The Ardennes Offensive always seemed like something from a Greek tragedy to me. The Germans really knew that it was hopeless, but still they tried their best. The American units, although some were green, were just not the pushover French reserve divisions of 1940. Neither could the German Army apply the pressure along the whole front to pin the Allied reserves down from interfering with the main thrust. Still it was a dramatic battle all the same. Great discussion Paul and Anthony with many a thought provoking comment.
I’ve listened to many of these and have become increasingly impressed with Paul’s knowledge and especially his ability to see things in context and to keep bringing the conversations back to the big picture. I’ve read and watched hundreds of histories but I’ve never felt as “smart” about the war as I feel with these shows.
I think that Eisenhower & Bradley never received the level of criticism they deserved for being caught out - with 80,000-odd casualties - when Germany launched the Ardennes offensive.
Howdy folks. This is a comprehensive overview of the German view of the Ardennes battle. Great information and an educated outlook on the situation. One of Woodys best shows ever.
I really enjoyed Anthony's presentation. It was great to hear a well researched presentation on the German perspective on the Battle of the Bulge. I hope Anthony comes back on WW2TV soon.
Great Video, have just ordered Anthony's Book. A couple of quick points on assault gun comments in the video (didn't see specific mention of this in the YT comments) as an aside for anyone interested: 1. Anthony wasn't quite right about the Assault Guns being artillery controlled. They were when the StuG was first designed and the first 'batteries' formed pre-war; but once Guderian became Inspector General of Panzertruppen about 1943 they were taken off the artillery and then all tanks, assault guns (and I believe Jagdpanzers) came under the Panzertruppen. So at time of 'The Bulge' they were panzer troops (not artillery). 2. Re: Paul R's comments about assault guns/StuGs on the attack and their effectiveness (with or without infantry support). FWIW this was explicitly against German doctrine and that was in place for the whole war. The StuG batteries/abteilung mid to late-war repeatedly complained about their misuse as tanks in offensive operations and the excessive losses they suffered when used that way (especially when used to lead an attack). They were always highly vulnerable if used offensively (i.e. on the attack) and were intended to either come forward to support infantry against fortifications on ground already secured by the infantry (early war artillery manned StuGs) or to fight from prepared hidden or defensive positions and do a variation of shoot and scoot. In late war PanzerGrenadier Divisions the StuGs were intended to come up or follow the infantry to provide fire support, but not to lead or be in the front rank (just like the early war ones). Anything that put them at risk of exposed flanks (to AT fire) resulted in heavy casualties and infantry support made no difference to this. I think much of this is covered in the WW2TV Sturmgeschütz episode, but otherwise several good books, etc, are available on StuG doctrine and performance... P.S. For those who may not know the original JagdPanzer IV (with the 75/48) was originally designated as a Sturmgeschütz before being reclassified as JgdPz partway through its production run. So some StuG units had this for a time.
Excellent program today. Anthony has done considerable research to learn more about the German side of the battle. Thanks for another enjoyable episode Paul!!
Interestingly enough, and is one of the great things in this channel, the Ardennes offensive is seen in the context of the V2 offensive the Bodenplate operación (LW attack january 1st 1945) and the offensive against Alsace. Great presentation.
Hello folks. The presentation on a different perspective of the Bulge is one of the top 5 shows so far. Well done. As they say in sports, The other team gets paid too.
This was a great show; lots of interesting information from a different perspective; the maps were brilliant. Thank you, Paul and Anthony for an informative presentation. I look forward to a future show with Anthony on the Falaise Gap.
Superb points! The German commanders didn't know a LOT of what was going on around them except for when they came into contact with the enemy. Great idea to write it the way he has! Good job again gents 💯👍❗
Regarding the StuG IIIs. Depending on the version they can be either offensive of defensive weapons. The early short barrelled versions (Ausf. A etc) were assault guns (offensive) in that they were armoured mobile howitzers that could keep up with the advancing infantry and provide them with (HE mainly) support. Later versions with the longer gun - as used in the Ardennes - were, in effect, tank destroyers & not assault guns. These are not ideal for either hunting enemy armour or providing infantry support in the close confines of this location. That's my pedantic understanding at least.
Anthony’s, presentation tonight was one of the best I’ve listened too on the Battle of the Bulge. So marvellous to hear from the German side. This channel Paul as I’ve said before is number one for me, always some new slants on known subjects. Keep it coming Paul, thank you both for tonight’s show.
One of the main feelings on the part of the allies was once they had the forces in place they failed to use their air power to cut all of the bridges to block all of the retreat routes of the German forces the same thing happened in Normandy when they tried to trap the German army just a failure to block properly they could have bagged up all of the German forces and shorten the war very considerably in both instances
In no way disagree with Mr. Tucker-Jones assessment, but I am often fascinated by the phrase "above his pay grade", in this case pointing at Dietrich. I'm taken back to a remark Alan Brooke made concerning the period after the Allies had moved off the beaches when he wrote the British Army lacked a sufficient number of officers qualified to be division level commanders. That is not a knock on the British Army, not my point at all. Rather it highlights the fact that there is a universal lack of people who really, seriously have much of an idea how to handle 10,000, or 40,000, or 100,000 soldiers at a time. If we were to be serious about leadership and command, I think we would find the number of people who are genuinely good at much beyond a brigade are a very rare lot. Much of what we look back at in history as "pretty good" was actually only "adequate". Again, a universal thing, and they should be honored as the best of what was available. Had the pleasure of being around one or two persons who made it to the 3 or 4-star level who had leadership qualities that absolutely stood out. Been around some that, well, "being above their pay grade" is a bit more common than we let on.
Very enlightening show! Interesting to hear Anthony’s presentation of the offensive from the German point of view! I look forward to reading Anthony’s new book on the subject! Thanks very much Paul & Anthony!
Dietrich relied heavily on his Chief of Staff, F. Kramer, a Heer officer who had transferred to the Waffen SS. Kramer was experienced due to his training as a staff grade officer, and service on the Eastern Front. One of the reasons for 1st SS Pz Korps prolonged defense in Normandy.
It was a close call of 15 minutes or the Port of Antwerp hadn't been open before the start of 'The Battle of the Bulge'. Instead of sending German Parachute Rgt.6 straight to the Walcheren-Causeway via Benedensas and Zijpe on the eve of Oct.31 straight away as planned, it was sent to Numansdorp. To avoid severe consequences from Berlin a second attempt was planned the next evening on Nov.1 , but by then the Canadians crossed the Walcheren Causeway before this FJR.6 convoy was sent from Numansdorp via Zijpe to bolster North-Beveland and Walcheren. Student managed to let all proof 'disapear' and only the evacuation of the rearguard III./FJR.6 and Kampfgruppe Chill is reported for Nov.4 and 5. Until 2008 nobody knew exactly how Germany 1st Parachute Army was composed or looked at the big picture from the German perspective. Richard Binkhuysen aka 'A.C.E. van T.'
One thing that is not often mentioned is the Wehrmacht hadn’t altered its tactics sufficiently enough after the disastrous campaigns in late ‘42. Some Generals like Manstein and Model etc wanted to employ new tactics and methods like elastic defence, the backhanded slap, etc to best deal with a more effective Red Army, to use their strengths of Bewegungskrieg, tactical superiority and organisation; sadly instead they largely continued to fight as they had trained just before the war with slight changes in tactics like the PaK front, tank wedge and new technology; but from early ‘43 the offensive combined arms tactics remained largely unchanged, making their attacks predictable. If there was one thing they had control over it was updating and developing new strategy and tactics to blunt the Soviet spearheads, to pull back until a Schwerpunkt could be unleashed. Instead it was an internal struggle between Hitler’s romantic Darwinian approach and influential Generals trying to sell tactics that would preserve German combat strength whist whittling down the enemies. The Red Army became so much more effective because it evolved and studied its mistakes, as well as working towards the comprehensive goal of deep battle. As for the Western Allies, they were less imaginative and relied on overwhelming force. The Germans could have preserved enough men and materiel sacrificed at Tunis, Courland, Falaise, etc to have been able to at least maintain a strong defence with limited offensive operations.
We seem to always mention how surprising well these certain strategies work initially. It's not surprising, because when militaries attempt unexpectedly stupid strategies, they usually have short term success because they are a surprise. That doesn't mean they aren't stupid. The attempt to get to Antwerp wasn't going to happen even if everything went perfectly.
Paul, Thanks a lot for this interesting and well-researched programme. Good talk by Anthony on Battle of the Bulge and its origins in post D-Day Normandy and on the great lack of intelligence the Germans had to contend with.
Great discussion. Now I had the impression that artillery was key to stopping the Germans at Elsenborn Ridge regardless of weather. And, Steven Zaloga's thesis seems to be that that region was the schwerpunkt of the attack. If valid, does that meant the Germans were defeated regardless of weather and Bastogne? And if so, is it possible the bad weather actually helped the Americans (channel German formation along poor roads, into built up areas) in that part of the offensive?
If Hitler had been more realistic about it and had gone with a smaller scale offensive that Von Runstedt and Model put together, How many more months would Germany have lasted? What would be odds of success for a smaller operation?
Success or failure in a smaller operation in the west doesn't matter much in this stage of the war. The soviets are coming hard and fast from the east. The germans can't delay that.
Hitler had a obsession with bigger is better. So he brought in all of these Tiger tanks which had great armor and fire power. But were heavy fuel hogs. At a time when Germany hade a fuel shortage and during when the ground was saturated. And German units spent more time pulling Tigers out of the mud. Than they did fighting them. These units Hitler sacrificed at the bulge. Would have made crossing the Rhine much more deadly and costly for the allies. But you can expect this when Generals cower to a Corporal.
why was the prestart reconnaissance so poor-they needed to seize allied fuel stocks a s a first priority-skorzeny's men should have reconnoitred the fuel dumps and von der Hedyte men should have seized the big ones like the 4 million gallons at Stavelot
I spoke to a former Waffen SS man who had an autographed picture of Adolph Hitler he carried in a pocket next to his heart. This was in 1970. He told me we made Hitler look bad.
Maybe I'm just a bit cranky today, and I'm enjoying the show immensely, but could you please slip your guests the hint that they should really take a precious 30 minutes out of their life's work of writing 50+ books, and practice pronouncing the top 10 to 20 German names that keep coming up? I know they're writers so they mainly talk to walls, ghosts and cats, but I find it a little bit jarring that someone who spends a year researching a book can't pronounce the name of the small cast of characters he writes about. I don't mean this as criticism of mr. Tucker-Jones but come on: isn't being able to pronounce "Von Manteuffel" a reward in itself?
I have had a lot to do with the German - shall we call it "psyche"? I hoped to see this from that ethnographical viewpoint rather than the more superficial (though important) view of the major actors. German culture from my experience [and from the very disparate history of what only became a country in 1871] is an attempt to unite a varied populace. There is Hoch Deutsch, which everyone can speak over the multitude of dialects. Think about it: a high level language, the adoption of higher authority in how you speak in public. It's far from trivial. So the attempts to unify these vast lands result in adherence to authority. Sepp Dietrich didn't fancy the Ardennes attack? So said one commentator on WW2TV recently. That was post hoc rationalisation: all the German people followed the "Leader" - "Fueher Kommand, wir folgen" and he was an adherent of course. The lack of discussion, the belief in leadership, the atrocities, all point in he same direction. Don't forget the ethnic cleansing in what is now Namibia by German administrators - not army types - and the murder of Belgian civilians in WWI. We are not dealing with a rational entity here, and views from the side are based on second or third hand reports. Sadly, the analysis based on some kind of Anglo-Saxon based rationality does not fit. German history, German culture, and German life which is very different from our experience. Twelve million slaves were used by the State apparatus according to WW2 TV presenter Caddick-Adams. Can you imagine the culture of a folk which initiated and then promulgated such a situation? Who happily manned the multitude of camps? What kind of adherence to distant authority does that represent? Finally - an example: when I tried to cross a road in Germany while the red light was on - I was pulled back by a little old lady! My friends approached folk washing their cars or using lawnmowers on a Sunday. There is a host of issues about the attitude and actions of German troops which needs far more incisive reportage. Best of luck with that, Anthony! Best wishes to all. Neil
![Bad Luck Drivers And Car Crashes [10] [BeamNG.Drive]](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/hVMd8lohjmk/mqdefault.jpg)
The BofB was a big SNAFU for both sides. The Allies just had the ability to reconstitute themselves whereas the Germans had shot their last bolt.
The Ardennes Offensive always seemed like something from a Greek tragedy to me. The Germans really knew that it was hopeless, but still they tried their best. The American units, although some were green, were just not the pushover French reserve divisions of 1940. Neither could the German Army apply the pressure along the whole front to pin the Allied reserves down from interfering with the main thrust. Still it was a dramatic battle all the same. Great discussion Paul and Anthony with many a thought provoking comment.
I’ve listened to many of these and have become increasingly impressed with Paul’s knowledge and especially his ability to see things in context and to keep bringing the conversations back to the big picture. I’ve read and watched hundreds of histories but I’ve never felt as “smart” about the war as I feel with these shows.
Thanks you very much George. I feel I have got better since the early days
I think that Eisenhower & Bradley never received the level of criticism they deserved for being caught out - with 80,000-odd casualties - when Germany launched the Ardennes offensive.
I prefer just calling it the Ardennes Offensive.
Paul's comments are really incisive! What a great interlucutor!
Howdy folks. This is a comprehensive overview of the German view of the Ardennes battle. Great information and an educated outlook on the situation. One of Woodys best shows ever.
Great interview. Amazing channel!
I really enjoyed Anthony's presentation. It was great to hear a well researched presentation on the German perspective on the Battle of the Bulge. I hope Anthony comes back on WW2TV soon.
Great Video, have just ordered Anthony's Book. A couple of quick points on assault gun comments in the video (didn't see specific mention of this in the YT comments) as an aside for anyone interested:
1. Anthony wasn't quite right about the Assault Guns being artillery controlled. They were when the StuG was first designed and the first 'batteries' formed pre-war; but once Guderian became Inspector General of Panzertruppen about 1943 they were taken off the artillery and then all tanks, assault guns (and I believe Jagdpanzers) came under the Panzertruppen. So at time of 'The Bulge' they were panzer troops (not artillery).
2. Re: Paul R's comments about assault guns/StuGs on the attack and their effectiveness (with or without infantry support). FWIW this was explicitly against German doctrine and that was in place for the whole war. The StuG batteries/abteilung mid to late-war repeatedly complained about their misuse as tanks in offensive operations and the excessive losses they suffered when used that way (especially when used to lead an attack).
They were always highly vulnerable if used offensively (i.e. on the attack) and were intended to either come forward to support infantry against fortifications on ground already secured by the infantry (early war artillery manned StuGs) or to fight from prepared hidden or defensive positions and do a variation of shoot and scoot. In late war PanzerGrenadier Divisions the StuGs were intended to come up or follow the infantry to provide fire support, but not to lead or be in the front rank (just like the early war ones). Anything that put them at risk of exposed flanks (to AT fire) resulted in heavy casualties and infantry support made no difference to this.
I think much of this is covered in the WW2TV Sturmgeschütz episode, but otherwise several good books, etc, are available on StuG doctrine and performance...
P.S. For those who may not know the original JagdPanzer IV (with the 75/48) was originally designated as a Sturmgeschütz before being reclassified as JgdPz partway through its production run. So some StuG units had this for a time.
Skorzeny career after the war is really crazy.
Excellent program today. Anthony has done considerable research to learn more about the German side of the battle. Thanks for another enjoyable episode Paul!!
Thanks again. I’ll def be checking this out. Reading Retreat from Moscow by Stahel and Island Infernos by McManus.
Interestingly enough, and is one of the great things in this channel, the Ardennes offensive is seen in the context of the V2 offensive the Bodenplate operación (LW attack january 1st 1945) and the offensive against Alsace. Great presentation.
Fantastic presentation 👍
Many thanks
Hello folks. The presentation on a different perspective of the Bulge is one of the top 5 shows so far. Well done. As they say in sports, The other team gets paid too.
Great presentation !
I enjoyed the way Anthony said the word artillery. Very informative talk.
This was a great show; lots of interesting information from a different perspective; the maps were brilliant. Thank you, Paul and Anthony for an informative presentation. I look forward to a future show with Anthony on the Falaise Gap.
Sending best wishes to Peter Caddick-Adams and hoping we get to see him again soon on this channel.
Superb points! The German commanders didn't know a LOT of what was going on around them except for when they came into contact with the enemy. Great idea to write it the way he has! Good job again gents 💯👍❗
Great show. Thank you both 👍
Glad you enjoyed it
Regarding the StuG IIIs. Depending on the version they can be either offensive of defensive weapons.
The early short barrelled versions (Ausf. A etc) were assault guns (offensive) in that they were armoured mobile howitzers that could keep up with the advancing infantry and provide them with (HE mainly) support.
Later versions with the longer gun - as used in the Ardennes - were, in effect, tank destroyers & not assault guns. These are not ideal for either hunting enemy armour or providing infantry support in the close confines of this location.
That's my pedantic understanding at least.
Anthony’s, presentation tonight was one of the best I’ve listened too on the Battle of the Bulge. So marvellous to hear from the German side. This channel Paul as I’ve said before is number one for me, always some new slants on known subjects. Keep it coming Paul, thank you both for tonight’s show.
Glad you enjoyed it!
I stand in complete agreement with you, Kevin
One of the main feelings on the part of the allies was once they had the forces in place they failed to use their air power to cut all of the bridges to block all of the retreat routes of the German forces the same thing happened in Normandy when they tried to trap the German army just a failure to block properly they could have bagged up all of the German forces and shorten the war very considerably in both instances
In no way disagree with Mr. Tucker-Jones assessment, but I am often fascinated by the phrase "above his pay grade", in this case pointing at Dietrich. I'm taken back to a remark Alan Brooke made concerning the period after the Allies had moved off the beaches when he wrote the British Army lacked a sufficient number of officers qualified to be division level commanders. That is not a knock on the British Army, not my point at all. Rather it highlights the fact that there is a universal lack of people who really, seriously have much of an idea how to handle 10,000, or 40,000, or 100,000 soldiers at a time. If we were to be serious about leadership and command, I think we would find the number of people who are genuinely good at much beyond a brigade are a very rare lot. Much of what we look back at in history as "pretty good" was actually only "adequate". Again, a universal thing, and they should be honored as the best of what was available.
Had the pleasure of being around one or two persons who made it to the 3 or 4-star level who had leadership qualities that absolutely stood out. Been around some that, well, "being above their pay grade" is a bit more common than we let on.
Very enlightening show! Interesting to hear Anthony’s presentation of the offensive from the German point of view! I look forward to reading Anthony’s new book on the subject! Thanks very much Paul & Anthony!
Glad you enjoyed it!
Really great program, thank you.
Dietrich relied heavily on his Chief of Staff, F. Kramer, a Heer officer who had transferred to the Waffen SS. Kramer was experienced due to his training as a staff grade officer, and service on the Eastern Front. One of the reasons for 1st SS Pz Korps prolonged defense in Normandy.
It was a close call of 15 minutes or the Port of Antwerp hadn't been open before the start of 'The Battle of the Bulge'.
Instead of sending German Parachute Rgt.6 straight to the Walcheren-Causeway via Benedensas and Zijpe on the eve of Oct.31 straight away as planned, it was sent to Numansdorp.
To avoid severe consequences from Berlin a second attempt was planned the next evening on Nov.1 , but by then the Canadians crossed the Walcheren Causeway before this FJR.6 convoy was sent from Numansdorp via Zijpe to bolster North-Beveland and Walcheren.
Student managed to let all proof 'disapear' and only the evacuation of the rearguard III./FJR.6 and Kampfgruppe Chill is reported for Nov.4 and 5.
Until 2008 nobody knew exactly how Germany 1st Parachute Army was composed or looked at the big picture from the German perspective.
Richard Binkhuysen aka 'A.C.E. van T.'
Excellent presentation. great guest. Really interesting.
Glad you enjoyed it!
One thing that is not often mentioned is the Wehrmacht hadn’t altered its tactics sufficiently enough after the disastrous campaigns in late ‘42.
Some Generals like Manstein and Model etc wanted to employ new tactics and methods like elastic defence, the backhanded slap, etc to best deal with a more effective Red Army, to use their strengths of Bewegungskrieg, tactical superiority and organisation; sadly instead they largely continued to fight as they had trained just before the war with slight changes in tactics like the PaK front, tank wedge and new technology; but from early ‘43 the offensive combined arms tactics remained largely unchanged, making their attacks predictable.
If there was one thing they had control over it was updating and developing new strategy and tactics to blunt the Soviet spearheads, to pull back until a Schwerpunkt could be unleashed.
Instead it was an internal struggle between Hitler’s romantic Darwinian approach and influential Generals trying to sell tactics that would preserve German combat strength whist whittling down the enemies.
The Red Army became so much more effective because it evolved and studied its mistakes, as well as working towards the comprehensive goal of deep battle.
As for the Western Allies, they were less imaginative and relied on overwhelming force.
The Germans could have preserved enough men and materiel sacrificed at Tunis, Courland, Falaise, etc to have been able to at least maintain a strong defence with limited offensive operations.
We seem to always mention how surprising well these certain strategies work initially. It's not surprising, because when militaries attempt unexpectedly stupid strategies, they usually have short term success because they are a surprise. That doesn't mean they aren't stupid. The attempt to get to Antwerp wasn't going to happen even if everything went perfectly.
Paul,
Thanks a lot for this interesting and well-researched programme. Good talk by Anthony on Battle of the Bulge and its origins in post D-Day Normandy and on the great lack of intelligence the Germans had to contend with.
awesome
Can a Tiger Tank Run on schnapps?
Great discussion. Now I had the impression that artillery was key to stopping the Germans at Elsenborn Ridge regardless of weather. And, Steven Zaloga's thesis seems to be that that region was the schwerpunkt of the attack. If valid, does that meant the Germans were defeated regardless of weather and Bastogne? And if so, is it possible the bad weather actually helped the Americans (channel German formation along poor roads, into built up areas) in that part of the offensive?
If Hitler had been more realistic about it and had gone with a smaller scale offensive that Von Runstedt and Model put together, How many more months would Germany have lasted? What would be odds of success for a smaller operation?
Success or failure in a smaller operation in the west doesn't matter much in this stage of the war. The soviets are coming hard and fast from the east. The germans can't delay that.
How much did operation nordwind add to the reduction of German forces also?
Hitler had a obsession with bigger is better. So he brought in all of these Tiger tanks which had great armor and fire power. But were heavy fuel hogs. At a time when Germany hade a fuel shortage and during when the ground was saturated. And German units spent more time pulling Tigers out of the mud. Than they did fighting them. These units Hitler sacrificed at the bulge. Would have made crossing the Rhine much more deadly and costly for the allies. But you can expect this when Generals cower to a Corporal.
why was the prestart reconnaissance so poor-they needed to seize allied fuel stocks a s a first priority-skorzeny's men should have reconnoitred the fuel dumps and von der Hedyte men should have seized the big ones like the 4 million gallons at Stavelot
5.40 "the Americas defeated it"
6.50 MG "Montgomery took his eye off the ball"
Mislabeled battlefields - like alligator creek/tenaru on Guadalcanal
I spoke to a former Waffen SS man who had an autographed picture of Adolph Hitler he carried in a pocket next to his heart. This was in 1970. He told me we made Hitler look bad.
Brainwashed fool
@@WW2TV SS were loyal to Hitler, not Germany. They were fools.
Maybe I'm just a bit cranky today, and I'm enjoying the show immensely, but could you please slip your guests the hint that they should really take a precious 30 minutes out of their life's work of writing 50+ books, and practice pronouncing the top 10 to 20 German names that keep coming up?
I know they're writers so they mainly talk to walls, ghosts and cats, but I find it a little bit jarring that someone who spends a year researching a book can't pronounce the name of the small cast of characters he writes about.
I don't mean this as criticism of mr. Tucker-Jones but come on: isn't being able to pronounce "Von Manteuffel" a reward in itself?
Relax bro my day sucked too no need to knit pick. You ain’t Saving the world with your comment. Shit happens. Could be worse
@@misterbaker9728 You should follow your own advice.
❤
Thank heavens Monty sorted it out.
I have had a lot to do with the German - shall we call it "psyche"?
I hoped to see this from that ethnographical viewpoint rather than the more superficial (though important) view of the major actors. German culture from my experience [and from the very disparate history of what only became a country in 1871] is an attempt to unite a varied populace.
There is Hoch Deutsch, which everyone can speak over the multitude of dialects. Think about it: a high level language, the adoption of higher authority in how you speak in public. It's far from trivial. So the attempts to unify these vast lands result in adherence to authority.
Sepp Dietrich didn't fancy the Ardennes attack? So said one commentator on WW2TV recently. That was post hoc rationalisation: all the German people followed the "Leader" - "Fueher Kommand, wir folgen" and he was an adherent of course. The lack of discussion, the belief in leadership, the atrocities, all point in he same direction. Don't forget the ethnic cleansing in what is now Namibia by German administrators - not army types - and the murder of Belgian civilians in WWI.
We are not dealing with a rational entity here, and views from the side are based on second or third hand reports. Sadly, the analysis based on some kind of Anglo-Saxon based rationality does not fit. German history, German culture, and German life which is very different from our experience. Twelve million slaves were used by the State apparatus according to WW2 TV presenter Caddick-Adams.
Can you imagine the culture of a folk which initiated and then promulgated such a situation? Who happily manned the multitude of camps? What kind of adherence to distant authority does that represent?
Finally - an example: when I tried to cross a road in Germany while the red light was on - I was pulled back by a little old lady! My friends approached folk washing their cars or using lawnmowers on a Sunday.
There is a host of issues about the attitude and actions of German troops which needs far more incisive reportage.
Best of luck with that, Anthony! Best wishes to all. Neil
Total waste of lives ...model was a shocker . Absurd Prussian militarism