Skeptical Theism and the Problem of Evil | Dr. Perry Hendricks
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- Опубліковано 5 лип 2024
- Today I’m joined by Perry Hendricks to discuss skeptical theist responses to arguments from evil. We also cover seven objections to skeptical theism.
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OUTLINE
0:00 Intro
1:30 Problem of evil
2:10 Rowe’s ‘noseeum’ argument
5:44 Common sense argument
15:51 Draper’s Humean argument
18:51 Skeptical theism
20:01 Wykstra’s CORNEA
23:45 Bergmann’s skeptical theism
29:11 Deontological skeptical theism
36:45 Addressing Rowe’s argument
46:40 Addressing the common sense argument
54:41 Addressing Draper’s argument
56:18 Climenhaga’s objection
1:01:20 Draper’s objection
1:13:48 Damaging natural theology
1:18:16 Moral paralysis
1:21:36 Divine deception
1:27:20 Radical skepticism
1:31:25 Horrific world: a reductio?
1:36:25 Conclusion
RESOURCES
(1) Perry's website with all his papers: www.perryhendricks.com/
(2) Climenhaga's paper contra skeptical theism: philpapers.org/rec/CLIIWC
(3) Perry's forthcoming book, "Skeptical Theism": www.amazon.com/Skeptical-Palg...
(4) Perry's paper, "Deontological skeptical theism proved": www.cambridge.org/core/journa...
(5) Perry's paper, "We are not in the dark: refuting popular arguments against skeptical theism": scholarlypublishingcollective...
(6) My Springer book: (a) www.amazon.com/Existential-In... (b) link.springer.com/book/10.100...
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Wow Joe is like this evil person who is laughing at the horrors experienced by conscious creatures!!!
1:08:58 "Sophie has to make a choice. There is no way out of this" Sophie is limited by the confines of the reality she lives in. A god, if they exist, sets the parameters of reaility. Any "permissibility" is something they would choose to build into reality.
Excellent discussion on skeptical theism and the problem of evil.
Here's a thought. Even assuming a non-reductionist view of the epistemology of testimonial knowledge, could not the divine deception objection as applied to specifically biblical theism still go through? After all, while we may not need a positive reason to trust its deliverances as innocent until proven guilty, we are given a number of positive reasons (defeaters) in the form of repeated narratives strongly implying deception on the part of God. If the biblical content provides such a defeater, then it appears that the skeptical theist cannot presume testimonial innocence and may, as a result, lack justification for claims that have biblical justification only.
Further Edit: One argument often ignored in these discussions is J.H. Sobel's Bayesian Argument from Evil, which allegedly fixes some of the issues in Rowe's original argument. Would be curious to see how skeptical theists engage that argument.
In contemplating the divine deception objection, it's crucial to acknowledge the limitations of our human perspective. As finite beings, we're confined to our own understanding, which may not encompass the entirety of divine intentions. What might appear as deception from our vantage point could potentially serve a purpose beyond our comprehension. The divine plan might involve intricate layers of wisdom that extend far beyond our ability to discern. Thus, while we encounter narratives that seemingly imply deception, it's wise to exercise humility in our judgment and recognize that the nature of the divine is profoundly intricate, often transcending our understanding. As skeptical theists, we are called to embrace a position of trust and acknowledge that our finite viewpoint might not capture the full scope of divine intentions.
@@barry.anderberg ok
@@barry.anderberg No offense meant, but doesn't taking that kinda stance sound a bit too much like blind trust for a supposed "skeptical theist"?
@@bigchungus6827 Trust in what?
@@barry.anderberg The last sentence in your comment.
I've talked about this with Perry before, but I don't think he gives a clear reply to the hell world reductio or attempts to take it seriously.
The thought is this: It's obvious that if we lived in hell world, the fact that we lived in such a horrible world should be public evidence against God, and so any view on which this wouldn't be true should be rejected.
Perry's reply is that 'we can justify atheism in some other way'. That is ambiguous. If he means there is some other justification unrelated to the quality or distribution of evils in that world, it's not relevant to the reductio. If it is related to those evils, the crucial question Perry doesn't answer is what exactly that 'way' is. According to Perry, *all known, plausible ways for showing that evil is public evidence against the existence of God whether it is Rowe's, Draper's, Sterba's, etc. fail*. So what possible justification would there be in hell world? So long as hell world is built the right way, nothing about it would change our relationship to God's reasons. The obviously plausible routes are screened off in that world for the same reason they are in ours, if he is right about skeptical theism. The challenge Perry has is to provide some alternative route by which hell world would be unlikely on theism that would not hold in our world. I think the reason Perry is remaining coy about the answer is this: it's obvious that the way we would justify the improbability of hell world on theism is just the same as the way we justify the improbability of particular facts about good and evil in our world. But, Perry cannot accept this. Now, his book is not out yet, so maybe he provides a good reason that won't also work in our world there. I will eagerly await that route! That being said, I read his thesis, and his proposal for how to generate predictions on theism had no obvious bearing on this question, so I'm not too hopeful.
Another interpretation of Perry's response is that he agrees that there wouldn't be a good way to argue that hell world is evidence against God's existence. This is somewhat suggested by his analogy with the holocaust and the child. In this case, that's all good and well, but he is biting the bullet: he's admitting that irrespective of what kind/quality of evils exist, that would fail to be public evidence against God's existence. I don't think that's a viable view.
Yeah, I felt Perry failed to give any coherent answer in that part.
When he likened the scenario to child living through a holocaust, as if that somehow wasn't a point against him, I was rather baffled. It is a shame that Joe was so tired at that point that Perry's response went trough without any push back.
Why do you think it is not a viable view ?
Yeah I have interacted with him quite a bit and he has a big ego and can be quite an ass.
This channel is gold
0:45 As Perry said, he has nothing to say and was only answering your question. It was you who made him clarify that.
Mainly here for Joe and Perry's zoom names
Omg those are amazing😭
They had to cut the original intro because Joe was like "Welcome back to The Majesty of Reason. I'm Joe. 'Joe who?' you may ask? Why, Joe Mama, of course!"
If god is supposed to be omnipotent there are no "reasons" external to itself. That means it set the "reasons" as it desired. Which means, if evil is "necessary", it is so because god desired it to be
⭕️
That's only if omnipotence can produce paradoxes. If paradoxes are not physically producible then God cannot control all reasons, for example humility would be impossible if there were no greater things to feel humble about if everything was perfect there would be no greater things.
@@theintelligentmilkjug944 That would mean there are norms that supersede god (that he is not able to control or change). Then god wouldn't be omnipotent, would he?
@@mdl9224 Not if physical paradoxes can't exist, which I'm inclined to believe they can't. Paradoxes aren't really a norm in fact they are the opposite of norms if we encountered a paradox that means we made a mistake in reasoning. Even if paradoxes do physically exist calling them beyond God would be a little strange because they're inconsistent and God is consistent by being all good and all powerful making him all orderly (consistent). Therefore, God creating a paradox is like God creating evil they don't mix.
@@theintelligentmilkjug944 Again, if there are rules to reality that god doesn't have power to change (aka: potency) that means god is not omnipotent. Or are we all omnipotent because we can do everything that we are able to do?
Was just having this argument the other day. Should be fun.
As a non native speaker iam not sure i understood everything correct, but iam under the impression that i just heard "God works in Mysterious Ways" in all sorts of flavours :D
I feel like the two "best" rejoinders for the Problem of Evil are:
- god isn't worried about the prevention of suffering (which seems problematic)
- god has good reasons to tolerate suffering (which, as you put it, amounts to "mysterious ways")
I'll translate: He actually said, 'my book works in mysterious ways.'
@@scottsmith8687 lol
@@shassett79 I always feel that "mysterious ways" is very bad for the christian god, cause you have to add the threat of infinite torture every time someone stops believing because of the mysterious ways
what an oversimplification of such a deep discussion
I don't get it. Why didn't Perry like the hell world argument?
He just said you could run other arguments for atheism in such a world. Well, sure... But
Isn't the point is supposed to be that if you could be a sceptical theist in that world, then there seems to be something odd about sceptical theism?
Yeah. It is a real shame That MR was too tired to give any pushback at that point. Perry gave such an non-answer.
@@Trombi01 Getting some more time to think on it, it just gets more upsetting.
The sceptical theist in hell world could do the same moves Perry is making:
*Incredulous stare*
"It just 'seems' to you being boiled in lava forever is gratuitous evil? C'mon man.."
"Are you really thinking about deontological gratuity means?"
"What you mean is that being boiled in lava seems really bad."
@@olexalex8874 Yeah, he has thrown away his capacity to call anything gratuitous evil. Which is convenient, as that keeps his God safe, even if it comes at a cost of him apearing incredibly unreasonable.
This was a fantastic video. Perry is doing a debate at my college this week so I’ve been watching some videos with him in it and I have to say this was an awesome one! Your a pretty talented philosophical interviewer. This was a much better one than the Capturing Christianity’s and I’m a big fan of that channel.
Thanks❤️
Thanks for the bayesian breakdown, i think it really helped to point out (implicitly) that the god of the gaps argument (or in this case, god's reasons for evil of the gaps...a less elegant name, i know) is just not a convincing argument. "Well we uh just dont know why god would allow these things but we gotta assume that he has good reasons."
Exactly. "God's reasons for evil of the gaps" is the perfect way to describe the argument. At best it makes God possible, but it still leaves God extremely unlikely. It's not an argument that would ever convince an atheist or agnostic. It's the kind of argument that you would only buy if you already believe in God for other reasons, and just want to defend that belief against the "problem of evil" objection.
So much in this one, will probably have to listen a few times
Love Dr.Hendricks, he's Perry funny.
When you're wrapping up your interviews, you should plug your guest (e.g. name, book, bio, channel, etc.) again. It seems rude that the last word is all about you.
Hey , what are your thoughts about Etienné Gilson , and his critique of Kant and Decartes ?
Good show! 😊👍
I really enjoyed this fascinating conversation between Perry the Platypus and Joe mama!
If we're unable to discern the reason God allows evil, then there might as well not be one for all practical purposes. We normally make important decisions based on what we _know_ to be the case, not on the off chance that even though something doesn't make sense it _must make sense_ somehow.
Also, arguably, withholding the reason is an evil in and of itself. We would not accept this excuse in any other context. For instance, I just come up to you and slap you in the face unprovoked. If you ask why I did that would you be okay with the response "I have a good reason for it but I just can't tell you what it is. Rest assured, I love you very much"? 😂
It might not be the fact that God doesn't want to tell us what it is, but that we couldn't understand it even if He tried.
If you have kids, you'll know what I mean. Try explaining to a 1 yr old why they shouldn't cross the road or just eat ice cream every day. There's good reasons for these things, but the 1 yr old is simply not in a position to understand it.
In my view, the 1yr old is closer to an adult in terms of capacity to grasp such things then any human being is to God. Assuming classical theism, how are we, as time bound, material, finite creatures supposed to comprehend the action (or perceived inaction) of a timeless, spaceless, infinite one? We simply cannot.
I would disagree, it matters here who has the burden or proof and what is being claimed. The problem of evil is supposed to be a specific refutation of the existence of God by atheists through a claim that the omnipotence and omnibenevolence of a creator would logically imply that the world it creates should be perfectly happy.
What if we are simply mistaken about that? What if there are reasons for why the world should be necessarily imperfect that we don't yet understand?
If you agree that this is logically possible, then the original implication clearly doesn't follow *as was claimed*. Remember the atheist has to prove it follows here. That means there can be NO exceptions. So if it doesn't follow, then the force of the refutation also vanishes. And similarly for your example, what if there IS a good reason for withholding the reason why someone slapped you? What if that person had their family in a hostage situation and the terrorist was willing to release them only if you were slapped? Your example doesn't seriously address the objection of there being hidden reasons.
The problem of evil is not a "practical argument" of any sort. It is supposed to be a proof of God's non-existence. All that skeptical theism shows is that so long as there are holes in that proof, then it doesn't qualify. That is an entirely correct position to hold.
Now I do think it gets interesting when you try to argue in which ways it might be logically possible for an omnipotent, omnibenevolent creator to create a world filled with evil. To be honest I think it might be possible to construct an argument. I think a lot of it appeals to free will and the need for individuals to seek out challenges. Maybe living in a world where everything is perfect and we always get what we want simply isn't interesting. For the same reason you don't play games on very easy mode. Maybe there has to be some actual visceral risk of danger, from volcanoes and tornadoes, without a secret backdoor where you pray and the tornado goes away. And maybe without those things we just aren't satisfied. It seems logically possible to me, just based on a naive picture of what a free-willed being might want.
But even if I couldn't think of an argument, that still wouldn't be an argument for the non-existence of such an argument, and therefore the objection would still stand. The counter must be something which is logically binding, and I simply can't conceive of an argument that is logically binding. To claim otherwise (in the former case) would be committing the same fallacy that theists often fall prey to, when they make "God of the gaps" arguments through things like the fine-tuning argument. E.g. because they can't think of plausible reasons how the constants of the universe are fine-tuned, they claim God must be the reason. This is bad reasoning. Even claiming God is more probable is bad reasoning, because nothing establishes the probable correctness of your position either. It relies on an outdated Aristotelian position that reality must reflect the logic of the mind. Sean Carroll already refuted William Lane Craig brutally based on this point.
@@abjws Isn't it interesting, though, how we can't understand the reasons when it comes to evil but when it comes to things like creating the universe, fine tuning, resurrecting Jesus, etc we claim to know exactly the reasons why God did those things?
@@radscorpion8 Have you ever heard of the probabilistic version of the argument from evil? Not knowing the reason is also expected from there simply being no reason and so it seems the theist has the burden to provide one.
@resurrectionnerd Christians claim to know those things as a result of divine revelation. Had God not spoken, we would not know why, and we would not be able to reason our way towards them.
Even insofar as we do understand them, we certainly do not understand them perfectly. We don't understand the Trinity, we don't understand the hypostatic union, we don't understand eternalism, etc. I also don't think we ever truly can, because again, we don't have the capacity to grasp them.
Amazing !
I have to say that Hendricks' viewpoint sounds very…radicalized…in such a way that makes it seem utterly divorced from reality.
I'd add that whatever god he believes in certainly is NOT the god of the Bible.
I straight up don't get his response to the Draper/Tooley equiprobability objection. I guess it's not clear what "reality is biased towards impermissibility" means, as far as I can tell that can mean two things. Perhaps it means that the space of possible permissible actions is larger than the space of possible impermissible actions, but then that's just false. There are infinitely many impermissible actions just as there are infinitely many permissible actions. Easy examples; Torturing a baby for n seconds is wrong, Torturing a baby for n+1 seconds is wrong, and so on ad infinitum.
On the other hand, maybe what's being said is that there are more ways for an action to be permissible than impermissible, this would make more sense. Since there are 4 ways for an action to be permissible (There are no-right-making or wrong-making factors or there are right-making and wrong-making factors but they cancel out and in these cases the action is morally neutral, or there are right-making factors and no wrong-making factors, or there are right-making and wrong-making factors but the right-making factors are weightier, in these cases the action is good, or supererogatory) and only 2 ways for an action to be impermissible (There are wrong-making factors, and no right-making factors. There are wrong-making and right-making factors, but the wrong-making factors are weightier). Problem; This is completely consistent with saying that we should assign an equal probability to each of the individual possibilities given a restricted principle of indifference or equiprobability principle. Which is all we need for the objection to go through. In cases where the known reasons are such that there are wrong-making factors and no known outweighing right-making factors, then the only way for the act to be permissible is if there are unknown right-making factors which outweigh all wrong-making factors both known and unknown. On every other possibility, of which there are 4 it would be impermissible (there are no unknown morally relevant factors, or there are but the unknown wrong-making and right-making factors are counterbalanced, or there are just unknown wrong-making factors which make the action even worse, or there are unknown right-making factors but they fail to outweigh the known wrong-making factors).
If neither of these are what he means by "reality is biased towards permissibility" then I don't understand the claim. But on either of the interpretations I can glean, the objection is either built on a false claim or just seems utterly non-threatening.
I also wasn't convinced by the response to moral paralysis. Yes, the deontological skeptical theist principle is made on the basis of God's reasons but it seems to me much too fast to say that you don't get a paralysis of human reasons. For surely, the relevant difference-maker in the case of God's reasons is God's omniscience, which is to say God's knowledge of morally-justifying facts. So if you come to know that God permits X, then that's just to say you come to know that there are morally-justifying reasons for X. So given this knowledge, it looks like you no longer have a good reason to prevent X.
I wasn't convinced by the responses to other objections either but I'll just leave it at that.
People of all kinds please state if your christian or muslim, atheists, agnostics or any combination of those and then if willing participate in the test. As well, looking for 5 good moral theist questions for atheists/agnostics.
#1 You see a child drowning in a shallow pool and notice a person just watching that is able to save the child with no risk to themselves but is not, is that persons non action moral?
#2 If you go to save the child, the man tells you to stop as he was told it was for the greater good, but he does not know what that is, do you continue to save the child?
#3 Is it an act of justice to punish innocent people for the crimes of others?
#4 If you were able to stop it and knew a person was about to grape a child would you stop it?
#5 Would you consider a parent who put their kids in a room with a poison fruit and told the kids not to eat it but then also put the best con artist in the room with the children knowing the con artist will get the kids to eat the fruit and the parent does nothing to stop it a good parent?
Hey Joe, layperson here.
Regarding the thought that we’re to God like an ant is to a human, in that we can’t possibly know the reasons god has to allow horrific evil, wouldn’t that also undermine the idea that theists put forth in claiming that god has performed or was a part of goods in their life?
I.E : God provided me the needed comfort to get through a car accident
How can they know god had any part to play in the process if they can’t possibly know the mind of god or his reasons to get involved in the car accident?
Thoughts?
Im still stuck on permissible evils. Evils are by definition impermissible. And we also seem to be operating under a consequentialist framework, which I would reject.
saved me 1,5 houers, if i could get a penny every time a theodecy uses a consequentialist framework i would be rich by now.
@@DeadEndFrog its even more annoying for theists who reject consequentialism yet base their theodicy on it
@@21stcenturyrambo16 Yeah, most of the ones i have talked to seem to give special privlage to god, his morality is diffrent then the one he expects us to hold, yet oue morality is supposedly derived from him.
Not to dismilar to 'One law of the ruler, and one for the peasents.
I think consequentialism is Machiavellian. "The end justifies the means." Not always. What I will say is that the goal of a theodicy is meant to demonstrate that there is a gaping hole in the argumentation from evil.
on skeptical theism a maximally evil world is indistinguishable from a maximally good world, making a morally good* god unfalsifiable. thus there would be no reason to believe in such a god.
*classical theism gets around this by defining good as whatever god does: 'evil' exists because it pleases god and therefore it's good for god to make it. this just runs into the same problem: any amount of evil is equally explainable by god's reasons, so there's no reason to think god exists.
Joe can you please interview Michael Heumer on his argument for an afterlife. I think there are a lot of potential objection you can come up with. Detroyer from Friction did an interview with him.
Video idea. Try to do a debate when everyone is extremely sleepy at 3:00am. 1:27:20 gave me this thought. The more in-depth the conversation goes, the better
I still dont understand rhe distinction between requiring vs justifyig reasons, can someone explain this one for me??
Are you going to review Dr. Perry's book on skeptical theism now that it's out?
Joe, what do you think about arguments from pro-toto evil?
I am not sure I fully understood this, and I'm some variety of moral antirealist so I'm not sure why I care but here goes.
Would S-Theism under these terms also apply to just everyone for everything? Like do I really have reasons to judge a human murderer under this view. It seems that "Gods more intelligent" is insufficient to delineate God from us on this point.
I'm not a wartime deathtoll analyst, and I concede that those people are better informed as to the damage caused by war. If they decide that horrific actions are permissible, can I disagree? I feel like I should be able to, but under this view wouldn't the answer just be "Oh you have no good reason to think that your perceived reasons and the analysts actual reasons align, where you see horrors (the daughter with the blinking light) he sees the path towards greater peace and prosperity (the left turn)." And couldn't this feasibly apply to just about any circumstance we see bad behavior but not have all the facts. After all, the thief is probably better informed about the reasons behind his theft than I. How about the murderer, the war criminal, or even worse?
Wouldn't our human's shared status as a persons, moral agents, beings who can feel pains and pleasures, etc. not be defeasible but good reasons that our perceived reasons track others actual reasons. Why wouldn't these apply to God, at least apply enough that God would have to come down and justify himself to demonstrate that these actions are permissible despite our understanding otherwise?
Idk, I feel like there are huge holes here, but I'm having trouble picking out the exact reason I think it fails. But morality and "reasons" generally confuse me so perhaps I'm totally out of my depth.
Ive got a buddy who went to Purdue! I almoat went there myself but scholarships were more bountiful in other pastures
This is hard to listen to.
I don’t think much about POE discussions, but his defense really felt like it requires a particular theistic conception. At the point where we are happy to say that God is to us as I am to a child…idk, I guess I’m just gonna go back to doing what I was doing.
I suppose his affect is justified by the fact he has a PhD (which I don’t) but the smugness is also off putting. To respond to the idea of ‘gratuitous evil’ with a chortled ‘really?’ is…hard to understand.
Really disappointed with Hendricks response to the last objection. I haven't seen a good response to this objection since posting about it two years ago in the Reason and Religion Facebook group. This is how I put it back then:
"So one thing Stephen Law’s work on an evil God has done is that it has made me question the viewpoint of skeptical theism. I do this by conceiving of different kinds of worlds.
It seems that we can conceive of a Dante’s inferno type hell world that we are all born into and the logic of skeptical theism is that we are not in a position to say that God would likely not make this world because God could have morally sufficient reasons for the evil that is in it.
Likewise if we conceive of a heaven type world that we are all born into on the same logic borrowed from skeptical theism we could not say that this world was likely not created by an evil God because such a being could have sufficiently evil and nefarious reasons for the good in this world.
The move at this point it seems is that we can simply accept our intuition that these extreme results are absurd and embrace that good and evil in a world can be legitimately seen as being more likely or less likely on a good or evil God hypothesis and reject the reasoning of skeptical theism."
I really hope someone publishes an objection like this so it can be discussed as part of the academic dialectic in the Philosophy of Religion.
ok
Yeah you're not the only one that is disapointed to the non-response to last question. I really wish Joe had been less tired, so he could have pushed him on that point more.
Joe, hope you didnt turn into spiderman. Lol
What do you personally make of the devine deception and radical skepticism objections?
Incredible interview, here are just a few random thoughts. Climenhaga's objection is truly one of the strongest objections to skeptical theism. However, here's a move that the skeptical theist could make:
if we adopt Plantinga's epistemology (or something similar), we could argue that if Christianity is true (this applies to any other monotheistic religion), then God would have formed our cognitive faculties in such a way that even when the probability of Christianity was inscrutable, we could still form justified beliefs about it. Thus, the fact that skeptical theism implies that Christianity has an inscrutable probability does not make believing in Christianity irrational.
Also, about the point of skeptical theism implying skepticism about the external world, while it's true that skeptical theism doesn't inherently imply that, when faced with skeptical arguments like the evolutionary argument against naturalism or evolutionary arguments against moral realism, the skeptical theist can't use God to escape the (supposed) defeats that these arguments present.
How can the skeptical theist, under the conditions that skeptical Theism self imposes, justify that God would have formed our cognitive faculties in such a way? Such justification certainly requires recognizing god's reasons, something skeptical theism whole stick is to cast doubt on.
That's precisely why I used “if Christianity is true.” I agree that using “God” in a generic way doesn't work. Therefore, the skeptical theist needs to commit to a specific religion that, if true, implies that God would grant us the ability to form basic beliefs about it. By committing to this, the skeptical theist can be certain that this intention is something that, if the religion is true, God has actualized in our world.
@@darkreflectionsstudio4506
Within the intricate web of theodicy and skeptical theism, how might one navigate the dialectical labyrinth that emerges from juxtaposing the evidential problem of evil with the epistemic limitations posited by skeptical theism, all while contending with the inherent tensions between theodical optimism and the epistemological ramifications of divine hiddenness?
Wow you sound so smart 😮
Boilers down....Hoosier up!!! Loved the discussion
Am I supposed to heart react this comment, or delete it? This is a hard decision…
@@MajestyofReason Sorry I am an Indiana University alum
As a student of the University of Indianapolis, (definitely not IU) I only sit and cheer for blood as I watch the fight from the sidelines of my small D3 school
@@sneakysnake2330 Go Greyhounds.Lots of people get confused with IUPUI I go to the Simon cancer center/IU Uni for cancer care and listen to people trying to understand IUPUI I dont see why thats a hard concept lol
I've seen others make about the same point but any "reasons" a god would have would be self-imposed. If there are any outside reasons that would make the being "not-god".
47:12 On the implausibility of deontological axiological gratuity (or whatever it's called), I'm still not getting how this is an unreasonable seeming, that God lacks greater good reasons to allow something as opposed to merely a 'this is really bad' seeming. One could easily have the impression that some evil wouldn't cause a greater harm to the bigger picture if it didn't happen, by noticing how isolated it is from affecting anyone.
The butterfly effect is counter-intuitive because we do have the seeming that whether we motion our hands to the left or the right in private, it doesn't matter, we aren't affecting anyone else. I don't just have a bare seeming of 'this is amoral', it does seem to me that it doesn't matter in the big picture and no consequences will come of it.
The skeptical theist forfeits any right to preach with certainty on scripture, as he can never know God’s real intentions behind any command. His skepticism cannot just so conveniently pertain to the problem of evil…
What is meant by “preach with certainty” here? That seems ambiguous
@@Sugarycaaaaaandygoodness the command to Love thy Neighbour is considered the word of God. Yet how can the Christian, on sceptical theism, know that God doesn't have a higher order intention that renders that command incorrect? Thus any preacher who preaches such verses with authority, cannot in fact be certain whether those words are truly indicative of God's will or not.
@@bigol7169 So I agree that the ST’s skepticism can’t (and doesn’t) pertain to only evil, but it needn’t apply to everything. What we should say is that “we don’t know exactly what God would do”, not “we have no clue what God would do/want/like”
So while the holocaust (for example) may be somewhat surprising given theism, it is neither disproof nor strong evidence against God’s existence, since it can factor into a larger plan.
In general though, our knowledge of what other individuals actually do is much more certain than our knowledge of their motivations or plans.
@@Sugarycaaaaaandygoodness how can our scepticism NOT apply to everything about God's will? The central claim of Sceptical Theism is that we CANNOT understand God's mind, not that we 'don't know, but possibly could'. It's an epistemic argument.
And so regarding evils like the one you mentioned quite callously: yes, we cannot know God's ultimate plan, and such evils may just be a necessary part of it. We are finite minds after all, and He is infinite. Yet this must also apply to the Good. God's sacrifice through Christ appears good to us, but its goodness may be negated by some ultimate plan that we cannot access epistemically.
It is an objection so strong that it renders useless all sides of the debate.
@@SugarycaaaaaandygoodnessYou're mistaken in implying God is analogous to a human person in this respect, since humans can act contradictory to their own beliefs and may also fail to actualize their own desires, unlike God.
A skeptical theist walks into a casino, sits down at the poker table and before he's been dealt any cards, thrusts all his chips into the pot.
He then spends the next hour complaining that there's no way the other players can know he doesn't have a Royal flush and in fact all the chips should be his, as he's dragged outside by two burly bouncers.
Lettsss gooo
"Trust me, bro, there's a method." He obviously doesn't have anything, otherwise providing the summary Joe asked for wouldn't undermine the value of the book...
1:01:28
is perfect example of gratuitous good
Fails out of the gate for want of puns!
Bigger problems than Evil afoot here...
The well woman pun was very CORNEA 😅
This was a somewhat good argument. I am still a bit puzzled if we can't make inference to weight of god's reasons from our finite vantage point, how do we get to the inference that god's reasons are good?. If we take it analytically that god's reasons are good always then aren't we back to Leibnitz's best of all possible worlds where the modern problem of evil got started?.
Yes, I think this is basically what motivates the evil God objection. If given omnipotence and omniscience we as creatures are too finite in our knowledge to know that it is more likely that there are no good reasons for allowing all the evils that we see, it seems that likewise we would be unable to know that it is more likely that there are no evil reasons for allowing the cases of good that we see given the attributes mentioned.
Can you get Hud Hudson on to discuss ST?
Is this meaningfully different than the “mysterious ways” response theists have been making to the problem of evil for ages?
In effect, it rejects the premise that any real evil exists by asserting that we cannot know what good reasons god may have for allowing suffering. On the cosmic balance sheet, says the apologist, any given instance of suffering may be a net positive.
But this forgets the problem of evil's target in the first instance-that is, that the claimed deity is omniscient/-benevolent/-potent. Solving the problem therefore requires EVERY instance of suffering be affirmatively NECESSARY. After all, such a god would know of all suffering and have the power and desire to achieve its aims with the least amount possible. ANY suffering must be required.
I concede I cannot prove that every instance of suffering is not necessary. However, suffering without any apparent purpose plainly exists-e.g., the fawn dying slowly in the forest or the thousands of people who die of hunger in obscurity every day.
Asserting each and every instance of such suffering is necessary to achieve the aims of an ALL POWERFUL deity strikes me as very bold. Not one of the estimated ten thousand children who died of hunger yesterday could have been spared while still achieving the ends of an omniscient/-benevolent/-potent god?
Perhaps this is so, but surely such a claim requires more support than merely asserting the deity might have good reasons to view each death as a net positive.
I don't think that this really addresses the POE. Even if yo assume we could never know what god's reasons for allowing evil were, we know that god can only not do something if it leads to a contradictions logically. So if he is allowing evil, its because this is the best logically possible world, which is rather unlikely, considering just the shear number of better possible worlds we could imagine. Saying that this world is the best one logically possible is rather a strong claim entailed by the omnis+determinism. Either that, or, if you add the libertarian free will stuff, you can just say that, given the indeterministic behavior of agents and maybe some natural processes (if we think god has to make them indeterministic too for whatever reason), well why would the distribution of evil we have know be likely? It seems, prima facie, that it would be unlikely, especially considering that god could've "tipped the scales" so to speak to make it so that people are more likely to do good (even if its ultimately indeterministic). I think everyone can agree that, even if the PAP is true, it doesnt entail that there is an equal objective probability that any given person or group would do evil. Just looks at mentally ill people as an example. Graham Oppy actually makes a similar point in one of his papers. Not to mention that many Christians, Jews and Muslims have traditionally believed that god is sovereign over all events.
I would restate moral paralysis objection and propose a moral permissibility objection instead: If God is a moral exemplar and have good reasons to allow evil and suffering, every evil things we do and suffering we cause have a necessary good reason behind it, which is whatever reasons God have to allow them, so we ought do evil things.
But if god is all powerful, meaning he can do any action that is logically concievable of a being, the only reason he would have for creating evil is that is logically constitutive of some other good thing. Or in other words, creating that good without that evil would be a contradiction. But in that case, this implies that a perfectly good world is logically impossible. But then how can this thing trully be called evil, as opposed to merely an apparent evil, or a pro tanto evil?
In that case, why not just deny that there is evil at all. Of course that seems a rather implausible view (as opposed to one where the unmoved mover is just devoid of moral properties altogether).
Nice video yet again. Question - regarding the reductionist view of justification being one that requires a non defeated testimony plus a reason - couldn't one just say that the lack of any clear defeater is itself the reason to hold such and such a belief, thereby making both reductionist and non reductionist views basically the same?
Cheers!
it always annoys me when theists get away with coyly giving up on god's omnipotence when discussing the problem of evil. 'morally sufficient reasons' assumes a limited, human-like agent, using instrumental means to get ends. likewise the language of 'permitting' evils, where for an omnipotent being there is no distinction between doing and permitting.
for omnipotence there is only pure act; all contingent facts are as they are directly for the being's pleasure. every instant of suffering is an end in itself for whatever god actually exists. i suppose you could argue that that is the morally sufficient reason, because god's pleasure is the greatest good. you could even defend it as loving because god's self-love is so great it is willing to infinitely torture lesser beings for its own joy. but all the skeptical theist gymnastics are just redundant at that point. there remains no reason to think any actually extant god cares for us or means us any good though, to be fair, no actually existing religion is committed to god caring about us or meaning us any good.
and that's the real reason the argument from evil fails: theists and the gods that live in their hearts are spiteful and callous, if not outright cruel and hateful.
That Dr Dre joke is not a permissible evil. There is no classical God. QED.
If God is morally justified in allowing an event, I really can't see how one could consider it Evil. If every event is morally justified, there is no such thing as Evil. If God is not morally justified and/or is justified for a non-moral reason, he is not perfectly moral.
Can't wait to get his book on Skeptical Theism! Not going to lie though, it is pretty expensive 😅
It is wrong to say, that reasons dont track value in all cases. For one only has reasons for anything, If it concerns the value wanted from it, for else there would be inummerable reasons to be worse of and similar Things.
Obviously, when one argues in favor of the deontological Account, one sees more value in there then in the other Account, for we have no reason to be more in favor of it, If otherwise.
Probably, the destinction will be argued for by asserting, that both Accounts refer to different values. But that is as wrong, for value is one Thing, as it devides reasons in two and Takes all possiblity away to compare and weigh them.
I therefore cannot see, that reasons ever fail to track value, and that the two Accounts are seperate at all, Beyond mere Wordplay.
Tom Holland is a pretty talented guy.
Wow Perry was absolutely incompetent answering the horrific world question.
Damn bro. Yeah.
Yep, I would love someone to publish a paper based off of this notion.
I think the point is that the horrid world argument is just another nouseem argument which isn’t an issue given ST.
It seems like thesits don't really have a problem if they just insist god has reasons to permit the impermissible. It isn't impermissible all things considered, it ought be done. There just seems to be no pro toto evils on theism when you go this route.
I haven't watched video but i am pretty sure its not debunked!
Edit: watched first few mins and just heard him say if god exist there must be a reason for suffering that we think "unnecessary" omg as expected classic "god works in mysterious ways" argument!! we are off to good start!
I’m with you. I haven’t watched but it’s not going to be good. Given that it’s a problem that’s how old and the imagined answer is always mysterious ways.
What do you think about transcendental argument? I don't know if you are familiar with Jay Dyer.
Evil doesn't come from God it comes from the devil.
we should not be calling this evil, because if a perfectly good all powerful being has reasons for allowing it it must necessarily be a good
You seem to have missed the underlying reason for posing this line of thought:
You say that there is a all powerful being that is necessarily good. I then ask: Then why is there so much evil in the world?
So, it's a question about how you came to the determination that an all powerful good being exist.
It's not a question of where evil comes from, assuming the all powerful good being exist. Once the assumption is reached, you can justify the evil in a plethora of ways.
It's a bit like if some group of people said: 2 plus 2 is 5, and then I ask: Well, then why does 2 apples and 2 apples result in 4 apples? And you then say: Well, first you must accept that 2+2 IS 5, and then you can see that apples can't be used for math.
I'm using the "problem" as evidence against (some of) your claim. You ask me to accept your claim first, and then reject the evidence.
And, you could be right. It could be that the "evil" is necessary. But we know we have the "evil". We don't know that we have an all powerful good being.
that's not true, just because certain virtues(e.g. courage) logically require evil does not mean that evil itself is good.
@@DarkArcticTV It does if you think good comes from it.
I Absolutely Love Joe Mama. The tedium of Academia and it's affect of jargon-laden neo-apologia - are unbearable. But, in the face of this; as peeps be doin stuff like that, in order to counteract the uncertainty, Joe Mama is prepared.
In an ocean of semblance-sorely-suffering
under the weight of it's renovation, too wide for it's foundation
This tower of farm-boy USA babble, endlessly strewn through crossword puzzles of redundant & sterile syntax, Joe harmonizes the super-mundane detritus, with a GOLDEN & fiery sword of Semantic Mastery!
Might-imbued potential ally: Confirmed.
Impressed LAMF
I did not understand the drapers objection. 😅
Way over simplified version:
Skeptical theist: There may be reasons unknown to us for him to allow evil
Draper: Then, equally, there may be reasons unknown to us for god to prevent evil
Whether or not there is a God, you've got to live your life.
Whether or not you believe in God, you've got to live your life.
Whether or not there is a god, we've gotta live with the religious
Aren’t there evils not allowed by God? I can’t cause anyone harm merely with my thoughts. Or draw an imaginary box on the ground where people fall into a void. I can’t memory wipe the last five minutes of a conservation with someone where I implicated myself in some awful crime. Clearly, these things were a bridge too far for God. But not the slow torturous death of a toddler over the course of several months? I’d rather people be allowed to fall into the void.
You can harm God with your thought crimes, even though, you can't do that to fellow living people. But also, you can't punch God, while you can punch fellow living people. So God thinks that it is too far to him to get punched, while it is not too far for us to get punched, and vice versa for thought crimes. That seems like a weird way to draw lines about what evil is allowed and what isn't. And in general, why does God get to choose how he can be harmed, but we can't choose how we can be harmed?
That well joke...... If there was an all good god. I wouldn't have heard that joke. Case closed.
The intuition behind the problem of evil is so strong that I don't think it can ever be defeated, especially not by a marvelous cop out like skeptical theism. Cheers!
Joe should have pushed back much harder on the nonsense this guy was sprouting.
On a more serious note: Any view that seemingly entails that fine-tuning shouldn't raise one's credence in theism has to be wrong. I take that to be a Moorean fact
Still a very interesting guest!
Dunno man,,, what explains why the god's desires are fine-tuned in such a way that he desired to create such an unlikely world?
If this theistic god's desires were off by only 0.0001% it would have caused a universe with only black holes in it.
@@olexalex8874 God is defined, among other things, as a morally perfect being. Morally perfect beings have a desire to create moral agents who can experience pleasure, etc
Thinking that black holes are as valuable as human beings would just be a false belief - and omniscient beings cannot have false beliefs.
@@dominiks5068 Sorry, I went off on you saying "theism", thinking some vague goddish 1st cause concept. Imagining a god, that isn't defined as wanting to create humans, etc. (given the topic of the video I should have had a more specific kind of god in mind)
Yeah, if we presuppose a god that has a desire to cause the data we happen to observe, then the data will be expected. But entirely ad hoc.
Need to be careful when comparing infinite possibility space - A god who could do, and could want to do, anything.
And narrowed possibility space, I'm being unfair here, trying to make my point :
A hypothesis that got the data we are trying to explain, already baked into it - A God who got the specific desires and powers to cause the data we are trying to explain.
@@olexalex8874 You can of course say that a maximally great being has an insanely low prior probability, but then you need to given argument for that! So far you have done nothing but misrepresenting the literature (by assuming a non-standard definition of God) and ridiculous posturing.
@@dominiks5068 Getting back at fine-tuning.
The point is to ask why things are this way, instead of another way. Then have the explanation be that a god has a nature/desire to cause it to be this way, or some such.
Without explaining why god's nature is this way, instead of another way - this is not a good explanation.
If we assume God to be truly all-good and truly to have created everything that is not God itself, wouldn't all creation that involves any evil whatsoever be inherently evil? If we recognise evil as some type of value in its own right I'd think the conclusion is obvious, but even if evil is just some comparative state to good or lack of God's goodness or whatever wouldn't it still follow that God deliberately created this evil? Before anything but God existed everything was perfectly good, goodness was de facto neutral state. Through creation evil was brought into existence so how is all and any evil not gratuitous? God gets often compared to light but isn't it vice versa? I have no comprehension of what it means for something to be all-light because light actually is something. All-dark is easy because that just means there is no photons. If there were no photons to begin with we likely wouldn't have the concept of darkness because there would be nothing to compare it. So how can the answer to evil be anything but complete denial of evil (and good for that matter) given the all-good starting point, and how is that intellectually honest when the goodness of God is like the main reason given as to why we ought to trust Him and it is explicitly stated in the scriptures that evil does indeed exist?
Isaiah 45:7 KJV clearly states:
"I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I the LORD do all these things." GOD MAKES EVIL! It's in the bible. Christians need to STOP arguing that God is GOOD. That is BLASPHEMOUS NONSENSE! And STOP with the privation nonsense. A toothache is not a 'privation'.
Christians be like: "I've got 99 problems, but evil ain't one!"
If god has reasons to permit evil amd we are supposedto follow god's plan, how do we know what evils we ae supposed to avoid or prevent or combat?
Also, it seems to me that there really cant be reasons forgod to allow evil because that would imply that those reasons are more powerful than god. Sure god could intend evil but that would be a very different god than tbe Christians defend.
Removing Christianity from the conversation for a bit. Whatever the structure of divinity there would have to be immutable law. Weather the reason for evil is the malice of a god say ajax or loki is inevitable constrained by another say themis and thor. The over arching generalization is "gods" whatever their purpose aren't controlling man just preying on their weaknesses.
Coming back to Christianity for humans to have free will their has to be a opposite of good for there to be choice. Therefore for God to not allow evil would be for God to remove free will. There would be no choice no divergent paths we would all be copies without choice or options. Let me close the loop for a person to choose to have a relationship with God the only device that works is free will.
It's only a problem because the truth of Evil competes with the fiction of the Christian story.
no one in this conversation understands the problem of evil
What makes you think that? This video taught me a lot more about the problem of evil than I previously known
Curious to hear what you think they've overlooked.
for the dumb people out there, THE PROBLEM of evil is an ALL LOVING god, see, if GOD is ALL LOVING, EVIL CANNOT, BY DEFINITION EXCIST, so if evil is in this world GOD CANNOT EXCIST
or to put a gentler spin on it, can't be all loving
@@Flum666 I would expect a skeptical theist to grant that you perceive tension between an all loving god and the existence of evil, but also question whether or not your impressions of things like love or evil meaningfully align with god's understanding of the same.
You may not find that compelling (I don't) but I very much doubt either Perry or Joe are unfamiliar with the formulation of the Problem of Evil to which you allude.