As a British listener, it's interesting to see your discussion on the "Germany First" policy. The irony is that from a British perspective, we didn't have much to complain about. American supplies in mass-produced American Liberty ships poured across the Atlantic escorted by American-made and often American-crewed ships and aircraft. American equipment made a difference in the desert and allowed us to keep up the periphery battles that were all that we could do. American grain and oil almost certainly kept the USSR in the war, and American locomotives and trucks let the USSR keep fighting - and ultimately to break the Wehrmacht. Meanwhile the USAAF took the war to Germany and essentially defeated the Luftwaffe in 1943, helped by the RAF which indeed benefitted from American fuels and aircraft. When we were finally strong enough to take the war to Germany in Torch, Italy, and Normandy, the Americans were always there and we couldn't really have asked for more. As for America breaking "Germany First" to do operations like Guadalcanal... I think that distracting the Japanese from their operations toward Australia, Burma, and India would have been considered quite worthwhile as a tradeoff, especially given we could not have done much extra had all that effort been sent to Europe. If anything, it would probably have been too tempting for Churchill to push for yet another of his disastrous adventures: the fact that Britain could not afford another defeat was instrumental in keeping him in check.
I agree. If Watchtower hadn't happened and those resources were sent to Europe instead, it wouldn't have made much difference. But if Australia got isolated, and the Japanese didn't have to keep pulling troops and aircraft out of other theaters, then things would have been worse in the long run for Britain and the US.
What a great comment! Very insightful on many fronts. The aside about Churchill is where I am now. After many years of Churchill reverece, it's good to remember the times when he may have been right, but the technology and understanding of logistics in depth was missing and led to disaster. Gallipoli for sure. Commando raids in Calais in WW2 were lessons in how NOT to use scarce resources. The value of Sir Alan Brooke as voice of restraint, prudence, and reality is much underappreciated today, as he was then.
@@flparkermdpc Not to mention Churchill insisting on the campaign in Greece and Crete. That cost a great deal of men and material pulled away from the army in North Africa which was putting severe pressure on the Italians. The losses were serious and the effect on morale not to be underestimated
I totally agree with your assessment of Halsey as the right man for the job at this point in the war. I too am a firm backer of Raymond Spruance for making the better choices in 1944, but in the dark days of 1942, the aggressive nature of Bill Halsey was the perfect fit!
@leoamery I'm interested to hear what they think too... Halsey was far from perfect, and I agree that Hoover got a raw deal... I would only argue that the positive effect of his appointment had on overall morale and the more active support given by the Navy outweighed the negative of his tendency to rash decisions...
@@leoamerySo it was it a good thing Halsey was in hospital with shingles to give Spruance task force command? We'll never know, but had Halsey been there, there's no way Mitscher would have dared to disobey and send Hornet's air group to nowhere. And the scenario Seth and John bring up would likely have occurred. All four Japanese carriers would have been dead by 1045 and Yorktown would survive. Woulda, coulda.
As a Lifetime student of Military History I have come to the conclusion that the Guadalcanal Battle Campaign is the most complicated in human History. This is a 5 level effort in that there is Land, Air, Sea & Undersea as well as the Invisible war being waged with radio intercept intell as well as logistics supply & delivery being the 5th level of conflict. Any One level of Failure loses the Battle! There are many Battle with many more killed, longer duration but none come close to the extent that Guadalcanal does in terms of every level of Modern combat being utilized. Classic case of Irresistible Force meeting Immovable Object!
I sort of want to agree with you because Guadalcanal and the drive up the slot is my favorite topic. However, I can easily think of three equally intractable and even more logistically complicated campaigns: 1. The CBI theater/keeping China in the war. 2. The Allied effort in Supplying the Soviets to keep them in the war. 3. MacArthur’s drive back to the Philippines.
I think all subjects and battles are similarly complex but rarely have the scrutiny that this podcast has shown. When they have Dan on the show too, the audience is able to take part in a masterclass.
Awesome guys thanks. I am a former Marine MP and to Seth's comment always thought we were the Men's dept of the Navy, Yes Seth, you are correct that's what Marines think :). You guys really give me a whole new view of the teamwork we bring together. Semper Fi!!
Keep up the good work guys. I'm grateful to be living through this golden age of WWII historical research and distribution. Two cheers and a bravo. I'd buy all three of you a drink if I were listening to this chat in person.
I cannot begin to count all the 'wasted' hours I've spent watching, and rewatching, all of the episodes of this series. I also cannot compare the dividends of this time to any other parttime mania, unless it is the quiet time spent actually reading Parshall, or Ian Toll. Extraordinary series!!! Thank you.
I enjoyed the heck out of this episode. Jon always has some amazing tidbit of what some would say is trivia, but when you really think about it, is one of the keys to winning or losing a battle, "A ton of fuel to deliver 1 barrel of supplies." No wonder they started using Daihatsus! Bill puts it all in perspective as to how a command structure is SUPPOSED to work, and all three of you bring out the strengths or failings of the leaders on both sides of this conflict. Thanks so much to all of you!
Excellent discussion, as always. As for the notion that Ghormley suffered from dental issues, I find that unconvincing. There was an entire Army division on New Caledonia (Americal) with a dental team of roughly a dozen US Army dentists. There's no rational reason Ghormley would not have had his teeth attended to. My grandfather was the Assistant Division Commander of Americal Division, and diverted several boatloads of supplies from the Division to the Marines on Guadalcanal. His version of the initial meetings with Admiral Halsey was that the change in tone was immediate and electric.
I appreciate that you think Admiral Ghormley had no excuse to not have his teeth attended, but I don't agree. Fo r several reasons. Dental practice was NOTHING like it is today. Most dentists back then didn't even know how to fill a real cavity, if they could even properly identify a real one. Local anesthesia was poorly developed so a visit to a dentist was almost always a painful experience. A LOT of people are head shy, like horses. And dental condition is a mirror of overall health. Since Ghormley was cleared physically for full duty, you have an idea of how competent general medical and surgical practice was in 1942. For instance smoking was unconnected to heart and Hyper tension. Nor lung disease or the significance of smoker's cough. All were thought to be benign or at worst signs of advancing age. We now know that's very wrong. Robert Ghormley was a very sick man, and should have been medically limited. He failed the eyeball test several times. Nimitz, Halsey and King were all distressed at seeing him after a gap of a decade or more. The eyeball test is still the best initial part of a physical exam. What one can see is a pretty reliable indicator of true condition.
Outstanding episode guys! Right up my alley anyway. The senior military leadership and the decisions they make on those three levels you pointed out: strategic, operational, and tactical. Taking a snapshot point in time and seeing how those three things were being influenced and driven by who; And…, who in leadership had their head up their ass and who didn’t. Again, you all hit a home run on this episode. My two cents on having the right man in the job to handle current affairs. It’s related to your earlier episode concerning the USN’s defeat at The Battle Of Savo Island. And something that wasn’t talked about in enough detail. Howard Bode had no business being in command of a heavy cruiser much less in temporary charge of the naval forces assigned security that evening for the entire cruiser group once Crutchley departed the area around Savo Island. Bode was a terrible naval officer, and I believe that fact was generally known. If ever they patterned the main character, LCDR Philip Queeg from the novel The Caine Mutiny after some real living line officer, it would have been Howard Bode. I firmly believe the Chicago would have sounded the proper Task Group alarm if anyone but Bode had been at the helm of the wounded cruiser that awful night. I bring this up here simply because I believe, like Gormley; Bode was the wrong man, on the right ship, at the right time in history.
Thanks for the prompt reply Seth/Bill (?). If I’m not mistaken, Commander Bode’s stock plummeted fairly soon after that battle. He subsequently ended up “exiled” to some USN shore station/activity in or around the Panama Canal and shortly after that shot himself in the head which pretty much terminated the downward spiral of his naval career.
Interestingly, Layton in his book “…and I was there” mentions Howard Bode in passing, describing him as an exceptionally talented officer he met during a tour with Naval Intelligence in Washington. On the other hand, in memoirs of the Chicago crew he’s often described as a martinet and of course his performance at Savo does him no credit. Apparently he was no fool, but when he had to lead or to think fast under life-and-death pressure he could neither think clearly nor command well. People like Bode, Ghormley, and George MacClellan are fascinating and important to study because they’re *not* utter incompetents, up until the moment they are. How does an organization spot the warning signs?
John is a fantastic participant. He comes back because Seth and Bill are getting better by leaps and bigger leaps, and it's great to be a part of that educational success. And we and our fellow citizens are learning what has been done on our behalf, and what service entails.
I cannot add a complement that could improve on the ones already made. This podcast was just what the doctor ordered. I had reached the point that I needed a "summary", a break from the action, and this episode did precisely that. It plugged that knowledge gap that was driving me nuts. Thank you. In addition, thanks to Mr. Parshall for his always interesting and unique perspectives. A good team member !!! I suppose that comes at least partially from his sticking to his stated intention of not losing sight of Japanese viewpoints and doctrine. I watch a boatload of podcasts about the sea war during WW2 in the Pacific and hands down, yours is the best ... most informative and perceptive... a lot of talent at work. Good work. Fair winds and following seas, gentlemen.
Many thanks. I love Jon. I’ve known him for 15 years or so and he and I have always had a great working relationship. If we were ever to add a permanent third to this show, Jon would be it. If he would have us… -SP
Thank you for this marvelous series; I’m a new subscriber and scarfed down about a dozen episodes in the last week. Your efforts to present the historical context of what was actually going on with our heroes whose devotions preserved our republic is a precious resource in our current world that wants to rewrite history.
The Devotion to the Truth and the consequences of lying, either to oneself or your public, destroys your claim to legitimacy, and when the piper comes to be paid, there are no resources or allies to bolster or restore your position. You and yours collapse into the pit you have dug, intending it for your enemy, but finding it fits all liars and deniers equally.
How Halsey's leadership saved Guadalcanal and Admiral King would have been a better title for this episode as Halsey wasn't mentioned until halfway through it. As a newbie to this forum and a Pacific War enthusiast and a former active-duty sailor on the USS America CV-66 (1983-1987 and later a reservist), I appreciate these presentations - especially Captain Toti's explanation of military terms like strategic, operational and tactical levels. I also love Seth's and John's input and his and Tony Tully's Shattered Sword book on Midway. Observations on the Japanese and American leadership during the campaign: Japan had a fixed and rigid doctrine and learned little from their successes and even less from their defeats. The USN was a learning sponge and always sought to improve during the war and was always willing and able to learn and adapt. Being a casualty adverse culture versus a when all else fails, die for the emperor culture, was a key to America's success and kill ratio in the war. Japan - with a very few notable exceptions - had little concern for their human capital. How the IJN kept Nagumo as commander of their carrier fleet post Midway is beyond rationalization. Ozawa would have been a much better choice from the moment Kido Butai was conceived on April 10, 1941. I have never understood how Yamamoto was forced to keep Nagumo as the carrier commander (he was also a political opponent -Fleet Faction versus Treaty Faction - of Yamamoto during the 1920s and '30s). Yet he was able to obliterate Japan's long standing defense doctrine and foist the Pearl Harbor and Midway Operations against the will of most of the Navy AND Army Establishments Mikawa should be more heavily criticized for his failure to finish off the transports at Savo as you state. He was willing to lose his force in the battle but then gave up at the most critical time and lost Japan's last chance for a strategic victory. Had he finished the job, Gormley's pessimism would have been proved correct and I suspect that not only Nimitz would have been fired, but also King because, after all, Guadalcanal was HIS baby. And, at that time, King's direct Atlantic anti U-Boat command was a disaster. Furthermore, Mikawa was Nagumo's screen commander at Pearl Harbor just eight months before and certainly would have known about Yamamoto's displeasure of not following up with a third waive which necessitated the whole Midway debacle. Later he lost CA Kako to a submarine when he split up his force further removing it (CruDiv 6) from the Guadalcanal battle area. What was the rational for sending Goto's cruisers to Kavieng and not to the Shortland Base? Captain Toti thinks very highly of Spruance as do I, but I do wonder how he would have done had he been in Fletcher's or Gormley's position? I would love to hear an episode on that speculation. Spruance was excellent, but also very lucky. He was thrust into the Midway battle and if not for McClusky's initiative would have bis career ended right there and then. Being COS for Nimitz shielded him from the most difficult phase of the war when at least six US Admirals were either killed (Calahan and Scott) or had their careers chewed up and destroyed in the Guadalcanal reputation grinder. Halsey was the right man to replace Gormley and was able to function well with MacArthur throughout the SW Pacific Campaign. The tragedy of Halsey was he fought the first two years of the war under incredible stress when the situation was always in doubt and even post Guadalcanal, he was forced to operate on a logistical shoestring throughout the Solomons Campaign. The risky Bougainville campaign in November 1943 and the near reckless two carrier task force strike against Rabaul to save the Bougainville landing force probably burned him out after two years of touch and go combat. No American Admiral equals that achievement of enduring that much stress for that long. He should have become COS for Nimitz after Rabaul was abandoned and Towers should have alternated Third Fleet/Fifth Fleet with Spruance. By 1944 no admiral was going to lose a battle against the IJN.
Really excellent comment. Also, bearing on Halsey's failures later in the war were his failures to listen to subordinates who were competent and gifted. That shows me that he was getting influenced by his working with MacArthur, the premier self promoter and narcissist. I agree about his being burned out by late 1943. In
Superb recording once again, folks. I would add in defence of fletcher - pre the battle of Savo, Turner had arranged his ships to defend against the submarine threat. Submarines were obviously regarded as the biggest threat. Fletcher had America's three carriers tied to the east coast of guadalcanal in a place that would later be called 'torpedo junction'. If fletcher had lost a carrier that early in the war, it could have had serious effects. I find it hard to be too critical of fletcher with the information he had available.
Not only was there concern about submarines infiltrating Iron Bottom Sound but there were reports and expectations that a small surface force may also attempt to counter the landings. There were three possible paths through which an enemy force could approach. Admiral Turner was in overall command of the invasion force, but Admiral Crutchley commanded the screening force of six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and eight destroyers and had to consider all possibilities. Therefor he made the logical decision to split his forces to cover all three entrances and placed two of the DDs as warning pickets to avoid a sneak attack. While the dispositions could be seen as faulty and inviting the possibility of suffering defeat in detail (which did happen) there was no real choice as the 16 ships could not cover all the area at the same time. It must be remembered that the reconnaissance and communications were poor to nonexistent which caused what turned out to be poor but logical decisions to be made. And, it must be remembered, Turner approved Crutchley's dispositions. The only fault I have with the defensive plan was that the cruiser float planes were not used to supplement the warning net of the two DDs. Turner also called a conference to his flagship transport at what turned out to be a most unfortunate time which left the east and northern forces without an appointed commander allowing for the debacle. Regardless of where Admiral Fletcher's carriers were, the debacle would still have occurred and, as it turned out, Admiral Mikawa fled the scene for fear of carrier air retaliation. There was little chance that a morning strike would have found him without a search first and by dawn he was well over 100 miles away from Guadalcanal. That is the point that is most often missed by people who want to fault Fletcher for the debacle. Yes, Turner saved himself from much of the blame by dumping on Fletcher. Fortunately, the navy ran a very competent honest investigation, cleared everyone of culpability and learned from the many mistakes that were made thus ensuring there would be no repeat Battle Off Savo Island disasters. Unfortunately, Fletcher and the two surviving captains (of the sunken cruisers) reputations were badly tarnished. The other engaged cruiser captain (of the Chicago), Captain Bode, who failed to warn the northern force of the oncoming enemy committed suicide when he learned he was being investigated and implicated for his non action.
It is worth noting that so many battles and campaigns hinge on one commander or one small group of men. The detail you provide makes that clear, while most history glosses over how much is owed to the few.
This episode was exceptional. All the other podcasts you all do are great too! I've gotten to a point where I only watch these podcasts when I have TV time. Thanks for all the work you both do to bring these episodes about. My dad worked at pearl harbor for 40 years and bragged that he had 5 separate commendations from 5 different admirals during his time at pearl. He was a civil engineer who balanced subs.
Halsey at Guadalcanal, reminds me of Hancock at Gettysburg. This was both of their moment to shine so so bright. And after these two events both men would dim in their abilities.
There is such a thing as burnout. It is what happens before PTSD. Halsey was a very headstrong man, not given to introspection. Fortunately, Nimitz rotated his top commanders with his Third and Fifth Fleet designations, preserving both Spruance and Halsey. Halsey was headed for collapse, possibly like McCain and Lee.
Considering we had just given the UK almost a hundred post WWII destroyers with Radar upgrades under lend lease. The Atlantic job required upgrading more destroyers and getting them in the fight.
You and all your panel members work together so well it's nice to see. Thanks so much for this detail and thoughtful informed analysis that lets us apply lessons to now. Thank you for your service, also!
Thanks so much gentleman for a wonderful and informative podcast. Thanks also for the mention of the Kokoda Track. The Aussies can thank the US forces on Guadalcanal for the Japanese turning around 25 miles away from Port Moresby. As you say, PNG and Solomon Islands was one campaign from the perspective of the Japanese.
Well, that was just an incredible episode. The unique perspectives each of you bring to the discussion are insightful and rich. You perform an incredibly valuable service in furthering our understanding of the multiple layers of decision making required for victory to have occurred. I know the seemingly conversational nature of the podcast secretes the considerable amount of time you spend planning what to discuss and thinking through a synthesis of the vast amount of information in your triple brain trust to determine the critical insights to share in such an engaging manner. Y'all are just brilliant. I eagerly look forward to these each week. Five stars for you three!
Thank you very much for the kind words. To be honest though, this specific episode was strictly conversational. Yes, we had topics we wanted to hit in my notes, but we were just riffing on this one. -SP
Ted, (Seth/Bill), " ... the seemingly conversational nature ...". Bingo! That is the description that eluded me as I pondered as to why this episode was so magical. Similar to a listener sitting on a barstool next to incredibly informed guys throwing out a wide range of accurate anecdotal tidbits about events of great interest, your listeners have been exposed to info that was every bit as entertaining as educational. Amongst the best of episodes yet.
I've been following you Seth, Bill, and Jon for a number of sessions which are just awesome. In high school I read numbers of books on WWII Pacific war. SOOOO many things were left out as in what, where, and who was making the decisions at the top. Those books were briefs in the coverage you gentlemen discus. Wow, love it guys. I'm a Navy vet, USS Midway. I could make so many comments about my naval duty...but wouldn't hold a candle to what those sailors endured. I'm absolute follower...thanks for sharing!
These guys are good. This channel is the best out there on this topic. I always fall into the sensation that I'm sitting in the room with one of them enjoying a cold beverage. I don't usually gush like this. But, I can hardly stand the others doing this. I finally found this team. Please do more.
This episode was mainly about the US leadership during the Guadalcanal campaign. This was another outstanding video! I love your podcasts! I especially liked Jon's input, where he constantly tried to give some credence to the Japanese command, as to what they were thinking, what real info they had, and their overall doctrines. Without this, it is so easy to say 'what idiots they were'. I call this very unbiased reporting, and very refreshing. On another note, I also have to say that thinking that the Port Moresby/Owen Stanley Mountains campaign did NOT come close to the Battle of Guadalcanal at all. I contend that even if the Japanese were successful, and had taken Port Moresby, it would have had almost no impact on the war. The Allies would have come back later, when ready, and retaken it. So, to me, this is just a bias from the Australians, trying to not diminish their role, or to enhance their involvement in the Pacific War. On top of that, it clearly shows that the Japanese did not understand the huge significance of Guadalcanal, not until it was too late. Also, I think very few Japanese of their high command realized that Guadalcanal was the breaking point of the war in the Pacific, even after they pulled out. Guadalcanal proved how they could not wint on land, in the air, nor win enough naval battles to dominate the seas. What is left???
Most people now don't know that, unless they're subscribed here. I find it interesting that in the contest of will the non- militaristic, weak, culture won. But FREE men are not weak. We need to re-learn that axiomatic truth.
Bill, Seth, and John I loved you guys breakdown of the leadership of The United States Navy and the detail back ground stories on all the individuals. You guys got my pumped because I’m a huge fan of The Untied States in the pacific and how the country in time rose out the ashes only to become in a very small time the king of sea! Keep up the good work because I’m truly a huge fan of you guys!!!!
To answer your question, Bill I enjoyed this program and hope you do others as the war progresses. Always great to hear Jon on these shows. I'm a Halsey fan think he was a great Admiral. Thanks Seth and Bill and Jon!!!
I like Drach’s comment on Gormley’s replacement: “If there ever were a commander who could be guaranteed to stick his boot in… “ plus Halsey’s legendary command of invective, made him the man to have at GC. Halsey’s most famous comment after seeing Pearl Harbor was : After we’re finished, the Japanese language will only be spoken in Hell.”
When I learned that Halsey had been promoted to Fleet Admiral years ago, I had no problem with that! The situation was so bad in Guadalcanal that there was nobody who could have done the job better. Further, this was his real assignment after his hospital stay with shingles. If you could ask anyone what to reward Halsey for what he did, the fifth star and its value was elevated with his selection. Excellent job and discussion!
Great overview of two key figures in the point in the Pacific War. Very much enjoyed it. I’d love to see you do an Episode with Jon and Frank Jack Fletcher. He’s such a key figure in this phase of the war commanding US Carriers through 3 of the 4 carriers battles and his reputation as was touched on has in many cases been unfairly maligned. Fletcher wasn’t perfect but when you consider what he managed to accomplish against and arguably superior enemy with a doctrinal playbook that was still being written is pretty remarkable. And he was ahead of the curve in some areas like calling for multi carrier task forces that could combine and leverage US AA fire power.
@@flparkermdpc yeah if had been up to Nimitz he would have continued to play a central role in carrier commands and likely would have had a fleet later in the war. But as you note King wasn’t a fan and there were aviators in King’s circle that hated the idea of a black shoe commanding carriers and so constantly spoke evil of him to King. So when Nimitz sent him stateside for a well earned rest King made sure he wouldn’t go back. Not unlike how King intervened to yank Rochefort out of Pearl despite his utterly superb performance.
You guys certainly know our history and our commanders, along with their ways of leadership... It would be hard, very hard to get this level of INFO from any other ~public source ...
In the log jam of Noumea, New Caledonia, my Seabee Chief CCM Father and his 20 CB battalion was tasked with stevedore work to unload or transfer supplies.This went on for 5 months, before they were transferred to Townsville, Australia.
Absolutely love this channel. I’ve listened to Jon’s book on Audible and was fascinated by how different the battle was actually in the Japanese perspective.
Superbly organized and informative. The details and personal bits of info are very important when reviewing the battles. It's men and merely machines that determine the outcome.
Another great session! Blackjack Fletcher is a matyr to the truth, Turner was nearly as big a liar as Macarthur, Crutchley totally failed but never received the blame he 'deserved/avoided', Halsey and Vandergrift together won Guadacanal and Nimitz's ONLY ever failure was to trust people like Ghormley and Mitcher.
First episode I've watched & agree with all superlative comments from others I've read here. One thing off the cuff I would have loved to have been discussed was an analysis of my favorite war movie, Cagney's "The Gallant Hours" as to accuracy of events, portrayal of Halsey, etc.😊
Great discussion! One thing I should add: Watchtower wasn’t the first allied amphibious operation of the war. It was preceded by the Anglo-French intervention in Norway in April 1940 and the failed Anglo-Free French invasion of Senegal. I wonder how much the latter in particular might have influenced Ghormley’s pessimism and his timidity in dealing with the French. It occurred a month after he arrived in the UK, and the operation failed because the Vichy forces put up a serious fight for Dakar, humiliating both the British and DeGaulle. Furthermore, throughout his tenure in the UK the British were at war with the Vichy forces in Syria. His pessimism about amphibious assaults and about the French willingness to back the Allied cause are perhaps understandable. This doesn’t excuse his failure to do his job to the best of his abilities despite his doubts, but perhaps explains something of his state of mind.
Making DeGaulle look like the defective he was is one thing, humiliating a 'leader' as incompetent and vanity-filled as mAcarsehole or DeFool was not a possibility.
Another great episode. I've seen about 10 so far and I keep coming back. But one very small thing. I searched everywhere I could for Jon Parshall's commentary on the situation in modern day Ukraine and couldn't find anything. Could you give me a link to it? Thanks so much. Keep up the good work.
My opinion about Fletcher at the start of Watchtower is that he retains the direction that Nimitz laid down on the carrier leaders. The principle of calculated risk. Do not commit to decisive action without prospect of significant gain. On top of that, he knows that he has custody of 3 of the 4 US carriers in the Pacific. Probably he knows all about Hornet, and her "issues",, and that Wasp is a new boy with unknown capability. What he's got is basically all there is. Husband them like the treasure they are.
And he is the only experienced in that command group in dealing with Japanese air assaults which were still at the time exceptionally lethal and that he knew that reinforcements would be present for some time. The carriers he had on hand were it.
Morison was a Harvard Historian. The European Discovery of America Pulitzer winner. He went to FDR and convinced him the Navy needed some historians with security clearances to keep contemporaneous records and conduct interviews. Not to analyze strategy or tactics beyond ship tracks. They knew nothing of strategy beyond Mahan. Nothing of Magic, or the Manhattan project. Fletcher turned down a one on one interview with Morison even. Turner used Morison to mske Fletcher the fall guy. If one of the CVs or fast oilers was sunk before Eastern Solomons or Santa Cruz because Turner was too close to Cactus who knows? Fletcher had experience at Coral Sea, Neosho and Lexington and Yorktown then Midway. He knew the risk from IJN air, had land based air to defend against as well as IJN subs if he remained in one area. The IJN torpedoes were an unknown factor but make his reluctance to loiter close to Cactus more prudent in retrospect.
Great discussion gents. I'm currently reading Richard Frank's and James Hornfischer's books on Guadalcanal in parallel. One of them suggests that from his time in England, Ghormley took away a very over-simplified lesson from British experience in Norway and the Med: "land-based air always defeats ships". So he had little problem with Fletcher keeping the carriers (mostly) out of the fight in Aug and Sept. And, once (some) airpower was established at Henderson, his actions suggest he saw this as largely sufficient to establish sea control. In short, Ghormley (and others) were thinking of airpower and surface combatants as substitutes rather than complements. A silver lining is that he pleaded with Nimitz to get more airpower into the theater, which wasn't wrong. But a more nuanced take-away from the British experience (Dunkirk? Night? Bad weather?) would have helped a lot.
You guys and this channel are great. So glad I found it and subbed early while you only have a few thousand subs, won’t be long till it’s a few hundred thousand!
I still won't second guess Mikawa even if I'm glad he did what he did. He's got national assets that aren't as quickly replaceable as ours. He's in an area without air superiority because Rabaul can't fly CAP for his force. He's got no way of knowing what we've unloaded or what we haven't. He's in an unfamiliar sound and suddenly without charts. He's got no way of knowing what the situation is on Guadalcanal, as to whether the Army can back up their chat or not.. He's not intoxicated with having just won a huge hand just to risk wasting it against the odds as he can only see them with the info he has. He's going to take his wins and fold and walk to play another day. He had not the benefit of your hindsight. And to another point, your worst of the worst couldn't possibly be worse than Joe Stilwell. Interesting input from all of you today though. Enjoyed.
Not for nothing was Stillwell called "Vinegar Joe". Anything he was put on turned sour.And that was a very measured commentary on Mikawa, who by all counts here showed very western prudence, concern for his men and ships, which we usually applaud, until we don't, and have retrospectrascope to keep us without a real time decision to make. 😂❤
Except that it wasn't King's. FDR ordered that either Knox or King contact Nimitz to get out to Hawaii and don't leave until the war was won. Nimitz was not on the list of the forty best Admirals put together by a board of senior Admirals at Secretary Knox 's , FDR'S demand. But FDR knew his commanders, unlike any since, except perhaps Bush, Sr
In discussing Ghormley's attitude and approach to Watchtower, perspective should be given to his original task, that of organizing defense of the vital shipping lanes to Australia by way of numerous garrisons on the island nations. These were scattered across huge swaths of ocean, and were comprised of army and marine units and several bomber and fighter squadrons pulled from other theaters. Many of these units were built from newly minted officers and raw recruits, and needed both extensive training and large amounts of logistic support. Both of those were in short supply, which occupied a significant portion of Ghormley's staff's time and effort. So when Watchtower was hastily drawn and presented, the frighteningly thin resource base was the overarching concern, and it was shared by MacArthur. In fact, that concern went all the way down the line to the unit commanders tasked with the tactical operations. But of course, orders are orders....
I don't think there were many who would have considered Watchtower a good thing given our lack of readiness both materially and militarily, and with MacArthur's recent connection to losing to the Japanese in the Philippines. Only a man like King, the ultimate contrarian of the time, and a mean S.O.B. as he proudly styled himself. He, like quite a few others, were the right men, right time. Notice how they faded when their time passed. Churchill, Patton, FDR all lived to see the hourglass empty.
The reference to the importance of morale to the success or failure of the mission is not lost on this former infantry officer. Same old question of which is more important....mission or morale? The answer is clear.....the points are not mutally exclusive. Without morale the mission wll fail....ergo, both are equaly important. That's a testament to Vandergrift's leadership.
Thanks for your informative videos. With regards to Lt. Frank Jack Fletcher's Medal of Honor; it was one of 55+ Medals of Honor awarded at the 1914 Battle of Veracruz (!). His uncle; Rear Admiral Frank F. Fletcher, also received the Medal of Honor at Veracruz. Douglas MacArthur was considered for the Medal of Honor, but did not recive it during this battle..
John and Bill at their most animated state. The politics of command, the Great Circle of Blame. By September 42, the old heroes of the Great War, were physically and emotionally spent. Admiral King had a deep bullpen. Lee, Halsey, Lockwood are warming up. Lets go!
Not a Halsey at Guadalcanal issue/question, but a Halsey at Leyte Gulf question. Something that crawled into my head when reading Ian Toll's Pacific war trilogy. Leyte Gulf was Halsey's first time commanding in a major fleet battle. (Coral Sea - Fletcher; Midway - Spruance; Eastern Solomons - Fletcher again; Santa Cruz - Kinkaid; Philippine Sea - Mitscher) Do you think that this had any effect, if if so in what way, on Halsey's decision to go after the Japanese carriers and leave the landing force uncovered from the northern approaches? Maybe something to think about when y'all get to Leyte Gulf.
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar One thing I recall from Toll's books is that many of the subordinate carrier/air wing commanders were upset that MItscher hadn't been more aggressive in going after the Japanese carriers.
@@davelange3853 - Which operation are you referring to where he was accused by his subordinates of not pursuing the Japanese carriers? Keep in mind, the commander of U.S.N. carrier forces, Mitchner, was subordinate to the orders of the fleet commander; Whether he was 5th, 3rd, or 7th fleets. Admiral Mitchner wouldn’t have had the authority to independently peel off his carriers to conduct any separate operations without express approval from his particular fleet commander. It never was Mitchner’s call to pursue the Japanese carriers during the invasion of Saipan, he had to follow the directives of U.S. 5th fleet Admiral Raymond Spruance whether he agreed or not. And while the subject of U.S.N. carrier task force commanders is being discussed; My 37 cent opinion is U.S.N. Admiral Jocko Clark had a big mouth and zero appreciation of the strategic picture in the Pacific in 1944.
Is this channel covering the Pacific War in a chronological order? Would love to see a biographical episode covering Marc Mitscher and TF 38/58. Though if this channel is chronological, that may be a while. A look at Admiral Leahy and the JCS would also be very interesting. Excellent stuff, cheers!
We did the Guadalcanal episodes in chronological order because literally every event informed the next. To do it out of order would’ve been confusing. This next season will be less chronological and more topical. We will get back to the chronology once we hit 1944.
If Yamamoto is removed (or commits seppoku) because of the disaster at Midway, who succeeds him? Do they respond differently to Guadalcanal? Do they replace Nagumo, either because of Midway or because of Eastern Solomons?
Jeez...this episode is so good that I've had to create a "PacWar Rewatch" playlist so I can go back and take notes on all the cool stuff there is to learn from this discussion, and how thoroughly it integrates with, illustrates, and expands on material in the earlier episodes in the Guadalcanal series. Just brilliant stuff, guys! 😎
Was there any consideration of giving Spruance a task force command during the Guadacanal campaign? Or was Nimitz determined to keep him as Deputy to prepare him for bigger things in 1943?
Nimitz kept Spruance, and his intellect, his trusted companionship, his like minded fitness buddy, his idea and concept foil, until he felt he had sufficiently cloned himself, and his conscience wouldn't let him keep Spruance for himself any longer. It allowed him to create the Fifth and Third Fleet rotation to hopefully keep Halsey from burning up or having to relieve him when he made an expensive blunder. . He ran that out as far as he could. Even after. I'm sure he knew Halsey was done by August 1944. But the war was nearly done, too and there was no doubt. Even the Japanese knew, and were admitting it to each other, when Saipan fell. When Halsey went home he was glad to put his seabag away forever, to stop losing friends. I'm sure Charles Lockwood was also glad to be done. To not be having to order men to their deaths. Losses in the submarine service didn't stop until all the boats were in port. All his lost skippers and their wives) were close friends. I can't imagine the heartache. Talk about sacrifice. 😢
you three work so well together. thanks for sharing. i would love to see a discussion with Jon on alternative Japanese strategy/strategies and leadership for the entire war.
Enjoyed Ep 121 w/ Jon Parshall. I'm working through the story of the Guadalcanal campaign. Can you recommend an account of the campaign? Use your own criteria, or suggest a land and a sea account you find recommendable. Appreciate your work! Jon Parshall, I've read Shattered Sword, congratulations on that book!
The US was able to learn the problems and their solutions during WWII so fast because they were NOT new material to us. We had the US Civil War as an enormous military training ground that taught us huge amounts of information on all basic military subjects in what was one of the largest wars in human history at that time (1860s). During WWII much of what we learned was ALREADY part of our history and training system, just rather rusty and mostly just had to be adjusted to the new circumstances of the 1940s -- the duration of both the Civil War and our part of WWII was amazingly similar, wasn't it, regardless of the scale change in the size of the theaters involved. Japan had never had any kind of huge war anything like WWII (their part in WWI was tiny) and thus could not change their thinking rules about such things as how to finish the WWII against an enemy like the USA.
Japan's navy had stunned the world and themselves when they clobbered the Czarist Russian navy. That Russia was crumbling wasn't known, so the importance of those victories were over valued by the Japanese, but they weren't nothing. It was enough to get them self deceived, to underestimate all westerners.
I really like this back-and-forth, and some disagreements. Gives a thorough picture of these people, and some of the pros and cons leaders like King had to weigh when deciding who to put where
1:01:37 I just wanna point out 1 aspect of the Japanese troop commitment as well. It is well-known how the Japanese Navy and Army had severe internal struggle between each other. It's a topic worth a hour long video itself but will be brief about it here. Basically the Navy was the one who wanted to fight the US while the Army wanted to focus in China & USSR. They had different goals and plans. And they had no intension to help each other. Anyhow, the initial Guadalcanal airbase construction was done by the Japanese Navy, but the US Marines took it and finished it. This caused a major problem for all air/land/sea operations for Japan at the regioon. The Japanese Navy didn't tell the Army they were building the base, and only notified the Army after US captured and finished the base. For the Japanese Army, whole Guadalcanal campaign was the Navy's fuck-up and didn't want to put too much effort. But they had to since Hirohito the Emperor told them to send in troops. So they had to allocate some troops to look as if they 'tried' (Its a very Asian thing). And once they started putting in resources, they couldn't back-down because they had to save face (literally, there was no strategic implication about the whole campaign on the Japanese side after a few months)
Re NG vs. G, taken together (plus CBI), they over-stretched what Japan could do. As for G getting more attention with Americans, it was almost entirely Americans fighting at G (land and sea), and the USN became the widest and most accepted storytellers about the PTO (i.e. not MacArthur and the US Army). There is need for seeing the big process-picture to balance the episodic approach of focusing on individual battles.
My great-grandfather was killed aboard the USS LaVallette in the Battle of Rennell Island. I don’t think I’ve ever heard it discussed. I wonder if it might be something interesting for this show.
Right On, Brilliant Comments, Laddie! UK needed Logistical support desperately, December 7, 1941 changes everything. RN had. adequate surface warships in the Med and ATL/North Sea. USN badly needed warships from ATLFLT, in the Pacific Meatgrinder ASAP, I loved Ikes remarks about Admiral King. As Paul Harvey, Id say That's the Rest of the Story.
Regarding Malaysia vs Guadalcanal: Malaysia was planned out ahead of time and was a logistically sound operation. Guadalcanal was an off-the-cuff logistical nightmare.
As a British listener, it's interesting to see your discussion on the "Germany First" policy. The irony is that from a British perspective, we didn't have much to complain about. American supplies in mass-produced American Liberty ships poured across the Atlantic escorted by American-made and often American-crewed ships and aircraft. American equipment made a difference in the desert and allowed us to keep up the periphery battles that were all that we could do. American grain and oil almost certainly kept the USSR in the war, and American locomotives and trucks let the USSR keep fighting - and ultimately to break the Wehrmacht. Meanwhile the USAAF took the war to Germany and essentially defeated the Luftwaffe in 1943, helped by the RAF which indeed benefitted from American fuels and aircraft. When we were finally strong enough to take the war to Germany in Torch, Italy, and Normandy, the Americans were always there and we couldn't really have asked for more.
As for America breaking "Germany First" to do operations like Guadalcanal... I think that distracting the Japanese from their operations toward Australia, Burma, and India would have been considered quite worthwhile as a tradeoff, especially given we could not have done much extra had all that effort been sent to Europe. If anything, it would probably have been too tempting for Churchill to push for yet another of his disastrous adventures: the fact that Britain could not afford another defeat was instrumental in keeping him in check.
I agree. If Watchtower hadn't happened and those resources were sent to Europe instead, it wouldn't have made much difference. But if Australia got isolated, and the Japanese didn't have to keep pulling troops and aircraft out of other theaters, then things would have been worse in the long run for Britain and the US.
What a great comment! Very insightful on many fronts. The aside about Churchill is where I am now. After many years of Churchill reverece, it's good to remember the times when he may have been right, but the technology and understanding of logistics in depth was missing and led to disaster. Gallipoli for sure. Commando raids in Calais in WW2 were lessons in how NOT to use scarce resources. The value of Sir Alan Brooke as voice of restraint, prudence, and reality is much underappreciated today, as he was then.
@@flparkermdpc Not to mention Churchill insisting on the campaign in Greece and Crete. That cost a great deal of men and material pulled away from the army in North Africa which was putting severe pressure on the Italians. The losses were serious and the effect on morale not to be underestimated
I am not sure anything that happened in the Pacific took away from the war in Europe since D-day didn't happen until 1944.
Jon is superb no matter on which show I get to listen to him. Superb podcast as usual, thanks.
He is indeed.
I totally agree with your assessment of Halsey as the right man for the job at this point in the war.
I too am a firm backer of Raymond Spruance for making the better choices in 1944, but in the dark days of 1942, the aggressive nature of Bill Halsey was the perfect fit!
Well said
@leoamery I'm interested to hear what they think too... Halsey was far from perfect, and I agree that Hoover got a raw deal... I would only argue that the positive effect of his appointment had on overall morale and the more active support given by the Navy outweighed the negative of his tendency to rash decisions...
@@leoamery exactly, although USN Admirals had a 'Ooh, carriers!' mentality in general.
@@leoamerySo it was it a good thing Halsey was in hospital with shingles to give Spruance task force command? We'll never know, but had Halsey been there, there's no way Mitscher would have dared to disobey and send Hornet's air group to nowhere. And the scenario Seth and John bring up would likely have occurred. All four Japanese carriers would have been dead by 1045 and Yorktown would survive. Woulda, coulda.
@@flparkermdpc and there is a decent chance Halsey also tries to chase Nagumo down and gets wiped by Yamamoto coming after him.
As a Lifetime student of Military History I have come to the conclusion that the Guadalcanal Battle Campaign is the most complicated in human History. This is a 5 level effort in that there is Land, Air, Sea & Undersea as well as the Invisible war being waged with radio intercept intell as well as logistics supply & delivery being the 5th level of conflict. Any One level of Failure loses the Battle! There are many Battle with many more killed, longer duration but none come close to the extent that Guadalcanal does in terms of every level of Modern combat being utilized. Classic case of Irresistible Force meeting Immovable Object!
I sort of want to agree with you because Guadalcanal and the drive up the slot is my favorite topic. However, I can easily think of three equally intractable and even more logistically complicated campaigns:
1. The CBI theater/keeping China in the war.
2. The Allied effort in Supplying the Soviets to keep them in the war.
3. MacArthur’s drive back to the Philippines.
You guys really need to understand that your posts are amateurish. You confirm yourselves as extraordinarily immature.
I think all subjects and battles are similarly complex but rarely have the scrutiny that this podcast has shown. When they have Dan on the show too, the audience is able to take part in a masterclass.
And yet, there were several more, and larger Guadalcanals waiting in the wings in the years ahead.
Major General Merritt Austin Edson 1897-1955 USMC was on black Jack's staff during WW1, he knew Patton, McArthur etc.
Awesome guys thanks. I am a former Marine MP and to Seth's comment always thought we were the Men's dept of the Navy, Yes Seth, you are correct that's what Marines think :). You guys really give me a whole new view of the teamwork we bring together. Semper Fi!!
Yep! We were the MEAN little brother!!
Always good to see Jon.
Keep up the good work guys. I'm grateful to be living through this golden age of WWII historical research and distribution. Two cheers and a bravo. I'd buy all three of you a drink if I were listening to this chat in person.
Outstanding discussion putting everything on the table ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐👍👌
Thanks
I cannot begin to count all the 'wasted' hours I've spent watching, and rewatching, all of the episodes of this series. I also cannot compare the dividends of this time to any other parttime mania, unless it is the quiet time spent actually reading Parshall, or Ian Toll. Extraordinary series!!! Thank you.
I enjoyed the heck out of this episode. Jon always has some amazing tidbit of what some would say is trivia, but when you really think about it, is one of the keys to winning or losing a battle, "A ton of fuel to deliver 1 barrel of supplies." No wonder they started using Daihatsus! Bill puts it all in perspective as to how a command structure is SUPPOSED to work, and all three of you bring out the strengths or failings of the leaders on both sides of this conflict. Thanks so much to all of you!
Excellent discussion, as always. As for the notion that Ghormley suffered from dental issues, I find that unconvincing. There was an entire Army division on New Caledonia (Americal) with a dental team of roughly a dozen US Army dentists. There's no rational reason Ghormley would not have had his teeth attended to. My grandfather was the Assistant Division Commander of Americal Division, and diverted several boatloads of supplies from the Division to the Marines on Guadalcanal. His version of the initial meetings with Admiral Halsey was that the change in tone was immediate and electric.
I appreciate that you think Admiral Ghormley had no excuse to not have his teeth attended, but I don't agree. Fo r several reasons. Dental practice was NOTHING like it is today. Most dentists back then didn't even know how to fill a real cavity, if they could even properly identify a real one. Local anesthesia was poorly developed so a visit to a dentist was almost always a painful experience. A LOT of people are head shy, like horses. And dental condition is a mirror of overall health. Since Ghormley was cleared physically for full duty, you have an idea of how competent general medical and surgical practice was in 1942. For instance smoking was unconnected to heart and Hyper tension. Nor lung disease or the significance of smoker's cough. All were thought to be benign or at worst signs of advancing age. We now know that's very wrong. Robert Ghormley was a very sick man, and should have been medically limited. He failed the eyeball test several times. Nimitz, Halsey and King were all distressed at seeing him after a gap of a decade or more. The eyeball test is still the best initial part of a physical exam. What one can see is a pretty reliable indicator of true condition.
Outstanding episode guys! Right up my alley anyway. The senior military leadership and the decisions they make on those three levels you pointed out: strategic, operational, and tactical. Taking a snapshot point in time and seeing how those three things were being influenced and driven by who; And…, who in leadership had their head up their ass and who didn’t.
Again, you all hit a home run on this episode.
My two cents on having the right man in the job to handle current affairs. It’s related to your earlier episode concerning the USN’s defeat at The Battle Of Savo Island. And something that wasn’t talked about in enough detail.
Howard Bode had no business being in command of a heavy cruiser much less in temporary charge of the naval forces assigned security that evening for the entire cruiser group once Crutchley departed the area around Savo Island.
Bode was a terrible naval officer, and I believe that fact was generally known. If ever they patterned the main character, LCDR Philip Queeg from the novel The Caine Mutiny after some real living line officer, it would have been Howard Bode.
I firmly believe the Chicago would have sounded the proper Task Group alarm if anyone but Bode had been at the helm of the wounded cruiser that awful night.
I bring this up here simply because I believe, like Gormley; Bode was the wrong man, on the right ship, at the right time in history.
Of course Wouk was a Pacific vet and I believe he met more than a few Queegs. But Bode does seem like one of them. Old Yellow Stain.
Thanks for the prompt reply Seth/Bill (?).
If I’m not mistaken, Commander Bode’s stock plummeted fairly soon after that battle. He subsequently ended up “exiled” to some USN shore station/activity in or around the Panama Canal and shortly after that shot himself in the head which pretty much terminated the downward spiral of his naval career.
Interestingly, Layton in his book “…and I was there” mentions Howard Bode in passing, describing him as an exceptionally talented officer he met during a tour with Naval Intelligence in Washington. On the other hand, in memoirs of the Chicago crew he’s often described as a martinet and of course his performance at Savo does him no credit. Apparently he was no fool, but when he had to lead or to think fast under life-and-death pressure he could neither think clearly nor command well.
People like Bode, Ghormley, and George MacClellan are fascinating and important to study because they’re *not* utter incompetents, up until the moment they are. How does an organization spot the warning signs?
Superb, as always! Jon is a fantastic guest, so glad that you can get him on board as often as you do.
John is a fantastic participant. He comes back because Seth and Bill are getting better by leaps and bigger leaps, and it's great to be a part of that educational success. And we and our fellow citizens are learning what has been done on
our behalf, and what service entails.
I cannot add a complement that could improve on the ones already made. This podcast was just what the doctor ordered. I had reached the point that I needed a "summary", a break from the action, and this episode did precisely that. It plugged that knowledge gap that was driving me nuts. Thank you. In addition, thanks to Mr. Parshall for his always interesting and unique perspectives. A good team member !!! I suppose that comes at least partially from his sticking to his stated intention of not losing sight of Japanese viewpoints and doctrine. I watch a boatload of podcasts about the sea war during WW2 in the Pacific and hands down, yours is the best ... most informative and perceptive... a lot of talent at work. Good work. Fair winds and following seas, gentlemen.
Many thanks. I love Jon. I’ve known him for 15 years or so and he and I have always had a great working relationship. If we were ever to add a permanent third to this show, Jon would be it. If he would have us…
-SP
Thank you for this marvelous series; I’m a new subscriber and scarfed down about a dozen episodes in the last week. Your efforts to present the historical context of what was actually going on with our heroes whose devotions preserved our republic is a precious resource in our current world that wants to rewrite history.
The Devotion to the Truth and the consequences of lying, either to oneself or your public, destroys your
claim to legitimacy, and when the piper comes to be paid, there are no resources or allies to bolster or restore your position. You and yours collapse into the pit you have dug, intending it for your enemy, but finding it fits all liars and deniers equally.
I like this format of vid even more than your usual detailed look at a battle. I encourage more of it please.
Thank you. We like the back-and-forth too
How Halsey's leadership saved Guadalcanal and Admiral King would have been a better title for this episode as Halsey wasn't mentioned until halfway through it.
As a newbie to this forum and a Pacific War enthusiast and a former active-duty sailor on the USS America CV-66 (1983-1987 and later a reservist), I appreciate these presentations - especially Captain Toti's explanation of military terms like strategic, operational and tactical levels. I also love Seth's and John's input and his and Tony Tully's Shattered Sword book on Midway.
Observations on the Japanese and American leadership during the campaign:
Japan had a fixed and rigid doctrine and learned little from their successes and even less from their defeats. The USN was a learning sponge and always sought to improve during the war and was always willing and able to learn and adapt. Being a casualty adverse culture versus a when all else fails, die for the emperor culture, was a key to America's success and kill ratio in the war. Japan - with a very few notable exceptions - had little concern for their human capital.
How the IJN kept Nagumo as commander of their carrier fleet post Midway is beyond rationalization. Ozawa would have been a much better choice from the moment Kido Butai was conceived on April 10, 1941. I have never understood how Yamamoto was forced to keep Nagumo as the carrier commander (he was also a political opponent -Fleet Faction versus Treaty Faction - of Yamamoto during the 1920s and '30s). Yet he was able to obliterate Japan's long standing defense doctrine and foist the Pearl Harbor and Midway Operations against the will of most of the Navy AND Army Establishments
Mikawa should be more heavily criticized for his failure to finish off the transports at Savo as you state. He was willing to lose his force in the battle but then gave up at the most critical time and lost Japan's last chance for a strategic victory. Had he finished the job, Gormley's pessimism would have been proved correct and I suspect that not only Nimitz would have been fired, but also King because, after all, Guadalcanal was HIS baby. And, at that time, King's direct Atlantic anti U-Boat command was a disaster. Furthermore, Mikawa was Nagumo's screen commander at Pearl Harbor just eight months before and certainly would have known about Yamamoto's displeasure of not following up with a third waive which necessitated the whole Midway debacle. Later he lost CA Kako to a submarine when he split up his force further removing it (CruDiv 6) from the Guadalcanal battle area. What was the rational for sending Goto's cruisers to Kavieng and not to the Shortland Base?
Captain Toti thinks very highly of Spruance as do I, but I do wonder how he would have done had he been in Fletcher's or Gormley's position? I would love to hear an episode on that speculation. Spruance was excellent, but also very lucky. He was thrust into the Midway battle and if not for McClusky's initiative would have bis career ended right there and then. Being COS for Nimitz shielded him from the most difficult phase of the war when at least six US Admirals were either killed (Calahan and Scott) or had their careers chewed up and destroyed in the Guadalcanal reputation grinder.
Halsey was the right man to replace Gormley and was able to function well with MacArthur throughout the SW Pacific Campaign. The tragedy of Halsey was he fought the first two years of the war under incredible stress when the situation was always in doubt and even post Guadalcanal, he was forced to operate on a logistical shoestring throughout the Solomons Campaign. The risky Bougainville campaign in November 1943 and the near reckless two carrier task force strike against Rabaul to save the Bougainville landing force probably burned him out after two years of touch and go combat. No American Admiral equals that achievement of enduring that much stress for that long. He should have become COS for Nimitz after Rabaul was abandoned and Towers should have alternated Third Fleet/Fifth Fleet with Spruance. By 1944 no admiral was going to lose a battle against the IJN.
Really excellent comment. Also, bearing on Halsey's failures later in the war were his failures to listen to subordinates who were competent and gifted. That shows me that he was getting influenced by his working with MacArthur, the premier self promoter and narcissist. I agree about his being burned out by late 1943. In
Thanks@@flparkermdpc
Superb recording once again, folks.
I would add in defence of fletcher - pre the battle of Savo, Turner had arranged his ships to defend against the submarine threat. Submarines were obviously regarded as the biggest threat. Fletcher had America's three carriers tied to the east coast of guadalcanal in a place that would later be called 'torpedo junction'. If fletcher had lost a carrier that early in the war, it could have had serious effects. I find it hard to be too critical of fletcher with the information he had available.
A reasonable fear given the Saratoga's record
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar was Saratoga ever given a nickname like magnet ass?
Not only was there concern about submarines infiltrating Iron Bottom Sound but there were reports and expectations that a small surface force may also attempt to counter the landings. There were three possible paths through which an enemy force could approach. Admiral Turner was in overall command of the invasion force, but Admiral Crutchley commanded the screening force of six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and eight destroyers and had to consider all possibilities. Therefor he made the logical decision to split his forces to cover all three entrances and placed two of the DDs as warning pickets to avoid a sneak attack.
While the dispositions could be seen as faulty and inviting the possibility of suffering defeat in detail (which did happen) there was no real choice as the 16 ships could not cover all the area at the same time.
It must be remembered that the reconnaissance and communications were poor to nonexistent which caused what turned out to be poor but logical decisions to be made. And, it must be remembered, Turner approved Crutchley's dispositions.
The only fault I have with the defensive plan was that the cruiser float planes were not used to supplement the warning net of the two DDs.
Turner also called a conference to his flagship transport at what turned out to be a most unfortunate time which left the east and northern forces without an appointed commander allowing for the debacle.
Regardless of where Admiral Fletcher's carriers were, the debacle would still have occurred and, as it turned out, Admiral Mikawa fled the scene for fear of carrier air retaliation. There was little chance that a morning strike would have found him without a search first and by dawn he was well over 100 miles away from Guadalcanal. That is the point that is most often missed by people who want to fault Fletcher for the debacle.
Yes, Turner saved himself from much of the blame by dumping on Fletcher. Fortunately, the navy ran a very competent honest investigation, cleared everyone of culpability and learned from the many mistakes that were made thus ensuring there would be no repeat Battle Off Savo Island disasters.
Unfortunately, Fletcher and the two surviving captains (of the sunken cruisers) reputations were badly tarnished. The other engaged cruiser captain (of the Chicago), Captain Bode, who failed to warn the northern force of the oncoming enemy committed suicide when he learned he was being investigated and implicated for his non action.
Correction: The western (not eastern) force was left leaderless
another great show, love the format of the 3 of you together!!
More to come!
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar Yay!
It is worth noting that so many battles and campaigns hinge on one commander or one small group of men. The detail you provide makes that clear, while most history glosses over how much is owed to the few.
This episode was exceptional. All the other podcasts you all do are great too! I've gotten to a point where I only watch these podcasts when I have TV time. Thanks for all the work you both do to bring these episodes about. My dad worked at pearl harbor for 40 years and bragged that he had 5 separate commendations from 5 different admirals during his time at pearl. He was a civil engineer who balanced subs.
Excellent! Good job pointing out the difference in "Political" Admiral's and "Fighting" Admirals.
Halsey at Guadalcanal, reminds me of Hancock at Gettysburg. This was both of their moment to shine so so bright. And after these two events both men would dim in their abilities.
Great comparison.
Hancock the Superb!
Interesting comparison I'll have to think about it
There is such a thing as burnout. It is what happens before PTSD. Halsey was a very headstrong man, not given to introspection. Fortunately, Nimitz rotated his top commanders with his Third and Fifth Fleet designations, preserving both Spruance and Halsey. Halsey was headed for collapse, possibly like McCain and Lee.
Considering we had just given the UK almost a hundred post WWII destroyers with Radar upgrades under lend lease. The Atlantic job required upgrading more destroyers and getting them in the fight.
You guys do a fantastic job… love the history with war. Keep them coming
Thanks!
You and all your panel members work together so well it's nice to see. Thanks so much for this detail and thoughtful informed analysis that lets us apply lessons to now. Thank you for your service, also!
Thanks so much gentleman for a wonderful and informative podcast. Thanks also for the mention of the Kokoda Track. The Aussies can thank the US forces on Guadalcanal for the Japanese turning around 25 miles away from Port Moresby. As you say, PNG and Solomon Islands was one campaign from the perspective of the Japanese.
Well, that was just an incredible episode. The unique perspectives each of you bring to the discussion are insightful and rich. You perform an incredibly valuable service in furthering our understanding of the multiple layers of decision making required for victory to have occurred. I know the seemingly conversational nature of the podcast secretes the considerable amount of time you spend planning what to discuss and thinking through a synthesis of the vast amount of information in your triple brain trust to determine the critical insights to share in such an engaging manner. Y'all are just brilliant. I eagerly look forward to these each week. Five stars for you three!
Thank you very much for the kind words. To be honest though, this specific episode was strictly conversational. Yes, we had topics we wanted to hit in my notes, but we were just riffing on this one.
-SP
Ted, (Seth/Bill),
" ... the seemingly conversational nature ...".
Bingo!
That is the description that eluded me as I pondered as to why this episode was so magical.
Similar to a listener sitting on a barstool next to incredibly informed guys throwing out a wide range of accurate anecdotal tidbits about events of great interest, your listeners have been exposed to info that was every bit as entertaining as educational.
Amongst the best of episodes yet.
@@Coffeeguyzz thanks again. That’s what we are striving for.
-SP
So sorry I came to this podcast late in the game, one of the best of the type with people who are superb in their presentation.
I've been following you Seth, Bill, and Jon for a number of sessions which are just awesome. In high school I read numbers of books on WWII Pacific war. SOOOO many things were left out as in what, where, and who was making the decisions at the top. Those books were briefs in the coverage you gentlemen discus. Wow, love it guys. I'm a Navy vet, USS Midway. I could make so many comments about my naval duty...but wouldn't hold a candle to what those sailors endured.
I'm absolute follower...thanks for sharing!
Excellent discussion. Thanks for the insights - and work you guys do.
Our pleasure!
These guys are good. This channel is the best out there on this topic. I always fall into the sensation that I'm sitting in the room with one of them enjoying a cold beverage. I don't usually gush like this. But, I can hardly stand the others doing this. I finally found this team. Please do more.
Thank you. Perhaps we should be having a cold beverage while record. Would it be better or worse? Perhaps we have to find out...
What I love about listening to all you guys is you all know your stuff so well.
This episode was mainly about the US leadership during the Guadalcanal campaign. This was another outstanding video! I love your podcasts! I especially liked Jon's input, where he constantly tried to give some credence to the Japanese command, as to what they were thinking, what real info they had, and their overall doctrines. Without this, it is so easy to say 'what idiots they were'. I call this very unbiased reporting, and very refreshing. On another note, I also have to say that thinking that the Port Moresby/Owen Stanley Mountains campaign did NOT come close to the Battle of Guadalcanal at all. I contend that even if the Japanese were successful, and had taken Port Moresby, it would have had almost no impact on the war. The Allies would have come back later, when ready, and retaken it. So, to me, this is just a bias from the Australians, trying to not diminish their role, or to enhance their involvement in the Pacific War. On top of that, it clearly shows that the Japanese did not understand the huge significance of Guadalcanal, not until it was too late. Also, I think very few Japanese of their high command realized that Guadalcanal was the breaking point of the war in the Pacific, even after they pulled out. Guadalcanal proved how they could not wint on land, in the air, nor win enough naval battles to dominate the seas. What is left???
Most people now don't know that, unless they're subscribed here. I find it interesting that in the contest of will the non- militaristic, weak, culture won. But FREE men are not weak. We need to re-learn that axiomatic truth.
Bill, Seth, and John I loved you guys breakdown of the leadership of The United States Navy and the detail back ground stories on all the individuals. You guys got my pumped because I’m a huge fan of The Untied States in the pacific and how the country in time rose out the ashes only to become in a very small time the king of sea! Keep up the good work because I’m truly a huge fan of you guys!!!!
Thank you
Superb discussion. You knocked this one out of the park.
Really enjoyed the discussion, gentlemen, thank you.
I loved the discussion! Thank you guys. Well done.
Our pleasure!
Great show gentlemen.
To answer your question, Bill I enjoyed this program and hope you do others as the war progresses. Always great to hear Jon on these shows. I'm a Halsey fan think he was a great Admiral. Thanks Seth and Bill and Jon!!!
I like Drach’s comment on Gormley’s replacement: “If there ever were a commander who could be guaranteed to stick his boot in… “ plus Halsey’s legendary command of invective, made him the man to have at GC.
Halsey’s most famous comment after seeing Pearl Harbor was : After we’re finished, the Japanese language will only be spoken in Hell.”
Bill responding: As it turns out, that comment was not helpful to ending the war. See my article in World magazine
When I learned that Halsey had been promoted to Fleet Admiral years ago, I had no problem with that! The situation was so bad in Guadalcanal that there was nobody who could have done the job better. Further, this was his real assignment after his hospital stay with shingles. If you could ask anyone what to reward Halsey for what he did, the fifth star and its value was elevated with his selection. Excellent job and discussion!
Fully agree
Really learned and got new perspective on the very multifacet battle... superb commentary and historical relevance.
i am foaming at the mouth to hear about your takes on peleliu and tarawa. i absolutely love this podcast
Glad you enjoy it!
You have rabies???I hope it's just a root beer float!!
Thank you professors!!!
Great overview of two key figures in the point in the Pacific War. Very much enjoyed it.
I’d love to see you do an Episode with Jon and Frank Jack Fletcher. He’s such a key figure in this phase of the war commanding US Carriers through 3 of the 4 carriers battles and his reputation as was touched on has in many cases been unfairly maligned.
Fletcher wasn’t perfect but when you consider what he managed to accomplish against and arguably superior enemy with a doctrinal playbook that was still being written is pretty remarkable. And he was ahead of the curve in some areas like calling for multi carrier task forces that could combine and leverage US AA fire power.
Fletcher's irretrievable😮 failing was that King didn't like him. That removed him from any of Nimitz 's second chance opportunities.
@@flparkermdpc yeah if had been up to Nimitz he would have continued to play a central role in carrier commands and likely would have had a fleet later in the war.
But as you note King wasn’t a fan and there were aviators in King’s circle that hated the idea of a black shoe commanding carriers and so constantly spoke evil of him to King. So when Nimitz sent him stateside for a well earned rest King made sure he wouldn’t go back. Not unlike how King intervened to yank Rochefort out of Pearl despite his utterly superb performance.
You guys certainly know our history and our commanders, along with their ways of leadership... It would be hard, very hard to get this level of INFO from any other ~public source ...
In the log jam of Noumea, New Caledonia, my Seabee Chief CCM Father and his 20 CB battalion was tasked with stevedore work to unload or transfer supplies.This went on for 5 months, before they were transferred to Townsville, Australia.
Bill responding: been to Townsville. Great town
Absolutely love this channel. I’ve listened to Jon’s book on Audible and was fascinated by how different the battle was actually in the Japanese perspective.
Great conversation and insights - so much information!!
You gentleman have great chemistry
Superbly organized and informative. The details and personal bits of info are very important when reviewing the battles. It's men and merely machines that determine the outcome.
Excellent. Informative and fun. Should be required.
Another great session! Blackjack Fletcher is a matyr to the truth, Turner was nearly as big a liar as Macarthur, Crutchley totally failed but never received the blame he 'deserved/avoided', Halsey and Vandergrift together won Guadacanal and Nimitz's ONLY ever failure was to trust people like Ghormley and Mitcher.
Really enjoyed listening to you guys thanks for all of your efforts
You guys are the best. Learning so much of background of players in ww2.
First episode I've watched & agree with all superlative comments from others I've read here. One thing off the cuff I would have loved to have been discussed was an analysis of my favorite war
movie, Cagney's "The Gallant Hours" as to accuracy of events, portrayal of Halsey, etc.😊
This promises to be a new favorite by a new channel. I'm looking forward to fine listening.
Jon's a great speaker and extremely knowledgeable, cant get tired of him.
Great discussion! One thing I should add: Watchtower wasn’t the first allied amphibious operation of the war. It was preceded by the Anglo-French intervention in Norway in April 1940 and the failed Anglo-Free French invasion of Senegal. I wonder how much the latter in particular might have influenced Ghormley’s pessimism and his timidity in dealing with the French. It occurred a month after he arrived in the UK, and the operation failed because the Vichy forces put up a serious fight for Dakar, humiliating both the British and DeGaulle. Furthermore, throughout his tenure in the UK the British were at war with the Vichy forces in Syria. His pessimism about amphibious assaults and about the French willingness to back the Allied cause are perhaps understandable.
This doesn’t excuse his failure to do his job to the best of his abilities despite his doubts, but perhaps explains something of his state of mind.
Making DeGaulle look like the defective he was is one thing, humiliating a 'leader' as incompetent and vanity-filled as mAcarsehole or DeFool was not a possibility.
I work nights in Manila. I get to have nice history conversation with my buddies Seth, Bill and Jon while sitting alone in my office. Thanks guys!!!!
Watching this again it is fun, the back & forth, the personnel interjections to a story. You guys are good together. Thanks
Another great episode. I've seen about 10 so far and I keep coming back. But one very small thing. I searched everywhere I could for Jon Parshall's commentary on the situation in modern day Ukraine and couldn't find anything. Could you give me a link to it? Thanks so much. Keep up the good work.
Sorry-- it might be on his Facebook page
Thank-you
My opinion about Fletcher at the start of Watchtower is that he retains the direction that Nimitz laid down on the carrier leaders. The principle of calculated risk. Do not commit to decisive action without prospect of significant gain. On top of that, he knows that he has custody of 3 of the
4 US carriers in the Pacific. Probably he knows all about Hornet, and her "issues",, and that Wasp is a new boy with unknown capability. What he's got is basically all there is. Husband them like the treasure they are.
And he is the only experienced in that command group in dealing with Japanese air assaults which were still at the time exceptionally lethal and that he knew that reinforcements would be present for some time. The carriers he had on hand were it.
Morison was a Harvard Historian. The European Discovery of America Pulitzer winner. He went to FDR and convinced him the Navy needed some historians with security clearances to keep contemporaneous records and conduct interviews. Not to analyze strategy or tactics beyond ship tracks. They knew nothing of strategy beyond Mahan. Nothing of Magic, or the Manhattan project. Fletcher turned down a one on one interview with Morison even. Turner used Morison to mske Fletcher the fall guy. If one of the CVs or fast oilers was sunk before Eastern Solomons or Santa Cruz because Turner was too close to Cactus who knows? Fletcher had experience at Coral Sea, Neosho and Lexington and Yorktown then Midway. He knew the risk from IJN air, had land based air to defend against as well as IJN subs if he remained in one area. The IJN torpedoes were an unknown factor but make his reluctance to loiter close to Cactus more prudent in retrospect.
Fits my bill! Well done gents.
Great discussion gents. I'm currently reading Richard Frank's and James Hornfischer's books on Guadalcanal in parallel. One of them suggests that from his time in England, Ghormley took away a very over-simplified lesson from British experience in Norway and the Med: "land-based air always defeats ships". So he had little problem with Fletcher keeping the carriers (mostly) out of the fight in Aug and Sept. And, once (some) airpower was established at Henderson, his actions suggest he saw this as largely sufficient to establish sea control. In short, Ghormley (and others) were thinking of airpower and surface combatants as substitutes rather than complements. A silver lining is that he pleaded with Nimitz to get more airpower into the theater, which wasn't wrong. But a more nuanced take-away from the British experience (Dunkirk? Night? Bad weather?) would have helped a lot.
You guys and this channel are great. So glad I found it and subbed early while you only have a few thousand subs, won’t be long till it’s a few hundred thousand!
Outstanding series.
I still won't second guess Mikawa even if I'm glad he did what he did. He's got national assets that aren't as quickly replaceable as ours. He's in an area without air superiority because Rabaul can't fly CAP for his force. He's got no way of knowing what we've unloaded or what we haven't. He's in an unfamiliar sound and suddenly without charts. He's got no way of knowing what the situation is on Guadalcanal, as to whether the Army can back up their chat or not.. He's not intoxicated with having just won a huge hand just to risk wasting it against the odds as he can only see them with the info he has. He's going to take his wins and fold and walk to play another day. He had not the benefit of your hindsight.
And to another point, your worst of the worst couldn't possibly be worse than Joe Stilwell. Interesting input from all of you today though. Enjoyed.
Not for nothing was Stillwell called "Vinegar Joe". Anything he was put on turned sour.And that was a very measured commentary on Mikawa, who by all counts here showed very western prudence, concern for his men and ships, which we usually applaud, until we don't, and have retrospectrascope to keep us without a real time decision to make. 😂❤
Admiral King's greatest decision was making Admiral Nimitz his effective Executive Officer during WWII.
Except that it wasn't King's. FDR ordered that either Knox or King contact Nimitz to get out to Hawaii and don't leave until the war was won. Nimitz was not on the list of the forty best Admirals put together by a board of senior Admirals at Secretary Knox 's , FDR'S demand. But FDR knew his commanders, unlike any since, except perhaps Bush, Sr
King had nothing to do with sending Nimitz to the Pacific. In fact, had it been up to him, that command would have gone to Royal Ingersol.
Fascinating discussion!
Awesome discussion.
In discussing Ghormley's attitude and approach to Watchtower, perspective should be given to his original task, that of organizing defense of the vital shipping lanes to Australia by way of numerous garrisons on the island nations. These were scattered across huge swaths of ocean, and were comprised of army and marine units and several bomber and fighter squadrons pulled from other theaters. Many of these units were built from newly minted officers and raw recruits, and needed both extensive training and large amounts of logistic support. Both of those were in short supply, which occupied a significant portion of Ghormley's staff's time and effort. So when Watchtower was hastily drawn and presented, the frighteningly thin resource base was the overarching concern, and it was shared by MacArthur. In fact, that concern went all the way down the line to the unit commanders tasked with the tactical operations. But of course, orders are orders....
I don't think there were many who would have considered Watchtower a good thing given our lack of readiness both materially and militarily, and with MacArthur's recent connection to losing to the Japanese in the Philippines. Only a man like King, the ultimate contrarian of the time, and a mean S.O.B. as he proudly styled himself. He, like quite a few others, were the right men, right time. Notice how they faded when their time passed. Churchill, Patton, FDR all lived to see the hourglass empty.
The reference to the importance of morale to the success or failure of the mission is not lost on this former infantry officer. Same old question of which is more important....mission or morale? The answer is clear.....the points are not mutally exclusive. Without morale the mission wll fail....ergo, both are equaly important. That's a testament to Vandergrift's leadership.
Well said. And certainly justifies Nimitz's trip to the battle zone.
Thanks for your informative videos. With regards to Lt. Frank Jack Fletcher's Medal of Honor; it was one of 55+ Medals of Honor awarded at the 1914 Battle of Veracruz (!). His uncle; Rear Admiral Frank F. Fletcher, also received the Medal of Honor at Veracruz. Douglas MacArthur was considered for the Medal of Honor, but did not recive it during this battle..
I love your channel . I have learned a lot . Thank you !
6:32. 1935-1936 he was captain of USS Nevada.
Thank you!
John and Bill at their most animated state.
The politics of command, the Great Circle of Blame.
By September 42, the old heroes of the Great War, were physically and emotionally spent.
Admiral King had a deep bullpen.
Lee, Halsey, Lockwood are warming up.
Lets go!
Not a Halsey at Guadalcanal issue/question, but a Halsey at Leyte Gulf question. Something that crawled into my head when reading Ian Toll's Pacific war trilogy. Leyte Gulf was Halsey's first time commanding in a major fleet battle. (Coral Sea - Fletcher; Midway - Spruance; Eastern Solomons - Fletcher again; Santa Cruz - Kinkaid; Philippine Sea - Mitscher) Do you think that this had any effect, if if so in what way, on Halsey's decision to go after the Japanese carriers and leave the landing force uncovered from the northern approaches? Maybe something to think about when y'all get to Leyte Gulf.
Good question and we definitely can explore this at the right time.
@@UnauthorizedHistoryPacificWar One thing I recall from Toll's books is that many of the subordinate carrier/air wing commanders were upset that MItscher hadn't been more aggressive in going after the Japanese carriers.
@@davelange3853 - Which operation are you referring to where he was accused by his subordinates of not pursuing the Japanese carriers?
Keep in mind, the commander of U.S.N. carrier forces, Mitchner, was subordinate to the orders of the fleet commander; Whether he was 5th, 3rd, or 7th fleets. Admiral Mitchner wouldn’t have had the authority to independently peel off his carriers to conduct any separate operations without express approval from his particular fleet commander.
It never was Mitchner’s call to pursue the Japanese carriers during the invasion of Saipan, he had to follow the directives of U.S. 5th fleet Admiral Raymond Spruance whether he agreed or not.
And while the subject of U.S.N. carrier task force commanders is being discussed; My 37 cent opinion is U.S.N. Admiral Jocko Clark had a big mouth and zero appreciation of the strategic picture in the Pacific in 1944.
@@davelange3853 that was Spruance At Philippine Sea.
Is this channel covering the Pacific War in a chronological order? Would love to see a biographical episode covering Marc Mitscher and TF 38/58. Though if this channel is chronological, that may be a while. A look at Admiral Leahy and the JCS would also be very interesting. Excellent stuff, cheers!
We did the Guadalcanal episodes in chronological order because literally every event informed the next. To do it out of order would’ve been confusing. This next season will be less chronological and more topical. We will get back to the chronology once we hit 1944.
If Yamamoto is removed (or commits seppoku) because of the disaster at Midway, who succeeds him? Do they respond differently to Guadalcanal? Do they replace Nagumo, either because of Midway or because of Eastern Solomons?
Jeez...this episode is so good that I've had to create a "PacWar Rewatch" playlist so I can go back and take notes on all the cool stuff there is to learn from this discussion, and how thoroughly it integrates with, illustrates, and expands on material in the earlier episodes in the Guadalcanal series. Just brilliant stuff, guys! 😎
Was there any consideration of giving Spruance a task force command during the Guadacanal campaign? Or was Nimitz determined to keep him as Deputy to prepare him for bigger things in 1943?
Nimitz really wanted him as deputy...
Nimitz kept Spruance, and his intellect, his trusted companionship, his like minded fitness buddy, his idea and concept foil, until he felt he had sufficiently cloned himself, and his conscience wouldn't let him keep Spruance for himself any longer. It allowed him to create the Fifth and Third Fleet rotation to hopefully keep Halsey from burning up or having to relieve him when he made an expensive blunder. . He ran that out as far as he could. Even after. I'm sure he knew Halsey was done by August 1944. But the war was nearly done, too and there was no doubt. Even the Japanese knew, and were admitting it to each other, when Saipan fell. When Halsey went home he was glad to put his seabag away forever, to stop losing friends. I'm sure Charles Lockwood was also glad to be done. To not be having to order men to their deaths. Losses in the submarine service didn't stop until all the boats were in port. All his lost skippers and their wives) were close friends. I can't imagine the heartache. Talk about sacrifice. 😢
you three work so well together. thanks for sharing. i would love to see a discussion with Jon on alternative Japanese strategy/strategies and leadership for the entire war.
There's a really good comment about 5 previous that covers a lot of that.
Enjoyed Ep 121 w/ Jon Parshall. I'm working through the story of the Guadalcanal campaign. Can you recommend an account of the campaign? Use your own criteria, or suggest a land and a sea account you find recommendable. Appreciate your work! Jon Parshall, I've read Shattered Sword, congratulations on that book!
Splendid.
We have no group of people doing this for the UK forces of this time.
Well, there are some great English historians who know how to talk truth. Andrew Roberts comes to mind.
Very fine job of educating and entertaining us.
The US was able to learn the problems and their solutions during WWII so fast because they were NOT new material to us. We had the US Civil War as an enormous military training ground that taught us huge amounts of information on all basic military subjects in what was one of the largest wars in human history at that time (1860s). During WWII much of what we learned was ALREADY part of our history and training system, just rather rusty and mostly just had to be adjusted to the new circumstances of the 1940s -- the duration of both the Civil War and our part of WWII was amazingly similar, wasn't it, regardless of the scale change in the size of the theaters involved. Japan had never had any kind of huge war anything like WWII (their part in WWI was tiny) and thus could not change their thinking rules about such things as how to finish the WWII against an enemy like the USA.
Japan's navy had stunned the world and themselves when they clobbered the Czarist Russian navy. That Russia was crumbling wasn't known, so the importance of those victories were over valued by the Japanese, but they weren't nothing. It was enough to get them self deceived, to underestimate all westerners.
I really like this back-and-forth, and some disagreements.
Gives a thorough picture of these people, and some of the pros and cons leaders like King had to weigh when deciding who to put where
I am going to have to rewatch "The Gallant Hours" after this.
1:01:37
I just wanna point out 1 aspect of the Japanese troop commitment as well.
It is well-known how the Japanese Navy and Army had severe internal struggle between each other. It's a topic worth a hour long video itself but will be brief about it here. Basically the Navy was the one who wanted to fight the US while the Army wanted to focus in China & USSR. They had different goals and plans. And they had no intension to help each other.
Anyhow, the initial Guadalcanal airbase construction was done by the Japanese Navy, but the US Marines took it and finished it. This caused a major problem for all air/land/sea operations for Japan at the regioon. The Japanese Navy didn't tell the Army they were building the base, and only notified the Army after US captured and finished the base.
For the Japanese Army, whole Guadalcanal campaign was the Navy's fuck-up and didn't want to put too much effort. But they had to since Hirohito the Emperor told them to send in troops. So they had to allocate some troops to look as if they 'tried' (Its a very Asian thing). And once they started putting in resources, they couldn't back-down because they had to save face (literally, there was no strategic implication about the whole campaign on the Japanese side after a few months)
kamsamnida
Re NG vs. G, taken together (plus CBI), they over-stretched what Japan could do. As for G getting more attention with Americans, it was almost entirely Americans fighting at G (land and sea), and the USN became the widest and most accepted storytellers about the PTO (i.e. not MacArthur and the US Army). There is need for seeing the big process-picture to balance the episodic approach of focusing on individual battles.
My great-grandfather was killed aboard the USS LaVallette in the Battle of Rennell Island. I don’t think I’ve ever heard it discussed. I wonder if it might be something interesting for this show.
Seth, on the top shelf of he book case behind you, 918th Bomb Group Heavy!
Sometimes it’s horses for courses. Halsey was the guy for Battle of Guadalcanal and Patton was the guy for the Battle of the Bulge.
Outstanding!!
Really engaging conversation amongst a few advanced experts, each life with each other.
Boy, you get “the rest of the story” in very deep depth! 🧐
Right On, Brilliant Comments, Laddie!
UK needed Logistical support desperately, December 7, 1941 changes everything.
RN had. adequate surface warships in the Med and ATL/North Sea.
USN badly needed warships from ATLFLT, in the Pacific Meatgrinder ASAP,
I loved Ikes remarks about Admiral King.
As Paul Harvey, Id say That's the Rest of the Story.
Regarding Malaysia vs Guadalcanal: Malaysia was planned out ahead of time and was a logistically sound operation. Guadalcanal was an off-the-cuff logistical nightmare.