I purchased his Guadalcanal book in the 1980s and must have read it at least five times. A friend of mine borrowed it so her father (veteran of guadalcanal) could read it. This book is on my top ten list of books to own for amateur historians. Words can't express how thrilled I was to actually meet this esteemed author via youtube. KUDOS !!
My father served as a gunnery officer aboard the USS San Francisco later in the war. Thanks to the speaker for recognizing the gallantry of that great heavy cruiser and its officers and men.
The US sacrifices will always be remembered and valued...but do not forget that Australia fielded 11 Divisions (to US roughly 25 Divisions) and were the first to defeat the Japanese army at Milne Bay in August-Sept. 42. We also cleared the rest of New Guinea and the western Pacific, which enabled US forces to concentrate on the Central and Eastern Pacific. It highlights that we all need allies, and Australia has stood shoulder to shoulder with the US since.
Anytime any marine tells you the Navy did not do enough during the Guadalcanal campaign, look at the casualty lists. More sailors died inand around the waters of the islands than either Marine or Army.
Two things can be true at once. The Navy fought hard and spent a lot of brave sailors lives and ships to support the Marines. No one is saying they were not valiant in their efforts. The San Francisco is testament to this. The Marines watched the Navy sail away with desperately needed supplies and equipment and were not in a position to see the sacrifices the Navy made in trying to resupply them. So from their perspective they felt the Navy had abandoned them.
Unfortunately they were losses due mainly to failings on the allied side, not simply bravery in the face of crushing odds. Whether it was poor leadership, incompetence with radar, no skill at night combat, no idea that the japs had awesome long range torpedoes, take your pick. Poor sailors were wasted. Sad but true. It was painful, and I dont think the US ever really learnt the lesson from it. Ive never read or viewed anything that says that the US put major effort into training for night combat. It seems to me that the US strength, illustrated by South Dakota's determined AA protection of Enterprise, was excellent daytime AA. And that just got better and heavier as the war dragged on.
At 39:00, we imagine the end of Lend-Lease to the USSR via the Persian Gulf. However , Murmansk was still open, as was Vladivostok. Historians rarely mention that Japan and the Soviets observed strict neutrality, to include merchant ship travel between their Pacific ports. Approximately 50 percent of US Lend-Lease supplies to the Soviets were carried by Liberty ships sailing from West Coast ports with American crews and red Soviet banners waving on the fantails. They ran with their lights on , as in peacetime , and passed through the Bungo Suido (southern entrance to the Sea of Japan) or around the north end of Japan on their way to Soviet ports. American merchant sailors often waved back and forth with Japanese fishermen while American submarines blockading Japan had to carefully avoid killing their countrymen in these cargo ships. American aircraft for the Soviets were mostly flown via Alaska and Siberia for eventual use on the Eastern Front . In my mind , the Pacific War was always a savage affair culminating in Okinawa, kamikazes, and atomic bombs . Yet these "Soviet" ships quietly resupplied Germany's archenemy while Japanese fishermen waved. War always has its strange chapters.
Good and interesting points all. I do want to point out that the Arctic convoys were seen as very vulnerable. During one half of the year the sun never sets, which makes the convoys easily spotted from the air, and the other half the weather conditions are abominable. Obviously the convoys were ran anyway, but there was always the feeling that 1 or 2 more disasters would mean they would have to stop. Hence the strong, almost over-reaction to the few Kriegsmarine units stationed there.
There's a concept in football that the team that makes the fewest mistakes usually wins. The same applies to the Guadalcanal campaign. Regardless of the deficiencies on the American side going in, the deficiencies on the Japanese side was even more pronounced.
I am not sure that's true in war, although, of course it's always good to avoid mistakes. The US made huge mistakes. But our economy was so giant compared to everyone else that we could afford big mistakes and still win. Also, if your focus is on avoiding mistakes you will tend to be extremely conservative, avoid risk , etc. That leads to predictable outcomes.
The IJN bombardment of Henderson feild that night was described in the book Guadalcanal Diary written by Richard trekaskis.. I read that book several times in highschool..when it got to that point in his description of that Event ..I almost thought I could see that dark night with all of it's explosive horror.
One of my favorite movies is "The Gallant Hours", a dramatization of the Guadalcanal campaign starring James Cagney as Halsey. It opens with Halsey being ordered to replace Gormley and, basically, ends with the 'Friday 13th" battle. It is a study of top command, formulating battle plans, and giving orders that you know will get people killed, yet giving the orders anyway. Reviewers complain that there is no "action" but I see plenty of "action" in the run up to the battle. Halsey calls in Scott and Callahan to give them their orders personally and they all know that this will be a 'real brawl'. Then the waiting. . .
I thought that movie was a hagiography of Halsey. Seems like he was the Pacific Patton - bold guy, inspirational, risk taker - and prone to making some big mistakes too.
I wish you could have elaborated more on Willis Lee..that guy made some shit happen ..he was known for being able to snipe japanese ships with 16 inch rifles..he was absolutely an impressive individual.
The biography on Willis Lee is on my list of books to read. For example, as gunnery officer during the interwar period he would test the powder requirements for the main guns, just to see how accurate they were (they weren't). He would make adjustments. His battleship would always take first place in gunnery during fleet competitions
Outstanding presentation. Although I do not agree that the Battle of the Tenaru River/Alligator Creek dictated how the terms of the Pacific War would be fought. That happened already during the fiercely fought Bataan Campaign. I understand that most, but not all, our troops fighting there ended up killed or POW. Still, reports were sent from the Philippines back to the US, and even examples of captured materials for study via submarine, I think. So it's not as if the fight in 1941-1942 in the Philippines was some black hole from which nothing emanated. If one sees it differently, that's OK, I'd like to understand more.
"Shotguns at two paces" Interesting that Richard Frank describes it this way. I've described naval gunfire battles of this time as being like using shotguns with 00 buckshot (to simulate salvo firing of the main battery) while wearing a flak jacket. Stay far enough away from the enemy, so 100-200 yards, and the 00 buckshot pellets won't get through your flak jacket if they do hit, although they will hurt outside the protected area, and you're lucky to get one or two hits at all. Get too close, and you're likely to take most of the pellets in the cartridge and they'll barely notice the flak jacket.
Presumably because the islands closest to the sea lanes between Australia and the West Coast were on the southwest and southeast side of the archipelago. Building airfields on them enabled convoys to travel with air cover and to those planes to act as a shield from Japanese aerial attacks launched via Rabaul (to the northwest).
The lesson in Ukraine can potentially be drawn from the Japanese piecemeal effort and ultimate failure in Guadalcanal. The fact that the Western countries are giving the Ukrainians just enough to fight on worries me greatly.
This was just too abbreviated for me to enjoy. For instance, he keeps mentioning fantastic proportional differences between our air crew losses vs Japanese without explaining why such a gap existed even when we suffer more carrier damage. However. please read the seminal book by this man AND the one by the (tragically) late James Hornfisher entitled, "Neptune's Inferno," which is purely an accounting of the USN's ordeal at this battle; and, is one of the most compelling books I've ever read. The USN'S performance there was crucial above all else and they gave us, imo, our finest hour.
@@DalonCole what American controlled land? Guadalcanal? The island was up for grabs for months, with 10,000+ Japanese troops scattered over the island. Why didn't the Japanese bring down carriers IJN Zuikaku and IJN Shikaku. One was damaged in May '42 at Coral Sea and the other lost much of its air crew at the same battle. But this was August through Nov...plenty of time to repair damage and train new air crews. Yet, I don't hear a thing about those two vessels at Guadalcanal.
@@teller1290 where did Japanese flyers take off and land from? Rabaul Where did American flyers take off and land from? Cactus where did majority fighting take place? Guadalcanal. Why no IJN carriers? Easy, after Coral Sea, Eastern Solomon’s, and Midway Air Crews were decimated. You do not train new air crew in three months. You can barely replace aircrew with already trained personnel in that time.
@@DalonCole any crew losses sustained by Zuikaku and Shokaku occured in May. Neither were at Midway. Sept-Nov '42 would've been 4-6 months, not 3. Still... no-show. Those were some important months. And we'd dropped a few air crews at Coral Sea and Midway, as well. Yet, at Guadalcanal, we showed up with Enterprise and Hornet and Wasp (albeit from the Atlantic). The Japanese were fierce fighters but often the upper command levels were far too cautious about incurring "disgrace" from losing the emperor's ships. Instead, they lost battles (Coral Sea) or didn't fully exploit victory (Pearl Harbor).
Santa Cruz: IJN should have pursued the retreating U.S. task force and finish off the damaged Enterprise. Although the IJN had taken heavy aircraft and aircrew losses, they still had two working flight decks, and more than enough left to finish off the Americans. Or, if they chose not to pursue, IJN could unleash their 4 battleships,8 heavy cruisers to bombard Henderson Field and the Marines...*unopposed by any USN ships.*
Gormley was not a well man..he was sickly it's shows in his photos of the time..he really should never had had responsibility's over a carrier force..he really did not know how to use them.
I like this. However, I think the notion that the racist nazis and the racist japanese were going to be able to "link up" is more a historians placeholder than a realistic possibility back in those days. They essentially had no real cooperation, and no coordination. Any link across the indian ocean was going to be flimsy like rice paper, and wouldnt take the US much effort to sever. The only moment where there was some fear of this was when the whole IJN fleet had a frolic there and savaged the british navy. The Nazis were well into murdering jews by then, and we are expected to believe that the stereotypically depicted four eyed, buck toothed midgets from asia were going to be acceptable to Hitler? I call BS on it. Hitler basically went to war with the US on an impulse, much to the shock of his generals. Rommel couldnt even stay supplied enough to achieve victory in Egypt, and the nazi armies similarly ran out of puff in the Caucasus; the 'linking up via the indian ocean' concept isnt even serious. Tunisia, cutoff by concerted allied attack on the sea and air logistics, turned into a surrender similar in scale Stalingrad (not so much duration and ferocity). The Japanese were so terrified of having to open a 2nd front with the USSR that they just stuck their head in the sand in the far east and did nothing to aid the Nazi war effort on the eastern front. The reality is that Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan were both isolated, with no prospect of linking up. I see no evidence that they even wanted to link up.
Good evening, I am wondering why your analysis never includes the aircraft carrier “USS Robin” which was in fact an aircraft carrier borrowed from England? This was in fact your president who asked Winston Churchill for this. At this time the US Navy had “ONE OPERATIONAL CARRER”! Forever in His service
I don't think the issue is any Anglophobia. Rather, the period in which HMS Victorious operated as USS Robin was one in which US carrier operations are largely ignored. Between the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal in Nov 1942 (which the hastily patched Enterprise played a part) and the attacks on Rabaul and invasion of Tarawa almost exactly one year later (Nov 1943), one might think aircraft carriers had all somehow completely vanished from the Pacific ocean. In a war full of massive battles, this "quiet" period is ignored or forgotten. It's not a unique phenomenon to 1943. Another example is the American Civil War in which the entire latter half of 1863 in Virginia is basically ignored because the maneuvering, cavalry skirmishes, and small engagements are dwarfed by Gettysburg and the Wilderness. I would be quite interested to read a book about the Pacific War than covers USN carrier operations from late 1942 (when the Enterprise limps back to Pearl Harbor) through at least the end of 1943. Such a book should cover the development of the Fast Carrier Task Force and how the shortage of aircraft carriers affected USN strategy during this period, including the loan of HMS Victorious. If such a book already exists, someone please let me know.
@@jliller I agree, a simpler explanation isn’t some Anglophobia or American exceptionalism. It’s that just that HMS Illustrious had a similar Pacific career to USS Saratoga who she was paired with. Neither ship fought in a big naval battle or did anything of noteworthy. Not every ship is a Warspite or Enterprise.
Pearl Harbor and what followed should have been a massive wakeup call that the US had seriously underestimated the Japanese. The lesson seems to have only been half-learned. Throughout the entire Solomons campaign the Navy was very slow to recognize the flaws in their doctrine and adjust accordingly. Savo Island was the worst defeat, but several more defeats and squandered victories would follow.
What is one of the great mysteries is WHY THE US DID NOT REALIZE THE JAPANESE LONG LANCE HAD A GREATER RANGE AND POWER HEAD THAN THE AMERICANS PIECE OF JUNK Torpedoes AND COULD EVEN OUTRANGE OUR CRUISERS 6&8 in guns !
@@Happy11807 Flip the question around: by what experience, prior to Savo, should the Americans have known how dangerous the Long Lance torpedoes were? Americans considered the Japanese racially inferior (and thus assumed technologically inferior). They had failed to adequately test their own torpedoes, and had no experience in surface engagements against the IJN except for a couple engagements in Indonesian waters involving disorganized, poorly-led, multinational task forces comprised of second rate ships.
very easy for you to opine some 80 years later - presumably after having read multiple books on the subject by a variety of military historians/researchers...your 20:20 hindsight seems somewhat arrogant and perhaps ignores the context in which the U.S. was operating in 1942
Facts are facts always underestimate your enemy,WW2, US WAS A NON EXISTENT MILITARY! Ships ,weapons ,Armor,Military Intelligence and down right graft and incompetents. Always behind.Our latent industrial MIGHT ENABLED AMERICA TO OVERCOME THESE OVERSIGHTS, but at great cost in the early years! It seems that our Service men of all branches have to pay the price for budget cuts and cutting corners by the talking heads in Washington !
I purchased his Guadalcanal book in the 1980s and must have read it at least five times. A friend of mine borrowed it so her father (veteran of guadalcanal) could read it. This book is on my top ten list of books to own for amateur historians. Words can't express how thrilled I was to actually meet this esteemed author via youtube. KUDOS !!
My father served as a gunnery officer aboard the USS San Francisco later in the war. Thanks to the speaker for recognizing the gallantry of that great heavy cruiser and its officers and men.
The US sacrifices will always be remembered and valued...but do not forget that Australia fielded 11 Divisions (to US roughly 25 Divisions) and were the first to defeat the Japanese army at Milne Bay in August-Sept. 42. We also cleared the rest of New Guinea and the western Pacific, which enabled US forces to concentrate on the Central and Eastern Pacific. It highlights that we all need allies, and Australia has stood shoulder to shoulder with the US since.
Anytime any marine tells you the Navy did not do enough during the Guadalcanal campaign, look at the casualty lists. More sailors died inand around the waters of the islands than either Marine or Army.
Two things can be true at once. The Navy fought hard and spent a lot of brave sailors lives and ships to support the Marines. No one is saying they were not valiant in their efforts. The San Francisco is testament to this.
The Marines watched the Navy sail away with desperately needed supplies and equipment and were not in a position to see the sacrifices the Navy made in trying to resupply them. So from their perspective they felt the Navy had abandoned them.
And those air force guys died over Europe in bombers 10 per plane. Props to the armed forces.
Two weeks later the navy came back.
@@Whitpusmc I think you have that exactly right.
Unfortunately they were losses due mainly to failings on the allied side, not simply bravery in the face of crushing odds. Whether it was poor leadership, incompetence with radar, no skill at night combat, no idea that the japs had awesome long range torpedoes, take your pick. Poor sailors were wasted.
Sad but true.
It was painful, and I dont think the US ever really learnt the lesson from it. Ive never read or viewed anything that says that the US put major effort into training for night combat.
It seems to me that the US strength, illustrated by South Dakota's determined AA protection of Enterprise, was excellent daytime AA. And that just got better and heavier as the war dragged on.
At 39:00, we imagine the end of Lend-Lease to the USSR via the Persian Gulf. However , Murmansk was still open, as was Vladivostok. Historians rarely mention that Japan and the Soviets observed strict neutrality, to include merchant ship travel between their Pacific ports. Approximately 50 percent of US Lend-Lease supplies to the Soviets were carried by Liberty ships sailing from West Coast ports with American crews and red Soviet banners waving on the fantails. They ran with their lights on , as in peacetime , and passed through the Bungo Suido (southern entrance to the Sea of Japan) or around the north end of Japan on their way to Soviet ports. American merchant sailors often waved back and forth with Japanese fishermen while American submarines blockading Japan had to carefully avoid killing their countrymen in these cargo ships. American aircraft for the Soviets were mostly flown via Alaska and Siberia for eventual use on the Eastern Front .
In my mind , the Pacific War was always a savage affair culminating in Okinawa, kamikazes, and atomic bombs . Yet these "Soviet" ships quietly resupplied Germany's archenemy while Japanese fishermen waved. War always has its strange chapters.
Good and interesting points all. I do want to point out that the Arctic convoys were seen as very vulnerable. During one half of the year the sun never sets, which makes the convoys easily spotted from the air, and the other half the weather conditions are abominable.
Obviously the convoys were ran anyway, but there was always the feeling that 1 or 2 more disasters would mean they would have to stop. Hence the strong, almost over-reaction to the few Kriegsmarine units stationed there.
Thanks. I'd never heard of this. Interesting.
It was the RN whe escorted the convoys. The USN had no significant involvement
Love the graphics and use of pictures...
Great work, thank you for uploading this.
There's a concept in football that the team that makes the fewest mistakes usually wins. The same applies to the Guadalcanal campaign. Regardless of the deficiencies on the American side going in, the deficiencies on the Japanese side was even more pronounced.
I am not sure that's true in war, although, of course it's always good to avoid mistakes. The US made huge mistakes. But our economy was so giant compared to everyone else that we could afford big mistakes and still win.
Also, if your focus is on avoiding mistakes you will tend to be extremely conservative, avoid risk , etc. That leads to predictable outcomes.
WHEN ARE WE GETTING VOLUME 2 OF TOWER OF SKULLS?!?!?!
The IJN bombardment of Henderson feild that night was described in the book Guadalcanal Diary written by Richard trekaskis.. I read that book several times in highschool..when it got to that point in his description of that Event ..I almost thought I could see that dark night with all of it's explosive horror.
One of my favorite movies is "The Gallant Hours", a dramatization of the Guadalcanal campaign starring James Cagney as Halsey. It opens with Halsey being ordered to replace Gormley and, basically, ends with the 'Friday 13th" battle. It is a study of top command, formulating battle plans, and giving orders that you know will get people killed, yet giving the orders anyway. Reviewers complain that there is no "action" but I see plenty of "action" in the run up to the battle. Halsey calls in Scott and Callahan to give them their orders personally and they all know that this will be a 'real brawl'. Then the waiting. . .
I thought that movie was a hagiography of Halsey. Seems like he was the Pacific Patton - bold guy, inspirational, risk taker - and prone to making some big mistakes too.
I wish you could have elaborated more on Willis Lee..that guy made some shit happen ..he was known for being able to snipe japanese ships with 16 inch rifles..he was absolutely an impressive individual.
The biography on Willis Lee is on my list of books to read. For example, as gunnery officer during the interwar period he would test the powder requirements for the main guns, just to see how accurate they were (they weren't). He would make adjustments. His battleship would always take first place in gunnery during fleet competitions
Outstanding
Outstanding presentation. Although I do not agree that the Battle of the Tenaru River/Alligator Creek dictated how the terms of the Pacific War would be fought. That happened already during the fiercely fought Bataan Campaign. I understand that most, but not all, our troops fighting there ended up killed or POW. Still, reports were sent from the Philippines back to the US, and even examples of captured materials for study via submarine, I think. So it's not as if the fight in 1941-1942 in the Philippines was some black hole from which nothing emanated. If one sees it differently, that's OK, I'd like to understand more.
Wonderful …..
"Shotguns at two paces"
Interesting that Richard Frank describes it this way. I've described naval gunfire battles of this time as being like using shotguns with 00 buckshot (to simulate salvo firing of the main battery) while wearing a flak jacket. Stay far enough away from the enemy, so 100-200 yards, and the 00 buckshot pellets won't get through your flak jacket if they do hit, although they will hurt outside the protected area, and you're lucky to get one or two hits at all. Get too close, and you're likely to take most of the pellets in the cartridge and they'll barely notice the flak jacket.
I'm still surprised that the US Navy had more casualties than the Marines did during the Guadalcanal campaign.
It was a very close thing. If Admiral Mikawa had destroyed the Marine transports the Marines would have been up the creek without a paddle.
Richard Frank is a first rate historian.
Does anyone know why the Allies only invaded islands on the southwestern side of the Slot?
Presumably because the islands closest to the sea lanes between Australia and the West Coast were on the southwest and southeast side of the archipelago. Building airfields on them enabled convoys to travel with air cover and to those planes to act as a shield from Japanese aerial attacks launched via Rabaul (to the northwest).
The lesson in Ukraine can potentially be drawn from the Japanese piecemeal effort and ultimate failure in Guadalcanal. The fact that the Western countries are giving the Ukrainians just enough to fight on worries me greatly.
Sadly, it is in the west's interest to do exactly that. The longer the war continues the more hurt is applied to Russia.
The impacts were so great they buried several aircraft and fuel drums
and when he gets to heaven to saint Peter he will tell, one more marine reporting sir I’ve served my time in hell. (Guadalcanal Marine)
This was just too abbreviated for me to enjoy. For instance, he keeps mentioning fantastic proportional differences between our air crew losses vs Japanese without explaining why such a gap existed even when we suffer more carrier damage.
However. please read the seminal book by this man AND the one by the (tragically) late James Hornfisher entitled, "Neptune's Inferno," which is purely an accounting of the USN's ordeal at this battle; and, is one of the most compelling books I've ever read. The USN'S performance there was crucial above all else and they gave us, imo, our finest hour.
Most all fighting was done over American controlled land. Plus Japanese aircrew HS to fly for hours to engage. Americans had to fly minutes
@@DalonCole what American controlled land? Guadalcanal? The island was up for grabs for months, with 10,000+ Japanese troops scattered over the island.
Why didn't the Japanese bring down carriers IJN Zuikaku and IJN Shikaku. One was damaged in May '42 at Coral Sea and the other lost much of its air crew at the same battle. But this was August through Nov...plenty of time to repair damage and train new air crews. Yet, I don't hear a thing about those two vessels at Guadalcanal.
@@teller1290 where did Japanese flyers take off and land from? Rabaul Where did American flyers take off and land from? Cactus where did majority fighting take place? Guadalcanal.
Why no IJN carriers? Easy, after Coral Sea, Eastern Solomon’s, and Midway Air Crews were decimated. You do not train new air crew in three months. You can barely replace aircrew with already trained personnel in that time.
@@DalonCole any crew losses sustained by Zuikaku and Shokaku occured in May. Neither were at Midway. Sept-Nov '42 would've been 4-6 months, not 3. Still... no-show. Those were some important months.
And we'd dropped a few air crews at Coral Sea and Midway, as well. Yet, at Guadalcanal, we showed up with Enterprise and Hornet and Wasp (albeit from the Atlantic). The Japanese were fierce fighters but often the upper command levels were far too cautious about incurring "disgrace" from losing the emperor's ships. Instead, they lost battles (Coral Sea) or didn't fully exploit victory (Pearl Harbor).
Santa Cruz: IJN should have pursued the retreating U.S. task force and finish off the damaged Enterprise.
Although the IJN had taken heavy aircraft and aircrew losses, they still had two working flight decks, and more than enough left to finish off the Americans.
Or, if they chose not to pursue, IJN could unleash their 4 battleships,8 heavy cruisers to bombard Henderson Field and the Marines...*unopposed by any USN ships.*
I remember when Nimitz took Command of the Navy. He was a shock. Discipline went down the toilet. Took years to get it back. Not good.
Gormley was not a well man..he was sickly it's shows in his photos of the time..he really should never had had responsibility's over a carrier force..he really did not know how to use them.
Garcia Lisa Harris Helen Clark Shirley
I like this. However, I think the notion that the racist nazis and the racist japanese were going to be able to "link up" is more a historians placeholder than a realistic possibility back in those days.
They essentially had no real cooperation, and no coordination. Any link across the indian ocean was going to be flimsy like rice paper, and wouldnt take the US much effort to sever.
The only moment where there was some fear of this was when the whole IJN fleet had a frolic there and savaged the british navy.
The Nazis were well into murdering jews by then, and we are expected to believe that the stereotypically depicted four eyed, buck toothed midgets from asia were going to be acceptable to Hitler? I call BS on it.
Hitler basically went to war with the US on an impulse, much to the shock of his generals. Rommel couldnt even stay supplied enough to achieve victory in Egypt, and the nazi armies similarly ran out of puff in the Caucasus; the 'linking up via the indian ocean' concept isnt even serious. Tunisia, cutoff by concerted allied attack on the sea and air logistics, turned into a surrender similar in scale Stalingrad (not so much duration and ferocity).
The Japanese were so terrified of having to open a 2nd front with the USSR that they just stuck their head in the sand in the far east and did nothing to aid the Nazi war effort on the eastern front.
The reality is that Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan were both isolated, with no prospect of linking up. I see no evidence that they even wanted to link up.
Harris Carol Wilson Larry Garcia Donald
Good evening,
I am wondering why your analysis never includes the aircraft carrier “USS Robin” which was in fact an aircraft carrier borrowed from England? This was in fact your president who asked Winston Churchill for this. At this time the US Navy had “ONE OPERATIONAL CARRER”!
Forever in His service
I don't think the issue is any Anglophobia. Rather, the period in which HMS Victorious operated as USS Robin was one in which US carrier operations are largely ignored. Between the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal in Nov 1942 (which the hastily patched Enterprise played a part) and the attacks on Rabaul and invasion of Tarawa almost exactly one year later (Nov 1943), one might think aircraft carriers had all somehow completely vanished from the Pacific ocean.
In a war full of massive battles, this "quiet" period is ignored or forgotten. It's not a unique phenomenon to 1943. Another example is the American Civil War in which the entire latter half of 1863 in Virginia is basically ignored because the maneuvering, cavalry skirmishes, and small engagements are dwarfed by Gettysburg and the Wilderness.
I would be quite interested to read a book about the Pacific War than covers USN carrier operations from late 1942 (when the Enterprise limps back to Pearl Harbor) through at least the end of 1943. Such a book should cover the development of the Fast Carrier Task Force and how the shortage of aircraft carriers affected USN strategy during this period, including the loan of HMS Victorious. If such a book already exists, someone please let me know.
@@jliller I agree, a simpler explanation isn’t some Anglophobia or American exceptionalism. It’s that just that HMS Illustrious had a similar Pacific career to USS Saratoga who she was paired with. Neither ship fought in a big naval battle or did anything of noteworthy. Not every ship is a Warspite or Enterprise.
Could you imagine if the United States went to war today and Joe Biden was making all the decisions excuse me I think I just pooped myself
Sadly the reasons for the catastrophic Navy losses were due to INCOMPETENT LEADERSHIP,TACTICS,AND IGNORANCE OF THE JAPANESE TECHNOLOGY AND WEAPONS!
Pearl Harbor and what followed should have been a massive wakeup call that the US had seriously underestimated the Japanese. The lesson seems to have only been half-learned.
Throughout the entire Solomons campaign the Navy was very slow to recognize the flaws in their doctrine and adjust accordingly. Savo Island was the worst defeat, but several more defeats and squandered victories would follow.
What is one of the great mysteries is WHY THE US DID NOT REALIZE THE JAPANESE LONG LANCE HAD A GREATER RANGE AND POWER HEAD THAN THE AMERICANS PIECE OF JUNK Torpedoes AND COULD EVEN OUTRANGE OUR CRUISERS 6&8 in guns !
@@Happy11807 Flip the question around: by what experience, prior to Savo, should the Americans have known how dangerous the Long Lance torpedoes were?
Americans considered the Japanese racially inferior (and thus assumed technologically inferior). They had failed to adequately test their own torpedoes, and had no experience in surface engagements against the IJN except for a couple engagements in Indonesian waters involving disorganized, poorly-led, multinational task forces comprised of second rate ships.
very easy for you to opine some 80 years later - presumably after having read multiple books on the subject by a variety of military historians/researchers...your 20:20 hindsight seems somewhat arrogant and perhaps ignores the context in which the U.S. was operating in 1942
Facts are facts always underestimate your enemy,WW2, US WAS A NON EXISTENT MILITARY! Ships ,weapons ,Armor,Military Intelligence and down right graft and incompetents. Always behind.Our latent industrial MIGHT ENABLED AMERICA TO OVERCOME THESE OVERSIGHTS, but at great cost in the early years! It seems that our Service men of all branches have to pay the price for budget cuts and cutting corners by the talking heads in Washington !