As fun as it is to see so many people comment about Waterloo, this video is NOT actually about Waterloo. It is examining the reasons why the British infantry on a tactical level seemed to match up better against their French counter parts than those of the other Allied nations.
I’d agree that the British army matched better than other nations but it’s also because they fought less. The Austrians, Prussians, Russians fought the French for close to 20 years while the British mostly intervened on the ground in Spain, which saw plenty of failures (and successes of course). Size also matters, sending expeditions in continental Europe isn’t the same as waging the war. A great propaganda victory of Britain is to convince some people that they had the largest impact in the napoleonic wars
I agree, which is why I never tried to claim anything about Britain's impact. If anything, I suggested that they 'had it easier' because they never faced anywhere near the same cavalry threat in the Peninsular as the other Allies did in central Europe. In fact, my main motivation in researching this topic was due to my frustration at the perceived 'superiority' of the British soldier. It made no sense, yet I couldn't deny that the British were seeing more success in infantry engagements against the French than most other nations. Therefore they had to be doing something different, and fortunately my research offered a potential explanation, hence the video :)
I’ll admit, my first thoughts regarding the title was going beyond the tactical level and wondering if this would cover the financial and logistical aspects of the British war machine. I do remember the rate of fire thing being brought up in school in reference to the American Revolution, so part of that myth might be transposing something that may or may not be true for one war onto another. Edit: Regarding close range volleys, I’m wondering how long that had been common practice in the British Army, as it reminds me of them being on the receiving end at Bunker Hill during the American Revolution. 2nd edit: having continued to watch the video, Bunker Hill was probably just shared methods between regulars and colonial militias at that point in the war.
The British victories are more strategic than tactical: 1) Only fight at the edge of the French Empire, something the Austrians and Prussians couldn't do. The Russians had opportunities to do it, of course in 1812. 2) Only fight France's second army, never the Grand Armee under Napoleon, the French at Waterloo were not equivalent. 3) If things go wrong, head for the coast and sail away, therefore avoiding a catastrophic defeat. Britain never had to fight a Borodino or Wagram, how would they manage if they regularly had to field 80,000 men and would lose a third in each battle, with difficulty I imagine.
So basically the British used their limited available manpower to good effect and knew when to fight and when to not and your argument is that's a bad thing? How would any of the other countries manage if they had to funnel a huge percentage of there men and money into manning their nnavies? Britian had issues that the continental powers didn't have including the massive expense of running a large navy, comparativly armies are very cheap so you're comparing apples and oranges anyway. In 1805 the Royal navy ate up 52% of British GDP, a sum of money that on it's own would have banrupted every other European allied power except perhaps Austria, Britain also paid a large percentage of the cost of maintaining the Portugese army which was much much larger then was realistically affordable by the small economically deverstated country. Unlike the continental powers Britain had to have an army and a large number of garrisons for it's empire, before you can ask if the British could regualrly fight large battles like Borodino you have to understand the actual situation, also the fact the Britian had a popualtion of around 15 Million, Russia had 35 Million, Austria 23 million and France 35 Million. Prussia had about 11 million and if you look at there forces in the Napoleonic wars they tended to be relativly small as well, At the time of Waterloo prussia only fielded 140,000 men in total much less then the Royal navy on it's own and the army Prussia mobilized for the invasion of France in 1814 was about the same says as the army under Wellington. Britain never instituted conscription, assuming they could somehow come up with the money to raise and equip a large land army and maintain it logistically in Europe I expect that's the why they would ahve to deal with multiple large battles and losss. As a last note Britain officially suffered the second highest military casaulties in the Napoleonic wars in part because of the issues that come from running a large navy, 311,000 dead which is higher then Russias 289,000.
@@Delogros I'm not saying picking favourable fights is a bad thing, it's the art of war even. But this video makes the argument that the main reason that the British won was at the tactical, battalion level. That maybe true in smaller conflicts but it isn't comparing apples to apples. The British Army could have fought a comparable sizer French force in the Walcheren Campaign but chose not to. Hypothetically, if the size of the British army was increased and the Navy reduced, it would have a totally different character to the small army of the Peninsular campaign and they may not have been able to execute the volley and charge tactic reliably.
@@m0ltke582 In 50% of Wellingtons victory's he was out numbered, for Napoleon that is less then 30% so Wellignton fought in not ideal situations from time to time when he had to and there are a fair few examples of outnumbered and sometimes heavily outnumbered British infantry performing very well in particular at the battle of Barrosa under general Grayham. Vitoria onward the British committed about 70,000 men to south west Europe in Wellingotns army, 5,000 at Gibralter and another 14,000 or so under Murray of the 300,000 or so in the British army at the time while also fighting the united states. I find it fairly interesting that Wellington tried to have multiple converging attacks at Vitoria rather then simply using his army as a large hammer to smash through the French army, the complexity and timing requirments of his plan for the battle is fairly insane, sadly let down by some of his subordinates but I find it interesting because Napoleon rarely allowed such independance to his commanders in his battles unless he really really trusted them.
The thing is, you're only looking at local tactics and there's a much bigger picture. The British Army was much better able to conserve experienced soldiers than any of the other European armies, which suffered far greater losses and had to rely on fresh conscripts. In the French Army, this had a devastating effect on military capability after 1809. By keeping a relatively small army and using it sparingly (mostly relying on the power of both the Royal Navy and the British economy to win the war), the British Army was able to maintain a small, well-trained and experienced force that could not compete with the French by itself, but with the help of other allies, could hold its ground well in battle. The British Army also never suffered from the same large-scale logistical failures that devastated Napoleon's forces on various occasions.
I agree, the video does only look at local tactics, which is what it's entire purpose is. The video never tries to be anything other than that. To cover this topic 'thoroughly' with any sense of justice is beyond my capabilities to condense into a single video, lest it be 10+ hours long. There are soooo many factors at play that enabled the defeat of Napoleon, that it will take many videos and many long hours of research in order to even attempt to cover it in any detail. :)
An Army Marches on its stomach stated Napoleon. English Breakfast. Eggs bacon sausage toms mushrooms black pudding fried slice tea. French Breakfast A croissant.
Looking through your comments, i see some that object with your video title and seem to not have watched the whole video. This is great work, better and more concise than others while also being detailed and logical. Your debubking of old long-held ideas is top notch. Keep up the work and i hope to see more videos out on further topics, this channel seems to be a hidden gem. I myself want to make a series discussing the waterloo campaign, and i hope to produce something as nuanced and intelligent as this.
Oh yeah? Then read this my reply to the video creator. it was in Sharpe’s Company that he trained the South Essex raw recruits, to fire 3 rounds a minute, not the entire British army. At Waterloo, it was the new Shrapnel shells technology, fired by the British cannons that devastated the French infantry columns. After the battle, there were many French shell shock victims, laying and shaking, from the storms of exploding shrapnel shells, above the French columns. You failed to mention this in the video. Also in the Spanish peninsula campaign especially and elsewhere, it was the Logistics and supplies of food, equipment and ammunition that gave Britain’s armies the edge over the French, It don’t matter how many rounds you can fire a minute, your accuracy and battle tactics, if you’ve got worn out muskets, equipment, no boots on and no bullets to fire, and hardly any food in your belly. The French were forced to live off the land, which diminished their morale and made them exceedingly unpopular with the Spanish population. The French tried to oppress the Spanish citizens with brutality. While the British won their hearts and minds. These are the key factors, for winning long campaigns that the French were unable to contend with. The Royal Navy brought an endless river of supplies, equipment and armies of farm animals, as well as that all important lubricant for the wheels of a war machine, Gold. The French were all about taking whatever they could get, ransacking the churches, cathedrals and monasteries, stealing artwork, statues and all the precious metals and jewels that they could find. They were also hated by the Spanish catholics, for their godlessness, and their exploiting and abusive ways. At Waterloo, much of Britain’s army was made of Dutch and Irish , all Britain’s regiments were hardened veterans. By that time, most of the French general infantry were young boys. Who were conscripted to replace the lost and fallen, of le grande armee. You failed to mention these crucial factors.
The video is about the tactical battle between the British and French infantry, all of the factors that you listed above, whilst obviously important, are both beyond the scope of the video and not really relevant to the topic at hand, which is why I didn't mention them. It wasn't out of ignorance but lack of time. To discuss ALL the various factors involved in the defeat of Napoleon is going to take many, many videos, and cannot be covered in a half hour dialogue. I'll address some of the claims that you make here however, at least to the best of my current knowledge, as you're clearly a fellow student of the period. In terms of Waterloo, the French army actually consisted of many veterans who had been released from prisoner of war camps in the year previous. It was the armies of 1813 and 1814 that were mainly raw recruits, and even they fought well. The shrapnel shells were also less impactful than is imagined. Wellington didn't particularly rate them, and their accuracy is debatable as the fuse had to be cut perfectly for the shell to explode in the correct location in order to shower the enemy with the shrapnel. If they did hit they were devastating, but cut too short or too long and they were almost useless. They were also first used in the Peninsular and not at Waterloo. The Anglo-Allied army at Waterloo consisted of many different nationalities, all of varying quality, some of which had even fought for Napoleon in previous years. Whilst some of the British regiments were veterans from the Peninsula, for some, such as the Scots Greys, Waterloo was actually their first ever battle. You are right about the logistical side being a vital factor, but the French weren't not completely useless here, nor were they total savages in Spain. Certainly no angels, absolutely not, but Marshal Suchet for instance does well and seems to make peace with the general populace as well as quell the Guerrilla problem in his area. So it isn't as black and white as it appears.
Excellent. I am working on a Waterloo campaign game and Napoleonic (and American Civil War) corps level system for a good publisher and this gets my thumbs up. Dropping you a subscription.
You forgot one important contribution to the British Army success, specially during the Peninsular War. The Portuguese. Not only did they burned out their own country under Wellington ‘s request (lines of Torres Vedras) in order to make life unbearable for the French, the Portuguese militia (ordenanças) made sure their suffering be even greater and very important, at least 30% of the British Army was Portuguese (not forgetting crack marksmen caçadores). Lastly, Wellington branded the Portuguese as the fighting cocks of the British Army.
Yep. And he trusted them too. He often held the Spanish battalions back from a fight, because they were not reliable as soon as they saw a chance to stop fighting, and start looting and raping. He never did that with the Portuguese.
One of the first things Wellington did in 1815 when taking command of the Allied army in what would become Belgium was write a letter to the Portugese government asking them for 14,000 troops, he had great respect for the Portugese army particularly the light infantry. It is however worth pointing out that about 1/3 of the officers where actually British and the portugese army as well as being financed by the British (which is fair enough) was also trained to British standards after their arrival in 1808, none of that does anything to diminish their contribution but context is important.
Yep Wellington fought a great campaign in Iberia, using Protugese soldiers and essentially building up the Portugese Army into an extension of the British Army. Definitely not forgotten. One of Wellington's greatest strenghts was the ability to form an army from various nationalities into a cohesive and efficient force (shown throughout his career from india to Waterloo.)
@@markdavids2511 the Portuguese have always been formidable sailors and soldiers . Tough as f******g nails . One of the great seafaring nations of the world. Like the Venetians , the only roads that they had , was the sea .
Intuitively, if you shoot first you get them before they get you. You won't get all of them, not even close, but there's less to shoot back at you. Perhaps that's why armies tended to shoot at too far a range? Unless they're very disciplined, i.e. more scared of their own officers than the enemy.
So many people in the comments absolutely seething at any glories of Britain's past. The language they're writing in to communicate these falsehoods is ironic enough.
Great video. Sound - you need to do a sound clean. Remove background/ambient sounds. Watch a video about that on UA-cam for the program you are using. Exceptional work. Don’t let little things like sound cleaning reduce your excellence. Honestly, you’ll be astonished at the quality increase with this tiny tiny process.
Actually British at Maida, Barrosa and continuously under Wellington, bettered French (except at Waterloo where they were saved by the Prussians). All other British armies were beaten at tactical level in Netherland 1798 Southern and Eastern Spain 1813-1814 Netherland 1814. British had very sturdy infantry, but not the swiftness of combined maneuvers of French infantry, cavalry, artillery. That's why Wellington carefully lined his army on high ground on a narrow front with stronghold to avoid being over flanked (and it nearly happened to him at Buçaco and Fuentes de Onoro)
First class. The stoicism of the Redcoat though was played down but another factor was the British army was a regular army, professional and often facing mass conscript troops which the cocky Brits looked down on giving them a sense of superiority. They had a certain hubris that stemmed way back to Blenheim.
After all the beatings of the early peninsula hubris, not really the "professional army hubris is much later thing 1850s and later Wellington considered his troops scum and in most case was not far off. Experienced in fights and differences from others in Europe (volunteering rather than conscripted conscripted)
@goltandburlach Wellington looked down on his men sometimes because they were poor men joining the army for coin, and he was a rich aristocrat, so there was a wide gulf in manners between the two.
@@goltandburlach People quote that in perfect ignorance of the context : Vitoria1813. A total victory had been achieved and Wellington ordered a pursuit. Accordingly the cavalry went forwards and the infantry pressed on, they got to the massive French baggage train, blocking the road to France. Here most of the soldiers began looting, no rearguard could have been more effective and the French army was saved. *(Remember these soldiers were lucky to see the tiny amount were paid - ever - as the 'deductions' took most of it- and they were not permitted to loot or 'live off the land' as most other armies of the time were). As the supposedly far more disciplined soldiers of Kaiser II did the very same thing when they captured the British Supply dumps around Albert (Somme) in 1918, one can be a little more understanding today than the peppery but very popular and never to be defeated Wellesley was when he saw his victory (at Vitoria) not culminating in the capture of the dissolved French force)* Furious, Wellington wrote to the secretary of war, Lord Bathurst on 29 July 1813 that: “Our Vagabond Soldiers” had been “Totally knocked up”. A little later, 2 July 1813, he expanded on his theme: “It is quite impossible for me or any other man to command a British Army under the existing system. We have in the service the scum of the earth as common soldiers.” Few could or should challenge his anger, this looting had no military excuse and went against all ideals of good conduct, however by the autumn he had seemingly forgotten the matter, writing proudly that his army was: “The most complete machine for its numbers now existing in Europe.” 21 Nov 1813. Here are a few other comments he made about those 'low brutes' : The scum of the earth... but what fine soldiers we have made them. I don't know what effect these men will have upon the enemy, but by God, they frighten me. When other Generals make mistakes their armies are beaten; when I get into a hole, my men pull me out of it. My heart is broken by the terrible loss I have sustained in my old friends and companions *and my poor soldiers*. Believe me, nothing except a battle lost can be half so melancholy as a battle won. Considering he was part of the Nrmao-French aristocracy and talking about English peons, I suspect he grew very fond of those hard, brutal, STUBBORN men, English, Welsh, Scottish and Irish. (The Connaught's were a 'pet' of his - so they often ended up in the worst situation, (check Seringapatam and Waterloo, where he kept them in very similar and deadly circumstances, because he knew they would stand it)
I think you missed the part where the British didn’t even make up 1/3 of the forces present at Waterloo or Blenheim for that matter 😂. Waterloo was the British, Dutch, Brunswickers, hannoverians, and Nassau. Blenheim was literally THE ENTIRE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE(Habsburg Austria), the Dutch, Prussians, Hannoverians, Wurrtemberg (part of HRE), and auxiliary Danish troops. You really gotta look at things on a deeper level almost every British land victory over the French had 3rd party participants present on the British side, because France was too powerful on land to take by themselves
Some very good points. Makes me reconsider my belief based on the Cornwell novels. That would be devastating to have a valley in your face and from the smoke gleaming bayonets emerge. Terrifying.
Its very interesting that British infantry tactics seem so similar in spirit to the Caroleans Sweden used over a century ago to punch above their weight as well. The power of morale/discipline and well timed shock
I read the French account, as described, in Berwick many years ago , it does not however complete the story, as it was the artillery 12lb that often were the amassed to thin the ranks, that the French would employ indirect firing , as well as cavalry to do the work of the British Bayonet charge. British artillery during Napoleonic used round and grapeshot ,as opposed to indirect round and explosive shot. The French artillery was very good ,but against targets reverse sloped also depended upon the ground . Soft ground made the indirect fire less effective , in both maneuver of the guns and effect of the explosive. Unfortunately by WW1 this direct vs indirect artillery use proved the undoing of the BEF, as much as the machine gun . Alan Mallinson, 1914 Fight the Good Fight, worth a read.
Indirect fire against a foe whose numbers and position is unseen is just a waste. This proves the worth of hiding on the back of a hill to save one's skin from Napoleon's guns
I don't think it's as cut and dried as this certainly the Royal Horse Artilery employed indirect fire at Waterloo, firing shrapnel at the advancing french troops.
Unless your research is better than Mallinson's , that is not to say they didn't have indirect fire shells Henry Shrapnel cases in evidence General Sir George Wood, Wellington’s artillery commander, went so far as to state, “Without Shrapnel’s shells, the recovery of the farmhouse at La Haye Sainte, a key position in the battle, would not have been possible.” ,just that they used the artillery in direct fire with canister more. That is what until WW1, the heavier guns and howitzers were considered less important than mobility in the field. It is the rule rather than exceptions, that many seem to get bouncing down rabbit holes looking for unicorns, to hold up as debunking the whole case?
An interesting video, with some good tactical analysis, especially the point about limited availability of cavalry in the Peninsular War. However, I am surprised that one additional more strategic factor is not addressed - the fact that the British did not engage the best or the bulk of the French Grande Armee. There were two reasons for this. First, as you acknowledge, the high water mark of French tactical capability, and therefore its success, was 1804-07, before the Peninsular War. By 1808-09, the effects of attrition had started to diminish the quality of the French Army, but even so Moore was quickly bundled out of Iberia when Napoleon led his best troops into Spain. Second, after 1808, Iberia was a secondary seat of operations to that of mainland Europe; Napoleon starved it of prime troops especially after 1811. Nor was French strength in the Peninsula focused only on Wellington’s Army; Spanish regular and irregular forces tied up vast numbers of troops, preventing their concentration against Wellington. By 1813-15, the French Army was a poor shadow of the 1805 vintage. Had Wellington’s Peninsular Army faced the Grande Armee of 1804-07, and certainly in any strength, then it too would likely have been bested. When it did so finally at Waterloo, the French cupboard was pretty bare. Nevertheless, the result was ‘close’ and, arguably, only secured by the intervention of the Prussian’s from mid-afternoon onwards. More myths to be busted!
Great comment! Thanks, and I agree with much of what you've said. It certainly would have been interesting if the 'prime' Grand Armee, led by Napoleon, would have faced Wellington's 'Peninsular Veterans', though I think we would both agree who the likely winner would have been.
Whatever - Napoleon faced Wellington - who was undefeated in any major action, and he went down. Napoleon himself rated the general as the most important soldier in an army. Go figure again.
@@RussianEagles This is not borne out by French dispositions, which demonstrate that Napoleon’s main concern was to stabilise Central Europe. Even so, it is notable that Wellington’s Army was driven back onto the Lisbon peninsula in 1810 and did not get out of Portugal until after Napoleon had stripped out French forces in Spain for his Russian campaign.
@@patrickkelly6691 Clearly I should not have doubted the powers of an (Anglo) Irish general. I shall have to sharpen my wits against such implacable logic.
Don't forget that the Swedes continued on with the innovations of GAII, with the Carolean infantry using similar tactic to even more devastating effect until 1721 and even later.
Due to Nelson's navy keeping the French and Spanish bottled up in port, both the opposing navies were ill-practiced in both gunnery and seamanship, with some allied ships only managing 1 round per minute from their cannons. British warships conversely extensively drilled for speed and accuracy, both will full and partial gun crews to simulate losses. Ships captains are often reported to purchase private stocks of powder and shot to enable additional training at sea.
It seems to me that you describe the psychological impact very well - including that of the soundscape: The French view... Advancing from their form-up line after an indirect artillery preparation that left them a lot of ground to cover, so they started pot-shots that weakened their formation; The meeting with skirmishers, direct artillery fire - but the stoic silence of the British Infantry holding fire as the French crested the hill; That close range volley hitting you like artillery, and out of the smoke, three cheers followed by a bayonet charge. Look at it from the English side: Your officers have put you behind a hill, protecting you; Your officers are out to the front, placing themselves at risk, getting eyes on what is happening; The enemy crests the hill with their formation straggling as they try to reload and catch up with each other, so their fire-power - and smoke - is thinned; You see them go down under your volley and cheer, and before the smoke has cleared, you have at them with your bayonet. That would work. I'm with your line of thought.
I agree with your observation that the British tended to deploy even more skirmishers than the French was key to the British success in the Peninsular battles. Talavera being a great example of this. The heavy deployment of British lights at times confused the French into an early deployment into line from column. They often commented on having "defeated the first British line, only to me overthrown by an unexpected second line". That second line, holding its fire until close range followed by a quick disciplined bayonet charge repeatedly broke the French advance.
I'm fairly sure the British never beat Napoleon, and before Waterloo is mentioned what happened was that Wellington managed to hold him off on ground he had chosen until the Prussians arrived. It'd also be interesting to know what percentage were Irish, forced by poverty and Scottish,due to the Highland clearances.
So Wellington had a battle plan to be the Anvil and held against significantly better and more organised French forces then, sounds liek a win to me to be honest - If the Prussian arrival was a suprise I might agree with you Wellingto held as he was emant to and has as much right as anyone else to clainm ther ccredit for the victory.
Thanks for this video. An interesting line of argument. I agree with much of what you say. I'd like to offer a few observations: 1. When French infantry were deployed in line they showed as much grit and stoicism as the allied troops (in the Peninsular) e.g. Fuentes. 2. I agree with your emphasis on morale. Allied field and general officers were very good at judging when an enemy formation was ready to break ... 3. ... which leads to the point that the allied formations did not always volley then charge. There are plenty of accounts of more protracted platoon firing before the charge was made (i.e. one volley was not necessarily sufficient) ... 4. ... which then suggests you may have begged the line v column debate: because again there are plenty of accounts of; (a) the line wrapping around the head of a column; and (b) columns attempting to deploy under fire but failing. Personally I believe the controversy is in the nature of the question. It is one of those hypothetical "x was better than y" comparisons and to my mind they always ignore the context. A French infantry attack only ever met an Allied infantry defence in the context of a multitude of interrelated factors. Someone mentioned below the degradation of the French Army - and even that sits within the context of a nation so traumatised by decades of war that when the Allied army entered France the local people did not complain! I have read the argument that, by 1815, Napoleon headed an already failed social, economic and political system; and that this was reflected in a hamstrung general command system (certainly evident in Spain). Someone else mentioned Wellington himself. He had an untold impact on the morale of Anglo-Portugese soldiers (e.g. his reception at Sorauren). Even a Spanish force held off Soult's attempt to relieve San Sebastian (1813). It could be argued the French armies in western Spain began to lose faith in themselves after Bussaco; and that after Salamanca even the Generals had lost their self-confidence. I could go on. One of the things which always strikes me when reading the personal accounts of the Peninsular is the quality of tactical decision making by Allied field officers and brigade commanders. They seemed to know how to manoevre and deploy so as to create a local superiority of firepower, and how and when to exploit a brittle enemy formation. It's funny that Wellington is criticised for failing to allow subordinates the latitude to act independently, but he had a knack for placing formations in the right time and place, so they could do the job they became so good at. Finally, I think it's worth listening to Wellington's own opinion. Even in 1808 (in his personal correspondence with Castlereagh for example) Wellington believes he can beat the French: and his justification? Line versus Column.
@@fintonmainz7845 i see your other negative comments in the chat. If you can not respect my opinion i suggest you do not comment further. Good day sir.
@fintonmainz7845 given I was expressing an opinion it can not be wrong. People dislike trolls, so I would advise you keep you unwelcome thoughts to yourself.
One other factor - powder. THe Brits developed separate gunpowder as opposed to black powder blasting powder. Thi9 inolved purer materials. Better chemistry knowledge. Finer grains packed more closely chopped finely and ""corned"" (had it's corners knocked off in a tumbling action). Giving a powder that had air inclose contact witn the carbon, solphur and salpeter. Those changes plus the introduction of a small controlled amount of water resulted in a powder that was slower burning, more completely combusted with a slower process overall Giving musketry volleys that were more energetic, more predictable as to recoil Resultting in the English cartridge of 1853 or so
An excellent coverage - thank you - but - somewhere in an Infantry Field Manual of the time, I formed a slightly different opinion of the "volley fire". Yes, volley and charge - but a slightly different emphasis. TLDR. Assuming full strength battalions - circa six companies of 100 +/- 20. The "Colour" company was smaller - perhaps 50 men around the Ensign and the Regimental colour. The Colonel being in command. A battalion would deploy in two lines - the men one arms-length apart (as still today). with the rear rank then taking half a pace to fill the space between the men in the front rank. The battalions would be arrayed with the light company on the left flank and the grenadier company on the right flank. The Colour company in the centre - with usually three companies deployed either side. The Light company would deploy forward as skirmishers, falling back as the enemy advanced, then falling back into line on their left flank positions. At the appropriate moment - the Colonel would give the order to fire to the front rank of the Colours .... with the companies on either side taking fire in succession. Then the rear rank would receive the order to fire - with the successional effect along the whole line. Three rounds a minute was normal, with the first volley loaded of course - so perhaps four in the first minute or so. It might take something like fifteen seconds for the front rank to complete its whole volley - with the centre (rear rank) volleying after (say) ten seconds. This continuous run of fire would account for both the French and the Americans reporting that it was like someone running a stock down a picket fence. Then - the bayonet charge - once the Colonel judged that the enemy was suitably confused. Three ranks - and sometime four if there were sufficient men - was the usage for squares, as the front rank was kneeling. As I remember - the two standing ranks fired volleys into the approaching cavalry (much as described), firing at approx. 100 yards (horses are bigger and the aim point was the horse), then at say 60 yards with a final - double volley - including the kneeling rank, who then braced their weapons against their knees. Horses don't like sharp pointy things. Finally - the point of aim. I don't know when it began, it may well have been Marlborough (or before), but the chant of the sergeants was "Aim for the balls" (and heaven help the soldier that aimed high). I note that this was still the chant of the sergeants in my Service days .... albeit some 150 years later.
Such a fantastic video, so well researched and preset es and yet like every English UA-camr talking history of this period, completely unable to look up the pronunciation of the name Dundas.
I've seen it said in many documentaries that the french struggled to maintain formations over distance, and really struggled to form line near the enemy.
Very interesting video! Regarding your wondering about other European powers utilizing this tactic of fire and charge, I have one possible example to give - and it's from a nation you did mention! In the late 17th Century and early 18th Century, it was I believe a commonly used form of attack in the Swedish army. One or two volleys would be fired, from about 50 metres and then 30 metres, before charging. This was before bayonets had been adopted in the Swedish army, and so instead one in four or one in three men were armed with a shortened pike, while the rest drew swords. In at least one case (The battle of Fraustadt 1706, it's the one I have a book on so I know more about it) cavalry units marched alongside the infantry and charged alongside them. It was maybe less refined than the British usage! I know of no instance of it being used for defence, and the Swedish forces tended to find either great success or catastrophic defeat. There is a wikipedia article (I know, I know...) named 'Caroleans' if you want to read more about it in English. I'd recommend the book I've read, "Fraustadt 1706 - Ett fält färgat rött" by Oskar Sjöström, but unfortunately it doesn't seem like it was ever translated.
The Superiority of the Royal Navy over the French and Spanish navies during the Napoleonic Wars like those of the 18th Century was that the Fleet was at sea blockading French fleets in port keeping the British Tars at peak fitness, and perfrormance whilst repeated cannon practice from clearing the decks for action meant that not only was the average Royal navy ship able to clear for action faster than its opponents, with the possible exception of the Dutch Fleet, the Royal navy also practised gun drill and gunnery to minimise the time a warship could "Clear For Action" and deliver a heavier rate of Fire. The rather unique British practice of paying Prize Money for captured ships made many sailors and especially their officers, very rich - Especially for the smaller warships below the size of Frigate because they had vastly greater options for taking prizes. Indeed, for most of the most effective Royal Navy Officers such actions made their names and fortunes securing them fame and advancement in a service were advancement was on merit up to Post Captain and 'Buggins Turn' after that to Admiral with a few exceptions of very effective naval officers getting early appointment to admiral on merit. The Fire Superiority and Fire Discipline of the British Infantryman does in fact go back to the English Civil War where two sides could blaze away at each other all day using the European Method of open files so that a row of Muskeeteers could either fire and retire to form a new back rank to load leaving the second row to fire and retire likewise OR for the front rank to fire and have the loaded rear rank pass through to the front to form a mew fire rank for the unit to fire and advance. Enormous quantities of expensive powder was consumed which was a major difficulty for the Royalists. At the same time Montroses Royalist Army in Scotland was winning victory after victory in Scotland by forming in 3 or 4 closely packed ranks and advancing very close to the enemy and firing a devastating first volley at very close range followed by dropping their muskets and charging home with their swords and targets to break their opponents. In England both sides and the Royalists mainly adopted a modified version of Montroses tactics by advancing to very close, less than 20 paces, with their musketeers in 3 or 4 closely packed carrying loaded muskets to advance quickly alongside their pikemen to fire a single massed volley at very close range followed by charging home with clubbed muskets alonside their pikemen - usually enough to break a regiment using conventional European Tactics. Against Cavalry the tactic was to hold fire to an even closer range, less than 10 paces, with 6 to 8 muskets firing at each mopunted man in the cavalries front rank - enough to bring down the entire front rank and saome of the second rank either stopping an enemy cavalry charge dead OR breaking a cavalry unit using a pistol caracole against them. After the Civil War the New Model Army adopted the fire tactics under Cromwell in the wars against the enemies of the British Commonwealth. The fire tactics continued in the British Army after the Restoraration in an army continually at war from the end or the English Civil War to the peace of UItrecht, the Peace Treaties signed between April 1713 to February 1715 to end the War of the Spanish Succession also known in the UK as the Malburian wars. Brtitish Fire discipline and Fire Tactics continually evolved between the end of the English Civil war and the end of the Seven Years War in 1763. The technological changes were the complete replacement of matchlock muskets requiring a slow burning match to fire the musket with firelock muskets using a flint to strike a spark to fire. The speed of loading and firing was improved by first replacing the wooden ramrood with an iron ramrod and then the 12 apostles with paper cartridges and improved musket drill reducing the number of steps and commands to fire and load a musket speeding up the rate of fire. The need for pikes was reduced and ended by introducing a Bayonet to fit to the musket to convert the musket to a spear - initially a plug bayonet that was pushed into the muzzle of the musket barrel preventing the musket being loaded and fired and then the ring baynet that fitted to the outside of the barrel allowing the musket to be loaded and fired with the bayonet attached. Throughout the period from the end of the English Civil War to the end of the Seven Years War the French persisted in firing halted 4 ranks deep and opening fire at ranges in excess of 100 yards when the vast majority of musket balls would bury themselves in the ground short of their target causing minimal casualties whereas British Fire doctrine was to reserve fire until the range was less than 30 paces before firing a devastating first volley. Before the introduction fo iron ramrods and paper cartridges o facilitate efficient musket loading the charge to break the enemy would include pursuing the broken enemy BUT with efficient loading Battalions were required to halt on the enemy position and reload to face new enemies and especially the enemy second line to defeat them. The British Army soon dropped the 4th rank as their presence was to replace casualties in the first 3 ranks that could fire with a very complicated manouvre to lock the first 3 ranks into a firing position so all 3 ranks could fire increasing the time taken between firing volleys - something not needed for a 2 deep line thereby increasing the rate of fire fo a 2 deep line. Depending upon its fire discipline the battalions of the British Army carried out regular musket drills to ensure that in the heat of battle musket drill would be second nature to its men - The French Napoleonic armies did not bother with such live firing musket drills - I read somewhere that a French Recruit would complete his training firing a maximum of 10 individual rounds and not in a battalion firing exercise. The only other nation that carried out regular battalion firing exercises was the Prussian army often with targets comporising a cloth battalion frontage in which after each volley the number of holes was through the cloth were counted - I have the anaysis somewhere (I think in the Prussian Infantry Regulations of 1756) that proved very few bullets would hit an opposing battalion at ranges above 40 or 50 paces. The purpose of such target practice was to demonstrate to the offciers and men what an effective range was and where to point a levelled musket at that range for the fire to be effective. With regard to Battalion Volley Fire it can only be used when a battalion is stationary and a reserved first volley is very effective against attacking Infantry and charging cavalry BUT cannot be used effectively in attack or against supporting cavalry BECAUSE supporting cavalry can charge home before the infantry is reloaded. For that reason the British and Prussian Armies adopted platoon fire with a battalion divided into 8 equal size fire platoons that keep up a continuous fire by firing in pairs. Platoon fire is ideal for keeping a continuous fire up whilst advancing or retiring and holding a reserve fire to use against charging cavalry. The long peace of 25 years between the peace of Utrecht and the start of the War of the Austrian Succession meant the British Army had no battalion officers experienced in British fire tactics and British Infantry started the War of the Austrian Succession battalion volley firing at ranges over 100 tards like the French and lost their advantage over the French. British Battalion officers and their battalions had to learn the hard lessons of the previous 100 years again and when they did they could defeat the battalion volleying French foes with ease. In both the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War British Infantry were able to advance in line against multiple lines of French cavalry forcing them to charge and defeat the the frontal chage with devastating short range fire proving that well trained infantry could defeat charging cavalry whilst in Line - The Prussians also did the same against the Austrian Cavalry at Mollwitz in 1741. Wellington's Peninuslar Army were well drilled and had regular battalion firing exercises so that Wellington could depend on the fire discipline of his infantry battalions in the heat of battle and for his battalion officers to make the correct use of that fire discipline in battle to defeat the French - Namely reserving the frist fire to 30 paces or less followed by an immediate bayonet charge against a shaken enemy. I think it is worth noting that the Napoleonic tactics used by the French during the Napoleonic Wars were not developed by Napoleon BUT by the Ancien Regime Royal strategists such asJean-Baptiste Vaquette de Gribeauval; Jean-Pierre du Teil; Jacques Antoine Hippolyte; and Pierre-Joseph Bourcet - New thinking developed to find a way to defeat the British Infantry superiority on the battlefield against the Fremnch for the previous 100 years. They moved the French Army away from the Linear infantry tactics of Prussia and Britain dependant on musketry and emphasised the "flexible use of artillery" to dominate the battlefield and replace the fire power of the infantry and abandoned the cadenced slow marching in lines across the battlefield to maximise a unit's firepower in favour of rapid manouvre to attacking in columns and their specially developed "Ordre Mixte" for the French Demi-Brigades comprising a 3 battalions - the flanking battalions in Columns of Attack to provide the shock tactics supported by the firepower of the 3rd battalion deployed in line in the centre between the 2 battalions deployed in column. The second wave of the Old Guard attack at Waterloo was in Ordre Mixte comprising 3 battalions fo Grenadiers.
Thanks for such a detailed and interesting comment. I'm not going to address all of it because I feel I mentioned much of it in the video. However, one thing you state: 'Against Cavalry the tactic was to hold fire to an even closer range, less than 10 paces' is not likely because if a charging horse is brought down that close, its momentum will simply career into the defenders. 30 paces is the usual 'last chance' for firing at charging cavalry from what I've read, so as to avoid the wounded horse crashing into the formation. In terms of the French tactics, I have a video discussing their development coming very soon, same with order-mixed. As for the Guard attack, the second wave was three battalions as you say, but it was made up of two chasseur and one grenadier battalion, all of which, as far as I'm aware, where in squares.
@@ATimeOfEagles He is correct if the soldiers have formed square, otherwise NOT, Horses are smarter than humans, they won't charge head on into a wall of spiky things. Ney tried that several times at Waterloo (thanks Ney)
At Garcia Hernandez, in the pursuit after Salamanca, the KGL Dragoons accidently broke a French square due to exactly this. The 6th Legere held their fire too long resulting in a wounded horse literally crashing into them and creating a gap which the rest of the dragoons quickly exploited, breaking up the square and routing the unit, with most of the men forced to surrender.
One of the problems is that it ignores the fact that many British victories were achieved by armies that were made up of Allied toops. At Waterloo over half of Wellington's army were not British.
@@stephenelliott1135 Wellington based his defence around 2 strong points Hougoumont and La Haye Sante. Hougoumont was defended by British troops while La Hay Sante was manned by troops from the Kings German Legion. They played a crucial role in the battle.
@@dominiccassidy9708 Agreed but the initial proposition was "many British victories" which would include the whole peninsular war. The KGL was a very reliable part of Wellington's army.
@@dominiccassidy9708 As a side note the KGL was part of the british army, same as the Dutch or Polish in the French Guard or the French forign legioon today yet I never hear anyone saying those troops aren't part of the French army, it seems to be solely reserved for British army forign formations which is all just a bit odd don't you think?
“Three to their two, as usual”, as said by Lt. Bush to Captain Hornblower in, I think ‘A Ship of the Line”, was definitely the perception of British vs. French gunnery in the Napoleonic Wars. The reasons are many but the most important are that the British fleet spent much longer at sea and could exercise at the guns more, and having India, with its priceless supply of high quality saltpetre, especially from Bihar, the British had more and better gunpowder than the French. That enabled more practice on cost and availability grounds, and the more consistent quality of British gunpowder both made it easier to handle and meant that firing was more predictable. This led to more rapid loading and greater accuracy. Moreover, the British had naval gunnery enthusiasts such as Sir Philip Broke, who commanded HMS Shannon when she took USS Chesapeake in 1813, and innovated with weapons such as the carronade, which fired a very heavy ball over a short distance and which, if you had the confidence to get in close, was devastating.
@ 9:56 Here, my personal experience may help: In terms of accuracy? It depends. The earlier charge used for the Charleville is certainly more accurate than that of a Brown Bess. But that's not because of anything special regarding the Charleville. It's simply that the ball was a tighter fit (0.65'" for a 0.69" bore). IIRC, the ball in Napoleon's time was, however, closer to 0.62" or 0.63". It's not a big difference, but that does, in fact, decrease accuracy quite noticeably beyond ~80 yards. It's not dramatic, but it's still noticeable. If you compare that latter charge to the Brown Bess charge (0.69 in 0.75), then the two are actually about the same in accuracy. This is certainly what the Prussians observed in their weapons tests. Of course, all this is from a mechanical standpoint and assumes the soldier has gained mastery over either weapon. It tells us nothing about how easy it is to aim either weapon. In this case, the cheek rest that the M1777 and its corrected version come with helps with the consistency of aim, and having a dedicated front sight (instead of one doing double duty as a bayonet lug) helps the recruit learn to aim with the M1777, faster than the Brown Bess (at least, that's my experience). But that's still relative: I find that both are not that hard to learn. TBH, though, the M1777 and its corrected version are both superior to the Brown Bess, whatever the cartridge used. This is for reasons that have little to do with accuracy: they're easier to field strip and repair; they handle better (though admittedly, that's a low bar when it comes to muskets), and the construction is just stronger (and this for a variety of reasons). That's consistently been the case for French muskets since the 1720s in my experience: the muskets are better designed, easier to clean, fieldstrip, and repair, and just handle better (I own an M1746 French musket, as well as a long land pattern. No prizes for guessing which I prefer for sports shooting...)
Well researched and well presented. Minor point, but at 0:20, "undoubtedly" has no "b" for most folks in either British or US pronunciation. The 3d syllable is just "Ted" (or "Ded" if you're a fan of US-speak). That's followed by a "Lee." Thus sayeth the OED. Cheers.
Platoon volleys whereby each platoon fired after the one next to it meant that there was constant rolling fire along the entire length of a British line.
The main reason for French success in the Napoleonic era is that the French moved quickly by supplying themselves from the land. They could catch their opponents unaware and inflict a defeat on them in this way. Secondly the French tactics was to press a flank hard until the centre of the enemy line was depleted and then send a huge force up the centre to smash it's way through. The British also moved quickly due to their better logistics and bought supplies from locals thus not alienating them in the process. Advancing in column formation is easier than in line formation. You have better control with a column. However there is a trade off. You have to form into line before your attack and in front of enemy artillery and skirmishers. British skirmishers were superior in that we had that tradition form the American war of independence in the shape of The Rifles with better tactics and training. (P.S. The French were involved in that war as well supplying 80% of all american arms and ammunition.) The British were drilled relentlessly to be able to advance in line formation. So cannon was less effective in cutting down men than it was with the column formation. The British also tended to have better intelligence on French dispositions and movements because of their better relationship with locals. You kind of touched on this but the British were far less wasteful of British soldiers than the French were of French troops. France lost so many men in the Napoleonic wars that the average height of a French man fell by a few inches. The British also tended to fight on a ground of their choosing rather than of the French's. When the French picked the ground such as at Quatre Bra the French had success. Then there was Napoleon's presence. Napoleon was a good commander who tended to make the right decisions at the right time and if he made a mistake he could recover. That can not be said of his Marshals. They were indecisive in the main with only one offering any real ability in the Peninsular War.So really the short answer is that the British could stand up to the French tactics better and were better organised and better lead on the field than any other army in Europe in general.
Also, it did not reduce the firepower of a battalion to deploy in three ranks, because the regiments were trained to fire in this manner with the front rank kneeling so that all three ranks could fore at the same time. Some people say that three ranks could not all fire "Because the men in the rearmost rank would shoot the front rank in the back", but this is said usually by people who have no experience of linear musket drill and therefore are not aware that, whether in two ranks or in three ranks, the rear rack men extend their right foot out so as to clear the path for their muskets to fire.
The drill for four ranks is the same for three ranks, except the the front two ranks both kneel. Infantry battalions form four ranks when forming square.
@@patrickkelly6691 The drill for forming fours is simple. The rear rank and the even numbered front rank files take a step backwards, then the even numbered rear rank file men take a second step backwards and the whole formation closes rank, usually dressing on the Colours.
A lack of belief in the effectiveness of the third rank was a view among contemporary generals. Even Napoleon himself, who rarely thought about small scale tactics, expressed doubt about it. The problem is not shooting the first rank in the back, it's about interfering with the motions of reloading and the difficulty properly aiming for the third rank. At least some armies actually out the tallest soldiers in the front ranks to make them more impressive, which can't have helped.
The British charge was introduced by Wolfe, who saw its effectiveness as employed by the highlanders during the Jacobite uprising. He incorporated it into British methods in Canada.
It wasn't at all effective at Culloden when it ran onto the bayonet points of the Gov forces soldiers (mostly Scottish themselves) The Bayonet Drill developed by the British Army which crushed the Highlanders was actually the real root of the volley and charge tactic.
@patrickkelly6691 The Bayonet drill is another myth. Sword and targe was a lot more effective up close and personal than a heavy musket with a bayonet on the end, though most of the Jacobites themselves had muskets as their main weapon and only a few carried swords. The British Cavalry were actually one of the decisive factors at Culloden.
@@nutyyyy Wolfe noticed that the charge worked every time up to Culloden. The bayonet charge is the same thing with a different weapon. No tactic is infallible.
This is corroborated by musket balls have inaccuracy that scales disproportionately with range. With modern firearms their dispersion is proportional with distance, so if a spread of 1 inch at 100m it'll be 2 inches at 200m and 5 inches at 500m and so on, but a musket ball's asymmetric rotation in flight causes the accuracy to get disproportionately worse at longer range. So a fist-sized group at 50 yards would be a group as wide as a man is tall at 100 yards, and at several hundred yards the dispersion had the unusual quality of a "doughnut shaped" dispersion pattern, so no shots land in an area that you aim but cluster in an ring shaped pattern. So shooting at 50 yards is likely to be so accurate that not only will all bullets hit but they're also likely to hit at around chest height, this fire would be devastating.
Exactly! Which is why when French sources comment on the impressive British 'firepower', it is to this devastating effect that they likely refer, and not to the rate of fire as many historians have unfortunately believed and too often repeated.
Regarding the statement at 27:22, where not the swedes in the early 1700s under Charles XII employing a similar tactic? The Caroleans where instructed to march upon the enemy until they could see the whites in their eyes and then fire. Immediately followed by an attack with cold steel. 80-ish years after Gustavus Adolphus. In Sweden we regard the cold steel and the mentality of "gå på" as the factors gaining us the advantage in the first half of the Great Northern War.
Hi Gary A pronunciation tip Kerala. K RA LA. Would do. At the moment you're saying Karala.
4 місяці тому
Yes,the French manoeuvred in column but,almost,always against the British,they were doing the attacking.Switching from column to line was a delicate matter as when best to do it.
I suspect it was more the British Training to wait till Enemy was too close to miss then aim low so as to miss less as well as reload fast that made the difference.
Drachinifel you tube for naval. British rations were twice that of french sailors, perhaps that explains the rate of fire. He even has a video where he recreates a week's rations. Did British soldiers eat more than the french?
ultimately i suspect, the reason is logistics and transportation; the british were rarely engaging the french main armies or fought where the french were strongest; the fighting in egypt and spain shows this best. Of course they did do it, but only rarely alone.
Napoleon was not the commander he had been, not even a year ago in 1814 where he had fought a a epic campaign against overwhelmingly powerful Allied armies. He allowed the French to squander their advantages, if the French had not attacked Wellington's defensive position, the day would have gone better for them. Wellington had created killing zones on the slopes in front of his position, due to the terrain, his army had some protection because of the Ridge were he could hide the bulk of his army. What was required was some tuning maneuver probably through Papelotte turning the British left and getting the French artillery onto the Ridge firing along the ridge not at it. Hougomont and La Haye Saint should have been left well alone. With the Second Corp dropping back to reserve to support the 1st Corp.
Cornwell often states the British were the only nation in the Napoleonic wars that practiced musketry with live ammunition Also that the British fired by platoons or companies after the initial first volley, creating a machine gun effect of never ending firing. The French were a conscript army hence the column attack tactic to overawe their opponents, the British a professional army were better at musketry.
1.The british werent the only ones to use live ammo for Training. Everybody did. 2. The french didnt use column for Attack all the time. 3. Fire by * Insert tactical unit* was done by everybody.
Surely the british praticed with live fire,where as the french did not! Further more the french lost a lot of the verts and had a lot of raw conscribes
Would it be reasonable to assume that compared to the other opponents of the French, they did not fight the British very often. Given that most European armies fought in a Prussian manner, the French trained their mostly conscript army to counter them instead of the British. So given their lack of focus on the British army, and the fact that the British were led by very competent commanders, who knew the strengths and weaknesses of their forces causes the British to have a very good combat record against them.
One also has to consider that the british ususly faced the B Team while having massive Support from the portugese, spanish and spanish Guerillas. They also had the luxury of beeing the worlds strongest naval power and an Island. They could choose when and where to engage.
The naval power is also a handicap though has maintaining a navy of that size is expensive in men and money, in 1805 the Royal navy ate up more then 50% of british GDP for example.
@@Delogros They didnt Just fight the enemy Navy though. They also Delivered weapons, Equipment and straight Up Money to theire allies. That was of utmost importance for the war effort as britan could never Beat France alone.
@@vinz4066 You could do deliveries with the merchant navy to be fair you don't needexpensive warships for that job just enough for escourts, No one could really beat France alone either.
With the Naval Gunners, it more often than not depended on the ships Captain whether the gunners managed a higher, same or potentially even lower rate of fire than the French or Spanish. Many Captains were, shall we say a touch fixated with their crews gunnery, so many actually procured extra powder for gunnery training out of their own pocket. It was the crew of this type of Captain that were able to reach that three round a minute mark. Crews who were constantly drilled in almost all manner of weather to beat to quarters, lay their guns, and fire as rapidly as possible. As you have probably worked out by now not all Captains did this, instead only drilling their gun crews according to the amount the regulations demanded. As a result, yes its perfectly true that some of the better gunnery crews could indeed make three rounds a minute, they were not the majority. An important minority perhaps, but not the majority.
a lot of the myths you address sound like cases of circular sourced claims, unfortunately common in more popular military history and the wargaming hobby
Thanks I learned several things from this. But it was in Sharpe’s Company that he trained the South Essex raw recruits, to fire 3 rounds a minute, not the entire British army. At Waterloo, it was the new Shrapnel shells technology, fired by the British cannons that devastated the French infantry columns. After the battle, there were many French shell shock victims, laying and shaking, from the storms of exploding shrapnel shells, above the French columns. You failed to mention this in the video. Also in the Spanish peninsula campaign especially and elsewhere, it was the Logistics and supplies of food, equipment and ammunition that gave Britain’s armies the edge over the French, It don’t matter how many rounds you can fire a minute, your accuracy and battle tactics, if you’ve got worn out muskets, equipment, no boots on and no bullets to fire, and hardly any food in your belly. The French were forced to live off the land, which diminished their morale and made them exceedingly unpopular with the Spanish population. The French tried to oppress the Spanish citizens with brutality. While the British won their hearts and minds. These are the key factors, for winning long campaigns that the French were unable to contend with. The Royal Navy brought an endless river of supplies, equipment and armies of farm animals, as well as that all important lubricant for the wheels of a war machine, Gold. The French were all about taking whatever they could get, ransacking the churches, cathedrals and monasteries, stealing artwork, statues and all the precious metals and jewels that they could find. They were also hated by the Spanish catholics, for their godlessness, and their exploiting and abusive ways. At Waterloo, much of Britain’s army was made of Dutch and Irish , all Britain’s regiments were hardened veterans. By that time, most of the French general infantry were young boys. Who were conscripted to replace the lost and fallen, of le grande armee. You failed to mention these crucial factors.
The video is about the tactical battle between the British and French infantry, all of the factors that you listed above, whilst obviously important, are both beyond the scope of the video and not really relevant to the topic at hand, which is why I didn't mention them. It wasn't out of ignorance but lack of time. To discuss ALL the various factors involved in the defeat of Napoleon is going to take many, many videos, and cannot be covered in a half hour dialogue. I'll address some of the claims that you make here however, at least to the best of my current knowledge, as you're clearly a fellow student of the period. In terms of Waterloo, the French army actually consisted of many veterans who had been released from prisoner of war camps in the year previous. It was the armies of 1813 and 1814 that were mainly raw recruits, and even they fought well. The shrapnel shells were also less impactful than is imagined. Wellington didn't particularly rate them, and their accuracy is debatable as the fuse had to be cut perfectly for the shell to explode in the correct location in order to shower the enemy with the shrapnel. If they did hit they were devastating, but cut too short or too long and they were almost useless. They were also first used in the Peninsular and not at Waterloo. The Anglo-Allied army at Waterloo consisted of many different nationalities, all of varying quality, some of which had even fought for Napoleon in previous years. Whilst some of the British regiments were veterans from the Peninsula, for some, such as the Scots Greys, Waterloo was actually their first ever battle. You are right about the logistical side being a vital factor, but the French weren't not completely useless here, nor were they total savages in Spain. Certainly no angels, absolutely not, but Marshal Suchet for instance does well and seems to make peace with the general populace as well as quell the Guerrilla problem in his area. So it isn't as black and white as it appears.
If this is the case do u think the French could have made great use of this themselves during the Napoleonic wars in general or were the circumstances so different that only the British had more opportunities to use such deadly close quarters morale breaking tactics
A good question, but one that I think lacks a definitive answer, or at least so far as my current knowledge and understanding allows, however I'll give my thoughts: Interestingly, Marshal Ney does actually call for a similar technique in his military writings around 1804/5: ‘It would be better, therefore, after the two first ranks have fired, to charge boldly with the bayonet, and by an act of vigour force the enemy to retreat.’ As for why the French didn’t utilise it, I think the higher cavalry threat certainly played a role, but also the declining quality of the French troops as the wars progressed didn’t help. They also had a system that was working for the most part everywhere else, so perhaps they didn’t feel the need to change it. Plus, despite the British showing that it could be used on the offensive, generally the technique was most effective on the defensive, and for that reason I think that it simply may not have suited the French soldier, as Ney himself even admits to in the same writings: ‘The defensive system is ill calculated for the French soldier, unless his excitement be kept up by diversions and successive excursions.’ It is not to say that he couldn’t defend, but standing in silence waiting on the enemy to close was not in his nature. It could be done, as shown at Talavera, but generally he was just better suited to the offensive: ‘In offensive warfare, the French soldier has inexhaustible resources; his active genius, and his bravery in storming, double his energy...’
@@ATimeOfEaglesI see that’s a good way of putting and you are right the use of Calvary in central and Eastern Europe certainly rendered the tactic rather risky If only those very same legendary French Calvary that made an impact at ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, Eylau and Friendland were present in Spain in greater numbers
Again. As Churchill put it "we have beaten the French too many times for the to ever forgive us" Ok so we cheated and attacked them before the depluyed from column to line. Hey ho all's fair in war.
One problem with the French tactic was that advancing in column then moving into line ment changing formation right in front of and within range of the British line. This left them very vulnerable during the manoeuvre The British were also good at use of ground. Often putting their line behind the crest of a hill protecting them from the French guns It is most likely the British success was due to an accumulation of small advancements rather than one single factor and the margins between defeat and victory were sometimes very small
However the sources in the video establish quite how ineffective long range fire is and how the British would not waste their first best shot at such long range. Subsequent shots at just less accurate, a well cleaned musket with a carefully measured charge and tapped down carefully but fully would be much more accurate than a ball and charge that was hastily loaded down a fouled bore. Another benefit of firing at close range is you do not have to charge a great distance before you're upon them. If they were somehow to fire an accurate shot from 200 yards away then they'd have to charge 200 yards rather than only 20.
I’d say the fact that at this stage of the campaign the very best of the French troops lay dead in the vastness of Russia, might have had some bearing on the result of the war.
@@thedon8772 That would only be a relavent point if the Prussians arriving wasn't part of the plan and the reason Wellington fought at Waterloo which it was, the Prussians also arrived late and fought barely 14,000 men of the French army, even after they arrived most of the French efforts where against the Anglo-Allied army. One last thing to point out, by the time the Prussians arrived Wellington had held for longer then the Prussians managed at Ligney despite the Prussians enjoying a 16,000 man advantage and having more artillery while Wellington had almost 100 guns less and was outnumbered slightly, he also had 17,000 Dutch troops he didn't entirely trust given the history of the past 2 decades and an army that had to have orders issued in 5 languages... he did fine is my point.
As fun as it is to see so many people comment about Waterloo, this video is NOT actually about Waterloo. It is examining the reasons why the British infantry on a tactical level seemed to match up better against their French counter parts than those of the other Allied nations.
I’d agree that the British army matched better than other nations but it’s also because they fought less. The Austrians, Prussians, Russians fought the French for close to 20 years while the British mostly intervened on the ground in Spain, which saw plenty of failures (and successes of course). Size also matters, sending expeditions in continental Europe isn’t the same as waging the war.
A great propaganda victory of Britain is to convince some people that they had the largest impact in the napoleonic wars
I agree, which is why I never tried to claim anything about Britain's impact. If anything, I suggested that they 'had it easier' because they never faced anywhere near the same cavalry threat in the Peninsular as the other Allies did in central Europe.
In fact, my main motivation in researching this topic was due to my frustration at the perceived 'superiority' of the British soldier. It made no sense, yet I couldn't deny that the British were seeing more success in infantry engagements against the French than most other nations. Therefore they had to be doing something different, and fortunately my research offered a potential explanation, hence the video :)
Spot on at last someone who knows Thier history nice one 😊😊
I’ll admit, my first thoughts regarding the title was going beyond the tactical level and wondering if this would cover the financial and logistical aspects of the British war machine. I do remember the rate of fire thing being brought up in school in reference to the American Revolution, so part of that myth might be transposing something that may or may not be true for one war onto another.
Edit: Regarding close range volleys, I’m wondering how long that had been common practice in the British Army, as it reminds me of them being on the receiving end at Bunker Hill during the American Revolution.
2nd edit: having continued to watch the video, Bunker Hill was probably just shared methods between regulars and colonial militias at that point in the war.
Dear sir, yours reasoning is wrong the british had Richard Sharpe. And that my dear sir is actual soldiering
Agreed !
🤣 exactly!
" Bastards.."
Sharpe was nothing without Harper
@@thomasbrown3281 Harper was just a thick mick bruiser, you cannot trust Irishmen except to get drunk and fight 😉
Fantastic video. Great analysis that maintains the 'proper' view of looking at British successes vs the French.
oh my it's one of my fav creators...
Royal Navy fired three broadsides to the French navys two not three broadsides per minute!
The British victories are more strategic than tactical: 1) Only fight at the edge of the French Empire, something the Austrians and Prussians couldn't do. The Russians had opportunities to do it, of course in 1812. 2) Only fight France's second army, never the Grand Armee under Napoleon, the French at Waterloo were not equivalent. 3) If things go wrong, head for the coast and sail away, therefore avoiding a catastrophic defeat.
Britain never had to fight a Borodino or Wagram, how would they manage if they regularly had to field 80,000 men and would lose a third in each battle, with difficulty I imagine.
Own would the French manage against the Royal Navy? Oh that’s right they lost at Trafalgar and every single other naval engagement, didn’t they?
So basically the British used their limited available manpower to good effect and knew when to fight and when to not and your argument is that's a bad thing?
How would any of the other countries manage if they had to funnel a huge percentage of there men and money into manning their nnavies? Britian had issues that the continental powers didn't have including the massive expense of running a large navy, comparativly armies are very cheap so you're comparing apples and oranges anyway.
In 1805 the Royal navy ate up 52% of British GDP, a sum of money that on it's own would have banrupted every other European allied power except perhaps Austria, Britain also paid a large percentage of the cost of maintaining the Portugese army which was much much larger then was realistically affordable by the small economically deverstated country.
Unlike the continental powers Britain had to have an army and a large number of garrisons for it's empire, before you can ask if the British could regualrly fight large battles like Borodino you have to understand the actual situation, also the fact the Britian had a popualtion of around 15 Million, Russia had 35 Million, Austria 23 million and France 35 Million.
Prussia had about 11 million and if you look at there forces in the Napoleonic wars they tended to be relativly small as well, At the time of Waterloo prussia only fielded 140,000 men in total much less then the Royal navy on it's own and the army Prussia mobilized for the invasion of France in 1814 was about the same says as the army under Wellington.
Britain never instituted conscription, assuming they could somehow come up with the money to raise and equip a large land army and maintain it logistically in Europe I expect that's the why they would ahve to deal with multiple large battles and losss.
As a last note Britain officially suffered the second highest military casaulties in the Napoleonic wars in part because of the issues that come from running a large navy, 311,000 dead which is higher then Russias 289,000.
@@flashgordon6670 Sure, but this video isn't about that.
@@Delogros I'm not saying picking favourable fights is a bad thing, it's the art of war even. But this video makes the argument that the main reason that the British won was at the tactical, battalion level. That maybe true in smaller conflicts but it isn't comparing apples to apples. The British Army could have fought a comparable sizer French force in the Walcheren Campaign but chose not to.
Hypothetically, if the size of the British army was increased and the Navy reduced, it would have a totally different character to the small army of the Peninsular campaign and they may not have been able to execute the volley and charge tactic reliably.
@@m0ltke582 In 50% of Wellingtons victory's he was out numbered, for Napoleon that is less then 30% so Wellignton fought in not ideal situations from time to time when he had to and there are a fair few examples of outnumbered and sometimes heavily outnumbered British infantry performing very well in particular at the battle of Barrosa under general Grayham.
Vitoria onward the British committed about 70,000 men to south west Europe in Wellingotns army, 5,000 at Gibralter and another 14,000 or so under Murray of the 300,000 or so in the British army at the time while also fighting the united states.
I find it fairly interesting that Wellington tried to have multiple converging attacks at Vitoria rather then simply using his army as a large hammer to smash through the French army, the complexity and timing requirments of his plan for the battle is fairly insane, sadly let down by some of his subordinates but I find it interesting because Napoleon rarely allowed such independance to his commanders in his battles unless he really really trusted them.
" They don't like it up 'em!"… Corporal Jones.
Great video, very well put together.
The thing is, you're only looking at local tactics and there's a much bigger picture.
The British Army was much better able to conserve experienced soldiers than any of the other European armies, which suffered far greater losses and had to rely on fresh conscripts. In the French Army, this had a devastating effect on military capability after 1809. By keeping a relatively small army and using it sparingly (mostly relying on the power of both the Royal Navy and the British economy to win the war), the British Army was able to maintain a small, well-trained and experienced force that could not compete with the French by itself, but with the help of other allies, could hold its ground well in battle.
The British Army also never suffered from the same large-scale logistical failures that devastated Napoleon's forces on various occasions.
I agree, the video does only look at local tactics, which is what it's entire purpose is. The video never tries to be anything other than that.
To cover this topic 'thoroughly' with any sense of justice is beyond my capabilities to condense into a single video, lest it be 10+ hours long. There are soooo many factors at play that enabled the defeat of Napoleon, that it will take many videos and many long hours of research in order to even attempt to cover it in any detail. :)
An Army Marches on its stomach stated Napoleon.
English Breakfast.
Eggs bacon sausage toms mushrooms black pudding fried slice tea.
French Breakfast
A croissant.
😂
Sure, can you find ot in Spain or Portugal?
@@goltandburlach Yes but the sausages taste different.
He was referring to Fuzxy Wuzzies not the French.
Don't forget about the beans.
Looking through your comments, i see some that object with your video title and seem to not have watched the whole video. This is great work, better and more concise than others while also being detailed and logical. Your debubking of old long-held ideas is top notch. Keep up the work and i hope to see more videos out on further topics, this channel seems to be a hidden gem. I myself want to make a series discussing the waterloo campaign, and i hope to produce something as nuanced and intelligent as this.
Oh yeah? Then read this my reply to the video creator.
it was in Sharpe’s Company that he trained the South Essex raw recruits, to fire 3 rounds a minute, not the entire British army.
At Waterloo, it was the new Shrapnel shells technology, fired by the British cannons that devastated the French infantry columns.
After the battle, there were many French shell shock victims, laying and shaking, from the storms of exploding shrapnel shells, above the French columns. You failed to mention this in the video.
Also in the Spanish peninsula campaign especially and elsewhere, it was the Logistics and supplies of food, equipment and ammunition that gave Britain’s armies the edge over the French,
It don’t matter how many rounds you can fire a minute, your accuracy and battle tactics, if you’ve got worn out muskets, equipment, no boots on and no bullets to fire, and hardly any food in your belly.
The French were forced to live off the land, which diminished their morale and made them exceedingly unpopular with the Spanish population.
The French tried to oppress the Spanish citizens with brutality. While the British won their hearts and minds. These are the key factors, for winning long campaigns that the French were unable to contend with.
The Royal Navy brought an endless river of supplies, equipment and armies of farm animals, as well as that all important lubricant for the wheels of a war machine, Gold.
The French were all about taking whatever they could get, ransacking the churches, cathedrals and monasteries, stealing artwork, statues and all the precious metals and jewels that they could find.
They were also hated by the Spanish catholics, for their godlessness, and their exploiting and abusive ways.
At Waterloo, much of Britain’s army was made of Dutch and Irish , all Britain’s regiments were hardened veterans. By that time, most of the French general infantry were young boys. Who were conscripted to replace the lost and fallen, of le grande armee.
You failed to mention these crucial factors.
The video is about the tactical battle between the British and French infantry, all of the factors that you listed above, whilst obviously important, are both beyond the scope of the video and not really relevant to the topic at hand, which is why I didn't mention them. It wasn't out of ignorance but lack of time. To discuss ALL the various factors involved in the defeat of Napoleon is going to take many, many videos, and cannot be covered in a half hour dialogue.
I'll address some of the claims that you make here however, at least to the best of my current knowledge, as you're clearly a fellow student of the period.
In terms of Waterloo, the French army actually consisted of many veterans who had been released from prisoner of war camps in the year previous. It was the armies of 1813 and 1814 that were mainly raw recruits, and even they fought well. The shrapnel shells were also less impactful than is imagined. Wellington didn't particularly rate them, and their accuracy is debatable as the fuse had to be cut perfectly for the shell to explode in the correct location in order to shower the enemy with the shrapnel. If they did hit they were devastating, but cut too short or too long and they were almost useless. They were also first used in the Peninsular and not at Waterloo. The Anglo-Allied army at Waterloo consisted of many different nationalities, all of varying quality, some of which had even fought for Napoleon in previous years. Whilst some of the British regiments were veterans from the Peninsula, for some, such as the Scots Greys, Waterloo was actually their first ever battle.
You are right about the logistical side being a vital factor, but the French weren't not completely useless here, nor were they total savages in Spain. Certainly no angels, absolutely not, but Marshal Suchet for instance does well and seems to make peace with the general populace as well as quell the Guerrilla problem in his area. So it isn't as black and white as it appears.
A very nice summary of the tactical issues as currently understood. Many thanks.
Excellent. I am working on a Waterloo campaign game and Napoleonic (and American Civil War) corps level system for a good publisher and this gets my thumbs up. Dropping you a subscription.
You forgot one important contribution to the British Army success, specially during the Peninsular War. The Portuguese. Not only did they burned out their own country under Wellington ‘s request (lines of Torres Vedras) in order to make life unbearable for the French, the Portuguese militia (ordenanças) made sure their suffering be even greater and very important, at least 30% of the British Army was Portuguese (not forgetting crack marksmen caçadores). Lastly, Wellington branded the Portuguese as the fighting cocks of the British Army.
@@TimSerras as they should of been when fighting for their own country.
Yep. And he trusted them too. He often held the Spanish battalions back from a fight, because they were not reliable as soon as they saw a chance to stop fighting, and start looting and raping. He never did that with the Portuguese.
One of the first things Wellington did in 1815 when taking command of the Allied army in what would become Belgium was write a letter to the Portugese government asking them for 14,000 troops, he had great respect for the Portugese army particularly the light infantry.
It is however worth pointing out that about 1/3 of the officers where actually British and the portugese army as well as being financed by the British (which is fair enough) was also trained to British standards after their arrival in 1808, none of that does anything to diminish their contribution but context is important.
Yep Wellington fought a great campaign in Iberia, using Protugese soldiers and essentially building up the Portugese Army into an extension of the British Army. Definitely not forgotten. One of Wellington's greatest strenghts was the ability to form an army from various nationalities into a cohesive and efficient force (shown throughout his career from india to Waterloo.)
@@markdavids2511 the Portuguese have always been formidable sailors and soldiers . Tough as f******g nails . One of the great seafaring nations of the world. Like the Venetians , the only roads that they had , was the sea .
First class video. Totally enjoyed,well done
Sources cited within the first couple minutes.
Great video! Happily subscribed
Highly impressed with this video and research. Rare to have details like this on YT for this era of history. Well done!
Great video, a lot of research and delivered in an easy to understand format.
You do us all a disservice by forgetting that it was Jack, in the main, who defeated boney.
Great video busting many myths about the British army...
I would love for this to be a series that covers every coalition army!!!
Every army that’s ever existed in all humanity since the dawn of history.
Intuitively, if you shoot first you get them before they get you. You won't get all of them, not even close, but there's less to shoot back at you.
Perhaps that's why armies tended to shoot at too far a range? Unless they're very disciplined, i.e. more scared of their own officers than the enemy.
So many people in the comments absolutely seething at any glories of Britain's past.
The language they're writing in to communicate these falsehoods is ironic enough.
Great video. Sound - you need to do a sound clean. Remove background/ambient sounds. Watch a video about that on UA-cam for the program you are using.
Exceptional work. Don’t let little things like sound cleaning reduce your excellence.
Honestly, you’ll be astonished at the quality increase with this tiny tiny process.
Actually British at Maida, Barrosa and continuously under Wellington, bettered French (except at Waterloo where they were saved by the Prussians). All other British armies were beaten at tactical level in Netherland 1798 Southern and Eastern Spain 1813-1814 Netherland 1814. British had very sturdy infantry, but not the swiftness of combined maneuvers of French infantry, cavalry, artillery. That's why Wellington carefully lined his army on high ground on a narrow front with stronghold to avoid being over flanked (and it nearly happened to him at Buçaco and Fuentes de Onoro)
First class. The stoicism of the Redcoat though was played down but another factor was the British army was a regular army, professional and often facing mass conscript troops which the cocky Brits looked down on giving them a sense of superiority. They had a certain hubris that stemmed way back to Blenheim.
After all the beatings of the early peninsula hubris, not really the "professional army hubris is much later thing 1850s and later Wellington considered his troops scum and in most case was not far off. Experienced in fights and differences from others in Europe (volunteering rather than conscripted conscripted)
@@goltandburlachyou are completely wrong 😂😂😂
@goltandburlach Wellington looked down on his men sometimes because they were poor men joining the army for coin, and he was a rich aristocrat, so there was a wide gulf in manners between the two.
@@goltandburlach People quote that in perfect ignorance of the context :
Vitoria1813. A total victory had been achieved and Wellington ordered a pursuit. Accordingly the cavalry went forwards and the infantry pressed on, they got to the massive French baggage train, blocking the road to France.
Here most of the soldiers began looting, no rearguard could have been more effective and the French army was saved.
*(Remember these soldiers were lucky to see the tiny amount were paid - ever - as the 'deductions' took most of it- and they were not permitted to loot or 'live off the land' as most other armies of the time were).
As the supposedly far more disciplined soldiers of Kaiser II did the very same thing when they captured the British Supply dumps around Albert (Somme) in 1918, one can be a little more understanding today than the peppery but very popular and never to be defeated Wellesley was when he saw his victory (at Vitoria) not culminating in the capture of the dissolved French force)*
Furious, Wellington wrote to the secretary of war, Lord Bathurst on 29 July 1813 that: “Our Vagabond Soldiers” had been “Totally knocked up”. A little later, 2 July 1813, he expanded on his theme: “It is quite impossible for me or any other man to command a British Army under the existing system. We have in the service the scum of the earth as common soldiers.”
Few could or should challenge his anger, this looting had no military excuse and went against all ideals of good conduct, however by the autumn he had seemingly forgotten the matter, writing proudly that his army was: “The most complete machine for its numbers now existing in Europe.” 21 Nov 1813. Here are a few other comments he made about those 'low brutes' :
The scum of the earth... but what fine soldiers we have made them.
I don't know what effect these men will have upon the enemy, but by God, they frighten me.
When other Generals make mistakes their armies are beaten; when I get into a hole, my men pull me out of it.
My heart is broken by the terrible loss I have sustained in my old friends and companions *and my poor soldiers*. Believe me, nothing except a battle lost can be half so melancholy as a battle won.
Considering he was part of the Nrmao-French aristocracy and talking about English peons, I suspect he grew very fond of those hard, brutal, STUBBORN men, English, Welsh, Scottish and Irish. (The Connaught's were a 'pet' of his - so they often ended up in the worst situation, (check Seringapatam and Waterloo, where he kept them in very similar and deadly circumstances, because he knew they would stand it)
I think you missed the part where the British didn’t even make up 1/3 of the forces present at Waterloo or Blenheim for that matter 😂. Waterloo was the British, Dutch, Brunswickers, hannoverians, and Nassau. Blenheim was literally THE ENTIRE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE(Habsburg Austria), the Dutch, Prussians, Hannoverians, Wurrtemberg (part of HRE), and auxiliary Danish troops. You really gotta look at things on a deeper level almost every British land victory over the French had 3rd party participants present on the British side, because France was too powerful on land to take by themselves
Good quality research. Actual thought put into a small youtube production, well done.
Some very good points. Makes me reconsider my belief based on the Cornwell novels. That would be devastating to have a valley in your face and from the smoke gleaming bayonets emerge. Terrifying.
Very well thought out and argued!
Its very interesting that British infantry tactics seem so similar in spirit to the Caroleans Sweden used over a century ago to punch above their weight as well. The power of morale/discipline and well timed shock
I read the French account, as described, in Berwick many years ago , it does not however complete the story, as it was the artillery 12lb that often were the amassed to thin the ranks, that the French would employ indirect firing , as well as cavalry to do the work of the British Bayonet charge. British artillery during Napoleonic used round and grapeshot ,as opposed to indirect round and explosive shot. The French artillery was very good ,but against targets reverse sloped also depended upon the ground . Soft ground made the indirect fire less effective , in both maneuver of the guns and effect of the explosive. Unfortunately by WW1 this direct vs indirect artillery use proved the undoing of the BEF, as much as the machine gun . Alan Mallinson, 1914 Fight the Good Fight, worth a read.
Indirect fire against a foe whose numbers and position is unseen is just a waste. This proves the worth of hiding on the back of a hill to save one's skin from Napoleon's guns
I don't think it's as cut and dried as this certainly the Royal Horse Artilery employed indirect fire at Waterloo, firing shrapnel at the advancing french troops.
Unless your research is better than Mallinson's , that is not to say they didn't have indirect fire shells Henry Shrapnel cases in evidence General Sir George Wood, Wellington’s artillery commander, went so far as to state, “Without Shrapnel’s shells, the recovery of the farmhouse at La Haye Sainte, a key position in the battle, would not have been possible.” ,just that they used the artillery in direct fire with canister more. That is what until WW1, the heavier guns and howitzers were considered less important than mobility in the field. It is the rule rather than exceptions, that many seem to get bouncing down rabbit holes looking for unicorns, to hold up as debunking the whole case?
An interesting video, with some good tactical analysis, especially the point about limited availability of cavalry in the Peninsular War. However, I am surprised that one additional more strategic factor is not addressed - the fact that the British did not engage the best or the bulk of the French Grande Armee. There were two reasons for this. First, as you acknowledge, the high water mark of French tactical capability, and therefore its success, was 1804-07, before the Peninsular War. By 1808-09, the effects of attrition had started to diminish the quality of the French Army, but even so Moore was quickly bundled out of Iberia when Napoleon led his best troops into Spain. Second, after 1808, Iberia was a secondary seat of operations to that of mainland Europe; Napoleon starved it of prime troops especially after 1811. Nor was French strength in the Peninsula focused only on Wellington’s Army; Spanish regular and irregular forces tied up vast numbers of troops, preventing their concentration against Wellington. By 1813-15, the French Army was a poor shadow of the 1805 vintage. Had Wellington’s Peninsular Army faced the Grande Armee of 1804-07, and certainly in any strength, then it too would likely have been bested. When it did so finally at Waterloo, the French cupboard was pretty bare. Nevertheless, the result was ‘close’ and, arguably, only secured by the intervention of the Prussian’s from mid-afternoon onwards. More myths to be busted!
Great comment! Thanks, and I agree with much of what you've said. It certainly would have been interesting if the 'prime' Grand Armee, led by Napoleon, would have faced Wellington's 'Peninsular Veterans', though I think we would both agree who the likely winner would have been.
Spain was the primary and, in fact, the main front from 1809 to 1812.
Whatever - Napoleon faced Wellington - who was undefeated in any major action, and he went down. Napoleon himself rated the general as the most important soldier in an army. Go figure again.
@@RussianEagles This is not borne out by French dispositions, which demonstrate that Napoleon’s main concern was to stabilise Central Europe. Even so, it is notable that Wellington’s Army was driven back onto the Lisbon peninsula in 1810 and did not get out of Portugal until after Napoleon had stripped out French forces in Spain for his Russian campaign.
@@patrickkelly6691 Clearly I should not have doubted the powers of an (Anglo) Irish general. I shall have to sharpen my wits against such implacable logic.
Don't forget that the Swedes continued on with the innovations of GAII, with the Carolean infantry using similar tactic to even more devastating effect until 1721 and even later.
Good informed video
Good video: very thorough and without being too long-winded.
Excellent ideas in your video, not sure about some ideas but you give pause for thought.
Like a great many, I believed the myths. As a retired military person, I 'm glad I've been educated. Thanks. Your explanation makes absolute sense.
Very well argued!Well done!
Excellent essay. Well researched and presented. I look forward to seeing how this channel develops. 👍
Due to Nelson's navy keeping the French and Spanish bottled up in port, both the opposing navies were ill-practiced in both gunnery and seamanship, with some allied ships only managing 1 round per minute from their cannons. British warships conversely extensively drilled for speed and accuracy, both will full and partial gun crews to simulate losses. Ships captains are often reported to purchase private stocks of powder and shot to enable additional training at sea.
Thouroughly enjoyable video.
It seems to me that you describe the psychological impact very well - including that of the soundscape:
The French view...
Advancing from their form-up line after an indirect artillery preparation that left them a lot of ground to cover, so they started pot-shots that weakened their formation;
The meeting with skirmishers, direct artillery fire - but the stoic silence of the British Infantry holding fire as the French crested the hill;
That close range volley hitting you like artillery, and out of the smoke, three cheers followed by a bayonet charge.
Look at it from the English side:
Your officers have put you behind a hill, protecting you;
Your officers are out to the front, placing themselves at risk, getting eyes on what is happening;
The enemy crests the hill with their formation straggling as they try to reload and catch up with each other, so their fire-power - and smoke - is thinned;
You see them go down under your volley and cheer, and before the smoke has cleared, you have at them with your bayonet.
That would work. I'm with your line of thought.
The faster rate of naval gunfire meant the 64 gun HMS Africa could, at one point, engage the Spanish flagship Santisima Trinidad of 140 guns.
I agree with your observation that the British tended to deploy even more skirmishers than the French was key to the British success in the Peninsular battles. Talavera being a great example of this. The heavy deployment of British lights at times confused the French into an early deployment into line from column. They often commented on having "defeated the first British line, only to me overthrown by an unexpected second line". That second line, holding its fire until close range followed by a quick disciplined bayonet charge repeatedly broke the French advance.
I'm fairly sure the British never beat Napoleon, and before Waterloo is mentioned what happened was that Wellington managed to hold him off on ground he had chosen until the Prussians arrived.
It'd also be interesting to know what percentage were Irish, forced by poverty and Scottish,due to the Highland clearances.
So Wellington had a battle plan to be the Anvil and held against significantly better and more organised French forces then, sounds liek a win to me to be honest - If the Prussian arrival was a suprise I might agree with you Wellingto held as he was emant to and has as much right as anyone else to clainm ther ccredit for the victory.
Great video.
Thanks for this video. An interesting line of argument. I agree with much of what you say. I'd like to offer a few observations:
1. When French infantry were deployed in line they showed as much grit and stoicism as the allied troops (in the Peninsular) e.g. Fuentes.
2. I agree with your emphasis on morale. Allied field and general officers were very good at judging when an enemy formation was ready to break ...
3. ... which leads to the point that the allied formations did not always volley then charge. There are plenty of accounts of more protracted platoon firing before the charge was made (i.e. one volley was not necessarily sufficient) ...
4. ... which then suggests you may have begged the line v column debate: because again there are plenty of accounts of; (a) the line wrapping around the head of a column; and (b) columns attempting to deploy under fire but failing.
Personally I believe the controversy is in the nature of the question. It is one of those hypothetical "x was better than y" comparisons and to my mind they always ignore the context. A French infantry attack only ever met an Allied infantry defence in the context of a multitude of interrelated factors. Someone mentioned below the degradation of the French Army - and even that sits within the context of a nation so traumatised by decades of war that when the Allied army entered France the local people did not complain! I have read the argument that, by 1815, Napoleon headed an already failed social, economic and political system; and that this was reflected in a hamstrung general command system (certainly evident in Spain).
Someone else mentioned Wellington himself. He had an untold impact on the morale of Anglo-Portugese soldiers (e.g. his reception at Sorauren). Even a Spanish force held off Soult's attempt to relieve San Sebastian (1813). It could be argued the French armies in western Spain began to lose faith in themselves after Bussaco; and that after Salamanca even the Generals had lost their self-confidence. I could go on.
One of the things which always strikes me when reading the personal accounts of the Peninsular is the quality of tactical decision making by Allied field officers and brigade commanders. They seemed to know how to manoevre and deploy so as to create a local superiority of firepower, and how and when to exploit a brittle enemy formation. It's funny that Wellington is criticised for failing to allow subordinates the latitude to act independently, but he had a knack for placing formations in the right time and place, so they could do the job they became so good at.
Finally, I think it's worth listening to Wellington's own opinion. Even in 1808 (in his personal correspondence with Castlereagh for example) Wellington believes he can beat the French: and his justification? Line versus Column.
Thank you for an excellent, and well balanced, summary of the key points.
"Well balanced"
Nonsense
@@fintonmainz7845 i see your other negative comments in the chat. If you can not respect my opinion i suggest you do not comment further. Good day sir.
@@robgazzard4432 if you cannot bear to be corrected when you're wrong: I would suggest that you don't interact with other people.
Bye now
@fintonmainz7845 given I was expressing an opinion it can not be wrong. People dislike trolls, so I would advise you keep you unwelcome thoughts to yourself.
@@robgazzard4432 I'm not the cause of your problems bob
One other factor - powder. THe Brits developed separate gunpowder as opposed to black powder blasting powder. Thi9 inolved purer materials. Better chemistry knowledge. Finer grains packed more closely chopped finely and ""corned"" (had it's corners knocked off in a tumbling action). Giving a powder that had air inclose contact witn the carbon, solphur and salpeter. Those changes plus the introduction of a small controlled amount of water resulted in a powder that was slower burning, more completely combusted with a slower process overall
Giving musketry volleys that were more energetic, more predictable as to recoil
Resultting in the English cartridge of 1853 or so
An excellent coverage - thank you - but - somewhere in an Infantry Field Manual of the time, I formed a slightly different opinion of the "volley fire". Yes, volley and charge - but a slightly different emphasis.
TLDR.
Assuming full strength battalions - circa six companies of 100 +/- 20. The "Colour" company was smaller - perhaps 50 men around the Ensign and the Regimental colour. The Colonel being in command.
A battalion would deploy in two lines - the men one arms-length apart (as still today). with the rear rank then taking half a pace to fill the space between the men in the front rank.
The battalions would be arrayed with the light company on the left flank and the grenadier company on the right flank. The Colour company in the centre - with usually three companies deployed either side. The Light company would deploy forward as skirmishers, falling back as the enemy advanced, then falling back into line on their left flank positions.
At the appropriate moment - the Colonel would give the order to fire to the front rank of the Colours .... with the companies on either side taking fire in succession. Then the rear rank would receive the order to fire - with the successional effect along the whole line.
Three rounds a minute was normal, with the first volley loaded of course - so perhaps four in the first minute or so. It might take something like fifteen seconds for the front rank to complete its whole volley - with the centre (rear rank) volleying after (say) ten seconds.
This continuous run of fire would account for both the French and the Americans reporting that it was like someone running a stock down a picket fence.
Then - the bayonet charge - once the Colonel judged that the enemy was suitably confused.
Three ranks - and sometime four if there were sufficient men - was the usage for squares, as the front rank was kneeling. As I remember - the two standing ranks fired volleys into the approaching cavalry (much as described), firing at approx. 100 yards (horses are bigger and the aim point was the horse), then at say 60 yards with a final - double volley - including the kneeling rank, who then braced their weapons against their knees. Horses don't like sharp pointy things.
Finally - the point of aim. I don't know when it began, it may well have been Marlborough (or before), but the chant of the sergeants was "Aim for the balls" (and heaven help the soldier that aimed high). I note that this was still the chant of the sergeants in my Service days .... albeit some 150 years later.
Such a fantastic video, so well researched and preset es and yet like every English UA-camr talking history of this period, completely unable to look up the pronunciation of the name Dundas.
I've seen it said in many documentaries that the french struggled to maintain formations over distance, and really struggled to form line near the enemy.
Very interesting video! Regarding your wondering about other European powers utilizing this tactic of fire and charge, I have one possible example to give - and it's from a nation you did mention! In the late 17th Century and early 18th Century, it was I believe a commonly used form of attack in the Swedish army. One or two volleys would be fired, from about 50 metres and then 30 metres, before charging. This was before bayonets had been adopted in the Swedish army, and so instead one in four or one in three men were armed with a shortened pike, while the rest drew swords. In at least one case (The battle of Fraustadt 1706, it's the one I have a book on so I know more about it) cavalry units marched alongside the infantry and charged alongside them. It was maybe less refined than the British usage! I know of no instance of it being used for defence, and the Swedish forces tended to find either great success or catastrophic defeat.
There is a wikipedia article (I know, I know...) named 'Caroleans' if you want to read more about it in English. I'd recommend the book I've read, "Fraustadt 1706 - Ett fält färgat rött" by Oskar Sjöström, but unfortunately it doesn't seem like it was ever translated.
The Superiority of the Royal Navy over the French and Spanish navies during the Napoleonic Wars like those of the 18th Century was that the Fleet was at sea blockading French fleets in port keeping the British Tars at peak fitness, and perfrormance whilst repeated cannon practice from clearing the decks for action meant that not only was the average Royal navy ship able to clear for action faster than its opponents, with the possible exception of the Dutch Fleet, the Royal navy also practised gun drill and gunnery to minimise the time a warship could "Clear For Action" and deliver a heavier rate of Fire. The rather unique British practice of paying Prize Money for captured ships made many sailors and especially their officers, very rich - Especially for the smaller warships below the size of Frigate because they had vastly greater options for taking prizes. Indeed, for most of the most effective Royal Navy Officers such actions made their names and fortunes securing them fame and advancement in a service were advancement was on merit up to Post Captain and 'Buggins Turn' after that to Admiral with a few exceptions of very effective naval officers getting early appointment to admiral on merit.
The Fire Superiority and Fire Discipline of the British Infantryman does in fact go back to the English Civil War where two sides could blaze away at each other all day using the European Method of open files so that a row of Muskeeteers could either fire and retire to form a new back rank to load leaving the second row to fire and retire likewise OR for the front rank to fire and have the loaded rear rank pass through to the front to form a mew fire rank for the unit to fire and advance. Enormous quantities of expensive powder was consumed which was a major difficulty for the Royalists. At the same time Montroses Royalist Army in Scotland was winning victory after victory in Scotland by forming in 3 or 4 closely packed ranks and advancing very close to the enemy and firing a devastating first volley at very close range followed by dropping their muskets and charging home with their swords and targets to break their opponents. In England both sides and the Royalists mainly adopted a modified version of Montroses tactics by advancing to very close, less than 20 paces, with their musketeers in 3 or 4 closely packed carrying loaded muskets to advance quickly alongside their pikemen to fire a single massed volley at very close range followed by charging home with clubbed muskets alonside their pikemen - usually enough to break a regiment using conventional European Tactics. Against Cavalry the tactic was to hold fire to an even closer range, less than 10 paces, with 6 to 8 muskets firing at each mopunted man in the cavalries front rank - enough to bring down the entire front rank and saome of the second rank either stopping an enemy cavalry charge dead OR breaking a cavalry unit using a pistol caracole against them.
After the Civil War the New Model Army adopted the fire tactics under Cromwell in the wars against the enemies of the British Commonwealth. The fire tactics continued in the British Army after the Restoraration in an army continually at war from the end or the English Civil War to the peace of UItrecht, the Peace Treaties signed between April 1713 to February 1715 to end the War of the Spanish Succession also known in the UK as the Malburian wars.
Brtitish Fire discipline and Fire Tactics continually evolved between the end of the English Civil war and the end of the Seven Years War in 1763. The technological changes were the complete replacement of matchlock muskets requiring a slow burning match to fire the musket with firelock muskets using a flint to strike a spark to fire. The speed of loading and firing was improved by first replacing the wooden ramrood with an iron ramrod and then the 12 apostles with paper cartridges and improved musket drill reducing the number of steps and commands to fire and load a musket speeding up the rate of fire. The need for pikes was reduced and ended by introducing a Bayonet to fit to the musket to convert the musket to a spear - initially a plug bayonet that was pushed into the muzzle of the musket barrel preventing the musket being loaded and fired and then the ring baynet that fitted to the outside of the barrel allowing the musket to be loaded and fired with the bayonet attached.
Throughout the period from the end of the English Civil War to the end of the Seven Years War the French persisted in firing halted 4 ranks deep and opening fire at ranges in excess of 100 yards when the vast majority of musket balls would bury themselves in the ground short of their target causing minimal casualties whereas British Fire doctrine was to reserve fire until the range was less than 30 paces before firing a devastating first volley. Before the introduction fo iron ramrods and paper cartridges o facilitate efficient musket loading the charge to break the enemy would include pursuing the broken enemy BUT with efficient loading Battalions were required to halt on the enemy position and reload to face new enemies and especially the enemy second line to defeat them.
The British Army soon dropped the 4th rank as their presence was to replace casualties in the first 3 ranks that could fire with a very complicated manouvre to lock the first 3 ranks into a firing position so all 3 ranks could fire increasing the time taken between firing volleys - something not needed for a 2 deep line thereby increasing the rate of fire fo a 2 deep line.
Depending upon its fire discipline the battalions of the British Army carried out regular musket drills to ensure that in the heat of battle musket drill would be second nature to its men - The French Napoleonic armies did not bother with such live firing musket drills - I read somewhere that a French Recruit would complete his training firing a maximum of 10 individual rounds and not in a battalion firing exercise. The only other nation that carried out regular battalion firing exercises was the Prussian army often with targets comporising a cloth battalion frontage in which after each volley the number of holes was through the cloth were counted - I have the anaysis somewhere (I think in the Prussian Infantry Regulations of 1756) that proved very few bullets would hit an opposing battalion at ranges above 40 or 50 paces. The purpose of such target practice was to demonstrate to the offciers and men what an effective range was and where to point a levelled musket at that range for the fire to be effective.
With regard to Battalion Volley Fire it can only be used when a battalion is stationary and a reserved first volley is very effective against attacking Infantry and charging cavalry BUT cannot be used effectively in attack or against supporting cavalry BECAUSE supporting cavalry can charge home before the infantry is reloaded. For that reason the British and Prussian Armies adopted platoon fire with a battalion divided into 8 equal size fire platoons that keep up a continuous fire by firing in pairs. Platoon fire is ideal for keeping a continuous fire up whilst advancing or retiring and holding a reserve fire to use against charging cavalry.
The long peace of 25 years between the peace of Utrecht and the start of the War of the Austrian Succession meant the British Army had no battalion officers experienced in British fire tactics and British Infantry started the War of the Austrian Succession battalion volley firing at ranges over 100 tards like the French and lost their advantage over the French. British Battalion officers and their battalions had to learn the hard lessons of the previous 100 years again and when they did they could defeat the battalion volleying French foes with ease. In both the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War British Infantry were able to advance in line against multiple lines of French cavalry forcing them to charge and defeat the the frontal chage with devastating short range fire proving that well trained infantry could defeat charging cavalry whilst in Line - The Prussians also did the same against the Austrian Cavalry at Mollwitz in 1741.
Wellington's Peninuslar Army were well drilled and had regular battalion firing exercises so that Wellington could depend on the fire discipline of his infantry battalions in the heat of battle and for his battalion officers to make the correct use of that fire discipline in battle to defeat the French - Namely reserving the frist fire to 30 paces or less followed by an immediate bayonet charge against a shaken enemy.
I think it is worth noting that the Napoleonic tactics used by the French during the Napoleonic Wars were not developed by Napoleon BUT by the Ancien Regime Royal strategists such asJean-Baptiste Vaquette de Gribeauval; Jean-Pierre du Teil; Jacques Antoine Hippolyte; and Pierre-Joseph Bourcet - New thinking developed to find a way to defeat the British Infantry superiority on the battlefield against the Fremnch for the previous 100 years. They moved the French Army away from the Linear infantry tactics of Prussia and Britain dependant on musketry and emphasised the "flexible use of artillery" to dominate the battlefield and replace the fire power of the infantry and abandoned the cadenced slow marching in lines across the battlefield to maximise a unit's firepower in favour of rapid manouvre to attacking in columns and their specially developed "Ordre Mixte" for the French Demi-Brigades comprising a 3 battalions - the flanking battalions in Columns of Attack to provide the shock tactics supported by the firepower of the 3rd battalion deployed in line in the centre between the 2 battalions deployed in column. The second wave of the Old Guard attack at Waterloo was in Ordre Mixte comprising 3 battalions fo Grenadiers.
Thanks for such a detailed and interesting comment. I'm not going to address all of it because I feel I mentioned much of it in the video. However, one thing you state: 'Against Cavalry the tactic was to hold fire to an even closer range, less than 10 paces' is not likely because if a charging horse is brought down that close, its momentum will simply career into the defenders. 30 paces is the usual 'last chance' for firing at charging cavalry from what I've read, so as to avoid the wounded horse crashing into the formation.
In terms of the French tactics, I have a video discussing their development coming very soon, same with order-mixed. As for the Guard attack, the second wave was three battalions as you say, but it was made up of two chasseur and one grenadier battalion, all of which, as far as I'm aware, where in squares.
@@ATimeOfEagles He is correct if the soldiers have formed square, otherwise NOT, Horses are smarter than humans, they won't charge head on into a wall of spiky things. Ney tried that several times at Waterloo (thanks Ney)
At Garcia Hernandez, in the pursuit after Salamanca, the KGL Dragoons accidently broke a French square due to exactly this. The 6th Legere held their fire too long resulting in a wounded horse literally crashing into them and creating a gap which the rest of the dragoons quickly exploited, breaking up the square and routing the unit, with most of the men forced to surrender.
I take it you haven’t seen Ridley Scott, we were far better at trench warfare..
The field of Waterloo had more tents on it than Glastonbury according to that abomination of a film
How do you know? Were you there?
One of the problems is that it ignores the fact that many British victories were achieved by armies that were made up of Allied toops. At Waterloo over half of Wellington's army were not British.
Yes, but it was the British who played the key role in most parts of the battle.
Well yeh, but who played the main parts in battle and who led those armies?
You are right about army composition but ignore army ability
@@stephenelliott1135 Wellington based his defence around 2 strong points Hougoumont and La Haye Sante. Hougoumont was defended by British troops while La Hay Sante was manned by troops from the Kings German Legion. They played a crucial role in the battle.
@@dominiccassidy9708 Agreed but the initial proposition was "many British victories" which would include the whole peninsular war. The KGL was a very reliable part of Wellington's army.
@@dominiccassidy9708 As a side note the KGL was part of the british army, same as the Dutch or Polish in the French Guard or the French forign legioon today yet I never hear anyone saying those troops aren't part of the French army, it seems to be solely reserved for British army forign formations which is all just a bit odd don't you think?
“Three to their two, as usual”, as said by Lt. Bush to Captain Hornblower in, I think ‘A Ship of the Line”, was definitely the perception of British vs. French gunnery in the Napoleonic Wars. The reasons are many but the most important are that the British fleet spent much longer at sea and could exercise at the guns more, and having India, with its priceless supply of high quality saltpetre, especially from Bihar, the British had more and better gunpowder than the French. That enabled more practice on cost and availability grounds, and the more consistent quality of British gunpowder both made it easier to handle and meant that firing was more predictable. This led to more rapid loading and greater accuracy. Moreover, the British had naval gunnery enthusiasts such as Sir Philip Broke, who commanded HMS Shannon when she took USS Chesapeake in 1813, and innovated with weapons such as the carronade, which fired a very heavy ball over a short distance and which, if you had the confidence to get in close, was devastating.
Very interesting, ty
@ 9:56
Here, my personal experience may help:
In terms of accuracy? It depends.
The earlier charge used for the Charleville is certainly more accurate than that of a Brown Bess. But that's not because of anything special regarding the Charleville. It's simply that the ball was a tighter fit (0.65'" for a 0.69" bore).
IIRC, the ball in Napoleon's time was, however, closer to 0.62" or 0.63". It's not a big difference, but that does, in fact, decrease accuracy quite noticeably beyond ~80 yards. It's not dramatic, but it's still noticeable.
If you compare that latter charge to the Brown Bess charge (0.69 in 0.75), then the two are actually about the same in accuracy. This is certainly what the Prussians observed in their weapons tests.
Of course, all this is from a mechanical standpoint and assumes the soldier has gained mastery over either weapon. It tells us nothing about how easy it is to aim either weapon. In this case, the cheek rest that the M1777 and its corrected version come with helps with the consistency of aim, and having a dedicated front sight (instead of one doing double duty as a bayonet lug) helps the recruit learn to aim with the M1777, faster than the Brown Bess (at least, that's my experience). But that's still relative: I find that both are not that hard to learn.
TBH, though, the M1777 and its corrected version are both superior to the Brown Bess, whatever the cartridge used. This is for reasons that have little to do with accuracy: they're easier to field strip and repair; they handle better (though admittedly, that's a low bar when it comes to muskets), and the construction is just stronger (and this for a variety of reasons). That's consistently been the case for French muskets since the 1720s in my experience: the muskets are better designed, easier to clean, fieldstrip, and repair, and just handle better (I own an M1746 French musket, as well as a long land pattern. No prizes for guessing which I prefer for sports shooting...)
I saw the title and all I could think was 'which time?'
Well researched and well presented. Minor point, but at 0:20, "undoubtedly" has no "b" for most folks in either British or US pronunciation. The 3d syllable is just "Ted" (or "Ded" if you're a fan of US-speak). That's followed by a "Lee." Thus sayeth the OED. Cheers.
An excellent vid.
The infantry pursuit of infantry from a ridge breaking their line followed by a Calvary counter charge... sounds very Hastings doesn't it?
0:39 What battle on 1806? Never heard of it.
Battle of Maida, 1806
Platoon volleys whereby each platoon fired after the one next to it meant that there was constant rolling fire along the entire length of a British line.
That wasnt a Thing exclusive to the brits and not a reason for theire Victorys.
The main reason for French success in the Napoleonic era is that the French moved quickly by supplying themselves from the land. They could catch their opponents unaware and inflict a defeat on them in this way. Secondly the French tactics was to press a flank hard until the centre of the enemy line was depleted and then send a huge force up the centre to smash it's way through. The British also moved quickly due to their better logistics and bought supplies from locals thus not alienating them in the process.
Advancing in column formation is easier than in line formation. You have better control with a column. However there is a trade off. You have to form into line before your attack and in front of enemy artillery and skirmishers. British skirmishers were superior in that we had that tradition form the American war of independence in the shape of The Rifles with better tactics and training. (P.S. The French were involved in that war as well supplying 80% of all american arms and ammunition.) The British were drilled relentlessly to be able to advance in line formation. So cannon was less effective in cutting down men than it was with the column formation. The British also tended to have better intelligence on French dispositions and movements because of their better relationship with locals. You kind of touched on this but the British were far less wasteful of British soldiers than the French were of French troops. France lost so many men in the Napoleonic wars that the average height of a French man fell by a few inches. The British also tended to fight on a ground of their choosing rather than of the French's. When the French picked the ground such as at Quatre Bra the French had success. Then there was Napoleon's presence. Napoleon was a good commander who tended to make the right decisions at the right time and if he made a mistake he could recover. That can not be said of his Marshals. They were indecisive in the main with only one offering any real ability in the Peninsular War.So really the short answer is that the British could stand up to the French tactics better and were better organised and better lead on the field than any other army in Europe in general.
Also, it did not reduce the firepower of a battalion to deploy in three ranks, because the regiments were trained to fire in this manner with the front rank kneeling so that all three ranks could fore at the same time. Some people say that three ranks could not all fire "Because the men in the rearmost rank would shoot the front rank in the back", but this is said usually by people who have no experience of linear musket drill and therefore are not aware that, whether in two ranks or in three ranks, the rear rack men extend their right foot out so as to clear the path for their muskets to fire.
True enough - but FOUR Ranks? I don't even know of a fire drill for that - willing to be 'informed' though
The drill for four ranks is the same for three ranks, except the the front two ranks both kneel. Infantry battalions form four ranks when forming square.
@@patrickkelly6691 The drill for forming fours is simple. The rear rank and the even numbered front rank files take a step backwards, then the even numbered rear rank file men take a second step backwards and the whole formation closes rank, usually dressing on the Colours.
A lack of belief in the effectiveness of the third rank was a view among contemporary generals. Even Napoleon himself, who rarely thought about small scale tactics, expressed doubt about it.
The problem is not shooting the first rank in the back, it's about interfering with the motions of reloading and the difficulty properly aiming for the third rank. At least some armies actually out the tallest soldiers in the front ranks to make them more impressive, which can't have helped.
The British charge was introduced by Wolfe, who saw its effectiveness as employed by the highlanders during the Jacobite uprising.
He incorporated it into British methods in Canada.
It wasn't at all effective at Culloden when it ran onto the bayonet points of the Gov forces soldiers (mostly Scottish themselves)
The Bayonet Drill developed by the British Army which crushed the Highlanders was actually the real root of the volley and charge tactic.
@patrickkelly6691 The Bayonet drill is another myth. Sword and targe was a lot more effective up close and personal than a heavy musket with a bayonet on the end, though most of the Jacobites themselves had muskets as their main weapon and only a few carried swords.
The British Cavalry were actually one of the decisive factors at Culloden.
@@patrickkelly6691 except that they did not charge.
@@nutyyyy Wolfe noticed that the charge worked every time up to Culloden. The bayonet charge is the same thing with a different weapon. No tactic is infallible.
Thank you
This reminds me of Swedish tactics in the Great Northern War. The swedes were known for devastating shock tactics.
Britain: Oi
France: Oui
800 years of war
This is corroborated by musket balls have inaccuracy that scales disproportionately with range. With modern firearms their dispersion is proportional with distance, so if a spread of 1 inch at 100m it'll be 2 inches at 200m and 5 inches at 500m and so on, but a musket ball's asymmetric rotation in flight causes the accuracy to get disproportionately worse at longer range. So a fist-sized group at 50 yards would be a group as wide as a man is tall at 100 yards, and at several hundred yards the dispersion had the unusual quality of a "doughnut shaped" dispersion pattern, so no shots land in an area that you aim but cluster in an ring shaped pattern.
So shooting at 50 yards is likely to be so accurate that not only will all bullets hit but they're also likely to hit at around chest height, this fire would be devastating.
Exactly! Which is why when French sources comment on the impressive British 'firepower', it is to this devastating effect that they likely refer, and not to the rate of fire as many historians have unfortunately believed and too often repeated.
Regarding the statement at 27:22, where not the swedes in the early 1700s under Charles XII employing a similar tactic? The Caroleans where instructed to march upon the enemy until they could see the whites in their eyes and then fire. Immediately followed by an attack with cold steel. 80-ish years after Gustavus Adolphus.
In Sweden we regard the cold steel and the mentality of "gå på" as the factors gaining us the advantage in the first half of the Great Northern War.
With a bit of help from the Prussians, the Dutch, the Belgiums, Germans …
The video isn't about Waterloo my guy, also Belgium didn't exist at the time.
@@Delogros tallyhoo
@@robertschriek1353 *Tally-ho
Hi Gary
A pronunciation tip
Kerala. K RA LA. Would do.
At the moment you're saying Karala.
Yes,the French manoeuvred in column but,almost,always against the British,they were doing the attacking.Switching from column to line was a delicate matter as when best to do it.
I suspect it was more the British Training to wait till Enemy was too close to miss then aim low so as to miss less as well as reload fast that made the difference.
Drachinifel you tube for naval. British rations were twice that of french sailors, perhaps that explains the rate of fire. He even has a video where he recreates a week's rations. Did British soldiers eat more than the french?
ultimately i suspect, the reason is logistics and transportation; the british were rarely engaging the french main armies or fought where the french were strongest; the fighting in egypt and spain shows this best. Of course they did do it, but only rarely alone.
Napoleon was not the commander he had been, not even a year ago in 1814 where he had fought a a epic campaign against overwhelmingly powerful Allied armies. He allowed the French to squander their advantages, if the French had not attacked Wellington's defensive position, the day would have gone better for them. Wellington had created killing zones on the slopes in front of his position, due to the terrain, his army had some protection because of the Ridge were he could hide the bulk of his army. What was required was some tuning maneuver probably through Papelotte turning the British left and getting the French artillery onto the Ridge firing along the ridge not at it. Hougomont and La Haye Saint should have been left well alone. With the Second Corp dropping back to reserve to support the 1st Corp.
Cornwell often states the British were the only nation in the Napoleonic wars that practiced musketry with live ammunition
Also that the British fired by platoons or companies after the initial first volley, creating a machine gun effect of never ending firing.
The French were a conscript army hence the column attack tactic to overawe their opponents, the British a professional army were better at musketry.
1.The british werent the only ones to use live ammo for Training. Everybody did.
2. The french didnt use column for Attack all the time.
3. Fire by * Insert tactical unit* was done by everybody.
Surely the british praticed with live fire,where as the french did not! Further more the french lost a lot of the verts and had a lot of raw conscribes
Would it be reasonable to assume that compared to the other opponents of the French, they did not fight the British very often. Given that most European armies fought in a Prussian manner, the French trained their mostly conscript army to counter them instead of the British. So given their lack of focus on the British army, and the fact that the British were led by very competent commanders, who knew the strengths and weaknesses of their forces causes the British to have a very good combat record against them.
Short range volley followed by change. Sounds very Roman. Pilum and Gladius
10:11 The grenadier, who specializes in melee and shock combat, asking if it was a club is hilarious.
Edit: first timestamp was horrible.
One also has to consider that the british ususly faced the B Team while having massive Support from the portugese, spanish and spanish Guerillas. They also had the luxury of beeing the worlds strongest naval power and an Island. They could choose when and where to engage.
The naval power is also a handicap though has maintaining a navy of that size is expensive in men and money, in 1805 the Royal navy ate up more then 50% of british GDP for example.
@@Delogros
Worth every Pound though
@@vinz4066 Yes and no, don't really need an 800 ship navy when your enemy can barely muster 30 :) in terms of Empire building though certainly true.
@@Delogros
They didnt Just fight the enemy Navy though. They also Delivered weapons, Equipment and straight Up Money to theire allies. That was of utmost importance for the war effort as britan could never Beat France alone.
@@vinz4066 You could do deliveries with the merchant navy to be fair you don't needexpensive warships for that job just enough for escourts, No one could really beat France alone either.
With the Naval Gunners, it more often than not depended on the ships Captain whether the gunners managed a higher, same or potentially even lower rate of fire than the French or Spanish.
Many Captains were, shall we say a touch fixated with their crews gunnery, so many actually procured extra powder for gunnery training out of their own pocket. It was the crew of this type of Captain that were able to reach that three round a minute mark. Crews who were constantly drilled in almost all manner of weather to beat to quarters, lay their guns, and fire as rapidly as possible.
As you have probably worked out by now not all Captains did this, instead only drilling their gun crews according to the amount the regulations demanded.
As a result, yes its perfectly true that some of the better gunnery crews could indeed make three rounds a minute, they were not the majority. An important minority perhaps, but not the majority.
wonder if buckshot rather than ball would have been more effective from muskets at those ranges?
Probably not, and even if so, it wouldn't have been worth the loss of flexibility.
a lot of the myths you address sound like cases of circular sourced claims, unfortunately common in more popular military history and the wargaming hobby
Thanks I learned several things from this. But it was in Sharpe’s Company that he trained the South Essex raw recruits, to fire 3 rounds a minute, not the entire British army.
At Waterloo, it was the new Shrapnel shells technology, fired by the British cannons that devastated the French infantry columns.
After the battle, there were many French shell shock victims, laying and shaking, from the storms of exploding shrapnel shells, above the French columns. You failed to mention this in the video.
Also in the Spanish peninsula campaign especially and elsewhere, it was the Logistics and supplies of food, equipment and ammunition that gave Britain’s armies the edge over the French,
It don’t matter how many rounds you can fire a minute, your accuracy and battle tactics, if you’ve got worn out muskets, equipment, no boots on and no bullets to fire, and hardly any food in your belly.
The French were forced to live off the land, which diminished their morale and made them exceedingly unpopular with the Spanish population.
The French tried to oppress the Spanish citizens with brutality. While the British won their hearts and minds. These are the key factors, for winning long campaigns that the French were unable to contend with.
The Royal Navy brought an endless river of supplies, equipment and armies of farm animals, as well as that all important lubricant for the wheels of a war machine, Gold.
The French were all about taking whatever they could get, ransacking the churches, cathedrals and monasteries, stealing artwork, statues and all the precious metals and jewels that they could find.
They were also hated by the Spanish catholics, for their godlessness, and their exploiting and abusive ways.
At Waterloo, much of Britain’s army was made of Dutch and Irish , all Britain’s regiments were hardened veterans. By that time, most of the French general infantry were young boys. Who were conscripted to replace the lost and fallen, of le grande armee.
You failed to mention these crucial factors.
The video is about the tactical battle between the British and French infantry, all of the factors that you listed above, whilst obviously important, are both beyond the scope of the video and not really relevant to the topic at hand, which is why I didn't mention them. It wasn't out of ignorance but lack of time. To discuss ALL the various factors involved in the defeat of Napoleon is going to take many, many videos, and cannot be covered in a half hour dialogue.
I'll address some of the claims that you make here however, at least to the best of my current knowledge, as you're clearly a fellow student of the period.
In terms of Waterloo, the French army actually consisted of many veterans who had been released from prisoner of war camps in the year previous. It was the armies of 1813 and 1814 that were mainly raw recruits, and even they fought well. The shrapnel shells were also less impactful than is imagined. Wellington didn't particularly rate them, and their accuracy is debatable as the fuse had to be cut perfectly for the shell to explode in the correct location in order to shower the enemy with the shrapnel. If they did hit they were devastating, but cut too short or too long and they were almost useless. They were also first used in the Peninsular and not at Waterloo. The Anglo-Allied army at Waterloo consisted of many different nationalities, all of varying quality, some of which had even fought for Napoleon in previous years. Whilst some of the British regiments were veterans from the Peninsula, for some, such as the Scots Greys, Waterloo was actually their first ever battle.
You are right about the logistical side being a vital factor, but the French weren't not completely useless here, nor were they total savages in Spain. Certainly no angels, absolutely not, but Marshal Suchet for instance does well and seems to make peace with the general populace as well as quell the Guerrilla problem in his area. So it isn't as black and white as it appears.
If this is the case do u think the French could have made great use of this themselves during the Napoleonic wars in general or were the circumstances so different that only the British had more opportunities to use such deadly close quarters morale breaking tactics
A good question, but one that I think lacks a definitive answer, or at least so far as my current knowledge and understanding allows, however I'll give my thoughts:
Interestingly, Marshal Ney does actually call for a similar technique in his military writings around 1804/5:
‘It would be better, therefore, after the two first ranks have fired, to charge boldly with the bayonet, and by an act of vigour force the enemy to retreat.’
As for why the French didn’t utilise it, I think the higher cavalry threat certainly played a role, but also the declining quality of the French troops as the wars progressed didn’t help. They also had a system that was working for the most part everywhere else, so perhaps they didn’t feel the need to change it.
Plus, despite the British showing that it could be used on the offensive, generally the technique was most effective on the defensive, and for that reason I think that it simply may not have suited the French soldier, as Ney himself even admits to in the same writings:
‘The defensive system is ill calculated for the French soldier, unless his excitement be kept up by diversions and successive excursions.’
It is not to say that he couldn’t defend, but standing in silence waiting on the enemy to close was not in his nature. It could be done, as shown at Talavera, but generally he was just better suited to the offensive:
‘In offensive warfare, the French soldier has inexhaustible resources; his active genius, and his bravery in storming, double his energy...’
@@ATimeOfEaglesI see that’s a good way of putting and you are right the use of Calvary in central and Eastern Europe certainly rendered the tactic rather risky
If only those very same legendary French Calvary that made an impact at ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, Eylau and Friendland were present in Spain in greater numbers
Firing 3 rounds per minute was possible if the infantry was standing.
Blindfolded with one hand tied behind our back 😂
If my Patric o'Brien is correct, the navy hoped for three rounds every five minutes.
We hid all there garlic and salad dressing...ho.ho.ho
They lost confidence and morale due to a batch of garlic eclairs.
Again. As Churchill put it "we have beaten the French too many times for the to ever forgive us" Ok so we cheated and attacked them before the depluyed from column to line. Hey ho all's fair in war.
One problem with the French tactic was that advancing in column then moving into line ment changing formation right in front of and within range of the British line. This left them very vulnerable during the manoeuvre
The British were also good at use of ground. Often putting their line behind the crest of a hill protecting them from the French guns
It is most likely the British success was due to an accumulation of small advancements rather than one single factor and the margins between defeat and victory were sometimes very small
However the sources in the video establish quite how ineffective long range fire is and how the British would not waste their first best shot at such long range.
Subsequent shots at just less accurate, a well cleaned musket with a carefully measured charge and tapped down carefully but fully would be much more accurate than a ball and charge that was hastily loaded down a fouled bore.
Another benefit of firing at close range is you do not have to charge a great distance before you're upon them. If they were somehow to fire an accurate shot from 200 yards away then they'd have to charge 200 yards rather than only 20.
Cold steel and gin.
well, fix bayonets worked quite well in Iraq...
No it’s none of that. The real reason we won over the French is simple. We had Sharpe.
Why? One word; Wellington. Good video, subbed.
No sorry the Prussians arriving to save Wellingtons arse!! Go and do some proper research.
I’d say the fact that at this stage of the campaign the very best of the French troops lay dead in the vastness of Russia, might have had some bearing on the result of the war.
So Wellington was fighting the French all alone. Good to know.
@@thedon8772 That would only be a relavent point if the Prussians arriving wasn't part of the plan and the reason Wellington fought at Waterloo which it was, the Prussians also arrived late and fought barely 14,000 men of the French army, even after they arrived most of the French efforts where against the Anglo-Allied army.
One last thing to point out, by the time the Prussians arrived Wellington had held for longer then the Prussians managed at Ligney despite the Prussians enjoying a 16,000 man advantage and having more artillery while Wellington had almost 100 guns less and was outnumbered slightly, he also had 17,000 Dutch troops he didn't entirely trust given the history of the past 2 decades and an army that had to have orders issued in 5 languages... he did fine is my point.
La bataille la plus importante c'est la derniēre. Le soldat anglais était plus discipliné que le soldat francais pas plus courageux.
Dáccord
Fair comment. I don't believe any Briton would doubt the courage of the French armed forces then or now.