, 21 September), primarily because of die-hard German defenders who had to be ferreted from the super-structure and underpinnings of the bridge._ *_Once on the north bank, much of the British armor and infantry was used to help hold and improve the bridgehead that the two battalions of the 504th Parachute Infantry had forged._* - US Official History
The initial tanks over the bridge were to form a bridgehead on the northern bank with the US 82nd men. The idea was to prevent the Germans taking the bridge back, not wander off in the dark on a raised exposed road.
@@lyndoncmp5751 Of the four tanks over the bridge on the first wave two were hit by hand held panzerfausts. The tankers would be very aware that there would be some of them around the raised road. Robinson's two leading tanks were near hit by two anti-tank guns at Lent.
@@johnburns4017Yes very true. They would also have been aware that their orders were to stop the Germans taking the bridge back that night, seeing as there were still Germans around. No half baked attempt to get to Arnhem would have suceeded that night. Better to get a, stronger force and try and do it properly in daylight the next day. Three times already in Market Garden the Guards Armoured Division had been held up by German anti tank guns. At kick off on the first day, then at Aalst, just before Eindhoven, on the second day and then in front of the Nijmegen bridge on the third and fourth days.
Odd that the Americans fail to mention the failure of the 82nd Airborne Division to attach maximum importance to the early capture of Nijmegen Bridge. If the bridge had been taken in strength and with all speed, then it is possible that British tanks would have reached Arnhem Bridge before Frost was forced to surrender.
@@user-mc4sq3fk5dGavin "the decision [to prioritise the Groesebeek Heights] was *made by me* , and approved by my Corps commander" Similarly, it was the 82nd who were obsessed with the Reichwald to the point of distraction (not Browning's Corps HQ - and no credible threat emerged from the forest until Day 4), and it was Gavin and Lindqvist who either failed to issue pre drop orders to move against the bridge - or failed to execute said orders. It was nightfall by the time a token force of the 82nd tried to sieze the Waal bridge. But blame the nearest Brit, am I right?
General Browning was there as an observer and to coordinate with the approuching of XXX corps (he's totally reliant on Gavin's command for intelligence and movement of US and German troops). He doesn't want to undermine Gavin's command because Niijmagen area is 82nd Airborne's responsibility. He did advise Gavin to take the bridge first, but General Gavin was worried of approaching German reinforcement from the East that he decided to capture high ground near area to cover his flank. By the time they focused on the bridge the Germans was able to heavily fortify the entire town in Southern approach of the bridge. 3 days of fierce street fighting by 82nd Airborne in the town but they were unable to break even close the German defenses near the bridge. They have to wait for the arrival of the British tanks for it.
The American where clearly scapegoating the British post battle they needed to blame someone for the failure to secure the Bridge on the first day. They only sent one Battalion whilst the rest of the 82nd was all up on Groesbeck height waiting for rumoured 1000's of German tanks someone out of the forest, which there was no supporting intelligence for. The failure at Nijmegen was entirely that of the American and failure to priorities the main objective of the day and there by prevent the 9SS from getting across the Nijmegen bridge. This force the British to fight to secure the bridge tying up there armoured infantry.
how many bridges captured (that means both ends) by 1st AB ? "the rest of the 82nd was all up on Groesbeck height waiting for rumoured 1000's of German tanks" source ?
@@nickdanger3802 The contemporaneous reports of Lieutenant Colonel Norton (82nd G3), which stated that Gavin ordered Colonel Roy Lindquist (508th) to "attempt to seize the Nijmegen Bridge with a small force, not to exceed a battalion." With rumors of a large German armored formation nearby, Gavin initially made the decision to move most of his troops to the Groesbeek Heights rather than securing the Nijmegen Bridge. This decision left Lindquist confused about his orders, leading to the vital bridge being reinforced and in German hands for a further 36 hours. Will that do? Look up Lt. Col. Norton for yourself. I have even left the American spelling unaltered to help you. 'How many bridges captured (that means both ends) by 1st AB ?' I did think of asking you how that was relevant to events at Nijmegen, but I doubt you could answer that in any case.
Just in case you don't know, by the way, G3 refers to the senior staff officer or Assistant Chief of Staff for operations and plans. In other words, someone who might have been expected to have got his facts correct.
it was a yes and no situation. the guards did stop, and did have tea. but they had been ordered to stop, and wait for support, and as was their custom when in a stand down, they had tea, but did not specifically stop for tea. the us troops were a bit upset about this, as tucker thought an organized force would have been poised to speed forward, and was upset over the losses his men and suffered, and as such, was too angry to realize that the tanks could not just drive on. it was mostly an unfortunate misunderstanding that caused this terrible myth to exist.
If they had taken the bridge on the first day, which was possible as the bridge was only lightly held by the Germans, then the 504th crossing of the Waal would not have been necessary.
The plan agreed between Dempsey and Browning for MARKET included a further brigade to be dropped at Elst to aid the advance from Nijmegen to Arnhem but Brereton insisted this couldn’t be done. Dempsey said this was one of the two reasons Arnhem failed.
@@johnpeate4544 - thanks, it's on order. One of the things that came out of James Daly's new volumes on Poposed Airborne Assaults (2024) was that Dempsey was far more involved in the planning of airborne operations that many people thought, to a degree usually attributed to Montgomery. Often wondered why he was photographed wearing a Denison smock! Cheers.
@@johnpeate4544 - it's the first time I have heard of a drop zone at Elst. RG Poulussen (Little Sense of Urgency, 2014) mentions the drop zones for the 101st south of the Wilhelmina canal between Son-Eindhoven-Aalst to seize the bridges there to achieve an early linkup with ground forces were deleted by Williams on the grounds of the Flak around Eindhoven. He published the signal sent by Taylor to Dempsey stating that the decision was made by the commander of US IX Troop Carrier Command (Williams). I believe Taylor himself had objected to a drop zone at Uden on the grounds it over-extended his division, which makes some sense to me because there are no bridges or significant water courses there to create a potential bottleneck. Elst was presumably part of Browning's "airborne carpet" concept, which got thrown out with the Eindhoven and Uden objections, so I presume the Elst DZ was another casualty of this, despite the phrase "airborne carpet" surviving into the Hollywood film script.
People want to find someone else to blame for the failure of it, of course they'll start making allegations. After all, if you don't find someone else to blame then maybe you might be at fault yourself, and for most people that's too uncomfortable.
It's a failed operation, so naturally nobody wants responsibility. The Americans blame the British, the British blame the Americans, the Airborne forces blame 30 Corps, 30 Corps blames the Germans and the terrain.......
@@desydukuk291 there's no one cause it blame. It was a very high risk strategy, in which too many things could go wrong. Ultimately it was the fault of Montgomery and Eisenhower
Thanks for this. My uncle served as a Sergeant in Lord Carrington’s battalion of the Grenadiers and this myth has always interested me. How three tanks with no resupply capability in place could make a difference by charging to Arnhem, even if they had got there, is beyond me. Band of Brothers I recall includes a similar “incident” of British tank crews drinking tea rather than fighting, no doubt inspired by these myths too. Of course, war is full of one sided myth. The mainstream post war history of the Eastern Front was mainly written by German generals and pandered to both American and British prejudice about the Red Army. As well as making themselves look good at the same time. Authors such as Robert Citino have mainly debunked it now but the populist histories are still are very much all in on it.
@@nickdanger3802 - it was the episode for the fight at Neuen which was part of the Market Garden operation. In fact the episode does not show the British tank commanders drinking tea, but the British commander says that he has orders to keep the destruction of Dutch property to a minimum. Easy Company tells the British tank that there is a German tank nearby, but the Brit replies that he can't shoot at him if he can't see him. It's a great attempt to make the British look hidebound and stupid.
Excellent research young man, and the facts as recorded by both US & British forces at the time, tell the real story of events. As the old saying goes "never let the truth, get in the way of a good story".
An important point to remember here is that in such an extensive and complex operation, nothing happens in isolation. On the 21st, the day after the bridge was taken, the Germans counterattacked from both the West and the East in the Veghel area and very nearly cut Hell's Highway in two. Had they succeeded then the troops at Nijmegen would have been cut off. It was absolutely necessary to repel these attacks and consolidate the supply lines before an attack from Nijmegen to Arnhem could be contemplated.
I never believed the “stopping for tea crap” even after reading several books about Market Garden. What is an eye opener for me is the fact that the road to Arnhem was NOT open as Cornelius Ryan stated in his book and that only 2 operational tanks made it across. I knew there was a reason they did not push all the way and besides even if the 2 or 3 tanks made it to Arnhem the German tanks there were far superior in numbers and quality and would have wiped out the Shermans in no time. Shermans are great tanks when they fight in numbers.
Absolutely. The simple reason why less than a handful of tanks didn't push on was because their orders were to take the bridge and stop the Germans taking it back that night. They had no other orders. The plan was to keep hold of the bridge that night and then advance properly in force the next day, not half baked through the night with just a few tanks.
Cornelius Ryan was an American news hound that spent a great deal of time 1944-45 at Patton's HQ. Bridge Too Far was a novel that leaned heavily on the American version of events. It was certainly not based on historical fact as there are a great many errors. The main one being who planned the 1st Allied Airborne Army drops - not Monty!
Thank you for clearly, and precisely, dispelling this horrendous myth. Shame on those "historians", and writers, who fail to do their due diligence, and continue to propagate this lie.
Even if there were zero Germans after Nijmegen, what exactly were two tanks supposed to do when they arrived? Even if 20 tanks somehow made it, it wouldn't have mattered. There were way more German troops than expected and mad dash into them would not have changed the outcome.
Most excellent presentation of reality. Burriss even claimed there was "whole Corps of tanks" there that just sat and did nothing. Only 5 tanks got across that night, and 2 of those were damaged. The rest of the Corps tanks were split up and dispersed over 20 miles supporting the 82nd Airborne here there and everywhere.
Only seven tanks got over the bridge - one with only one crew member. On the initial wave of four tanks, two were hit on the northern section. One was got moving again by only Sgt Knight who run over the bridge and up to Lent to meet the tanks of Pacey and Robinson. Knight's tank was useless as it only had one crew member, him. Carington's tank, moving onto the bridge passing a knocked out British tank, 45 minutes behind the leading four tanks, later joined them at Lent after staying static at the northern end of the bridge on its northern ramp near the riverbank. The riverbank is where 82nd captain Burriss met Carington in his stationary tank. Burriss did not know tanks had already moved over the bridge 45 minutes before he reached it with about 15 men. He thought Carington's tank was the first. Carington moved on to Lent after an hour or two to join Pacey, Robinson and Knight, when reinforcements came over the bridge. Another three tanks were reported to have moved over the bridge making eight in all with one knocked out and one with a crew of one, giving a firepower of six. However some report that the last three tanks were actually armoured cars or self propelled guns.
@@johnburns4017I did not know another two tanks came across later. I know infantry and other vehicles, such as armoured cars, came across later but I wasn't aware of more tanks that night, just those five. Cheers.
No is the short answer (or at least halting wasn't because of tea). And frankly,. there is no controversy (other than from loonies, bampots and arseholes)
A lot of the issues about the assault crossing of the 3/504 go back to the errors that Lindquist, CO of the 504th and General Gavin; in which Gavin didn't make it clear to Lindquist that seizure of the bridges was the priority in the operation. This led to the heavy fighting in Nijmegen. Given the Allied casualties and the confusion of fighting through a dense urban combat environment and the time of day, it's quite understandable why an advance didn't occur
Clausewitz warned against marching through a valley without having taken the hills. Market Garden was the equivalent of doing just that. Monty demanded this operation then doesn't show up to direct it when the reality of it coming apart immediately is evident. Having only one road to advance upon should have been warning enough not to undertake the operation. This debacle should never have been consindered let alone launched,the miscreant monty never showed for his own plan.Not the Americans fault that the British units didn't deploy effectively using deplorable methods filtered down from Bernard's ineptitude. The whole concept for Operation Market-Garden was premised on the FALSE idea that the German Wehrmacht was in a shambles in September, 1944. This notion underrates the expertise of German military planners to reconstitute new divisions out of shattered ones. Their ability to respond and take a mishmash of broken, depleted troops, hastily assembled from miscellaneous units with a wild assortment of backgrounds then organize them to fight was a big factor in the outcome. The heavy fighting in In Nijmegan was because the Germans were there in strength with artillery.Unfortunately the Americans foolishly gave their tanks to the British that seemingly showed no initiative. It is well documented this shit show got pummeled from the very beginning making 7 miles the 1st day after getting ambushed and got worse every day afterward.
Well British Tanks in WW2 had a "BV" Boiling Vessell Yes, British tanks in World War II were indeed equipped with tea-making facilities, but this feature came later in the war, after a critical design change. The invention known as the "Boiling Vessel" (BV) was a response to the challenges faced by British tank crews, who needed to make tea and cook while on long missions without leaving their vehicles and exposing themselves to enemy fire. The BV allowed crews to boil water and make tea directly in the tank. While the Boiling Vessel itself became standard in British tanks after WWII, particularly during the 1950s, the stereotype of British soldiers loving tea was strong during the war, and this reputation may have contributed to the eventual adoption of this device. So while British WWII tanks did not initially have dedicated tea-making facilities, the Boiling Vessel became a later, important part of British tank design, ensuring soldiers could have hot tea even in combat situations.
Thanks for this, Ive only heard that story in the last 20yrs-ish and it never sat well with me. There was always something missing because I didnt believe that the Gren Guards would just stop for no reason...
I appreciate your dedication to getting the history right. I feel many of these myths do a great disservice to those who served corageously in this conflict.
The British stopping to have tea is meant to be derogatory. That myth was perpetuated every time the Americans didn't get their way in arguments with the British in WW2.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- LOL. Not even close to true. In 1941 alone the US supplied UK with over a million TONS of food. Rationing in UK didn’t end till 1954. Educate yiurself before you speak
@@JGM1800 Sit down and stop exaggerating facts. During the war Britain responded to the Germans by increasing its own agricultural production, shifting what kinds of food were eaten, and reducing luxury foods that might have tasted good but were nutritionally/calorically inefficient. At NO point during the Battle of the Atlantic was Britain in any danger of not having enough food. Because of rationing, while the calories eaten by the most well off decreased, it actually increased for the poorest. The other thing to know is that Britain essentially defeated the U-Boat threat by mid-late 1941. The U-Boats managed to hide this defeat because the US entry into the war provided new targets of opportunity on the US Eastern Seaboard and the Caribbean Sea. That increased shipping losses for the Allies, but it did nothing to threaten the British Isles.
*Martin van Creveld calculated in his superb study of logistics, Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton* Monty’s “40 divisions” realistically would have been quickly reduced to a mere 18 when all logistical and operational requirements were considered. Captured ground could not simply be left in a vacuum, but had to be occupied and defended against the inevitable German counterattacks. Supply lines had to be protected and secured, and as a force advanced, those key “sinews of war” extended longer and longer, requiring the diversion of increasing numbers of combat troops to protect them. Moreover, because Monty failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary expeditiously and open the port of Antwerp (closed to Allied shipping until December), Ike’s SHAEF logisticians at the time calculated that only 12 divisions could have been supported in a rapid advance. *Van Creveld weighed all the factors in the “broad front” vs. “narrow thrust” strategy debate and concluded, “In the final account, the question as to whether Montgomery’s plan presented a real alternative to Eisenhower’s strategy must be answered in the negative"* *Eisenhower actually gave Montgomery a chance to show that his narrow-thrust strategy could succeed - and Monty botched it* Ike approved the September 1944 Operation Market-Garden, Monty’s attempt to “jump” the lower Rhine and position his army group to drive on to the Ruhr industrial region. Market-Garden famously and disastrously failed at the “bridge too far” at Arnhem at the same time that German forces supposedly were so depleted and disorganized that Monty’s narrow thrust, it was claimed, would easily slice right through them and capture the Ruhr. Monty’s boast that his single axis advance would quickly win the war was both literally and figuratively “a bridge too far” at that point of the war in Europe
There are many factors that can be cited for the failure of Operation Market Garden, all deserving of consideration: 🔶The report by OB West blamed the decision to spread the airborne drop over more than one day as the main reason for the failure. 🔶 The Luftwaffe agreed and added that the airborne landings had been spread too thinly and too far from the Allied frontline. General Kurt Student thought the airborne landings were a great success and blamed the failure on the slow progress of XXX Corps. 🔶There is also the matter of Montgomery allowing the German Fifteenth Army to escape into northern Holland where it could defend the approaches to Arnhem by not clearing the Scheldt estuary, the nature of the highway along which XXX Corps had to advance (a two tank front), the failure to appreciate the unpredictability of the British weather in September, the critical requirement of good communications, which at that point in history was unlikely given the level of technology available and the blatant ignoring of intelligence (from both the Dutch resistance and reconnaissance flights) that armoured units had moved into the Arnhem area 🔶 Sosabowski in particular feared a flexible, speedy, and strong response, saying, *“The British are not only grossly underestimating German strength in the Arnhem area, but they seem ignorant of the significance Arnhem has for the Fatherland.”*
Why do the Americans have a thing about us drinking tea? and why is it in movies American officers are always shown with a cigar hanging out of the corner of their mouth is to make them look tough.
American here. We have no room to talk, honestly. I'm amazed our guys don't get in trouble more for doing stuff involving coffee or in some cases women (the amount of fraternization between our soldiers and local ladies across World War II and Korea afterwards just makes me shake my head at times, some of the movies actually downplay how much of it occurred in places).
I don't blame Americans as much as I blame Hollywood. The likes of Tom Hanks have to push down the Commonwealth at every chance to make the Americans look better. Hell most of them think that Americans made up the majority of the invasion force on D-Day.
@@thunderbird1921 - hold on matey. One of the best scenes in Band of Brothers was when a member of Easy Company was fraternizing with a German maiden just as Lt. Speers interrupts him in the middle of the 'action.' I've often paused my recording of the programme at this point and replayed it. I see it as him getting his just rewards. There's a similar scene in Fury. As for drinking tea or coffee: hell - the offensive lasted getting on for a week. They've got to eat and drink at some time.
June 13, 1944. Villers-Bocage, France. Twenty Cromwells, four Sherman Fireflies, and three Stuart tanks of the 22nd Armoured Brigade were destroyed along with numerous troop carriers and other vehicles when their crews dismounted to brew tea 200 yards from the enemy. Instead of punishing your soldiers, you made all future tanks capable of brewing tea from the inside. That's why.
Every tank the us came across was a tiger, the 8th AF always bombed precisely, the same force shot down twice as many planes that the Germans had and general Patton's shit smells of roses.......all true, I've seen the film
@@MinhThu-xn2bt Produced by an American company, with a screenplay written by an American, based on a book by an American 'journalist'. Not exactly British made then.
The Brits weren't known for stopping for tea. Some of the upper class officers, maybe. The troops were known for brewing up any time they stopped, which is a different thing. This story sounds like a typical American invention. They had standard insults and slurs for all their allies, and it was reciprocated.
The battle was lost when the road bridge had not been captured on the 17th or 18th when it was very lightly guarded. Guards Armoured arrived at Nijmegen on morning of 19th at about D+44 hours (schedule was 2 - 3 days). Unfortunately instead of driving across the bridge and pushing up to Arnhem, against minimal opposition (due to the Arnhem bridge being under 1AD control, German reinforcements were having to be ferried across the Rhine causing significant delays), they had to deploy 3/4 of their combat power to support Goosbeak Heights, the west of Nijmegen and South to help keep Hell’s Highway open. After the heavy fighting in Nijmegen there was nothing left in the tank, and (I think) 43rd Wessex Division would make the final push toward Arnhem. Historians have to sell books so going against established narrative is difficult. Up to the 80’s many of the key personalities were still around, and giving personal interviews, inevitably establishing good relationships with the historians. The historians then find it difficult to be anything but empathetic, causing them to be over supportive. The last 25 years has seen a much more neutral tackling of the issues, hence the obvious failure to capture Nijmegen bridge, as the main point of failure, has only really got an airing relatively recently.
Great post, but one slight inaccuracy. 1st Airborne never controlled the Arnhem bridge. They only controlled a section of the northern end and a few houses, which dwindled each day. 1st Airborne already failed in Arnhem due to the caution of Brereton and Hollinghurst. The Germans always controlled the bridge off ramp and 99.9% of Arnhem. The objective was the entire bridge and most of Arnhem, so that XXX Corps could cross the bridge, get off it and fan out through most of Arnhem, forming a bridgehead. That objective already failed on day one, sorry to say. Market Garden was screwed by the caution of the USAAF and RAF commanders.
Senior British commanders recognised that if their forces suffered devastating losses defeating the Germans in North-west Europe, British influence on post-war Europe would be diminished: Britain had not just to win the war but also the ensuing peace as well. Montgomery’s dispute with Eisenhower over theatre strategy and command reflected his determination “to maintain” the campaign on “lines most suitable to Britain, because it was of no avail to win the war strategically if Britain lost it politically. The maintenance of Britain’s international influence necessitated that British forces played a prominent role in the prosecution of the vital North-west Europe campaign; Britain’s post-war political prestige rested in part on the glory that her soldiers won on the battlefields of Europe. However, if Britain maintained such a high profile, with the 21st Army Group spearheading the Allied onslaught against the German Army in the West (Westheer), its forces would incur severe casualties. These partly irreplaceable losses would compel the army group to disband formations, thus reducing its already meagre peak strength of 16 divisions. The fewer the divisions with which the British army emerged at the war’s end, the weaker its influence on Europe would be in the face of the growing might of two nascent superpowers. Indeed, by 1945, the American forces deployed in the theatre outnumbered the British Commonwealth’s forces by three to one. Montgomery’s generalship qsought to achieve a high British military profile while paradoxically avoiding the casualties that went with such a profile. The longer the war lasted, moreover, the smaller would be the British effort in North-west Europe comparison with that of the ever increasing American forces. Thus the British remained more interested in achieving victory quickly than the Americans, since the British economy and man-power situation demanded victory in 1944: no later. The 21st Army Group, however, possessed insufficient resources to achieve early victory by itself, unless the Germans collapsed unexpectedly. Equally, Montgomery could not afford to sustain the heavy casualties that would be incurred in a British-dominated attempt to secure swift strategic victory over the Westheer. Should such a full-blown British offensive effort fail, Montgomery’s emasculated army group might be reduced to a secondary role in the theatre, left merely to observe America’s defeat of the Wehrmacht. On the 4th September Monty was told by a SHAEF intel report that the Germans facing his 2nd British army were disorganized, demoralized, short of equipment and arms, so he tried to hit them hard and force a crossing at the Rhine as quickly as he could, before the winter weather and before the Germans could regroup, reconstitute and strengthen their defences. If 21AG concentrated on clearing the Scheldt first then the Germans would probably have blown the bridges over the Waal and everywhere else in advance of the British and Canadian advance. Market Garden had the practical goal of ensuring that these major bridges were captured intact. And if they didn’t get there before the freezing weather Monty had already predicted no river assaults would be possible during ice season as pontoon bridges couldn’t be placed on the Rhine. The launching of Market-Garden is more intelligible in this context. The operation reflected Montgomery’s attempt to exploit an apparently unique fleeting battlefield opportunity. If Montgomery’s forces succeeded in capturing the Ruhr it might just deliver the crucial knock-blow to end the war, without the army group’s forces being devastated in the process. Although it failed to obtain a bridgehead over the Rhine British forces didn’t have to fight through the southern Netherlands through the winter of 1944/1945 as they were already there due to Market Garden. There almost certainly would have been more difficulties and more casualties had a British 2nd Army ground advance been carried out later in worse weather and strengthened German defences.
The reason why operation market garden failed was because of an American general who took the entire battle plan into the combat zone. His glider crashed and the Germans recovered the battle plans, which included the time and location of the polish reinforcements, who were then shot down, leaving the British forces without the support and supplies they needed. I is ironic that all American history books seem to leave that out even though the Germans said that it was the only reason they were able to stop the advance.
That's in the Hollywood movie, but it wasn't a plan of the operation, but a resupply roster for 101st Airborne Division. The American officer was a Captain and liaison officer to Browning's Corps HQ, whose glider crashed near Student's 1.Fallschirmarmee HQ at Vught. Student was able to extrapolate the schedule for all three divisions and although he could not deduce the objective he guessed it was Arnhem, but Student told Cornelius Ryan he couldn't contact any headquarters for 48 hours, by which time von Rundstedt, Model, Bittrich, Harmel and Harzer already knew all the objectives. Source: Cornelius Ryan Collection box 101 folder 09 page 95, letter to Gavin, Jan 1970. I would very much like to know your source for "the Germans said that it was the only reason they were able to stop the advance."
I note that Captain Carrington received the MC for his efforts at the bridge, I'm curious as to whether the 2 sergeants who made it to Lent were also decorated. Another excellent article, thanks
Peter Lord Carrington continued to serve this country long after WW2 in a very successful political career with the Conservative party serving as Defence Secretary under Margaret Thatcher .
I always wondered if that was true. Never made much sense to me. As a former tank crewman You do not advance without your infantry, you are so naked without them and their eyes on the countryside along with yours. Thank you for clearing this up. I always did feel had they pressed on, they would have met with a rather sticky situation once at Arnhem with the 9th SS Panzer already there.
Also even if they post war had proved the road was clear past the anti tank guns The Brits couldn't have known the road was clear, it's obvious they were acting on the best possible intelligence they had at that point which turned out to be mostly right
Thanks for the video. It's sad how my fellow Americans are so ready to bash every ally we have and act like we did everything ourselves. Oh, can't forget that we made no mistakes either. Love your work!
I’m nearly 60 and I remember my grandfathers and my father’s generation having a lot of anti British sentiment, I never understood where it came from but it was definitely present in WWII generation of Americans so that may explain some of it, also CYA on the US airborne troops who should have taken that bridge the first day.
Long story short: the Americans were happy to try and smear XXX Corps as being "too slow", in an attempt to divert attention away from the 82nd Airborne Division's failure to take the Waal bridge on time - the key factor in Market Garden disintegrating. XXX Corps were *not* the reason the plan failed, and they arrived at Nijmegen *on time* Nonetheless, bad historians repeated this falsehood for some time afterwards. It's good to see the traditional Cornelius Ryan narrative of the battle losing its grip on popular discourse. It's about time.
Your content, as always is superb and goes to a level of detail rarely published in wider histories. For the record, I am neither British or American and it seems to be a British cultural habit to all too readily self-criticize and take blame in contrast to American tendencies to shift blame and self-deny. I believe this was to excuse the failure of US Airborne to take the bridge when they had the chance and the need more generally for historical authors to placate a US readership to secure sales. Thanks for your efforts and keep them coming.
It's pretty sad because Market Garden saw the US blame the brits for faults if its own making. Then the brits scapegoat the polish commander for nothing too. The failure of Market Garden lies with Gavin and Brownings inaction.
@martinford4553 Browning was scapegoated. Browning was "convinced" to leave the Airborne. He was got rid of and shunted off out to Burma in an administration position (a lowly comedown after being an Airborne Corps Commander) already before the end of 1944. Sosabowski was dismissed not because of Market Garden but because of his general argumentative and non cooperative manner. This rubbed a number of people up the wrong way. It was his attitude, not ability.
GEEBARDS blabbered "it seems to be a British cultural habit to all too readily self-criticize and take blame" ------------------------------------------------- LMAO screw off limey fraud,sure you're not. MONTY the most arrogant asses in the world,Kings/Queens,Lords,Dukes,Sirs - ya nothing screams humble bunch like that. These fauntleroys that boasted the sun never sets on their Empire. Ask all those people they colonized and plundered their countries and used as sandbags and cannon fodder. You are an ignorant troll - this whole debacle was on Monty who then chickened out and RUNAWAY - must be a Monty thing
It wasn't the tea perse' it was their non chalance, not all though.From the Germans themselves *'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p. 215* *Heinz Harmel was to be more explicit: The English drank too much tea...! He later remarked "the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake when they stayed in Lent If they had carried on their advance it would have been all over for us."* *'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 221* *SS-Colonel Heinz Harmel wondered,even after the war,why the tanks that had rushed the Nijmegen bridge with such 'elan had not continued further.The Allies had certainly missed an opportunity.They might possibly have pushed a battle group into Arnhem itself. 'Why did they not drive on to Elst instead of staying in Lent? 'he asked;'at this instant there were no German armoured forces available to block Elst.'It was a lost chance* *Irish Guards there, how about Lt.Col. Vandeluer?* *Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360* *The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon* The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over *Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured.* *Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 LT* *John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright, "we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair"* *ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p 408* *on arrival at the Hotel Hartenstein at **23:45** *Lt.-Col Mackenzie opted to keep his disquiet over commands poor grasp of the gravity of the situation and the marked lack of urgency by XXX Corps and the 43rd Wessex to himself* *Heinz Harmel? Tasked with operations from Arnhem south to Nijmegen* *Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by William Buckingham,p.358* As Heinz Harmel later put it "the English stopped for tea* the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us"* A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced *Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,p.125* *Col Joe Vandeleur had halted the Irish Guards in Valkenswaard on orders of Briadier Norman Gwatkin, the commander of the 5th Guards Brigade, who joined him there. While they enjoyed a glass of champagne together from their captured supplies, Gwatkin told him "to take his time getting to Eindoven, that there was no hurry because the Son Bridge had been blown and would have to wait for the bridging to be brought up"* *Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,p.154* Montgomery's failure to secure the North side of the estuary had allowed the Germans to extricate almost all of the 15th Army for use against the left flank of Operation Market-Garden. So the Germans,GIs and Irish Guards themselves pointed out that elements of XXX Corp. weren't pushing hard and in fact mulling about. Nothing to do with Hollywood just History,British Revisionism of propping themselves up beyond either ability or accompiliment warrented.Having been surpassed as a world power by both the USA/USSR.This is not an indictment of the Tommies but of their fauntleroy officer corp
Indeed. Until I saw that remarkable documentary U571 I mistakenly thought that HMS Bulldog had captured the first Enigma machine, together with cypher books and logs, taken at sea. I will for ever be grateful for the correct facts of the matter.
We live in the post enlightenment era where facts and evidence don't get in the way of storytelling. A few years ago, I had occasion to review an American high school history book. Fairytales. Thank you for this factual account. btw, 50 odd years ago I participated in the Nijmegen marches. I don't know if they still happen.
I have a film recommendation "They were not divided." It centers on an English man, an American and an Irish man in the Welsh Guards Armoured. It has the dash across the bridge in it. Also the relationship between the Guards tankers and the American paras after. Also one of the best recruitment gags going. When the Irish man explains why he is a Welsh Guard
They had no infantry with them. No tanker enters a town without infantry cover. They hadn't trained 82nd and British tanks that they could cooperate in such an operation. "God Call Him God" Peter Carington made the right decision.
The Americans are not our "ALLIES".....and the "SPECIAL FRIENDSHIP" is a very abusive use of political and financial leverage by the Americans to assert their influence over the political landscape in the country.
Especially his claim that "a whole Corps of tanks" just sat there and did nothing. Only 5 tanks got across that night and 2 were damaged. The rest of the Corps tanks were split up and dispersed over 20 miles supporting the 82nd Airborne here there and everywhere.
Note: We did originally feature the ‘stopping for tea’ scene from the film ‘A Bridge Too Far’, however, copyright issues meant we had to remove it, otherwise UA-cam wouldn’t allow the video to be published.
In that scene in the film, everything around was pristine. The Germans had swept up the road and grass for them.
@livethforevermore I'm glad that you couldn't show it. It always adds fuel to the fire that it was a true event.
No, British were just defeated by Germans and taht is even worse than muslim made British tea
Another myth just like the one about a US submarine capturing an enigma machine... Oh deary deary me.. 😮
@@dondouglass6415 Never heard of that one. Of course there was that ghastly movie from 2000.
a problem with a lot of the well-known historical books is that they are not so much historical as journalistic. And that the authors to what journalists do most often: Repeat other journalists... And not what historians do: Look for original sources.
Then you get what we have here: A whole slew of -otherwise well written- books that repeat each other and thus spread the inaccuracies at a faster pace than proper historians can correct them.
That's why I'm so happy with channels like this one: They have wide reach and are dedicated to spreading the real histories.
Yeah this content involves critical thinking.
Cornelius Ryan (author of A Bridge Too Far, 1974) was a newspaper journalist who wanted to tell the story through a series of personal accounts rather than as a historical account.
I beg to differ. I read Cornelius Ryan book. It clearly stated that it's British tanks that broke through the heavily defended German defensive barricade in the Southern side of the bridge, after Gen. Gavin's 82nd Airborne failure to secure the bridge but opted to capture the high ground. He wrote after after the Niijmagen bridge was secured 5 British rush into Arnhem but well secured German anti-tank defenses. 4 of the tanks immediately lit up since they're well exposed and unable to maneuver since the road is up a high dike. The last tank reverse back and call for Air-support to deal with the German artillery. The Air support didn't came because of fog. The british with the help of Dutch resistance went around West of the bridge where a small farming support road is passable. They reach the river West of Arnhem and met with the Polish Airborne that was still trying to cross the bridge 8n order to reinforce the British Airborne on the other side of River West of Arnhem, that are slowly being encircled by the Germans. The British XXX armour decided to act as artillery and linen their tanks by river bank and tried to bombard the German forces, in order to give the British Airborne some time.
A lot of these things were not in the movie for some unknown reason. The British armor tried again to reach the bridge, now supported by Polish Airborne, by going by the road hugging the river and heading east towards the bridge. However, to was heavily defended by German anti-tank guns and large German panzers.
I don't remember about the drinking tea thing. The only mention of British halting was after first disastrous first charge to Arnhem and them waiting for airsupprt that only came a day later and didn't even dent the Heavy German defense. By that time British moved on to the side road.
All those are from the Movie which heavily diviate a lot from the book. (I.e. The umbrella guy in real life didn't. The guy that catched the airdrop packed with Beret didn't die too but only cried laughing for risking his life. General Browning was portrayed to be arrogant snob that dismisses any negative intelligence report. In real life he's a affable and rather caring person, well liked by staff, and in book showed he was deeply troubled by intelligence report of bigger German presence in Arnhem that he continually asks for more Airborne troops and gliders to fly them there. Actor Dirk Bogarde who plays General Browning on film, ironically was junior staff officer of General Browning during the war, and knew the man well. He was appalled at false portrayal of General Browning when he read the script and vainly asks the Director Richard Attenborough to lessen the negative aspects given to the Character)
So many things are wrong.
Best watch the British Movie/Documentary "Their is the Glory." A film made right after WWII about the Battle for Arnhem bridge. Most of the cast are the actual soldiers who were actually there during the battle. Far more accurate.
@@inisipisTV - Gavin did not 'opt' to capture the high ground - the 508th was to secure the high ground as their initial objective, but Gavin expected the 1st Battalion to go directly to the bridge as quickly as possible. Colonel Lindquist was not a good field officer and did not interpret his orders correctly, thinking he had to clear the drop zone and secure his other objectives before committing a large force to the bridge. By the time Gavin found out the battalion was not moving, it was too late and the Germans were moving SS units into the city and reinforcing the bridges.
The German blocking line north of Nijmegen was at Ressen on a line constructed between the 'hedgehog' positions in the villages of Oosterhout-Ressen-Bemmel. It was nowhere near Arnhem and still south of Elst - the town about halfway between Nijmegen and Arnhem on the main road and rail line. The air support at this time did not work because of a failure of primary and spare RAF control radio sets - the planes were frustratingly overhead waiting for instructions, not grounded by fog.
The Polish Brigade landing at Driel to the west of Arnhem made no attempts to reach the highway bridge. That was not their mission or the reason for landing there - it was to reinforce the British Airborne Divisional perimeter at Oosterbeek using the Driel-Heveadorp ferry, which had been scuttled by the Dutch ferryman shortly before the Poles arrived, fearing it would be captured by the Germans.
The film did not include many of these details and the book does not go into the failure of Lindquist to follow Gavin's instruction.
Browning dismissed the aerial photograph showing tanks near Arnhem on 12 September because he believed it showed obsolete panzer tanks that ruled out a 1944 panzer division, and this was finally verified when the photo was found in a Dutch archive in 2015 and the training unit the tanks belonged to identified and located near the 101st Airborne's drop zone on 17 September. Browning also wanted the airborne troops landed closer to their objectives and at a faster rate, but the double airlift on D-Day and the glider assaults on the main bridges were deleted by the USAAF air planners, and Gavin also discarded a suggestion to drop a battalion directly onto the northern approaches to the Nijmegen bridges. This is not in Cornelius Ryan's book, nor is the evolution of the MARKET plan from Browning's original operation COMET and his proposed operation SIXTEEN outline replacement upgrade.
Dirk Bogarde served in the RAF attached to Dempsey's 2nd Army staff identifying bombing targets from (ironically) aerial photographs, and he did know the key players like Browning and Montgomery. He played Browning's character as well as he could, but could not mitigate the script, which deeply upset Browning's widow as being grossly unfair to her husband.
Exactly, since WW2 writers have copied the American Hollywood version of events which hid American lies, politics and the horrendous casualty figures US troops suffered. The reality was the Americans Commanders did not shine.
Writers like Anthony Beevor help to perpetuate this sort of divisive stuff. In his book about D-Day, he claims that the Americans and Canadians 'looked askance' at British soldiers brewing up on the beaches, rather than pushing on inland. Really? Didn't the Americans have enough problems on their own beaches to take notice of what the British were doing? There is also wartime camera footage of Canadian soldiers on their landing beach, with a caption saying 'French-speaking Canadian soldiers chat to local people on the beach, as they brew-up'. My father was with the Guards Armoured Division and felt deeply offended by these allegations, in view of the bitter fighting and heavy casualties they suffered, and vehemently denied that any such delay happened.
Max Hastings is just as bad.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Agreed. Anything to sell books, especially to the American market. Never mind the quality...
@@hellcatdwe
'Never mind the quality...' Or the truth.
@@thevillaaston7811 Beevor is a laughing stock in the UK. He doesn't care ,money roles in!
@@thevillaaston7811 Beevor, Hastings 😏
My dad said the movie was not historically accurate. His uncle was there in the 504. He said the general in charge didn't take the bridge according to schedule because he was afraid of an attack from the Germans on his flank. Then they took one bridge but not the main one. He said the British lost some tanks doing that and were stuck on the other side divided by Germans infiltrating between them. They would not have held the bridgehead without the tanks that got through. British tanks had tea makers built into the tank. It would be hard to take them out and set them up outside. There was still fighting going on in town behind them holding up reinforcements. There was no way to go forward till they got through. That took another day.
British tanks didn't have BVs (boiling vessels) until very late in the war, when the Centurion was introduced.
But any significant stop allows a brew to go on - British soldiers have this down to a fine art and have done so for a very long time. (I speak from personal experience...)
'British tanks had tea makers built into the tank.'
Get real.
before 1st AB got 740 men to the north end of the last intact bridge in Arnhem area, the 82nd had captured the bridge north of Grave (longest road bridge in Europe at that time), the last intact bridge over the Maas Waal canal and the Heights for Brownings' useless HQ brought in by 38 of 1st AB's gliders (capacity 1,000 infantrymen)
@@nickdanger3802
'before 1st AB got 740 men to the north end of the last intact bridge in Arnhem area, the 82nd had captured the bridge north of Grave (longest road bridge in Europe at that time), the last intact bridge over the Maas Waal canal and the Heights for Brownings' useless HQ brought in by 38 of 1st AB's gliders (capacity 1,000 infantrymen)' Your words
And US General Brereton's FAAA landed those US troops a hell of a lot closer to those targets than they did for British troops at Anhem. And what was the strength of the opposition at Grave, the Maas Waal canal, and at the Groesbeek heights?.. Shall we check? The Groesbeek Heights were a target for US forces regardless of whether Browning's HQ brought was to be landed there. Oh, and those gliders for Browning's HQ were taken for the aircraft allocation for 1st Airborne, not the aircraft allocation for US forces.
Do try to get at least one thing right.
@@thevillaaston7811they did in late 1945, with the introduction of Centurion and every British tank since then has had a boiling vessel. They were such a good idea that now every US Army tank and infantry fighting vehicle has one as well.
Thinking that 3 Tanks...should advance alone at night into enemy terretory is just stupid.
5 British tanks had already rushed forward to the German positions resulting in 4 getting knocked out because they had to stay on the road where they were silhouetted against the sky and made easy targets, THAT'S why the rest were told to stay where they were until air support could deal with the German defenses.
The enemy always gets a vote in whether or not your plan will work, knowing that Montgomery never should have tried such a bombastic plan with so many moving pieces any one of which going wrong would scuttle the whole thing, the weak link was expecting the armor units to keep their schedule, every time they met enemy resistance they were stuck because when they got off the road they were in swampy soil where tanks bog down making it easy for the Germans to slow their advance.
There was simply too many things that could go wrong, and did, WW2 was the first time airborne troops were used in combat, commanders didn't understand their limitations, plus you'd think after D-Day they'd have understood that relying on air drops to go the way you want just isn't going to happen.
Everyone got in too much of a hurry to "end the war by Christmas" and it wound up biting them in their rear ends.
Eisenhower didn't like Market Garden and should have fought harder to stop it, so that much is on him, Montgomery should have known that the armor units couldn't have kept a schedule like that, so that's on him, and EVERYONE should have known better than to have "go-ittis" and try ending the war by Christmas, it's the same thing that caused so many disasters in history like the Challenger tragedy in January of 86, the engineers that worked for the company that built the solid rocket motors for the Challenger repeadly warned NASA about trying to launch in temperatures that cold, but NASA had go-ittis and we all saw how that worked out.
@@dukecraig2402 " Montgomery should have known that amor units couldn't have kept a schedule like that. so that's on him". XXX corp arrived at Nijmegen slightly ahead of schedule, despite the bridge at son being blown up the 101st face, the fact the operation failed wasn't due to enemy action so much as the incompetence of the 82nd not taking the bridge on arrival when all they faced was a couple of dozen "belly ache' troops guarding it. All this "they stopped for tea" BS was the 82nd trying to shift the blame to XXX corp.
@garryreeve824
All this tea nonsense is only from a movie, not real life.
And you really need to learn about who had what orders at Nijmegen and what they were really instructed to do instead of all this belly aching that comes from nonsense videos about what the 82nd Airborne did there.
@@dukecraig2402 Oh I've read pretty much everything I can find regarding Market Garden, yes I'm that old, my father was with British 1st airborne (one of the lucky ones who got out). Gavin ,in his auto biography, says before they jumped he gave Lindquist a direct order to take and hold the road bridge upon landing. "All this tea nonsense" isn't only from a movie, it is in a number of books on Market Garden, including Ryan's A Bridge Too Far. Montgomerys plan was a feasible plan, where it fell down was the way it was implemented such as dropping 1st airborne so far from their objective, not making a second drop on the first day, the shit show of setting up their radios wrong, 'Boy' Browning using vital air transport just so he could drop on Gavin's position. Please feel free to enlighten me with some sources on your nonsense.
From John Frost's book;"A Drop Too Many" *"We had been given to understand that the key Nijmegen Bridge had been captured by the Guards Armoured Division, and the saga of the river crossing by the U.S. 82nd Airborne in daylight against most formidable opposition was left untold"* (51 killed 136 wounded)
When speaking of Patton's 3rd Army, Frost said "All ranks of this Army, when they saw our red berets, would say: *'Arnhem. Aye. We'd have gotten through. Yes, sir. We'd have gotten through. I could not help believing that they would have. There was nothing slow or ponderous about them and they didn't stop for tea or the night for that matter."*
*Arnhem.Jumping the Rhine in 1944 and 1945. By Lloyd Clark, page 333.Tom Hoare,* who fought with the 3rd Para at Arnhem may be said to reflect a commonly held perception of OMG, (or Field Marshall Montgomery’s fiasco,as he calls it) when he writes: *'It is my opinion that Monty was a great soldier, but he had a even greater ego. When victory was in sight for the Allies, he degenerated into nothing more than a glory seeker. With little regard for the welfare or indeed the lives of his men of the British 1st Airborne Division, he threw the division away in an insane attempt to go down in history as the greatest military leader of the Second World War.’*
*Armageddon - The Battle for Germany,1944-45 by Max Hastings, p.50 Jack Reynolds and his unit, the South Staffords,* were locked into the long, messy, bloody battle. There was no continuous front, no coherent plan,merely a series of uncoordinated collisions between rival forces in woods,fields,gardens and streets. *That is when it got home to me.What a very bad operation this was The scale dropped from my eyes when I realized just how far from our objective we've landed.*
*Armageddon:The Battle for Germany, by Max Hastings* - Bob Peatling was keeping a diary, to relieve the dreadful boredom. “I am getting fed up with hearing German voices,” he wrote. "There is no noise of any firing whatever. I can’t make it out. Field-Marshal *Montgomery has dropped a clanger at Arnhem*
*Maj. Freddie Hennessy* the operations officer of the Guards Armored Division which was in the vanguard of the push up the road, compared advancing sixty-four miles on a narrow highway over several major water crossings to “threading seven needles with one piece of cotton, *and we only have to miss one to be in trouble.”*
I have for long wondered if the bluster of many of the US forces involved was merely a cover for the unforgiveable fact that the 82nd had not taken the bridge at both ends the moment they landed. It was the reason they were dropped into Nijmegen and had the first companies landed taken the bridge they would have found it defended by a couple of dozen Germans only. They did everything except take the bridge including charging around the hills and forest looking for a thousand non-existent German tanks!. XXX Corps arrived in Nijmegen within the parameters set expecting to be able to cross the bridge unopposed and in great numbers as was the plan. The failure of the US airborne to take and hold that bridge was incompetence or maybe worse (but that would be getting into the realms of conspiracy theorism and I really do not wish to indulge in that no matter how strong the evidence to support that concern may be)
There has always been the stench of something fishy about Gavin and his actions and why there was no immediate enquiry with the culprit(s) being put under the strongest of scrutiny from a mlitary court. Had a British or Polish unit been reponsible for that level of incompetence and it was US forces being slaughtered as a result of it, how different might the allied reaction to the dereliction of duty have been - instantly! Would the British or Polish commander have been cashiered or left to continue his command with no detriment to himself?
Most of the fault lies with Colonel Lindquist of the 508th, who was charged with taking the bridge with his 1st Battalion as soon as possible. LIndquist only sent a reinforeced platoon recon patrol to the bridge and most of them got lost, separated from the three leading scouts fom the battalion S-2 (Intel) Section, who reached the brudge, took seven prisoners at the southern end and waited about an hour until dark for reinforcements that never arrived before deciding to withdraw. They could hear "heavy equipment" arriving at the other end as they were leaving, so these were the first elements of SS panzer troops arriving in the city.
Gavin was quite open about Lindquist, and perhaps his own mistakes, in his 1967 interview with Cornelius Ryan for A Bridge Too Far:
_Gavin and Lindquist had been together in Sicily[?] and Normandy and neither Gavin nor Ridgway, the old commander of the 82nd, trusted him in a fight._
_He did not have a “killer instinct.” In Gavin’s words, “He wouldn’t go for the juggler [jugular].” As an administrative officer he was excellent; his troopers were sharp and snappy and, according to Gavin, “Made great palace guards after the war.”_
_Gavin confirms he ordered Lindquist to commit a battalion to the capture of the Nijmegen bridge before the jump. He also confirms he told Lindquist not to go to the bridge by way of the town but to approach it along some mud flats to the east._
_When Gavin learned that Lindquist’s troops were pinned down within a few hundred yards of the bridge on the night of the 17th, he asked him if he had sent them into town by way of the flats. Lindquist said that he had not; that a member of the Dutch underground had come along and offered to lead the men in through the city and that he “thought this would be all right.”_
_It’s interesting to note that Gavin was without an assistant division commander throughout the war. Ridgway refused to promote Lindquist to brigadier and, since Lindquist was senior colonel in the division, was reluctant to jump Tucker, Billingslea or Eckman over him._
_The British wanted him, he said, to drop a battalion on the northern end of the bridge and take it by coup de main. Gavin toyed with the idea and then discarded it because of his experience in Sicily. There, his units had been scattered and he found himself commanding four or five men on the first day. For days afterward, the division was completely disorganized._
_Instead, and in effect, Gavin decided to operated [sic] out of what he described as a "power center"; broadly, a strong, centralized circle of power from which he could move in strength upon his objectives. That power center was located, for the most part, in the Groesbeek heights area._
(box 101, folder 10: James Maurice Gavin, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University)
So Gavin was at fault for assigning his least aggressive and experienced regiment to the critical Nijmegen mission, but it seems that he thought giving Lindquist an instruction to send a battalion directly to the bridge and showing him on a map the exact route he wanted the 1st Battalion to take would be enough. He was clearly very angry when he found out thishad not been done:
_Captain Chet Graham, the regimental liaison officer with division headquarters, decided to obtain a status of the progress toward the capture of the Nijmegen highway bridge. "I went to the 508th regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, 'As soon as the DZ is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.' So I went through Indian country to the division CP and relayed Lindquist's message to Gavin. I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his Jeep, he told me, 'come with me - let's get him moving.' On arriving at the 508th regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, 'I told you to move with speed.' "_
_At about 8:00 P.M., Colonel Lindquist ordered Lieutenant Colonel Warren, the commander of the 1st Battalion, to seize the Nijmegen highway bridge. It was an order that Warren wasn’t expecting. “This was the first time the battalion was told it was to secure this bridge. By the time the battalion minus [Company C, one section of 81mm mortars, and one section of machine guns] was assembled from its rather wide defensive positions, it was well after dark.”_
(Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke 2012)
Also in the Cornelius Ryan Collection is the answer to the mystery of the tanks in the Reichswald. Gavin sent Ryan some papers by Dutch researcher TA Boeree, who had tracked the route of the Hohenstufen Division's withdrawal from Belgium and into the Netherlands, crossing the Maas at Maastricht on 4 September, concentrating near Sittard, and then on 8 September ordered north to Arnhem and the Veluwe region for refitting. Its route went through Nijmegen and apparently made a stop in the Reichswald. When Gavin was assigned Nijmegen for MARKET he went over to the 1st Airborne HQ to see their intel and plans, because they were to drop there for COMET and he saw the reports. Gavin only now realised in his 1966 covering letter to Ryan the armour was the Hohenstaufen in transit. It's in box 101, folder 09, page 48 for the cover letter.
Good post. Good points.
30th Corps. The British and Soviets numbered the Corps with Arabic numerals and the Germans and Americans with Roman numerals.
I read something about Montgomery a year or so ago that has stuck with me. After the war he told an interviewer that at this point the British government told him they could supply replacement soldiers for three months. After that, they would have to start breaking up existing regiments and parceling the men out.
Americans will criticize Monty for being a set piece chess player while Patton was a high risk poker player. But Britain had be doing it since 1939. I give Monty the benefit of the doubt.
Patton was a US media creation. He was average at best, achieving zero of note. Market Garden was an FAAA operation, led by USAAF General Brereton, using elements of Dempsey's Second Army as the ground element.
Thing is, Patton made cautious decisions in the Lorraine, to the detriment of his own army. A post war official US Army history of the Lorraine criticised Patton for his caution and fighting with his army dispersed instead of concentrated. German general Hermann Balck also said the cautious and hesitating American 3rd Army command helped his situation a great deal and he was able to resist for a long time.
@@lyndoncmp5751 Like the time he attacked a POW camp ( Not sanctioned ) to rescue his son in law ? 300 men went 35 returned. All tanks and equipment lost. Yes very cautious indeed.
I like the comment from actual soldiers in Band of Brothers about "blood & guts" Patton. It was their blood & guts he sacrificed..not his own. As for Monty..one look at US made Battle of the Bulge sums up US WW2 historical accuracy. For a true account from US & even German officers involved..one should read Charles Whiting's Battle of the Bulge Britains Untold Story.
This true account shows how Monty took charge and stopped the German advance with US, British and Canadian forces. The US top command were so embarrassed..as they had been in the rear having Xmas lunch with their mistresses..that they threatened to resign. This forced Churchill to wind Monty back in. The lies the US told about Monty in WW2 is a travesty....alongside this "taking tea" B/S to cover up US failure.
@@watkinsrory Yes there is that, but I was talking about his cautious Lorraine campaign September to December 1944. Over 3 months, 52,000 battle casualties (and another 40,000 non battle casualties) and barely 50 miles of ground taken. Probably the most costly allied failure of autumn 1944.
A contributing factor to the growth of this myth was the World At War TV series which in 1974 provided an opportunity for the likes of Gavin and Stephen Ambrose to put forward their views of Operation Market Garden. Given the 1st Airborne's communication problems, its very hard to believe the 82nd Airborne staff knew exactly what the situation was in Arnhem itself and its particularly unlikely any information about British paratroopers 'hanging on by their fingernails' had made its way down to company level. Despite their post war claims, the primary concern of Reuben Tucker - and certainly a 504th captain - at the time would quite rightly have been the problems facing their own men. My father vividly remembered being stuck outside Nijmegen with the Guards Armoured when German troops cut the road ahead and behind them, preventing ammunition and reinforcements getting through to the city and making it impossible to supply an advance to Arnhem. He certainly had no knowledge at all of what was happening to the 1st Airborne.
You are absolutely right. Hindsight talk. No more.
Exactly. My uncle served in the Grenadier Guards in a Sherman tank. He did not speak so much about the war but one sense I got was that he only really knew what was going on in his own tank and maybe the others in his troop. Beyond that, it was simply a case of doing his job, not letting his mates down and trying to stay alive.
The idea that junior commanders such as Captain Peter Carrington would have the strategic appreciation to order unsupported piecemeal advances with zero logistics support towards distant objectives to “save” another division seems totally fanciful. It’s the sort of plot right out of those 1970s war films where nobody ever runs out of ammunition or fuel and never needs to be resupplied or ever requires their tanks to be repaired.
Another myth allowed to be perpetuated by olivier on the world of war series is the closing of the malaise gap. The yank spokesmans critucal comment was allowed to be immortalised without redress.
Montgomerys american opposite general Bradley said himself the problem was the problem friendly fire Incidents.
He sent american troops off into relative open countryside in the direction of Paris which could have helped close the gap. I'm not saying it's another general clark type move on rome😊.
@@Teapot69I'm fairly sure the commentary for 'World at War' was not written by Lord Olivier
@@japhfo please tell us who then.
Thank you for this. My grandparents lived in Lent almost next to the church. My grandfather always told about this battle and maintained that the first allied soldiers he saw were British tankers and not American paratroopers which I always thought was strange as I always had thought the 504st of the 82nd airborne were the first ones there. His house was completely destroyed in the fighting after market garden and my mom was born in the garden shed in the beginning of 1946.
Warm respect and recognition for your family - and the other families who lived through those times❤
A Dutch historian has recently published a book claiming that it wasn’t the British fault Market Garden failed but was due to the Americans at Nijmegen. Their failure to capture the bridge on day one and their pre-occupation with securing the nearby drop sites led the Germans to reinforce the defences. It then took the famous boat crossing of the river to secure the bridge. The Arnhem bridge was a fiasco but they could have got away with more troops and maybe, just maybe, have secured the bridge.
even with their river crossing, the 504PIR from 82nd AB never did capture the road bridge at Nijmegen. They DID capture the rail bridge, but the road bridge was captured by the tanks for the Grenadier Guards, led by Sgt Robinson.
Market Garden failed due to the caution of the air commanders Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst.
The truth is. Gavin was out of his depth as a commander.
@@TomThumb-d1r I think he was an excellent Commander in general, but he just fecked up here, or communication with his 508th PIR Colonel Lindquist failed. No doubt, the 82nd and 101st AB Divisions (just like their British counterparts) were superb fighting units.
Best analytical book on MG is by Swedish author Christer Bergstrom - the second volume - and it holds no punches as to where the primary responsibility for its failure should lie.
I worked with a XXX Corps veteran in the early 1980s. I asked him if he had seen 'A Bridge Too Far'. He was furious about the film as he said that they turned up at the bridge expecting it to be open for them to advance and found the 82nd hadn't done this. As he put it 'they were the ones sitting around doing nothing - but they were drinking coffee not tea!'
Vandeleur had time for champagne with a female war correspondent
@@nickdanger3802 ...and do you know *why* (according to Cornelius Ryan) Joe Vandeleur had time to drink champagne in the first place?
Because it was Day 3/4 of the Operation, and Guards Armoured was stuck waiting around on the southern side of the Waal while Corps command was busy formulating a plan to make good Gavin's failure to take the bridge on Day 1!
@@skibbideeskitch9894 according to Beevor he also had a swim while he waited for hours for a tac air mission he had called.
any tac air missions called on Nijmegen ?
@@nickdanger3802 Beevor 🤣
@@nickdanger3802 heck if it had been an american, correspondent would have been assaulted
The British tanks completed the crossing at 1830 hours not 1900 hours, its in divisional 82nd US and several official British war office records. The first attempt was made at 1813 hours, and the second attempt at 1820 hours. There is some confusion as to which time zone various people were quoting (they were an hour apart), but the 82nd Divisional post-battle records actually includes a sketch that shows the British tanks completed the crossing at 1830 hours, and the first US troops at the bridge were just a handful at 1915 hours. The US troops then arrived in some larger force there at 1938 hours. US 82nd Division Captain Kappell (who was responsible for writing the post battle report), stated that at 1830 hours ........"at this time British tanks were already on the north shore".
Carrington claimed that crossing the bridge under the risk of detonation was the longest three minutes of his life' so at full speed at 30mph they did not hang around on it.
Otherwise, it is an excellent analysis, much of which I have been researching over some years, looking at the same documents you examine. So congratulations on an otherwise excellent piece of work. You will still get the usual detractors trying to lay blame at 30 Corps though (I can actually name two of the most likely detractors), a refusal to accept that any blame lays elsewhere despite the presentation of facts.
I think the US commanders were subsequently trying to make up for their inaction since arriving on 17th September, and failing to take the Nijmegen road-bridge that same day. The Grenadier Guards and US 505th PIR actually did most of the work, clearing the Germans out of the town and taking the crucial southern end of the bridge. The 504th PIR were absolutely heroic but they were on their last legs and running out of ammunition on the northern shore, but despite what Burriss subsequently claimed, they were nearly a mile away from the main bridge. His arrival actually coincided with the second troop of tanks forty-five minutes later, when things were much quieter, as Burris himself acknowledges. The 4 British tanks that actually took the bridge were fired upon all the way across, under heavy fire with two tanks taken out. A totally different scenario to what Burriss described. Maybe he did believe he was the first to arrive, but actually I very much doubt it. Sadly, I think it was simply part of a concerted campaign to shove the blame onto 30 Corps. But they have been found out!
Furthermore, on the evening of the 20th, most of 30 Corps were either back along the line resecuring route 69 in 101st Division's sector or in the case of the Coldstream and Welsh Guards helping out the American 82nd on their rear Nijmegen perimeter. And for anyone (like Burriss) trying to say there was just a single heavy gun between Nijmegen and Arnhem that night, guess what, this is another myth, as you rightly highlight. Within 2-3 miles were situated up to 24 heavy guns that night, though several may have been taken out that morning in RAF raids, though the vast majority were still active. Most of these were not 88 mm guns but captured French 75mm guns which had a very similar profile to the famous German gun.
It is increasingly becoming perfectly clear that there has been a lot of embellishment on behalf of certain US troops - 30 Corps were actually at Nijmegen in 42 hours and well under two days, from the time of 1400 hours on the 17th September that 1st Allied Airborne Army Commander permitted ground forces to move - mud sticks etc but it is disgusting.
Thank you for putting the record straight, even in a Play Station-3 war game they actually laugh at how slow the British was at reaching tha Falais gap, what they failed to say was the British & Canadians took on 10-devitions of the cream off the Germans panzer deviation, sorry about my spelling, & the Americans had to face just 1
It would not even be an issue if the American commanders had obeyed orders and gone straight for the bridge instead of wasting time securing their eastern flank against a non-existent threat. Unfortunately a repeat of Freyburg's mistake on Crete.
Most excellent presentation of reality.
Burriss even claimed there was "whole Corps of tanks" there that just sat and did nothing. Only 5 tanks got across that night, and 2 of those were damaged. The rest of the Corps tanks were split up and dispersed over 20 miles supporting the 82nd Airborne here there and everywhere.
@@rhannay39 how many bridges captured (that means both ends) by 1st AB ?
"securing their eastern flank against a non-existent threat"
British AO, British intel
@@nickdanger3802 British intel informed them that there was no threat but that intel was ignored.
Many years ago i was visiting my grand parents house with my father in Great Wakering , Essex. ( probably mid 70s ) As we walked up to the house a large bear of a man on a bike called out to my father. I was then introduced to ( Sgt ) Peter Robinson a lovely old guy. Later on my father explained about his escapades in Nijmegen etc which i googled years later. As a young boy this was so exciting. Peter and my grand father were very good friends and he recalled an incident that happened after the war . My father , grand father and Peter were going fishing up towards Wakering Creek . They were in an old car with my grand father driving. As they got towards the creek there was a German Prisoner of War camp nearby. As the war had ended they were allowed to work on the land. However Peter spotted two of the Germans walking arm in arm with some local girls. My father remembered that Peter went absolutely mad at this having seen his friends and comrades killed in action and tried to get out of the moving car to attack the Germans with his bare hands. My grand father who realized that Peter would seriously hurt the Germans ( or worse ), accelerated and had to physically fight him off from trying to stop the car .Luckily for them he managed to get away.
The vid omits that no US troops were on the bridge when taken by the tanks. Once the two leading tanks of Pacey and Robinson got past the bridge obstacles at the northern end, Pacey stopped expecting to see American troops. The War Office report states: _“At this point, Pacey stopped, he was not sure where to go as no Americans were seen, so Sergeant Robinson passed him and led on. Much to their surprise, they could not see any Americans so having passed through the concrete chicane they pushed on._
They didn't come across any American troops until they got to Lent, one kilometre from the bridge.
@@lyndoncmp5751
Correct. The second wave of tanks 45 mins later at 1915hr, inc Carington's lone tank, met the just arrived 82nd men at the riverbank, about 15 of them. One was killed by a German sniper in the bridge girders. At 1938hr the 82nd men arrived in greater force at the riverbank.
The tanks went over in three waves. 1st was four tanks (two hit), 45 minutes later the 2nd wave, which was one tank, 3rd wave soon after was three. The last three are questionable as they could have been armoured cars.
Right!? And just how did the British tanks clear the bridge head on the Nijmegen end of the bridge ? They didn't it was the 82nd that the bridge so they could cross.
@@grayharker6271There were Germans on the north end of the bridge when the tanks crossed and engaged them. That's how the tanks got battle damage. The 82nd didn't clear the end of the bridge. The 82nd was a kilometre to the north at the railway viaduct in Lent.
@@lyndoncmp5751
Two of the four tanks running over the bridge were hit because the 82nd never cleared the north end of the bridge. No 82nd men were on the bridge when the tanks went over. They even stopped to look around for 82nd men, seeing none.
U.S. 82nd Division records state that the first troop of British tanks, four of them, crossed the Waal road bridge at *1830 hours.* Two tanks were hit with the crews taken POW bar one, Sgt Knight. The tanks charged across at full speed approaching 30 mph firing against German guns all the way, with a few hundred high in the girders. Gunner Leslie Johnson in the lead tank said: _“They were falling like nine-pins. The incoming fire was so heavy that I swear to this day that Jesus Christ rode on the front of our tank. The Germans were so close that I didn’t bother to look through my sights. We could feel the tracks going over them as we shot them down, and there was blood and gore all over the tank.”_
Once the two leading tanks of Pacey and Robinson got past the bridge obstacles at the northern end, Pacey stopped. The War Office report states:
_“At this point, Pacey stopped, he was not sure where to go as no Americans were seen, so Sergeant Robinson passed him and led on. Much to their surprise, they could not see any Americans so having passed through the concrete chicane they pushed on. Having crossed the road bridge, the four tanks moved down the northern embankment, where they destroyed another anti tank gun. Robinson and Pacey found themselves in a running battle against more guns, and against German infantry who poured out of the church in Lent, and then 1,500 yards further down the road from the bridge, where the main road goes under the railway line, contact was at last made with some Americans, both were very happy to see each other."_
The 82nd men at Lent reached Lent following the railway embankment from the riverbank using it for cover. The first American troops that arrived at the bridge approaches/waterside after moving along the riverbank from their river landing point with Burriss’ company of about sixteen men, was at *1915* hours. *45 minutes.* after the first tanks had already crossed. This was not the main bridge span, just the raised approach road over land. Official U.S. records confirm that 82nd troops from the 504th arrived at the northern road bridge approaches at *1938 hours.* This would be the time they arrived in any real strength to consolidate, *one hour 8 mins* after the first tank crossed. The records state at *1938 hours:*
_“All seemed quiet at this point, with the enemy disorganised and in great confusion, suffering heavy losses. Prior to the physical occupation of the northern end of the bridge by 504th PIR, eight British light tanks had [already] crossed. Two of these were destroyed just north of the bridge”._ The second troop of tanks crossed at least half an hour after the first. Burris was there under the approach road when the second troop rolled over, thinking they were the first tanks over. Lord Carington's tank was one of them. Eight rolled over the bridge, with two hit, being there to consolidate the bridgehead and ensure the Germans did not take the bridge back.
Horrock of XXX Corps in his plan had the 43 Wessex infantry to seize the ground from Nijmegen bridge to Arnhem, destroying anti-tank weapons. It was not tank country. The tanks were to follow behind the infantry. The tanks would have been sitting ducks if they went first. The 43rd Wessex were to do the river crossing in two columns. There was a contingency planned if the bridge was blown. The Wessex were to use dedicated assault boats, which they had in Nijmegen, and DUKW amphibious craft. But to save face as they failed to seize the bridge, Gavin of the 82nd pestered Horrocks for his men to do the crossing, Horrocks agreed. It appears that the 82nd did not know of the DUKW amphibious craft using collapsible bridge engineers boats to cross the Waal. Or the Wessex did not want to give them fearing the valuable craft would be lost with an 82nd river assault failure - that needs more research.
Not one 82nd man was on the bridge when the first troop of four tanks crossed at *1830,* or at *1915* when the second troop of four went over. Official XXX Corps records from the War Office highlight that the successful tank attack on the road bridge was at *1830 hours.*
Thirty-four machine guns, an 88mm gun, and two 20mm cannons were found to be on the road bridge itself, and at least six anti-tank guns and a few 88mm guns were situated around the northern end.
All this nonsense of drinking tea by the British tankers disinterested in the battle seems to have started as an American diversion, after inquiries by the Official US historian Charles MacDonald into why the Nijmegen bridges were not taken on the first day.
Typical?
An excellent exposition. It's a pity that we can't generally discuss the friction or war without people sniping at each other. I hate nationalism.
Charles MacDonald very casually discards it as even being an issue, saying that there was "no incentive for urgency over taking the Nijmegen Bridge as XXX Corps were yet in Eindhoven" - when XXX Corps were already at the Zon.
The official history and subsequent memoirs have been vehicles to try and repair a few reputations and shift blame to others.
@@gust0o
Where does Charles MacDonald say: _"no incentive for urgency over taking the Nijmegen Bridge as XXX Corps were yet in Eindhoven"_
@@johnburns4017 in the US Official History. The additional quote from Macdonald's is "According to this theory, General Gavin had another full day to tackle the Germans at Nijmegen" - pretty sure same source, although it might be Time for Trumpets as I'm reading off my own notes for that one.
Did strike me as a pretty casual dismissal.
This is a very informative video. I live just a few hundred meters from the bridge. The story from the Americans crossing the river is well know in town, since a new bridge has been build where they crossed the river. And every night a veteran follows the light that turn on one after the other to honor the fallen Americans during the crossing.
The story of the tanks pressing on to the north of Lent while the Germans were still in Lent and Nijmegen. Is also very impressive. We in Nijmegen should do more to honor those also.
Glad to know how it went, will tell kids and friends about. When this situations arises.
So the Americans lied again! I saw a TV documentary on the crossing of the Waal at Nijmegen and it featured one of the American commanders who crossed the river at this point in flimsy boats. The Americans certainly suffered greatly in getting across the river and lost a lot of troops. One can only admire the courage and the sheer grit of the American soldiers. But the American commander in that TV programme certainly blamed Carrington - and even named him - for failing to take out the anti-tank gun at Lent. Btw: he said that there was only one a/t gun, not two as in this video. So I doubt his word.
This is the second time that I have read of a cocky Yank supposedly putting his gun against the head of a supposedly cowardly member of the British armed forces. The first was in one of the books by Stephen Ambrose. He wrote that an American officer put his revolver against the head of a Royal Navy sailor who was the coxswain on a landing craft taking American troops into Omaha beach. Under pressure from British historians and journalists, Ambrose later admitted that he made this story up. This is disgusting behaviour. British people have never had a problem with ordinary American soldiers. But there is a problem with some of their commanders and historians.
'British people have never had a problem with ordinary American soldiers. But there is a problem with some of their commanders and historians.'
And also, there is a problem with their film makers.
According to Robinson it was an assault gun covering the underpass where the main highway crosses under the embanked rail line at the north end of Lent. The 10.SS-Panzer-Division had just four StuG IIIG assault guns concentrated in the 7.Kompanie of II./SS-Panzer-Regiment 10. When the division was initially raised as a panzergrenadier-division in 1943 and Hitler ordered the 9 and 10 divisions to be converted to panzer-divisions, the StuG Abteilung was reorganised into 7 and 8.Kompanien of the new Panzer-Regiment and the remainder of the II.Abteilung equipped with Panzer IV. The 16 Panzer IV in the 5.Kompanie could not be ferried over the river at Pannerden, they were too heavy, but the four StuGs arrived in Nijmegen and split two to each bridgehead in the city, road and rail.
In the October returns the division still reported 3 StuGs on strength, so either a reported loss by the Grenadier Guards in the rail bridgehead (at the Hezelpoort rail underpass) on 19 September, or the loss outside the Lent church mentioned in this video must be incorrect. Lent has two churches, like many Dutch communities, Catholic and Protestant, and I haven't heard of a StuG knocked out here before. The remaining 3 StuGs were successfully withdrawn to the Lent side of the river, probably two in the direction of Bemmel to the east, and one we know was at the Lent underpass blocking Robinson and later withdrawn to the blocking line at the Stationsstraat crossroads between Oosterhout and Ressen, where the Irish Guards were stopped the next day.
The 504th troopers from 'G' Company at the Lent underpass that met Robinson's two tanks were unable to stalk the assault gun as they were out of bazooka rounds, added to the fact it was now well after dark, the priority was to consolidate the bridgehead and prepare for a possible immediate counter-attack, which was the German doctrine.
Great analysis and detail to counter rumour and stories. It is crazy to criticise the British for not pushing forward with half a troop of tanks unsupported while still in close combat in Nijmegen.
Hollywood wrote this version of history.
British XXX Corps arrived at Nijmegen on time, but the Americans failed to take the Nijmegen bridge, the British had to take it for them.
Gavin screwed up, he failed to take the bridge at Nijmegen, seeing it as a secondary matter to protecting his Eastern flank from a phantom German tank army! Read Robin Neillands book The Battle for the Rhine 1944: Arnhem and the Ardennes, the Campaign in Europe.
This history book is not the Hollywood film version of Arnhem but a well researched book.
Gavin's poor choices, warts and all, different chains of command back to Washington, lack of strategic vision by Eisenhower, duplicity of Ike's subordinate commanders and the huge level of American corruption in supplying its Armies in Europe all contributed to this American led failure.
no reading allowed! Only fictional movies will be used as our sources
Pure Bull Shit.
None of the Airborne Divisions accomplished all their objectives without XXX Corps help. There were to many of them and the Germans got a say in things.
The 82nd Eventually accomplished all their objectives - with XXX Corps help.
1st Airborne accomplished NONE of theirs partly because - as the farthest away - XXX Corps couldn't get to them.
Most importantly 1st Aiborne failed to accomplish taking both ends of the Arnhem Highway Bridge.
That mean that the Germans could have blown it up any time they wanted.
If XXX Corps were about to take the South End of the Arnhem Highway Bridge - the Germans would have blown it up.
Are you to stupid to see that?
.
The more you learn about Market Garden the more you realize how much of a disaster General Gavin was for whole operation. First, he fails to secure the bridge at Nijmegen on day one. Then, he fails to engage German reinforcements moving into Nijmegen over the bridges over the next two days, allowing them to dig in and fortify their positions. This meant XXX Corps had to clear Nijmegen itself before capturing the main road bridge themselves. They essentially had to do Gavin's job for him. The Americans then have the gall to blame the British.
before 740 men had even arrived at the last intact bridge in Arnhem area, 82nd had captured the bridge north of Grave (longest road bridge in Europe at the time), the last intact bridge over the Maas Waal canal and the Heights for Brownings' useless HQ brought in by 38 of 1st AB's gliders (capacity 1,000 infantrymen)
In Gavin’s defence he simply had too many objectives for the force he had available on the first day. At Nijmegen itself Gavin was given the dilemma of either capturing the bridge immediately and leaving the Grossbeek Heights poorly defended thus leaving his landing fields vulnerable to flanking attacks. As it was he secured the landing fields first allowing the Germans to reinforce the bridge. Difficult to say if he made the right or wrong decision, the result of the choice made is clear, but given that German strength was much greater than planners anticipated it is possible that if the alternative was chosen the units around Nijmegen could have found themselves in a similar situation to the Brits in Arnhem - cut off from re-supply and forced into urban fighting against superior forces.
@@robertshiell887 Which is why he was absolutely the wrong person for the job. The whole purpose of the operation was to capture the bridges so that XXX Corps could get the Arnhem quickly. Regardless of the flanks, the bridges were to be put first above everything else. He failed the most basic task.
@@thebrigadier1496
how many bridges captured (that means both ends) by 1st AB ?
@@nickdanger3802 1st AB capturing the north end of their bridge while facing the heaviest German counter attacks with the heaviest armour. Gavin didn't even capture one side of the Waal bridge when it was only guarded by a dozen infantry. He then let the enemy hold the rail bridge and move reinforcements over both bridges with no resistance over two days.
If the Nijmegen bridge, had been captured on day 1, all of this could have been avoided.
As with any good plan, after its implementation the enemy has a major say in whether it gets changed, the fact of major German forces where there were expected to be resting units was a change the plan didnt need but got anyway
Yes the bridge was a second thought of Gavin and should have been taken immediately. It is interesting to read the facts but the yanks blame the British.
FYI XXX Corps crossed the 1st Bridge w/c is Son after 36 Hrs second main Bridge was Grave w/c 82nd AA captured intact on day one Sept 17. Interesting to note as well that XXX Corps did not advance till "2pm of Sept 17".
@@elmersalonga6424 30 Corps could not advance earlier in the day, as they had to wait until First Allied Airborne were overhead. There had already been 15 airborne operations cancelled, and until those transports and gliders were overhead, Horrocks could not be certain that this was not going to end the same way.
Also, if Horrocks had got moving earlier, it would have potentially given the game away and led to the probability that the bridges would have been destroyed.
This is also one of the major reasons why Market Garden had to happen before the clearing of the Scheldt was complete, as the Germans would simply have blown up every bridge over every waterway making every river and canal an amphibious crossing.
Almost all of the time lost in building the Bailey Bridge over the Son was made up for between Son and Grave, as 30 Corps covered that distance in about two hours, only to be informed that the bridge at Nijmegen was still in German hands.
@@sean640307 Yes I know about the 1st Airbornes cancelled Op SHAEF was being pressured by Gen Arnold at the behest of CoS Marshal because he wanted to see the "Strategic Use of an Airborne Army".
Its not really Op MG but OP Market plus Garden.
The thing with XXX Corps being on time is now being a tricky bit, of course elements of the Guards Armor reaching the "objective/Bridges as fast as they can was a priority will they have enough Force to punch thru Arnhem? The thing with OP MG there is a lot of materials on Airborne Action but not a lot with XXX Corps. The Narrow Route Rd dubbed as Hell Highway,Club Route was a concern at the inception of the Plan...And looking at the German Counter-Attacks at XXX Corps Route of advance at the start Valkenswaard,Sint Oedenrode and Eerde, it now hard to see that the XXX Corps was reaching the objective on time! And just because Elements of the Guards Armor was reaching the Bridges on time it doesn't meant that they have the Force to Punch thru Arnhem. Case in point only 3 Tanks has crossed Nijmegen because the "Main Force was tied up at Hells Highway.
Was the Nimjegen bridge not supposed to secured by the 82nd on day 1, is the tea break story not a blame shift.
Yes absolutely, and I think yes. I do think much of the rancour comes from guilt or embarrassment and the natural response is a cover up - MARKET GARDENGATE anyone? Apart from the USAAF air commanders compromsing the operation by scheduling all flights in daylight and deleting Browning's proposed double airlifts on D-Day and the glider coup de main assaults on the main bridges, Gavin compromised his own divisional plan by discarding a British request to drop a battalion on the northern end of the Nijmegen bridge to seize it by coup de main, because of his experience in Sicily he told Cornelius Ryan. He then compounded it by assigning his least aggressive and experienced regiment - the 508th PIR - to the critical Nijmegen mission, instructing Colonel Lindquist to send his 1st Battalion directly to the bridge after landing on D-Day. Lindquist was not a good field commander (he was a gifted administrator) and had not performed well in Normandy on the 508th's first operation, and he simply did not understand the urgency of moving the battalion as soon as it hit the ground, thinking he had to clear the drop zone and secure his other objectives first.
Lindquist did send a reinforced platoon recon patrol to check on the condition of the bridge, despite already getting a first hand report from Dutch resistance leader Geert van Hees at the initial objective on the Groesbeek ridge that the Germans had deserted Nijmegen and left only 18 men guarding the bridge, but apart from three scouts from the 1st Battalion S-2 (Intel) Section, the patrol got lost and couldn't find the way to the bridge. The delay allowed the 10.SS-panzer-Division to send units into the city and reinforce its bridges.
Despite the default XXX Corps plan for a scenario in which the Nijmegen bridges were still intact, but strongly held by the enemy, being an assault crossing of the Waal to the west by 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division with either one brigade (operation BESSIE) or two brigades up (operation BASIL), Gavin twice intervened to insist on using his own troops to make the crossing and asked for boats to be supplied. Although 43rd Division was put on a warning order for BASIL on 19 September, Gavin's plan was accepted the second time of asking and there was a debacle in supplying the boats because it was assumed they would have to be brought up the corridor from supplies in Belgium. Nobody had thought to ask the Royal Engineers in Guards Armoured Division for their boats - they actually had 34 already at Nijmegen. It's most likely these were the 26 finally used, after an artillery shell hit one of the trucks in Nijmegen, losing 8 boats.
Sources:
Notes on meeting with J.M. Gavin, Boston, January 20, 1967 (box 101 folder 10: James Maurice Gavin, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University)
Bridging The Club Route - Guards Armoured Division’s Engineers During Operation Market Garden, John Sliz (2015, 2016)
September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, John C McManus (2012)
Put Us Down In Hell - The Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke (2012)
Yes and yes, lol, but it is a game of musical chairs as to who is to blame. General Gavin stated he was ordered to take the Maas-Waal canal bridge, the Grave bridge as well as securing the Groesbeek Heights to the east of Nijmegen to prevent a German counter attack from the Reichswald forest, to prevent German artillery spotters working from the heights and to keep the landing zones clear for follow up drops. Only then was he to proceed to the Nijmegen bridge and secure it. He states that Browning agreed with these orders.
However since then there has been a blame game. Browning states Gavin worked off his own initiative and didn't send men to Nijmegen until is was to late. Gavin also stated he gave Lt.Col Linquist of the 508th a verbal order to send men to the Nijmegen bridge straight after dropping, but Linquist says as far as he understood his orders he was to secure the bridges he had been tasked with first, and only then send men north to Nijmegen. Supposedly the 508th were still sitting around having taken their assigned bridges at 1800 when Gavin asked if they had secured the Nijmegen bridge yet, which they had not even marched on.
@@ukmediawarrior This is also similar to the Falaise Gap controversy.
@@ukmediawarrior - Browning wanted all the key bridges taken as quickly as possible on D-Day and this included the Nijmegen highway bridge. He first had the three main bridges at Arnhem-Nijmegen-Grave planned to be taken by glider coup de main assaults in Operation COMET. After that operation was cancelled, the proposed replacement operation SIXTEEN expanded on the same plan by adding the US divisions at Nijmegen-Grave (82nd) and to secure the corridor between Valkenswaard and Uden (101st). Brereton and Williams removed the double airlift and the dawn glider assaults by deciding to conduct all flights in daylight for MARKET. Then, Gavin told Cornelius Ryan:
'The British wanted him, he said, to drop a battalion on the northern end of the bridge and take it by coup de main. Gavin toyed with the idea and then discarded it because of his experience in Sicily. There, his units had been scattered and he found himself commanding four or five men on the first day. For days afterward, the division was completely disorganized.
Instead, and in effect, Gavin decided to operated [sic] out of what he described as a "power center"; broadly, a strong, centralized circle of power from which he could move in strength upon his objectives. That power center was located, for the most part, in the Groesbeek heights area.'
(box 101, folder 10: James Maurice Gavin, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University)
The Maas-Waal canal bridges would be attacked on D-Day by the 504th and 505th at Heumen and Malden. The 508th was to take the Groesbeek ridge, less D Company to clear the drop zone and 1st Battalion to take the Nijmegen bridge. Lindquist was given the instruction to take the Nijmegen bridge two days before take-off, not after landing. Gavin stated this in a letter to US Historical Officer Captain Westover in a 17 July 1945 letter:
"About 48 hours prior to take-off, when the entire plan appeared to be shaping up well, I personally directed Colonel Lindquist, commanding the 508th Parachute Infantry, to commit his first battalion against the Nijmegen bridge without delay after landing, but to keep a very close watch on it in the event he needed it to protect himself against the Reichswald. So I personally directed him to commit his first battalion to this task. He was cautioned to send the battalion via the flat ground east of the city."
He re-iterated this again in his 20 January 1967 interview with Cornelius Ryan:
'Gavin confirms he ordered Lindquist to commit a battalion to the capture of the Nijmegen bridge before the jump. He also confirms he told Lindquist not to go to the bridge by way of the town but to approach it along some mud flats to the east.'
(box 101, folder 10: James Maurice Gavin, Cornelius Ryan Collection, Ohio State University)
This has been further confirmed by eye-witness accounts in two books published in 2012:
As Gavin finished his briefing, the British General [Browning] cautioned him: “Although every effort should be made to effect the capture of the Grave and Nijmegen bridges, it is essential that you capture the Groesbeek ridge and hold it.”
General Gavin did have some appreciation of this. At an earlier meeting with his regimental commanders, he [Gavin] had told Colonel Roy Lindquist of the 508th Parachute Infantry that even though his primary mission was to hold the high ground at Berg en Dal near Groesbeek, he was also to send his 1st Battalion into Nijmegen to take the key road bridge. Gavin told Lindquist to push for the bridge via "the flatland to the east of the city and approach it over the farms without going through the built-up area." Gavin considered this so important that he stood with Lindquist over a map and showed him this route of advance.
At the same time, Colonel Lindquist had trouble reconciling Gavin's priorities for the two ambitious objectives of holding Berg en Dal and grabbing the bridge. He believed that Gavin wanted him to push for the bridge only when he had secured the critical glider landing zones and other high ground. According to Lindquist, his impression was that "we must first accomplish our main mission before sending any sizeable force to the bridge." Actually, General Gavin wanted the 508th to do both at the same time, but somehow this did not sink into the 508th's leadership. "If General Gavin wanted Col Lindquist to send a battalion for the bridge immediately after the drop, he certainly did not make that clear to him," Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Shanley, the executive officer of the 508th, later wrote.
Perhaps this was a miscommunication on Gavin's part, probably not. Lieutenant Colonel Norton, the G-3, was present for the conversation (Shanley was not) and recorded Gavin's clear instructions to Lindquist: "Seize the high ground in the vicinity of Berg en Dal as his primary mission and ... attempt to seize the Nijmegen bridge with a small force, not to exceed a battalion."
(September Hope - The American Side of a Bridge Too Far, John C McManus 2012)
Captain Chet Graham was assigned as the regimental liaison officer with division headquarters. "I sat in on a high level briefing at division headquarters. Colonel Lindquist was told by General Gavin to move to the Nijmegen bridge as soon as Lindquist thought practical after the jump. Gavin stressed that speed was important. He was also told to stay out of the city and to avoid city streets. He told Lindquist to use the west farm area to get to the bridge as quickly as possible as the bridge was the key to the division's contribution to the success of the operation."
(Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke 2012)
It was only later in the day when Gavin started receiving reports on initial progress that he found out the battalion was not moving on the bridge:
Captain Chet Graham, the regimental liaison officer with division headquarters, decided to obtain a status of the progress toward the capture of the Nijmegen highway bridge. "I went to the 508th regimental CP and asked Colonel Lindquist when he planned to send the 3rd Battalion to the bridge. His answer was, 'As soon as the DZ is cleared and secured. Tell General Gavin that.' So I went through Indian country to the division CP and relayed Lindquist's message to Gavin. I never saw Gavin so mad. As he climbed into his Jeep, he told me, 'come with me - let's get him moving.' On arriving at the 508th regimental CP, Gavin told Lindquist, 'I told you to move with speed.' "
At about 8:00 P.M., Colonel Lindquist ordered Lieutenant Colonel Warren, the commander of the 1st Battalion, to seize the Nijmegen highway bridge. It was an order that Warren wasn’t expecting. “This was the first time the battalion was told it was to secure this bridge. By the time the battalion minus [Company C, one section of 81mm mortars, and one section of machine guns] was assembled from its rather wide defensive positions, it was well after dark.”
“A Dutch Underground worker [Geert van Hees] who had contacted regimental headquarters had stated that the highway bridge over the Waal River was defended by a noncommissioned officer and seventeen men. This Dutch patriot also volunteered to guide the battalion into town.”
(Put Us Down In Hell - A Combat History of the 508th PIR in WW2, Phil Nordyke 2012)
@@davemac1197Excellent post, as usual. 👍
I've been saying this for years. I'm glad to see many young Brits are finally seeing this nonsense for the utter shite that it is. Unfortunately most Americans still believe it and it's a shame. It's a shame that they feel it necessary to make up derogatory things about British servicemen to stroke their ego's instead of just letting the brave actions of American servicemen speak for themselves.
Summarised perfectly. You can see the anger and frustration on this thread.
I am not an American but rather an Australian and the British had trouble with showing initiative especially in units like the Guards. Australians, Canadians, New Zealanders even Americans who didn't have the same spit and polish training did much better at using individual initiative which was what the Germans were taught right down to squad level. The Poms had some very good soldiers like John Frost but too many others were always waiting for orders before they moved
@@tonyolivari2480 This is just not true, there was plenty of initiative demonstrated by the British when the 11th Armoured Division captured Brussels and Antwerp, after a rapid advance of 260 miles in 6 days. For the record that’s faster than George Patton moved.
@@tonyolivari2480 funny you should say that. As during the course of WW2 the "poms" worked hard to develop units made of of Soldiers who acted off their own initiative such as the Commandos and the SAS. And the officers behind the development of those units had a tendency to come from spit and polish regiments.
David Stirling (SAS founder) Scots Guards
Jock Lewes (developed the SAS) Welsh Guards
Robert Laycock (established the Commandos) Royal Horse Guards
Simon Fraser (led the Commandos at D-day) Scots Guards
Even today the Guards have their own platoon in the Parachute Regiment and G squadron SAS tend to recruit from Guards regiments.
Being a tightly disciplined unit does not render men incapable of independent thought.
@@Apollo890 Absolutely, and also the 11th Armoured was one of the most forward thinking tank divisions under Pip Roberts.
As soon as you said they were the Guards Armoured Division I knew they were not part time militia but a renown honourable troop. I think the Colonel has his wires crossed with another meeting or was beefing up his cowardice
Just so people know, the U.S. Army installed thirty-two mobile, trailer-mounted coffee-roasting and grinding units attached to field bakeries in July 1944, each operated by six specially-trained men. These units produced 90,000 lbs of coffee a day, every day.
I guess they never stopped for coffee and doughnuts though (:-.
Lend Leased to British Empire
36,998 pounds tea line 13 page 38
10,032 pounds coffee line 4 page 35
299,999 pounds sugar line 11 page 38
54,600 cart. Cigarettes, American Assorted line 2 page 35
584,756 pounds Milk, Evaporated, Canned line 10 page 36
1,000 pounds Mustard, (Dry, English) line 13 page 36
1,060 imp. gal. Sauce, Ketchup, Worchester line 4 page 38
Lend Lease Shipments Quartermaster
@@nickdanger3802 And what has that got to do with coffee and doughnuts on the battlefield?
@@nickdanger3802 I had a cheese toastie for lunch
We have all seen the great Movie a Bridge to Far and remember this part. I'm a Vietnam Combat Veteran and I know how stories get started that could possibly be true but nobody takes the time to investigate if it is. I throughout my life have studied WW2 history and I always thought this incident went against all I have known about the bravery of the British Soldier or Sailor. Thank you for correcting this story.
Hi from Germany! There were military sinulations before September about the way from Elst to Arnheim. The conclusion of this "game" was, that it's impossible and nothing but a "road to suicide" for the British tanks. Unfortunately Montgomery ignored the conclusion of the simulation.
@@Cadfael007 in fact , Montgomery did not have a hell of a lot of input to Market Garden. The main movers and shakers of this operation were Brereton and Browning . The first pretty incompetent, the second pretty arrogant.
First off people should know better than to take history lessons from movies, that's a good way of getting yourself in a bind in life.
That said, people seem to misinterpret that scene in the movie, it's like their brains shut down right after Robert Redford delivers his line, it's NEVER implied that the British were stopping FOR THE SAKE OF HAVING TEA, only that since they're stopped they're having it, I don't know how things work in other armies but the one I was in no matter what the reason is for stopping you eat, sleep (catnaps), piss, and do all the other things you can to take advantage of being stopped and having the opportunity to do it, given the British well known love for having tea why in the world wouldn't they if they were stopped? Of course they would, they like tea, why wouldn't they have some when they were stopped? The American GI's were probably drinking Coca-Cola or moonshine or whatever their favorite beverage was growing up.
If everyone would follow the movie beyond what Robert Redford's character says the British tank commander clearly says that they can't go on without support, which is what really happened after something like 5 British tanks rushed forward with all but one getting knocked out.
To me movies about historical events aren't history lessons, but I do use them to spark an interest in something that if I'm intrigued enough I find credible sources to do the research on it.
@@dukecraig2402 Thank you! I've never served in any capacity, but the novels I've read bear out exactly what you said, to whit, in the forces you never know when you will have the opportunity to eat and/or sleep again so you take any opportunity that presents itself. Nice to hear from an actual vet that the fiction gets that right! :)
Monty demanded and got this debacle ignoring how easy it was to defend one road elevated for 55 of the 70 miles. Field Marshall Walter Model against monty would be like Ghengis Khan against Tinkerbell - the tainted waif never showed up. To make matters worse general Kurt Student was there too and had landed in that area 4 yrs earlier, yup, MONTY GARDEN
According to General Horrocks, after the four Shermans stormed the bridge, no other tanks were available to cross the bridge because they were all heavily engaged in fierce fighting in Niijmegen, and so it would have been suicide for a few tanks on their own, at night, to have tried to reach Arnhem, even if the road was undefended, because there were no forces available because they were all tied down in Niijmegen. Thank you for putting the record straight.
What, Gavin did not take the bridge for three days!
The Guards tanks were indeed split up and dispersed over 20 miles supporting the 82nd Airborne here there and everywhere. Even at the time the 504th PIR were crossing the river in boats the Germans opened up a counter attack at Mook and the Coldstream Guards tanks were requested to help out by Bill Eckman of the 505th PIR which was in danger of being overrun there at Mook.
not the only reason, tanks had used up most ammo in support of river crossing and no arrangements had been made for resupply or for British infantry to support an advance
@@nickdanger3802The Guards Armoured Division had to deviate from their mission, which was to drive up the road to Arnhem. The various Guards tank groups (Grenadier Guards, Coldstream Guards, Irish Guards and Welsh Guards) had to be split up and dispersed over 20 miles supporting the 82nd Airborne here there and everywhere.
Due to Brereton's stubbornness in insisting on 3 day drops the 82nd were short of reinforcements as they didn't arrive because of the weather and so the Guards tanks had to be used in that role all over the landing sector after the 82nd requested their assistance to help combat German counter attacks. This took up precious ammo and fuel. This was not foreseen to happen. The Guards tanks were not supposed to be parcelled out all over the place.
Nijmegen was supposed to be taken and cleared by the 82nd before they got there.
The 82nd fluffed their lines in Nijmegen for various reasons, but I suspect a lot the dodgy 'recollections' are down to them wanting to hide the fact that XXX corps had to take the town and bridge that were their day 1 objectives, and the reason they couldn't advance to arnhem was the force that should have been available to do that was busy. The germans in Nijmegen when the Guards arrived were not in Nijmegen 3 days earlier when 82nd airborne arrived, and if the 82nd had done what Frost did at arnhem, this story would have been dramatically different.
Brilliant Video.
Thank You for correcting the miss information and protecting the legacy of the British troops.
Cheers
A Bridge Too Far is one of my favourite movies, but it did contain numerous inaccuracies. I didn't realize the 'stopping for tea' was one of them.
There was the soldier who dies retrieving a supply cannister containing berets... he actually survived and was understandably annoyed about risking his life for a cannister of berets.
The officer with the umbrella dying... the real officer survived.(there's a youtube video about him.)
Essentially, the movie seemed to place the blame on the British.... the Americans, of course, did everything right.
The movie shows a line of Shermans sitting idly... not two. Also, the movie only depicts the assault on one bridge... I wasn't aware there were two until now.
directed by Baron Attenborough, CBE
nominated for 8 BAFTA's, won 4
not nominated for any Academy Awards
Financed by Americans and with eyes on making a lot of money in the most lucrative market, the USA. The real 'villain' of Market Garden, Brereton, was not even mentioned anywhere in the film. Nor his equally cautious fellow USAAF general Paul Williams. Both were conveniently omitted from the film.
The "active" Americans and "slow" British meme is a continuation of the American revolutionary war mythology. The opposite is invariably the case. Taking the wrong bridge and then being saved by Guards' Armed wouldn't maintain their favourite mythology of independent vitality.
@@nickdanger3802- Not really, he proposed the plan to Eisenhower and Eisenhower agreed to the plan and totally support it. Even Patton was impressed by it too that he got on board with it, since if the operation did succeed it would totally knock out German war production and cut off all supply to most Germany, ending the war much sooner . It's a joint British American operation.
Most of the Planning was done by General Browning but was alarmed at such an ambitious operation and hearing reports of bigger German presence. He and Monty asks for more Aircraft and Gliders so they can fly and drop all the Airborne troops in their target in one day in order to take the Germans by suprise. Unfortunately they can only came up with only 1/3 of what they asks and the delivery of troops will be staggered and in the course of 3 days.
Plus, the troops barely received any real Air-support during the battle. Even in Arnhem the Germans were hardly bombed by Air-support.
@@inisipisTVThe lack of tactical ground attack air support in Market Garden was because of Brereton. He wanted to skies cleared for his 3 days of drops which ballooned into a week due to the weather. That's on Brereton.
The story about the Brits 'stopping for tea' was reinforced by the 1977 movie,' A bridge too far'. This has only strengthened and unfortunately increased the acceptance of this story.
because Americans think movies are reality
That's the problem of allowing others to tell "our story". We should make our own films.
Though the Brit stopping for tea isn't exactly a myth because the British soldier was heavily unionised but in this case its complete bollocks it like at the famous battle in Normandy Villars Bucage turn out the force that stopped to drink tea was actually a rear Gaurd advance force had already pushed thorough and took their objects LazerPig has a very good video on this called The Myth of Wittman.
Which I consider really fucking dumb, because even in the movie the tankers tell the 82nd that their infantry are still fighting in the city.
The British army as never been. " Unionized "
15:23 Odd to talk about "British caution" in the 3rd most daring large scale operation of WW2. 2nd being Dunkrik again a British operation. The 1st being D-day organised mostly by Britain.
Um no such bullshit The British had 4 full years to cross their channel after getting driven into it. Admiral Ramsay with many US officers from the pacific that were landing every day in the Pacific, planned the landings.Monty planned CAEN and we know how that worked out.The USA filled ships filled stem to stern with tanks,trucks,artillery,men,material,food,fuel and crossed the freakin' ocean
@@bigwoody4704 The chain of command for the planning of Overlord was
Frederick Morgan
Bernard Montgomery
Admiral Ramsay
Leigh Mallory
A total myth even American records support the British account.
The Dutch one I read does so as well. It goes even one step further: before 1939 the Dutch military already knew how easily defensible the road from Nijmegen to Arnhem was. Some artillery was enough to halt an entire colonne of tanks.
This was one of several huge flaws in the plan.
Unfortunatly people don't read these accounts, they believe authors and films, sad as it is,
@@neilhooper8759 Sadly they think that 'it was in the movie so it must be true' A Bridge Too Far was made for an American audience, and one of the 'big stars' Robert Redford wanted a heroic scene to himself. The individual he portrayed (lampooned?) Julian Cook, objected to his performance, and apparently made his objections totally clear to those responsible for the movie.
The 'drinking tea' scene was imaginative, but entirely made up.
@@marknieuweboer8099 True.
That said, had XXX Corps been able to press on to the Arnhem-Nijmegen "Island" on the morning of 19 September, they would've had two significant factors mitigating in their favour:
1) Ample air support (weather conditions were good on that day)
2) Frost's men still controlling the northern end of the Arnhem road bridge - preventing the Germans from flooding the "Island" with reinforcements.
Of course, after the delay in taking Nijmegen, neither of these factors were in place.
@@marknieuweboer8099 I have studied Market Garden for years and have well over 20 books on the subject. A few mention this so-called Dutch military exam, but in all I have and in all I have read, not once have I ever come across this "exam". You'd think that someone, somewhere would have it, but it just doesn't exist. I think it's a myth. Even if it DID exist, at the time that it was "a thing", the Dutch military never had anything like the arsenal that 30 Corps was bringing to the battle. 43rd Wessex, alone, was greater in firepower than the entire Dutch army had been, and that's before we start looking at the RHA, the Guards armoured, 30 Corps' own engineers, etc.
My grandad drove the second tank across that bridge. He would tell you exactly what happened that day if he was still with us.
Has any research been done on the Bonner Fellers (Cairo, American military attache) despatches and the likely significant damage to the Allied cause during the North African campaign?
considerably more so than
Radio Kills: Rommel’s 621st Radio Intercept Company
@@nickdanger3802 Nah. 621 didn't accomplish a tenth of the damage Fellers inflicted on the Allied war effort in Africa. Even Rommel himself personally praised Fellers.
On the 21st of September the Irish Guards Group tried to fight their way through to Arnhem but they were shot to pieces by german anti tank guns, so the idea that three tanks could have reached Arnhem on the 20th is simply not true as this video clearly proofs.
the difference was that had the bridge been in US hands when 30 Corps arrived initially, then they would have been able to roll right on through to Arnhem, brushing aside the meagre German units that were between Nijmegen and Frost's men at Arnhem.
On the night of the 20th, though, there was no possible way that four tanks (one damaged, and with mixed US/British personnel) were going to be able to go on through the night to Arnhem without infantry and air and/or artillery support.
@@sean640307
The orders for the tanks was to secure the bridge preventing the Germans from taking it back, not wander off into the night.
@@johnburns4017 exactly right.
@@sean640307 when lead elements of 30 Corps arrived at Grave at 0820 on day three they were still 25 miles/40km from Arnhem having averaged just over 2 miles/3km per hour
on day four Frosts' men ran out of food, ammo and water
@@nickdanger3802 they would still have reached Frost's men before those German reinforcements arrived. The distance between Son and Grave was covered in a little over two hours so trying to factor in what happened before and averaging it out is disingenuous and mischievous.
It's also fair to suggest that as 30 Corps got closer, they would have had become more energised, as that is human nature.
It is interesting that Sgt Peter Robinson, who cleared the way across the bridge, got the DCM, while Lord Carrington, who followed, got the MC.
Wasn't the MC for commissioned officers only?
@@coling3957 Yes. The alternative for non-commissioned officers and lower ranks is the Military Medal.
The Distinguished Conduct Medal was a decoration established in 1854 by Queen Victoria for gallantry in the field by other ranks of the British Army. It is the oldest British award for gallantry and was a second level military decoration, ranking below the Victoria Cross, until it was discontinued in 1993 when it was replaced by the Conspicuous Gallantry Cross.
DCM is higher than MC...
Unfortunately some Americans can be disappointing . A lie can travel a very long way especially in an American film .
The sad truth is that Thirty Corps was smeared as too slow because of the falsehood of Gavin who claimed that Thirty Corps was 36 hours late on reaching the bridge, which is clearly nonsense as the operation had only started 42 hours before Thirty Corps reached the Nijmegen bridge, a distance of 50 miles. The fatal delay for this operation was at Nijmegen, not in the advance before then.
British XXX Corps arrived at Nijmegen on time, but the Americans failed to take the Nijmegen bridge, the British had to take it for them.
Gavin screwed up, he failed to take the bridge at Nijmegen, seeing it as a secondary matter to protecting his Eastern flank from a phantom German tank army! Read Robin Neillands book The Battle for the Rhine 1944: Arnhem and the Ardennes, the Campaign in Europe.
This history book is not the Hollywood film version of Arnhem but a well researched book.
Gavin's poor choices, warts and all, different chains of command back to Washington, lack of strategic vision by Eisenhower, duplicity of Ike's subordinate commanders and the huge level of American corruption in supplying its Armies in Europe all contributed to this American led failure.
And if you believe all that rubbish. You're a tart that would believe American Paratroopers were kissing brits like shared here. Americans, especially Paratroopers Despised that stuff.
100% British armour arrived on the afternoon of the 19th, and no bridge was captured. The hole point of the opposition was the bridges. But Boy Browning has to take some of the blame
One could round snd round. Gavin didn’t take Nijmegen because pompous Browning ordered him to hold the heights.
@@user-mc4sq3fk5d Nope. Browning ordered Gavin to take the bridge. Gavin landed first and decided to prioritize the heights. It's time to stop accepting Gavin's own account and post-war lies as fact. He was the main reason why Market Garden failed.
Thank you for finally putting this issue to rest. My father was with the 43rd Div., XXX Corps and got as far as Elst when they did advance, probably the next day.
@@StevenUpton14-18 I doubt it will ever be put to rest but it’s good to see someone presenting facts and not myth. 😊
My username is a link to my service with the units that followed on after the 43rd Wessex Division.
@@wessexdruid7598 - My father was in the 94th Field Regt. Royal Artillery, a 25 pounder battery, from Normandy to Hanover.
@@StevenUpton14-18 My uncle was a gunner (well Bombardier) too. 🙂As an ex-infantryman, the artillery are the kings of the battlefield.
Let’s not forget the 2 Sherman we’re low on amo
Don’t me started on Hollywood changing our history for abit of drama
It was the same as Ambrose's account of Omaha. Royal Navy personnel that crewed the landing craft some were accused of cowardice for being reluctant to go in and had to be threatened with shooting to get them to go in. The veterans of the US 'Bedfordshires' agreed with the RN vets that they had no record of any such incidents occurring. The RN and US vets approached Ambrose to correct this slur, he ignored them.
@@johnarmstrong1578 like the movie U 571 where the yanks captured an enigma machine. In reality one had been captured a year before
Very interesting and well done. Well at least one American historian does not fault the British tanks for not attempting to head on to Arnhem. In "September Hope," John McManus recounts the basics of the incident, including the part about a US paratrooper threatening a British tank commander. But he makes an even stronger case than that made here that advance to Arnhem would have been unlikely to succeed. He doesn't go into detail, as is helpfully done here, about specific German units and strength, but emphasizes that the elevated (dike?) road was horrendous for unsupported armor, making them easy targets, and that in fact there was plenty of German power between Lent and Arnhem.
He also adds the larger context that at this point the Allies were in no position to supply a strong force for a run to Arnhem. The thin one-road umbilical that was the spectacular fatal flaw of Market Garden was under attack at several points, Allied road traffic was backed up in several places, etc. He also notes that the US paratrooper frustration with the situation was almost certainly a direct result of the losses endured in the heroic assault across the Waal, which even the British overall commander of Market Garden witnessed and described as incredible. Heat of battle. Plus of course those paratroopers didn't/couldn't know the larger picture that made a run to Arnhem at that time out of the question.
Having read over 30 books concerning Market Garden from every angle…I still realise how good the film was at misleading so many people… thank you for this story
in any of those books was Vandeleur taking time for a swim and champagne with a female war correspondent discussed ?
@@nickdanger3802 - did it impact the operation?
yep lots of lies and myths
And still people use movies as history lessons? That's mistake #1.
The movie script was written off Cornelius Ryan's book which was not a researched historical account, it was taken from first hand accounts of people who were there, as we all know people who were involved in anything in life don't have the full picture.
Also I don't know why people think from watching that movie that the British stopped FOR tea, it's only implied that they're drinking tea BECAUSE THEY HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DRINK TEA, ie they were stopped, so take advantage of the time to do whatever.
I don't know about any other armies but the one I was in whenever things stop you take advantage of it to take catnaps, eat, drink, take a squirt, whatever, I never took it that the British stopped for the sake of having tea only that they were because they were stopped, if people would pay attention PAST where Robert Redford's character delivers his line the British tank commander clearly states why they can't go forward, and it isn't because they can't be bothered while they're drinking tea.
The very fact that people get so upset over a movie is just mind boggling, here's a suggestion, instead of being so lazy that people who want to learn about historical events learn it from a movie maybe they should try putting a little effort into it and try learning it from credible sources.
You better return those coloring books and ask for your money back. Ryan easily talked to more veterans of the battle than anyone before dying of cancer in 1974. The book has plenty of pictures with him talking to German,American & British officers. This carnival barker is no different than TIK telling you bent freaks that monty was great this is a british cheering section not a history lesson. Before the GIs and Russians got involved monty was run off the continent
that burriss story sounds like "what i wish i'd said and done" that becomes the memory almost before the dust has settled.
It might have had a shred of credibility if Carrington had actually been there at the time.
good points.
@@thevillaaston7811 I should perhaps have mentioned, also, that Carrington maintained that no such conversation ever occurred. Still less that a John Wayne wannabee put a pistol to his head.
@@dovetonsturdee7033
Yep, I read his book, 'Reflect on Times Past'. I was wanting to read what he had to say about MARKET GARDEN, and the Falklands War.
Thanks for putting the record straight. It appears a lot of the false accusations arose from the failure to take the final objective ( Arnhem ) and people were eager to point the finger of blame regardless of their remarks being true or false. Puzzles me why Operation Market Garden is largely seen as a failure when the Allies punched a large hole in enemy lines opening up a new front. Admittedly Arnhem was the key but it was a big territorial gain nonetheless. Arnhem wasn't the whole battle.
Market Garden was actually the fastest allied advance against German opposition in the entire September 1944 to February 1945 period. Nearly 100km of German held ground taken in just 3 days. Compare that to the months of getting nowhere in the Hurtgen Forest and Lorraine.
Yeah - it's funny how Market Garden is always portrayed as a massive failure, stupid Monty etc... whereas the disaster of the Ardennes offensive by the Nazis against the Americans is always portrayed as a heroic American effort. In fact, the first two weeks were an almighty cock-up by the Yanks.
@@28pbtkh23
_The British 2nd Tactical Air Force similarly took control of the IX and XXIX Tactical Air Commands from Vandenberg’s Ninth Air Force [in the Bulge]._
_The First Army’s hasty defense had been one of hole-plugging, last stands, and counterattacks to buy time. Although successful, these tactics had created organizational havoc within Hodges’ forces as divisional units had been committed piecemeal and badly jumbled._
_Ridgway wanted St. Vith’s defenders to stay east of the Salm, but Montgomery ruled otherwise. The 7th Armored Division, its ammunition and fuel in short supply and perhaps two-thirds of its tanks destroyed, and the battered elements of the 9th Armored, 106th, and 28th Divisions could not hold the extended perimeter in the rolling and wooded terrain. Meanwhile, Dietrich’s second wave of tanks entered the fray. The II SS Panzer Corps immediately threatened the Salm River line north and west of St. Vith, as did the LVIII Panzer Corps circling to the south, adding the 2d SS Panzer Division to its drive. Ordering the St. Vith defenders to withdraw through the 82d Airborne Division line to prevent another Schnee Eifel disaster, Montgomery signaled them that “they come back with all honor.”_
- Ardennes-Alsace by Roger Cirillo. US Army Center of MIlitary History
“I find it difficult to refrain from expressing my indignation at Hodges and Ridgeway and my appreciation of Montgomery whenever I talk about St.Vith. It is my firm opinion that if it hadn't been for Montgomery, the First US Army, and especially the troops in the St.Vith salient, would have ended in a debacle that would have gone down in history.”
“I'm sure you remember how First Army HQ fled from Spa leaving food cooking on the stoves, officers' Xmas presents from home on their beds and, worst of all, top secret maps still on the walls... First Army HQ never contacted us with their new location and I had to send an officer to find them. He did and they knew nothing about us...(Montgomery) was at First Army HQ when my officer arrived. A liaison officer from Montgomery arrived at my HQ within 24 hrs. His report to Montgomery is what saved us...”
- Hasbrouck of 7th Armor - “Generals of the Bulge” by Jerry D. Morelock, page 298.
@@lyndoncmp5751 lyndon try your other alias accounts - it was a disaster 34,400 go in 17,000 don't come out - in just 9 days - keep bullshitting yourself. Alan Brooke had stated many times that Monty was out selling himself to others- adrift in twaddle & nonsense
Bernard,Prince of the Netherlands said later "My country can never again afford the luxury of another Montgomery success."
Its to keep the conversation on the British and not the 82nd who did not even attack the bridge on the first day. The Germans had minimal troops guarding the bridge. Also Guards armoured reached the bridge on time. It was the 82's failure to take the bridge that doomed 1st airborne. TIK history has a programme on this.
LZ Z, 4 miles/6km from rail bridge, destroyed 4 hours after 1st AB landed
when 30 Corps arrived at Grave at 0820 on day 3 they were still 25 miles/40km from Arnhem, Grave to Heumen (last intact bridge over Maas Waal canal) to Arnhem, over 1/3 the distance from Joes Bridge to Arnhem
@@nickdanger3802 Watch TIK History on it... its an eye opener.
@@nickdanger3802 You don't appear to have noticed the effect of the failure to capture the Son bridge? Wasn't it mentioned in your cut & paste, or did you simply choose to ignore it, perhaps?
_At nightfall on D plus 3, the British had at Nijmegen only the Guards Armoured Division. Because inclement weather continued to deny arrival of the 82nd Airborne Division's glider infantry, the Guards Armoured's Coldstream Guards Group still was needed as a reserve for the airborne division. This left but two armored groups to go across the Waal. Even these did not make it until the next day (D plus 4, 21 September), primarily because of die-hard German defenders who had to be ferreted from the super-structure and underpinnings of the bridge._ *_Once on the north bank, much of the British armor and infantry was used to help hold and improve the bridgehead that the two battalions of the 504th Parachute Infantry had forged._*
- US Official History
The initial tanks over the bridge were to form a bridgehead on the northern bank with the US 82nd men. The idea was to prevent the Germans taking the bridge back, not wander off in the dark on a raised exposed road.
Indeed. Captain Carrington had no orders to blindly go off ten miles to Arnhem.
@@lyndoncmp5751
Of the four tanks over the bridge on the first wave two were hit by hand held panzerfausts. The tankers would be very aware that there would be some of them around the raised road.
Robinson's two leading tanks were near hit by two anti-tank guns at Lent.
@@johnburns4017Yes very true. They would also have been aware that their orders were to stop the Germans taking the bridge back that night, seeing as there were still Germans around.
No half baked attempt to get to Arnhem would have suceeded that night. Better to get a, stronger force and try and do it properly in daylight the next day.
Three times already in Market Garden the Guards Armoured Division had been held up by German anti tank guns. At kick off on the first day, then at Aalst, just before Eindhoven, on the second day and then in front of the Nijmegen bridge on the third and fourth days.
Odd that the Americans fail to mention the failure of the 82nd Airborne Division to attach maximum importance to the early capture of Nijmegen Bridge. If the bridge had been taken in strength and with all speed, then it is possible that British tanks would have reached Arnhem Bridge before Frost was forced to surrender.
Again.. who was the commander? British!!!! General Browning who was next to Gavin
@@user-mc4sq3fk5d Gavin failed to follow Brereton's orders
Every Dutchman who has read about M-G knows this.
@@user-mc4sq3fk5dGavin "the decision [to prioritise the Groesebeek Heights] was *made by me* , and approved by my Corps commander"
Similarly, it was the 82nd who were obsessed with the Reichwald to the point of distraction (not Browning's Corps HQ - and no credible threat emerged from the forest until Day 4), and it was Gavin and Lindqvist who either failed to issue pre drop orders to move against the bridge - or failed to execute said orders. It was nightfall by the time a token force of the 82nd tried to sieze the Waal bridge.
But blame the nearest Brit, am I right?
General Browning was there as an observer and to coordinate with the approuching of XXX corps (he's totally reliant on Gavin's command for intelligence and movement of US and German troops).
He doesn't want to undermine Gavin's command because Niijmagen area is 82nd Airborne's responsibility. He did advise Gavin to take the bridge first, but General Gavin was worried of approaching German reinforcement from the East that he decided to capture high ground near area to cover his flank. By the time they focused on the bridge the Germans was able to heavily fortify the entire town in Southern approach of the bridge. 3 days of fierce street fighting by 82nd Airborne in the town but they were unable to break even close the German defenses near the bridge. They have to wait for the arrival of the British tanks for it.
Never let the facts get in the way of a good story.
The American where clearly scapegoating the British post battle they needed to blame someone for the failure to secure the Bridge on the first day. They only sent one Battalion whilst the rest of the 82nd was all up on Groesbeck height waiting for rumoured 1000's of German tanks someone out of the forest, which there was no supporting intelligence for.
The failure at Nijmegen was entirely that of the American and failure to priorities the main objective of the day and there by prevent the 9SS from getting across the Nijmegen bridge. This force the British to fight to secure the bridge tying up there armoured infantry.
how many bridges captured (that means both ends) by 1st AB ?
"the rest of the 82nd was all up on Groesbeck height waiting for rumoured 1000's of German tanks"
source ?
@@nickdanger3802 The contemporaneous reports of Lieutenant Colonel Norton (82nd G3), which stated that Gavin ordered Colonel Roy Lindquist (508th) to "attempt to seize the Nijmegen Bridge with a small force, not to exceed a battalion."
With rumors of a large German armored formation nearby, Gavin initially made the decision to move most of his troops to the Groesbeek Heights rather than securing the Nijmegen Bridge. This decision left Lindquist confused about his orders, leading to the vital bridge being reinforced and in German hands for a further 36 hours.
Will that do? Look up Lt. Col. Norton for yourself. I have even left the American spelling unaltered to help you.
'How many bridges captured (that means both ends) by 1st AB ?' I did think of asking you how that was relevant to events at Nijmegen, but I doubt you could answer that in any case.
Just in case you don't know, by the way, G3 refers to the senior staff officer or Assistant Chief of Staff for operations and plans.
In other words, someone who might have been expected to have got his facts correct.
it was a yes and no situation. the guards did stop, and did have tea. but they had been ordered to stop, and wait for support, and as was their custom when in a stand down, they had tea, but did not specifically stop for tea. the us troops were a bit upset about this, as tucker thought an organized force would have been poised to speed forward, and was upset over the losses his men and suffered, and as such, was too angry to realize that the tanks could not just drive on. it was mostly an unfortunate misunderstanding that caused this terrible myth to exist.
If they had taken the bridge on the first day, which was possible as the bridge was only lightly held by the Germans, then the 504th crossing of the Waal would not have been necessary.
The plan agreed between Dempsey and Browning for MARKET included a further brigade to be dropped at Elst to aid the advance from Nijmegen to Arnhem but Brereton insisted this couldn’t be done. Dempsey said this was one of the two reasons Arnhem failed.
What's the source for that John?
@@davemac1197
The Military Life & Times of General Sir Miles Dempsey GBE KCB DSO MC: Monty's Army Commander by Peter Rostron
@@johnpeate4544 - thanks, it's on order. One of the things that came out of James Daly's new volumes on Poposed Airborne Assaults (2024) was that Dempsey was far more involved in the planning of airborne operations that many people thought, to a degree usually attributed to Montgomery. Often wondered why he was photographed wearing a Denison smock! Cheers.
@@davemac1197
No worries.
@@johnpeate4544 - it's the first time I have heard of a drop zone at Elst.
RG Poulussen (Little Sense of Urgency, 2014) mentions the drop zones for the 101st south of the Wilhelmina canal between Son-Eindhoven-Aalst to seize the bridges there to achieve an early linkup with ground forces were deleted by Williams on the grounds of the Flak around Eindhoven. He published the signal sent by Taylor to Dempsey stating that the decision was made by the commander of US IX Troop Carrier Command (Williams).
I believe Taylor himself had objected to a drop zone at Uden on the grounds it over-extended his division, which makes some sense to me because there are no bridges or significant water courses there to create a potential bottleneck.
Elst was presumably part of Browning's "airborne carpet" concept, which got thrown out with the Eindhoven and Uden objections, so I presume the Elst DZ was another casualty of this, despite the phrase "airborne carpet" surviving into the Hollywood film script.
It’s unfair on the Grenadier Guards. Market Garden seems get to everyones blood boiled up.
People want to find someone else to blame for the failure of it, of course they'll start making allegations. After all, if you don't find someone else to blame then maybe you might be at fault yourself, and for most people that's too uncomfortable.
It's a failed operation, so naturally nobody wants responsibility. The Americans blame the British, the British blame the Americans, the Airborne forces blame 30 Corps, 30 Corps blames the Germans and the terrain.......
@@Lykas_mitts It was Gavin because he caused 3 days delay.
@@Peoples_Republic_of_Devonshire Same principle with the Falaise Pocket.
@@desydukuk291 there's no one cause it blame. It was a very high risk strategy, in which too many things could go wrong. Ultimately it was the fault of Montgomery and Eisenhower
I'm glad that this matter has been cleared up as I found it difficult to believe.
Thanks for this.
My uncle served as a Sergeant in Lord Carrington’s battalion of the Grenadiers and this myth has always interested me.
How three tanks with no resupply capability in place could make a difference by charging to Arnhem, even if they had got there, is beyond me.
Band of Brothers I recall includes a similar “incident” of British tank crews drinking tea rather than fighting, no doubt inspired by these myths too.
Of course, war is full of one sided myth. The mainstream post war history of the Eastern Front was mainly written by German generals and pandered to both American and British prejudice about the Red Army. As well as making themselves look good at the same time. Authors such as Robert Citino have mainly debunked it now but the populist histories are still are very much all in on it.
"Band of Brothers I recall includes a similar “incident” of British tank crews drinking tea rather than fighting"
which episode ?
@@nickdanger3802 - it was the episode for the fight at Neuen which was part of the Market Garden operation. In fact the episode does not show the British tank commanders drinking tea, but the British commander says that he has orders to keep the destruction of Dutch property to a minimum. Easy Company tells the British tank that there is a German tank nearby, but the Brit replies that he can't shoot at him if he can't see him. It's a great attempt to make the British look hidebound and stupid.
@@28pbtkh23 sometimes orders are stupid, such as shifting forces from North Africa to Greece
Excellent research young man, and the facts as recorded by both US & British forces at the time, tell the real story of events. As the old saying goes
"never let the truth, get in the way of a good story".
An important point to remember here is that in such an extensive and complex operation, nothing happens in isolation. On the 21st, the day after the bridge was taken, the Germans counterattacked from both the West and the East in the Veghel area and very nearly cut Hell's Highway in two. Had they succeeded then the troops at Nijmegen would have been cut off. It was absolutely necessary to repel these attacks and consolidate the supply lines before an attack from Nijmegen to Arnhem could be contemplated.
I never believed the “stopping for tea crap” even after reading several books about Market Garden. What is an eye opener for me is the fact that the road to Arnhem was NOT open as Cornelius Ryan stated in his book and that only 2 operational tanks made it across. I knew there was a reason they did not push all the way and besides even if the 2 or 3 tanks made it to Arnhem the German tanks there were far superior in numbers and quality and would have wiped out the Shermans in no time. Shermans are great tanks when they fight in numbers.
Absolutely. The simple reason why less than a handful of tanks didn't push on was because their orders were to take the bridge and stop the Germans taking it back that night. They had no other orders. The plan was to keep hold of the bridge that night and then advance properly in force the next day, not half baked through the night with just a few tanks.
Cornelius Ryan was an American news hound that spent a great deal of time 1944-45 at Patton's HQ. Bridge Too Far was a novel that leaned heavily on the American version of events. It was certainly not based on historical fact as there are a great many errors. The main one being who planned the 1st Allied Airborne Army drops - not Monty!
Thank you for clearly, and precisely, dispelling this horrendous myth. Shame on those "historians", and writers, who fail to do their due diligence, and continue to propagate this lie.
Even if there were zero Germans after Nijmegen, what exactly were two tanks supposed to do when they arrived?
Even if 20 tanks somehow made it, it wouldn't have mattered. There were way more German troops than expected and mad dash into them would not have changed the outcome.
Most excellent presentation of reality.
Burriss even claimed there was "whole Corps of tanks" there that just sat and did nothing. Only 5 tanks got across that night, and 2 of those were damaged. The rest of the Corps tanks were split up and dispersed over 20 miles supporting the 82nd Airborne here there and everywhere.
Only seven tanks got over the bridge - one with only one crew member. On the initial wave of four tanks, two were hit on the northern section. One was got moving again by only Sgt Knight who run over the bridge and up to Lent to meet the tanks of Pacey and Robinson. Knight's tank was useless as it only had one crew member, him.
Carington's tank, moving onto the bridge passing a knocked out British tank, 45 minutes behind the leading four tanks, later joined them at Lent after staying static at the northern end of the bridge on its northern ramp near the riverbank. The riverbank is where 82nd captain Burriss met Carington in his stationary tank. Burriss did not know tanks had already moved over the bridge 45 minutes before he reached it with about 15 men. He thought Carington's tank was the first.
Carington moved on to Lent after an hour or two to join Pacey, Robinson and Knight, when reinforcements came over the bridge. Another three tanks were reported to have moved over the bridge making eight in all with one knocked out and one with a crew of one, giving a firepower of six. However some report that the last three tanks were actually armoured cars or self propelled guns.
@@johnburns4017
Lyndon, John
Yep. Great stuff.
We await a measured contribution from Para Dave?
@@thevillaaston7811Good grief let's hope he doesn't come and ruin yet another video. Im sure one of his alter egos will turn up sadly.
@@johnburns4017I did not know another two tanks came across later. I know infantry and other vehicles, such as armoured cars, came across later but I wasn't aware of more tanks that night, just those five.
Cheers.
No is the short answer (or at least halting wasn't because of tea). And frankly,. there is no controversy (other than from loonies, bampots and arseholes)
The smearing of XXX Corp is the same as the Americans never talk about Overloon or the Maisy Battery...WW2 politics
Or Metz, or Hurtgen Forest or Operation Queen......
very true- Overloon was where British 3rd Division had to do the job American divisions had previously failed at
Excellent video! Very informative! Have you considered covering the Last Stand of the 2nd Devons at Bois Des Buttes?
A lot of the issues about the assault crossing of the 3/504 go back to the errors that Lindquist, CO of the 504th and General Gavin; in which Gavin didn't make it clear to Lindquist that seizure of the bridges was the priority in the operation. This led to the heavy fighting in Nijmegen. Given the Allied casualties and the confusion of fighting through a dense urban combat environment and the time of day, it's quite understandable why an advance didn't occur
Clausewitz warned against marching through a valley without having taken the hills. Market Garden was the equivalent of doing just that. Monty demanded this operation then doesn't show up to direct it when the reality of it coming apart immediately is evident. Having only one road to advance upon should have been warning enough not to undertake the operation.
This debacle should never have been consindered let alone launched,the miscreant monty never showed for his own plan.Not the Americans fault that the British units didn't deploy effectively using deplorable methods filtered down from Bernard's ineptitude.
The whole concept for Operation Market-Garden was premised on the FALSE idea that the German Wehrmacht was in a shambles in September, 1944. This notion underrates the expertise of German military planners to reconstitute new divisions out of shattered ones. Their ability to respond and take a mishmash of broken, depleted troops, hastily assembled from miscellaneous units with a wild assortment of backgrounds then organize them to fight was a big factor in the outcome.
The heavy fighting in In Nijmegan was because the Germans were there in strength with artillery.Unfortunately the Americans foolishly gave their tanks to the British that seemingly showed no initiative.
It is well documented this shit show got pummeled from the very beginning making 7 miles the 1st day after getting ambushed and got worse every day afterward.
Well British Tanks in WW2 had a "BV" Boiling Vessell
Yes, British tanks in World War II were indeed equipped with tea-making facilities, but this feature came later in the war, after a critical design change. The invention known as the "Boiling Vessel" (BV) was a response to the challenges faced by British tank crews, who needed to make tea and cook while on long missions without leaving their vehicles and exposing themselves to enemy fire.
The BV allowed crews to boil water and make tea directly in the tank. While the Boiling Vessel itself became standard in British tanks after WWII, particularly during the 1950s, the stereotype of British soldiers loving tea was strong during the war, and this reputation may have contributed to the eventual adoption of this device.
So while British WWII tanks did not initially have dedicated tea-making facilities, the Boiling Vessel became a later, important part of British tank design, ensuring soldiers could have hot tea even in combat situations.
Thanks for this, Ive only heard that story in the last 20yrs-ish and it never sat well with me. There was always something missing because I didnt believe that the Gren Guards would just stop for no reason...
Total rubbish, my uncle crossed the bridge in his Sherman. The whole column was strung and under constant attack. They done their best RIP.
I appreciate your dedication to getting the history right. I feel many of these myths do a great disservice to those who served corageously in this conflict.
The British stopping to have tea is meant to be derogatory. That myth was perpetuated every time the Americans didn't get their way in arguments with the British in WW2.
Vandeleur had time for champagne with a female war correspondent
If it wasn’t for the Americans the UK would’ve been starved to death. Thus no base to invade fortress Europe
@@JGM1800 Not at all, the UK implemented a rationing system to stop that.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- LOL. Not even close to true. In 1941 alone the US supplied UK with over a million TONS of food. Rationing in UK didn’t end till 1954. Educate yiurself before you speak
@@JGM1800 Sit down and stop exaggerating facts.
During the war Britain responded to the Germans by increasing its own agricultural production, shifting what kinds of food were eaten, and reducing luxury foods that might have tasted good but were nutritionally/calorically inefficient. At NO point during the Battle of the Atlantic was Britain in any danger of not having enough food. Because of rationing, while the calories eaten by the most well off decreased, it actually increased for the poorest.
The other thing to know is that Britain essentially defeated the U-Boat threat by mid-late 1941. The U-Boats managed to hide this defeat because the US entry into the war provided new targets of opportunity on the US Eastern Seaboard and the Caribbean Sea. That increased shipping losses for the Allies, but it did nothing to threaten the British Isles.
*Martin van Creveld calculated in his superb study of logistics, Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton* Monty’s “40 divisions” realistically would have been quickly reduced to a mere 18 when all logistical and operational requirements were considered. Captured ground could not simply be left in a vacuum, but had to be occupied and defended against the inevitable German counterattacks. Supply lines had to be protected and secured, and as a force advanced, those key “sinews of war” extended longer and longer, requiring the diversion of increasing numbers of combat troops to protect them. Moreover, because Monty failed to capture the Scheldt Estuary expeditiously and open the port of Antwerp (closed to Allied shipping until December), Ike’s SHAEF logisticians at the time calculated that only 12 divisions could have been supported in a rapid advance. *Van Creveld weighed all the factors in the “broad front” vs. “narrow thrust” strategy debate and concluded, “In the final account, the question as to whether Montgomery’s plan presented a real alternative to Eisenhower’s strategy must be answered in the negative"*
*Eisenhower actually gave Montgomery a chance to show that his narrow-thrust strategy could succeed - and Monty botched it* Ike approved the September 1944 Operation Market-Garden, Monty’s attempt to “jump” the lower Rhine and position his army group to drive on to the Ruhr industrial region. Market-Garden famously and disastrously failed at the “bridge too far” at Arnhem at the same time that German forces supposedly were so depleted and disorganized that Monty’s narrow thrust, it was claimed, would easily slice right through them and capture the Ruhr. Monty’s boast that his single axis advance would quickly win the war was both literally and figuratively “a bridge too far” at that point of the war in Europe
There are many factors that can be cited for the failure of Operation Market Garden, all deserving of consideration:
🔶The report by OB West blamed the decision to spread the airborne drop over more than one day as the main reason for the failure.
🔶 The Luftwaffe agreed and added that the airborne landings had been spread too thinly and too far from the Allied frontline.
General Kurt Student thought the airborne landings were a great success and blamed the failure on the slow progress of XXX Corps.
🔶There is also the matter of Montgomery allowing the German Fifteenth Army to escape into northern Holland where it could defend the approaches to Arnhem by not clearing the Scheldt estuary, the nature of the highway along which XXX Corps had to advance (a two tank front), the failure to appreciate the unpredictability of the British weather in September, the critical requirement of good communications, which at that point in history was unlikely given the level of technology available and the blatant ignoring of intelligence (from both the Dutch resistance and reconnaissance flights) that armoured units had moved into the Arnhem area
🔶 Sosabowski in particular feared a flexible, speedy, and strong response, saying, *“The British are not only grossly underestimating German strength in the Arnhem area, but they seem ignorant of the significance Arnhem has for the Fatherland.”*
Why do the Americans have a thing about us drinking tea? and why is it in movies American officers are always shown with a cigar hanging out of the corner of their mouth is to make them look tough.
American here. We have no room to talk, honestly. I'm amazed our guys don't get in trouble more for doing stuff involving coffee or in some cases women (the amount of fraternization between our soldiers and local ladies across World War II and Korea afterwards just makes me shake my head at times, some of the movies actually downplay how much of it occurred in places).
Hollywood want to make their guys look the bollocks while making the Brits (their former colonial master) look silly.
I don't blame Americans as much as I blame Hollywood. The likes of Tom Hanks have to push down the Commonwealth at every chance to make the Americans look better. Hell most of them think that Americans made up the majority of the invasion force on D-Day.
@@thunderbird1921 - hold on matey. One of the best scenes in Band of Brothers was when a member of Easy Company was fraternizing with a German maiden just as Lt. Speers interrupts him in the middle of the 'action.' I've often paused my recording of the programme at this point and replayed it. I see it as him getting his just rewards. There's a similar scene in Fury.
As for drinking tea or coffee: hell - the offensive lasted getting on for a week. They've got to eat and drink at some time.
June 13, 1944.
Villers-Bocage, France.
Twenty Cromwells, four Sherman Fireflies, and three Stuart tanks of the 22nd Armoured Brigade were destroyed along with numerous troop carriers and other vehicles when their crews dismounted to brew tea 200 yards from the enemy.
Instead of punishing your soldiers, you made all future tanks capable of brewing tea from the inside.
That's why.
For the Americans here, Capt Carrington would later be a minister in Margret Thatcher's government.
Not really something to be proud of (:-. I say that as a Brit
The tea scene is an insult to Lord Peter Carrington.
I was privileged to be at Arnhem for the 80th anniversary
And Secretary General of NATO. He was given a congressional award by the Reagan presidency.
@@OldWolflad Peter Carrington was a decent, honorable man. How many ministers since, have resigned when their departments cocked up?
@@OldWolflad Depends if you were an ordinary man trying to find work before Thatcher took over. 🤔
Every tank the us came across was a tiger, the 8th AF always bombed precisely, the same force shot down twice as many planes that the Germans had and general Patton's shit smells of roses.......all true, I've seen the film
If you mean "A Bridge Too Far"
it's a British-bashing Brutish-made movie.
@@MinhThu-xn2bt Produced by an American company, with a screenplay written by an American, based on a book by an American 'journalist'. Not exactly British made then.
It wasn’t tea. It was beans on toast.
The Brits weren't known for stopping for tea. Some of the upper class officers, maybe. The troops were known for brewing up any time they stopped, which is a different thing. This story sounds like a typical American invention. They had standard insults and slurs for all their allies, and it was reciprocated.
The battle was lost when the road bridge had not been captured on the 17th or 18th when it was very lightly guarded. Guards Armoured arrived at Nijmegen on morning of 19th at about D+44 hours (schedule was 2 - 3 days). Unfortunately instead of driving across the bridge and pushing up to Arnhem, against minimal opposition (due to the Arnhem bridge being under 1AD control, German reinforcements were having to be ferried across the Rhine causing significant delays), they had to deploy 3/4 of their combat power to support Goosbeak Heights, the west of Nijmegen and South to help keep Hell’s Highway open. After the heavy fighting in Nijmegen there was nothing left in the tank, and (I think) 43rd Wessex Division would make the final push toward Arnhem. Historians have to sell books so going against established narrative is difficult. Up to the 80’s many of the key personalities were still around, and giving personal interviews, inevitably establishing good relationships with the historians. The historians then find it difficult to be anything but empathetic, causing them to be over supportive. The last 25 years has seen a much more neutral tackling of the issues, hence the obvious failure to capture Nijmegen bridge, as the main point of failure, has only really got an airing relatively recently.
Great post, but one slight inaccuracy. 1st Airborne never controlled the Arnhem bridge. They only controlled a section of the northern end and a few houses, which dwindled each day. 1st Airborne already failed in Arnhem due to the caution of Brereton and Hollinghurst.
The Germans always controlled the bridge off ramp and 99.9% of Arnhem.
The objective was the entire bridge and most of Arnhem, so that XXX Corps could cross the bridge, get off it and fan out through most of Arnhem, forming a bridgehead. That objective already failed on day one, sorry to say.
Market Garden was screwed by the caution of the USAAF and RAF commanders.
@@lyndoncmp5751
But First Airborne denied the use of the Arnhem bridge to the Germans. This left the island between the two bridges lightly defended.
Something said often enough becomes a “truth"
Especially when Hollywood writes the script.
Senior British commanders recognised that if their forces suffered devastating losses defeating the Germans in North-west Europe, British influence on post-war Europe would be diminished: Britain had not just to win the war but also the ensuing peace as well. Montgomery’s dispute with Eisenhower over theatre strategy and command reflected his determination “to maintain” the campaign on “lines most suitable to Britain, because it was of no avail to win the war strategically if Britain lost it politically. The maintenance of Britain’s international influence necessitated that British forces played a prominent role in the prosecution of the vital North-west Europe campaign; Britain’s post-war political prestige rested in part on the glory that her soldiers won on the battlefields of Europe.
However, if Britain maintained such a high profile, with the 21st Army Group spearheading the Allied onslaught against the German Army in the West (Westheer), its forces would incur severe casualties. These partly irreplaceable losses would compel the army group to disband formations, thus reducing its already meagre peak strength of 16 divisions. The fewer the divisions with which the British army emerged at the war’s end, the weaker its influence on Europe would be in the face of the growing might of two nascent superpowers. Indeed, by 1945, the American forces deployed in the theatre outnumbered the British Commonwealth’s forces by three to one. Montgomery’s generalship qsought to achieve a high British military profile while paradoxically avoiding the casualties that went with such a profile. The longer the war lasted, moreover, the smaller would be the British effort in North-west Europe comparison with that of the ever increasing American forces. Thus the British remained more interested in achieving victory quickly than the Americans, since the British economy and man-power situation demanded victory in 1944: no later.
The 21st Army Group, however, possessed insufficient resources to achieve early victory by itself, unless the Germans collapsed unexpectedly. Equally, Montgomery could not afford to sustain the heavy casualties that would be incurred in a British-dominated attempt to secure swift strategic victory over the Westheer. Should such a full-blown British offensive effort fail, Montgomery’s emasculated army group might be reduced to a secondary role in the theatre, left merely to observe America’s defeat of the Wehrmacht.
On the 4th September Monty was told by a SHAEF intel report that the Germans facing his 2nd British army were disorganized, demoralized, short of equipment and arms, so he tried to hit them hard and force a crossing at the Rhine as quickly as he could, before the winter weather and before the Germans could regroup, reconstitute and strengthen their defences.
If 21AG concentrated on clearing the Scheldt first then the Germans would probably have blown the bridges over the Waal and everywhere else in advance of the British and Canadian advance. Market Garden had the practical goal of ensuring that these major bridges were captured intact. And if they didn’t get there before the freezing weather Monty had already predicted no river assaults would be possible during ice season as pontoon bridges couldn’t be placed on the Rhine.
The launching of Market-Garden is more intelligible in this context. The operation reflected Montgomery’s attempt to exploit an apparently unique fleeting battlefield opportunity. If Montgomery’s forces succeeded in capturing the Ruhr it might just deliver the crucial knock-blow to end the war, without the army group’s forces being devastated in the process.
Although it failed to obtain a bridgehead over the Rhine British forces didn’t have to fight through the southern Netherlands through the winter of 1944/1945 as they were already there due to Market Garden. There almost certainly would have been more difficulties and more casualties had a British 2nd Army ground advance been carried out later in worse weather and strengthened German defences.
The reason why operation market garden failed was because of an American general who took the entire battle plan into the combat zone. His glider crashed and the Germans recovered the battle plans, which included the time and location of the polish reinforcements, who were then shot down, leaving the British forces without the support and supplies they needed.
I is ironic that all American history books seem to leave that out even though the Germans said that it was the only reason they were able to stop the advance.
That's in the Hollywood movie, but it wasn't a plan of the operation, but a resupply roster for 101st Airborne Division. The American officer was a Captain and liaison officer to Browning's Corps HQ, whose glider crashed near Student's 1.Fallschirmarmee HQ at Vught. Student was able to extrapolate the schedule for all three divisions and although he could not deduce the objective he guessed it was Arnhem, but Student told Cornelius Ryan he couldn't contact any headquarters for 48 hours, by which time von Rundstedt, Model, Bittrich, Harmel and Harzer already knew all the objectives.
Source: Cornelius Ryan Collection box 101 folder 09 page 95, letter to Gavin, Jan 1970.
I would very much like to know your source for "the Germans said that it was the only reason they were able to stop the advance."
I note that Captain Carrington received the MC for his efforts at the bridge, I'm curious as to whether the 2 sergeants who made it to Lent were also decorated. Another excellent article, thanks
Peter Lord Carrington continued to serve this country long after WW2 in a very successful political career with the Conservative party serving as Defence Secretary under Margaret Thatcher .
Also my thoughts. It seems that the primary drive was made by Carey and Robinson.
SGT Peter Robinson was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal. The second highest medal for gallantry for other ranks.
"History lies in the heart of the debate." Great stuff bringing these facts to light with this vid, adding to the discussion of Market Garden.
I always wondered if that was true. Never made much sense to me. As a former tank crewman You do not advance without your infantry, you are so naked without them and their eyes on the countryside along with yours. Thank you for clearing this up. I always did feel had they pressed on, they would have met with a rather sticky situation once at Arnhem with the 9th SS Panzer already there.
Also even if they post war had proved the road was clear past the anti tank guns
The Brits couldn't have known the road was clear, it's obvious they were acting on the best possible intelligence they had at that point which turned out to be mostly right
It wasn't clear though - thats the point. Another myth
No we had crumpets as well.
Thanks for the video. It's sad how my fellow Americans are so ready to bash every ally we have and act like we did everything ourselves. Oh, can't forget that we made no mistakes either. Love your work!
I’m nearly 60 and I remember my grandfathers and my father’s generation having a lot of anti British sentiment, I never understood where it came from but it was definitely present in WWII generation of Americans so that may explain some of it, also CYA on the US airborne troops who should have taken that bridge the first day.
Long story short: the Americans were happy to try and smear XXX Corps as being "too slow", in an attempt to divert attention away from the 82nd Airborne Division's failure to take the Waal bridge on time - the key factor in Market Garden disintegrating.
XXX Corps were *not* the reason the plan failed, and they arrived at Nijmegen *on time*
Nonetheless, bad historians repeated this falsehood for some time afterwards.
It's good to see the traditional Cornelius Ryan narrative of the battle losing its grip on popular discourse. It's about time.
This channel so underrated. Great research and storytelling here.
"British caution.." Ummmm Market Garden "cautious"?!?! Nice try Gavin....
Your content, as always is superb and goes to a level of detail rarely published in wider histories. For the record, I am neither British or American and it seems to be a British cultural habit to all too readily self-criticize and take blame in contrast to American tendencies to shift blame and self-deny. I believe this was to excuse the failure of US Airborne to take the bridge when they had the chance and the need more generally for historical authors to placate a US readership to secure sales. Thanks for your efforts and keep them coming.
It's pretty sad because Market Garden saw the US blame the brits for faults if its own making. Then the brits scapegoat the polish commander for nothing too. The failure of Market Garden lies with Gavin and Brownings inaction.
@martinford4553
Browning was scapegoated. Browning was "convinced" to leave the Airborne. He was got rid of and shunted off out to Burma in an administration position (a lowly comedown after being an Airborne Corps Commander) already before the end of 1944.
Sosabowski was dismissed not because of Market Garden but because of his general argumentative and non cooperative manner. This rubbed a number of people up the wrong way. It was his attitude, not ability.
GEEBARDS blabbered "it seems to be a British cultural habit to all too readily self-criticize and take blame"
-------------------------------------------------
LMAO screw off limey fraud,sure you're not. MONTY the most arrogant asses in the world,Kings/Queens,Lords,Dukes,Sirs - ya nothing screams humble bunch like that. These fauntleroys that boasted the sun never sets on their Empire. Ask all those people they colonized and plundered their countries and used as sandbags and cannon fodder. You are an ignorant troll - this whole debacle was on Monty who then chickened out and RUNAWAY - must be a Monty thing
I think you have very much summed up the difference in cultures. Especially when Hollywood is involved 👍
It wasn't the tea perse' it was their non chalance, not all though.From the Germans themselves
*'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw,p. 215*
*Heinz Harmel was to be more explicit: The English drank too much tea...! He later remarked "the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake when they stayed in Lent If they had carried on their advance it would have been all over for us."*
*'It Never Snows in September' Robert J Kershaw - page 221*
*SS-Colonel Heinz Harmel wondered,even after the war,why the tanks that had rushed the Nijmegen bridge with such 'elan had not continued further.The Allies had certainly missed an opportunity.They might possibly have pushed a battle group into Arnhem itself. 'Why did they not drive on to Elst instead of staying in Lent? 'he asked;'at this instant there were no German armoured forces available to block Elst.'It was a lost chance*
*Irish Guards there, how about Lt.Col. Vandeluer?*
*Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360*
*The Irish Guards did not try to hard despite the urgency of the situation Lt-Col John Vandeluer ordered to hold in place after the advance was stopped in the early afternoon* The clear inference was that the Guards had done enough and it was time for another formation to take over
*Lt Brian Wilson considered this attitude "shameful" that his Division had remained immobile for 18 hrs after the Nijmegen Bridges had been secured.*
*Arnhem,by Willam Buckingham,p.360 LT*
*John Gorman a commander in the 2nd Irish Guards was equally forthright, "we had come all the way from Normandy,taken Brussels fought half way through Holland and crossed the Nijmegen Bridge.Arnhem and those Paratroopers were just up ahead and almost insight of the bloody bridge we were stopped. I never felt so much despair"*
*ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p 408*
*on arrival at the Hotel Hartenstein at **23:45** *Lt.-Col Mackenzie opted to keep his disquiet over commands poor grasp of the gravity of the situation and the marked lack of urgency by XXX Corps and the 43rd Wessex to himself*
*Heinz Harmel? Tasked with operations from Arnhem south to Nijmegen*
*Arnhem: The Complete Story of Operation Market Garden 17-25 September 1944,by William Buckingham,p.358*
As Heinz Harmel later put it "the English stopped for tea* the 4 tanks who crossed the Bridge made a mistake staying in Lent, if they carried on their advance it would have been all over for us"* A rapid and concentrated relief effort across the lower Rhine never happened because the Irish Guards remained immobile for hours in darkness and beyond as the Guards Armored Division had collectively done since Operation Garden commenced
*Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,p.125*
*Col Joe Vandeleur had halted the Irish Guards in Valkenswaard on orders of Briadier Norman Gwatkin, the commander of the 5th Guards Brigade, who joined him there. While they enjoyed a glass of champagne together from their captured supplies, Gwatkin told him "to take his time getting to Eindoven, that there was no hurry because the Son Bridge had been blown and would have to wait for the bridging to be brought up"*
*Battle of Arnhem,by Antony Beevor,p.154*
Montgomery's failure to secure the North side of the estuary had allowed the Germans to extricate almost all of the 15th Army for use against the left flank of Operation Market-Garden.
So the Germans,GIs and Irish Guards themselves pointed out that elements of XXX Corp. weren't pushing hard and in fact mulling about. Nothing to do with Hollywood just History,British Revisionism of propping themselves up beyond either ability or accompiliment warrented.Having been surpassed as a world power by both the USA/USSR.This is not an indictment of the Tommies but of their fauntleroy officer corp
Never mind. Hollywood can always make up one of their ‘historical’ accounts!
Indeed. Until I saw that remarkable documentary U571 I mistakenly thought that HMS Bulldog had captured the first Enigma machine, together with cypher books and logs, taken at sea.
I will for ever be grateful for the correct facts of the matter.
We live in the post enlightenment era where facts and evidence don't get in the way of storytelling. A few years ago, I had occasion to review an American high school history book. Fairytales. Thank you for this factual account. btw, 50 odd years ago I participated in the Nijmegen marches. I don't know if they still happen.
Yes, they still do - mid-July, every year.
I have a film recommendation "They were not divided." It centers on an English man, an American and an Irish man in the Welsh Guards Armoured. It has the dash across the bridge in it. Also the relationship between the Guards tankers and the American paras after. Also one of the best recruitment gags going. When the Irish man explains why he is a Welsh Guard
outstanding video.
This is what lets the film a Bridge to far down
They had no infantry with them. No tanker enters a town without infantry cover. They hadn't trained 82nd and British tanks that they could cooperate in such an operation.
"God Call Him God" Peter Carington made the right decision.
My thought exactly. They were extremely brave to advance without infantry support and through an urban area no less.
The Americans are not our "ALLIES".....and the "SPECIAL FRIENDSHIP" is a very abusive use of political and financial leverage by the Americans to assert their influence over the political landscape in the country.
And we _still_ don't have screw-off beer bottle tops
Captain Moffat Burris account sounds like something out of a Hollywood writer's room.
Especially his claim that "a whole Corps of tanks" just sat there and did nothing. Only 5 tanks got across that night and 2 were damaged. The rest of the Corps tanks were split up and dispersed over 20 miles supporting the 82nd Airborne here there and everywhere.