Common Mistakes about the Moral Argument, Fine-Tuning, and Ontological Arguments
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- Опубліковано 9 лип 2024
- In this fourth installment of my common mistakes series, I cover mistakes relating to the moral argument, fine-tuning argument, and ontological arguments.
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OUTLINE
0:00 Intro
0:37 Mistake 105
2:46 Mistake 106
5:33 Mistake 107
15:18 Mistake 108
22:33 Mistake 109
39:54 Mistake 110
51:49 Mistake 111
53:04 Mistake 112
55:52 Mistake 113
58:09 Mistake 114
59:26 Mistake 115
1:02:15 Mistake 116
1:07:49 Mistake 117
1:09:24 Mistake 118
1:11:48 Mistake 119
1:16:03 Mistake 120
1:21:18 Mistake 121
1:31:10 Mistake 122
1:37:30 Mistake 123
1:43:21 Mistake 124
1:44:07 Mistake 125
1:45:29 Conclusion
RESOURCES
(1) Resource Document for Part 4: docs.google.com/document/d/1V...
(2) Document with resources criticizing WLC-style moral arguments: docs.google.com/document/d/1x...
(3) Common Mistakes Series playlist: • Common Mistakes Series
(4) My Springer book: (a) www.amazon.com/Existential-In... (b) link.springer.com/book/10.100...
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*_List of Mistakes (for Part 4)_*
_Moral argument_
0:37 Mistake 105: Confusing moral ontology and epistemology
2:46 Mistake 106: Misunderstanding internal critiques
5:33 Mistake 107: Asserting there can be no grounding of morality under atheism, while ignoring potential groundings
15:18 Mistake 108: Conflating why things _instantiate_ moral properties with _what those moral properties are_
22:33 Mistake 109: "Even atheists think that without God there can be no morality!"
39:54 Mistake 110: Being too hasty with evolutionary debunking arguments
51:49 Mistake 111: Intrinsic value/dignity proves God’s existence
53:04 Mistake 112: Non-theistic accounts can’t explain why human morality is different from animal behavior
55:52 Mistake 113: Theists objecting to certain non-theistic accounts on the basis that they land in brute facts
58:09 Mistake 114: Confusing normative judgements with metaethical judgments
59:26 Mistake 115: Ignoring the distinction between agent and appraiser relativism
_Fine-tuning_
1:02:15 Mistake 116: Chance, design, physical necessity avoids worries about Pr(data | theism)
1:07:49 Mistake 117: Puddle analogy / anthropic principle
1:09:24 Mistake 118: Naive frequentism
1:11:48 Mistake 119: Bad responses to multiverse objection
1:16:03 Mistake 120: ‘The constants and initial conditions are metaphysically necessary’ as a response to the FTA
_Ontological arguments_
1:21:18 Mistake 121: Ignoring the distinction between logical and metaphysical possibility
1:31:10 Mistake 122: Ignoring the distinction between epistemic and metaphysical possibility
1:37:30 Mistake 123: Presenting the MOA while being totally oblivious to the reverse MOA
1:43:21 Mistake 124: Saying that _all_ ontological arguments try to define God into existence
1:44:07 Mistake 125: Ignoring controversy over system S5
Btw, did your concussion cause any brain damage? Have you noticed anything like it being harder to focus ?
You’re a real one, Joe. You woke me up from my dogmatic slumbers of Turek-like apologetics, and I am, in all seriousness, forever grateful for that. I’m still a theist, but just an informed one now. I wish this stuff would trickle down to the popular level audiences.
Yet another banger comment. So amazing to see it 🥰
A great public service. Give this guy some money! I certainly do.
Great and lowly are RELATIVE. 😉
Incidentally, Slave, are you VEGAN? 🌱
Hi Joe a little off topic but I am a Christian and I really want to thank for helping for me learn about philosophy of religion and for having many of
My favorite philosophers on your channel this has both helped me strengthen my faith but also challenge it at the same time which I think is good because it is often great faith that wrestles with these things.
one of the best comments ngl
EWWWW STRENGTHEN YOUR FAITH you should be becoming more and more faithless :(
Hey, fellow Christian here too! Though specifically I am in RCIA to become Catholic. I love philosophy and reason so much. Something I recommend to people who are in similar mindsets is The Thomistic Institute. It is a beautiful organization that really prioritizes faith and reason. But if you just want to get a little immersed into that, I would recommend Father Gregory Pine, O.P., here on UA-cam. Truly can not thank him enough for his work, and of course the work of the Thomistic Institute. ✝ Blessings.
Thank you Majesty of Reason for this awesome informative content. This is a huge contribution
Wake up babe, new movie-length Majesty of Reason video just dropped
Ngl THE best UA-camr philosopher in the online space has got to be Joe Schmidt... and he's helping me become the same [a good philosopher] :)
Aah yes.. another playlist for my workout
Great video ❤
Great video, awesome resource!
Thank you, again, Joe! Invaluable content. ❤
♥♥
I'm only finishing the moral argument section but I'm really liking everything you're saying! I think one mistake I would add to that section (unless I missed it) is that even if all non-theistic accounts of morality fail it doesn't follow that the Theistic account is true because it could be the case the Theistic account is just as incoherent or inconsistent as the non-theistic accounts.
Thank you for your logical analysis
Thanks for recommending my video on moral arguments 😊
Working in S4 which models an epistemic modality of logical necessity and provability, it makes sense to attempt to defend the premise “It’s possible a MGB exists” of the MOA using arguments that treat possibility as epistemic possibility. But the MOA is not valid in S4.
Working in S5 which models a metaphysical modality, the MOA is valid. But in this modality, it doesn’t make sense to use arguments that assume intuitions appropriate to epistemic possibility to support the premise “It’s possible a MGB exists” of the argument. S5 includes an axiom which is appropriate to a metaphysical modality, but which is nonsensical when interpreted within the epistemic modality modeled in S4.
All attempts I’ve seen to justify the MOA involve trying to have our cake and eat it too. They cite S5 to show the argument is valid, but then they use intuitions appropriate to possibility as epistemic possibility to justify the possibility premise that would only make sense if we were working in S4.
I’d be interested if you have a counterexample.
Do you plan on making a video about Crummett's argument on psychophysical harmony?
You mentioned on another video a while ago that you were studying it and preparing something.
I think you gave a very good presentation on the MOA. I especially appreciated your distinction between logical and metaphysical possibility. This is something that’s generally very poorly understood, and in my opinion responsible for nearly all the misguided attempts to actually use the MOA as a persuasive argument.
Logical possibility as you described it is typically modeled in S4. In S4, we start with logical tautologies together with a set of propositions that are assumed a’priori to be necessarily true, and then anything deducible form this initial set either using the laws of logic or unwinding definitions is also necessarily true. This is an epistemic modality of knowability, demonstrability, or provability. It has actually been used by mathematicians to study the undecidability of the continuum hypothesis. (See Smullyan: Set Theory and the Continuum Problem)
And of course S5 models metaphysical possibility. S5 includes all the axioms of S4 and adds one more: If it is possible a proposition is necessarily true, then it is necessarily true. This axiom is nonsensical in a modality of knowability or provability; even if it is impossible to prove a proposition is not necessarily true, it need not be the case it is necessarily true. In my opinion there is nothing wrong with S5; it is just not appropriate for modelling a modality of logical possibility; it is intended to model a metaphysical modality.
You stated the MOA as follow:
1. God’s existence is possible.
2. God’s existence is either necessary or impossible.
3. So God’s existence is necessary.
I would state this as
1. It is possible a MGB exists.
2. It is either necessarily true or impossible a MGB exists.
3. So it is necessarily true a MGB exists.
God, at least to me, feels like a proper name. Stating the argument using "MGB" in its place makes it clear we are not presupposing the existence of God; rather we are arguing a certain definition is instantiated. Of course once we are satisfied a MGB exists, we may if we wish refer to that being as God. Having said this, I’ve sometimes used “God” instead of “MGB” in these arguments myself because of the emotional and intuitive resonance the term “God” supplies.
In defending premise 2 of the argument, you say. “The idea is if there were to be a God, God would be a necessary being. And so God is going to have to either exist in all possible worlds or no possible worlds. He’s going to have to be either necessary or he's going to have to be impossible.” I would add a bit more explanation here. Beings are only assumed to have their properties when they are instantiated. So if God exists, it follows God exists in all possible worlds, but if God does not exist, it does not follow God can’t exist in any possible world. At least not working in S4. Working in S4, a proposition can be necessarily true in a possible world but false in the actual world. This is where we need S5. Working in S5, a proposition that is necessarily true in any possible world is true in every possible world, including the actual world.
Finally, I would question what you describe as “mistake #124: Saying that all ontological arguments try to define God into existence.” Of course arguments don’t try to do anything. People using them do. But if someone gives a definition, and then argues it must be instantiated purely because of an examination of the character of the definition itself and the concepts within it without any reference to the actual world, how is that not an attempt to define something into existence?
In the MOA Plantinga defines a MEB to be an omniscient omnipotent omnibenevolent being that has these properties essentially. In other words, in every possible world in which the MEB exists, it has these properties. Plantinga then defines a MGB to be MEB that exists in every possible world.
Note that we can define our terms how ever we like, so this choice doesn’t need to be defended.
We then choose to work in the axiom system S5. In working in S5, we are defining what we mean by necessity, possibility, and impossiblity. This is typically how formal axiom systems work; we define a new notion by specifying the axioms it satisfies. Again, like our definition of a MGB, this decision does not need to be defended. It’s only because of this that typically the only disputed premise in the MOA is “It is possible a MGB exists,” as all the others follow from either the definition of a MGB or the assumptions of S5.
So with these assumptions, if no MEB exists, then it is logically impossible it’s the case it could be metaphysically possible a MGB exists, because given the definition of a MGB it can’t be possible a MGB exists unless it’s possible it’s necessarily true a MGB exists, and given the axioms concerning possibility in S5, it can’t be possible it’s necessarily true a MGB exists unless a MGB exists, and of course it’ can’t be true a MGB exists unless a MEB exists.
In other words, given the modality we’ve chosen to work in and the way we’ve defined a MGB, if no MEB exists, then it will be metaphysically impossible a MGB exists purely because no MEB exists, because of the definitions we’ve made and the modality we’ve chosen to work in, and for NO OTHER REASON.
Suppose someone argues the definition of a MGB exists is coherent, and therefore we should grant the main premise of the MOA argument together with the conclusion. The problem is there is nothing, absolutely nothing in the MOA that says if no MEB exists then the definition of a MGB will be somehow incoherent. There is nothing, absolutely nothing in the MOA that says if no MEB exists then it will be impossible a MGB exists because the definition of a MGB will be incoherent. Given its assumptions, the MOA tells us that if no MEB exists then it will be impossible.a MGB exists purely because no MEB exists and for no other reason.
Or suppose someone argues we have symmetry breakers that favor the metaphysical possibility of a MGB over its impossibility. There is nothing, absolutely nothing in the MOA argument that says if no MEB exists, then there will fail to be symmetry breakers favoring the possible existence of a MGB over its possible nonexistence. If no MEB exists, then it will be impossible a MGB exists purely because no MEB exists, because of the way we’ve defined our terms and of the axiom system we have chosen to work in, and for no other reason.
There could be hundreds of symmetry breakers favoring the metaphysical possible existence of a MGB, but if no MEB exists it will still be the case it will be metaphysically impossible a MGB exists purely because no MEB exists, because of the way we’ve defined our terms, and the axiom system we’ve chosen to work in, no matter how many symmetry breakers there are. To complete the argument, we must explain why it can’t be the case those symmetry breakers exist and yet no MEB exists, which would make it metaphysically impossible a MGB exists. In other words, we must show how those symmetry breakers give us good reason for concluding a MEB exists. But if we had that, we would not need the MOA! We’d just use this new argument that somehow the symmetry breakers show us a MEB exists and stop there. The MOA would not help us construct such an argument, because there is nothing in the MOA that says if a MEB doesn’t exist then there won’t be symmetry breakers. It only tells us that if a MEB doesn’t exist, then it will be impossible a MGB exists purely because no MEB exists, because of the way we’ve defined our terms and the axiom system we’ve chosen to work in. Either way, it is completely useless.
The MOA gains its illusionary persuasive power because we find it very difficult to separate our intuitions concerning epistemic vs metaphysical modalities. We find it difficult to grant it is impossible a MGB exists. We ask, how can you say it’s impossible a MGB exists? That seems a farfetched notion. But the answer is if no MEB exists, then it is impossible a MGB exists purely because no MEB exists, because of the way we’ve chosen to define a MGB, because of the modality we’ve chosen to work in, and for no other reason.
I do like the MOA. I think it involves many subtle ideas, and I’ve learned a lot by studying it. But as a genuine argument to support the existence of God it is, in my opinion, absurd. Ultimately, it is completely empty of content. It simply notes that two logically equivalent assertions are logically equivalent. I find it astonishing all the work that goes on, using higher order logic or other techniques to try to somehow justify it as a genuine argument for the existence of God.
HIIII!!!!! I recently found your channel and I am SO impressed. I don't think I've EVER met anyone of your intellectual caliber and I can't stop watching your videos now. I am not kidding when I say that you are one of the greatest philosophers in this field at the moment, thank you for what you do!!! 💕💕💕
On the topic of ontological arguments, what do you think about Mulla Sadra's/Tabatabai's Ontological Argument (e.g. in Bidayah Al-Hikmah, free online on Internet Archive)? I think its one of the best ones out there. This is my rendition or my own argument inspired from Tabatabai and I'd LOVEEE to hear what you think about this since the argument is somewhat unknown and I haven't seen many criticisms of it:
(1) There is reality (i.e. all things that exists. we are careful here not to commit reification fallacy)
(2) There is no case under which reality isn't real for it would be self-refuting fallacy. Consider absolute nothingness (negation of any being or absence of all potentiality and actuality, etc.). Such a situation would either be real or unreal or something else. However, if it's not real, then it's non-existent and not possible. So reality is necessary.
(3) This necessity can be derived either internally, externally, or via itself.
(4) It cannot be derived externally, for anything outside of reality would be unreal, and hence, wouldn't exist
(5) It cannot be internally (i.e. on some existent A that happens to be real), for it would implicate that there is some existent A which logically precedes reality itself. This however, is not possible, for if something were to precede reality, it would also be unreal, and hence, wouldn't exist.
(6) Therefore, the only option is that this necessity is self-derived.
Conclusion: There is some "thing" which is identical to reality or existence itself in its essence and cannot NOT exist. Hence, there is at least one Necessary Existence. Also from (5), this Necessary Existence is One (lacks parts). It is timeless for it would precede the universe (contingent) and thus, spacetime. It is immaterial for the same reason. It also must be only one (law of identity of indiscernables, though this is more questionable. I think Spinoza had a better argument for this). Ultimately, you get to a single, immaterial, necessary, absolute, eternal, self-subsisting "Being" which is Pure Existence itself. This is what Classical Theists would call God. You can manually derive some other attributes, but that's besides the point of this argument right now. By the way, I think its also possible to reformulate it to get rid of the Classical Theist ideas i.e. without referring to necessity.
Thoughts?
This argument is formally invalid. It doesn't follow that it doesn't have accidental features in all respects, and that it stops at a single terminus.
@@jmike2039 I don't think I ever personally denied any accidental features in all respects. As for the latter, it wouldn't be possible and would collapse your coherence and soundness as far as I can tell.
Thanks for including that last mistake. While I don't have a specific reason and haven't done a ton of research into it, my gut reaction to S5 was doubt. I could be wrong and maybe S5 is as solid as Non-contradiction, but maybe I'm right and it's more like the parallel postulate. I don't know, but I'm gratified to hear that I'm not bucking settled philosophy. Also I'm thankful for your providing a starting point for researching it - with the brain damage, I might not understand any of it, but with the brain damage, I for sure wasn't going to find the best papers/books/videos on the topic.
Hi Jo. Really love the content that you upload. This series included. The thing that gets me about many arguments for "God", including the moral arguments, is two fold. 1) If they are true, then they do not prove that Jesus died for our sins or that Mohamed was the last prophet of Allah; they only prove that some god is true or that religion per se somehow produces morality. 2) Because they can be equally applied to any religion, and because most - if not all - religions are incompatible (if one is right, the others are all wrong), these arguments cannot be used to prove anything about any particular religion. I have this niggling feeling that I'm missing something here, but I'm blowed if I can work out what it is ...
I think the problem here is that the moral argument never intended to prove that a specific religion was right. So, you are absolutely correct that the moral argument does not prove Christianity, and it cannot be used to prove any particular religion, however, that was never its primary goal.
To illustrate, imagine someone presenting an argument for the existence of aliens, and someone else objects by saying, 'But this argument doesn't tell us who their leader is.' The appropriate response would be, 'So what?' The initial argument wasn't meant to establish the leader of aliens in the first place. Similarly, the moral argument seeks to establish only that, given the existence of morality, there must be a transcendent being that serves as its foundation-nothing more.
Furthermore, these broad arguments serve to eliminate various religious possibilities. For example, the contingency argument leads to the existence of a necessary being, while the moral argument points to an essentially good being. With just these two arguments, we've already narrowed down the possibilities to the Abrahamic religions. However, as you rightly noted, to specifically reach Christianity, additional arguments are necessary.
I hope this helps, and keep exploring philosophy.
I see the internal critique mistake happen time and time again in mainstream apologetics, im glad you mentioned it and I hope those who see it realize its not a good defense for theistic immoralities.
Are you going to publish a book in which you will list an explain all the mistakes you mentioned in this series?
Thank you for all your efforts
58:54 Mistake 114. Huh? What exactly does it mean for something to be stance-dependently wrong but not stance-independently wrong?
If I have the stance that baby torture is not wrong, then am I right or wrong?
What I don't get about the Fine Tuning argument is how they come up with the tiny probabilities of the constants being the values we currently think they are?
Their logic seems to be "if the value has been measured to 60 significant digits, then that's a probability of 1 over 10^60" which seems to treat the possible values as completely and utterly open to any number. So if we do a better experiment and measure the value to 65 significant digits next year, does the probability change to 1 over 10^65 ? If we measure a different value in the 53rd decimal point, what would proponents of fine tuning say then?
Anyway, thanks for the resources, because I need to read up on how we are so glibly dismissing the possibility that at least one of those constants is necessarily that value because of some mathematical relation we don't yet understand. Is it not possible that some development in brane theory might show us that the relation between electrons and quarks in the 13h dimension is such that no other ratio of their energies could exist or whatever?
I'm imagining a scenario where we someone might have argued that pi was fine tuned to 50 digits because they hadn't worked out more than 50 digits yet, and that any change to pi would cause planetary orbits to be impossible so naturally it must be fine tuned for life. But jokes on them, pi was slightly larger than they thought because it keeps having more digits after the 50th, and their probability calculation of 1 over 10^50 was wrong because the probability of pi having that value was (and is) exactly 1.
my uneducated response to fine tuning arguments has always been strong skepticism, I simply don’t understand 1) what reason we have for assuming the constants of the universe could be different than they are
2) what reason we have to assume we can predict which universes could support life when we know that our current model of physics is wrong/incomplete. we can only make inferences about universes which would could turn out to be very wrong if we’re missing any small variable across a huge timescale.
3) we don’t understand life, how it arises or what forms it could take other than our limited understanding of our own so i don’t see how to put a probability on that for wildly different universes when structures could appear at hugely different scales than the ones we know.
given all the different ways in which we lack firm knowledge, especially taken together i just don’t see how we can make solid knock down probabilistic cases for fine tuning or the multiverse. it seems to be resting on assuming we can put probabilities on things we know so little about.
it always surprises me that i’ve never heard philosophers discuss this. am i just committing mistake 120?
i suppose one might answer “in other universes particles would all just fly apart so we know large scale structures could never form” but that still seems like a wildly confident claim about a universe we know almost nothing about. why can we rule out that over huge space and huge timescales structures could emerge?
I was thinking the same. Suppose that temporal consciousness is necessary (and perhaps we do not know it). Such would necessarily lead to a universe with life. There is no way we can assert probability to a system that we do not understand
But yet you would say even with all the knowledge we're missing it's not possible for an intelligent first cause and designer behind the complexity of the Universe: something nonintelligent brought it forth!
I find that even more problematic to logic!
@@davidjanbaz7728 it seems possible to me
1) Absolutely, we are making an assumption that the constants _could_ be different. If they can then we should adopt the Copernican principle, that ours is not a special set of constants. That either through multiverse theories, long timescales, black hole cosmology or whatever, that all sets of constants exist/are possible.
2 and 3) When apologists claim that other constants could support life, what they are implicitly saying is _our_ kind of life and they ignore the broadest definitions of life.
Many apologists like to cite the laws of thermodynamics as evidence against natural origins of life, but those laws don't preclude life, they demand it. Most importantly, nothing about fine tuning arguments will provide evidence for _their_ favorite god.
What do you think about transcendental argument? Are you familiar with Jay Dyer?
About #120 I feel like a more charitable interpretation of the of the objection is that the proponent of the FTA is claiming that there's a stochastic process giving rise to the laws of nature, which requires some justification. I guess since the advent of quantum physics it's not as strange to assume some things can be stochastic, but I'm not sure that should be the default either.
You’re a young menace to society fr😂 great video as always.
Could you do a debate/ dialogue with jay dyer on presuppositional apologetics & his transcendental arguments? I’d be so invested I don’t think you understand how much.
Even then, great content, keep it up!
And we’re still waiting for the update about you and Trent on the argument from change..
Dyer's argument is really hard to get off the ground because it relies on the premise that all different worldviews other than Christianity are necessarily false, and cant give an adequate account of transcendental categories. (Most of by the way he assumes you take for granted which can obviously be contended)
His argument to even attempt the proof of showing other positions are false relies on a false dichotomy that they can be split into an intentional/accidental split. When the correct disjunction is actually intentional and non-intentional. Combine this with the idea that he presupposes a very specific form of Christianity is necessarily true and you got a boatload of problems
@@jordanh1635 I appreciate the effort, but I didn’t ask for critique of his arguments from you, or ask in general. Fortunately I can do my own thinking and research, but thanks.
Only reason I asked Joe to debate Jay is because I find Joe extremely informed and intelligent, as opposed to most non-theists jay has debated. Thanks again tho
I agree, I just wanted to add my own thoughts because I am interested in this as well@@user-ox5se7jg9b
Changing the apologetics sphere
For what it's worth, I don't think it's right to say that rejecting the historicity of Noah's flood (or the Aqedah, the mauling of the forty-two children, etc.) requires a "revisionary view of the Bible." Pre-modern Christians pretty commonly rejected literal readings of Biblical stories when they appeared to depict God acting immorally. The classic example is St. Gregory of Nyssa in *The Life of Moses*. When he discusses the killing of the Egyptian firstborns, he begins by saying that this can't be literal history, since it would be inconsistent with God's perfect goodness as taught elsewhere in scripture (he cites Ezekiel 18:20), and hence we must turn to a spiritual reading (which he then proceeds to develop). With that in mind, I certainly wouldn't say that Christian theism "seems to require" accepting that a perfectly good God could e.g. drown children in a flood.
All the same, good video :)
Excellent points! I could have added the following clarification: I really meant that some decently revisionary view is probably needed to avoid the full gambit of moral problems the OT raises, not that it’s needed to avert any particular one🙂
@MajestyofReason I think one might need a revisionary view of the Mosaic law, such that objectionable laws were never literally ordained by God (or at least not ordained as ideals). Sam Lebens explores something like this in *The Principles of Judaism*, if I recall correctly. I think the idea is that one can say that God's revelation consists not only of the Biblical text, but also of the subsequent tradition of commentary and exegesis. That might fit rather nicely with how Catholics and the Eastern Orthodox think of revelation.
Under reductive physicalism, what would objective morality be in substance?
CosmicSkeptic committed mistake #105 in his first debate against Michael Jones 😕
1.11.30 Agree with the point but that example doesn't work.
We have tonned of examples of how star arrangements look and that one would look markedly different.
What is your opinion of the common response made by apologists like Frank Turek to the Euthyphro dilemma? The response basically states that it is Gods character/nature which is always "good" which makes god make these specific moral condemnations/permissions.
Its very possible that I have misinterpreted this argument since to me it seems that this doesnt seem to solve the problem whatsoever. Firstly, it doesnt seem to follow that Gods nature is good, therefore God condemns murder for example. One would need to add the proposition that murder is in fact incompatible with Gods good nature (and is therefore bad) for it to be logically consistent. However this proposition also seems to run into the dilemma again. Who/what determined that this specific command from god was compatible or incompatible with God's good nature? And if it was god himself who determined that approving of humans to murder is incompatible with his own good nature (which holds true to divine command theory), was there a reason or not?
I want to be clear that I have not studied much philosophy, and this could very much be a mistake in my own reasoning.
You should make a video looking at the debate between cosmic skeptic and Ben Shapiro. I dont really wanna watch it, but i would enjoy your commentary, im sure.
Bruh I also don’t want to watch it😆
@@MajestyofReason fair
@@MajestyofReasonlmaooo
@@MajestyofReason please make a debate review video.
It's your moral responsibility.
now, now, insisting that others endure torture for your amusement is self-evidently evil
Hi Joe. Being an agnostic, is there a place where you make a rigorous case against atheism? Recently watched your video with Trent Horn, 'The Agnostic Case Against Atheism'. I heard you give quick responses to arguments like the problem of evil and divine hiddenness, and this got me interested in whether you have a written positive case against atheism. Context: I'm an atheist and I've engaged with some theistic arguments from consciousness, fine-tuning etc., and I'm curious which of these has taken your evidential case for theism to a credence of 0.5 (agnosticism). As an atheist, I obviously find the arguments to be quite lacking evidentially, past the general facts, so a credence of 0.5 is more surprising to me than the kind of agnostic that simply hasn't thought about it or the kind that doesn't think we can ever know. I'm thinking that maybe your formulation of the theistic arguments is stronger, as well as your responses to the positive atheistic arguments. Did you write something down somewhere? (Maybe you've done this in your book 'Classical Theistic Proofs and EI' but I'm a "kid starving in Africa" so I can't get it lol)
Thanks for the comment!
I don't have a single place wherein I detail the considerations that raise my credence in theism; I mainly just cover them sporadically in various videos of mine (e.g., the 'why am I agnostic video') and youtube appearances on other channels (e.g., the Horn one you mentioned, and many others). Among the reasons you'll find me present are things like variants of contingency arguments, arguments from consciousness, etc.
Also, regarding my Springer book, if you email me, I can help :)
@@MajestyofReason Thank you for the response. I think you should think about detailing those considerations. I think if you get in your theistic bag, you can definitely strengthen some of these arguments because of your (good) tendency to delve so deep philosophically. Regarding the book, I'm definitely interested, and I'll send you an email. Thanks!
@@MajestyofReasonso does the atheist default position that nonintelligence created the universe seem ignorant to you?
Since they don't have/ give any evidence that supports this denial position ! ?
@@davidjanbaz7728 _so does the atheist default position that nonintelligence created the universe seem ignorant to you?_ That's not the atheist default position. Being atheist doesn't require any beliefs or positions except the non-belief that at least one god exists. That would be more akin to a material naturalist's position, but maybe not since simulation theory exists.
@@davidjanbaz7728 as @Rogstin mentioned, that is not the "default atheist" position. The sentence "nonintelligence created the universe" doesn't describe any atheist position because it's not a well formed sentence even.
For one thing, "created the universe" begs the question of the origin of the universe - calling it 'created' implies an act of creation, but some atheists (and even some theists) might hold that it just always existed, and even if it came into existence, that doesn't necessarily imply creation, just a beginning. When the sun rises tomorrow, morning just comes into existence without someone or some thing performing a specific act of creating tomorrow morning.
For a second thing, "nonintelligence created" isn't a coherent description of any action, because "nonintelligence" is not a being capable of action - it's not even a being at all.
Even if we accept your (false!) premise that the "default atheist" position is a kind of bare materialism, the more accurate description of that would be "the universe came into existence without any overt action by some kind of intelligent agent," but other possible positions include "the universe always existed," "the universe doesn't exist except in our minds," "the universe self-created," etc. There are zillions of positions that have been taken by atheists and theists alike over the millennia.
1:05:00
I am not sure if the sharpshooter analogy is successful.
There is I think a important difference between surviving and being born.
Consider the improbability of the existence of someone with the exact same genes like me, with the exact same finger prints, that is born at the exact same place, time, in the same family and without any twin siblings.
From the probability it seems like my existence is a miracle.
But usually we would not feel the need for a non-random explanation in that case.
Unlikelihood of birth is not a reason to think that there is a non-random explanation.
But unlikelihood of survival might be a good reason to think that there is such a explanation.
Yay!
Select 0.75x playback speed for regular-person pacing.
It's important to know that the MOA can be expressed without S5:
1. For all x, if x is metaphysically possible, x is either contingent or exists necessarily.
2. God is metaphysically possible.
3. God is not contingent.
4. So, God exists necessarily.
Can you please clarify what you mean by premise 3? When you say "God is not contingent," do you mean to say there exists an entity, God, that has the property of not being contingent? If so, that's presupposing the conclusion of the argument.
Do you mean to say that it is not contingently possible a MGB exists? That's what I think you must mean, and the argument is valid if that's the case.
However, we now need a justification for premise 3. Why should we assume it is not contingently possible a MGB exists? Working in S4, it is not sufficient to say it's because we've defined a MGB to be necessary (and therefore not contingent). Entities only have their properties if they are instantiated. Working in S4, it would be a contradiction to assert that a MGB exists but it is not necessarily true a MGB exists, as that existing MGB would not satisfy the definition of a MGB. However, working in S4, there is nothing logically contradictory in asserting no MGB exists, but it is possible a MGB exists (as there is no existing MGB whose definition is violated). So working in S4, all we can conclude from the definition of a MGB is that if a MGB exists then it is necessarily true a MGB exists.
This is where we need S5. S5 tells us a proposition cannot be both false and possibly necessarily true. S5 allows us to go from the definition of a MGB, if a MGB exists then it is necessarily true a MGB exists, to the conclusion, is not contingently possible a MGB exists.
With S5, the MOA has one unsupported premise: "It is possible a MGB exists".
Without S5, the MOA has two unsupported premises: "It is possible a MGB exists" and "It is not contingently possible a MGB exists."
Working only in S4, I see no reason whatsoever to grant it is not. contingently possible a MGB exists.
Two points.
First:
When I say that God is not contingent, I mean that the concept of God does not refer to a metaphysically possible contingent being.
Second:
We don't need any modal system to formulate the argument.
@@yonnerzmuller5304 We don't need S5 to formulate the argument; we may formulate it in S4. But working in S4, the proposition "It is not contingently possible a MGB exists" cannot be justified using the definition of a MGB, and must become an additional unsupported premise.
This is why people say the argument relies on S5.
@@roderictaylor I don't know if the argument can be successfully formulated in S4. But it doesn't matter. The argument can be formulated without any modal system. That's my main point.
@@yonnerzmuller5304 I don't understand. When you make an assertion "For all x, if x is metaphysically possible, x is either contingent or exists necessarily," you are appealing to modal logic, as axiomitized by K. Any formal argument is going to be stated assuming some axiomatic system.
I have an argument i would like to get som feeback on. I'm sure its been put forth before, but I constructed it myself yesterday. What do you guys think? Strengths? Weaknesses?
Premise 1: If God's nature is random, then His commands and actions are completely arbitrary.
Premise 2: If God's nature is a necessity, then His commands and actions are forced.
Conclusion: Therefore, whether God's attributes are random or determined, the concept of God's free will becomes obsolete, as a will governed by randomness or necessity lacks freedom.
What about reason based action, God has reasons why he commands or does x, but is not obliged by it, but chooses to go with x or z. It avoids both randomness and necessity. Albeit in a subtle way.
@@whitevortex8323 Thank you for your feedback.
Here's my counter: God's choices depend on His opinions, traits, desires and worldview. He can't choose these Himself because they themselves are needed for making any choices. So, without these already being established by something external, God can't make any choices at all.
Schopenhauer said sometging that relates to the desire-aspect of will: "Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills." And this is not because humans are mere mortals, but because it is logically impossible (law of noncontradiction).
"it's well-known that most of these continental atheist existentialists were the opposite of rigorous and failed to present actual arguments" is such a massive dunk lol
I dont use any of the 3, lol
Great video as usual ! About mistake 114 I agree but isn't that only true of moral relativism ? I don't see how one can be an moral error theorist and say that the Holocaust is wrong. I think it's implicit in what you're saying, but I just wanted to make sure
Correct! I wasn’t intending to say that *all* anti-realists can say the Holocaust was wrong, but only that anti-realism *as such* doesn’t imply the Holocaust wasn’t wrong, and that one can be an anti-realist and say the Holocaust was wrong.
Thank you for your response. I really appreciate your work, it helps me a lot as a philosophy teacher in France ! @@MajestyofReason
@@MajestyofReason But what does it even mean for a moral anti-realist to say the Holocaust was wrong? How can he be a moral anti-realist if he's saying the Holocaust was wrong?
What does it mean to say the holocaust was "stance dependently wrong" but not "stance-independently wrong" ?
It means that it is wrong in whatever stance dependant way they are cashing out their anti realism @@otakurocklee
get this man some more cocaine !
these summaries are great
After some reflection, I’ve decided I disagree with you on Mistake #124. I think it is reasonable to say that most attempts to justify the main premise of Plantinga’s MOA are attempts to define God into existence, even if it is not necessarily obvious at first.
What do I mean by defining something into existence?
Suppose I define a MEB to be an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good being who has these properties essentially (in other words, has these properties in every possible world in which it exists).
There are two possible attitudes we could take to this definition. #1- We could say, in order to show a MEB exists, we need to show a being exists that has the property of being omnipotent (as well as the other properties). #2- We could say, Oh, this makes things much easier, all we have to do to show an omnipotent being exists, is to show a MEB exists!
The second attitude is what I would call an attempt to define something into existence. The properties included in definitions are requirements a being must possess to satisfy the definition. Just because we’ve made a definition, doesn’t mean an instance of that definition exists in reality. Reality exists before we create definitions to attempt to describe it.
In the case of the MOA, we define a MGB to be, in part, a being that exists necessarily. To show a being in a possible world is a MGB, we need to show it satisfies the definition of a MGB in that possible world. In particular, we must show it exists necessarily in that possible world. And by the assumptions of S5, we must show it exists in all possible worlds, including the actual world. And that is all there is to it. To show a being in a possible world meets the definition of a MGB, we must show it exists in the actual world (and all other possible worlds, and is omniscient, etc, in all of them). Any attempt to get around this, to try to argue that some being in a possible world meets the definition of a MGB while ignoring the requirements of the definition, is, I believe, an attempt to define a MGB into existence. It’s an attempt to go from, “Oh dear, our requirements for what it is to be a MGB are so strict that in order for a being to meet those requirements even in a possible world, it must exist and meet those requirements in actuality,” to “Hey! All we have to do to show a MGB exists is to show there is a possible world with a MGB!” Well yes, that’s technically true. _All we have to do to show a MGB exists in the actual world is to show there is a being in a possible world that meets the definition of a MGB, said definition requiring that it exist in the actual world_ . It’s no different than arguing, all we have to do to show an omnipotent being exists is to show a MEB exists.
In your argument against this, you mention the use of symmetry breakers to justify the main premise of the MOA. But then how does the existence of symmetry breakers justify the assumption that a being satisfying the definition of a MGB exists in a possible world, when that definition requires a MEB exists? There could be hundreds of symmetry breakers, but it’s still the case that if no MEB exists, no entity in any possible word will satisfy the definition of a MGB, because part of that definition requires a MEB exists. The MOA tells us that if no MEB exists, then no being in any possible world will satisfy the definition of a MGB (for an obvious reason); it says nothing about symmetry breakers.
In your video on this topic, you also mentioned Godel’s argument. In Godel’s argument (and similar ones) we define our terms so that if no MEB exists then certain entailment relations will hold, and then we assert these entailment relations do not hold, while ignoring the fact they will hold by definition if no MEB exists. Since we’re working in S5, entailment in this argument means metaphysical entailment, but people typically try to support the argument using intuitions appropriate to epistemic entailment. It’s really not very different from Plantinga’s argument, it’s just a lot more complicated. I would say that Plantinga’s argument is superior, due to its simplicity.
I may need to think more about Godel's argument. I may be confusing it with an argument I saw Josh Rasmussen give.
Godel’s argument uses the term “being Godly” in place of the term “being a MGB.” It starts by introducing the idea of positive properties. It is assumed that a positive property may not entail a property that is not positive, and that the negation of a positive property is not positive. So we are assuming a positive property may not entail its own negation.
We then assume being Godly is a positive property. So, we are assuming the property being Godly does not entail its own negation. In formal logic, saying a property does not entail its own negation is to say that the property is possibly instantiated. So Godel’s argument starts by asserting the property of being Godly is possibly instantiated. That is, it is possible a Godly being exists. So Godel’s argument begins by asserting the main premise of Plantinga’s argument, but in what seems to me to be an unnecessarily complicated way.
Bear in mind we are working in S5, which assumes when we speak of entailment, we are speaking of metaphysical entailment. Any attempt to argue that the property of being Godly can not entail a negative property because our intuitions tell us that conceptually the idea of a negative property doesn’t seem like it ought to follow from the idea of being Godly is to appeal to intuitions appropriate to the epistemic modality modeled in S4. In S5, given the later assumptions Godel makes, if no Godly being exists, then the property of being Godly will entail all other properties (including negative properties), regardless of what our intuitions tell us.
I believe both sides in the moral debate ignore a basic thing.
Any world premieted by an objective moral system needs fast or eventual accountability( evil confronted and kindness reworded ). Unless the non theistic world predicts an afterlife to bring people their due punishment or reword then it has no explanational advantage because such a world is not moral. A country that does not apply its laws is not a just country.
A theistic universe covers this need quite well. But as far as I know a few atheists do believe in this but most antheologians do not believe in ultimate accountability.
I think for the grounding case it would be somewhat unreasonable to expext someone to look at every single possible grounding to justify their claim. I think they should examine the more common ones, and then make an inductive case that the excersise generalizes, then if the atheist thinks that there are plausible accounts not covered they could bring them up
I think this is fair; though, if they do that, they should be careful to make their conclusion probabilistic in character, rather than claiming full-stop that one *cannot* account for morality under atheism
1:50 The problem with the argument for objective morality is that that there is no evidence that objective morality exists, and evidence that it doesn't.
Strictly speaking, one can really only claim that people have not been following any objective standard of morality, but not necessarily that this means that it doesn't exist.
@@disassembledpurity i.e. there is no _evidence_ that objective morality exists.
@@frogandspanner that's not even right though lol, there are some universal human views and behaviours which can be considered as "morality", at least based on certain anthropological findings. I think you're getting very confused over the term "objective". We have evidence of the aforementioned "morality" which is universals (even though only an incredibly tiny number of such actions or views would fall into this category) which is thought to be both largely innate, existent in reality, and rationally justifiable, and hence, it is the correct way for us and so its "objective" morality.
@@disassembledpurity Any such consideration is only in the mind eye of the beholder, and some beholders see differently - otherwise we would not have a spectrum of 'morality'.
What we call 'morality' fits in with the evolution of social animals, but not with the proposition of objective morality.
@@frogandspanner I literally just explained this...
I'm sorry, but I fail to see how any of the provided groundings for moral realism under atheism are actually realist. They provide groundings for moral systems, but those systems wouldn't be realist. There is simply no reason independent of perspective and values why one ought to minimize the suffering of other organisms, or attempt to be fair, or attempt to be caring, or to fulfill the ends hardwired into their nature (this last one is especially dubious, as all behavior, even immoral behavior, is part of human nature). Whichever of the groundings you select for the morality you wish to construct, the choice will be arbitrary and the rationale predicated on pre-existent values and beliefs, which of course vary between individuals and groups.
Perhaps my definition of moral realism is too narrow, but it runs as follows:
1.) There exists a single set of moral principles enjoined on all humans, and indeed all sentient creatures that do or could potentially exist.
2.) There is no possible world in which this set of moral principles could fail to obtain. Moral facts are necessarily true, like mathematical theorems or the three-sidedness of triangles.
This definition of moral realism is the one I think is held by all humans other than maybe a few philosophers and (ironically) theologians.
As far as I can tell, the only valid groundings for moral principles are values, which are a type of belief about what has worth and what does not. Thus, for moral facts to exist, there must be some sort of beliefs about what has worth that exist at the fundamental, unchanging level of reality, where numbers and theorems do. But for that to be the case, it seems like there must be some sort of fundamentally-existent mind or minds to hold the beliefs, and which cannot modify these beliefs (after all, other fundamental truths are also incapable of changing). Ergo, by my lights, moral realism entails some variant of theism.
Yes.
bro how is that comment older than the video
I can time travel, don’t you know this already
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Mistake 106:- yes internal critiques are fine but then you are making a complete strawman of God by saying “God is Evil because he causes suffering ”. The statement itself is contradictory as you are falsely subjecting God to a moral standard and assumes that it is above God. That isn’t the God of Christian faith atleast. If it’s an internal critique then it should be on God as per the definition of that theistic view not a strawman God created by you alone and then calling it evil. That’s not an internal critique.
I have subbed to your channel even though I m a Christian theist. I m very interested in philosophy and your channel seems really good. Keep it going.
39:00 Well, to be fair, if actual infinities are impossible, and we have no valid reason to accept Platonism, then the very fact that infinities are impossible is reason to reject Platonism. So, Billy is right in asking for positive reasons for believing Platonism.
But the very question at issue is whether actual infinities are impossible. Of course, if they *were* impossible, then Platonism would be false. But the very thing needing established is that actual infinites are impossible. Since platonism is incompatible with that claim, if Platonism is even an epistemically live option, then it’s epistemically open whether
there are actual infinites, and hence their existence will not have been ruled out, and Craig’s argument will fail. So Craig needs to show that Platonism isn’t even a live option if his argument is to succeed. It won’t do, then, to merely note that his interlocutors hasn’t proved or justified platonism.
@@MajestyofReason Billy did show it is not a live option because Platonism requires the existence of an actual infinite number of things. But an infinite number of things cannot exist in reality. Therefore, Platonism is false.
To give an analogy: Suppose I present a deductive argument to demonstrate that the past cannot be infinite. Then you point to a cyclic cosmological model and say, "But if this cyclic model is true, then the universe is past-eternal." Sure, but so what? I just presented an argument to conclude the world is not infinite, and so your cyclic model is by extension false. I don't have to present additional reasons to reject your model; this one is sufficient.
@@CosmoPhiloPharmaco I don't think we actually disagree, then! I agree, if course, that if he could *show* that an infinite number of things cannot exist in reality, then he will have shown platonism's falsity; but the very point under contention is whether he *has* show that. This then bridges into whether we think his reasons for thinking actual infinite are impossible are any good, and you certainly know my take on _that_ question😉. His platonist interlocutors (and even those who think platonism is an epistemically live position) certainly won't think he has, since his reasons tend to crucially involve manipulation of concrete objects or appeals to intuitions that the aforementioned interlocutors don't find probative. And in *this* sort of context, the burden is not on his *interlocutors* to positively justify platonism; instead, they need only show that he has failed to _rule it out_, i.e., that *Craig* hasn't justified platonism's *falsity* (since his proffered reasons for thinking actual infinites are impossible are inefficacious against such interlocutors for the aforementioned reason).
@@MajestyofReason Well, if the reason why they reject Billy's argument is because it appeals to an intuition that they don't have -- or some other objection --, then believing Mathematical Platonism is true or thinking it is a live possibility is not the reason why they think actual infinities can exist (and consequently that Billy's argument doesn't show Platonism is false). They are independent reasons.
first
The problem with non-theists who are also anti-realists who are trying to make an internal critique of theism based on seemingly gratuitous evil is that they tend to fall back onto their subjective moral preferences when affirming what God would value. This is clearly misguided as one can't adequately justify why God would be compelled to "act" in accordance with any set of subjective moral dispositions. Perhaps revelation can be appealed to, which would highlight the values of a particular deity in a particular religious tradition. However, revelatory religious texts also highlight why God would create such a world which entails the evil that it does, as well as affirming God's transcendence and our inability to hold Him accountable to our human standards. If a non-theist wants to make an argument from evil which is predicated upon there actually being objective moral values and duties which would compel or at least motivate God's "actions", I don't see how objective morality could be justified. This stems from the fact that I'm attracted to the idea of objective morality being grounded in the fact that humans are created in accordance with a certain form, thus deviations from the form constitute an ontological privation which is precisely what evil is. Even if the non-theist could provide an ontological grounding of objective morality, objective doesn't mean absolute, necessary and universal. There could very well be objective moral norms which only apply to humans, which is what I'm inclined to believe. God is no more compelled by the moral laws which govern humans than He is by the physical laws which govern humans.
Yeah, I didn't get that at all. It's not an inconsistency to make up an assertion and then claim it's a contradiction. That's a strawman. It would only be inconsistent if a Theist claimed that God is the arbiter of what is objectively Good, and that God does something to which he deemed to be Evil. Even if that was the case it still wouldn't really be inconsistent without the additional claim that God is all Good or can not do Evil. It seems trivially easy for an Apologist to say all the things the Atheist are claiming are objectively Evil are not so. They can just point to what the Bible says. The Atheist on the other hand has no basis for asserting they are objectively Evil, especially since they are also claiming there is no objective morality! Who's the one being inconsistent here?
With regards to Christian theism, they claim is that God has written the moral law on our hearts. So a non-Christian can criticize God by adopting that view for argument. Since God made everyone know the moral law, then people can see God's actions and deem them evil. As to objective morality, in the usual use of meaning some absolute morality outside of anyone's mind, then either God is merely relaying that code and can be evil, or God is relaying _His_ morality and can never be evil, but also there is no objective morality, just might makes right. Since at least one person can hear the story of the Flood and judge that action as evil, then God is _not_ the source of morality. If we assume that God did indeed write the law upon our hearts.
Since atheism has nothing to say about morality except the lack of involvement from any gods, it is more accurate to be comparing to various secular moral systems.
@@JebeckyGranjola Yeah I agree. Of course many atheists especially in contemporary analytic philosophy claim to be able to provide an adequate account of objective morality but I don't think they succeed in doing so. Despite what Joe said, I don't think you need to refute all the fine intricacies of their ethical theories, although doing so would definitely be beneficial in some sense. However, there are certain basic claims which can determine whether a moral theory is a coherent one, let alone a plausible one. If the atheist gets it wrong on these fundamental issues, whatever stems from that can automatically be rejected. For example, if we accept that objective morality requires humans to be created intentionally in accordance with a certain form and the atheist denies humans were intentionally created, then no matter what else they posit they've already missed the mark and can be ruled out.
@@Rogstin That's an interesting point but it's a separate issue. Why would certain moral intuitions misalign with the moral law? This however isn't a question about why God would allow the evil in this world. It should be noted that the Bible also talks about original sin corrupting the moral faculties of man, as well as affirming God's ways aren't our ways, Isaiah 55:8-9 and that the potter has absolute sovereignty over his clay, Romans 9:19-24.
@@Rogstin Objectivity doesn't have to mean absolute as in applicable to all. Newtonian mechanics describe objectively how the physical world operates, however this objectivity is only limited in scope as it can't accurately describe physical processes at the quantum level. So in that sense, it is objective yet not absolute. I can't see any moral or ontological reason as to how God can be subject to a moral law, the idea doesn't make any sense to me. However, this doesn't mean God isn't perfectly good, as this truth can be derived from knowledge of God as unqualified being. Since being is convertible with goodness according to certain classical theistic traditions, God is therefore also unqualifiedly good.
joe pls tell us your age :c
I don't think a theist about morality - such as myself - should be troubled by the evolutionary debunking argument. On the contrary, it is objectivists about morality who are challenged by it (though such views have bigger problems - such as being crazy!). I make the following points in more detail in my book, Normative Reasons and Theism (Palgrave Macmillan)
First, put morality to one side entirely. Now note that epistemic reasons cannot reasonably be doubted and must be assumed to exist if there is a case for evolution by natural selection. That is to say, if you think there is a 'case' for the truth of evolution by natural selection, then you agree that epistemic reasons exist.
Now note that epistemic reasons require God. Why? The same reason moral reasons do. They are prescriptions - or biddings - that have a singular source in Reason. And only a mind can issue a prescription. Thus Reason is a person - and she'd qualify as God - and epistemic reasons emanate from her. Bit quick - but sound, I think (I give 15 arguments in support of its premises in my book).
What is an epistemic reason? Well, it's a bidding of believing a proposition due to its truth or likely truth. So, we can now conclude that God exists and wants us to believe what is true.
Now look at the world we're living in. It's a very dangerous place in which having true beliefs is extremely helpful, at least in the main.
So, God exists and wants us to adopt a policy of believing what is true in a world in which having such a policy is likely to prove immensely helpful.
Seems, then, that God is benevolently inclined towards us. At least a bit. That seems a reasonable conclusion.
Would a person who is benevolently inclined towards us, at least to some degree, do no more than just tell us to adopt a policy of believing what is true or likely true and leave it at that?
No, surely not - it would be reasonable to suppose that they would also tell us to look out for ourselves, but also to look out for others and to regulate our pursuit of self-interest in ways that acknowledge the equal value of others.
Those sorts of bidding of reason seem to exist. They're called prudential reasons and moral reasons respectively. What theism allows us to do, then, is to take the indubitable existence of epistemic reasons and predict - or retrodict - from them the existence of prudential and moral reasons of precisely the kind that appear to exist. Given we live in a world like this, and given God seems at least to some degree benevolently inclined towards us, we would positively expect God to issue us directives of the kind we are issued with. And creatures who got such impressions and acted on them would enjoy a reproductive advantage over others. It's not that they're designed to give us such a reproductive advantage - no, they're designed to help us navigate the world a bit more safely and make us look out for each other. But creatures who behave like that will, if they also wish to reproduce, reproduce more successfully - and raise their young more successfully - than those who got very different rational impressions.
If you're an objectivist about morality, can you do any of the above? No. Why? Because an objectivist analysis of epistemic reasons would turn them into directives that are emanating from mindless nature or, alternatively, emanating from nothing - just floating about - or from a Platonic form or something else that makes no sense whatsoever. Now of course, that's mad - no sensible person should think such things. But put that aside. For present purposes the important point is that one cannot, from the indubitable existence of epistemic reasons, make any kind of retrodiction about what other normative reasons there will be. From the fact that a Platonic form wants us all have a policy of believing what is true, one cannot infer that it also probably wants us to be nice to one another and look out for ourselves. It's a Form. It doesn't have a personality, a character. The same applies to the natural world.
To me it isn't clear how it would be established that the source of epistemic reasons is a person/mind specifically. Would we not still have an incentive to navigate and make sense of our environment even if that environment had no creator or interest in seeing us survive?
@@BardicLiving That the source of epistemic reasons - and indeed, all normative reasons - is a mind is established by the fact that it is only minds who can favour things. I am a mind and I can favour having another coffee. But the coffee can't favour me drinking it - its mindless. So, the argument is:
1. Epistemic reasons are favouring relations that have one and the same source: Reason
2. Only a mind can be the source of a favouring relation
3. Therefore, epistemic reasons are favouring relations that have one and the same mind - Reason - as their source
@@geraldharrison5787 I might have misunderstood your point - do you mean that all reasons stem from the same mind/source, or that a given reason can’t exist without a mind? (i.e. a mind to do the “favoring” of option A over option b?)
@@geraldharrison5787 I might have misunderstood your point - do you mean that all reasons stem from the same mind/source, or that a given reason can’t exist without a mind? (i.e. a mind to do the “favoring” of option A over option b?)
@@BardicLiving Both claims are true. All reasons - all normative reasons - have one and the same source, Reason (I take that to be a borderline conceptual truth - they're called 'reasons' precisely because they all share the same source, Reason, I think). And it is also true that for any given favouring relation there is a mind that is doing the favouring in question. And thus for any particular reason, there is a mind that is the source of that particular favouring relation, and it's the same mind that is the source of all of the other favouring relations constitutive of reasons. Normative reasons, that is (the word 'reason' being multiply ambiguous).
Note, what you are asking me to clarify is already there, plain as day, in the premises:
1. Epistemic reasons are favouring relations that have one and the same source, Reason.
2. Only a mind can be the source of a favouring relation
3. Therefore, epistemic reasons are favouring relations that have one mind - the mind of Reason - as their source
I still don't see how any of these accounts of moral groundings are actually grounded. They seem about as grounded as a random piece of wood floating aimlessly through the ocean. Like yeah you can latch onto a piece. But youre still going to end up drowning eventually because its not actually grounded. And you're going to really struggle to convince anybody standing on truly solid ground that you have a position thats desirable to cling to. I think you confuse being able to come up with any framework on which to pin morality with actual grounding. No. The law of gravity provides the grounding. All attempts to point to pieces of floating wood as being grounded are just silly distractions from the necessary law that grounds. Like saying, well we don't need God to have gravity, because we can describe the effects of gravity. Ok? What is gravity? You sure God has no crucial role in the reality of its existence? Same is true with morality. And if this law of objective moral truth doesn't exist, then why should anybody care what someone else wants to cobble together a moral grounding from. Do what you want, nothing is actually grounded.
I kind of feel the same way. Can you put your argument into a syllogism?
@@jamesmarshel1723 Man, I doubt it. I have a hard time putting my thoughts down onto paper in a way that pleases me. Like when I reread my comment, I know what I was shooting for, but the thoughts I turned into brief sentences are parts of bigger arguments that might not be apparent to someone else reading it and I wouldn't know how to begin to turn it into a syllogism without narrowing it down.
If you'd like to write back at me the parts that kind of made sense to you in your own words, maybe we could work out a syllogism together.
I'm not gay
I know what you are
@@nvna1111 what daddy?
No offence, but this feels like a huge word salad that entirely misses the point.
The problem Christians propose is, if God doesn't exist, there's no objective standard for morality- this means morality is an opinion in the atheist/agnostic worldview.
The closest I've seen to actually wrestling with this dilemma was the idea in moral realism that morality is created by quantum fields.
Not only is the only, sole, somewhat plausible answer to objective morality without God, it seems like atheists inventing a non-personal god to sidestep the issue, and sounds utterly stupid.
God works because He is personal and perfect. Nothing else seems to work because without God, the world should be agnostic to humanity, morality, and personhood altogether.
If we're all accidental startust, nothing cares about morality but accidental stardust that accidentally formed what are objectively, subjective opinions. What in the world makes opinions objective, then?
The honest answer is: nothing. Unless God exists.
No offence, but you obviously didn't understand the video.
@@cultofscriabin9547 I did.
"The problem Christians propose is, if God doesn't exist, there's no objective standard for morality- this means morality is an opinion in the atheist/agnostic worldview. "
The problem is that grounding it on God, ALSO makes the theist position on morality a subjective, and thus, not objective. So when the theists criticize athiests using this line, they are not making the killer argument they think they have...They are just incurring in hypocresy.
@@mendez704 False, you misunderstood the argument. On theism, it's objective because God is omniscient and thus, knows what is perfectly moral without error. It doesn't get more objective than perfect ontology.
@@EXTREMEKIWI115 Ecen if God is omniscient and knows what is perfectly moral, that does not make HIM moral, nor his intention to deliver what is morally perfect. So no, that doesn´t work either.
Your assertion, ironically without argument, that Nietzsche just asserted without argument that there is no morality without God...is wrong, and also very weird. How would you know what his assertions about morality are without apparently having any knowledge of his major published work on morality, The Geneology of Morals? You know that Nietzsche doesn't believe in God, but you somehow think he believes morality comes from God? Like I said, very strange. It should be clear to anyone with even the slightest knowledge of Nietzsche that he thinks morality comes from human psychology and social rules, and God is the invention and justification for that. So if morality preceded the invention of God, then morality does not require God. Even the phrasing of "God" implies that he primarily considered a perspective of monotheism, as opposed to Gods, like the Greek Gods. Tell me you have never read any Nietzsche without telling me.
I don’t think you’ve interpreted that part of the video correctly. It’s clear from context (and, indeed, what I explicitly said) that I was talking about *objective* morality - according to these thinkers, *objective* morality requires God (which is consistent with denying God’s existence - to say X requires God is only to say that IF X exists, THEN God exists). And clearly, the morality you mentioned - deriving from human psychology and social rules - is not objective. So there’s nothing strange in my video, and nothing that would indicate that I haven’t read Nietzsche. (We read most of the Genealogy in a modern ethics course with Pat Kain at Purdue)
@MajestyofReason Ok. Sorry, I was mistaken on your position and I was wrong to accuse you of not reading him. My core criticism still stands. You said that he asserted the moral position in question without argument. Based on your reasoning of his view, sure it makes sense that he would agree that if objective morality depends on God, then there is no objective morality because there is no God. That's not the same thing as just asserting that objective morality depends on God, and doing so without argument. Arguing why morality is subjective, and why there is no God, constitutes as an argument for it, no?
re: citing anti-realist atheists is especially disingenuous quote mining because many if not most of them would deny that objective morality is possible *even if god exists*.
That’s a great addition!