Abortion: Impermissible, Whether Fetuses are Persons or Not?
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- Опубліковано 29 бер 2020
- In this video, I examine Alexander R. Pruss''s (2011) essay, "I Was Once a Fetus: That is Why Abortion is Wrong." Specifically, I explain Pruss's reasons for thinking that abortion is morally impermissible whether fetuses are persons or not.
This puts Pruss's view in contrast with:
1. Judith Jarvis Thomson's view, since Thomson argues that abortion is permissible even if fetuses are persons: • Abortion: Permissible,...
and
2. Mary Anne Warren's view, since Warren argues that abortion is permissible because fetuses are not persons: • Abortion: Permissible ...
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To view videos in their proper sequence, see the following playlist: • Introduction to Bioeth...
This is a strong argument. I wish this was assigned back when I took and had to teach material on abortion in ethics classes.
Pruss is such a genius.
Absolutely. I used to spend hours reading his blog posts -- so many interesting arguments to consider.
@@bioethicsondemand6258 he has like two PhDs and one masters degree... The man is worth taking seriously!
@@bioethicsondemand6258 Could you link the sources for this video?
@@Kristian-ql8zw the sources appear at 17:07
but the main one according to the description is Alexander R. Pruss''s (2011) essay, "I Was Once a Fetus: That is Why Abortion is Wrong."
Regarding self defense, there is another analogy which is more valid. If you are on the edge of a cliff and a skier is out of control and crashes into you, and then tangles with you and is pulling both of you over, you are not morally wrong to disentangle yourself and save your own life even if it mean the other person falls to their death.
This is similar to a tubal pregnancy where the fetus risks both lives and will certainly die either way - with or without killing the mother.
The skier analogy is a really nice one for the self-defense case.
I think it fits with the doctrine of double effect (DDE), which Pruss does accept (elsewhere). As he puts it (in one of his books):
It can be permissible to perform an action that has both a good and a bad effect, provided that
1. the action is intrinsically morally neutral or good,
2. the bad effect is proportionate to the good, and
3. the bad effect, or “side-effect,” is not intended, either as a means or as an end.
In an ectopic pregnancy, removal of the affected fallopian tube may well be permitted on DDE, even if it is foreseeable that doing so will lead to the death of the embryo.
Still, DDE doesn’t permit abortion (i.e., the direct/intentional killing of an embryo/fetus).
Rather, if a surgery is required to save the life of a person, the surgery will (indirectly) lead to the death of an embryo and the death of the embryo is not the aim of the surgery (as is the case with abortion, arguably) then the surgery may be permissible. But for Pruss, I think this will only apply in extreme cases (where the badness of the death of an embryo is proportionate to whatever good the surgery secures). So, it seems plausible to me that he’d think this kind of surgery is only permissible in cases - like the skier example - where both will die if the surgery is not performed.
(At least, I think that's what he might say.)
@@bioethicsondemand6258 Thanks for the very thorough and well reasoned reply. So refreshing to find on the internet!!
Really good video, by the say. I'm sharing it.
@@Cre8tvMG Excellent -- thank you!
And thanks again for the skier analogy -- I may borrow it in future discussions with others if you don't mind. :-)
How does the metaphysical view that a fetus is numerically identical to its adult self relevant to the fetus’ moral status? What property (other than species and dna) does a human fetus possess that affords it moral status and rights?
Thanks for the very informative video! If one of Pruss' arguments is that the fetus is identical metaphiscally to its adult self, doesn't that imply that the fetus is identical to a person? Which means he isn't really putting aside the question of the personhood of fetuses.
Also the going back in time seems arbitrary - imagine you stopped two teenagers sleeping together, and had you not, the girl would have gotten pregnant. Wouldn't you be equally at fault for stopping that would-be-baby living its entire life?
I think that the life that began at conception that is being discussed is referring to the organism itself. Not metaphysically speaking. Possibly. I think this may be why personhood isn’t talked about and has no bearing on the argument. Even if you presupposed that personhood didn’t even exist, this argument would still hold together. As well with the second question raised, since each premise hinges on the one prior, an organism must actually exist to begin with so going back in time to a point when the organism never existed doesn’t object to the argument. It’s an interesting thought though and may be worth looking into since (let’s invoke Back to the Future as a reference) if let’s say Biff went back in time and killed George McFly as an adult, would it be wrong only because he terminated George’s life or also wrong because he ended the possibility of George having Marty as a kid and thus also Marty’s life?
I think Pruss’ argument can only object to the living organism in this situation which would be George McFly’s life. The question of whether Marty’s life being terminated by butterfly effect isn’t in question and doesn’t prove that it’s right or wrong. That would be a separate topic and argument.
I may have made absolutely no sense, so forgive me. You raise interesting questions.
Pruss's argument is practically the same as Marquis's, still a good argument tho
If only Americans were taught to be rational in school, this video would end abortion. But they are taught to respond by mob emotion.
Atleast Americans _are_ debating about it. The rest of the world doesn't even seem to care.
Does Pruss conflate you with your DNA when he talks about the persistence principal. If free will exist (and I know that is a big if) could it not be the case that the fetus that was born could make radically different choices then you when you go back in the time machine? They may be no more similar to me then a clone of me born at the same time. To say that you and the fetus are the same would assume that it makes all the same choices. That if the experiment that is you is played again then the results would be the same.
@Eskil Hansson but if it is wrong to kill me now and as a fetus then I would need to be the same "me". Identy seems to he more about psychological states then it is biological states. I agree I have never been a different organism, but my past selfs wants and desires at times are alien to me. The easy way out is to deny this matters that its not about the person but about life. But then its about the sanctity of life abd not about identity.
The biggest flaw factually is premise one...
No one is identical to their fetal self despite having once been one. The reason is obvious, because you're not anymore, something has changed therefore not identical. The identity of indiscernible states that no two things are exactly the same (identical) in every regard. Two points in time (fetal and adult) are clearly describing differences not identicals.
Also... your fetal self could have resulted in many variations of that same person from happenstance, environment, choices, opportunity, fortune, mishap and other factors outside the genetic you. A single path is not implied here. And what is true for this, is also true for any other fetus which is inconsistent. Bob is not Nick, only in one specific path.
Lastly, this premise automatically presumes the point it is trying to make as already true which is circular reasoning... making a scenario where a future self goes back in time arguing against the abortion of their fetal self is assuming that future self is guaranteed. It is not. This is what abortion is seeking to do already, meaning aborting a fetus, means no future person, therefore this analogy doesn't exist because that future person is impossible and never came to be. Pregnancy does not guarantee a living baby, far from 100%. Presuming that during a pregnancy is the tragedy when an expecting couple loses the pregnancy or has a still birth, because it never came to be, not that it was already but not anymore.
Wishful thinking is good to an extent but when arguing or debating reality such as abortion, wishful thinking is a fallacy and is an argument from imagination through hasty conclusions and circular reasoning.
"The biggest flaw factually is premise one... No one is identical to their fetal self despite having once been one. The reason is obvious, because you're not anymore, something has changed therefore not identical. The identity of indiscernible states that no two things are exactly the same (identical) in every regard. Two points in time (fetal and adult) are clearly describing differences not identicals."
This is a misunderstanding. Pruss didn't argue that his fetal-self and his adult-self have zero differences. Rather, he argued that they are _numerically identical,_ meaning that they are one and the same being. For example, I am numerically identical to myself from yesterday even though there are differences between yesterday-me and today-me.
"Also... your fetal self could have resulted in many variations of that same person from happenstance, environment, choices, opportunity, fortune, mishap and other factors outside the genetic you. A single path is not implied here. And what is true for this, is also true for any other fetus which is inconsistent. Bob is not Nick, only in one specific path."
This is irrelevant. If fetuses grow up to be beings who have either the properties of personhood or the the right to life as an _essential property,_ then they had these properties at all moments of their existence, including while they were still fetuses.
"Lastly, this premise automatically presumes the point it is trying to make as already true which is circular reasoning... making a scenario where a future self goes back in time arguing against the abortion of their fetal self is assuming that future self is guaranteed."
Again, irrelevant. You do not understand how the inference of the argument works. You should read Pruss's actual paper on the argument for a better understanding.
@@mnmmnm925 "This is a misunderstanding. Pruss didn't argue that his fetal-self and his adult-self have zero differences. Rather, he argued that they are numerically identical, meaning that they are one and the same being. For example, I am numerically identical to myself from yesterday even though there are differences between yesterday-me and today-me. "
A numerical identity is as good as saying a number without describing the units. One. One what? 1 is 1. Meaning 1 is numerically identical to 1 as is any other number. That, is a useless distinction to make which is what I was pointing out. 1 dollar is not equal to 1 diamond, 1 born alive human is not equal to 1 preborn human. Despite they all have 1 quantifying the number of units present.
"This is irrelevant. If fetuses grow up to be beings who have either the properties of personhood or the the right to life as an essential property, then they had these properties at all moments of their existence, including while they were still fetuses. "
What you said is actually the irrelevant part of it. Directly pertinent to their existence as a being with rights and personhood, that ends at them, to which the woman who is using her own biological bodily functions inherent to her own existence allows the fetus to continue to exist through the very same processes that keep her alive. This is not irrelevant, it's actually the opposite, irrefutably paramount. Her breathing, heartbeat, brain activity, metabolism, blood pressure and other vital functions that keep her alive allow her to stay alive and also umbrella those functions to the fetus that cannot yet do it for themselves (she eats, drinks, breathes, digests, moves, etc for both). It actually doesn't matter that the fetus is a person, with rights, because you argue they are inalienable and essential, which means hers are just as inalienable and essential otherwise you contradict the very equal argument you claim exists for the fetus in reducing hers. Meaning numerically identical is actually the irrelevant argument. The difference matter, and the differences mean, one is out of luck, while the other isn't. Flip floping it to make it seem like the opposite that the woman must compensate is in direct contradiction to the argument being made for the fetus. Hence, a self losing argument. The differences >> the sameness. None of which are unjust, inhumane nor disprovable. The harsh reality of a stalemate between the two people with rights, shows that one will continue to survive just fine, while the other is doomed, and an inequity aside from basic human rights therefore cannot be resolved using basic human rights.
"Again, irrelevant. You do not understand how the inference of the argument works. You should read Pruss's actual paper on the argument for a better understanding."
Yours as well as Pruss' is far from a inferential argument, but an unrealistic presumptuous one that defies scientific reality, and the nature of human reproduction as well as how it works. First science must be accurately defined, then morals based on the science. A woman in her own existence, biology, reality, reproductive power, all new humans rely on her ability to carry that pregnancy and is protected at her complete discretion before pregnancy, and thus cannot be diminished after a pregnancy that went against her initial discretion to not intend/want/ever be pregnant was circumvented to begin with. This is known as autonomy (not bodily autonomy, just autonomy)...rights protect everyone's autonomy meaning aspects of existence that are self serving, without any involvement of another party (such as vital functions, organs, servitude, property, expression). Once again, you have the irrelevant argument here, far from inferential, and far from anything provable and scientifically pertinent.
@@gb213 “A numerical identity is as good as saying a number without describing the units. One. One what? 1 is 1. Meaning 1 is numerically identical to 1 as is any other number. That, is a useless distinction to make which is what I was pointing out. 1 dollar is not equal to 1 diamond, 1 born alive human is not equal to 1 preborn human. Despite they all have 1 quantifying the number of units present.”
This is not what “numerical identity” means. Numerical identity means that A and B are the same thing, not that A and B are equal in quantity. For example, Clark Kent is numerically identical to Superman. In contrast, two blueberries are not numerically identical to two strawberries. It’s hard to get the discussion off the ground if you don’t even know standard philosophical terminology.
“What you said is actually the irrelevant part of it. Directly pertinent to their existence as a being with rights and personhood, that ends at them, to which the woman who is using her own biological bodily functions inherent to her own existence allows the fetus to continue to exist through the very same processes that keep her alive. This is not irrelevant, it's actually the opposite, irrefutably paramount. Her breathing, heartbeat, brain activity, metabolism, blood pressure and other vital functions that keep her alive allow her to stay alive and also umbrella those functions to the fetus that cannot yet do it for themselves (she eats, drinks, breathes, digests, moves, etc for both). It actually doesn't matter that the fetus is a person, with rights, because you argue they are inalienable and essential, which means hers are just as inalienable and essential otherwise you contradict the very equal argument you claim exists for the fetus in reducing hers.”
I’m glad you acknowledge the fetus is a person. And no, we aren’t reducing any of the pregnant woman’s rights. Neither men nor women nor fetuses are allowed to make a decision with their body that *_intentionally_* harms or kills another innocent person.
“Yours as well as Pruss' is far from a inferential argument, but an unrealistic presumptuous one that defies scientific reality, and the nature of human reproduction as well as how it works. First science must be accurately defined, then morals based on the science.”
Science doesn’t say anything about morality. And I don’t know why you’re claiming we “defy scientific reality” - no one has made any judgements on science or espoused scientific claims. You make a lot of category errors.
“A woman in her own existence, biology, reality, reproductive power, all new humans rely on her ability to carry that pregnancy and is protected at her complete discretion before pregnancy, and thus cannot be diminished after a pregnancy that went against her initial discretion to not intend/want/ever be pregnant was circumvented to begin with. This is known as autonomy (not bodily autonomy, just autonomy)...rights protect everyone's autonomy meaning aspects of existence that are self serving, without any involvement of another party (such as vital functions, organs, servitude, property, expression). Once again, you have the irrelevant argument here, far from inferential, and far from anything provable and scientifically pertinent.”
No, our autonomy is not absolute nor does it take precedence over all other things. For example, we stop people from committing suicide, because life takes precedence over autonomy. And nothing you said was “scientifically pertinent’; the claims you’re making are ethical in nature, not scientific. Do you know the difference?
@@mnmmnm925 "This is not what “numerical identity” means. Numerical identity means that A and B are the same thing, not that A and B are equal in quantity. For example, Clark Kent is numerically identical to Superman. In contrast, two blueberries are not numerically identical to two strawberries. It’s hard to get the discussion off the ground if you don’t even know standard philosophical terminology."
You're right. I actually did not know that, though it is a bit nonsensical because it brute forces two things into a word that means sameness. According to philosophy, a numerical identity "It is contrasted with qualitative identity which simply means that an object has all the same properties or qualities." to which still doesn't explain your point any better than what I described. A fetus does not have the same properties nor qualities as a born alive humans (born alive have more, that's what development does; clark kent and superman have the same properties and qualities), reason being that is why it is still and needs to develop further inside the woman's body (clark kent has also needed to be superman secretly without changing his clothes, a fetus doesn't do this). These differences matter and still outweigh this philosophical claim that they somehow have some arbitrary equal standing when it comes to terminating a pregnancy and nonsensical to parallel it to a fictional character changing clothes...
To clarify, a "numerical identity" refers to two members in a set sharing some basic fundamental commonalities defined by the set they belong to, but not a complete/entire commonality with each other overall. This is known as extensionality. This is elaborated with its complementary term known as intensionality, the members of that set having different descriptions aside from their basic parameters of how they were grouped, thus requiring additional explanation that cannot be described in relevance by itself to the entire set it belongs to (requires extensionality). Logically, a numerical identity in your use of the unborn is extensional but not intensional, the intension of a fetus vs a born alive human matter more despite they both belong to the set of living humans when it comes to abortion. Extensionality example would be the factors of I.E. 18 (identical) , the intensionality (identical is not correct to use here) would be the various numbers in the set [ 1 is not 2 is not 3 is not 6 is not 9 is not 18] they are all integer factors of 18. And as factors they're all valid, but in some context we might use some over others, and in abortion that is exactly what is being argued, not against being in the set but the difference between members in the set and why that matters over the equality of validity of being in the set. (intensionality). Logic >> philosophy.
"I’m glad you acknowledge the fetus is a person. And no, we aren’t reducing any of the pregnant woman’s rights. Neither men nor women nor fetuses are allowed to make a decision with their body that intentionally harms or kills another innocent person."
Yes, indeed, I am not someone who argues against that it isnt a human being, I am someone that argues it doesn't matter especially from a equal point of argumentation. The fact the fetus cannot live without the woman's own bodily functions that keep her alive is neither killing nor harm. Suppose we simply remove the fetus from the mother, we surgically excise the uterine tissue that disconnects the fetus from her, then gently and carefully remove it from her. Thus terminating her pregnancy, which she has every right to do, nothing was done to the fetus' body, everything was done to her. The fact it will no longer survive without her body is neither descriptive of harm nor killing. This is the inequalities I was speaking of, you cannot argue in any ethical way demanding her body and it's functions for another (were not talking about bottles and blankets, were talking literal breathing, eating, heartbeat, drinking, digestion, physical viscerality etc). The rest of the world is welcome to bring all the medicine, eqiupment, methods to try and save that fetus after it is removed from her body, but failure to successfully save that fetus from doom is not liable on the woman (who never wanted it there in the first place) nor the doctors removing the fetus non violently (providing a treatment to restore her body to a state she wishes it to be in). Her choice being her body, the surgery being applied to only her body, the fetus not able to survive without her, you cannot connect those dots using the points of equality and dignity you posit for the fetus without compromising hers. Hence numerical identity can indeed apply, but as you can see, the difference matter more. To which isn't killing, harming nor murder, that fetus would still be whole, ALIVE and unharmed and has the chance for any efforts made to continue to care for it and live on, just using not her body and its functions. That choice is incontestably hers to make freely. You don't have the right to directly kill someone on your property just because you don't want them there, but you can have police come and remove them for you, despite they cannot survive outside your home, they can be brought to a homeless shelter, a hospital or anywhere else capable of caring for them, you have no responsibility to. You have a right to your property, they don't, the woman has right's to her body, the fetus doesn't, it has it's own equal rights to it's own body, and ethically there is no argument against escorting someone out of someone else's property and even moreso removing someone from someone elses body and certainly not in an unwilling pregnancy.
"No, our autonomy is not absolute nor does it take precedence over all other things. For example, we stop people from committing suicide, because life takes precedence over autonomy. And nothing you said was “scientifically pertinent’; the claims you’re making are ethical in nature, not scientific. Do you know the difference?"
Our autonomy is absolutely absolute. We don't force people to not commit suicide, strapping them down, imprisoning them, or convicting them of a crime just because they're suicidal, we encourage, suggest, support, provide, counsel, guide, reason and convince them through their own autonomy not to, never force. We TALK them off the ledge, they either jump or step down from it... That's the difference, you clearly don't seem to know the difference. It's called suicide watch, not governance, suicide awareness, not thought policing, suicide prevention, not punishment. Just like you don't seem to know the difference between failing to save someone, versus killing and harming someone. If a person despite every reasonable effort takes their life, no one is to blame, that is a failure to save, and nonetheless a tragedy still, but no one had a duty to personally make sure by force on them to forcefully ensure the victim didn't. Can YOU separate those concepts?
Abortion results in a dead human, that is tragic, but what you need to understand is that arguing killing and harm requires proof, to which deals with the methodologies of abortion and not what abortion does. So arguing against physical harm, the current methods bring is valid, but it doesn't remove abortion as a procedure to which simply removing the fetus from her body using her body is not the same and still sustains the validity of abortion overall. Meaning you argue against dismemberment, tearing apart, etc but then by doing so narrow it down to removing the fetus from her body and despite all efforts watching it struggle helplessly into certain doom without her because her body was never up for debate here and is not to be blamed. Which is why you argue only for the fetus and leave out the woman entirely. Failing to save is not killing or harm. And her body is not/was never ethically part of that discussion in any just or valid context. After the fetus is removed from her body, the entire world is welcome to be informed and encouraged to help what better place to medically help someone than in a clinic or a healthcare setting, so no more violent methods sure, but removing the fetus from her is still yet to be rationally argued against.
Premise 1 is false according to the psychological continuity account of personal identity which is accepted by the vast majority of professional philosophers. No one who holds that account of personal identity thinks that killing an organism is bad UNLESS you thereby affect a person (which is defined in terms of psychological continuity). So the argument is either equivocating and is thus invalid or it's blatantly question-begging against the commonly accepted account of personal identity
I'm not sure that psychological continuity is the prevailing theory, but even if it were it wouldn't be question begging to assume another theory in this defense. It would likely devalue the quality of the defense, but it wouldn't be fallacious.
The bulk od Pruss's 2011 paper is spent addressing psychological accounts of personal identity. You should read it