Metaethics - The Moral Fixed Points
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- Опубліковано 27 лип 2024
- This video outlines a new defense of non-naturalism proposed by Terence Cuneo and Russ Shafer-Landau, who argue that there are various moral propositions that are conceptual truths. These are the moral fixed points.
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0:00 - Moral non-naturalism
6:28 - The moral fixed points
15:54 - Conceptual truths
23:51 - Developing non-naturalism
Objections
35:16 - Conceptual deficiency
41:41 - Are the MFPs conceptual truths?
49:30 - Why be moral?
-- Cuneo, Terence and Shafer-Landau, Russ. (2014). "The moral fixed points: New directions for moral nonnaturalism." Philosophical Studies 171(3): 399-443.
-- Evers, Daan and Streumer, Bart. (2016). "Are the moral fixed points conceptual truths?" Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 10(1): 1-9.
-- Ingram, Stephen. (2015) "The moral fixed points: Reply to Cuneo and Shafer-Landau" Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 9(1): 1-5.
-- Killoren, David. (2016). "Why care about moral fixed points?" Analytic Philosophy 57(2): 165-173.
Metaethics introduction:
ua-cam.com/video/OBE50_tfAIA/v-deo.html
Moral non-naturalism:
ua-cam.com/video/P60yrm6AWHM/v-deo.html (1)
ua-cam.com/video/xr3i8oYlG_g/v-deo.html (2)
Moral naturalism:
ua-cam.com/video/Cw_a8NXZwMw/v-deo.html
Moral disagreement:
ua-cam.com/video/0Gxtj65Vyew/v-deo.html
Evolutionary debunking arguments:
ua-cam.com/video/0x2v-ucrSGA/v-deo.html
This content is why Kane and I get busy under the blanket.
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Excellent. You speak so directly and efficiently I don't seem to get lost when listening to you.
Thank you for what you do
Another great video I'm ready to watch Dr. Baker!
Excellent video, as usual. I'm always happy to see more coverage of metaethics. This video discusses the published critiques of their views, but I'd be curious to hear your own take on moral fixed points in some other video that's less about presenting the academic landscape.
I am reflexively inclined to reject their arguments, but in this case I find myself more confused and hoping to hear more than to simply reject what they're arguing for out of hand. It all sounds very obscure and dubious to me, but I want to see if there's something I'm missing, if there's more arguments or details beneath the surface that would help make sense of what they're arguing for and why.
Very interesting, love the content
I assume that Morality doesn't exist. Because so far, for me it appears that moral properties can't be defined empirically.
There is a naturalistic conception of morality which uses game theory and evolution to explain moral behaviour. Given this, then theoretically, it may be possible to define the optimal moral decision empirically if you were completely omnipotent, but practically it would not be possible. However in addition, I propose that the optimal moral theory depends on the empirical facts we have at hand. So given, X empirical facts, it is assessed that Y is the optimal moral action. I believe that is largely how humans assess moral actions, this is purely for "selfish" reasons though. The non-selfish parts may come from other accidents in our evolutionary pathway caused by our switch to dominantly nerve based learning systems.
By that logic neither does causality
For the final objection, would we not say that it is conceptually true that normative statements are action-guiding? We could restrict it a bit more to things like 'guiding rational action,' whatever that might mean, but the point still stands: there are conceptual truths relating normative statements, and therefore moral statements, to action-guidance, so of course if 'killing is wrong' is a MFP then that would compel you, or whoever falls under the action-guiding restriction, to not kill.
You could further object to this that 1. In its restricted form we can ask why we should fall under that restriction. For the rational action case, for example, why be rational? Why do rational actions? 2. In its unrestricted form we could argue that no statement is categorically action guiding and we get back to standard meta-ethics debates
The problem with this is that moral internalism is on pretty shaky ground empirically, e.g. some people do accept the moral case for veganism but they just can't be arsed to change their diet. Not to mention Shafer-Landau and friends deny internalism themselves.
There's also the problem of alternative normative concepts raised by Matti Eklund in his book: it might well be that it's right to feed the poor and wrong to ignore their plight, but it's also wrong* to feed the poor and right* to ignore their plight (imagine a community of perfect Randians who think altruism is a sickness) and so forth. You can come up with any amount of alternative normative concepts that are not co-extensional. The problem is - what should we do? Either the answer is trivial - we should feed the poor (and we shouldnt* feed the poor) and we haven't answered the problem of which concepts "should" (see the problem here?) guide our behavior - or the question cannot be answered since we have to use some normative concepts or others.
@@jolssoni2499 In foundations of geometry there is a similar dispute about the parallel postulate and what the "right" characterization of parallel lines is. In flat Euclidean space, parallel lines remain at a constant distance from each other. In elliptical geometry, parallel lines curve away from each other, getting infinitely farther away from each other. In hyperbolic geometry, the lines curve towards each other and converge.
With these conceptions, let's assume we've completely set up geometric pluralism. Parallel lines remain at constant lengths according to Euclidean geometry. Parallel lines diverge according to elliptical geometry. Parallel lines converge according to hyperbolic geometry. Now what behavior do parallel lines demonstrate independent of any geometry? Which is the right characterization of parallel lines? Which parallel lines concept is true?
I think despite the fact that these lines of reasoning can be formed into questions, they're meaningless. There's no such thing as behavior of parallel lines independent of geometry. Just like there's no such thing as height independent of a system of measurement.
Likewise when we set up epistemic or moral pluralism. It doesn't make sense to ask "We ought utilitarian kill 1 to save the 5, we ought not deontological kill the 1 to save the 5... now which one ought we do?" "We ought accept true conclusions if we care about truth, we ought not accept true conclusions if we don't care about truth... now which one ought we do?" These questions are meaningless. Once you've set up pluralism about a topic you've exhausted its conceptual space. There's no further fact of the matter about the "right" geometry or the "right" morality, independent of any frame of reference.
@@DaKoopaKing facts about frame dependent facts are independent of frames of references, otherwise, there's infinite regress or I got it wrong?
@@jolssoni2499 I don't see how insincere proclaimings pose threat to internalism. That's not matter of empirical facts, rather it's conceptual truth Through Which we will be able to grasp empirical findings that is concerned. And "inverted commas judgements" that, for example, animal exploitation is wrong which don't lead to action does not speak against internalism in any way.
@@DaKoopaKingto continue the geometric metaphor, reason can show the implications of any set of axioms but it's everyone's prerogative to choose what axioms to adopt in the first place.
People try to evoid suffer, we have tried to destroy diseases, hunger, homeless, getting old, evoid death... To not suffer.
The rules of society are going in the same way, we are replacing rules that create more suffer for new rules that create less suffer.(sometimes through argumentation, sometimes trough conflict and war, because some rules that create a lot of suffer are beneficial to some people, but the ones that suffer because those rules rebel against those rules and many times they found a way to change those rules, by argument or by force. Workers, slaves, womans, black, gays... They pushed the change of the old rules that was making them suffer for new rules. )
That make me think that this is the future of morality, that's is what is happening and will happen. And if humanity do not destroy itself someday morality will be resume to this: "the rules that create the minimal suffer to the greatest number". Seems it will end in negative rule utilitarianism, not because everyone care about everyone suffer, but as a equilibrium between having rules that protect themselves from suffer and that will not make others rebel against them and make them suffer, is not about altruism, is about self interest. Will become instrumentally efficient follow those rules, today is instrumentally efficient follow many moral rules.
The rules are being created by us, but what is making us create those rules(our desire to evoid suffer) are not create by us. All beings want to evoid suffer, so this desire plus the conflict between beings seems that always will get them closer to negative rule utilitarianism no matter what being, not matters in which part of universe.
Evolution create suffer to help us to survive, a alarm to conscience that the body is or will be under attack, so conscience must try to find a way to evoid the destruction of the body. But now we don't want just to survive, but to live well, survive without the alarm, survive without pain. Free yourselves of that necessity.
All his morals fixed points fit very well to negative rule utilitarianism.
Is there any video about Moral constructivism? Sean Carroll always talks about it, I think there's a humean constructivism. He makes it sound very intuitive and naturalist.
Here is my video introducing Kantian constructivism: ua-cam.com/video/7RM8kOQlZdM/v-deo.html
I haven't got around to doing Humean constructivism yet.
@@KaneB hey, thank you very much! I'll take a look 😄
What are the costs vs benefits of recreational slaughter? Our assumptions put into the equation will affect our moral judgment.
There's one basic idea here that I don't seem to understand, how comes that concepts are independent of the way the world is? I know that if we made an empirical investigation there's no way we can find married bachelors, but the reason for that seems precisely to be that we build our concepts depending on how the world is! We go around in the world and find out that there are some men who aren't married and we give them the term bachelor! What am I missing?
What about a concept such as "unicorn"? We didn't go out into the world and find horse-like creatures with large horns on their foreheads, but we still have the concept.
@@KaneB since the unicorn-concept's significant part is indeed a phenomenon that is most definitely not "separate" in any way from "the way the world is", since one way the "world is", can be, and indeed is, is a horse. i mean that a horse is an incredibly specific and differentiated manifestation of the biosphere, of the "universe". even a concept of a creature that is purposefully illustrated to not resemble any earthly organism, is illustrated through properties which are inextricably entangled with our limited sensory apparatuses and the resulting qualia that appears through and with the continuous becoming and differentiation of The One (differential henology plug here). empirically verifiably, any conscious state is a possible way "the world is". subscendence instead of transcendence. (OOO)😉
I have always phrased my view like this:
Natural truths are truths ‘of what there is’.
Mathematical, logical, or normative truths are truths ‘about what there is’.
Saying, “there aren’t any numbers, where are the numbers? Since there isn’t any numbers, math can’t really be true.” This assumes that mathematical truths, or that all truths, are truths ‘of’ what there is, when there are truths ‘about’ what there is. Asking, “where are the reasons?” I cannot point out into the distance and show you.
The epistemology of all this is complicated, to be sure.
I think maybe what Parfit believes are partial and impartial reasons are actually just selfish and compassion desires.
A little girl is drawing and her suffer cause me to feel compassion for her suffer. So now what I will do?
If I let her die I will feel really bad, If I save her I will maybe lose my new shoes and get wet and cold, what I don't like too(cause me suffer).
I would end up save her because letting her die would cause me more suffer than the other option.
But if I didn't know how to swim I probably would die if I tried to save her, what I think is worst FOR ME than see her die. So in this case I would let her die.
I think moral intuition is compassion. The problem with compassion is we only feel for who we think don't deserve to suffer, if was Hitler(because he hurt many people)there, many people would let him die, if was a animal(because many people think animal suffer is less important than human suffer) many people would let it die.
Many people feels more compassion for people of the same race, gender, class... So to make compassion universal we need to show people that this features are arbitrary, because many people think they are not.
If they want to say that something is immoral by definition, they need to set up necessary and sufficient conditions.
This video greatly confuses me. There are only unmarried bachelors because those are synonyms. It's like saying there are only human people. Is the claim that "wrong" and "recreational murder" are synonyms? Because they then list other things, so "wrong" must have quite a few, contradicting synonyms
My main argument against moral realism: ok, slavery is always wrong. So there must be a clear definition of it somewhere. At the very least, of an idea(l) or prototypical version of either slavery or the traits that should encompass it. Somewhere, such a clear definition has to exist, you can't be COMPLETELY fuzzy, else you have nothing..
Now take thing X. Thing X NATURALLY and OF COURSE is slavery, but is this other thing, this kind of bondage thing Y, also slavery? Most people would say no, but maybe their mind can be changed? (Actually, in country Z they consider it slavery).
Here's the thing: Y falls outside your traditional slavery definition. But the moral realist isn't a COMPLETE tool, he allows for common sense clauses that allows for evaluation functions for borderline/extraordinary shit.
But ... congrats. The moral constructivist will say that we parsimoniously ONLY need this evaluation functions, and don't need to invoke some realism at all. It's all human evaluations. Always has been.