German here. My great grandfather on the paternal side of my family was one of those, he was "lucky" that he got injured from a gas attack at Verdun and therefor was able to spent the rest of WWI in a Lazarett and later at home. In WWII he was teaching battlefield-related topics most of the time like at the SS-Schule in Bad Tölz and despite being and surviving Verdun and the gas attack, i still got to know him as a little kid. He died at the age of 104 back in 1999 after he fell from his bicycle and the complications that arose from that the following months. Yeah he was a very stubborn guy and wanted to ride his bicycle even at that age knowing full well it's a bad idea at his age, but he always claimed: "I'm only this old because i work in my garden everyday and still ride my bicycle."
Chartreux it was my Great grandpa matthei who has as similar story, then moved to Long Island New York, my current grandpa was a commnader in the US navy from just after ww2 then into Korea, Vietnam eras.......he is 97 atom, drinks gin daily, does very engineered lawn patterns on his lawn with a mower. Truly men of steel
"Strike at zero hour with overwhelming fire, they're fueled by the fear in their enemies eyes it's a shock troop infiltration a fast and violent escalateion, out of the trenches the Stormtroopers rise!" -Sabaton
Jägers led the way, the pioneers would join the fray Initiative gained, advancement sustained Lead through direct command, as they're advancing through the land Encircling their flanks, and ravage their ranks
@@swordsnspearguy5945 Expose their reinforcements, destroying their lines New doctrine in combat aligns Infantry attacks, exposing the cracks New combat ideals, on the Kaiserschlacht's fields
@@Neapoleone-Buonaparte sounds surprisingly emotional and fallacious that germans are ‘never charlatans’ especially without supporting evidence to such an absolute statement. Unless of course you’re being a troll in which case, carry on you silly goose
That sort of levity sprinkled throughout the videos is a big part of why I keep coming back to this channel. Anyone can relay statistics and citations but doing so in a compelling & entertaining way is a real art.
Ahhh, the Geballte Ladung (Bundle Grenade), the answer to the age long German question:"Hans, let's see what happens if we strap 6 grenade heads together, ja?".
"What if we take two ofthose and connect them end-to-end? That way we have 14 charges." "You do realise someone will have to carry and throw this, right?" "Not my problem tbh."
I would argue that the german word is actually pretty weird. Bündelgranate sounds way more militaristic while Geballte Ladung sounds more like a civil name.
German and english millitary terms just differ in many ways. In english the projectiles shot by tanks would be tank shells for example, in german it would be panzergranate, which literally translates to "tank grenade". You can't translate those things 1 literally. Honestly, I'd say both work.
I realize that the "run into your own artillery fire" doctrine is used in conjunction with a creeping barrage to, theoretically, prevent friendly fire, it sounds positively Orkish at first. "Oi! You gitz kepp runnin' into da dakka! We needz more dakka ova 'dere! WAAAAGH!!!"
I think they convinced the troops that casualties from the creeping barrage were much less than what they would have received from the enemy fire without the creeping fire.
15:59 "For instance, the regulation explicitly states that *the infantry should run into own artillery fire* during the initial assault, and that this technique of the assault battalions should become common practice of the whole infantry." Good Lord.
they did a creeping barrage pattern basically the artillery fired while compensating for the infantry's movement. this way ..the shells would only hit the enemy....in theory
At the same time, the French Army explicitly said, "If the infantry are not taking casualties from their own artillery, they are not following the barrage close enough." World War I, everybody
Note also that this tactical theory is formulated at the point in the war when German artillery tubes are so thoroughly worn out that impact accuracy varies from "somewhere over there" to "anybody's guess" . . .
unfortunately, if you were not that close to the barrage when the artillery fire ceased to allow the infantry to assault the trenches, then the defenders were able to prepare & caused much heavier casualties then one's own artillery fire.
This is awesome. We are still using many of these lessons today! Suppression of the enemy positions from long range indirect fire and then seek to utilize machineguns as we get closer to the enemy positions. Once within (ideally) minimum safe distance of machinegun impacts, the infantry takes over internal suppression as they continue to close. Within hand grenade range, frag grenades are used against hostile infantry within cover. Continue to exploit suppression from direct fire and indirect fire until you finish the enemy in hand to hand.
I love your videos dude. They help me with my projects not just in history, but art. I wanna create some cool stuff and you do an awesome job in providing the right material I need. Thank you again, keep it up!
I think there's also a lot of 18th-19th century flank company tactics in these, like the light infantry's mobile style of fighting and firing by files (which are in a way proto-fireteams) and grenadiers' shock trooper role.
It is also important to notice that the modern Squad system was born on the French Army with their Combat Group (Groupe de Combat), hence the Germans using the name Gruppe. The war started with the infantry from both sides being counted by bayonets with every infantrymen with his rifle and bayonet advancing en masse and charging the enemy under direct support of artillery guns. The final bayonet charge would deliver the 'coup de grace' and put the enemy in flight. The year of 1915 is instrumental for the development of tactics in the new trench covered battlefield. With the men still advancing in line with an ever increasing violence of bombardment but still being unable to destroy the barbed wire. A specially lightened attack order was introduced by the French Army in 1915, and by October the Adrian helmet was standard issue (the first modern steel helmet). The introduction of the Chauchat and the Viven-Bessières (VB) rifle grenade in 1916 prompted something of a rethink, with the infantry becoming a unit of interdependent combined arms (the first modern infantry unit). Each assault now consisted of a number of waves. A first wave formed by the rifle/bomber half-platoons, accompanied by engineers with wire cutters, was followed by a second wave made up of the bomber/VB half-platoons. A third wave followed 30 metters (33 yards) behind, again consisting of bombers and rifleman, with the role of clearing the captured trench. And behind them came the remaining two platoons of the company, with the VBs on the flank and in the centre, acting as a reserve. The role of the first wave was to capture the first line of enemy trenches and then move on, with their main objective to gain ground; the second wave acted as a reserve, and could pass through the first in order to maintain the impetus of the attack. The moppers-up of the third wave (trench cleaners) took possession of the trench, bombing their way along the traverses, and reducing any strongpoints. Formations for the assault were kept flexible. The first two waves might be in extended order, with four or five paces between each man, but the third and fourth could be in columns of squads, to make it easier to maneuver quickly; remembering that the supply of grenades dictate the advance. Yet, all too frequently, the pace and form of attacks were ruled by a rigid timetable that left insufficient discretion to local commanders to exploit success (one of the main advances for the infantry in WWII was the portable communication systems). By 1916, the French Army was moving towards tactical methods that emphasized concentrated firepower and the flexible use of infantry in "fire and maneuver/movement" advances, with infantrymen covering each other by organic fire (rifle and light machine gun fire) as they moved in alternate groups (like we do today). In 1916-17 Nivelle and Pétain refined this method, attacking limited objectives with the heavy artillery concentrations necessary to ensure success. During the battle of Malmaison, in October 1917, General Franchet d'Esperey, the commander of the Sixth Army, successfully introduced specially trained squads of infantry whose role was to accompany the tanks, in advance of the main infantry assault, and direct them towards their targets. Each armored group was associated with an infantry regiment or with a battalion of chasseurs à pied (light infantry, élite, hence the smaller unit).
All the armies were moving towards the modern squad based Infantry Platoon, not just the French and German. While the armies of France and Germany got there a little faster due to the attritional battles at Verdun, the British went through the same learning process later in the year during the Somme. It is interesting to look at the Infantry platoon of any of the principle opponants in 1914 and in 1918, in the British Army for example the Platoon was a purely administrative unit in 1914, it often did not even have a full time officer. The British in 1914 considered the Company the smallest unit for battlefield operations. As you said, they were all riflemen. By 1918 this had changed completely, the platoon was smaller for a start, and was built around a Lewis Gun squad comprising 2 or 3 guns. Then you had grenadier squad, rifle grenadier squad, a mortar squad with 2 inch Stoke mortars as well as your regular rifle squads. The main difference with the British Army is that these tactics were NOT relegated to elite formations, but were standard training for ALL British Infantry by mid to late 1917. While that meant the average quality was not as high as in the German Storm Divisions of Spring 1918 it also did not have the disasterous effect of removing all the best officers, NCO's and soldiers from the Line Divisions that the German army suffered that led to serious morale problems, especially once the Spring Offensives had failed. It is certain that WWI was the birthplace of modern Combined Arms Operations though, as several Historians have noted, you could take Napolean to 1914 and he would essentially understand the battlefield. Take him to 1918 just four years later and he would not have a clue about how to progress. War, and the waging of war had undergone a series ofchanges in those 4 short years that were utterly astounding, and utterly revolutionary. I have often said that the German tactical Doctrine of WWII was in fact born out of the Stosstruppen of WWI.... There are certainly very glaring similarities between them, and its possible to see the evolution from 1918 through to 1939...
The French command also adopted the new system for the whole army: it was the new modern way of fighting. The French Command also considered the use of separate assault units as a lack of trust in the regular troops, which did dilute its quality. Also worth nothing: it is a historical fact that the Germans ultimately failed to really translate the tactical successes of stormtroopers into operational let alone strategic victory. The French motorization, according to Ludendorff, was the real deal. The Germans would take those lessons to heart and the squad automatic weapon, trucks, halftracks and tanks would receive special attention for the next war. More on tactical changes: The principle role of the Chauchat was to provide a mobile barrage during the advance. This required skilled teamwork on the part of the crew, changing the magazines while on the move to keep up the volume of fire. Yet for the individual rifleman, firing during the advance was discouraged, as it was felt that it simply slowed forward progress. Firing, by the platoon or half-platoon, was permitted only to cover its own advance or that of a neighbouring platoon, or to deal with a knot of enemy resistence. The men of the new fire and support teams were given new equipment for their spare ammunition. The Chauchat gunners each wore semi-circular pouches on the waistbelt, containing one spare magazine each, as well as a pack containing a further eight magazines and 64 loose rounds, and a haversack containing a further four magazines. The rifle grenadiers and bombers each carried a special haversack, which held the grenades in individual pouches inside. The rifle grenade cup was carried in its own pouche attached to the user's waistbelt. The lightened attack order of 1915 took into practical consideration the infantry's need to fight the terrain before fighting the Germans. The pack was now to be left in the second line; instead, rations and spare ammunition were rolled up in a blanket and worn bandolier-style. Later experience at Verdun showed how difficult it was to keep men in the front line supplied with fresh water, so every men was given a second water bottle.
As I said, looking at the evolution of infantry tactics, *especially* squad level infantry tactics during WWI is looking at the start of modern combined arms warfare. Sure the idea of fireteams did not really see universal acceptance until after WWII, but the idea of self contained platoons, with specialist squads, able to field a variety of weaponry in order to obtain a firepower, and thus maneuver advantage was something all the main combatants of WWI learned and was common practice by 1918, and considered normal only 20 years later in 1939. Those lessons were learned the hard way, which is why I personally believe that the modern interpretation of many WWI Generals needs addressing, these were men who were learning an entirely new, and utterly revolutionary style of warfare, from scratch. Unlike us, they did not have a hundred years of combined arms warfare to work from, they were making it up as they went on.... You only have to look at it, in 1914 aircraft were little more than powered kites, by 1918, only four years later, you had specialised recon, fighter, bomber and even torpedo aircraft. In 1914 the idea of tanks was something barely even hinted at, by 1918 you had methods by which infantry and tanks could coordinate and you had seen the first hints of massed tank warfare. Even in WWII, hell even NOW tanks are most often used in support of Infantry..... The MAIN failure of WWI technology was communications, while radio did exist the smallest radios were truck mounted, try getting a truck mounted radio across the shell torn landscape that was no mans land! The most reliable form of communication was telephone, which meant the defender ALWAYS had an advantage when it came to communications, as the attacker generally had to rely on pigeons or runners... both of which had a habit of dying before they got their messages back to even Batallion, let alone Brigade HQ..... People all to often forget the Communications restraints WWI Generals were under.... it is literally the only war in history where the Generals, once an attack went in, were not in communication with their troops... and THAT led directly to the modern practice of giving the Commanding Officer on the Ground far more responsibility, you just have to look at how much responsibility a Platoon leader had in 1914, compared to 1918.... in the latter he had far more freedom to use his own initiative..... I think all to few people realise exactly how much warfare changed in those short 4 and a half years..... nice to speak to some who do. Take care
The modern squad system revolves around the Squad Automatic Weapon, which is the light machine gun or, in French parlance, the rifle machine gun (machine rifle in the English translations I know). The unit strength stopped being counted by the rifles and started being counted by the LMGs. These new weapons gave the infantry squad an organic capacity for supression in order to execute fire and movement. It is worth noting that the Japanese tried an arcaic solution in 1904-05 by employing Hotchkiss M1914 in fire and movement, with groups advancing in turns (bigger groups of course, but with the same principle). Just another lesson not learned from that conflict.
I really love your work. You manage to present a rather complex topic with easy to follow narrative and balanced comparison between theoretical and practical implementation of tactics. I do hope you`ll find the time to make a few videos about the Balkan front of 1914/15 since it`s not very well covered and is in great part neglected when it comes to ww1. I mention this mostly because this video reminded me of the first Allied victories in ww1 at Cer and Kolubara (present day Serbia). Serbian army used a variant of "assault tactics" that they developed and perfected during the Balkan Wars that preceded ww1. As a matter of fact, it is now generally accepted that the early victories were due to the combined use of machine guns, field guns and especially hand-grenades, or rather the way this weapons were used. Since most fighting occurred in hill terrain speed and movement were of paramount importance. Often, the Serbian artillery (lighter guns such as the french quick firing 75mm field gun M1897) would be moved forward during the engagement to better support the infantry (and keep up with it). Used in direct-fire role it was devastatingly effective against massed infantry that tried to pass narrow hill ravines or was exposed coming down the hill. As a matter of fact, this approach made it possible for Serbia to engage and defeat a far larger and better equipped opponent through hit-and-run attacks that were ideal for the hilly terrain not suited for heavier artillery pieces and large-scale offensives that the Austro-Hungarians were planning to conduct. As I said, it`s a rather interesting but often neglected front that saw less trench warfare (compared to the western front) and more fast-paced engagements.
There's something weirdly... adorable about when history channels cross over and try to cross promote. Especially when they have wildly different styles. MHV sounds like he's trying to be the co-host on an informerical and I love it. "That's very interesting but what can stosstrupptaktik do to save my family money?"
Nice, most people call such videos "collaborations", whereas you are completely correct, this is cross-promotion. I do a lot of collaborations, but those often don't result in content. There are some exceptions like interviews etc.
This is one of the best channels on Y-tube, and love conflict history..Epecially the 2nd war as dad was with the 7th Army 3rd Infantry division, and was overseas for almost all four years of our involvement. He was there when they blew the giant swastika on top of Nuremberg stadium, as well as the raid on eagle's nest and fought alongside Audie Murphy 💪🏼😎
I personally think the most revolutionary aspect of the Stormtrooper tactic is at 15:10. When the squads were ordered just to push on. Basically this meant the higher commands staffs transferred the whole development of the offense to the lower echelons. While before war in Europe was the ideas always was about the commander keeping in control of his troops and thus the flow of the battle. Most famously demonstrated early in the Great War by the English still attacking in a walking line so the commanders could oversee everything.In 1918 these small squads were basically unleashed which make them nearly impossible to track higher up the chain of command let alone control. Other countries experimented with squad based assault units. But only the Germans let them loose in a grant offensive. A precursor to the WOII Blitzkrieg when after the breakthrough the tank squad commanders were allowed free decision of action once broken through to accomplish maximum advancement . Of course then the wireless radio helped out, but the distance increased also.
Having carried a M-16/203 for overr two years as a Sr. EM/Jr. NCO back in the late 70s early 80s; I was struck even then how there was NO doctrine per se for it's tactical use. This was no NG or reserve unit, but the 82nd Abn. Even range time was extremely limited, which I guess was related to cost per round. Considering how lightly ABN forces typically are, it's more than puzzling that squad and platoon tactics were basically silent on it's formal employment, Think about the fact there were 6 per platoon with an area range of 300 meters and RPMs of 10-15 per gunner depending on experince and circumstance. On two different occasions at the range I brought up the idea of practicing concentrated area fire by the entire platoon's complement... I even proposed designating and shifting targets using the 40mm colored smoke grenades at hand. ABSOLUTELY ZERO INTEREST. I've always thought that the "203" is incredibly under-utilized. If anyone has experience with them, or thoughts on the subject... Feel Free.
Infantry mortars are scary, and this is what, basically two of them per squad? Logic would dictate that they are wery effective, but I dont know how much actual combat usage they get. The insurgents in asstan do use rpg 7s in a similar role though.
Arthur Brogden I totally agree with you, I also did 203, 90 mm recoilless, same problem with the 90 training even worse. I also was a M60 m-gunner witch had lots of training and rounds to shoot, like over 60,000 rounds in a year just for me alone in S Korea in 88' I wish I could have gotten to know the 90mm and 203 as well as I knew m60. as I feel the other two weapons could be and maybe 'are' more effective and definitely an asset to the squad/platoon and would greatly increase effectiveness with much increased and needed training.
Well, as the FNG, when I first got to Bragg, in a Recon Plt I ended up humpin a "Pig" as we called the M-60 for about 9 months. The 82nd version had a cut down barrel compared to standard issue, so it could be jumped in one piece. So effective range was reduced from I think 1100 meters to 900...but again, that was 35 plus years ago. The 90mm recoiless was being contemplated as a supplemental AT/Bunker weapon with modern HESH/Heat warheads, but nothing happened before I left. I will say the "Dragon" was seen as a poor joke. I went to Dragon school and qualified as an "Expert" without EVER firing a live shot....go figure. I think that basically below company level formal tactics and doctrine fall off because there's NO path to career "enhancement" in it for a West Point pro. After all, Plt Ldr is the very first ticket they punch and one they forget as quickly as possible. NCO's, no matter how Senior, are strickly forbidden from ANY attempts to formulate and implement Army wide anything. So at the very pointiest point of the spear there's a vacuum. One that sooner or later we'll pay for in blood. Regards, Art
I need no channel youtube! No. It was crap. The launch blast was so great it was almost impossible to gain control of the actual missle during initial flight. Also the launch signature itself was a HUGE red flag, and the engagement envelope put you well inside the cmdrs turret mounted hvy machine guns range. So he could engage the actual exposed Dragon gunner b4 the missile would reach the target vehicle. It was essentially a suicide launch. Why we didn't just copy the RPG series... Well, REASONS, I guess.
I think there is a huge dearth of content about historical infantry tactics on youtube and you fill that niche so perfectly in this video without even trying. I really need to learn German, seems like so many the best personal accounts from the world wars are German.
We still use many of the tactics (referring manly about the ‘art’ aspect of conducting warfare) today. The concept of mass (at a decisive point), speed, and surprise are universal tenants that are always sought after during offensive based operations.
If you think about the two elements of mass & surprise, In WWI everyone initially used mass and the Germans developed surprise tactics that sacrificed mass. But then the Russians bested them by combining mass attacks that were also a surprise.
WOW! What a great video! Would have liked a sentence (a nod) to the innovative equipment developed for these troops-armored (steel) vests and helmet frontal covers, submachine gun use and of course extra grenades. LOVED IT! Thank you!
I saved a bunch of videos on storm trooper tactics and uniform and equipment because I was doing it for Airsoft with my squad. Trying to learn all of the movement and use of equipment. And so I was watching Andy’s (the Great War) videos and your tactical videos. So when I was watching this one I was super sleepy and when Andy showed up I was so confused. I was like “did a new video play? Did I accidentally press another video?” And then It took a moment for me to realize that he was in your video! I was quite surprised but yes I watched his videos on the stormtroopers.
3:35 The swedes did this back in the thirty years war. The lghter infantry formations had their own "regimental" pieces, which they used to tear Tillys heavy formations at Breitenfeld to shreds
When you mention the effect authors ascribe to the flamethrower it reminds me of the game Day of Infamy. Each class there has a different advantage. Engineers can carry more weight, assault units move faster, etcetera. Of course different units also have different loadout options (such as your average infantryman not having access to the engineer's 'splody stuff :/ ). What is the advantage of flamethrower units? "+ has flamethrower".
Soon I will publish my Bulgarian collection of manuals, from 1915 for stormgroups to 1943-1944 for so called shocktroops, or .....maybe punch or hit groups- in time already, developed to different infantry parts- hit company, hit platoon, hit section. Maybe with my collection of Cold Trench arms from period , not only bayonets,or their variations made by every Regimental workshop. And of course the shovels & other pioneer instrumens which everyone must keep'em ready even in a Gas Attack. With Respects to all your hard work and keep on!)
The thing your missing here is the German word(Not Deutsch). Stossen means to 'bump'. These troops were not meant to annihilate the enemy. They were to bump the defending troops to an defense that the regular infantry could deal with. These troops found weak spots in the line where demoralized troops were ready to surrender or fall back/side. Thus leaving brave fighting troops to be surrounded, isolated and destroyed later.
My greatgrandfather was in the Sturmabtaillon Nr.5 Rohr in the 4th Sturmkompanie he fought in Verdun and captured the Fort Duamont.I am glad he kept his documents and photos from these timeframe!
listening to this vid in background and genuinely thought he was saying head grenades and thought he was talking about the crazy helmet cannons someone designed for ww1
Great job, as usual! I have recently read(again) Mosier's great - and quite controversial - book "The Myth of the Great War." In it he described the growth of stormtrooper tactics a bit differently than you do, and placed their development in the hands of the combat engineers, AKA pioneer troops. I can understand, now, that the stormtrooper tactics were not a sinister ploy developed by a race of hateful misanthropes, or social Darwinists with guns, but the logical and admirable evolution of what we now know to be the most effective military tactics in existance; the way to get the most "bang for the buck." It came about because Germany was fighting a war on two(three, really) fronts and was quite outnumbered. Thanks to your video, I better understand how these innovative methods came to be. I like Indy's cameo, too. Good work!
In the beginning, they used real maple syrup, but by the end, they were so desperate that they were forced to use artificial maple syrup. Those were dark times for the polar lumberjacks.
Hi MHV. Could you do a video on how effective bomber defensive gunners were? For example, the practicality and hit-rate of the gunners on an American B-17 bomber or British Lancaster. Was having gunners worth putting more crew at risk?
I think the difference between the blast grenade and the fragmentation grenade can be stated very simply: A blast grenade can be thrown farther than its lethal/wounding radius, while the fragmentation grenade can’t. Thus, I’ve also seen the blast grenade labelled as an ‘offensive’ hand grenade while the fragmentation grenade was labelled ‘defensive’.
I love how you use the British teacup to symbolize the British forces 🙏 ...quite historically accurate . For the militarily conservative British, that's about all they used the water cooled machine gun for in special tactics...."trench tea"😎 . It was to make hot tea at the front ... literally . A "special " tactic the British used ...until it was formally banned...by the British Vickers machine gun was to make Trench Tea ....a bloke rattled off half a belt ( 50 rds) of 0.303 in. MG Ammo and collect the boiled water for 4pm tea time from the condenser can ...instant hot tea for up to 6 men ! So much ammunition was wasted and positions compromised of the teetotalers 4 p.m. antics that the British military formally outlawed the practice as a court-martial offence to stop its widespread use .
I love using this stuff and seeing how I can screw around with the Arma 3 editor with it. That's the closest I'm ever getting to being a soldier, unfortunately.
It's all good Orion. I am a veteran and also a military history/tactics/strategy enthusiast. And I have known many a decent strategist who never wore a uniform. As far as I am concerned, helping to keep alive the military art and science is it's own type of service... cheers!
I need to sew a flag with the beret/cup o' tea/pickelhaube insignia. It is the most succinct way of stating "France, Britain, Germany" I have ever seen.
Mein Gott, Deine Literaturliste ist beeindruckend. Ich kenne das von Ralf Raths, habe ich beim Praktikum beim MGFA bekommen, aber die anderen Bücher... wie kommt man an soviel Spezialliteratur?
It would be a good idea. To me, the Battlefield 1 game appears to generated misunderstanding of what they really were, their role was, and how efficient they were at their job. I remember one comment online doing that typical nationalistic chest pounding stating they just squashed all Austrians they faced, didn't let them penetrate into Italian land, and went all the way into their lands and.... you get the idea. Just the typical very young teenage and early 20's naive laymen that mistakes everything he saw in a game, and surmises he created about what it might have been like in ww1 to be true. Basically the same typical thing a lot of online trolls and whiners that get on Americans about. They were good but they were not... they were not rambo kids. Haha. They had enough defeats or failures to let people know it is nothing but hubris to have such a idea they have defeated every opposition and went that far into Austria at that scale. (The person wasn't doing normal nationalistic pride banter. I mean he was literally thinking they opponent was inferior and weak. The type behavior that can be recognized to lead to karma on himself if he didn't realized his hubris.) I am pretty sure even the veterans themselves would laugh at some of the crap I have seen some people have stated about them once the game came out. "Yeah. I don't remember it being that way. I frankly don't feel comfortable joining in the gloating people are doing about us. It's because I know the reality, and the reality leaves a biting sting in my heart of the experience if I tried, actually knowing what really went down." I am not against people taking pride in stuff like this. It's just that I want education and the truth be taught to people along with stuff like this in the media, so that people don't form too much of a misinformed ego they start trashing others
soweit ich weiß, hat die Ö-U Armee Stoßtruppentaktik sehr enthusiastisch übernommen, trotz Mangel an Spezialausrüstung, in sogar weiterem Rahmen als die Deutschen
I like the added visual elements. Weird that you do this now that Bismarck is doing more stuff too. I haven't ever seen the two of you in the same room.
you mean the blueprints? I first used them on the Me262 video back in 2016, but didn't use them again for ages. Bismarck and me work rather closely and actually in late 2017 there are two videos of both of in one room, but maybe you are being ironic.
The sturmtruppen tactics were heavily based on the shock trooper tactics used by the Russians during the brusilov offensive by infiltrating and attacking enemy weak points in their trenches
Well made - no quibble with details. There are some related points (that you didn't try to cover for understandable reasons) that could be worth making. 1) The German Army was the logical candidate to develop tactics based on increasingly lower elements. After 1815 Germany was the only country to keep the "nation in arms" so there wasn't the large cadre of "lifers" that developed in other armies. The earliest leaders of the General Staff were also aware that command positions at the top were going to be on paper in the hands of the high aristocracy - no guarantee of quality. So, you need a small (Moltke's staff in 1870 astounded American observers like Sheridan used to the US Civil War by its very small size) group of extremely able men possessing a kind of "corporate mind" due to common doctrine, common training and frequently a common social position. Down below, the leadership almost had to go to the brightest of the conscripts (Landwehr etc). This developed over time naturally. But it was Prussia that adopted a breech loading rifle because the General Staff believed German command & control at low level was good enough to keep infantry from "going to ground" and staying there. Operation Michael - the first, largest and most dangerous of the "Kaiserschlacht" attacks does illustrate one of the weaknesses of an attempt to break the front by using tactical innovation as opposed to more firepower. As I recall General Hutier who commanded the attack's spearhead 18th Army agreed with Ludendorff that the point chosen for the attack on British lines was a very good one - but suggested that the British were weak because they were not protecting anything of obvious value. Ludendorff counters with Aimens - a crucial rail junction but nearly 60 miles from the start point. Hutier cautioned that he was uncertain about the ability of sustaining an advance of that depth: which proved true. I think the Germans ended up about 15 miles short. They'd also left their cozy positions on the Hindenberg Line and were very vulnerable to the UK counter thrust in August. I also wonder how this all fits into the German emphasis on the counter attack which characterized their tactics for over a century. In the right place and time a well led counter attack could lead to a spectacular success. However, if the thrust was off center by a small amount for any reason, counter attack could lead to a very bloody reverse. So ultimately you have luck involved (see Clausewitz on "chance"). But the sophisticated German tactics also depended on very good men. And as every elite unit in every army finds out, if you go to the well too often, you will lose people. It may be worth the candle if you can withdraw "tired" units and refit, but if you can't the key to today's victory can be tactically identical to tomorrow's serious defeat. Look at the Ardennes for a good example there. There were many reasons for the failure to take Antwerp, but many German officers noted that, overall, their troops simply didn't have the fighting edge present even one year before, much less three.
Military History Visualized I only ask because of the similarities, small unit tactics, shock, speed, use of special weapons etc, makes it sound like sort of a precursor, love your videos keep up the good work!
Often the best men were selected for those units. And unlike normal army units did they have very much firepower at the lowest levels in the organization and stormtroopers were equiped everything from body armour, to submachine guns (which was a raririty back in those days) and they could carry flamethrowers and all kinds of modified weapons. And they had tactics which was basicly the opposite of the common wisdom of the day - which was bombarding an area for days or even weeks and then making large assault on the enemy positions. The stormtroopers did the opposite. They tried to use surprise attacks instead of alerting their enemy ahead of time that an attack were about to come. And stormtroopers were not shy to night fighting. But they could also fighting during the day. And before an attack they tried to make a short but very intensive and powerful bombardment which surprised and chocked the enemy, and shortly afterwards would the stormtroopers attack while the enemy was trying to recover from the confusion after the artillery bombardment. Decisions were also made by the NCOs (lower officers) who were fighting togheter with their men at the frontline - unlike ther enemies which followed orders from their Generals. And that was a huge problem when no radio existed, so it would on average take an order 8hours to get from the Generals headquarters to reach the frontline. And then it took 8 hours for the information from the frontline to reach the General. So it is needless to say that orders often became completly outdated once they reached the troops. The enemy could for example have brought forward reinforcements, prepared defensive positions and weather could have become bad so an order of an attack that was earlier sensible could later on become foolish and impossible to follow. But if you are having good commanders at the front who knows the situation, then they can decide and determine the situation instead. And that was what the Germans did. Normally they would follow orders from their Generals, but the NCOs were also free to use their common sense and make changes to their plans if they deemed them necessary. And that helped the Germans to react faster than their enemies and always be one step ahead. So I think one could say that they were a bit better than the regular infantry. But I don't think they were Rambo like elite troops. And I think their kind of warfare was a little bit revolutionary. I don't think that there is a coincidence that Germany would invent this tactic, since the Prussians had a tradidion of mission type tactics. And another reason why they discovered this new concept was that Germany realized that the odds were stacked against her. The Allies had more resources, so Germany was not likely to win a long war. Therefore it became more important for Germany to fast find new ways of quickly winning this war. So they tried posion gas, flamethrowers, uboats, zeppelin bombraids and new better tactics of course - and stromtrooper tactics became one those new superweapons. Neverhteless I do still think it is amazing that the ideas never gained more popularity after all the gigantic stipidity Hötzendorf, Haig, Cadorna, Enver Pasha, Nivelle, Falkenhayn and others had commited. It was incompetence beyond just incompetene, their behaviour was criminal in how wasteful they were with their solidiers lives and kept on repeating the same stupid mistakes that had lead to failure, over and over again........until the 287th battle of the Isonzo river.
Nah, special forces are different entirely. The stormtroopers were an elite unit, which was at first experimental, then training orientated and finally just the line standard. Pulling the best soldiers (by experience or physical atributes) out and putting them in an elite unit is ancient, the Grenadier companies and Guards regiments of Napoleonic armies would be examples of this. Grenadiers were using shock tactics and special weapons in the 18th century. Using elite units to try experimental tactics and equipment is also historical common practice, elite units usually have experienced men and quality officers so can adapt quickly to new ideas. Same goes with passing on new ideas to the army as a whole through training with the elites. Special forces is way different, they are using special tactics for special operations. Their skills are not necessarily useful to pass on to line units and you would not experiment with them en masse. Modern special forces really took off in ww2 but their origins are earlier, the British were using such units in Africa and India in the late 19th/early 20th century. The Western front was not really the place for the irregular warfare special forces are good at but it would not surprise me if there are good examples of modern special forces fighting in ww1 on the other fronts (especially Africa and the Middle East). Even on the western front you had sniper units and such. There is some misconception about special forces, they are not necessarilly the best line troops, they might actually be ill equiped for it, instead they have special abilities your line troops don't have.
You have different uses of terms so that what one group of people said at one time might be completely different than what other people said at another - and the same words - could have very different meanings. For example - the British Army and the US Marines both use the term "Mad Minute". What they are referring to when they use this term - is COMPLETELY different - with no similarity what so ever. In the US Army - you have Special Forces and Rangers. The Special Forces are more oriented towards Force Multiplication - by training indigenous peoples to be our allies - where as the Rangers are more like Commandos, engaged in assaults. Special Forces are employed as small units whereas Rangers are often deployed as much larger units. The US Marines have Force Recon and Marine Raider units where the emphasis of the Recon units - is on intelligence gathering while the Raiders are more like assault troops or Commandos. The Force Recon units are deployed as small units whereas the Raiders are larger. The Navy Seals are very small units that take on special missions involving attacks and intelligence gathering. The Air Force Para Rescue guys are - what it sounds like - they have some combat training but are more oriented towards rescue operations to recover downed pilots and are very small in number when used. Other nations have their own elite units of different types and purposes, so that while there might be some similarities between some units - each was created by their own nation with their own purposes - and doctrine for carrying out those purposes in mind. So, while there could be some similarities there could also be major differences. My Knowledge of my own nations units is limited and my understanding of other nations units even more so. Anyone seeking to really understand what these units are and how they operate should look up information on those specific units from those specific nations. Comparing one to the other is not necessarily productive and none are necessarily "better" than the others. .
![Stormtroopers - The German Elite of WW1 - Sabaton History 119 [Official]](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/YiGKCtoeFsg/mqdefault.jpg)
German here. My great grandfather on the paternal side of my family was one of those, he was "lucky" that he got injured from a gas attack at Verdun and therefor was able to spent the rest of WWI in a Lazarett and later at home. In WWII he was teaching battlefield-related topics most of the time like at the SS-Schule in Bad Tölz and despite being and surviving Verdun and the gas attack, i still got to know him as a little kid. He died at the age of 104 back in 1999 after he fell from his bicycle and the complications that arose from that the following months. Yeah he was a very stubborn guy and wanted to ride his bicycle even at that age knowing full well it's a bad idea at his age, but he always claimed: "I'm only this old because i work in my garden everyday and still ride my bicycle."
War er Mitglied der SS?
Chartreux stop u hut me with the feels
He was a wise man. And strong, and lucky.
Chartreux it was my Great grandpa matthei who has as similar story, then moved to Long Island New York, my current grandpa was a commnader in the US navy from just after ww2 then into Korea, Vietnam eras.......he is 97 atom, drinks gin daily, does very engineered lawn patterns on his lawn with a mower. Truly men of steel
Chartreux humans should move as long as they can. In his age he could have done whatever he wanted as he had little to loose...
"Strike at zero hour with overwhelming fire, they're fueled by the fear in their enemies eyes it's a shock troop infiltration a fast and violent escalateion, out of the trenches the Stormtroopers rise!"
-Sabaton
yes.
Jägers led the way, the pioneers would join the fray
Initiative gained, advancement sustained
Lead through direct command, as they're advancing through the land
Encircling their flanks, and ravage their ranks
@@swordsnspearguy5945 Expose their reinforcements, destroying their lines
New doctrine in combat aligns
Infantry attacks, exposing the cracks
New combat ideals, on the Kaiserschlacht's fields
I love how the British were represented as a cup of tea😎
I loved that too, but then the French should be made into a baguette and the Germans into a sauerkraut. Then we would have had a balanced meal.
@@musclesglasses5790 Wrong. Because the Germans have never been charlatans like the English and the French, but always quintessential professionals.
@@Neapoleone-Buonaparte you must be a lot of fun at parties...
@@JustIn-op6oy he must be german.
@@Neapoleone-Buonaparte sounds surprisingly emotional and fallacious that germans are ‘never charlatans’ especially without supporting evidence to such an absolute statement. Unless of course you’re being a troll in which case, carry on you silly goose
You shouldn't quote this Ralf Raths guy, his research is weak and biased.
I hope you are the original ;)
Celebrity in the house!
(maybe!)
He is. I mean: I am.
This is confusing. :D
Go to UA-cam channel and get 'internal server error' So deffo the right guy, lol.
Herr Raths, ich hätte gerne Ihren Job
My two favorite channels did a collab. This pleases me greatly.
Light Infantry icon "-50% fat" hahaha I love these little jokes in such an otherwise serious documentary lol
That sort of levity sprinkled throughout the videos is a big part of why I keep coming back to this channel. Anyone can relay statistics and citations but doing so in a compelling & entertaining way is a real art.
I was in “light infantry” and it isn’t light for the soldiers 😅it is light logistically for the army as it does not have organic transportation
Ahhh, the Geballte Ladung (Bundle Grenade), the answer to the age long German question:"Hans, let's see what happens if we strap 6 grenade heads together, ja?".
"What if we take two ofthose and connect them end-to-end? That way we have 14 charges."
"You do realise someone will have to carry and throw this, right?"
"Not my problem tbh."
"Hans, what do we do with all these mines we have left over?"
"Lets make a mortar and throw them to the enemy."
That is an annoyingly shitty translation. Bundled charge would be much better. The word grenade isn't even present.
I would argue that the german word is actually pretty weird. Bündelgranate sounds way more militaristic while Geballte Ladung sounds more like a civil name.
German and english millitary terms just differ in many ways. In english the projectiles shot by tanks would be tank shells for example, in german it would be panzergranate, which literally translates to "tank grenade". You can't translate those things 1 literally. Honestly, I'd say both work.
I realize that the "run into your own artillery fire" doctrine is used in conjunction with a creeping barrage to, theoretically, prevent friendly fire, it sounds positively Orkish at first.
"Oi! You gitz kepp runnin' into da dakka! We needz more dakka ova 'dere! WAAAAGH!!!"
I think they convinced the troops that casualties from the creeping barrage were much less than what they would have received from the enemy fire without the creeping fire.
15:59 "For instance, the regulation explicitly states that *the infantry should run into own artillery fire* during the initial assault, and that this technique of the assault battalions should become common practice of the whole infantry."
Good Lord.
they did a creeping barrage pattern
basically the artillery fired while compensating for the infantry's movement.
this way ..the shells would only hit the enemy....in theory
It's a sound concept, if "they fought with expert timing" (from "Everybody was Kung Fu Fighting")
At the same time, the French Army explicitly said, "If the infantry are not taking casualties from their own artillery, they are not following the barrage close enough." World War I, everybody
Note also that this tactical theory is formulated at the point in the war when German artillery tubes are so thoroughly worn out that impact accuracy varies from "somewhere over there" to "anybody's guess" . . .
unfortunately, if you were not that close to the barrage when the artillery fire ceased to allow the infantry to assault the trenches, then the defenders were able to prepare & caused much heavier casualties then one's own artillery fire.
This is awesome. We are still using many of these lessons today! Suppression of the enemy positions from long range indirect fire and then seek to utilize machineguns as we get closer to the enemy positions. Once within (ideally) minimum safe distance of machinegun impacts, the infantry takes over internal suppression as they continue to close. Within hand grenade range, frag grenades are used against hostile infantry within cover. Continue to exploit suppression from direct fire and indirect fire until you finish the enemy in hand to hand.
So Elite light infantry is basically punchy like heavy infantry but mobile like light infantry - aka less DAKKA and more KAPOM ?
I love your videos dude.
They help me with my projects not just in history, but art.
I wanna create some cool stuff and you do an awesome job
in providing the right material I need.
Thank you again, keep it up!
MHV is austrian and you are a painter. Fuse pls
The work you did on these videos is outstanding
I know it's not from a world war but could you at some point cover the fireforce tactics used by the Rhodesians during the Rhodesian Bush war?
I third it!!!!
I know I'm 4 years late but digital battlegrounds released a video about fireforce.
At last someone who knows what he's talking about AND gets the German pronunciation right..
He is german !
From a german i would hope so...
he's german :skull:
Of he would get the pronunciation wrong, there is no hope for any non-German.
ich liebe deine videos :D großartige arbeit! weiter so!
Stormtrooper tactic: Always miss, so the whole squad can be shot by the main heroes.
The image for "Stosstrup use Surprise, Speed & Small Units" was the pinacle of this amazing video.
I think there's also a lot of 18th-19th century flank company tactics in these, like the light infantry's mobile style of fighting and firing by files (which are in a way proto-fireteams) and grenadiers' shock trooper role.
It is also important to notice that the modern Squad system was born on the French Army with their Combat Group (Groupe de Combat), hence the Germans using the name Gruppe.
The war started with the infantry from both sides being counted by bayonets with every infantrymen with his rifle and bayonet advancing en masse and charging the enemy under direct support of artillery guns. The final bayonet charge would deliver the 'coup de grace' and put the enemy in flight. The year of 1915 is instrumental for the development of tactics in the new trench covered battlefield. With the men still advancing in line with an ever increasing violence of bombardment but still being unable to destroy the barbed wire. A specially lightened attack order was introduced by the French Army in 1915, and by October the Adrian helmet was standard issue (the first modern steel helmet).
The introduction of the Chauchat and the Viven-Bessières (VB) rifle grenade in 1916 prompted something of a rethink, with the infantry becoming a unit of interdependent combined arms (the first modern infantry unit). Each assault now consisted of a number of waves. A first wave formed by the rifle/bomber half-platoons, accompanied by engineers with wire cutters, was followed by a second wave made up of the bomber/VB half-platoons. A third wave followed 30 metters (33 yards) behind, again consisting of bombers and rifleman, with the role of clearing the captured trench. And behind them came the remaining two platoons of the company, with the VBs on the flank and in the centre, acting as a reserve.
The role of the first wave was to capture the first line of enemy trenches and then move on, with their main objective to gain ground; the second wave acted as a reserve, and could pass through the first in order to maintain the impetus of the attack. The moppers-up of the third wave (trench cleaners) took possession of the trench, bombing their way along the traverses, and reducing any strongpoints. Formations for the assault were kept flexible. The first two waves might be in extended order, with four or five paces between each man, but the third and fourth could be in columns of squads, to make it easier to maneuver quickly; remembering that the supply of grenades dictate the advance. Yet, all too frequently, the pace and form of attacks were ruled by a rigid timetable that left insufficient discretion to local commanders to exploit success (one of the main advances for the infantry in WWII was the portable communication systems).
By 1916, the French Army was moving towards tactical methods that emphasized concentrated firepower and the flexible use of infantry in "fire and maneuver/movement" advances, with infantrymen covering each other by organic fire (rifle and light machine gun fire) as they moved in alternate groups (like we do today). In 1916-17 Nivelle and Pétain refined this method, attacking limited objectives with the heavy artillery concentrations necessary to ensure success. During the battle of Malmaison, in October 1917, General Franchet d'Esperey, the commander of the Sixth Army, successfully introduced specially trained squads of infantry whose role was to accompany the tanks, in advance of the main infantry assault, and direct them towards their targets. Each armored group was associated with an infantry regiment or with a battalion of chasseurs à pied (light infantry, élite, hence the smaller unit).
All the armies were moving towards the modern squad based Infantry Platoon, not just the French and German. While the armies of France and Germany got there a little faster due to the attritional battles at Verdun, the British went through the same learning process later in the year during the Somme.
It is interesting to look at the Infantry platoon of any of the principle opponants in 1914 and in 1918, in the British Army for example the Platoon was a purely administrative unit in 1914, it often did not even have a full time officer. The British in 1914 considered the Company the smallest unit for battlefield operations. As you said, they were all riflemen.
By 1918 this had changed completely, the platoon was smaller for a start, and was built around a Lewis Gun squad comprising 2 or 3 guns. Then you had grenadier squad, rifle grenadier squad, a mortar squad with 2 inch Stoke mortars as well as your regular rifle squads.
The main difference with the British Army is that these tactics were NOT relegated to elite formations, but were standard training for ALL British Infantry by mid to late 1917. While that meant the average quality was not as high as in the German Storm Divisions of Spring 1918 it also did not have the disasterous effect of removing all the best officers, NCO's and soldiers from the Line Divisions that the German army suffered that led to serious morale problems, especially once the Spring Offensives had failed.
It is certain that WWI was the birthplace of modern Combined Arms Operations though, as several Historians have noted, you could take Napolean to 1914 and he would essentially understand the battlefield. Take him to 1918 just four years later and he would not have a clue about how to progress. War, and the waging of war had undergone a series ofchanges in those 4 short years that were utterly astounding, and utterly revolutionary.
I have often said that the German tactical Doctrine of WWII was in fact born out of the Stosstruppen of WWI.... There are certainly very glaring similarities between them, and its possible to see the evolution from 1918 through to 1939...
The French command also adopted the new system for the whole army: it was the new modern way of fighting. The French Command also considered the use of separate assault units as a lack of trust in the regular troops, which did dilute its quality. Also worth nothing: it is a historical fact that the Germans ultimately failed to really translate the tactical successes of stormtroopers into operational let alone strategic victory. The French motorization, according to Ludendorff, was the real deal. The Germans would take those lessons to heart and the squad automatic weapon, trucks, halftracks and tanks would receive special attention for the next war.
More on tactical changes:
The principle role of the Chauchat was to provide a mobile barrage during the advance. This required skilled teamwork on the part of the crew, changing the magazines while on the move to keep up the volume of fire. Yet for the individual rifleman, firing during the advance was discouraged, as it was felt that it simply slowed forward progress. Firing, by the platoon or half-platoon, was permitted only to cover its own advance or that of a neighbouring platoon, or to deal with a knot of enemy resistence.
The men of the new fire and support teams were given new equipment for their spare ammunition. The Chauchat gunners each wore semi-circular pouches on the waistbelt, containing one spare magazine each, as well as a pack containing a further eight magazines and 64 loose rounds, and a haversack containing a further four magazines.
The rifle grenadiers and bombers each carried a special haversack, which held the grenades in individual pouches inside. The rifle grenade cup was carried in its own pouche attached to the user's waistbelt.
The lightened attack order of 1915 took into practical consideration the infantry's need to fight the terrain before fighting the Germans. The pack was now to be left in the second line; instead, rations and spare ammunition were rolled up in a blanket and worn bandolier-style. Later experience at Verdun showed how difficult it was to keep men in the front line supplied with fresh water, so every men was given a second water bottle.
As I said, looking at the evolution of infantry tactics, *especially* squad level infantry tactics during WWI is looking at the start of modern combined arms warfare. Sure the idea of fireteams did not really see universal acceptance until after WWII, but the idea of self contained platoons, with specialist squads, able to field a variety of weaponry in order to obtain a firepower, and thus maneuver advantage was something all the main combatants of WWI learned and was common practice by 1918, and considered normal only 20 years later in 1939.
Those lessons were learned the hard way, which is why I personally believe that the modern interpretation of many WWI Generals needs addressing, these were men who were learning an entirely new, and utterly revolutionary style of warfare, from scratch. Unlike us, they did not have a hundred years of combined arms warfare to work from, they were making it up as they went on....
You only have to look at it, in 1914 aircraft were little more than powered kites, by 1918, only four years later, you had specialised recon, fighter, bomber and even torpedo aircraft. In 1914 the idea of tanks was something barely even hinted at, by 1918 you had methods by which infantry and tanks could coordinate and you had seen the first hints of massed tank warfare. Even in WWII, hell even NOW tanks are most often used in support of Infantry.....
The MAIN failure of WWI technology was communications, while radio did exist the smallest radios were truck mounted, try getting a truck mounted radio across the shell torn landscape that was no mans land! The most reliable form of communication was telephone, which meant the defender ALWAYS had an advantage when it came to communications, as the attacker generally had to rely on pigeons or runners... both of which had a habit of dying before they got their messages back to even Batallion, let alone Brigade HQ.....
People all to often forget the Communications restraints WWI Generals were under.... it is literally the only war in history where the Generals, once an attack went in, were not in communication with their troops... and THAT led directly to the modern practice of giving the Commanding Officer on the Ground far more responsibility, you just have to look at how much responsibility a Platoon leader had in 1914, compared to 1918.... in the latter he had far more freedom to use his own initiative.....
I think all to few people realise exactly how much warfare changed in those short 4 and a half years..... nice to speak to some who do.
Take care
Actually the mosern squad system started in the prussian army and was first used in the battle of Königgratz.
The modern squad system revolves around the Squad Automatic Weapon, which is the light machine gun or, in French parlance, the rifle machine gun (machine rifle in the English translations I know). The unit strength stopped being counted by the rifles and started being counted by the LMGs. These new weapons gave the infantry squad an organic capacity for supression in order to execute fire and movement.
It is worth noting that the Japanese tried an arcaic solution in 1904-05 by employing Hotchkiss M1914 in fire and movement, with groups advancing in turns (bigger groups of course, but with the same principle). Just another lesson not learned from that conflict.
I really love your work. You manage to present a rather complex topic with easy to follow narrative and balanced comparison between theoretical and practical implementation of tactics. I do hope you`ll find the time to make a few videos about the Balkan front of 1914/15 since it`s not very well covered and is in great part neglected when it comes to ww1.
I mention this mostly because this video reminded me of the first Allied victories in ww1 at Cer and Kolubara (present day Serbia). Serbian army used a variant of "assault tactics" that they developed and perfected during the Balkan Wars that preceded ww1. As a matter of fact, it is now generally accepted that the early victories were due to the combined use of machine guns, field guns and especially hand-grenades, or rather the way this weapons were used. Since most fighting occurred in hill terrain speed and movement were of paramount importance. Often, the Serbian artillery (lighter guns such as the french quick firing 75mm field gun M1897) would be moved forward during the engagement to better support the infantry (and keep up with it). Used in direct-fire role it was devastatingly effective against massed infantry that tried to pass narrow hill ravines or was exposed coming down the hill. As a matter of fact, this approach made it possible for Serbia to engage and defeat a far larger and better equipped opponent through hit-and-run attacks that were ideal for the hilly terrain not suited for heavier artillery pieces and large-scale offensives that the Austro-Hungarians were planning to conduct.
As I said, it`s a rather interesting but often neglected front that saw less trench warfare (compared to the western front) and more fast-paced engagements.
Here from the Great War channel, thanks for the more in depth look at the development of this (at the time) entirely new concept in modern war.
Nice work! I appreciate your efforts to support your narration with references. That's real study.
There's something weirdly... adorable about when history channels cross over and try to cross promote. Especially when they have wildly different styles. MHV sounds like he's trying to be the co-host on an informerical and I love it. "That's very interesting but what can stosstrupptaktik do to save my family money?"
Nice, most people call such videos "collaborations", whereas you are completely correct, this is cross-promotion. I do a lot of collaborations, but those often don't result in content. There are some exceptions like interviews etc.
This man is a treasure. Just keeps getting better.
This is one of the best channels on Y-tube, and love conflict history..Epecially the 2nd war as dad was with the 7th Army 3rd Infantry division, and was overseas for almost all four years of our involvement. He was there when they blew the giant swastika on top of Nuremberg stadium, as well as the raid on eagle's nest and fought alongside Audie Murphy
💪🏼😎
I personally think the most revolutionary aspect of the Stormtrooper tactic is at 15:10. When the squads were ordered just to push on. Basically this meant the higher commands staffs transferred the whole development of the offense to the lower echelons. While before war in Europe was the ideas always was about the commander keeping in control of his troops and thus the flow of the battle. Most famously demonstrated early in the Great War by the English still attacking in a walking line so the commanders could oversee everything.In 1918 these small squads were basically unleashed which make them nearly impossible to track higher up the chain of command let alone control. Other countries experimented with squad based assault units. But only the Germans let them loose in a grant offensive. A precursor to the WOII Blitzkrieg when after the breakthrough the tank squad commanders were allowed free decision of action once broken through to accomplish maximum advancement . Of course then the wireless radio helped out, but the distance increased also.
INDY!!!
Dragon's Armory ii
There you go: a Master Work, only a true German would be able to come up with. Excellent!
🤨
Hes an austrian non-painter
@@literalantifaterrorist4673got somthing to say?
This is probably one of the best videos on youtube. Google should give you a medal.
Everyone knows Google's medals go to people that flag every video with even a fraction of a second of music in it
1. Always check twice if those are the droids you are looking for
2. If it's THEM, blast'em
Having carried a M-16/203 for overr two years as a Sr. EM/Jr. NCO back in the late 70s early 80s; I was struck even then how there was NO doctrine per se for it's tactical use. This was no NG or reserve unit, but the 82nd Abn. Even range time was extremely limited, which I guess was related to cost per round. Considering how lightly ABN forces typically are, it's more than puzzling that squad and platoon tactics were basically silent on it's formal employment, Think about the fact there were 6 per platoon with an area range of 300 meters and RPMs of 10-15 per gunner depending on experince and circumstance. On two different occasions at the range I brought up the idea of practicing concentrated area fire by the entire platoon's complement... I even proposed designating and shifting targets using the 40mm colored smoke grenades at hand. ABSOLUTELY ZERO INTEREST. I've always thought that the "203" is incredibly under-utilized. If anyone has experience with them, or thoughts on the subject... Feel Free.
Infantry mortars are scary, and this is what, basically two of them per squad? Logic would dictate that they are wery effective, but I dont know how much actual combat usage they get.
The insurgents in asstan do use rpg 7s in a similar role though.
Arthur Brogden I totally agree with you, I also did 203, 90 mm recoilless, same problem with the 90 training even worse. I also was a M60 m-gunner witch had lots of training and rounds to shoot, like over 60,000 rounds in a year just for me alone in S Korea in 88' I wish I could have gotten to know the 90mm and 203 as well as I knew m60. as I feel the other two weapons could be and maybe 'are' more effective and definitely an asset to the squad/platoon and would greatly increase effectiveness with much increased and needed training.
Well, as the FNG, when I first got to Bragg, in a Recon Plt I ended up humpin a "Pig" as we called the M-60 for about 9 months. The 82nd version had a cut down barrel compared to standard issue, so it could be jumped in one piece. So effective range was reduced from I think 1100 meters to 900...but again, that was 35 plus years ago. The 90mm recoiless was being contemplated as a supplemental AT/Bunker weapon with modern HESH/Heat warheads, but nothing happened before I left. I will say the "Dragon" was seen as a poor joke. I went to Dragon school and qualified as an "Expert" without EVER firing a live shot....go figure. I think that basically below company level formal tactics and doctrine fall off because there's NO path to career "enhancement" in it for a West Point pro. After all, Plt Ldr is the very first ticket they punch and one they forget as quickly as possible. NCO's, no matter how Senior, are strickly forbidden from ANY attempts to formulate and implement Army wide anything. So at the very pointiest point of the spear there's a vacuum. One that sooner or later we'll pay for in blood. Regards, Art
+Arthur Brogden I was under the impression the dragon was just generally all round shite. Was it just the training then?
I need no channel youtube! No. It was crap. The launch blast was so great it was almost impossible to gain control of the actual missle during initial flight. Also the launch signature itself was a HUGE red flag, and the engagement envelope put you well inside the cmdrs turret mounted hvy machine guns range. So he could engage the actual exposed Dragon gunner b4 the missile would reach the target vehicle. It was essentially a suicide launch. Why we didn't just copy the RPG series... Well, REASONS, I guess.
Always interesting, thank you
im a huge history person and thinking of making videos like these but in another way i love your channel so im planning to make my own history series
I think there is a huge dearth of content about historical infantry tactics on youtube and you fill that niche so perfectly in this video without even trying. I really need to learn German, seems like so many the best personal accounts from the world wars are German.
I appreciate your well prepared and presented programs. thank you
Erwin Rommel's book "Infantry Attacks" was covering this material topic
We still use many of the tactics (referring manly about the ‘art’ aspect of conducting warfare) today. The concept of mass (at a decisive point), speed, and surprise are universal tenants that are always sought after during offensive based operations.
If you think about the two elements of mass & surprise, In WWI everyone initially used mass and the Germans developed surprise tactics that sacrificed mass. But then the Russians bested them by combining mass attacks that were also a surprise.
Russians defeated by the Germans in most minor conflicts during WW1.
WOW! What a great video! Would have liked a sentence (a nod) to the innovative equipment developed for these troops-armored (steel) vests and helmet frontal covers, submachine gun use and of course extra grenades. LOVED IT! Thank you!
I saved a bunch of videos on storm trooper tactics and uniform and equipment because I was doing it for Airsoft with my squad.
Trying to learn all of the movement and use of equipment.
And so I was watching Andy’s (the Great War) videos and your tactical videos.
So when I was watching this one I was super sleepy and when Andy showed up I was so confused. I was like “did a new video play? Did I accidentally press another video?” And then It took a moment for me to realize that he was in your video!
I was quite surprised but yes I watched his videos on the stormtroopers.
This video made me realize that (atleast) all modern offensive infantry tactics can be traced back to this principle
3:35 The swedes did this back in the thirty years war. The lghter infantry formations had their own "regimental" pieces, which they used to tear Tillys heavy formations at Breitenfeld to shreds
When you mention the effect authors ascribe to the flamethrower it reminds me of the game Day of Infamy. Each class there has a different advantage. Engineers can carry more weight, assault units move faster, etcetera. Of course different units also have different loadout options (such as your average infantryman not having access to the engineer's 'splody stuff :/ ). What is the advantage of flamethrower units? "+ has flamethrower".
I really like the nuanced narrative you bring. The zjerman aczzend izz a nise bonoos.
Soon I will publish my Bulgarian collection of manuals, from 1915 for stormgroups to 1943-1944 for so called shocktroops, or .....maybe punch or hit groups- in time already, developed to different infantry parts- hit company, hit platoon, hit section.
Maybe with my collection of Cold Trench arms from period , not only bayonets,or their variations made by every Regimental workshop. And of course the shovels & other pioneer instrumens which everyone must keep'em ready even in a Gas Attack.
With Respects to all your hard work and keep on!)
The thing your missing here is the German word(Not Deutsch). Stossen means to 'bump'. These troops were not meant to annihilate the enemy. They were to bump the defending troops to an defense that the regular infantry could deal with. These troops found weak spots in the line where demoralized troops were ready to surrender or fall back/side. Thus leaving brave fighting troops to be surrounded, isolated and destroyed later.
I learned some new things here. Good video. Thanks a lot !
My greatgrandfather was in the Sturmabtaillon Nr.5 Rohr in the 4th Sturmkompanie he fought in Verdun and captured the Fort Duamont.I am glad he kept his documents and photos from these timeframe!
Studied this a good bit and taught some people in a ww1 game using these tactics, won every time lol
Indy brought me here!
You know it's funny, at this point whenever something WW1 comes up I expect Indy to show up. Nice to see you Indy.
Watching this to get better at Verdun
0:02 “Sorry I’m driving through a tunnel”
i love the pictographs for each country, pickelhaube, Barrett and a cup of tea!
Outstanding video and presentation.
listening to this vid in background and genuinely thought he was saying head grenades and thought he was talking about the crazy helmet cannons someone designed for ww1
Great job, as usual! I have recently read(again) Mosier's great - and quite controversial - book "The Myth of the Great War." In it he described the growth of stormtrooper tactics a bit differently than you do, and placed their development in the hands of the combat engineers, AKA pioneer troops. I can understand, now, that the stormtrooper tactics were not a sinister ploy developed by a race of hateful misanthropes, or social Darwinists with guns, but the logical and admirable evolution of what we now know to be the most effective military tactics in existance; the way to get the most "bang for the buck." It came about because Germany was fighting a war on two(three, really) fronts and was quite outnumbered.
Thanks to your video, I better understand how these innovative methods came to be. I like Indy's cameo, too. Good work!
It would be nice to see the evolution of Canadian forces over the course of the war
In the beginning, they used real maple syrup, but by the end, they were so desperate that they were forced to use artificial maple syrup. Those were dark times for the polar lumberjacks.
Top 10 anime crossovers
EdSkywalker uh
EdSkywalker Are you talking about Fate/Stay Night X Mobile Suit Gundam: ua-cam.com/video/nt0b6d52sHw/v-deo.html
Hi MHV. Could you do a video on how effective bomber defensive gunners were? For example, the practicality and hit-rate of the gunners on an American B-17 bomber or British Lancaster. Was having gunners worth putting more crew at risk?
The minewerfer was the french nightmare in the close trenches of verdun
That slick überleitung at 1:50
I think the difference between the blast grenade and the fragmentation grenade can be stated very simply: A blast grenade can be thrown farther than its lethal/wounding radius, while the fragmentation grenade can’t. Thus, I’ve also seen the blast grenade labelled as an ‘offensive’ hand grenade while the fragmentation grenade was labelled ‘defensive’.
I love how you use the British teacup to symbolize the British forces 🙏 ...quite historically accurate .
For the militarily conservative British, that's about all they used the water cooled machine gun for in special tactics...."trench tea"😎 .
It was to make hot tea at the front ... literally .
A "special " tactic the British used ...until it was formally banned...by the British Vickers machine gun was to make Trench Tea ....a bloke rattled off half a belt ( 50 rds) of 0.303 in. MG Ammo and collect the boiled water for 4pm tea time from the condenser can ...instant hot tea for up to 6 men !
So much ammunition was wasted and positions compromised of the teetotalers 4 p.m. antics that the British military formally outlawed the practice as a court-martial offence to stop its widespread use .
We need a video about partroopers! (Fallschrimjäger-101 Airbone division)
just need one more book, see my wishlist ;)
I'd love to see a video about the Fallschrimjager
I love using this stuff and seeing how I can screw around with the Arma 3 editor with it. That's the closest I'm ever getting to being a soldier, unfortunately.
It's all good Orion. I am a veteran and also a military history/tactics/strategy enthusiast. And I have known many a decent strategist who never wore a uniform. As far as I am concerned, helping to keep alive the military art and science is it's own type of service... cheers!
Seeing Indy pop in was pretty trippy.
i need that "surprise" icon on a shirt please!!
I absolutely love the thumbnail of this video
Interesting watching this after having just read Ernst Jünger's "In Stahlgewittern."
Excellent presentation.
Would you consider to make a video about differences and relations between strategic, tactical and operational level? :)
planned for quite some time, not sure when it will happen.
ua-cam.com/users/shortsBmc9NFfhx74?feature=share
Very good stuff here. Thank you.
Please MORE small group size, tactics videos! I even watched the German Squad tactics vid. For good old times sake!!!
I need to sew a flag with the beret/cup o' tea/pickelhaube insignia. It is the most succinct way of stating "France, Britain, Germany" I have ever seen.
Mein Gott, Deine Literaturliste ist beeindruckend. Ich kenne das von Ralf Raths, habe ich beim Praktikum beim MGFA bekommen, aber die anderen Bücher... wie kommt man an soviel Spezialliteratur?
Great video! Came here from the great war channel.
WOW, two fantastic content creators supporting one another, what has UA-cam come to!
In the future will be a video about italian assault troops, the arditi?
If not, The Great War already has a special episode if you haven't seen it.
It would be a good idea. To me, the Battlefield 1 game appears to generated misunderstanding of what they really were, their role was, and how efficient they were at their job. I remember one comment online doing that typical nationalistic chest pounding stating they just squashed all Austrians they faced, didn't let them penetrate into Italian land, and went all the way into their lands and.... you get the idea. Just the typical very young teenage and early 20's naive laymen that mistakes everything he saw in a game, and surmises he created about what it might have been like in ww1 to be true. Basically the same typical thing a lot of online trolls and whiners that get on Americans about. They were good but they were not... they were not rambo kids. Haha. They had enough defeats or failures to let people know it is nothing but hubris to have such a idea they have defeated every opposition and went that far into Austria at that scale. (The person wasn't doing normal nationalistic pride banter. I mean he was literally thinking they opponent was inferior and weak. The type behavior that can be recognized to lead to karma on himself if he didn't realized his hubris.) I am pretty sure even the veterans themselves would laugh at some of the crap I have seen some people have stated about them once the game came out. "Yeah. I don't remember it being that way. I frankly don't feel comfortable joining in the gloating people are doing about us. It's because I know the reality, and the reality leaves a biting sting in my heart of the experience if I tried, actually knowing what really went down."
I am not against people taking pride in stuff like this. It's just that I want education and the truth be taught to people along with stuff like this in the media, so that people don't form too much of a misinformed ego they start trashing others
Great video on one of my favorite topics! Thanks :)
I want to hear more about the Experimental units with mutant mustaches.
Great video, Really really enjoyed it
Sehr Gut :)
Minenwerfer.....it werfers Minen.
pls more world war one
bitte mehr über den ersten weltkrieg. österreich ungarn währ besonders interresant
there will be some specials on my second channel soon. Medals etc.
danke für die schnelle antwort. warst du eigentlich beim dolomitenmuseum ?
Nö, werd bald ins Keltenmuseum Frög fahren. Hauptproblem ist, dass solche besuche sehr zeit und geldintensiv sind.
Military History Visualized zweites kanal?
soweit ich weiß, hat die Ö-U Armee Stoßtruppentaktik sehr enthusiastisch übernommen, trotz Mangel an Spezialausrüstung, in sogar weiterem Rahmen als die Deutschen
I like the added visual elements. Weird that you do this now that Bismarck is doing more stuff too. I haven't ever seen the two of you in the same room.
you mean the blueprints? I first used them on the Me262 video back in 2016, but didn't use them again for ages. Bismarck and me work rather closely and actually in late 2017 there are two videos of both of in one room, but maybe you are being ironic.
I'm being ironic. Because both your content and voice is, to my ears, close enough I thought you were the same person for several weeks.
I just rewatched the Me 262 video to make a more or less informed comment.
That is not what I meant, I meant the bar at the top of the screen.
The sturmtruppen tactics were heavily based on the shock trooper tactics used by the Russians during the brusilov offensive by infiltrating and attacking enemy weak points in their trenches
must have been friendly fire hell clearing a trench in multiple locations simultaneously.
Run into my own artillery fire? Friendly fire better be turned off.
Great work! Thank you.
Interesting thumbnail. It's like, "Look! I got the beer! Come and get some!"
Well made - no quibble with details. There are some related points (that you didn't try to cover for understandable reasons) that could be worth making. 1) The German Army was the logical candidate to develop tactics based on increasingly lower elements. After 1815 Germany was the only country to keep the "nation in arms" so there wasn't the large cadre of "lifers" that developed in other armies. The earliest leaders of the General Staff were also aware that command positions at the top were going to be on paper in the hands of the high aristocracy - no guarantee of quality. So, you need a small (Moltke's staff in 1870 astounded American observers like Sheridan used to the US Civil War by its very small size) group of extremely able men possessing a kind of "corporate mind" due to common doctrine, common training and frequently a common social position. Down below, the leadership almost had to go to the brightest of the conscripts (Landwehr etc). This developed over time naturally. But it was Prussia that adopted a breech loading rifle because the General Staff believed German command & control at low level was good enough to keep infantry from "going to ground" and staying there.
Operation Michael - the first, largest and most dangerous of the "Kaiserschlacht" attacks does illustrate one of the weaknesses of an attempt to break the front by using tactical innovation as opposed to more firepower. As I recall General Hutier who commanded the attack's spearhead 18th Army agreed with Ludendorff that the point chosen for the attack on British lines was a very good one - but suggested that the British were weak because they were not protecting anything of obvious value. Ludendorff counters with Aimens - a crucial rail junction but nearly 60 miles from the start point. Hutier cautioned that he was uncertain about the ability of sustaining an advance of that depth: which proved true. I think the Germans ended up about 15 miles short. They'd also left their cozy positions on the Hindenberg Line and were very vulnerable to the UK counter thrust in August.
I also wonder how this all fits into the German emphasis on the counter attack which characterized their tactics for over a century. In the right place and time a well led counter attack could lead to a spectacular success. However, if the thrust was off center by a small amount for any reason, counter attack could lead to a very bloody reverse. So ultimately you have luck involved (see Clausewitz on "chance"). But the sophisticated German tactics also depended on very good men. And as every elite unit in every army finds out, if you go to the well too often, you will lose people. It may be worth the candle if you can withdraw "tired" units and refit, but if you can't the key to today's victory can be tactically identical to tomorrow's serious defeat. Look at the Ardennes for a good example there. There were many reasons for the failure to take Antwerp, but many German officers noted that, overall, their troops simply didn't have the fighting edge present even one year before, much less three.
Great video
So were the stormtroopers the first modern “special forces”? Kind of sounds like it
not really, they were an experimental unit and then a training unit. Then it became common tactics.
Military History Visualized I only ask because of the similarities, small unit tactics, shock, speed, use of special weapons etc, makes it sound like sort of a precursor, love your videos keep up the good work!
Often the best men were selected for those units. And unlike normal army units did they have very much firepower at the lowest levels in the organization and stormtroopers were equiped everything from body armour, to submachine guns (which was a raririty back in those days) and they could carry flamethrowers and all kinds of modified weapons.
And they had tactics which was basicly the opposite of the common wisdom of the day - which was bombarding an area for days or even weeks and then making large assault on the enemy positions. The stormtroopers did the opposite. They tried to use surprise attacks instead of alerting their enemy ahead of time that an attack were about to come. And stormtroopers were not shy to night fighting. But they could also fighting during the day. And before an attack they tried to make a short but very intensive and powerful bombardment which surprised and chocked the enemy, and shortly afterwards would the stormtroopers attack while the enemy was trying to recover from the confusion after the artillery bombardment.
Decisions were also made by the NCOs (lower officers) who were fighting togheter with their men at the frontline - unlike ther enemies which followed orders from their Generals.
And that was a huge problem when no radio existed, so it would on average take an order 8hours to get from the Generals headquarters to reach the frontline. And then it took 8 hours for the information from the frontline to reach the General.
So it is needless to say that orders often became completly outdated once they reached the troops. The enemy could for example have brought forward reinforcements, prepared defensive positions and weather could have become bad so an order of an attack that was earlier sensible could later on become foolish and impossible to follow.
But if you are having good commanders at the front who knows the situation, then they can decide and determine the situation instead. And that was what the Germans did. Normally they would follow orders from their Generals, but the NCOs were also free to use their common sense and make changes to their plans if they deemed them necessary. And that helped the Germans to react faster than their enemies and always be one step ahead.
So I think one could say that they were a bit better than the regular infantry. But I don't think they were Rambo like elite troops. And I think their kind of warfare was a little bit revolutionary.
I don't think that there is a coincidence that Germany would invent this tactic, since the Prussians had a tradidion of mission type tactics. And another reason why they discovered this new concept was that Germany realized that the odds were stacked against her. The Allies had more resources, so Germany was not likely to win a long war. Therefore it became more important for Germany to fast find new ways of quickly winning this war. So they tried posion gas, flamethrowers, uboats, zeppelin bombraids and new better tactics of course - and stromtrooper tactics became one those new superweapons.
Neverhteless I do still think it is amazing that the ideas never gained more popularity after all the gigantic stipidity Hötzendorf, Haig, Cadorna, Enver Pasha, Nivelle, Falkenhayn and others had commited. It was incompetence beyond just incompetene, their behaviour was criminal in how wasteful they were with their solidiers lives and kept on repeating the same stupid mistakes that had lead to failure, over and over again........until the 287th battle of the Isonzo river.
Nah, special forces are different entirely. The stormtroopers were an elite unit, which was at first experimental, then training orientated and finally just the line standard. Pulling the best soldiers (by experience or physical atributes) out and putting them in an elite unit is ancient, the Grenadier companies and Guards regiments of Napoleonic armies would be examples of this. Grenadiers were using shock tactics and special weapons in the 18th century. Using elite units to try experimental tactics and equipment is also historical common practice, elite units usually have experienced men and quality officers so can adapt quickly to new ideas. Same goes with passing on new ideas to the army as a whole through training with the elites.
Special forces is way different, they are using special tactics for special operations. Their skills are not necessarily useful to pass on to line units and you would not experiment with them en masse. Modern special forces really took off in ww2 but their origins are earlier, the British were using such units in Africa and India in the late 19th/early 20th century. The Western front was not really the place for the irregular warfare special forces are good at but it would not surprise me if there are good examples of modern special forces fighting in ww1 on the other fronts (especially Africa and the Middle East). Even on the western front you had sniper units and such.
There is some misconception about special forces, they are not necessarilly the best line troops, they might actually be ill equiped for it, instead they have special abilities your line troops don't have.
You have different uses of terms so that what one group of people said at one time might be completely different than what other people said at another - and the same words - could have very different meanings. For example - the British Army and the US Marines both use the term "Mad Minute". What they are referring to when they use this term - is COMPLETELY different - with no similarity what so ever.
In the US Army - you have Special Forces and Rangers. The Special Forces are more oriented towards Force Multiplication - by training indigenous peoples to be our allies - where as the Rangers are more like Commandos, engaged in assaults. Special Forces are employed as small units whereas Rangers are often deployed as much larger units.
The US Marines have Force Recon and Marine Raider units where the emphasis of the Recon units - is on intelligence gathering while the Raiders are more like assault troops or Commandos. The Force Recon units are deployed as small units whereas the Raiders are larger.
The Navy Seals are very small units that take on special missions involving attacks and intelligence gathering.
The Air Force Para Rescue guys are - what it sounds like - they have some combat training but are more oriented towards rescue operations to recover downed pilots and are very small in number when used.
Other nations have their own elite units of different types and purposes, so that while there might be some similarities between some units - each was created by their own nation with their own purposes - and doctrine for carrying out those purposes in mind. So, while there could be some similarities there could also be major differences.
My Knowledge of my own nations units is limited and my understanding of other nations units even more so.
Anyone seeking to really understand what these units are and how they operate should look up information on those specific units from those specific nations. Comparing one to the other is not necessarily productive and none are necessarily "better" than the others.
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"war is a team effort" = "it takes two to tango"
Yes my 2 fave youtubers love the video already thanks
the noise i made when Indy made his cameo good lord
You should have gotten some icons displayed on The Great War episode. It would have been really cool if they just floated above Indy's desk.
Ich empfehle auch Ernst Jünger 'In Stahlgewittern'. Er beschreibt recht gut, wie es sich anfühlt, Teil eines Stoßtrupps zu sein.
Tielner - Ich empfehle oralverkehr.
2 of my favorite tubers